Deterrence

[NRao]

An interesting read.

The Sneaky Way the Falcon Controls their Prey's Mind

[NRao]

Pakistan army feels n-brinkmanship can bring India to its knees: Benazir Bhutto

Four years before her assassination in December 2007, Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto accused her country’s military leadership of nuclear brinksmanship, but ruled out a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.
In an interview recovered from a lost archive — it was recorded in 2003 at her Dubai home when she was out of power and in exile — Benazir, commenting on the tactics deployed by the Pakistani security establishment, said: “They think that with nuclear brinkmanship, they can bring India to its knees because they feel no matter how intense the insurgency gets in Kashmir, what can India do?”

“If lndia tries to have a war, the world community will have to come in because they’re both nuclear. And if the world community doesn’t come in, India knows that if they cross towards Lahore, Pakistan will throw a bomb. India might retaliate, but it will still mean that so many people in India will die.”

Pakistan observes Benazir's second anniversary
“Since 1977, our security establishment was hijacked by pro-Zia (ul-Haq) officers. They have a vision in direct contrast with the political leadership’s vision. They think that Pakistan should have a puppet government in Afghanistan, so that we can get strategic depth all the way to the river Amur.”

Asked if she had ever considered launching a nuclear attack on India when she was Prime Minister — she had two stints:1988-90 and 993-96 — Benazir said, “For God’s sake, never have l ever for a moment woken up with such a thought because l know that nuking any Indian, if l was even mad enough to think that, would end up nuking my own people.”

“This is what l don’t understand about the deterrence because neither India can use the nukes, nor can Pakistan. Because whichever country is throwing that nuke knows there is not enough time/space and is going to get it back.”

This interview forms part of a chapter on Benazir Bhutto in this correspondent’s book ‘Bullets and Bylines, Dispatches from Kabul, Delhi, Damascus and Beyond’, published by Speaking Tiger.

Asked if she could characterise the feelings that most ordinary Pakistanis have for India and Indians, she said, “It changes from times of tension to times of less tension. When there is tension and the troops are at the border, then people hate anybody who’s Indian, irrespective of whether they are Hindu or Muslim or whatever. They say they want to attack us, kill us and destroy our country.”

“But when there is no tension, people really welcome Indians. Indian films are very popular in Pakistan, Indian goods are smuggled across in Pakistan all the time, people are desperate to get Indian visas, travel to India, go visit their families, or go and see the Taj Mahal or the Mughal heritage.”

“Overseas in America… the Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis see themselves as South Asians, there is no hatred at all… they feel their interests are the same, they work together, they socialise together, there is no hatred at all.”

“I feel the only way forward… is to try and see what the European Union did and to have a kind of common market. What makes economies move? In my view, economies move through the service centre, through creativity. So if we open up, people will come to visit Pakistan, our hotels will be full, more hotels will be built, more labour will get jobs, same in your country…”

“All the visitors who come will want to have kebab and tikka and nihari… people will want to buy, they will want to spend… go to museums, to sight-see. It’s the flow of money that strengthens economies and that’s what we all need, whether it’s Nepal or Bangladesh or Sri Lanka or India or Pakistan, we all need that.”

[Haresh]

An interesting read.The Sneaky Way the Falcon Controls their Prey's Mind

Not related to the subject of deterrence, but a link from the the BBC story re. Dwaraka and Poompuhar

http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20160118 ... eally-true

[arun]

X Posted as could have deterrence value .............

Concise information our country’s present and proposed strategic crude oil and refined petroleum product storage capacity. Underground Storage cavern of Vizag unit of Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve Limited aka ISPRL with 1.33 MMT of crude oil has been commissioned and stands filled up. Excerpt:

“The Government, through Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve Limited (ISPRL) is setting up strategic crude oil reserves with storage capacity of 5.33 Million Metric Tonnes (MMT) at three locations viz. Visakhapatnam(1.33 MMT), Mangalore(1.5 MMT) and Padur (2.5 MMT). Also, Detailed Project Reports have been prepared for establishing additional crude oil reserves of 12.5 MMT at Chandikhol (3.75 MMT), Padur(2.5 MMT), Rajkot (2.5 MMT) and Bikaner (3.75 MMT).

At present, there is existing tankage of 14.8 MMT of crude oil and 13.7 MMT of petroleum products in the country which provides coverage of approximately 63 days as per consumption. Strategic crude oil reserves of 5.33 MMT being set up in phase-I and strategic crude oil reserve of 12.5 MMT in phase-II will give coverage of approximately 12 days and 28 days respectively as per present consumption.

