Deterrence

[Umrao Das]

No!!!
Bum currency is for intimidation. therefore PRC will have maximum for the love of India.

Because it can be at the receiving end if it goes into numerical equivalency or competing with Ivan or AmeriKhans.

remember "true pleasure lies in the company of inferiors"

[shiv]

The internet has many resources to remove the tamas of ignorance and light up with the jyoti of gyan. But it requires the effort to search and read.

For example the effect of "overpressure" to take out bunkers was mentioned casually by me and has been mentioned by others. It is worth using the link Johann provided to see what yields you need to "take out bunkers"

A buried concrete arch of the type designed to withstand a nuclear attack requires over pressures of over 200 psi. Even "light" arches require 120 to 160 psi

Now Using the link to the bomb effects computer provided by Johann you find that:

A 3 megaton bomb produces a max overpressure of over 200 psi at 1 km radius.
A 3 megaton bomb at 1.6 km (1 mile) produces a max overpressure of 110 psi (hardened bunkers unaffected)

A 1 megaton bomb provides 130 psi within a 1 km radius (hardened bunkers unaffected)
A 1.6 km (1 mile) the max overpressure psi reduces to 51 psi (hardened bunkers unaffected)

That means that to take out one underground bunker in one location the exact location of a nuke in that bunker should be known accurately (to within 1 km) and a 3 megaton bomb has to fall in that 1 km radius. Anything more and the 3 megaton bomb is wasted. A missile that has travelled 5-8000 km has to drop is payload within 1 km of a designated spot, and that designated spot should be known to contain a missile in an underground bunker. And if there is a network of bunkers tens of kilometers long how accurately can the 3 megaton warhead be targeted given that the exact site is unknown? Any sensible adversary would be moving his assets around continuously underground. China, as far as I can tell - has mounted its 3 megaton warheads on its US directed 12000 km ICBMs. The rest are gravity bombs, and I doubt if China has more than 12 to 20 3 megaton warheads.

So exactly what is it that anyone is saying when there is a reference to a "counter-force strike" that takes out a large proportion of Indian deterrent with the "overpressure" of megaton yield warheads?

[NRao]

China, as far as I can tell - has mounted its 3 megaton warheads on its US directed 12000 km ICBMs. The rest are gravity bombs, and I doubt if China has more than 12 to 20 3 megaton warheads.

from: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-is ... na-cdi.htm

They have 17 3.3 MTs based on a missile with a range of 5,400+ Kms. And, they have 20 4-5 Mt based on a missile with a range of 13,000 Kms, BUT, these are being replaced by a missile with a range of 11,000+ Kms BUT hosts 200-300 Kt weapons. Currently they estimate 6 of these new 11,000+ Km missiles, with numbers expect to grow to 75-100 in another seven years or so.

So, by 2015 or so China should be down to some 17 3.3 Mt weapons (from 37 Mt based missiles) on a missile with a range of 5,400 Kms or so.

Which means that China's main missile threat will be 200-300 Kt on 11,000 Km ranged missiles.

BUT, what is of interest is that the weapons are really OLD. Missiles will be new.

I would not be surprised if China dismantles her Mt weapons by about 2025 or so.

[Sanku]

Wasn't that discussed in Rudradev's post itself, behavior of PLA in prior wars?

I have already stated the fact that i disagree with him and my question was directed at you. You have "passed the buck" to Rudradev and ducked the question .

So behavior in other wars indicates behavior after nuclear war? I believe that this is ignorance, but let me continue with the logic-defying line of thought you are proposing.

If behavior in non nuclear situations equated to behavior in the nuclear scenario then Chinese should have no problem with collisions against walls in their cars. You are deterred from crashing your car against a wall. Are the Chinese deterred? If the Chinese are deterred by walls a nuclear bomb should be a far bigger deterrent. Unless you can construct logic to say that the Chinese are deterred only by collisions against walls and by nuclear arsenals bigger than theirs, but are not deterred by anything in between those two extremes.

