Deterrence

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Supratik
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Re: Deterrence

Postby Supratik » 29 Sep 2018 15:46

Clandestine transfer of weapons or weapon grade uranium/plutonium from China cannot be ruled out.

Haridas
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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 29 Sep 2018 21:10

Nothing cladestine, Chine provided ready made Plutonium bomb to TSP in 1998 to save paki echendi. The Pu was detected by US air sniffing U2 flight.

Can someone provide link to a classic video and a v apt one, make by one Brf-ite?

Added later

here is the link:

Photochor: The Truth About Pakistan's Nuclear Program - YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3Dwci ... bOPf4M3jyp

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Re: Deterrence

Postby PratikDas » 30 Sep 2018 11:31

Haridas wrote:Photochor: The Truth About Pakistan's Nuclear Program - YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3Dwci ... bOPf4M3jyp

This is hilarious! Thanks :)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Ravi Karumanchiri » 30 Sep 2018 22:38

^^^^^^^^^ Your link is broken (because it includes your logged-in session routing, not available to anyone else). I think you meant to link-to this....


Rudradev
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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 17 Oct 2018 00:39

PratikDas wrote:
Haridas wrote:Photochor: The Truth About Pakistan's Nuclear Program - YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3Dwci ... bOPf4M3jyp

This is hilarious! Thanks :)


You're welcome :mrgreen:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby souravB » 17 Oct 2018 01:50

Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:^^^^^^^^^ Your link is broken (because it includes your logged-in session routing, not available to anyone else). I think you meant to link-to this....


OMG!!! I laughed for 5 mins straight after watching this.. :rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl:
This should go to the Terroristan description considering every fifth word they use is aatmi taqat. :lol: :lol:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 19 Oct 2018 09:23

Putin: Russia would only use its nuclear arms in retaliation - AP
Moscow: President Vladimir Putin says Russia would only use its nuclear weapons in response to an incoming missile attack.

Putin said Thursday Russia's military doctrine doesn't envisage a preventative nuclear strike. He noted that Russia would only launch a nuclear strike if its early warning systems spot missiles heading toward its territory, adding that "the aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable."

Speaking at a policy forum, Putin that "when we see a coming strike on the territory of Russia, we will retaliate." He acknowledged it will mean a global catastrophe, but emphasized that "we can't be those who initiated it."

"We would be victims of aggression and would get to Heavens as martyrs," while those who would launch the strike would "just die and not even have time to repent."

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Haridas » 19 Oct 2018 13:06

Rudradev wrote:
PratikDas wrote:This is hilarious! Thanks :)


You're welcome :mrgreen:

Rudradev, please take a bow, for the factual masterpiece, presented in easy way.

About 13 years ago I showed this to a US police sharrif (soccer dad) who had recently gone through anti terrorism training and learnt all kinds of Pakistani names who were honest followers of Islaam.

He liked the primer (of course he was uneducated in pakistani language and terms, so could not laugh full 5 minutes).

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 19 Oct 2018 20:27

Pakistan justifies China supplying it MIRV and the missile tracking system.

India’s decision to buy S-400 missile system will further destabilise region: Pak - PTI
Pakistan said on Friday that India’s decision to buy S-400 missile defence system from Russia will further destabilise stability in the region and renewed the arms race.

In a statement, the Foreign Office said the Indian purchase was part of its efforts to acquire a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System through multiple sources.

“This (S-400) will further destabilise strategic stability in South Asia, besides leading to a renewed arms race,” it said.

India and Russia concluded the $5 billion S-400 air defence system deal early this month during the visit of President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi for the annual summit with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The S-400 Triumf system is a next-generation mobile air defense system, which is capable of destroying aerial targets at an extremely long range of up to 400 kilometers. The S-400 is known as Russia’s most advanced long-range surface-to-air missile defence system.

The Foreign Office also claimed that following the May 1998 nuclear tests by both sides, Pakistan had proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime in the region, advocating against the acquisition of BMD systems due to their destabilizing effect.

Indian rejection of this proposal forced Pakistan to develop capabilities which render any BMD system ineffective and unreliable,” it said.


Pakistan remains fully confident of its ability to address threats from any kind of destabilizing weapon system, the Foreign Office said.

“We reiterate our commitment towards ensuring national defence in line with the policy of maintaining credible minimum deterrence and maintaining strategic balance in the region in the future as well,” it said.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 07 Nov 2018 11:15

Preserving the taboo: on nuclear arms control - Rakesh Sood, The Hindu
Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the U.S. is quitting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a bilateral agreement with Russia signed in 1987. The decision was not unexpected since the U.S. has long maintained that Russia has been violating the treaty and Mr. Trump has been critical of arms control agreements because, according to him, other countries cheat putting the U.S. at a disadvantage.

Mr. Trump’s decision has generated dismay and concern that this will trigger a new nuclear arms race in Europe and elsewhere. What it ignores is that the INF Treaty reflected the political reality of the Cold War — of a bi-polar world with two nuclear superpowers — no longer consistent with today’s multi-polar nuclear world. The greater challenge today is to understand that existing nuclear arms control instruments can only be preserved if these evolve to take new realities into account.

Under the INF Treaty, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to eliminate within three years all ground-launched-missiles of 500-5,500 km range and not to develop, produce or deploy these in future. The U.S. destroyed 846 Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs); and the U.S.S.R., 1,846 missiles (SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s), along with its support facilities.

