Deterrence

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dinesha
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Re: Deterrence

Postby dinesha » 18 May 2018 14:42

PFBR achieving criticality slides further..
Kalpakkam Fast Breeder Test Reactor achieves 30 MW power production
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cit ... 480884.cms
CHENNAI: The Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) in Kalpakkam produced 30 MW power for the first time in its 32-year life cycle this month.
The milestone was achieved on March 20. Since March 21, FBTR has also been generating 5.6 MW electrical power. The FBTR achieved criticality in October 1985.

According to A K Bhaduri, director, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), the new milestone was testament to India's capability to produce power from indigenously developed fuel. "The FBTR's design is French (Rapsodie) and the reactor was built to generate power using a mixed oxide (contains uranium and plutonium) fuel that was to be supplied by France," Bhaduri said. However, the fallout of India's peaceful nuclear experiment in Pokhran (1974) had denied the nation the use of this fuel, as bowing to international pressure France backed out. This pushed India to develop its own mixed carbide variant fuel (also contains uranium and plutonium in the ratio of 30% and 70% respectively) and test it in the FBTR.
"The key thing to note is that FBTR is only operated in campaign mode. It is a test reactor and was never meant to produce power for supplying to the grid," Bhaduri said. But that is exactly what IGCAR has achieved.

Bhaduri added that in another two or three campaigns (a campaign is a test period spanning between three to six months), the FBTR would achieve its absolute power generation capacity of around 39-40 MW. At maximum output, the FBTR would also generate around 13 MW electrical energy. The previous milestone was set in the reactor's 25th campaign when 27.3 MW power was produced. The FBTR had also defied expectations in terms of fuel utilisation, said Bhaduri. Fuel utilisation (or burn up) is the measure of energy that is extracted from an initial nuclear fuel source. "We have achieved a fuel burn up of 165 GWd/t (giga watt days per ton), which is incredible for this type of fuel and was achieved without fuel pin failure," said Bhaduri, adding that most test reactors across the world struggle to achieve fuel burn up rates in the range of megawatt days/ton.

The experience over the years with the test reactor has allowed IGCAR scientists to build what they estimate is a "highly reliable" 500MW capacity successor to the FBTR - the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), which is expected to achieve criticality either in late 2018 or early 2019.
Augmentation of India's nuclear power production, which is also a prime agenda for the central government, means six more fast breeders would be set up across the country in the next 15 years. Two of the six reactors will come up in Kalpakkam. "We expect to begin construction by 2021," said Bhaduri. The reactors would be ready for commercial power production by 2029 and 2031 respectively.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 18 May 2018 19:19

I don't think our nuclear industry has a bright future. It will only comprise a small portion of the energy mix. Renewables and hydro will increase substantially and eat into the coal share. We should begin seriously investing in SILEX, reprocessing, battery tech, etc.

Only 6 commercial breeders 500 MW each coming online in over a decade? What's the point?!

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 18 May 2018 22:20

RoyG wrote:I don't think our nuclear industry has a bright future. It will only comprise a small portion of the energy mix. Renewables and hydro will increase substantially and eat into the coal share. We should begin seriously investing in SILEX, reprocessing, battery tech, etc.

Only 6 commercial breeders 500 MW each coming online in over a decade? What's the point?!
I think it is time to instill some accountabilities. The AEC has enjoyed non-scrutinized budgets and administration without being under the energy ministry for too long now. While this setup did indeed help in the initial days of Babha, it is time to rope in the entire structure under a ministry with accountability.

We have potential here but just like any other lagging government controlled enterprise, this one lacks accountability almost entirely. Forget FBR and three stage, they were recently sanctioned 10 or so indigenous PHWR builds of 700 MW, let us see how long it takes to get these running.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Ravi Karumanchiri » 18 May 2018 22:21

RoyG wrote:I don't think our nuclear industry has a bright future. It will only comprise a small portion of the energy mix. Renewables and hydro will increase substantially and eat into the coal share. We should begin seriously investing in SILEX, reprocessing, battery tech, etc.

Only 6 commercial breeders 500 MW each coming online in over a decade? What's the point?!

^^^^^^^
Compact Fusion

Lockheed Martin Now Has a Patent on its Potentially World Changing Fusion Reactor

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 18 May 2018 23:07

shiv wrote:HEU derived gun design is very unlikely because of the size.

One of my professor (quite famous - who actually worked in Manhattan project) remarked that accurate word for the design should have been "cannon design"...the mechanism is definitely cannon (too big to be called a "gun").
("bullet" of Hiroshima Bomb was about 40 Kg BTW)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 19 May 2018 01:51

ShauryaT wrote:
RoyG wrote:I don't think our nuclear industry has a bright future. It will only comprise a small portion of the energy mix. Renewables and hydro will increase substantially and eat into the coal share. We should begin seriously investing in SILEX, reprocessing, battery tech, etc.

Only 6 commercial breeders 500 MW each coming online in over a decade? What's the point?!
I think it is time to instill some accountabilities. The AEC has enjoyed non-scrutinized budgets and administration without being under the energy ministry for too long now. While this setup did indeed help in the initial days of Babha, it is time to rope in the entire structure under a ministry with accountability.

We have potential here but just like any other lagging government controlled enterprise, this one lacks accountability almost entirely. Forget FBR and three stage, they were recently sanctioned 10 or so indigenous PHWR builds of 700 MW, let us see how long it takes to get these running.


We should have an active nuclear program just in case but pouring money into it to get the 3 stage in full force is a waste. Renewables are slowly turning residential, commercial, and industrial complexes into self sustaining units. Massive off grid power generation is going to be the future with compact thorium and fusion reactors taking the lead for units requiring power far more than what solar and other technologies can provide. Building these massive reactors for non-military applications is out of style. Just recently Kakodkar admitted that he should've done MSBR instead of LMFB. They dont have a committee that looks at emerging tech anywhere in these dept? I would ditch the 3 stage and invest money into getting silex, battery, and renewable tech. Start programs on compact thorium and fusion reactors and invest in the clean coal technologies and improving the grid. In another decade, nuclear will only occupy 5-6% of total energy gen. NSG isn't about energy gen. It's about geopolitics, FMCT, UNSC, reprocessing, etc. Nuclear will never exceed 10-15% of India's total power generation ever at the rate we are going at.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 19 May 2018 05:39

Could we stick to deterrence please? There is a separate India Nuclear thread for lamenting about the state of the civil nuclear program

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 19 May 2018 17:57

Amber G. wrote:
shiv wrote:HEU derived gun design is very unlikely because of the size.