Vishakhapatnam cavern has been commissioned and filled with crude oil. Mangalore and Padur caverns would be completed by March and May 2016 respectively.”

From here:

Strategic crude oil reserves in the country

[Gagan]

Located all three on Google earth. In the process of identifying other sites.
I think India is moving from these steel tank farms to these cemented underground tunnels for Oil storage.
The walls are Cement lined, and will store only curde oil.



Vizag facility

Water curtain works
Excavation work included advance of two 6m x 6.5m x 1.3km long water curtain galleries. Once completed boreholes of 102mm diameter and 75m long were drilled horizontally at 10m intervals from both sides of the galleries to cover the caverns. These were sealed and connected to a continuous recirculating pumping system injecting water to a pressure of 6 bar to seal any fissures in the rock around the caverns. As an essential part of the project, the water will prevent seepage of crude fumes through the fissures to eliminate the possible risk of explosions. Similarly, the strictly enforced smooth finish specification of the gallery walls, with just 400mm tolerance either side of the tunnels, is set to reduce the risk of voids in the caverns and the possible build-up of fumes and once again preventing the risk of explosions.
The floors of the caverns are 80m below mean sea level and beneath a hill that rises above the site to an elevation of about 130m.

[SSridhar]

Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN

The Natio­nal Command Authority (NCA) has renewed the proposal for a regional Strategic Restraint Regime as it expressed alarm over India’s growing conventional and nuclear arsenals.

The NCA — the principal decision-making body on nuclear issues — at its meeting presided over by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Wednesday, “took note of the growing conventional and strategic weapons’ development in the region”, according to a press statement issued by the ISPR.

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

The need for a sustained dialogue with India for resolution of outstanding disputes was also underscored.

The proposal for Strategic Restraint Regime has been on the table since Oct 1998, but India, which is opposed to a regional mechanism, has always avoided discussions on it.

Experts believe that regional stability, in the absence of such an overarching strategic architecture, has been tenuous.

The NCA was of the view that development of conventional and nuclear weapons by India had “adverse ramifications for peace and security” in the region.

The usual tricks.

[member_29350]

you know, if you want to do some drag racing there......

[Supratik]

http://idrw.org/rise-of-indias-nuclear-submarine-fleet/

A gist of planned nuclear submarine acquisitions. 8-10 SSBNs, 6 SSNs. Assuming MIRVs (3 warheads) on K4MII or K5 you can estimate number of warheads on sea.

[member_29190]

Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

The usual tricks.

Arms race is what we should force Pak in to. They should get down to eat grass..

[narmad]

Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

Arms race is what we should force Pak in to. They should get down to eat grass..

If you are trying to make an Analogy with the US-USSR scenario, it won't work here .
Pak gets the arms almost for free from US as well as china.
Also it gets doles from the ME.

We on the other hand .....[ are starting to partly pay US arms to pak ]

[shiv]

Cross posts

I have no idea why you say none of our subs will sail with nuclear warheads?

Shaurya this is my belief. People are free to think otherwise

I get the impression from a lot of discussions that people are coloured by the "ready to fight nuclear war any minute" posture that the US has maintained for decades and there is a tendency for people to think that this is the only way to be prepared for nuclear war. Anything less is a sham.

Well then we have a sham - if that's the word. I seriously doubt if Indian land based deterrents are going to sit around in unmated condition while the sea based ones are mated and ready to fire.

If this is called a weak and risky posture, then there you have it, I believe we have a weak and risky posture. India has no policy of maintaining ready to use warheads anywhere - not even on subs. Just my view.

[shiv]

One of the biggest concerns that the armed forces have is that we have no doctrine or mechanism in place to keep fully functional warheads + delivery systems with the armed forces and then a foolproof mechanism to give launch orders from competent authority (PM ?). And no back ups if PM and political leadership is incapacitated. All of these needs to be thought through and mechanisms set, training done if we are to have a robust second strike capability.

From reading statements here and there it seems to me that there is no serious belief among political decision making circles in India that we may be in a situation where we get nuked and we have to suddenly sit up and use nuclear weapons.

This is in stark contrast with the signals we get of testing of nuclear capable missiles (even if that testing in not all that frequent). That apart the information that is leaked out all too infrequently from Atomic energy dept officials is that India has consistently worked on nuclear weapons for a long time. Of course there has been very little public info that I have seen in the last 2 years.

Having said that - senior army officers and diplomats have occasionally made public statements warning that the Indian nuclear deterrent is to be taken seriously. A fairly significant number of retired armed forces officers have been critical of India's opaque doctrine and to me this silence from India while there are almost monthly reports of Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal seems like a surreal drama. India's posture is not reassuring to either Pakis as being harmless and it is not reassuring to Indians because some fear it is toothless. Sorry - this discussion is better off in the deterrence thread - I will cross post there.