Shiv; I do not believe that there is any onus on me to justify what the expected behavior of the Chinese is or will be when faced with a nuclear attack.

The fact remains that ALL the P 5 powers possess
1) TN which are unambiguously demonstrated to the design yield
2) Have unambiguously demonstrated delivery vehicles.
3) Possess significant stockpiles

Three of these powers pursue MAD even today

The remaining two can easily put wipe out at least 1 large size adversary.

These are open demonstrated facts.

Also it is demonstrated that all the P5 have chosen to acquire and maintain these capabilities even in "globalized peaceful world" and target each other as well.

That alone is proof enough what they expect their deterrence stand to be.

Also open and demonstrated facts are that CPC routinely treats a large part of its population as dispensable, and it not averse to loss of large populations up-till recent times.

In light of all the above, and many such examples posted here by Rudradev (I find it easy to refer to others thank you very much, it is not cop out it is efficiency, as unlike you I am not a free thinker who can come up with brand new solutions. I only refer to existing work) and some by me, it is obvious what China is preparing for.

I am sure some will claim the Indian way of doing things, which is not discovered any body else in the world. Deterrence with a 25 Kt nuke -- I believe the onus is on them to explain how the Indian way will work when the entire world (which is slightly bigger than America) works in a particular way.

The question is not ducked, however even in light of demonstrated behavior of P5 with light of their capability some one thinks that the 6 person will be fundamentally different -- the onus is on them to show how.

[Sanku]

I would not be surprised if China dismantles her Mt weapons by about 2025 or so.

Are you using astrology? Otherwise how can you talk about the future at all. Or is this argument only selectively applicable?

Anyway, since we are all, including Shiv, who claims that any claim on the future must be astrology is talking about what is enough with a view on how things will be in future, let me throw my hat in the ring.

China will have NEW MT nuclear warheads by 2025. Its missiles are designed with that in mind in the first place. They will not mount 200 KT weapons on missiles designed to carry MTs. Why would they?

Nature abhors singularities despite all the digital electronics, the real world is continuous.

[Sanku]

I would like to address what I term as MVRamana syndrome - where whatever India does is wrong and it is implied that what others do is right.

I hope you are not talking of those who dont follow the "Some in GoI said there fore Bum worked" here, because they dont take to being labeled very well, including me, and get back with labels for others of their own and many of the orignial labelers dont find the return compliment nice, threads tend to get locked then.

So kindly avoid getting into piskological analysis of why others are saying what they are saying since they certainly can speak for themselves and find no need for others who cant understand them to ascribe thought to them.

Also I wish people would avoid talking about Sanathan and co, since it would reopen a can of worms, which has been buried after due diligence to get the one thread locked.

Finally, things go back to Sundarji for a lot of issues, but not all.

[NRao]

China will have NEW MT nuclear warheads by 2025. Its missiles are designed with that in mind in the first place. They will not mount 200 KT weapons on missiles designed to carry MTs. Why would they?

You seem to have a point. Will need to investigate that a little more. (Do you have a URL for a new MT weapon? TIA.)

But, the current trend is very clear. They have no Mts designed in the past 30 years. Which is rather odd - that they would design missiles for Mts and then not deploy Mts!!

[Umrao Das]

We dont trust Wallace we dont trust Amerikhans findings but we model based on Barbie ( Ok Baneberry) and quote their expereinces with bunker busting data etc.

While Santanam makes a mistake of 70mm to 75 mm we say he is not credit worthy? no...

We are like this onlee

5 tests data = 5000 test data no?

like 1 Paki >= 10 Yindo SDRE

[Sanku]

We dont trust Wallace we dont trust Amerikhans findings but we model based on Barbie ( Ok Baneberry) and quote their expereinces with bunker busting data etc.

While Santanam makes a mistake of 70mm to 75 mm we say he is not credit worthy? no...

We are like this onlee

5 tests data = 5000 test data no?

like 1 Paki >= 10 Yindo SDRE

Very well put.