One of my professor (quite famous - who actually worked in Manhattan project) remarked that accurate word for the design should have been "cannon design"...the mechanism is definitely cannon (too big to be called a "gun").
("bullet" of Hiroshima Bomb was about 40 Kg BTW)

40 kg? Gawd :shock: That would be heavier than a 155 mm artillery shell. Imagine the reaction on the other side of the cannon - at least how thick and tough that would have to be to stop the back from blowing off. It would be mother of all fizzles if that happened.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Amber G. » 19 May 2018 22:58

shiv wrote:
Amber G. wrote: ...
("bullet" of Hiroshima Bomb was about 40 Kg BTW)

40 kg? Gawd :shock: That would be heavier than a 155 mm artillery shell. ....

Yes, the "bullet" was nearly twice as heavy as "target"..I tried to check online popular sources and found that wiki entry happened to be quite accurate and detailed.

(Little Boy design .. "bullet" 39Kg (18cm long, 16cm diameter), hollow cylinder) .. Target 26K multiple rings)
Speaking of "mother of all fizzle", another point, if one is thinking to buy a "gun" from Peshawar, is the speed the "bullet" must have to avoid a fizzle is, it must pass the width of target in less than 80 shakes, IOW faster than speed of sound.
(I am no nuclear weapons expert - just a nuclear physicist - but I don't think *any one* has a gun-type mechanism in any of *modern* arsenal)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Austin » 21 May 2018 10:13


shiv
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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 21 May 2018 11:51

Amber G. wrote:.
(I am no nuclear weapons expert - just a nuclear physicist - but I don't think *any one* has a gun-type mechanism in any of *modern* arsenal)

Speaking of guns - you must have seen that video of the single one-off test of an atomic artillery shell. I was watching that video again and suddenly something struck me. In 1962 (or 63?) - an uncle of mine returning from Amreeka gifted me a scale model of exactly that atomic cannon mounted on a trailer. They used to make beautiful toys those days. The driver's cabin car was articulated and the wheel could be steered, while the cannot itself could be raised and lowered and actually used to fire a shell - also a scale model that was provided. Sigh! I played and played and played with it and destroyed it. I never knew what it was and I had some awesome military toys apart from that. Whattay remarkable thing it would be to have it today!

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 22 May 2018 01:23

8 inch M 203 howitzer?


LINK

Especially the last para.

BTW Shell balloting phenomenon put an end to all such toys in mid 1970s.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 May 2018 07:43

ramana wrote:8 inch M 203 howitzer?


This one
Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 22 May 2018 20:39


Yawning into fantasy.
New agyan (false knowledge) being distributed for free:
The technological politics behind the CTBT was that the big five nuclear powers are now willing to give up tests because they can conduct sub-kiloton tests (which are not prohibited by CTBT) and simulate them on computers to yield higher kilotons or even megatons. So, if, say, one of the big powers wants to build a new warhead of 100 kilotons, it would conduct a virtual laboratory test of less than one kiloton, feed the data into computers and project them into higher kilotons. The data thus projected can be used for building a new type of bomb.

Per the author there is no difference between sub critical testing and sub-kilo tonne yield test :rotfl:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 May 2018 22:28

A well-researched piece. Would love to get counter arguments of the message and not the messenger or how someone thinks he knows "more" and is a "scientist".
Walking Back Delusional Nuclear Policies -
Bharat Karnad

Indeed, an active programme of exports of nuclear goods will more quickly ease India’s entry into the P-5 club on the principle pithily enunciated by the US President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s that it is better to have a nuclear capable country, such as India, ‘in the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in’! All that India’s submissive attitude and pleadings and supplications have fetched it so far is diplomatic manipulation, finger wagging and counsels of patience by the US and other P-5 states. Why the NSG membership on US terms is so prized is unclear. China’s success in this arena points to success emanating from precisely the opposite policy tack, namely ‘bad boy’ proliferant behaviour. By challenging the existing global nuclear order with policies brazenly transferring nuclear material, technology and expertise especially to the so-called ‘rogue states’ (Pakistan, North Korea, Iran), Beijing has obtained the power to calibrate the resulting turbulence and turmoil, setting itself up thus as an inalienable part of both the problem and of the solution. It has gained enormous diplomatic leverage as mediator with North Korea, and has led to China vaulting into the great power ranks.43 On the issue of new tests to obtain safe and reliable thermonuclear weaponry, the Indian Government has since 1998 been paralysed, unable to summon the courage and the political will to resume testing despite China’s aggressive military posturing and the North Korean tests disrupting the international security situation, providing both strategic provocation and political excuse for such an Indian decision. Lacking boldness and gumption, Delhi can do the next best thing: prepare to resume nuclear testing at an instant’s notice because it is only a matter of time before something gives in the growing US–Russia and US–China military stand-offs, with all these parties racing to upgrade and technologically improve the strategic armaments in their employ. Once India resumes testing, it should be on an open-ended basis to reassure the military end-users that the fission and fusion weapons they fire will in fact work as advertised—confidence the Strategic Forces Command presently lacks!

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 May 2018 22:45

ShauryaT - my trying to rebut Karnad will not improve his knowledge or change mine. That quote is full of bitter polemic and accusations. If you agree with them fine. If I agree or don't agree I will say so - but frankly Karnad does not interest me in the least bit. I never read or listen to him. I try to skip your posts when you quote him. He has lost my confidence and no amount of your pushing him down my throat is going to make me pick up his rants and God forbid try and rebut them. He speaks of boldness gumption paralysis etc. This is where he excels. Just so long as he does not try to talk technical stuff. My opinion of him plummeted further when he confused some aircraft -I can't remember what it was - but it was too ridiculous to remember. Just because the man uses words like fission-fusion etc does not mean that he actually understands anything. Even that statement of his is rhetorical made to sound technical but I am not going to explain why. I have indicated many times where I have disagreed. I just don't trust him. And remember, whether I trust him or not is not going to make any difference to anyone or to Indian or any other nuclear forces - so why this drama of asking for rebuttal?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 22 May 2018 22:46

ramana wrote:
Can someone post the Dr. Anil Kakodkar interview full text please for archival purposes.