[member_28990]

isnt the whole point of a submarine based nuclear capability is that a certain fraction of the nukes will be safe at sea, mated with delivery systems and ready to launch immediately once a certain signal is received? The checks and balances are designed around this paradigm - how/when the signal arrives, and what is the procedure to launch. IIRC, in soviet subs it required the approval of three people in the sub - captain, first mate and political commissar [happy to be corrected here].
I do not think the Arihant will be carrying live nukes initially - we will probably be firming up/training these SOPs until the Aridhman joins the fleet, and then we will absolutely have nuke mated missiles on whichever boat is on patrol.

[ShauryaT]

Well then we have a sham - if that's the word. I seriously doubt if Indian land based deterrents are going to sit around in unmated condition while the sea based ones are mated and ready to fire.

If this is called a weak and risky posture, then there you have it, I believe we have a weak and risky posture. India has no policy of maintaining ready to use warheads anywhere - not even on subs. Just my view.

Shiv ji: While I do not think India is at a "launch on warning" type of readiness, it is no longer the de-mated weapons at separate locations scenario. We have come some ways from the days of a liquid fuel propelled missile for delivery of strategic weapons to cannisterized and dispersed assets with corresponding investments into command and control. So, I think we are battle ready and with some additional investments in command and control ready to deploy a fully ready system in our SSBN's.
The unmated scenario only is largely a myth now with many systems a command away from being armed.

Attaching a reference: New chief of India's military research complex reveals brave new mandateThere are other references also I have read in the past to similar capabilities.

"In the second strike capability, the most important thing is how fast we can react. We are working on cannisterised systems that can launch from anywhere at anytime," said Dr Chander. "We are making much more agile, fast-reacting, stable missiles so response can be within minutes."

Now the sham part, I am not in disagreement but for other reasons, primarily to do with validation of the payload.

[Aditya G]

We take nuclear triad to be composed of only machines capable of delivering warheads from air, sea and land. This is too simplistic.

Triad also comprises of:

1. Protocols to deliver these nuclear weapon
2. Command structures to relay the instructions
3. Training on the above
4. Doctrine to package all of this

I am concerned that we lack on #1 to #3. While it is the Prime Minister who will press the proverbial button, a man in uniform is the one who is actually going to do it. We have created a SFC, but the commander seemingly does not report to COSC or Chairman COSC. There is an impression that PM will take the decision, but he has no 4-star military advisor to guide him in the decision, instead he will rely on a committee of decision makers, who are mostly or solely civilian. When we are hit by a first strike, say by a tactical nuke on armoured corps in Pak territory, the squealers in this committee will give advise on the lines "oh it was not on our soil" ,"withdraw the army", "they have called our bluff" itiyadi.

Pakis on the other hand have created a nuke command in each of the services, including the Navy which at the moment has no delivery mechanism. It has created a specialist unit the size of a division to guard and man these units.

My wishlist to start with:

1. SFC commander to report to a millitary general, ideally CDS but will accept Permanent Chairman COSC

2. At least 3 IAF squadrons (1 each of Mirage, Jaguar and Su-30) to be designated as nuclear strike units. At present my understanding is that CO of say battleaxes and tigers is not in the chain of command. His pilots will get instructions from elsewhere and they will pull out.

3. Each of these squadrons to be allocated dummy warheads for practice and carriage for testing etc.

4. They should have custody of the warhead less physics package. Even Turkish air force has NATO nukes entrusted to them - why cant we trust our own guys.

5. INS Arihant to be permanently under SFC and not under ENC.

One of the biggest concerns that the armed forces have is that we have no doctrine or mechanism in place to keep fully functional warheads + delivery systems with the armed forces and then a foolproof mechanism to give launch orders from competent authority (PM ?). And no back ups if PM and political leadership is incapacitated. All of these needs to be thought through and mechanisms set, training done if we are to have a robust second strike capability.

From reading statements here and there it seems to me that there is no serious belief among political decision making circles in India that we may be in a situation where we get nuked and we have to suddenly sit up and use nuclear weapons.

This is in stark contrast with the signals we get of testing of nuclear capable missiles (even if that testing in not all that frequent). That apart the information that is leaked out all too infrequently from Atomic energy dept officials is that India has consistently worked on nuclear weapons for a long time. Of course there has been very little public info that I have seen in the last 2 years.