[Umrao Das]

China will have NEW MT nuclear warheads by 2025. Its missiles are designed with that in mind in the first place. They will not mount 200 KT weapons on missiles designed to carry MTs. Why would they?

You seem to have a point. Will need to investigate that a little more. (Do you have a URL for a new MT weapon? TIA.)

But, the current trend is very clear. They have no Mts designed in the past 30 years. Which is rather odd - that they would design missiles for Mts and then not deploy Mts!!

PLA has its officers on secondment in Sandia and Los Almos. One such Was When Who Leeway

[NRao]

Cannot talk of Baneberry (although personally I can vouch for that methodology in another field).

I have no problem with Santhanam, except that V Sunder and BR have to retract the article and Chengappa has to withdraw his statement too.

OR Santhanam has to provide one more data point (which is what I thought would be the "other shoe").

Besides, the GoI team (and Chengappa) have been very consistent.

Actually this radius stuff has nothing to do with personalities - just pure equations (that have been presented here).

That the S1 was a fizzle is a possibility - no two ways about that. But, IF we were to base the fizzle on the crater radius provided by Santhanam then something has to give. The question is what - either radius (Santhanam) or depth (Chengappa - and by extension V Sunder/BR).

[Sanku]

Cannot talk of Baneberry (although personally I can vouch for that methodology in another field).

NRao lets leave this one fizzile vs sizzile debate (although I would very much like to have) for the benefit of this thread.

Let us just discuss what we need and or like for deterrence, irrespective of what we have or what we have achieved towards that so far.

[ldev]

In the evolution of atomic and subsequently thermonuclear weapons since 1945, one side or the other in a adverserial relationship has held at various points of time overwhelming superiority in terms of warheads, weapon class or megatonnage. And yet deterrence did not break down. I wonder why?

[Sanku]

In the evolution of atomic and subsequently thermonuclear weapons since 1945, one side or the other in a adverserial relationship has held at various points of time overwhelming superiority in terms of warheads, weapon class or megatonnage. And yet deterrence did not break down. I wonder why?

Because the deterrence was never tested, the conditions for doctrines to put to test never arose?

[Umrao Das]

me two

[NRao]

Let us just discuss what we need and or like for deterrence, irrespective of what we have or what we have achieved towards that so far.

No problem.

Having said that two things:
1) "deterrence" is a very fluid thing - both mentally (each one will have something diff) and "computing" it - I doubt we will ever agree on anything. But, we can find out what is common, and
2) I have always maintained India has deterrence. Even if a single missile with a 50 Kt load gets through is enough to prevent a first strike on India

Let me know what you think.

[Umrao Das]

No.
watch this movie.




Available in Walmart for 4.99 + tax please.

[Sanku]

Let us just discuss what we need and or like for deterrence, irrespective of what we have or what we have achieved towards that so far.

No problem.

Having said that two things:
1) "deterrence" is a very fluid thing - both mentally (each one will have something diff) and "computing" it - I doubt we will ever agree on anything. But, we can find out what is common, and

I agree.

2) I have always maintained India has deterrence. Even if a single missile with a 50 Kt load gets through is enough to prevent a first strike on India

Deterrence against whom? Anyway irrespective of the nation in question --

I definitely do not agree with this, I believe any nation ready for a nuclear war, and possess over a 20-30 warheads will definitely expect to take in a 50 Kt load. A 50 Kt load will at best dent a large city, much larger damages have been caused by purely conventional wars (protracted of course).

If I expect to lose a part of Calcutta (say) and my reply would be to hit 30 enemy cities with 1 MT nuke each, hey I would do it. I fully expect that to be done by others too.

[NRao]

I definitely do not agree with this, I believe any nation ready for a nuclear war, and possess over a 20-30 warheads will definitely expect to take in a 50 Kt load. A 50 Kt load will at best dent a large city, much larger damages have been caused by purely conventional wars (protracted of course).

What do mean by "ready for a nuclear war"?

Does it mean a willingness to initiate a nuclear exchange?

Or do you mean a willingness to inflict nuclear damage BUT escape a retaliation?

