Deterrence

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 12 May 2018 07:26


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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 12 May 2018 18:23

India’s nuclear policy: China, Pakistan and two distinct nuclear trajectories -- HARSH V. PANT, YOGESH JOSHI
Explains my earlier post on why 1998, rather than 1974 was viewed as the public start of nuclear India.
New Delhi’s calculation was simple but profound: any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by Beijing against India involved a risk of nuclear retaliation from the great powers. This minimal risk rather than absolute credibility of great power response was sufficient to deter the Chinese decision-makers. This assumed both rationality and restraint on Beijing’s part. India’s historical experiences vis-à-vis Pakistan however betrayed both these assumptions. Pakistani nuclear capability was solely directed against New Delhi. Given its penchant for risk-taking, it also posed a fundamental threat to the Indian state. Therefore, to deter Pakistan, an indigenous nuclear capability was a must.

India’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis China and Pakistan therefore explain the gradual evolution of India’s nuclear weapons program in the first two decades after the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 and the catalytic response to Pakistani nuclear program thereafter. Not all nuclear adversaries are the same after all. Two decades after Pokhran-II, New Delhi’s nuclear policy is still coming to terms with two different kinds of adversaries on its frontiers, despite occasional talks of a ‘two front’ war.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 12 May 2018 19:18


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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 14 May 2018 00:08

Nuclear Brinkmanship: Lessons for South Asia - Balraj Nagal
I would highly recommend reading this paper by our ex-SFC, pertaining to the how India looks upon the Pakistani nuclear threat.
Brinkmanship is the deliberate creation of a recognisable risk, a risk that one does not completely control.

Cultivating irrationality at the highest level of government benefits
a State’s bargaining power.

The Cuban blockade
was an act of brinkmanship since the US, instead of succumbing to the pressure from the USSR, decided to see how the Soviets would react to the US stopping their vessels from entering Cuba.

When non- strategic or local subjects become the drivers of brinkmanship, there is a great possibility of
loss of credibility either due to lack of interest or repetition fatigue of the international community.

The power to bargain must be credible. When a threat or demand is made, there must be reason
to believe that the adversary will agree to the demands raised and there must be credibility in the power to back the threat issued.

The 1971 Indo-Pak War was not a classic case of brinkmanship in the initial stages of the crisis.

Pakistani officials have threatened to use nuclear weapons should India invade, after India’s current Army Chief Gen Rawat admitted to having secret military plans for attacking its neighbour in the event of a crisis.

That Pakistan has not mastered the strategy of brinkmanship is evident from the many failures of the strategy in the past 70 years, and that it lost half its territory was the biggest failure.

In the past, only on one occasion was Pakistan faced with a strategic choice to threaten, or pose a dangerous option, i.e. when its integrity was under attack internally in East Pakistan, but it chose to attack India, instead of combatting the internal rebellion, and eventually lost the war.

Whilst prosecuting a proxy terror war on India, Pakistan has linked the sub-conventional domain to conventional and nuclear escalation – a strategy that is fraught with danger, as no nation in the past has done so.

In a nuclear environment, the greatest vulnerability of Pakistan is the geographical layout of the country, the linearity of its urban centres and communication systems.

An important lesson for leaders in South Asia is to understand the limits of brinkmanship, and that it cannot be a solution for all problems or policies.

Nuclear weapons are meant to ensure national security and peace through deterrence, and not support sub- conventional war.

To practise the strategy of brinkmanship, there is a critical need to develop tools to war- game the plan to
be executed. Today, advanced tools, are available to war-game situations and the escalation matrix. Once these tools are exploited, the national leadership will be in a position to develop a rational (may be, irrational) and viable strategy.

The brinkmanship strategy is a deliberate choice of a dangerous policy to achieve a strategic outcome, and is based on manipulating the shared risk of war, creating a threat to force the adversary to relent, or else, the consequences are far worse than mere loss of face.

In South Asia, nuclear brinkmanship is a strategy fraught with danger and unimaginable consequences. The Pakistan Army is not well versed in levels of statecraft that a nuclear crisis needs.


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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 14 May 2018 00:39

...Stifled because the thermonuclear device tested on May 11, 1998 was a dud

In another news:
Flat Earth BOMBSHELL: Shock claim Australia ‘is NOT REAL and never existed’

Alas too often we still read about idiotic claims like this and some gullible people still fall for it.