Politics of negotiations

The INF Treaty was widely welcomed, especially in Europe because these missiles were deployed in Europe and the treaty was signed on December 8, 1987 in Washington by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan had earlier declared, “A nuclear cannot be won and must never be fought,” marking a ratcheting down of Cold War tensions that had been rising. By the early 1980s, the U.S.S.R. had accumulated nearly 40,000 nuclear weapons, exceeding the U.S. arsenal. In Europe, Russia replaced single warhead SS-4s and SS-5s with more accurate 3-warhead SS-20 missiles, heightening concerns. To reassure its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies about its nuclear umbrella, the U.S. began deploying Pershing IIs and GLCMs in the U.K., Belgium, Italy and West Germany, setting off a new arms race.

Growing rhetoric made the Europeans nervous. Realisation dawned that any nuclear conflict on European soil would only lead to more European casualties, catalysing a movement for ‘no-deployments’ in Europe. In the 1980s, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. began three sets of parallel negotiations — on strategic weapons leading to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), on intermediate-range weapons leading to the INF, and the Nuclear and Space Talks to address Soviet concerns about Reagan’s newly launched ‘space wars’ programme (Strategic Defense Initiative).

The INF talks originally considered equal ceilings on both sides but then moved to equal ceilings and non-deployment in Europe to address the sensitivities of allies. The U.S.S.R. wanted British and French missiles of similar ranges to be covered but the U.S. rejected the idea as also the inclusion of older 72 Pershing I missiles already deployed in Germany. To break the stalemate, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl made an announcement that Germany would unilaterally dismantle the Pershing 1s while the U.S.S.R. came up with a double global zero covering both shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles.

The U.S. agreed, Europe breathed a sigh of relief and the INF was hailed as a great disarmament treaty even though no nuclear warheads were dismantled and similar range air-launched and sea-launched missiles were not constrained. Since it was bilateral, the INF Treaty did not restrict other countries but this hardly mattered as it was the age of bi-polarity and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear equation was the only one that counted.


Changing political backdrop


Fast forward to 2018. Since 2008, the U.S. has voiced suspicions that with the Novator 9M729 missile tests, Russia was in breach; in 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama formally accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty. However, he refrained from withdrawal on account of European concerns. On the other hand, Russia alleges that the U.S. launchers for its missile defence interceptors deployed in Poland and Romania are dual capable and can be quickly reconfigured to launch Tomahawk missiles, constituting a violation. China has always had a number of Chinese missiles in the 500-5,500 km range but its modernisation plans, which include the commissioning of the DF-26, today raise the U.S.’s concerns.

The U.S.’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects a harsher assessment of the security environment faced by the U.S. and envisages a more expansive role for nuclear weapons than in the past. Russia is blamed for seeking the break-up of NATO and a re-ordering of ‘European and Middle East security and economic structures in its favour’. China is identified for the first time as a strategic competitor seeking regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region in the near-term and ‘displacement of the U.S. to achieve global pre-eminence in the future’. A 30-year modernisation plan with a price tag of $1.2 trillion with new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCMs) and low-yield warheads is detailed in the NPR. Russia has unveiled plans to develop a new nuclear torpedo and nuclear-powered cruise missile.

Even more worrisome are developments that blur the line between nuclear and conventional weapons. In order to lessen its dependence on nuclear weapons, the U.S. developed layered missile defences and conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities that use conventional payloads against strategic targets. Other countries have responded with hypersonics and a shift to lower yield tactical warheads. With growing dependence on space-based and cyber systems, such asymmetric approaches only increase the risks of accidental and inadvertent nuclear escalation.

Preserving the nuclear taboo

The key difference with today’s return of major power rivalry is that it is no longer a bi-polar world, and nuclear arms control is no longer governed by a single binary equation. There are multiple nuclear equations — U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, U.S.-North Korea, India-Pakistan, India-China, but none is standalone. Therefore, neither nuclear stability nor strategic stability in today’s world can be ensured by the U.S. and Russia alone and this requires us to think afresh.

The INF Treaty is not the first casualty of unravelling nuclear arms control. In December 2001, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the U.S.S.R. which limited deployment of ABM systems thereby ensuring mutual vulnerability, a key ingredient of deterrence stability in the bipolar era. The next casualty is likely to be the New START agreement between the U.S. and Russia, which will lapse in 2021, unless renewed for a five-year period. This limits both countries to 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs) and heavy bombers and 1,550 warheads each. However, Mr. Trump has described it as “one of several bad deals negotiated by the Obama administration”. The lapse of the New START would mark the first time since 1968 that the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would be unconstrained by any agreement.

The political disconnect is also evident in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the most successful example of multilateral arms control. It has become a victim of its success. It can neither accommodate the four countries outside it (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) as all four possess nuclear weapons, nor can it register any progress on nuclear disarmament. It succeeded in delegitimising nuclear proliferation but not nuclear weapons. This is why NPT Review Conferences have become increasingly contentious.

The most important achievement of nuclear arms control is that the taboo against use of nuclear weapons has held since 1945. Preserving the taboo is critical but this needs realisation that existing nuclear arms control has to be brought into line with today’s political realities.

Rakesh Sood is a former Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and currently Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 08 Nov 2018 01:20

ramana wrote:


Posting in full as its very important and shreds the Perkovich and the 'liberal' deluded Indian elite bakwas. The declassified letter is from Pran Nath Haksar. He was supposedly a leftist and if this was his advice then the whole Praful Bidawi types are toast.


Image of Jaguar omitted as its only good for show. it was the Mirage 2000 that operationalized it. This Jaguar was only good for kickbacks and killing the HF-24.