IF it is the prior, then there are examples - as late as Clinton and Bush II - when both the presidents preferred not to use a nuclear device because there was that very small "chance" that a retaliation was possible (from NK). And, it was really small - BUT it was there. (The article is in NYTimes - I had posted it.) So far, from open sources, every incident that has reached this stage has hinged on the fact that that one single missile might get back - and THAT dent prevented the political .

Whatever NK had was a deterrence. Small as it was. As unreliable as it was. Whatever it was the small "dent" it would have could have caused was sufficient to deter the US.

Deterrence holds in the latter - and actually in a minimalistic way.

It is my opinion and understanding that my ability to destroy or to prevent you from destroying is not really part of the deterrence. It is a part of post-deterrence - which is not what we are discussing I think. (????)

[ldev]

In the evolution of atomic and subsequently thermonuclear weapons since 1945, one side or the other in a adverserial relationship has held at various points of time overwhelming superiority in terms of warheads, weapon class or megatonnage. And yet deterrence did not break down. I wonder why?

Because the deterrence was never tested, the conditions for doctrines to put to test never arose?

What is the meaning of "deterrence was never tested". Can you give an example.

[Umrao Das]

Deterrence did not breakdown except in couple of cases.

1) Deterrence between USA & USSR because USSRs magnanimity or some like Johaan may say USSR chickened out.

2) Detrrence between USSR & PRC broke down. Because again USSR's magnanimity or chickened out.

3) Detrrence between Pakistan & India broke down, because India's magnanimity or chikened out.

[shiv]

No.
watch this movie.




Available in Walmart for 4.99 + tax please.

Ha Ha - so funny. I am reminded of my aunt who told me about her daughters' (my cousins) one day "One is in Malleshwaram and the other is in Kent" I thought both were areas of Bangalore.

4 rupees 99 paise must be the cheapest movie in India. Plus tax is a joke - if you pay cash you can avoid the tax. But where is Walmart?

[svinayak]

No.
watch this movie.




Available in Walmart for 4.99 + tax please.

I have watched this 50 times till now.
It gives all the information about how the world turned up in the last 30 years from 1980.
RAND corporation simulated wargames from 1960s or even earlier on different regions of the world. You can see some of them on the screens in the movie.

[Umrao Das]

Just takable distance

[shiv]

If I expect to lose a part of Calcutta (say) and my reply would be to hit 30 enemy cities with 1 MT nuke each, hey I would do it. I fully expect that to be done by others too.

Now you're talking.

I have no dispute with this statement as long as you do not claim that the ability fight a nuclear war and hit back with 30 1 MT nukes will somehow stop (deter) the very nuclear war you want to fight by creating magical megaton deterrence that cannot be created by 50 X 50 kt nukes.

That is exactly the sort of claim made by some on here and I suppose you do not support that claim any more.

If you have a huge arsenal there is no guarantee that it will deter anybody. The huge arsenal only helps to ensure that you can hit someone else hard if you are not deterred by the other guy and are willing to write off a few cities and a few million people of your country. By hitting him harder, you lose your cities and people anyway and if I am dead after such an exchange I would not be around to see you celebrating your victory. But if I was around I would want to know exactly what kind of victory was being celebrated when you have lost 30 cities and you have knocked out 30 of someone else's cities.

The whole idea of deterrence is to avoid losing your cities and avoid such celebrations.

Stating that nuclear war can be avoided by claiming that X bombs of Y yield will deter the other guy while any numbers less than X or Y will not deter him is an absurd prediction that can never be proven. It can only be disproved. How does one base deterrence on a concept that can only be disproved?

The best one can hope for in terms of deterrence is to promise that you will not start a nuclear war but if someone else starts a war you will punish him hard. The kiloton versus megaton argument is only an argument about quantum of damage AFTER nuclear war has started. It has nothing to do with deterrence. At best you can decide what quantum of punishment you want to inflict on the other guy in a nuclear war. But claiming that the pre-decided quantum of punishment serves as "deterrence" is absurd because you do not yourself believe that kiloton nukes are good enough for deterrence. A time may come in future when Bangladesh aims 10 kiloton nukes at you and you may laugh off that threat and say "Hey I will lose Kolkata but will decimate Bangladesh. I am not deterred LOL ".