This one:

viewtopic.php?p=2272342#p2272342

Thanks, ramana

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 May 2018 23:22

Shiv ji: What you think of Karnad and his knowledge is entirely your prerogative. If you choose to disregard him due to his supposed technical knowledge and treat his policy views as rhetoric, even those are entirely up to you. FWIW: You may not have a high view of his views on the matter but there are others who matter in the policy realm, who do care. He is after all one of the authors of our doctrine and is treated as an expert on nuclear policy not nuclear science by many. My ask was, if someone does have an alternative viewpoint on the message and not on the messenger, I am interested to hear it. Hope that is clear enough. FWIW, again: I think you have misread Karnad almost entirely or are deliberately slinging his name down the mud because you disagree with his views on nuclear policy.

R. Chidambaram thought we did not need testing in 1996, A.N Prasad had to almost lead a revolt petition to override that view. I bring this point to emphasize, there are no clear pure nuclear science issues at stake, it is very much mired in politics, geopolitics, perceptions, psychological attitudes, willpower, national objectives, etc. How much did Brajesh Mishra know on nuclear science to back the BARC view over the DRDO? Science, weapons design is important but not the full story.

You can take this message to the bank. The SFC does not have confidence in our TN arsenal.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 23 May 2018 00:28

ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji: What you think of Karnad and his knowledge is entirely your prerogative. If you choose to disregard him due to his supposed technical knowledge and treat his policy views as rhetoric, even those are entirely up to you. FWIW: You may not have a high view of his views on the matter but there are others who matter in the policy realm, who do care. He is after all one of the authors of our doctrine and is treated as an expert on nuclear policy not nuclear science by many. My ask was, if someone does have an alternative viewpoint on the message and not on the messenger, I am interested to hear it. Hope that is clear enough. FWIW, again: I think you have misread Karnad almost entirely or are deliberately slinging his name down the mud because you disagree with his views on nuclear policy.

R. Chidambaram thought we did not need testing in 1996, A.N Prasad had to almost lead a revolt petition to override that view. I bring this point to emphasize, there are no clear pure nuclear science issues at stake, it is very much mired in politics, geopolitics, perceptions, psychological attitudes, willpower, national objectives, etc. How much did Brajesh Mishra know on nuclear science to back the BARC view over the DRDO? Science, weapons design is important but not the full story.

You can take this message to the bank. The SFC does not have confidence in our TN arsenal.


If TN fizzled than it wouldn't be fielded. Why waste the Pu for a dud? Therefore, SFC wouldn't have confidence in TN design but would have full confidence in FBF arsenal. A 50kt explosion over Beijing or Shanghai would be devastating. Now imagine 50 of them over China's major cities. China will cease to be a state with ~25-50 million of their citizenry dead. Majority of them skilled workers, business and political elite, industrialists, scientists, and technocrats.

It seems as though the 'TN' device didn't work as planned. I'm not sure that it will be tested but considering how China is blocking our NSG entry and the powers are keeping us out of UNSC pressure may be building. If BJP faces further electoral losses before 2019 it may be further incentive. Also remember India has carefully studied how NK brought USA to negotiating table. It may help to be disruptive player when you want to get something.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 23 May 2018 06:30

Some more on the gun type design and how it may possibly fit into the NASR, who's payload is rated at 400 KG. Although an SRBM its dimensions are very close to a 300 mm tube artillery.

Gun Assembly

4.1.6.1 Gun Assembly

This was the first technique to be seriously proposed for creating fission explosions, and the first to be successfully developed. The first nuclear weapon to be used in war was the gun-type bomb called Little Boy, dropped on Hiroshima. Basic gun assembly is very simple in both concept and execution. The supercritical assembly is divided into two pieces, each of which is subcritical. One of these, the projectile, is propelled into the other, called the target, by the pressure of propellant combustion gases in a gun barrel. Since artillery technology is very well developed, there are really no significant technical problems involved with designing or manufacturing the assembly system.

The simple single-gun design (one target, one projectile) imposes limits on weapon, mass, efficiency and yield that can be substantially improved by using a "double-gun" design using two projectiles fired at each other. These two approaches are discussed in separate sections below. Even more sophisticated "complex" guns, that combine double guns with implosion are discussed in Hybrid Assembly techniques.

Gun designs may be used for several applications. They are very simple, and may be used when development resources are scarce or extremely reliability is called for. Gun designs are natural where weapons can be relatively long and heavy, but weapon diameter is severely limited - such as nuclear artillery shells (which are "gun type" weapons in two senses!) or earth penetrating "bunker busters" (here the characteristics of a gun tube - long, narrow, heavy, and strong - are ideal).

Single guns are used where designs are highly conservative (early US weapon, the South African fission weapon), or where the inherent penalties of the design are not a problem (bunker busters perhaps). Double guns are probably the most widely used gun approach (in atomic artillery shells for example).

4.1.6.1.1 Single Gun Systems

We might conclude that a practical limit for simple gun assembly (using a single gun) is a bit less than 2 critical masses, reasoning as follows: each piece must be less than 1 critical mass, if we have two pieces then after they are joined the sum must be less than 2 critical masses.

Actually we can do much better than this. If we hollow out a supercritical assembly by removing a chunk from the center like an apple core, we reduce its effective density. Since the critical mass of a system is inversely proportional to the square of the density, we have increased the critical mass remaining material (which we shall call the target) while simultaneously reducing its actual mass. The piece that was removed (which will be called the bullet) must still be a bit less than one critical mass since it is solid. Using this reasoning, letting the bullet have the limiting value of one full critical mass, and assuming the neutron savings from reflection is the same for both pieces (a poor assumption for which correction must be made) we have:

Eq. 4.1.6.1.1-1
M_c/((M - M_c)/M)^2 = M - M_c
where M is the total mass of the assembly, and M_c is the standard critical mass. The solution of this cubic equation is approximately M = 3.15 M_c. In other words, with simple gun assembly we can achieve an assembly of no more than 3.15 critical masses. Of course a practical system must include a safety factor, and reduce the ratio to a smaller value than this.

The weapon designer will undoubtedly surround the target assembly with a very good neutron reflector. The bullet will not be surrounded by this reflector until it is fired into the target, its effective critical mass limit is higher, allowing a larger final assembly than the 3.15 M_c calculated above.