The main argument in favor of India going nuclear is the Chinese threat” — L.K. Jha (Secretary to Prime Minister) March 5, 1967

“A nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible” — P.N. Haksar (Secretary to Prime Minister) 1968

The Counsel of History

Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar recently made a controversial “personal” comment that perhaps India must revisit its no first-use nuclear policy. However, the only available document on Indian nuclear policy has been the “Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” which has fostered perpetual speculation on the vector and valences of Indian strategic doctrine. We have had little historical perspective on how Indian doctrine has absorbed Chinese and Pakistan nuclear threats ever since India carried out its first underground nuclear test — “Smiling Buddha” — in May 1974. There is still no consensus on what the historical reasons were for India to cross the no-bomb line or what internal discussions were taking place between the scientists and the prime minister’s office. However, newly declassified documents from the prime minister’s office, which include letters between the prime minister’s office and the Department of Atomic Energy, as well as correspondence between the prime minister and scientists help establish the specific considerations that went into the making of India’s nuclear doctrine. It revises arguments such as those of George Perkovich, that, in the second half of the sixties, “the (Indian) scientists acted without benefit of a national security strategy or requirement.” The documents reveal disquiet among India’s strategists about China’s repeated nuclear tests from 1964 onwards.



{In 1998 tests ABV wrote to Bill Clinton about the China factor in deciding to test again at Pokhran. Again Indi awas consistent in threat perception. It was US based NPA propaganda fed by deluded fools like IPCS head Chari and his coterie. Shows they were out of the loop.}

India’s “Long Telegram” and Crossing the No-Bomb Line

Perhaps the single most important document for establishing the evolving history of India’s nuclear weapons policy comes from P.N. Haksar, Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that may be dated to 1968. The note is titled “Need for India In a Changing World to Reassess her National Interest and Foreign policy.”


{Long verbose title guided by old school British practices. Could have been shortened to "Need for India to reassess Foreign Policy" as national interests don't get reassessed.}

The revealing document tends to defy most assumptions held about India’s nuclear policy regarding the level of “stand-off capability” that was being considered in the Prime Minister Secretariat. P.N Haskar wrote:

i. the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium range (2,000-3,000 miles) capable, from sites within India’s frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centers of population

ii. The development simultaneously of submarines driven by nuclear power fitted out to carry nuclear missiles

iii. This nuclear arms program should be based on adequate stockpiling of those sensitive instruments and machinery…. which will be difficult to import from abroad increasingly
[/I]

Haksar distinguished between the role of nuclear India as opposed to other nuclear powers. [b]Haksar also reveals his thought that India’s nuclear ambition should be clearly communicated with the United States at a relevant time.
The nuclear specter of China remained the overwhelming consideration. Haksar seemed to appreciate nuclear balancing in Europe and wrote of India’s “own security require that she becomes a nuclear power to establish a genuine balance of power with China.”


{So those frenetic world wide visits by L.K. Jha were just that. There was no way India would have come under any umbrella even if it was offered. It so happens such an umbrella was not offered and show the P-5 had India as a scape goat or a target in mind}

Haksar wrote this for the benefit of the Indian prime minister almost fifty years ago. This was India’s equivalent of George Kennan’s “long telegram” to the State Department. The long telegram also carried an unsparing assessment of Pakistan as “an unstable state contrived artificially” whose internal logic compelled the “inevitable and chronic hostility of Pakistan to India.” Haksar was India’s Kennan and much of what he assessed has become part of India’s enduring strategic culture. A study of it is central to any constructions of Indian strategic thought. The Indian long telegram assesses the great power approach to Indian nuclear ambition. Haksar acutely felt a “growing convergence of interest in Washington, Peking and Moscow of keeping India under pressure and using Pakistan for the purpose.” He also wrote of both Moscow and Washington having similar a view on balancing India and Pakistan: “making the development of nuclear arms by her (India) that much more difficult by providing measured quantities of arms to Pakistan.” It also gives a window to understanding the Russia-Pakistan rapprochement that was taking place, which had implications for China’s nuclear strategy towards both India and Soviet Union. Haksar grappled with Soviet attempts to gain leverage with Pakistan with the argument that Russia was weaning away Pakistan from China for its own reasons because “close understanding between Pakistan and China may bring nuclear tipped missiles aimed not only at India but the Southern flank of Soviet Union.” Therefore, the dangers of Pakistan and China colluding were not only for India but also for the Soviet Union, and that too in nuclear terms. Haksar self-reflection shows a strategist forming his thoughts rather than a draft where the thoughts are already complete. Uncertain of Soviet strategic intentions, Haskar’s writing reveals a realist exploration of the limits of Indo-Soviet cooperation even as in this same year (1968) military cooperation between India and Soviet Union had begun in earnest. The larger subcontinental strategy of Soviet Union was still not clear.


{Even after collapse of former Soviet Union its not clear even now.}

The Haskar “long telegram” cites Bhutto being under house arrest at the time but acknowledges the possibility of the “flamboyant” Bhutto taking Pakistan closer to China as indeed turned out to be the case. Ayub was seen by both the United States and Russia as a counterweight to India and neither of them wanted to strengthen the war-making capacity of Ayub, but rather his war-deterring capacity towards India.


Another immediate provocation for this “long telegram”: in 1968 Pakistan was looking to set up a nuclear reactor in East Bengal and was holding discussions with Westinghouse before ultimately withdrew. After Soviet statesman Alexei Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan in the same year, it settled for commissioning a feasibility study by Soviet “Technopromexport.” Soviets considered the cooperation a pure commercial transaction in the manner that France described much of its arms and nuclear sales. One of the reasons why Westinghouse withdrew from the bid was because, according to the Indian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan wanted to retain used fuel rods. If Pakistan had succeeded in creating the impression that it had a nuclear explosive device in East Bengal or even a nuclear facility in East Bengal that would have made any intervention by India in that region out of question. This is not to give the impression that India had designs on breaking off East Bengal much before 1971, but it was a factor that could not have been taken lightly by India.