Having said that - senior army officers and diplomats have occasionally made public statements warning that the Indian nuclear deterrent is to be taken seriously. A fairly significant number of retired armed forces officers have been critical of India's opaque doctrine and to me this silence from India while there are almost monthly reports of Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal seems like a surreal drama. India's posture is not reassuring to either Pakis as being harmless and it is not reassuring to Indians because some fear it is toothless. Sorry - this discussion is better off in the deterrence thread - I will cross post there.

[ramana]

nooks are political weapons and will be under political control.

All you want is already in place and more.

All the committee/vomitee is bokwas.
The PM takes the decision.
And has the President in the loop as the C-i-C.


Most of the retired officers never dealt with it.
Only ones who can talk are earlier former IAF chiefs and now IA and IN (?) chiefs..
Same with diplomats. They have no say.
Its not foreign policy.
Its national security.

[ShauryaT]

Aditya: SFC already has a dotted line to COSC. The rest of your post seems more on the lines of the integrated commands posture that we all want, linked with a real CDS. Looks like even the Arun Singh report is in the dustbin now? Parikkar was saying, he will have a decision on CDS soon --- the 4 star version??? What is he waiting for, these things are not going to win or loose any votes, so what is the government waiting for?

[shiv]

Posting this useful link here for future ref
Kilotons per kilogram
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/12/ ... -kilogram/

[shiv]

Cross post from the Arihant thread

You need to have at least one (or two) SSBN constantly deployed on deterrent patrol with its nuclear arsenal. That's one more sure-way to guarantee a viable second-strike option. Others stored in various land bases will not be as survivable when the enemy launches a preemptive first strike targeting all-known storage sites.

There was a news item recently in which the Russians stated that they were upgrading their trains to carry some new missile - some MIRVed thing I think. For a person like me, who has been bombarded with the American way of using nuclear deterrence, this made me wonder, "Do the Russians not know that their land based deterrence will be taken out leaving only the sea based deterrent?"

That made me ask myself the question, "What makes anyone certain that all land based nukes will be destroyed in a pre -empitve strike?" In fact - during the cold war - it was the US that proliferated weapons initially but then decided that they could never guarantee that all Soviet nukes would be destroyed in a pre emptive. Of course the Soviets had tens of thousands of warheads.

But I do ask, if even 100 nukes are in secure bunkers connected by under ground tunnels or in trains going around along with twice that number of decoys. There are now 300 targets to hit and these exclude conventional targets like air bases, camps and C&C centers which will number several hundred. How many nukes are Pakistan or China going to throw at us in a counter force? And how many will they have left for a second strike in case a few of ours get away? Or are we expecting attacks from the US or Russia with 3000 warheads?

Of course I am not questioning the need for a sea based deterrent. That is the icing on the cake. It is the icing because any pre emptive first strike is, in my view, bound to fail to destroy all land based nukes leaving a large percentage untouched in addition to sea-based nukes, exhaust most of the nukes an adversary has leaving plenty free to nuke their population and economic centers with low risk of getting hit by them after that.

Obviously one could "play this game" in a 100 different ways, but let me say this: If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. Remember that the US is on record pointing out that they will not be able to take out Paki nukes, despite our fond hopes - never mind Trump's bluster. The reason why India does not have a pre-emptive "counter force" strategy is because no nuclear armed nation is stupid enough to keep their nukes vulnerable and visible to prying satellites or have systems that will be paralysed by an airburst nuke that will fry electronics. There is no reason to assume that Indians are more stupid than planners in other countries.

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

[ramana]

Shiv, Precisely. Log ago right after POKII tests and before MND was announced, I had written in BRM about the number of targets that a challenger has to take out in India to prevent retaliation and that was beyond the capability of non-P2 powers.

It takes 2 per a delivery target. I did not count at sea deployed targets.

If BRM ever gets uploaded the article is What Next? Way to a credible deterrent. Nov/Dec 1999

[Aditya G]

.... If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. ...

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

I don't need a pre-emptive strike with nukes to take out the nukes - that was a scenario applicable to cold war where the US stored ICBMs in land based silos. The enemy can destroy Delhi, Bombay and each of Navy and Air Force stations (say 50 targets in total) so that there is nobody left alive to order a retaliation.

[NRao]

nobody left alive to order a retaliation

#1 safeguard for a deterrence. If you feel that a way, then you have perhaps lost deterrence.

__________________


One of the major features of deterrence is you yourself do very little and let the opponent do a LOT. That includes things like discussions, authoring papers, etc. Pakis seem to have achieved this by making "tactical nukes". Which may not even work.

IF India wants to gain control over this narrative, then perhaps India should talk about making tactical nukes and keep quite.

[rgosain]

.... If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. ...