If you are not deterred by kiloton nukes what would make anyone imagine that others are thinking exactly like you. There will be others who laugh disdainfully at your megaton gigabooms and still others who are scared of 10 kiloton nukes. You don't know who is scared by what and in the absence of astrology you can never predict that X weapons of Y yield each with "deter" the next guy.

The only "certainty" in deterrence is what deters YOU. The only other thing is whether you can hit back with nukes if the other guy is not deterred. And how much you can punish him.

[shiv]

I believe that a lot of people in India's strategic community have confused "deterrence" with "ability to fight nuclear war"

Deterrence means no nuclear war.

Nuclear war means deterrence is over.

You can, however plan for both.

You can say " I do not want nuclear war" - stating plainly that you are "deterred" by the idea of nuclear war. At the same time you can prepare for a nuclear war.

But saying that you are preparing for nuclear war to deter the other guy is silly. The other guy is also preparing for nuclear war against you. Your "deterrence" has no effect on his preparations for nuclear war.

Also, you claim that you are deterred. if you are deterred by him why the hell are you preparing for war? You are preparing for nuclear war because you are afraid that he is not deterred by you. You preparations are for nuclear war, not deterrence. Since you are afraid that he is not deterred you are preparing to punish him. And since you are preparing to fight nuclear war with him despite his superiority, it only means that his megaboom superiority is not deterring you from preparing for nuclear war.

The lesson here is simple. nobody is deterred by the size of anyone else's arsenal. Your idea in nuclear war is clear. You are going to lose a lot anyway. But while you lose a lot you must not allow him to "win" without punishing him as severely as you can. You may decide that you want multimegaton yields for that.

So the megaboms of your arsenal (if any) are not for "deterrence". They are for war. If you need megaton gigabooms - you need them for war, not for deterrence. Do not confuse war with deterrence.

Claiming that megaton bombs are required to "deter" someone is wrong and it is shocking (to me) to hear that some of our "strategic thinkers" imagine that this is the case. We need to make megaton yield bombs to fight nuclear war and one must have no confusion about that. It is frightening to see people of influence mistaking deterrence for war and vice versa.

[samuel]

I am not so sure about this.
An enemy's strength might deter me from launching an attack, but an enemy's ability to attack will not deter me from becoming stronger (at least to the point of matching). It will encourage me to be stronger so that I might be able to deter him in the same way as he is deterring me from launching an attack from his stronger position. If I am stupid enough to let an an enemy's strength to not deter me from attacking or knowingly deter myself from strengthening in response from a known ability of the enemy to attack from his position of strength, then I am finished or am at the mercy of the enemy. Whether or not my enemy actually is deterred when I match up to him is not actually known but assuming the contrary is somewhat puzzling. None of the countries that have weapons thought so either.

If we further assume that a nuclear weapon is a rational choice, by this we mean it is a weapon available for use in a war even as it is far more potent, then if there is strategic advantage in using it, our enemy could use it. But then deterrence is the same as in a conventional sense of having parity or matching up. On the other hand if we assume that a nuclear weapon is such a macabre choice, then one thing we can do is to ensure that if it is used, it is over for the enemy, in the hope that the enemy is not so irrational as to not see that. If the enemy truely does not then we have no choice but to prepare ourselves and do our darndest every minute to marginalize their ability to inflict any harm on us. In that case, parity is just a start not an irrelevant non consequence.


S

[shiv]

I am not so sure about this.
An enemy's strength might deter me from launching an attack, but an enemy's ability to attack will not deter me from becoming stronger (at least to the point of matching). It will encourage me to be stronger so that I might be able to deter him in the same way as he is deterring me ...

S

This is where you begin to assume that your enemy thinks like you. This is an assumption. A lot of people are talking of deterrence based on an assumption that the other party thinks in a particular way. You are saying that the other party might think like you. That is an assumption.