Only a hopelessly scientifically ignorant person will still claim it a "dud". People like BK (the author of this article) may have followers like flat-earth society but rightly have NO credibility in scientific circle.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 14 May 2018 06:33

Amber G: You have the liberty to question the credibility of a whole host of scientific people, who have called it a dud/fizzle. Having debated this before, do not wish to open the can. You also have the liberty to call these claims idiotic. But beyond the labs of science, there is a real world out there. Men who have (had) a responsibility (such as retd SFC Lt. Gen Balraj Nagal) do not probably share your view that Bharat Karnad is propagating some crazy theory, I pray not!. For if he was, they would not quote him (a critic or his works), which he has done right in the paper posted above. Maybe you should write to the Strategic Forces Commander and share your insightful scientific views!

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Re: Deterrence

Postby dinesha » 14 May 2018 14:16

Previously there used to be thread called "India nuclear news and discussion " in the Military Issue Section, I didn't find it so posting here...

Nuclear scientist Anil Kakodkar explains: How Pokhran happened
20 years ago, on May 11, 1998, India carried out nuclear tests. What were the circumstances that led to the tests? What did India gain from them? Could testing have happened at another time?
http://indianexpress.com/article/explai ... d-5172010/


Immediately after the 1998 tests, and more strongly during the debate on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, several voices, including some from within the atomic energy establishment, raised question marks over the success of the nuclear tests, especially that of the thermonuclear device. Can those debates be set to rest?

In my mind, that debate does not exist. But I know why it has arisen. It has happened because of the placement of the thermonuclear device. The fission device and the fusion device were placed in different locations, more than a mile away. The thermonuclear device was placed in a much harder environment, in much harder rock. The ground movement that you observe after the test is a very strong function of the placement. What happened is that a crater had developed at the site of the fission device, while at the location of thermonuclear device, there was a mound. Now, a crater is a sign of higher yield. As the yield increases, the ground shape that you get moves from a mound towards a crater. So the argument was that the fusion device had produced a lower yield than the fission device. the way to resolve this is to actually go by instrumental readings. We can also simulate the earth movement back to see whether the calculated ground shape matches with the actual ground shape. And all this exercise has been done.

There were constraints under which the tests were carried out. The two devices had to be tested together, because if one was tested first, it would have damaged the other. Also, the total yield had to be controlled, it could not have exceeded a certain number because there were populated villages nearby and they had to be protected.

Why was the thermonuclear device so important to us?

Well, there were people who did not want the thermonuclear tests. There was this argument that if you carry out two similar tests successfully, you establish the reliability better. But then, it would have also meant that we restrict our deterrence capability to only 15 kilo tons. Nuclear weapons are called the weapons of peace, because of the deterrence they offer. If you want an effective deterrence, you must have a capability higher than your opponent.

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Re: Deterrence6

Postby shiv » 14 May 2018 15:19

Karnad knows less than me about nuclear physics or bombs and I am no expert

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 15 May 2018 08:14

Shauryaji - As you know even with recent admission by an ex-PM there still a whole list of "eminent experts" -- many in Pak government/military/scholars but also in other nations including my own -- who still insist that 26/11 was a false flag and RSS sajish. I give them NO credibility too.

I am not exaggerating - The claim "[one or more] 1988 test was a dud" falls into the same category. Also the "basis/proof(s)" for that "claim" has been discussed in brf, and again I am not exaggerating are very similar to the "analysis" I am seeing recently where they are arguing that Kasab in his video was saying "bhagwan" instead of "A---a" is proof positive that Kasab was not a Pakistani. (

Sorry to give this kind of analogy, but seriously anyone who still claims (after 20 years)or believes that a "1998 test was a dud does lose all the credibility. It should lose that credibility from you too. REALLY!

Earth is not flat, there is Australia, 26/11 was not a false flag drama, and none of 1998 test( (or 1974) was a dud.

REALLY!
***
It is more than 50 years since I have taken my first graduate nuclear physics course (from IIT got an A :) ) but over all these years I have interacted with (and learned from and taught) not only US but Indian scientists and can safely say it is not possible to hide or fake data to the extent that a possibility of "dud" exist in any sane mind who has examined the data available on open source.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 16 May 2018 06:37

Data point for my own future reference (cross post from mil forum)
wig wrote:http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/the-cold-start-hypothesis/587347.html