{On the contrary Indian resolve to sever East Pakistan and limit the 1971 war to the East makes lots of sense. To deny a future nuclear plant infrastructure for Pakistan would be a strategic objective of the 1971 war.}

By 1967, as revealed by a cable from External Affairs official J.S. Mehta from the Indian embassy in Washington to the Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Prime Minister Secretariat that there were differences between the U.S. administration and Congress on the ICBM capability of the Chinese nuclear program. The administration felt that Chinese ICBM would only be ready by 1971-72 and miniaturization of warhead would have to precede any ICBM capability. Congressional hearings revealed that China was still struggling with submarine missile launch. Sidney Graybeal, an advisor to President Kennedy during Cuban missile crisis and a CIA expert on Chinese rocketry, informed Indian EZ official K.P. Jain that China was going to test an ICBM by placing a satellite in orbit irrespective of the size of the payload. The missile test itself would be into the Indian Ocean off the coast of Tanzania and the CIA was monitoring the presence of Chinese technicians in Tanzania. It was also apparent that the Cultural Revolution had not slowed down Chinese nuclear program. In April 1970, K.R. Narayanan (Policy Planning Division-MEA Ministry of External Affairs) wrote on the launch of the earth satellite by China as a follow up to his 1964 paper when he was Director of the China Division. At about this time Haksar had written that India’s “India’s future status in the world and her own security require that she becomes a nuclear power so as to establish a genuine regional balance of power with China.” In March 1969, the Government of India answered in Lok Sabha that it “did not consider it necessary to seek any nuclear umbrella.” (MEA, 1969) As a former Chairman of Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. M.R Srinivasan told the author, “no one in current memory knows that an Indian thinker as P.N. Haksar was already thinking in terms of a triad and it has till now remained hidden in the archives.”


{MRS truly jests. By that time Sarabhai had setup ISRO. Dr. Nag Chaudhri had started exploring Valiant at DRDL. Submarine feasibility studies were underway. I guess unless they seen in writing they don't want to connect any dots.}

The April 1970 satellite launch established that China had acquired MRBM range. Indian agencies were all basing their nuclear calculation around China. China’s nuclear program established the success of the Communist leadership in navigating through domestic political and economic upheaval while keeping the nuclear program a consistent priority. Subramanian Swamy had written in the October 1970 issue of United Service Institution of India Journal that in a nuclear conflict with a major power, China would have to rely on second strike with fifteen to twenty missiles to undertake assured destruction. (Swamy, 1970) Ten would be decoys and ten pointed at cities to penetrate Nike-X. Calculating for eluding sprint missile detonation height among other things, it would succeed in destroying at least three cities by radioactive fallout, which was a sufficient deterrent for China. This argument was a way of arguing that even a smaller number of missiles with appropriate strategies could give sufficient deterrence for counter value massive retaliation. This was a counterpoint to the United Nations study on the minimum deterrence, which placed the arsenal at one hundred warheads, thirty to fifty aircrafts and fifty missiles.

{Also by then the Ussuri River clashes between FSU and PRC were already over. And PRC had tested the CHIC-4 design which was later passed on to Pakistan.}


There was also an argument at the time that India should go in for a tactical weapon arsenal instead of strategic systems. As the PMO documents reveal, this was considered head on by the Department of Atomic Energy. The Indian atomic establishment argued that if China were to meet determined resistance from our ground forces while crossing the Himalayas, she could make use of tactical nuclear weapons and demoralize our troops. It concluded that the argument that India could impact the military situation by possessing only tactical weapons was a fallacy and that India needed to focus on developing strategic delivery capability rather than settling for a small tactical arsenal.


If China is using a nuclear weapon to bully or to annihilate our forces, we can expect China to escalate the conflict if the limited use is successfully countered by us. China is known to be developing a strategic nuclear weapon system involving long range guided missiles. Therefore, the only way by which we could deter Chinese escalation would be to ourselves have a strategic system capable of inflicting an unacceptable damage on China.


The only way to stop China from escalating was to have second-strike capability inflicting unacceptable damage. According to the Department of Atomic Energy, “paper tigers do not provide security, that is, you cannot bluff in regard to your military strength.” India would require a total defensive system rather than a prototype by a scientist. However, since Indian cities were within range of China’s intermediate missile arsenal, India would require longer ranges missile to bring Chinese cities within their striking capacity. The completion of the reprocessing facility at Tarapur, which had begun in 1968, was a pointer in the direction the prime minister’s office was thinking.


{Now we know why the Agni range and payload weight were given to Dr. Kalam when IGMP was began in 1984. He had proposed a small Re-entry Experiment (REX) and was given the range and payload weight objectives and asked to work it in. BTW in his ISRO days he used to do system architecture studies under Sarabhai guidance. No other supervisors.}

In conclusion, it would be a mistake to ascribe the wisdom of Indian nuclear doctrine and strategy merely to those who came in at the weaponization/operationalization stage. The archival history establishes that doctrinal inquiries went back to the mid-1960s. China was and remains the main nuclear threat for India. Indian nuclear doctrine considers China to be its main nuclear rival. Former National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon told the author that since Pakistani delivery platforms are essentially based on Chinese systems, it made them an extension of the Chinese nuclear threat.

Vivek Prahladan is a visiting researcher at Keio University in Japan.




svinayak thanks for posting this.


I would like to see those declassified material for we can understand better the decisions.