I disagree with that assumption.

[Umrao Das]

using shiv ji analogy of ant fantasizing elephant.....
(instead of long posts)

If ant is only fantasizing but not penetrating elephant its deterrence(in working) status.

If the ant penetrates and also ejeculates in elephant then its a Nuclear war, the staus is no longer fantasizing.

The out come is antelephontom of the opera for the world.

[V_Raman]

I am not so sure about this.
An enemy's strength might deter me from launching an attack, but an enemy's ability to attack will not deter me from becoming stronger (at least to the point of matching). It will encourage me to be stronger so that I might be able to deter him in the same way as he is deterring me from launching an attack from his stronger position. If I am stupid enough to let an an enemy's strength to not deter me from attacking or knowingly deter myself from strengthening in response from a known ability of the enemy to attack from his position of strength, then I am finished or am at the mercy of the enemy. Whether or not my enemy actually is deterred when I match up to him is not actually known but assuming the contrary is somewhat puzzling. None of the countries that have weapons thought so either.

If we further assume that a nuclear weapon is a rational choice, by this we mean it is a weapon available for use in a war even as it is far more potent, then if there is strategic advantage in using it, our enemy could use it. But then deterrence is the same as in a conventional sense of having parity or matching up. On the other hand if we assume that a nuclear weapon is such a macabre choice, then one thing we can do is to ensure that if it is used, it is over for the enemy, in the hope that the enemy is not so irrational as to not see that. If the enemy truely does not then we have no choice but to prepare ourselves and do our darndest every minute to marginalize their ability to inflict any harm on us. In that case, parity is just a start not an irrelevant non consequence.


S

if i understand this right, i believe this is called an arms-race.

[Manish_Sharma]

Here we have two things:
1.) Size of target city: Example Shanghai: 6,340 sq.km., Mumbai : 456 sq. km.
Now 3 warheads of 50kt. will have different results infra-damage/deathwise on these two due to the size they are spread over.
Immediately it may seem that Shanghai too is in trouble due to people left injured etc.

2.) Survival of both civilizations post nuclear war.

Now after one country has bombed the other to pashan yug and the other has bombed the first to kansya yug. In next 100-200 years and longer run wouldn't the country which had been hit with smaller warheads on its bigger spreadout cities get advantage to race ahead of the other?

[Sanku]

You can say " I do not want nuclear war" - stating plainly that you are "deterred" by the idea of nuclear war. At the same time you can prepare for a nuclear war.

Yes this is true, and there is no confusion.

Deterred does not mean unpreparedness.

We dont want a conventional war either, but maintain and army all the same.

Only Chacha Nehru the original visionary was bright enough to understand that if we dont want war, why have army? unfortnately 62 got in the way.

As long as you cant wrap your mind around the concept that, although Nuclear war is horrendous, it may still happen if the other person thinks he can lose 5% of his total strength and then completely decimate you, you will also not understand deterrence.

-----

Obviously there will always be assumptions in life, its just that some are believable are some are visionary, like Chacha Nehru's

The best one can hope for in terms of deterrence is to promise that you will not start a nuclear war but if someone else starts a war you will punish him hard. The kiloton versus megaton argument is only an argument about quantum of damage AFTER nuclear war has started. It has nothing to do with deterrence.

Obviously NOT

The quantum of punishment you can give will determine whether or not the other party is up for adventures which can result in those.

Ramu may risk breaking a mango for a single cane stick trash, he wont risk it if that may mean the owner will shoot him though.

Yeah, we can never know what the owner will do since we cant predict the future, but if the owner keeps a gun, puts a board saying Keep out, has been shooting animals getting into his yard yada yada what does that say.

All this "we dont know what the future will bring hence everything today is same" is a discussion for Advaita and not Nuke deterrence.

[Rudradev]

Now after one country has bombed the other to pashan yug and the other has bombed the first to kansya yug. In next 100-200 years and longer run wouldn't the country which had been hit with smaller warheads on its bigger spreadout cities get advantage to race ahead of the other?