Analyst Vipin Narang, MIT-based nuclear analyst, writes that even as the majority of Pakistani strategists see the TNW mindset as providing ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ and a counterweight to deter Cold Start ambitions, others like former SPD, Brigadiers Naeem Salik and Feroz Khan doubt whether Pakistan has the ‘wherewithal for battlefield management and escalation control’. Analyst Micheal Krepon backs the majority global view that TNWs are ‘unwise’ and ‘strategically unsound’. This opinion is reinforced by simulation studies of TNW hit tank losses which have been found insignificant. This is because the overpressure of 45psi needed to destroy tanks will need a literal rain of TNWs which is not possible.
Let ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons be Pakistan’s favourite oxymoron even as the newly-formed Defence Planning Committee refines NFU/Cold Start. Work is also needed on our SIOP for the time when the nuclear armageddon dawns.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 16 May 2018 08:40

Why is 45 psi overpressure needed to destroy a tank? Does it need to be physically disintegrated?

I would think the heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. In WW2, flamethrowers and even molotov cocktails were efficient tank killers for this very reason.

For the Pakis, TNWs are a far better option than any conventional shell or ATGM to effectively kill large columns of advancing Indian armour.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby pravula » 16 May 2018 08:45

Rudradev wrote:Why is 45 psi overpressure needed to destroy a tank? Does it need to be physically disintegrated?

The heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. For the Pakis, TNWs are a far better option than any conventional shell or ATGM to effectively kill large columns of advancing Indian armour.


probably because blast radius is too small to take out a column if the tanks are not closely clustered together.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 16 May 2018 08:57

Maybe, but still more efficient than a conventional airdropped fuel air incendiary device, no? And that's the best sort of munition they can field short of TNWs (that too, only until the point when IAF has completely established air dominance).

Also, as I understand it the radius wherein thermal radiation fro. a nuclear explosion is enough to set structures on fire is considerably larger than the radius in which kinetic blast effects are enough to physically destroy those same structures. May be true of tanks as well?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 16 May 2018 09:20

I would think the heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. In WW2, flamethrowers and even molotov cocktails were efficient tank killers for this very reason.

The "immediate" heat produced (within seconds) which is good enough to roast right-away is mainly due to gamma rays which will be blocked by tank's armor. Temperature inside the tank will go higher later due to secondary fires and conduction/convection but that may take time - minutes-- and may be not serious enough if the tank is fire-proofed with good insulations or people may have time to get out.

Unless it is a neutron bomb (neutrons can penetrate armor deeper than gamma rays) I think effect due to heat or radiation will not enter in the picture.

I recall seeing some unclassified papers for the test's conducted in 1960's or 70's with US tanks (M 60?).. IIRC they found reductions in crew radiation exposure of over 95% (even for neutron radiation too). They found thermal/heat effects nearly negligible - short lived and not likely to even noticed by the crew - negligible rise in temperature inside with hatches closed..
With 10KT weapon probably 500 m away and one will be safe.

As Shiv said blast/ pressure is main killer for tank.

Added later: Here are two papers .. Shivji may like it..
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a118342.pdf
and
*** for tanks ***(Added later)
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a112303.pdf
Last edited by Amber G. on 16 May 2018 11:01, edited 3 times in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 16 May 2018 09:32

Rudradev wrote:Why is 45 psi overpressure needed to destroy a tank? Does it need to be physically disintegrated?

I would think the heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. In WW2, flamethrowers and even molotov cocktails were efficient tank killers for this very reason.

For the Pakis, TNWs are a far better option than any conventional shell or ATGM to effectively kill large columns of advancing Indian armour.
A TNW depending upon how one factors it but in most cases, less than 5 KT has a "blast" radius of only about 120 M. A tank regiment about 50 tanks would easily occupy a formation
(modern) of 3-5 Sq KM. So, how many TNW's to destroy one regiment? Tanks are hardened against radiation. So, after how many such TNW's will it take for India to escalate. The doctrine asks for just one.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 16 May 2018 09:54

Shaurya, what exactly do you mean by "blast" radius? Radius defining a sphere of significant kinetic effects, i.e. overpressure, right? Ok, let's say for the moment 120m. And the zone of anything like 45+ psi overpressure, probably much smaller than 120m for a TNW of 5 kT or less. Fine.

Now how far away from the explosion would you get temperatures high enough to kill or severely injure/disable people inside metal vehicles? Even if the vehicles did not actually combust?

As a reference point, 3rd degree burns can be caused from contact exposure to temperatures of 60 degrees celsius (not very much at all) for 5 seconds. Less time at higher temperatures.