Looking at U-235 critical mass tables for various candidate reflectors we can estimate the achievable critical mass ratios taking into account differential reflector efficiency. A steel gun barrel is actually a fairly good neutron reflector, but it will be thinner and less effective than the target reflector. M_c for U-235 (93.5% enrichment) reflected by 10.16 cm of tungsten carbide (the reflector material used in Little Boy) is 16.5 kg, when reflected by 5.08 cm of iron it is 29.3 kg (the steel gun barrel of Little Boy was an average of 6 cm thick). This is a ratio of 1.78, and is probably close to the achievable limit (a beryllium reflector might push it to 2). Revising Eq. 4.1.6.1.1-1 we get:

Eq. 4.1.6.1.1-2
M_c/((M - (1.78 M_c))/M)^2 = M - (1.78 M_c)
which has a solution of M = 4.51 M_c. If a critical mass ratio of 2 is used for beryllium, then M = 4.88 M_c. This provides an upper bound on the performance of simple gun-type weapons.

Some additional improvement can be had by adding fast neutron absorbers to the system, either natural boron, or boron enriched in B-10. A boron-containing sabot (collar) around the bullet will suppress the effect of neutron reflection from the barrel, and a boron insert in the target will absorb neutrons internally thereby raising the critical mass. In this approach the system would be designed so that the sabot is stripped of the bullet as it enters the target, and the insert is driven out of the target by the bullet. This system was apparently used in the Little Boy weapon.

Using the M_c for 93.5% enriched U-235, the ratio M/M_c for Little Boy was (64 kg)/(16.5 kg) = 3.88, well within the limit of 4.51 (ignoring the hard-to-estimate effects of the boron abosrbers). It appears then that the Little Boy design (completed some six months before the required enriched uranium was available) was developed with the use of >90% enrichment uranium in mind. The actual fissile load used in the weapon was only 80% enriched however, with a corresponding WC reflected critical mass of 26.5 kg, providing an actual ratio of 64/26.5 = 2.4.

The mass-dependent efficiency equation shows that it is desirable to assembly as many critical masses as possible. Applying this equation to Little Boy (and ignoring the equation's limitations in the very low yield range) we can examine the effect of varying the amount of fissile material present:

1.05 80 kg
1.1 1.2 tons
1.2 17 tons
1.3 78 tons
1.4 220 tons
1.5 490 tons
1.6 930 tons
1.8 2.5 kt
2.0 5.2 kt
2.25 10.5 kt
2.40 15.0 kt LITTLE BOY
2.5 18.6 kt
2.75 29.6 kt
3.0 44 kt
3.1
If its fissile content had been increased by a mere 25%, its yield would have tripled.

The explosive efficiency of Little Boy was 0.23 kt/kg of fissile material (1.3%), compared to 2.8 kt/kg (16%) for Fat Man (both are adjusted to account for the yield contribution from tamper fast fission). Use of 93.5% U-235 would have at least doubled Little Boy yield and efficiency, but it would still have remained disappointing compared to the yields achievable using implosion and the same quantity of fissile material.

4.1.6.1.2 Double Gun Systems

Significant weight savings a possible by using a "double-gun" - firing two projectiles at each other to achieve the same insertion velocity. With all other factors being the same (gun length, projectile mass, materials, etc.) the mass of a gun varies with the fourth power of velocity (doubling velocity requires quadrupling pressure, quadrupling barrel thickness increases mass sixteen-fold). By using two projectiles the required velocity is cut by half, and so is the projectile mass (for each gun). On the other hand, to keep the same total gun length though, the projectile must be accelerated in half the distance, and of course there are now two guns. The net effect is to cut the required mass by a factor of eight. The mass of the breech block (which seals the end of the gun) reduces this weight saving somewhat, and of course there is the offsetting added complexity.

A double gun can improve on the achievable assembled mass size since the projectile mass is divided into two sub-critical pieces, each of which can be up to one critical mass in size. Modifying Eq. 4.1.6.1.1-1 we get:

Eq. 4.1.6.1.1-3
M_c/((M - 2M_c)/M)^2 = M - 2M_c
with a solution of M = 4.88 M_c.

Taking into account the effect of differential reflector efficiency we get mass ratios of ratios of 3.56 (tungsten carbide) and 4 (beryllium) which give assembled mass size limits of M = 7.34 M_c and M = 8 M_c respectively.

Another variant of the double gun concept is to still only have two fissile masses - a hollow mass and a cylindrical core as in the single gun - but to drive them both together with propellant. One possible design would be to use a constant diameter gun bore equal to the target diameter, with the smaller diameter core being mounted in a sabot. In this design the target mass would probably be heavier than the core/sabot system, so one end of the barrel might be reinforced to take higher pressures. Another more unusual approach would be to fire the target assembly down an annular (ring shaped) bore. This design appears to have been used in the U.S. W-33 atomic artillery shell, which is reported to have had an annular bore.

These larger assembled masses give significantly more efficient bombs, but also require large amounts of fissile material to achieve them. And since there is no compression of the fissile material, the large efficiency gains obtainable through implosive compression is lost. These shortcomings can be offset somewhat using fusion boosting, but gun designs are inherently less efficient than implosion designs when comparing equal fissile masses or yields.

4.1.6.1.3 Weapon Design and Insertion Speed

In addition to the efficiency and yield limitations, gun assembly has some other significant shortcomings:

First, guns tend to be long and heavy. There must be sufficient acceleration distance in the gun tube before the projectile begins insertion. Increasing the gas pressure in the gun can shorten this distance, but requires a heavier tube.

Second, gun assembly is slow. Since it desirable to keep the weight and length of the weapon down, practical insertion velocities are limited to velocities below 1000 m/sec (usually far below). The diameter of a core is on the order of 15 cm, so the insertion time must be at least a 150 microseconds or so.

In fact, achievable insertion times are much longer than this. Taking into account only the physical insertion of the projectile into the core underestimates the insertion problem. As previously indicated, to maximize efficiency both pieces of the core must be fairly close to criticality by themselves. This means that a critical configuration will be achieved before the projectile actually reaches the target. The greater the mass of fissile material in the weapon, the worse this problem becomes. With greater insertion distances, higher insertion velocities are required to hold the probability of predetonation to a specified value. This in turn requires greater accelerations or acceleration distances, further increasing the mass and length of the weapon.

In Little Boy a critical configuration was reached when the projectile and target were still 25 cm apart. The insertion velocity was 300 m/sec, giving an overall insertion time of 1.35 milliseconds.

Long insertion times like this place some serious constraints on the materials that can be used in the bomb since it is essential to keep neutron background levels very low. Plutonium is excluded entirely, only U-235 and U-233 may be used. Certain designs may be somewhat sensitive to the isotopic composition of the uranium also. High percentages of even-numbered isotopes may make the probability of predetonation unacceptably high.