Finally the P.N. Haksar plan of 1968 has been operationalized with the deterrent patrol of INS Arihant.

viewtopic.php?p=2304119#p2304119

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 08 Nov 2018 01:22

The problem with Rakesh Sood article is he had gnan but no buddhi.
he is still pursuing the Nehruvian quest for world disarmament.
Not happening.
As long as experts like him are there giving advice, the US NPA dreams of Cap, Eliminate, and Roll back (CRE) will continue.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Kashi » 08 Nov 2018 08:01

It seems that PN Haskar had a very thorough grip on the state of things and the construct of Pakistan itself.

I wonder what made him give a very naive advice to Indira Gandhi about the Bhutto negotiations? Or was that PN Dhar?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 15 Nov 2018 00:52

Folks, Our Sanjay Badri Mahraj, PhD, LLM has written a new book on Indian Nuclear Strategy.
Here are link to Flipkart.

https://www.flipkart.com/indian-nuclear ... 83qb7r8kft

He studies the dual nuclear threat scenario.

I had the good fortune to read an advance copy. I will post my review soon.

Please read the book and comment here.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 15 Nov 2018 06:41

Kashi wrote:It seems that PN Haskar had a very thorough grip on the state of things and the construct of Pakistan itself.

We will not go into that much here. Suffice it to say that Indian leaders and policy makers have had extraordinary understanding of 'Pakistan', no doubt. One example. GoI openly said even at the time of war in 1965 that it was due to a power struggle between Ayub & ZAB.

BTW, it was P.N.Haksar's premise that further humiliation on Pakistan was unwarranted & counterproductive.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 15 Nov 2018 07:04

Arihant launch strengthens nuclear ‘triad’ - G.Parthasarathy, Business Line
Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced with justifiable national pride on November 6, that India’s first nuclear propelled submarine, INS Arihant, which was commissioned in 2016, was now operationally ready, as an integral part of its nuclear deterrent.

India earlier had the capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from the Air, mounted largely on its Mirage 2000 and Jaguar Aircraft, and by land based missiles, ranging from its Agni 1 missile, with a range 700-900 km, to Agni 5 Missiles, with a range of 5500 km. Its aim has been to develop a “credible nuclear deterrent”, with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons from multiple locations on land, air and sea, to all strategic areas and centres, in its two nuclear-armed neighbours —China and Pakistan.

The Arihant provides India with a capability to hit either neighbour from 300 meters under the sea. The sea-based missiles envisaged for this purpose are the Sagarika with a range of 750 km and the K-4, with a range of 3500 km. While land-based missile sites can be attacked and destroyed, a submarine-based deterrent is virtually impregnable against a missile attack. India is the only country having a sea-based nuclear deterrent, which is not a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council.

India will soon operationalise a second nuclear submarine the “Arighat” and is expected to have a fleet of four such submarines by 2022. According to US Federation of Nuclear Scientists, India currently possesses 130-140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has 140-150 and China 280. While India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan’s first weapons test was in 1990, on Chinese soil.

The China hand

In a recent book he authored, Thomas Reed, an American nuclear weapons designer and former Secretary of the US Air Force, stated that China’s “Pakistan Nuclear connection”, can be explained in the the following words: “India was China’s enemy and Pakistan was India’s enemy. The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave them the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build-a model for export.”

Gary Milhollin, another American expert, remarked: “Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist”. China has also provided Pakistan the designs of its nuclear weapons, upgraded its “inverters” for producing enriched uranium in Kahuta and provided it with Plutonium reactors and separation facilities, for building tactical nuclear weapons in Khushab and Fatehjang. Pakistan’s ballistic and Cruise Missiles are replicas of Chinese missiles.

India’s nuclear doctrine stated that its nuclear weapons would only be used in retaliation against a major attack on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which nuclear weapons are used. India also retains the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of major attacks on its territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which chemical or biological weapons are used. Pakistan, on the other hand does not have a formal nuclear doctrine.

The long time Head of Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, however, mentioned over a decade ago, that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. He added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces.

Kidwai also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. Pakistan’s statements in recent years have, however, indicated that it would not be averse to using tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with India.

China, like India, also had proclaimed that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But China has maintained a measure of ambiguity on whether its “no first use” pledge will be applicable to India. This became evident when China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman on July 29, 2004 rejected a suggestion from then Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh that both countries should adopt a “common nuclear doctrine”.

Subsequent discussions between Indian and Chinese experts have suggested that China maintains deliberate ambiguity on its nuclear doctrine, when it comes to dealing with India. Many legitimately ask whether this is meant to signal to Pakistan that China will come to its aid in any nuclear exchange Pakistan has with India, even if it is initiated by Pakistan. This Chinese ambiguity only adds to India’s determination to strengthen its “Triad” of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons.

India’s Agni 5 missiles can target China’s populous East Coast. Within the next four years, we would also have an adequate sea-based deterrent to deter China from holding out credible nuclear assurances to Pakistan that it would intervene should India choose to respond to use, or threats of use, of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan.

Bureaucratic morass

While India has a well-organised, streamlined nuclear command structure headed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet Committee on Security, it needs to address serious issues on the archaic structure of its Ministry of Defence. Most importantly, the key military figure in the Nuclear Command structure is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who generally holds office for less than a year. This is hardly the time adequate for him to become fully familiar the complexities of our Strategic Nuclear Command.

Sadly, repeated proposals including from high level Defence Committees and Task Forces, recommending appointment of a full time “Chief or Defence Staff”, or “Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee”, who will hold charge of the Nuclear “Strategic Forces Command” and report to the political authority, have gathered dust for years in the offices of the generalist bureaucracy of the Defence Ministry.

The present set up of the Defence Ministry needs to be drastically reorganised. Recommendations for such change even from the Parliament Standing Committee of Defence lie unimplemented.
We recently acquired our desperately needed first batch of artillery guns, after the Bofors controversy broke in the 1980s. This happened even as the full and detailed designs for 155 mm. Howitzers provided by Sweden, were gathering dust in the offices of the Defence bureaucracy, for two decades. There is also surely something wrong if it takes more than a decade to acquire new fighter aircraft, even as we are today facing a shortage of around 30 per cent in the sanctioned strength of our Air Force.