What good is a tank battalion where all the tankers have 3rd degree burns or worse? They will not fight long or get far even if the tanks themselves haven't been kinetically destroyed by overpressure.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 16 May 2018 09:58

Rudradev wrote:Also, as I understand it the radius wherein thermal radiation fro. a nuclear explosion is enough to set structures on fire is considerably larger than the radius in which kinetic blast effects are enough to physically destroy those same structures. May be true of tanks as well?

If I understand you correctly this is not the case..
The "thermal radiation" (or EM radiation) is mainly in gamma rays.. they go in straight line and will have energy enough to set your skin / house made full or partially of wood in a flash ..

As said before a tank's shell will block 95% or more of the gamma rays.. (Beta and alpha rays are blocked even by thin paper/clothes).

Most of the heat damage is done by secondary fires.

(In side the tank -- as studies have shown - forget about third degree burns, a crew may not even feel heat if the tank is, about 500 m from a TNT ).
(Please read the reference I gave to get better understanding for these results done from actual trials)
Last edited by Amber G. on 16 May 2018 10:03, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 16 May 2018 10:06

Sorry, did not see your post in response to my question earlier. Will go through the reference, thanks.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 16 May 2018 20:46

RD, Look at big picture. Michael Crapon et al the NPA community now thinks the Paki TNWs are a waste measure.

Long back I had said they are self neutering weapons: nasl powered Nasrs.

All those will turn Pakjab into nuclear wasteland for a long time.

Why waste time refuting a good argument?

I have said elsewhere that nuke powers need space or area to be able to use the nukes against invading forces.

Apocalyptic wars are only in novels. There is life after such a war.
How do you live when you have destroyed the land yourself?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 16 May 2018 20:48

I had done some reading up and did a video on the proposed use of TNW by Pakis in a video. This included my analysis of what their use would do to tanks but my assumption is a TNW yield of about 0.2 kt. Please seen and comment
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxJvLNrZzdU

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 16 May 2018 20:51

https://twitter.com/bennedose/status/738307011339640832
Chart shows the damage radius of nukes of different yields. Subkiloton Tac Nukes <1kt not even listed

Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 16 May 2018 22:30

Shiv: saw the video. only comment: very good.
Also please see, if you have not, the paper I posted for tanks (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a112303.pdf).

The data is old but still very valid. (we can fairly accurately model the effect etc without trying an actual bomb) Modern tanks are better (much better) shielded so radiation damage is less than than the paper says.)

For blast radius/damage etc type of bomb (fission vs fusion vs dirty/non-dirty) obviously matters a lot.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 16 May 2018 23:05

Shiv ji: A couple of comments. The paper below estimates a yield of up to 10 KT within that 30 CM frame, based on the W-33 design. Since much of this miniaturization needs advanced designs, which requires testing to be credible, we can probably discount the sophistication of Pakistani TNW and IMO, rule out sub KT yields.

@RD: The paper also deals with effects on tank formations. Please bear in mind the table there has a number of tanks destroyed by radiation. Most modern tanks have a depleted uranium shielding and hence the number destroyed by radiation should be severely discounted. I also think the number of tanks destroyed by the blast effect is also overestimated. With increasing weapon ranges and communications, tanks can be wider apart and still bring the needed coordinated force on targets as required.

Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 16 May 2018 23:25

ramana wrote:
I have said elsewhere that nuke powers need space or area to be able to use the nukes against invading forces.
Bingo!! A key point missed by many, many "experts". The Warsaw tank force numbered in the 10's of thousands and the landscape, huge swaths in central Europe. Another key point often missed is, it was easy for US to transfer its tac nukes to the European front but soon the Europeans realized who's land will be made unlivable and they were the first ones to howl against these TNW's and get them out of commission.

The funny thing to me is the definition in those days of tactical was about 250 KT. We are talking of the era when a 50 MT bomb was tested!!!

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 16 May 2018 23:59

This may be of interest: Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 17 May 2018 07:38

ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji: A couple of comments. The paper below estimates a yield of up to 10 KT within that 30 CM frame, based on the W-33 design. Since much of this miniaturization needs advanced designs, which requires testing to be credible, we can probably discount the sophistication of Pakistani TNW and IMO, rule out sub KT yields.
Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability

I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.

Basically that Plutonium has to be squeezed to make it explode. The best method to squeeze it is a ball - with explosive packed around a plutonium ball and some other stuff to help. This typically requires a big ball. Ball is worst shape for small diameter. If you try and make the ball smaller by putting less explosive (which is the bulkiest part) then you get a fizzle. Of course - you could use a city buster on the battlefield - but that screws own forces as well. Most tactical nukes are deliberate fizzles and are expensive in terms of wasted Plutonium. The low yield makes sure that own forces are not blinded and killed by one's own nuke.