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

I don't need a pre-emptive strike with nukes to take out the nukes - that was a scenario applicable to cold war where the US stored ICBMs in land based silos. The enemy can destroy Delhi, Bombay and each of Navy and Air Force stations (say 50 targets in total) so that there is nobody left alive to order a retaliation.

Correct this is a more likely and plausible scenario.
Much of the theoretical basis and coaching for Pakistan's nuclear stance is provided by western p-5 nations either directly or via their think-thanks to provide the cover of plausible deniability. So although the hardware eg designs, testing-data, war-heads, missiles, enrichment and fabrication are directly from China, the software that enables the functioning has to come from the West. Who provides the codes for the F-16's to marry the cinc-4 design and variants. Or are the F-16s which are provided to the PAF, plug and play, nevertheless this is where the nexus between the prc and the usa raises its head.
Taken together, Pakistan can be assured that a bolt from the blue preemptive strike against consisting of between 30-65 weapons delivered from air, land and slcm can decapitate India permanently by striking at the c3i nodes and most of the politico-military leadership. These are known to most of Pakistan's sponsors

[member_22733]

IMVVVHO.

Not directly related to deterrence, but India has one more problem. Decapitation first strike would only be the first of our problems. As soon as that strike is over, the physical wing of the break India forces would move into divide India up into chunks, in the name of protecting India from Indians.

For ex: They would wait until India and Bakistan finish each other and then when they know we are weak and unable to do any more damage, move in.

Our deterrence can never be Bakistan centric. A credible second strike deterrence has to pose a credible, legit threat to the vultures who would be circling around us after the first exchange is over.

[rgosain]

IMVVVHO.

Not directly related to deterrence, but India has one more problem. Decapitation first strike would only be the first of our problems. As soon as that strike is over, the physical wing of the break India forces would move into divide India up into chunks, in the name of protecting India from Indians.

For ex: They would wait until India and Bakistan finish each other and then when they know we are weak and unable to do any more damage, move in.

Our deterrence can never be Bakistan centric. A credible second strike deterrence has to pose a credible, legit threat to the vultures who would be circling around us after the first exchange is over.

You said it sir. I can't add to your statement..

[Aditya G]

nobody left alive to order a retaliation

...

One of the major features of deterrence is you yourself do very little and let the opponent do a LOT. That includes things like discussions, authoring papers, etc. Pakis seem to have achieved this by making "tactical nukes". Which may not even work.

IF India wants to gain control over this narrative, then perhaps India should talk about making tactical nukes and keep quite.

Yes. Deterrence is a perception game: played out as much in academic circles by military men & bureaucrats as well as in public.

Pakistan plays this game well.

" jehadis will control over the nukes so you need to arm me"

"I will nuke your tanks with tac nukes" etc - shiv showed in a video how useless such a strike will be. But deterrence is achieved in the public mind. I can't say whether it worked on our establishment since they don't talk about it for fear of being labeled irresponsible I think.

[krishna_krishna]

^+1 LokeshC,

I am pained by some member posting here and in, ATV forum their views with all due respect they are entitled to them as everyone is. However to say we have a sham with Arihant and nuclear submarine is idiotic to put it mildly. Few points:

Indian planners wants to neutralize any threat of a nuclear attack by amassing the “credible minimum” firepower and capability required to deliver a punitive retaliatory measure, which can ensure gross destruction of the opposing forces, conforming to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

In the past we did not have the capability does not mean that desire did not exist to have always some maal outside in oceans away from inventory so that adversary will be assured that "maal" exists even though some how (magically although impossible) it would be able to take down submarine pens, bases and populations center it would be assured that in form of MIRV's from arihant and its sisters, in addition to left over from its on land cousins it would be so severe that continuation in any form would be unimaginable (last line is from ex. general)

The whole premise if you read statements of ex. navy chief they said over and over again that a nu. submarine is the most assured form of nuclear deterrence when that submarine is on patrol those warheads are removed from your inventory to be targeted.

Now think of what some members suggest like we wait till balloon gets up and they you load your submarines and send them to patrol no it does not work that way anywhere in the world. If you see the videos of Russian submarines going for patrol they load the boat and when the are in base the tubes are emptied and filled into ones going on patrol at any point in time some of them are always rotated. They would need periodic testing and maintanence and there would be cost associated but nothing that cannot be paid and will be paid. And I disagree as some member suggest that S Union went bankrupt due to warhead testing and maintenance cost.