Of course. Why 100-200 years? Even in the next few weeks the Chinese could more easily bring relief supplies to their cities which we have bombed. Their B-Country (rural and unpopulated areas) would be relatively untouched because we have only kiloton devices and we are only going to use them in airbursts over the cities.

They would face no fallout because we will not have carried out any groundstrikes (which require MT-plus weapons).

They could still use their fundamentally superior infrastructure to transport supplies because we will not have taken out their transportation hubs (which, again, requires high-yield weapons to achieve effectively).

The resources and supplies they have stored in their B-country would not be touched, because we will be spending all of our kiloton-yield weapons on their cities alone. Considerable portions of their industrial and agricultural production base will survive intact because our limited arsenal will not damage them at all.

And they would have plenty of unaffected B-country space to efficiently re-locate the survivors of their bombed cities, thus avoiding potentially far higher numbers of civilian casualties compared to the numbers killed in the initial strike.

Compare this to India on the receiving end of a comprehensive Chinese nuclear attack: groundstrikes creating long-term fallout, crippling our infrastructure, rendering large parts of our B-Country useless or inaccessible, destroying our means of production and logistic assets.

And all this is assuming that their first-strike megaton weapons don't knock out the bulk of our strategic assets, preventing us from launching any sort of meaningful retaliation at all.

There is no question to any sensible observer that we will have it far worse in the event of a nuclear exchange with the Chinese, because their arsenal is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to ours.

No amount of semantic gerrymandering over the meaning of "deterrence", no blanket declarations that "it is absurd to make assumptions about what the enemy thinks", can detract from this extremely simple fact.

We cannot know "what they are thinking", but we do know-- and they also know-- that they have more capacity to damage us than we have to damage them. If deterrence is based on the capacity to inflict damage (what else?), the conclusion is obvious.

Maybe after all it is best to recognize that "deterrence" is a term devoid of any inherent meaning whatsoever (just as well, because if you never know what is going to "deter" your enemy then pursuing "deterrence" is by definition a hopeless goal).

Today, "deterrence" is simply the excuse cited by nations for activities which actually amount to preparing for the contingency of having to fight a nuclear war... nothing less, nothing more. It is a fluffy term with no more actual substance than "war on terror" or "enemies of freedom".

And in preparing a suitable arsenal for the contingency of a nuclear war against the Chinese... we have a very long way to go indeed.

[Umrao Das]

Simple pooch
Why is PRC interested in AP when It has trouble in Ughiristan and Tibet?

[svinayak]

Simple pooch
Why is PRC interested in AP when It has trouble in Ughiristan and Tibet?

It shows that nuclear deterrence has not worked. Not with 25kt

[Rudradev]

Simple pooch
Why is PRC interested in AP when It has trouble in Ughiristan and Tibet?

PRC thinks that seizing AP will help to consolidate Tibet and end its troubles there. AP can also establish a bridgehead for potential Chinese expansion to the Bay of Bengal, snipping off India's Northeast in concert with Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Uighurs meanwhile are on top of the ISPR's "Al-Keeda of the Month" charts... any Uighurs dangerous enough to be an actual threat to the security of China are fighting in AfPak, and because of the tallel-than-mountain-fliendly concerns, they are the first ones whose positions the TSPA rats out to American drone pilots. The Uighurs actually living in China are simply victims who can be intimidated or eliminated Tian-an-men style.

So PRC's "Uighurstan" trouble is actually quite well under control thanks to the coopelation of its Paki dogs.

[Umrao Das]

Thanks Acharya.

That PRC can go into contentions and make threats, trasparent,, physical by encroaching, strategic entrapment in international fora, demographic and cartographic aggression relentlessly, be in SIberia or AP or Burma Or Tibet or in Nepal, is clear indication of its intent overt and covert.

That PRC is able to do this vis a vis India is an indication that PRC is not detrred but just waiting for the right opportunity to stage a conventional move, to overtly test our capability to flex Nuclear dterrence. Should AP fall to them are we going to abondon the use of MIRVs of 8 Kt to 20 Kt {certified by Wallce & co} as FU? Since we dont have TNs ( Tactical and Thermo?)