The 64 kg of uranium in Little Boy had an isotopic purity of about 80% U-235. The 12.8 kg of U-238 and U-234 produced a neutron background of around 1 fission/14 milliseconds, giving Little Boy a predetonation probability of 8-9%. In contrast to the Fat Man bomb, predetonation in a Little Boy type bomb would result in a negligible yield in nearly every case.

The predetonation problem also prevents the use of a U-238 tamper/reflector around the core. A useful amount of U-238 (200 kg or so) would produce a fission background of 1 fission/0.9 milliseconds.

Gun-type weapons are obviously very sensitive to predetonation from other battlefield nuclear explosions. Without hardening, gun weapons cannot be used within a few of kilometers of a previous explosion for at least a minute or two.

Attempting to push close to the mass limit is risky also. The closer the two masses are to criticality, the smaller the margin of safety in the weapon, and the easier it is to cause accidental criticality. This can occur if a violent impact dislodges the projectile, allowing it to travel toward the target. It can also occur if water leaks into the weapon, acting as a moderator and rendering the system critical (in this case though a high yield explosion could not occur).

Due to the complicated geometry, calculating where criticality is achieved in the projectile's travel down the barrel is extremely difficult, as is calculating the effective value of alpha vs time as insertion continues. Elaborate computation intensive Monte Carlo techniques are required. In the development of Little Boy these things had to be extrapolated from measurements made in scale models.

4.1.6.1.4 Initiation

Once insertion is completed, neutrons need to be introduced to begin the chain reaction. One route to doing this is to use a highly reliable "modulated" neutron initiator, an initiator that releases neutrons only when triggered. The sophisticated neutron pulse tubes used in modern weapons are one possibility. The Manhattan Project developed a simple beryllium/polonium 210 initiator named "Abner" that brought the two materials together when struck by the projectile.

If neutron injection is reliable, then the weapon designer does not need to worry about stopping the projectile. The entire nuclear reaction will be completed before the projectile travels a significant distance. On the other hand, if the projectile can be brought to rest in the target without recoiling back then an initiator is not even strictly necessary. Eventually the neutron background will start the reaction unaided.

A target designed to stop the projectile once insertion is complete is called a "blind target". The Little Boy bomb had a blind target design. The deformation expansion of the projectile when it impacted on the stop plate of the massive steel target holder guaranteed that it would lodge firmly in place. Other designs might add locking rings or other retention devices. Because of the use of a blind target design, Little Boy would have exploded successfully without the Abner initiators. Oppenheimer only decided to include the initiators in the bomb fairly late in the preparation process. Even without Abner, the probability that Little Boy would have failed to explode within 200 milliseconds was only 0.15%; a delay as long as one second was vanishingly small - 10^-14.

Atomic artillery shells have tended to be gun-type systems, since it is relatively easy to make a small diameter, small volume package this way (at the expense of large amounts of U-235). Airbursts are the preferred mode of detonation for battlefield atomic weapons which, for an artillery shell travelling downward at several hundred meters per second, means that initiation must occur at a precise time. Gun-type atomic artillery shells always include polonium/beryllium initiators to ensure this.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 23 May 2018 07:28

RoyG wrote:Anyone advocating anything > 300 kt has lost their mind.

BK needs to chill with the megaton language.
You have to read the prescriptions in context and in view of the timeframes being referred to.

1. To my knowledge, BK has used the megaton language in terms of proven, tested yields to characterize our 20 KT against a 3 MT from PRC. The point is about proven credibility of yields and capabilities thereof and not targeting strategies per se.

2. Every one of the NWS, who did have MT yielding warheads in their arsenal have still retained the high 3-5 MT total yield from each of the launchers, the difference being the warheads are in MIRV. Over time due to improving CEP's the need to have MT yielding warheads has decreased BUT the overall destructive power likely to be unleashed on a city has increased. Calculate the damage on a large metropolitan area from any of the NWS MIRV launchers. The point is the 300 KT limit you have prescribed is good for MIRV otherwise it is just another version of the minimum theory and no one but India is playing this minimum game.

China just tested one of their latest DF-41 with 10 MIRV's. So, if I have to requote you, we should advocate 300 KT *10? :)

Another key point, I would like to make in context of some of your posts on targeting, etc.

For all the conventional advantage we enjoy due to terrain and the high altitude and barren plateau and the long supply lines against China in Tibet, when it comes to nuclear it is a disadvantage for India. Our short-range and mid-range missiles are of no use to carry nuclear payloads, as our targets are all in PRC heartland and close to the east coast of China. OTOH, PRC is free to use its short and mid-range nuclear launchers against India from the plateau. Creates a great asymmetry and provides them with an easier route to escalation dominance, the increasing deltas in quantitive and qualitative carrier platforms notwithstanding.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 23 May 2018 08:33

ShauryaT wrote:
RoyG wrote:Anyone advocating anything > 300 kt has lost their mind.

BK needs to chill with the megaton language.
You have to read the prescriptions in context and in view of the timeframes being referred to.

1. To my knowledge, BK has used the megaton language in terms of proven, tested yields to characterize our 20 KT against a 3 MT from PRC. The point is about proven credibility of yields and capabilities thereof and not targeting strategies per se.

2. Every one of the NWS, who did have MT yielding warheads in their arsenal have still retained the high 3-5 MT total yield from each of the launchers, the difference being the warheads are in MIRV. Over time due to improving CEP's the need to have MT yielding warheads has decreased BUT the overall destructive power likely to be unleashed on a city has increased. Calculate the damage on a large metropolitan area from any of the NWS MIRV launchers. The point is the 300 KT limit you have prescribed is good for MIRV otherwise it is just another version of the minimum theory and no one but India is playing this minimum game.

China just tested one of their latest DF-41 with 10 MIRV's. So, if I have to requote you, we should advocate 300 KT *10? :)

Another key point, I would like to make in context of some of your posts on targeting, etc.

For all the conventional advantage we enjoy due to terrain and the high altitude and barren plateau and the long supply lines against China in Tibet, when it comes to nuclear it is a disadvantage for India. Our short-range and mid-range missiles are of no use to carry nuclear payloads, as our targets are all in PRC heartland and close to the east coast of China. OTOH, PRC is free to use its short and mid-range nuclear launchers against India from the plateau. Creates a great asymmetry and provides them with an easier route to escalation dominance, the increasing deltas in quantitive and qualitative carrier platforms notwithstanding.