In Aesopian terms, as long as Pakistan remains the hare and India the turtle, Pakistani security managers believe they can continue to compete successfully against India. But if India were to choose to MIRV some of its missiles so as not to fall further behind China as well as Pakistan, or to compete against both by redirecting fissile material toward stockpile growth, or if India deploys limited ballistic missile defenses, then Pakistan would be faced with having to compete even harder to sustain (or not lose) the advantages it has accrued through what appears to be an asymmetric escalation strategy.

This is where our BMD and cold start comes into play even if adversary throws everything we will have enough strength to brush up and keep going same cannot be said for pakis (They will be plastic).

[shiv]

Cross posted from the Arihant thread

What you say doesn't sound logically correct. The very idea of having a nuclear submarine force is to have a strike capability even if we have to bear a surprise first strike..in such a scenario, if you say "the reality is that submarines sail with their tubes empty", then that submarine force doesn't become part of the nuclear triad. So, it is not wet dreams or masturbation if someone says they expect the submarines sail with ready to fire missiles. If that is not trues, then having such a submarine force is a waste. Cost, technogy or any other bla bla cannot and should not be the reason. Simply put, if it is not the case, then we simply do not have the so called nuclear triad complete.

If there are going to zero mated warheads why have the submarines on patrol at all? Have them sitting in the docks and then load them up when tensions rise? By definition then all nuclear submarine patrols will be training patrols. A deterrent patrol by definition needs ready to fire missiles.

If Arihant's base gets n-attacked where will we have the time to arm? Like it or not, deterrence patrols will likely be carried out with missiles onboard.
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/ssbnpatrols/

All perfectly correct.

But let me state the problem. Other than our own personal conclusions that it is desirable and logical and necessary to have ready and mated warheads, which Indian official policy statement has ever deviated from the openly proclaimed norm that India's fissile material will be kept in a de-mated condition under the control of the Atomic Energy dept away from the rest of the warhead?

Overnight, I got an interesting link on Twitter from a BRF lurker. Actually the link is terrific and worth watching - a very lucid 2014 talk by Adm (retd) Vijay Shankar
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZpIrZvP0Co
Starting around 41:30 as the message to me mentioned, the Admiral says that the mating process in canisterized submarine missiles is not one of "using a wheelbarrow to cart the warhead to the missile and using wrenches to do the mating" but the mating is electronic.

While the Admiral's words are very reassuring, I believe that he is referring to security locking of a warhead that is already mated with the delivery system. He speaks generalities and may or may not be referring to India's specific policy.

What I have been going on about is India's stated policy of keeping fissile material away from rest of warhead so that the warhead itself cannot be placed on a delivery vehicle until the fissile material, under control of dept of Atomic Energy is put inside the warhead. In short - Pu cores and Tritium are kept separate from warheads in storage and if nuclear war is likely to occur those cores will be put into warheads and those warheads delivered to teh appropriate end user. Naturally everyone will ask "How can this be a safe policy of deterrence". Well you folks need to answer that one. I am doing the asking because I have not seen any statements of change of policy

I would be happy to see any statements that this policy has changed. I repeat that I am unhappy and unsatisfied by statements that "It is logical" to have them mated or that 'it is a no brainer that they must be mated" etc. these are simply assumptions. No one. I repeat NO ONE seems to have pointed out this huge anomaly between earlier policy statements and the reality of deterrence. I am only seeing assumptions that make us imagine that al iz vel. To quote Shreeman on this

"You're only saying that to reassure us"

I am asking: "What if all your assumptions about what is logical, or desirable, or obvious, are wrong and India's policy of safety in deterrence enters around keeping fissile material out of warhead and warhead out of missile holds true until someone feels that the threat is high enough to actually have working ready to use nukes?"

[shiv]

.... If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. ...

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

I don't need a pre-emptive strike with nukes to take out the nukes - that was a scenario applicable to cold war where the US stored ICBMs in land based silos. The enemy can destroy Delhi, Bombay and each of Navy and Air Force stations (say 50 targets in total) so that there is nobody left alive to order a retaliation.

Let us suppose this is correct. What have you seen regarding India's deterrence policy that reassures you that things will not pan out this way?

[shiv]

Now think of what some members suggest like we wait till balloon gets up and they you load your submarines and send them to patrol no it does not work that way anywhere in the world. If you see the videos of Russian submarines going for patrol they load the boat and when the are in base the tubes are emptied and filled into ones going on patrol at any point in time some of them are always rotated. They would need periodic testing and maintanence and there would be cost associated but nothing that cannot be paid and will be paid. And I disagree as some member suggest that S Union went bankrupt due to warhead testing and maintenance cost.

It feels very nice to read a post to the contrary and to believe it to be true.