There are other non ball designs for TNW- but those require testing. One this is called a "flying plate" which Hoodbhoy mentioned in an article long ago. But I doubt if Nasr has flying plate design. Another design is oval rather than ball but that is tricky and requires much testing

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 17 May 2018 07:40

Amber G. wrote:Shiv: saw the video. only comment: very good.
Also please see, if you have not, the paper I posted for tanks (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a112303.pdf).

The data is old but still very valid. (we can fairly accurately model the effect etc without trying an actual bomb) Modern tanks are better (much better) shielded so radiation damage is less than than the paper says.)

For blast radius/damage etc type of bomb (fission vs fusion vs dirty/non-dirty) obviously matters a lot.

Thank Amber G. Will add this paper to my large collection of nuke related material :)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 17 May 2018 08:23

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3JNY4 ... sp=sharing
This is an image of the blast effects radius of a 15 kiloton bomb

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3JNY4 ... sp=sharing
This table shows blast effects from 0.1 kt onwards

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3JNY4 ... sp=sharing
Table shows kg of Plutonium to get 1, 5, 10 and 20 kt depending on whether the tech is high, medium or low

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3JNY4 ... sp=sharing
Graph shows weight to radius connection - check Nasr radius and warhead weight

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 17 May 2018 08:43

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji: A couple of comments. The paper below estimates a yield of up to 10 KT within that 30 CM frame, based on the W-33 design. Since much of this miniaturization needs advanced designs, which requires testing to be credible, we can probably discount the sophistication of Pakistani TNW and IMO, rule out sub KT yields.
Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability

I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.

Basically that Plutonium has to be squeezed to make it explode. The best method to squeeze it is a ball - with explosive packed around a plutonium ball and some other stuff to help. This typically requires a big ball. Ball is worst shape for small diameter. If you try and make the ball smaller by putting less explosive (which is the bulkiest part) then you get a fizzle. Of course - you could use a city buster on the battlefield - but that screws own forces as well. Most tactical nukes are deliberate fizzles and are expensive in terms of wasted Plutonium. The low yield makes sure that own forces are not blinded and killed by one's own nuke.

There are other non ball designs for TNW- but those require testing. One this is called a "flying plate" which Hoodbhoy mentioned in an article long ago. But I doubt if Nasr has flying plate design. Another design is oval rather than ball but that is tricky and requires much testing


Not really, you could cold test the flying plate design. DAHRT can probably help. Regardless, I don't think Pakistan would ever use it against Indian forces nor would India think about seriously launching incursions past 15-20 km. They probably reached some sort of city buster threshold which Massa and Israelis aren't comfortable with so they are just building these sling shot weapons. I still think they are more threatening against Punjabs adjoining territories which are itching for independence. A hit from one of these things on Karachi could probably kill 50,000 people. So perhaps it could indeed be a necessity given the constraints imposed upon them. Can't think of any other reason why Pakistan would build them.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 17 May 2018 10:14

RoyG wrote:Not really, you could cold test the flying plate design. DAHRT can probably help. Regardless, I don't think Pakistan would ever use it against Indian forces nor would India think about seriously launching incursions past 15-20 km. They probably reached some sort of city buster threshold which Massa and Israelis aren't comfortable with .

It is easier to build city busters than small TNWs that work. The city buster threshold was crossed by Pakistan long ago. Of course I consider 10 kt as city buster because I would not like to see 50,000 dead in Bengaluru and then laugh at the puny yield.

I have made a (researched) video about various degrees of destruction depending on whether 100 kt to 1 MT are used.

What if Nuclear deterrence fails?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q70u5G-gk1E

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 17 May 2018 21:23

I think in honor of Pakis begging for roz ki roti whe should call the it 'flying roti' concept.

Flying plate is too firang.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 17 May 2018 22:06

ramana wrote:I think in honor of Pakis begging for roz ki roti whe should call the it 'flying roti' concept.


This also fits in well with the Chinese connection where flying would be frying roti

Amber G.
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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 17 May 2018 22:32

shiv wrote:This also fits in well with the Chinese connection where flying would be frying roti

:rotfl:
Guys Have you ever flown in AirAsia? I am not making it up ..they call themselves as "Flying Restaurant in the sky" and onboard menu includes items shown below...
Image
:rotfl:
Image taken from ( credit): Eat at the flying restaurant called AirAsia

Click to see even more interesting pictures. - Can you spot the RAW agent in the pictures

g.sarkar
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Re: Deterrence

Postby g.sarkar » 18 May 2018 00:08

Fake picture. Why no polk fly lice?
Gautam

ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 18 May 2018 03:11

Now AmberG you are coming down to our level.