[shiv]

Maybe after all it is best to recognize that "deterrence" is a term devoid of any inherent meaning whatsoever (just as well, because if you never know what is going to "deter" your enemy then pursuing "deterrence" is by definition a hopeless goal).

Today, "deterrence" is simply the excuse cited by nations for activities which actually amount to preparing for the contingency of having to fight a nuclear war... nothing less, nothing more. It is a fluffy term with no more actual substance than "war on terror" or "enemies of freedom".

And in preparing a suitable arsenal for the contingency of a nuclear war against the Chinese... we have a very long way to go indeed.

Precisely.

I think it is important to know what one is talking about, while talking.

The need for a bigger arsenal of bigger bums is for nuclear war against China among other countries. It is decidedly not for deterrence so it is important to get that source of fog out of one's mind.

China with its vast land mass stretching from Gobi and Tibet has two Indias worth of 'B country' that Chinese can easily occupy in case even 10 percent of their city areas become unlivable. Furthermore as you point out India will be unlivable even in B country because Chinas 300 nukes at round level will make all of India unlivable even for the Chinese. Having said that you have also pointed out how the Chinese have behaved in prior wars so they may not mind living with fallout in India.

All things considered, India has already lost because even if India quadruples it weapon stockpile we cannot make China B country unlivable.

Under the circumstances of certain defeat as per your own analysis, what is the rationale for your recommending that India meeds more and bigger bombs? To me your recommendation seems like a pointless exercise. India's do little achieve less minimalist doctrine appears quite sensible don't you think?

[svinayak]

Thanks Acharya.

That PRC can go into contentions and make threats, trasparent,, physical by encroaching, strategic entrapment in international fora, demographic and cartographic aggression relentlessly, be in SIberia or AP or Burma Or Tibet or in Nepal, is clear indication of its intent overt and covert.

But thing is that it is doing what Uncle/Aunty wants it to do. It is not apparent from outside but closer info gives a different picture.

That PRC is able to do this vis a vis India is an indication that PRC is not detrred but just waiting for the right opportunity to stage a conventional move, to overtly test our capability to flex Nuclear dterrence. Should AP fall to them are we going to abondon the use of MIRVs of 8 Kt to 20 Kt {certified by Wallce & co} as FU? Since we dont have TNs ( Tactical and Thermo?)

I dont have any answer for your questions.
China military modernization gives a scary picture

[Sanku]

The need for a bigger arsenal of bigger bums is for nuclear war against China among other countries. It is decidedly not for deterrence so it is important to get that source of fog out of one's mind.

Deterrence exists only on the basis of your enemies war preparedness ability. So preparing for war is deterrence.

Its simple.

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Added later -- missed this out

Under the circumstances of certain defeat as per your own analysis, what is the rationale for your recommending that India meeds more and bigger bombs? To me your recommendation seems like a pointless exercise. India's do little achieve less minimalist doctrine appears quite sensible don't you think?

The answer is self evident, from above can China really defeat India should it chose to? Yes, unless we develop a capablity to have more bums than their bums such that we can inflict MAD on them.

Should we aim for MAD with China -- yes probably.

Short of MAD are we nuke nood?

No -- the fallacy is that any deterrence less than 100% is same as that of 0%, thus 20% deterrence is as good as 50% deterrence (% referring to kind of situation in which CPC will not use Nukes)

The bigger the arsenal the bigger the space. 0 Nukes does not mean that we automatically become targets of war, tomorrow. Just as 1 50 Kt does not mean that we will never have war.

It is like figuring out the intersection point of two curves, the curves are for cost vs gain, w.r.t. the nuclear exchange.

People like BC et al have done this exercise and find a particular number, that number is also the number of missiles and warheads possesed by smaller P5s.

So we can safely say, that we need AT LEAST a certain number of nukes for deterrence to start being effective. This is the minimum talked about.