But please show me any official statement that contradicts earlier "assurances" from India that India maintains a posture of "recessed deterrence" where the warheads are kept separated from the delivery vehicle.

The point is as follows: India cannot have any credible deterrence as long as we take the attitude that warheads can be kept separate from delivery vehicles, to be mated in a time of crisis. However India's policy is to do exactly that i.e keep warhead separate, to reduce the "risk" of nuclear war.

How much do you trust politicians? Remember italian and mouse were in charge of this for 10 years. How come all you guys are so confident that the government actually had its finger on a usable nuclear button? You could be fooling yourself with such self reassuring talk no? Who has asked these questions?

[shiv]

One last point.

In the video talk linked above by Adm (retd) Vijay Shankar, after he points out that warheads will be mated "electronically", he also says that these facts need to be stated openly so everyone knows.

Where and when has any Indian statement pointed out that we have mated warheads ready to use? If such a statement has not been made, how can I assume that the policy exists rather than the old and well publicized policy of "recessed deterrence" with physically demated warheads?

[Aditya_V]

Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN
quote]

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

/quote]

The usual tricks.

Arms race is what we should force Pak in to. They should get down to eat grass..

Pakistan has always been taking the lead in Arms trade- they Arm themselves to the maximum extent with whatever technology others are willing to sell them, they have been heavily supported by US, EU, Gulf and China, the country will collapse if these pillars stop their support, it is no longer an economically viable country.

If is we who have to develop military capability and economic sustainability at the same time. the better and more equipped we are the lesser our adversaries can make Pak challenge us.

[SSridhar]

. . . the Admiral says that the mating process in canisterized submarine missiles is not one of "using a wheelbarrow to cart the warhead to the missile and using wrenches to do the mating" but the mating is electronic.

PAL

[krishna_krishna]

Shiv, Let me ask you a simple question: With Agni V onwards the plan is to have canasterized even land based maal what do you think happens for a canasterized mijjile ?, they can never be demated for practical operational use.

Like everyone else you also have your claims, assumptions and views My problem is that you state those assumptions as that of indian SFC or official indian establishment. Without stating any credible links where as I can give multiple authentic open source data points to point contrary.

Our doctrine is of "Credible Mininum Deterrence" (that is open to different assumptions and imaginations) no where else doctrine mentions a word recessed. Just because they did for the land based options for liquid mijjiles (in the past) does not mean the same will be assumed for the sea based one. Ones the submarine is in pen/base/refit, they again be removed and put under extra security but nowhere on sea.

And if you read Admiral Arun Prakash that's what he said, no civilian would be permitted on the nuclear submarine we are moving away from that unless we say that admiral is false or not stating correct:

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uplo ... errent.pdf

[shiv]

Shiv, Let me ask you a simple question: With Agni V onwards the plan is to have canasterized even land based maal what do you think happens for a canasterized mijjile ?, they can never be demated for practical operational use.

Like everyone else you also have your claims, assumptions and views My problem is that you state those assumptions as that of indian SFC or official indian establishment. Without stating any credible links where as I can give multiple authentic open source data points to point contrary.

Our doctrine is of "Credible Mininum Deterrence" (that is open to different assumptions and imaginations) no where else doctrine mentions a word recessed. Just because they did for the land based options for liquid mijjiles (in the past) does not mean the same will be assumed for the sea based one. Ones the submarine is in pen/base/refit, they again be removed and put under extra security but nowhere on sea.

And if you read Admiral Arun Prakash that's what he said, no civilian would be permitted on the nuclear submarine we are moving away from that unless we say that admiral is false or not stating correct:

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uplo ... errent.pdf

Well this is the best information I could get - it is better than I thought but not much information to suggest that we are ready for a massive first strike. Sounds like some may be mated, some "nearly mated" and some demated. I have deliberately highlighted the parts that raise doubt in my mind..
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/news/pdf/NarangFiveMyths.pdf

In his magisterial 2001 book on India’s emerging nuclear posture, Ashley Tellis wrote that the three key features of India’s nuclear posture were that it was limited in size, separated in disposition, and centralized in control. He noted: ‘‘The weapons and delivery systems are developed and produced, with key subcomponents maintained under civilian custody, but these assets are not deployed in any way that enables the prompt conduct of nuclear operations. Such assets are, in fact, sequestered and covertly maintained in distributed form, with different custodians exercising strict stewardship over the components entrusted to them for
safekeeping.’’18

This belief that India maintains all of its nuclear forces in a disassembled, and certainly demated, state across various civilian agencies persists today.19 But it is largely now a myth. Over the past decade, all observable indicators are that India, while adhering to its posture of assured retaliation, has increased the baseline readiness of at least a subset of its nuclear forces, if not all of them particularly as it marches toward a force consisting largely of so called ‘‘encapsulated’’ or ‘‘canisterized’’ systems in which the warhead is likely pre-mated to the delivery vehicle and kept hermetically sealed for storage and transport (though procedures may exist that allow for the warhead to be mated in the field).20 This encapsulation is made possible by the fact that India’s ballistic missiles are essentially all now solid fuel.