Can someone post the Dr. Anil Kakodkar interview full text please for archival purposes.

ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 18 May 2018 06:34

shiv wrote:I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.
I was not thinking of a fizzle derived sub kt yield, quite ingenious even for Pakis to come to those levels. My read of the situation leads me to be inclined towards an HEU based gun-type design for the NASR and not a linear implosion Pu device, let alone a boosted Pu device. I also lean on the theory that they have taken the basic CHIC-4 design they received from the PRC and have sought to miniaturize it for their various missiles including the NASR. I also leave open the possibility that the NASR threat is a bluff. Their WG Pu stocks are quite limited and due to the high inefficacy of yield ratios for those dimensions and the untested nature of their designs, unlikely the Pakis are using a Pu based device in such a miniaturized form. Their best bet without testing is to field some showcase HEU based NASR's.

RoyG
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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 18 May 2018 11:01

Shiv,

Came across this:

https://books.google.com/books?id=rOq4X ... ce&f=false

Looks like we borrowed our doctrine of 'credible minimum deterrence' from Robert McNamara.

He wanted a countervalue centric force of 1000 50 kt warheads.

50-200kt is more than enough for broad spec deterrence.

I do however feel that 100-200 kt would be better if it puts less pressure on the WG fissile stock.

Anyone advocating anything > 300 kt has lost their mind.

BK needs to chill with the megaton language.

shiv
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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 18 May 2018 11:11

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote:I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.
I was not thinking of a fizzle derived sub kt yield, quite ingenious even for Pakis to come to those levels. My read of the situation leads me to be inclined towards an HEU based gun-type design for the NASR and not a linear implosion Pu device, let alone a boosted Pu device. I also lean on the theory that they have taken the basic CHIC-4 design they received from the PRC and have sought to miniaturize it for their various missiles including the NASR. I also leave open the possibility that the NASR threat is a bluff. Their WG Pu stocks are quite limited and due to the high inefficacy of yield ratios for those dimensions and the untested nature of their designs, unlikely the Pakis are using a Pu based device in such a miniaturized form. Their best bet without testing is to field some showcase HEU based NASR's.

HEU derived gun design is very unlikely because of the size. It will not fit into Nasr. Gun designs do not need compression but the mass of Uranium total will have to be about 50 kg or more. Even if the mass is divided into 2 equal halves to be joined up on firing the radioactive shielding required and the gun barrel and the end bit where the Uranium that is shot in would have to be strong enough to withstand a 15-20 kg Uranium artillery shell type shot. The mass has to come together very quickly to explode, and for that it is literally an artillery shell mass of HEU fired into another one - so the other one should not disintegrate and needs to be housed in an appropriately strong container while carrying enough shielding for the damn mass to not be radiating everything around. Lead is great for shielding but too soft otherwise. We are talking a lot of metal there. If the HEU masses are too close they radiate each other and may start glowing. Too big for Nasr. A 50 kg ball of Uranium is nearly 7 inches in diameter and highly radioactive. Radiation is detectable from the outside with even 4 inches of lead shielding and that would up the diameter to more than 30 cm and the weight far more than the Nasr can carry. Makes zero sense to use a gun design HEU for tac nuke of Nasr dimensions.
Last edited by shiv on 18 May 2018 11:21, edited 1 time in total.

shiv
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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 18 May 2018 11:12

RoyG wrote:BK needs to chill with the megaton language.

You mean megatonne language :D

RoyG
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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 18 May 2018 11:31

shiv wrote:
RoyG wrote:BK needs to chill with the megaton language.

You mean megatonne language :D


8)

The B61-12 is 50kt and will be carried by F35. With accurate targeting the days of > 300 kt are over. Trend is toward smaller more reliable bombs.

I think NSG is being opposed by China b/c we'll be able to boost our reprocessing capacity and be in better position for UNSC seat.

I'm starting to think if expanding our present reactor capacity even makes sense anymore given how much more efficient renewables are getting.

3 stage program will turn out to be a dud when solar > 50% efficiency using rare earth alternatives which will happen in the next 10-15 years.

Kakodkar during the thorium conf stated that if he could go bck he would invest in salt reactor rather than liquid metal pool design.


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