MIRV allows you to overcome ABM defenses and hit multiple targets over broad distances. What you are referring to is MRV which are like buckshot citybusters. Nobody invests in this technology b/c of improved CEP. The only missile that I know that still does linear release in orbit is ss-18. Anything from 50-300kt is enough to totally incapacitate a large city. Do this to every major city and you just finished the country.

Our credible minimum deterrence concept was borrowed from 'limited' deterrence from Robert McNamara. He proposed a force of 1000 50 kt nukes. He was a bit ahead of his time.

What do increasing deltas in quantitative and quantitative carrier platforms or escalation dominance have to do with anything? If the guy so much as farts radiation he'll get shot in the head. Period. No country is going to risk it all when they've had a taste of the good life.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 23 May 2018 11:10

ShauryaT wrote:You can take this message to the bank. The SFC does not have confidence in our TN arsenal.

Bulls eye !!

Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, and eye only sees visible proof in explicit form.
LIF etc etc is for the nerds not warriors, on either side of the border.

One SFC very senior afsar (many years ago) i met many times was kazoo in understanding nuke physics & engineering matters (he was depending on hearsay opinion of russian reporter), not withstanding his Mig piloting skills when he was younger.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 24 May 2018 06:02

Haridas wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:You can take this message to the bank. The SFC does not have confidence in our TN arsenal.

Bulls eye !!

Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, and eye only sees visible proof in explicit form.
LIF etc etc is for the nerds not warriors, on either side of the border.

One SFC very senior afsar (many years ago) i met many times was kazoo in understanding nuke physics & engineering matters (he was depending on hearsay opinion of russian reporter), not withstanding his Mig piloting skills when he was younger.


At the end of the day nobody is going to risk even one nuke going off in a major industrial/financial/capital center. Just one 50-300kt is devastating. Now imagine all of them being hit. Why would any country risk it? Whether you have 20 MT or 50 kt, country will cease to exist in a full fledged nuclear conflict.

As far as thermonuke is concerned - if it failed, we should test. It's less Pu intensive, lighter, and packs more punch. Everything I've heard leads me to believe they had experimented with a new design. Perhaps it was some sort of 'pill boosted' weapon which uses LiD in place of Tritium at the center of the primary. This design is a bit more difficult to master which is why it proly didn't work as planned. Maybe Kakodkar and Co. thought it would be some sort of shortcut which could compress the fusion fuel without resorting to the traditional 'two stage' process.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 24 May 2018 11:02

RoyG ji, it's not as simplistic as you say.
Not wothstanding Chidambaram, Dr. Kakodkar gave his note to NSA saying we have to shortly conduct next round of test (to proof test rectified TN design). But 1998 was to remain the only window India got to test nukes. As he himself says in that interview, no way to breakaway from self imposed monitorium . :evil:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 24 May 2018 11:12

RoyG wrote:At the end of the day nobody is going to risk even one nuke going off in a major industrial/financial/capital center. Just one 50-300kt is devastating. Now imagine all of them being hit. Why would any country risk it? Whether you have 20 MT or 50 kt, country will cease to exist in a full fledged nuclear conflict.

Even a country that doesnt have much to lose off its frugal prosperity, N Korea found it necessary to slog and sweat to make a TN weapon (300-400kt consensus estimate) whereby it did not find 50 kt was enough. That invalidates your argument.

Leaving behind Indian deterrence to shame.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 24 May 2018 20:14

Haridas wrote:
RoyG wrote:At the end of the day nobody is going to risk even one nuke going off in a major industrial/financial/capital center. Just one 50-300kt is devastating. Now imagine all of them being hit. Why would any country risk it? Whether you have 20 MT or 50 kt, country will cease to exist in a full fledged nuclear conflict.

Even a country that doesnt have much to lose off its frugal prosperity, N Korea found it necessary to slog and sweat to make a TN weapon (300-400kt consensus estimate) whereby it did not find 50 kt was enough. That invalidates your argument.

Leaving behind Indian deterrence to shame.


When testing a TN it makes sense to test over 100 kt. They already mastered FBF. I already said it makes sense to employ TN over FBF since it is lighter and less Pu intensive. Regardless, it's all optics if all you're left with is FBF. 50 50kt is just as much a deterrence as 50 1MT. No country will seriously risk it.

Personally, I think India should give ultimatum to China. If it doesn't relent on NSG and powers keep India out of UNSC seat, India should so series test and give no indication when it will stop. Before elections, it may yield rich dividends. What is West gnna do especially with Russia and China playing a bigger role in economy.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 24 May 2018 20:34

Haridas wrote:RoyG ji, it's not as simplistic as you say.
Not wothstanding Chidambaram, Dr. Kakodkar gave his note to NSA saying we have to shortly conduct next round of test (to proof test rectified TN design). But 1998 was to remain the only window India got to test nukes. As he himself says in that interview, no way to breakaway from self imposed monitorium . :evil:


China not too long ago stole pill boosting tech from USA for neutron weapon. They did experiment w/ this design very early in their testing but I think they abandoned it for traditional TU design which was in fashion. I'm not sure why Kakodkar and Co. would experiment with pill boosting variation. It's relatively uncharted waters. They must've been very confident but missed something critical. Regardless, Modi isn't a disruptive candidate so I don't expect him to do it unless electorally he becomes potato or we are left in the cold with NSG and UNSC.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 24 May 2018 21:48

RoyG wrote:MIRV allows you to overcome ABM defenses and hit multiple targets over broad distances. What you are referring to is MRV which are like buckshot citybusters. Nobody invests in this technology b/c of improved CEP. The only missile that I know that still does linear release in orbit is ss-18. Anything from 50-300kt is enough to totally incapacitate a large city. Do this to every major city and you just finished the country.

Our credible minimum deterrence concept was borrowed from 'limited' deterrence from Robert McNamara. He proposed a force of 1000 50 kt nukes. He was a bit ahead of his time.

What do increasing deltas in quantitative and quantitative carrier platforms or escalation dominance have to do with anything? If the guy so much as farts radiation he'll get shot in the head. Period. No country is going to risk it all when they've had a taste of the good life.

Could you share some more details on your view that MIRV is largely not used in "buckshot" (not a bad analogy) mode? From what I have read, these targeting details are highly classified and scenario dependent. My understanding is nothing (except for the blast radius) stops the MIRV to be fired in buckshot mode?