Encapsulation enhances missile longevity by protecting the solid fuel from the elements, but it also complicates our picture of an India managing its nuclear forces in a disassembled or demated state. Though it is possible that reserve components are stewarded by their respective civilian agencies nuclear pits with the Department of Atomic Energy, the explosives package with DRDO, the delivery vehicle with the SFC it seems increasingly likely that India already has some subset of the force within minutes of readiness. This is likely to include co location of subcomponents, and in some cases, potentially fully mated systems that are either a proverbial ‘‘last screw’’ or ‘‘last code’’ from being armed and ready to be released. Indeed, in July 2013 the new DRDO head, Dr. Avinash Chander, revealed that DRDO is increasingly ‘‘working on canisterized systemsthat can launch from anywhere at any time[and] making much more agile,fast reacting, stable missiles so [that a] response can be within minutes’’ forultimately all of India’s nuclear missile systems.2

[Supratik]

X-post

That is exactly what I have been thinking that they are electronically demated with an extremely regulated mating process to avoid accidents. The idea of a SDRE in his dhoti or mundu running to the AEC with his fissile core and other stuff under his cycle after a first strike and trying to assemble a warhead that will be transported by IR at 70 kmph to the naval base is not very encouraging.

[shiv]

More info:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/25 ... d-in-sight

All Indian nuclear weapons currently are maintained routinely in de-mated condition, though whether this posture will persist after the four ballistic missile submarines are eventually inducted into its arsenal is unclear.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=7Et ... ia&f=false

India's nuclear forces are in a de alerted state in peacetime and the nuclear warheads are kept de mated. The fissionable Plutonium cores are in the custody of the AEC

http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/sym ... 9/e_06.pdf

Indeed, Indian nuclear forces are still reportedly kept de-alerted and de-mated, which would obviate LOW or LUA strategies. Such a posture assumes that there will be considerable time between an attack and an order to retaliate because it will be many hours before the various components of India’s nuclear forces can be brought together and mated for delivery. This might change once India’s nuclear submarines assume a strategic deterrent role because India will then have to keep its submarine-based nuclear weapons mated, but it is unlikely that the nuclear submarine component of India’s strategic forces would be ready for many more years.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/india-an ... arms-race/

“India, like Pakistan, is known to keep its nuclear warheads de-mated from the delivery mechanisms. For the INS Arihant to fulfill its operational responsibility, SLBMs mounted with nuclear warheads will have to be deployed on the vessel.”

http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/rkEybO3 ... trine.html

Finally, India’s imminent deployment of the submarine leg of its nuclear triad makes the current de-mated and de-alerted posture nearly obsolete. As the weapons and delivery systems will be on the same platform (even if they are de-mated) and on a higher degree of alert than on land, the 2003 posture will have to be revisited. Also, delegation of use authority will also have to be considered.

[krishna_krishna]

Shiv,

I would go by our ex naval chief vs third grade paid analysts from dc fish tank,Like I said that may have been thing of past due to lack of capability.

You didn't answer my question on canasterized A V. It does not matter what you or I believe what matters is our official stated positions that our ssb n would be on patrols with full load. Now we
Are free to use our imaginations like I would assume the Maal would be fabricated when Baloon goes up till that point it's all raw material only because my friends whores another client in foreign fish tank says so , we all are free to assume what we want

[JTull]

shiv, they're ready and available to strike. SFC is fully operational. There's no reason to doubt it.

[shiv]

Cross post

^^ None of your so called sources are credible. The capability didn't exist in past that we have now with cannestarized Mijjile in land bases avatar and sea bases ones. We now have the capability period

Fair enough. The references are there for people to read and people will read and believe them. I didn't write them though I have read references to them from time to time. If you think they are "not credible" that is your prerogative. Belief is a choice.

The other question that "cannestarized Mijjile" raises is "What is the use of Air Force deterrent?".How many Air Force delivered nuclear bombs exist? Will they be subject to the old "de mated treatment"? And what happens to Agni I, 2 and 3? No references that I know of. But that should not be a problem for anybody when we all have the choice of rubbishing any references that anyone quotes. Rubbishing references is a self goal - makes it easier to say things without quoting any source.