The writer is former High Commissioner of Pakistan

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Re: Deterrence

Postby sanjaykumar » 15 Nov 2018 10:37

Hmmm....when India can threaten China with assured and inevitable annhilation in response th a Pakistani nuclear strike, the Pakistani nuclear enterprise will be wound down. G. Parthasarathy does not seem to conflate with two, maintening the fiction of an autonomous Pakistani nuclear capability.

That needs to be articulated as the next goal of Indian nuclear doctrine. Along with adoption of Vietnam as an Indian nuclear proxy. Vietnam is foreseeable to enter middle income country status with a increasingly educated public. Without the ideological burden of Islam. With the above nuclear overhang, India can proliferate at will as can the Chinese.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby krishna_krishna » 28 Nov 2018 09:30

Interesting interview look at the face of paid chindu , track thoo, JNU jolawala, evanjeehadi non proliferation presstitute who could not digest/believe India having independent mission ready bada meal. Will come to him in the end, first important points :

1) What does Arihant completed nuclear deterrence patrol means ?

-This means Arihant has completed its first mission armed with full "Quota" of ballistic missiles, deployed to places from where it can launch second strike at important high value target and cities.With command and control in place to communicate the command in case to launch wherever the platform may be operating from.

2) Current range of missile operational is around 3K+ with Arihant. Future sub missile range is 5K+ with aridaman onwards for new maal we need bigger silos.

3) Porkis are trying for longer range missile is they can target important population centers in the south so your back is broken and you can never get back.

4) The true fear in Indian military policy makers was that with neighboring military in control of "new-clear" maal has big itch to use weapons (which are political weapons). Only active weapons in ready state to fire from long ranges will only deter these mad dogs.

5) Porkis will only use nuclear weapons first , only when major chunk of their territory is lost.

6) Indian territory, military or ships gets attacked by chotu maal will invite massive Indian retaliation.

Given his paid, non proliferation, massa paid chindu background look at the mediocre knowledge of so called professor doctor.

- He does not understand why ssbn submarine ? he thinks water maal would be used only after land and air options are exhausted/failed, poor chap thinks series and not parallel that you can use sea based for assured retaliation and not necessarily in a 1,2,3 manner. (Good admiral admirably says you have a point....)

- He did not even know that there are no technical restrictions to limit submarine operations but only human.

- Just because PLA is not able to master command and control, he assumes that Indian command and control works only close to shore, shallower waters :D

- Could not stop laughing when he asks question paid by his masters on actual number of subs, good admiral twists his chaddi saying I don't know the plans you quoted number 4 , so if I have to deploy 4 subs continuously always at sea I need 6 or 7 subs.

His face expressions were priceless on good admirals response. :rotfl:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02bWOkY7ZyI

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 29 Nov 2018 08:04

krishna_krishna wrote:Interesting interview look at the face of paid chindu , track thoo, JNU jolawala, evanjeehadi non proliferation presstitute who could not digest/believe India having independent mission ready bada meal.

That's a great interview.

The Vice Admiral has indirectly confirmed K4s were carried on the first deterrence patrol mission.

Happymon Jacob is a hoax. His recent article in The Hindu on the Arihant subject elicited all angry responses. He was clearly trying to create doubts, singing the same tune he is doing in the interview. Arihant not a potent boat, we lack 'Command & Control', K15 not good enough, K4 not ready, no proof it has been tested, Arihant is not designed to carry K4s, SSBNs take away civilian control of nukes, one SSBN not good enough, we have communication difficulties with an SSBN etc. Then, he weent on to say that Arihant destabilizes the delicate strategic balance. Really a fraudster.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Yugandhar » 29 Nov 2018 08:57

Happymon Jacob is a hoax. His recent article in The Hindu on the Arihant subject elicited all angry responses.


He had also said "There is no honour in dying of pulmonary oedema". It was a dig against those standing to defend Siachen. That was so cheap, I stopped my subscription of The Hindu.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby sanjaykumar » 29 Nov 2018 09:30

Fabulous presentation by Admiral Sinha-full confidence on display. He confirms my contention that India is stronger than what the Chinese can bring to bear on the Indo-Tibetan border. He is sanguine about Gwadar and obviously sees it as a target more than a strategic threat. Command and control in place, but I wonder if there is a type of dead man command in the Indian set-up. I believe he may have hinted at it ie in the escalation ladder, a rung will be reached such that a launch will be deemed ordered unless it is explicitly countermanded. That may be also a way to insure that the other side stand down from targeting command and control including the political leadership.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramdas » 29 Nov 2018 21:07

This interview indeed seems to indirectly confirm that the K-4 is operational. The satellite images put up by @Prasannasimha (from DFILITE on twitter) also seem to show one missile at the centre of each launch tube (unlike the 3 that would be there if it was the K-15). So, the K-4 may well be operational. It may have probably been tested many more times than news reports identified. Could @Haridas weigh in on this possibility?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2018 23:46

You can go to the Missiles thread and search for K4 test.
it has been tested enough times.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramdas » 30 Nov 2018 04:46

News reports only point out 3 K4 tests (March 2014 and 2 in March-April 2016 to a shorter 700 km range). A news report from Dec. 2017 stated that a 4th K4 test that was to happen was a no launch owing to some electrical issues (we can never know if this is true or false). There are no other reports of K4 tests. An SLBM would require more tests when even the A5 is not operational after undergoing 6 tests. So, more tests could have happened that news reporters missed. After all, even the 3 reports that came out came out a week or so after the actual test. All in all, the K4 seems to have become operational.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby prasannasimha » 30 Nov 2018 09:36

The K4 tests were always opaque with hardly any pics etc. There is only one video I think from DRDO. They have ckeverly masked tests and also obfuscated ranges to prevent detection by NOTAM's etc. I suspect even the range will have been underreported. 750 Km missile would have just been a stepping stone

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 30 Nov 2018 14:03

In fact, K4 was reported tested as early as c. 2010.