That dude McNamara at one time was contemplating use of nuclear weapons in the 100's maybe over 1000 in Vietnam as counterforce weapons :roll: So, would not credit him with anything. Our minimum deterrence is the result of our own conditioning due to beliefs and resources and priorities. Maybe ramana can chime in on the history here with K.Subramanyam who led our doctrine.

One thing we need to be clear about is to NOT confuse intent and capabilities. We build capabilities to match risks and to not allow our adversaries a route to escalation dominance.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 24 May 2018 21:57

RoyG, I think a large yield FBF should also have been proofed in POKII and not rely on the TN only. But they could be shaft/tunnel challenged.

This does not jive with the supposed frugality of RC when he did not want to test the second TN on May13 per Telegraph or circa 1998.

The MND was a combined document of Sunderji, Johnny green, Talhiliani, Kalam, and KS garu.
This is stated in Perkovich book.
ABV added BCW to the threat matrix as he got intel that Pak was developing Bio weapons and there is no convention to ban them
E.g. Latur plague outbreak.
Yes our politicians are bad but not fools.
Devagowda, the master sleeper/humble farmer had those two tunnels of May 13 dug.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 25 May 2018 03:48

ShauryaT wrote:
RoyG wrote:MIRV allows you to overcome ABM defenses and hit multiple targets over broad distances. What you are referring to is MRV which are like buckshot citybusters. Nobody invests in this technology b/c of improved CEP. The only missile that I know that still does linear release in orbit is ss-18. Anything from 50-300kt is enough to totally incapacitate a large city. Do this to every major city and you just finished the country.

Our credible minimum deterrence concept was borrowed from 'limited' deterrence from Robert McNamara. He proposed a force of 1000 50 kt nukes. He was a bit ahead of his time.

What do increasing deltas in quantitative and quantitative carrier platforms or escalation dominance have to do with anything? If the guy so much as farts radiation he'll get shot in the head. Period. No country is going to risk it all when they've had a taste of the good life.

Could you share some more details on your view that MIRV is largely not used in "buckshot" (not a bad analogy) mode? From what I have read, these targeting details are highly classified and scenario dependent. My understanding is nothing (except for the blast radius) stops the MIRV to be fired in buckshot mode?

That dude McNamara at one time was contemplating use of nuclear weapons in the 100's maybe over 1000 in Vietnam as counterforce weapons :roll: So, would not credit him with anything. Our minimum deterrence is the result of our own conditioning due to beliefs and resources and priorities. Maybe ramana can chime in on the history here with K.Subramanyam who led our doctrine.

One thing we need to be clear about is to NOT confuse intent and capabilities. We build capabilities to match risks and to not allow our adversaries a route to escalation dominance.


MRV does saturation attacks because the warhead bus lacks the advanced inertial nav and maneuvering to do independent targeting of warheads. This was employed to increase the probability of hit of large cities and surrounding townships. With a single 200-300kt warhead with CEP < 100m you can achieve the same results.

MIRV on the other hand can cover wide geographical area. Sure you can drop 1-2 over a given target to ensure a successful hit but they are largely used to hit targets stretched over 100''s of miles.

Sure Mac said a lot of things but the point is on this particular issue he was a bit ahead of his time. He as far as I know drafted the first minimum credible deterrence doctrine which in my view would have worked just fine and saved quite a bit of $. If you look at most new gen warhead designs, they are trending < 200 kt. W88/87 and maybe a few others are exceptions but I think < 300 kt will be the norm going into the future.

No more MT nonsense. That era is over. Deterrence is still going to be around but its going to rest more on who will control this AI and alternative energy technology and what sort of cure to this general feeling of unhappiness you can provide. In all of these things Indian state is not even competing. Anyway this is a different discussion altogether.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 25 May 2018 03:51

ramana wrote:RoyG, I think a large yield FBF should also have been proofed in POKII and not rely on the TN only. But they could be shaft/tunnel challenged.

This does not jive with the supposed frugality of RC when he did not want to test the second TN on May13 per Telegraph or circa 1998.

The MND was a combined document of Sunderji, Johnny green, Talhiliani, Kalam, and KS garu.
This is stated in Perkovich book.
ABV added BCW to the threat matrix as he got intel that Pak was developing Bio weapons and there is no convention to ban them
E.g. Latur plague outbreak.
Yes our politicians are bad but not fools.
Devagowda, the master sleeper/humble farmer had those two tunnels of May 13 dug.


FGF appears to have worked. We seem to have mastered this technology. TN including pill boosting design probably needs validation. Whatever. At the end of the day nobody is going to hit us. Just sit tight and grow the economy, strengthen the institutions, and do massive reforms. This will strengthen deterrence.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramdas » 25 May 2018 04:21

@haridas:

Why is there no way to break out of the `self imposed moratorium' ? All we lose is the nuclear deal. Russia will continue supplying us nuclear plants, given that it itself is under sanctions. Full scale sanctioning of such a large economy is too disruptive for the world at large. Didnt happen in 1998. Wont happen now.

Given the united opposition NaMo faces, breaking out of this moratorium by testing the corrected TN would make sense, especially if done close to the LS polls. Something like this is necessary for NaMo to have a fighting chance in the next LS election.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 25 May 2018 04:56

ramdas wrote:@haridas:

Why is there no way to break out of the `self imposed moratorium' ? All we lose is the nuclear deal. Russia will continue supplying us nuclear plants, given that it itself is under sanctions. Full scale sanctioning of such a large economy is too disruptive for the world at large. Didnt happen in 1998. Wont happen now.

Given the united opposition NaMo faces, breaking out of this moratorium by testing the corrected TN would make sense, especially if done close to the LS polls. Something like this is necessary for NaMo to have a fighting chance in the next LS election.