Another data point. On September 23, 2015, DRDO scientists associated with K-4 from DRDL, Hyderabad were presented with a special award for its design & development. Obviously, no award is given if the product wasn't finished.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby VinodTK » 30 Nov 2018 19:48

India under pressure to upgrade nuclear arsenal as major powers expedite modernisation plans in edgy world order
:
:
Contemporary political developments and advances in technology are challenging the uncomfortable but useful notion of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) that has ensured nuclear peace so far. Countries like India, a modest nuclear weapons power, which faces two nuclear adversaries, will now have to take them into account.

First, India’s no first use (NFU) pledge has been challenged by the low-yield theatre weapons deployed by Pakistan which believes theatre weapons are crucial for their defence against India’s conventional superiority.

But even a low-yield weapon is thousands of time more destructive than a conventional one. As of now India has promised “massive retaliation” against any nuclear use. The way it sees it is similar to the position of US defence secretary James Mattis who said in February “I don’t think there’s any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. Any nuclear weapon used anytime is a strategic game-changer.”

Second, India has to worry about a modernised Chinese arsenal that can defeat American counter-measures. In view of India’s somewhat primitive arsenal, the Chinese may be encouraged to think they can get away with a disarming first strike, eroding the stability provided by the idea of MAD.

Nuclear forces being upgraded and modernised globally are pressuring India once again, just as once the perpetual extension of the NPT and the CTBT pushed New Delhi across the nuclear threshold.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramdas » 30 Nov 2018 20:24

@SSridhar: The K-4 test in 2010 was a pop-up test. Not a full flight test. Regarding the award for K-4 development, the clincher would be if no award for A-5 development has been given out until now. The fact that the head of the K-4 team is now DG Missiles ain DRDO suggests that the K-4 development would not have stalled after the three tests in 2016.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 01 Dec 2018 07:41

ramdas wrote:@SSridhar: The K-4 test in 2010 was a pop-up test. Not a full flight test. Regarding the award for K-4 development, the clincher would be if no award for A-5 development has been given out until now. The fact that the head of the K-4 team is now DG Missiles ain DRDO suggests that the K-4 development would not have stalled after the three tests in 2016.

Ramdas, it doesn't matter what test it was. It obviously shows that tests have been going on for a long time. From what can be seen, DRDO missiles do get ready in five to six years after first test.

As for awards, I don't think we can negatively extrapolate it for any conclusion. Positive news, though, confirms conclusion. Nor, is it necessary that every successful missile project is awarded similarly or equally. If anything, A-4 should be credited for A-5.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby dinesha » 10 Jan 2019 21:47

Why is India’s no first use policy under so much strain?
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis ... ymu6I.html

In 2014, the election manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) included a promise to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine. It gave rise to speculations that the Narendra Modi government, upon being elected, would consider revoking India’s pledge of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. In an interview to ANI, Modi quelled those speculations by asserting that NFU won’t be revoked. “No first use is a reflection of our cultural inheritance,” Modi added.

Not just a politician like Modi, but scholars too had once tried to explain India’s nuclear posture using arguments of culture. Rajesh Basrur, an expert on South Asian security, had argued that minimalism and restraint are part of India’s “nuclear-strategic culture”. Culture can certainly be one of the factors but nuclear postures are first and foremost decided on the basis of structural realities.

As another scholar, Kanti Bajpai, argued in a 2000 paper, India’s nuclear posture after the 1998 tests evolved through a debate between three different schools of nuclear thinking: rejectionism; pragmatism; and maximalism. The final posture corresponds to the school which is more aligned with structural realities at that point of time. That India chose NFU in its draft nuclear doctrine (1999) and official nuclear doctrine (2003) was a result of structural factors favouring pragmatists.

However, in recent times, we have seen a number of statements from sitting and retired senior members of the nuclear security establishment questioning the NFU policy. No less than the then defence minister, Manohar Parrikar, expressed doubts over the utility of NFU in November 2016. Most recently, Lt Gen (retd.), BS Nagal , former commander-in-chief of the Strategic Forces Command, has called the NFU policy a “formula for disaster” and argued for dropping it forthwith.


It is true that India still officially sticks to a NFU policy but it is hard to deny that the consensus around NFU has weakened and that the maximalist position has grown stronger.

How have structural factors diluted the NFU consensus? In three ways.

First, NFU policy suits a power which wants to deter just nuclear wars.
In other words, if a nuclear weapons state is comfortably placed on a conventional (or, more broadly, non-nuclear) front with respect to its adversaries, it does not need to threaten first use of its nuclear bombs. India was, and continues to remain, a stronger conventional power compared to Pakistan. While China was conventionally stronger, India felt somewhat protected due to difficult terrain on the Himalayan border. Now, China’s impressive infrastructure and massive military modernisation have effectively eroded the Himalayan buffer. Now, the conventional disparity between India and China is not just huge but also more palpable. This is putting immense pressure on India’s NFU policy.