I have said this as well. I have a theory as to what may have happened before and after Pokhran II. Vajpayee wanted to test but knew when he did that elements from within his own gov and opposition would shut him down real quick b/c they are compromised. He along with Rao proly instructed team to work on conservative TN design with high probability of success. Kakodkar and Co. went through the literature and found something he thought was super duper (some sort of pill boosted design). It failed. US came down on India hard and through secret talks may have given Vajpayee a choice. They may have felt that had they put too much pressure on India, pro-testing faction would have won out and tested again anyway and India would have eventually advanced its expertise to encompass more advanced designs and yields. They could have seen that India was using some pill design and shared some know how in the form of gifting equipment to cold test along with supercomputing tech to get them to perfect the design scalable to ~300 kt and keep us stuck there. Either way India probably has a very high confidence debugged design which they have been continuously refining over the years through some sort of alternate validation route. I wouldn't be surprised if Agni I, V, VI, Shaurya, K4, etc. all carry some variation of it. There has been 0 noise on this from anyone in gov so I think that's it. We may be content with some advanced pill design which is proly lighter than FBF but a bit heavier than newer gen TN warheads.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 25 May 2018 11:41

RoyG wrote:I have said this as well. I have a theory as to what may have happened before and after Pokhran II. Vajpayee wanted to test but knew when he did that elements from within his own gov and opposition would shut him down real quick b/c they are compromised. He along with Rao proly instructed team to work on conservative TN design with high probability of success.
DAE worked strictly under PMO. it is extreamly unlikely and speculative to think ABV in opposition party instructed DAE team to work on TN, much less a conservative one. In reality RC tried a very speculative design and failed due to overconfidence. Take it for what it is worth (I won't get into an argument on this).

Kakodkar and Co. went through the literature and found something he thought was super duper (some sort of pill boosted design).
unfortunately not true. There is some indication they were egged and climbed "dhaniya kaa peyd". BTW I do not know what is the pill design that you mention.
...... Either way India probably has a very high confidence debugged design which they have been continuously refining over the years through some sort of alternate validation route
.
That I agree. But that is nowhere even closly as valuable as demonstrated TN weapon.

Heck the team should have had wider than the tunnel vision, and put into the sixth tunnel a high yield fbf (didn't matter it's size or weight). Isolated tech team without any support of strategic thinker.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 27 May 2018 08:03

Pakistan’s sea-based nuclear deterrent and its asymmetric escalation strategy -- ABHIJNAN REJ
However, with the Modi government coming to power in 2014, there has been more than minor rumblings about the continued efficacy of India’s nuclear doctrine in a changing strategic environment. His party campaigned to power noting that, if elected, they would “study in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and update it if there was a need.[14] While such a review has not happened so far (at least publicly), there is broad consensus that India’s extant nuclear posture is no longer suitable in light of the growing capabilities of India’s adversaries.[15]


However, in this move away from a deterrent to war-fighting role for nuclear weapons, Pakistan is hardly alone. Over the past years, Russia too—with its “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy – has proposed to use low yield nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict in order to generate an operational pause. As Debak Das has recently written, the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, with its advocacy of “useable” nuclear weapons, seems to also move the US towards a posture that is more akin to full spectrum deterrence, in spirit if not in letter.[33] As such, the shifts in thinking about the role of nuclear weapons present significant challenges to Indian strategic planners and the international community at large.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 27 May 2018 08:23

ShauryaT wrote:Pakistan’s sea-based nuclear deterrent and its asymmetric escalation strategy -- ABHIJNAN REJ
However, with the Modi government coming to power in 2014, there has been more than minor rumblings about the continued efficacy of India’s nuclear doctrine in a changing strategic environment. His party campaigned to power noting that, if elected, they would “study in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and update it if there was a need.[14] While such a review has not happened so far (at least publicly), there is broad consensus that India’s extant nuclear posture is no longer suitable in light of the growing capabilities of India’s adversaries.[15]


However, in this move away from a deterrent to war-fighting role for nuclear weapons, Pakistan is hardly alone. Over the past years, Russia too—with its “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy – has proposed to use low yield nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict in order to generate an operational pause. As Debak Das has recently written, the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, with its advocacy of “useable” nuclear weapons, seems to also move the US towards a posture that is more akin to full spectrum deterrence, in spirit if not in letter.[33] As such, the shifts in thinking about the role of nuclear weapons present significant challenges to Indian strategic planners and the international community at large.


Why isn't India's nuclear doctrine suitable? Authorizing nuclear weapons in any capacity leads to full scale use.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 27 May 2018 08:36

DAE worked strictly under PMO. it is extreamly unlikely and speculative to think ABV in opposition party instructed DAE team to work on TN, much less a conservative one. In reality RC tried a very speculative design and failed due to overconfidence. Take it for what it is worth (I won't get into an argument on this).


I didn't say this. I'm saying that BJP played some role in its development, testing, etc. when in power.

unfortunately not true. There is some indication they were egged and climbed "dhaniya kaa peyd". BTW I do not know what is the pill design that you mention.


By who? Pill design is alternative 'fusion' design in which solid LiD is compressed within center of primary.

That I agree. But that is nowhere even closly as valuable as demonstrated TN weapon.


Maybe it worked and its all disinformation.

Heck the team should have had wider than the tunnel vision, and put into the sixth tunnel a high yield fbf (didn't matter it's size or weight). Isolated tech team without any support of strategic thinker.[/quote]

Nothing we can do about it now.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 27 May 2018 21:32

RoyG wrote:Nothing we can do about it now.

People and organizations must be held accountable & pay the price for landing nation and its future in mess. They certainly need to be brought down from their high pedestal and ivory tower, for their failure of such magnitude.

Strategic nuclear group organization & process require funding to make two independent excellence center that keep each other true, where each is capable of delivering. Else incestuous inbreeding will continue and nation put to jeopardy.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 28 May 2018 00:00

RoyG wrote:Why isn't India's nuclear doctrine suitable? Authorizing nuclear weapons in any capacity leads to full scale use.
There are two issues with our doctrine.

1. NFU. It lacks credibility in the eyes of our adversaries and there have been enough indications from those in decision-making circles that if there is a threat of an "imminent" attack, we shall not wait for a first hit. NFU also takes away some of the edge that we may need if confronted by a superior power. e.g: Big reason for IG to authorize POK I, was to signal the US. In those days, a nuclear weapon was the weapon of choice against carriers. NFU also puts an extra burden on India to be ready to absorb a hit and then retaliate in a manner that will end the war.

2. Massive retaliation. MR, by all means, a valid response to a nuclear attack lacks credibility as the only response to ANY nuclear or WMD attack. A scenario where a tactical lone strike against an armored formation in a foreign land, say destroying a handful of tanks being responded to with MR against civilians threatening the lives of millions, lacks any sense of proportionality. There could be instances where such a response may be valid however, to limit it by doctrine is an issue as many factors would be at play to determine such a response. There are other scenarios of WMD attack, where MR as the only choice is problematic.

The above parts have been debated before and Shiv ji had indicated a different take on these. Too bad, he is not here and I already miss him and his sharp responses.


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