Second, India’s conventional advantage has been blunted by Pakistan through a clever use of sub-conventional assets (read terrorists) and threat of using tactical nuclear weapons against any Indian conventional response to a 26/11 type of an attack. India’s nuclear doctrine, that professes massive retaliation even against use of midget nukes, does not help. Pre-emptive counterforce (CF) strikes, if they can be executed, seem to be a way out of this problem. Nagal has openly advocated this strategy and Shivshankar Menon, the former national security advisor, has indicated openness to the idea.


Third, India today has access to much better technology than it had in 2003 when it released its nuclear doctrine. In their forthcoming paper, “India’s Counterforce Temptations”, two US-based scholars, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, list out the technologies that enable a CF posture for India. New Delhi now has more missiles and more accurate ones. It has high quality surveillance platforms. It can access commercially available remote sensing technologies. It is developing MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and investing in missile and air defence systems. While most of these developments may be relevant for China, they also make India more capable than ever before of executing CF strikes against Pakistan. However, it should be noted at this point that India is still a long way away from possessing the capability of executing successful CF strikes. And it may never reach there because Pakistan is rapidly increasing its arsenal size and improving the survivability of its nuclear weapons.

India’s solid fuel missiles have enabled it to move towards canisterised systems for storing its land-based ballistic missiles. Such systems can reduce turnaround times — earlier India used to rely on physical separation of components to prevent unauthorised use — and hence are suitable even for pre-emptive strikes in case the rival is shown to be readying its nuclear assets for use. Canisterisation has further enabled India’s nuclear deterrent to move to the seas. With INS Arihant, a nuclear propelled ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), India has a credible sea-based deterrent. With a couple of more SSBNs, it can boast of a genuine nuclear triad. But SSBNs involve pre-mating of warheads with ballistic missiles, and hence increase the strain on command and control, especially with the NFU policy intact. Both canisterisation and sea-based deterrence thus increase the strain on NFU policy.


These three changes have created a more propitious ground for nuclear maximalists. There is no single strategic culture that is immune to changes in structural realities.

kunal.singh@htlive.com

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Re: Deterrence

Postby nam » 10 Jan 2019 23:37

There can only be conventional counter force strike. Not nuclear.

It is frankly a waste of time writing reports about nuclear warfighting, becoz there cannot be one.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby kit » 10 Jan 2019 23:53

sanjaykumar wrote:Hmmm....when India can threaten China with assured and inevitable annhilation in response th a Pakistani nuclear strike, the Pakistani nuclear enterprise will be wound down. G. Parthasarathy does not seem to conflate with two, maintening the fiction of an autonomous Pakistani nuclear capability.

That needs to be articulated as the next goal of Indian nuclear doctrine. Along with adoption of Vietnam as an Indian nuclear proxy. Vietnam is foreseeable to enter middle income country status with a increasingly educated public. Without the ideological burden of Islam. With the above nuclear overhang, India can proliferate at will as can the Chinese.


a pertinent observation. A credible and survivable Indian nuclear threat to China even in the face of a " full spectrum" Pakistani nuclear deployment will render Pakistan as a "useless" strategic client state of China.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Prem » 11 Jan 2019 00:58

Chinese snake oil selling 0830 and 49.00

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Re: Deterrence

Postby souravB » 11 Jan 2019 03:46

OT but couldn't help posting it
May be I am too green but I find it refreshing to see Raisina Dialogue being conducted over an copious amount of alcohol. Panelist and guests being offered whiskey and cognac on camera while in discussion. It is a fresh air to my ears when even a Russian delegate says he'll get drunk.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 12 Jan 2019 16:00

I liked the Russian presentation, especially by Rogov. They spoke to the point, unlike the Chinese Professor.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby dinesha » 15 Jan 2019 16:56

Angles And Dangles: Arihant And The Dilemma Of India’s Undersea Nuclear Weapons
https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/angle ... r-weapons/

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Re: Deterrence

Postby dinesha » 18 Feb 2019 18:19

India’s Counterforce Temptations-Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities
-by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pd ... nload=true
....
We argue that these apparently discrepant capability developments are most likely the result of India’s conscious pursuit of more ºexible options beyond countervalue targeting—namely, counterforce options against Pakistan’s longer-range nuclear systems—and are largely not the product of either technological drift or strategic confusion.

If our assessment is correct, then these developments are an early indication of India’s exploration and development of options to target Pakistan’s strategic nuclear systems in a conºict. Unlike India’s nuclear strategy toward China, which appears to remain countervalue assured retaliation, available evidence suggests that India may be developing options toward Pakistan that would permit it to engage in hard nuclear counterforce targeting, providing India a limited ability to disarm Pakistan of strategic nuclear weapons.3 Such a development would entail a decoupling of India’s nuclear strategies toward its two neighbors.

...


...
The article proceeds as follows. First, we situate India’s nuclear developments in the context of broader strategic developments in the India-Pakistan relationship. Second, we document a growing number of statements by recent Indian ofªcials offered in a private capacity while serving or shortly after retirement that call into question India’s NFU commitment and demonstrate interest in being able to execute disarming attacks. Third, we discuss Indian nuclear force developments over the last two decades, which have substantially improved India’s ability to conduct hard-target counterforce strikes despite continuity in India’s ofªcial nuclear doctrine. Fourth, we assess Pakistan’s likely responses to these developments and conclude that India’s prospects for counterforce success are dubious and the adoption of a counterforce strategy—or Pakistan’s fear of its adoption—could have signiªcant deleterious consequences. This conclusion implies that just as conventional military options have failed to resolve India’s Pakistan dilemma, adjustments to its nuclear strategy are similarly unlikely to yield positive results—and may increase the risk of catastrophic outcomes. Finally, we consider the implications of these ªndings for scholars’ understanding of theories of nuclear strategy and the prospect of a broader era of counterforce in the emerging nuclear landscape.
..


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