Deterrence

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 21 Nov 2009 17:24

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-5.html
out of a current arsenal of over 10000 warheads, the US only has 50 bombs with yields over 3 megatons.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 21 Nov 2009 17:25

Amber G. wrote:NY times report about US...
Panel Sees No Need for A-Bomb Upgrade


That is a report that can get the US to ratify the CTBT, after which India will be committed.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 21 Nov 2009 17:40

Chinese megaton nuclear tests
http://www.nti.org/db/china/testlist.htm

21 May 1992 - 660kt to 1 MT
16 Oct 1980 - 200 kt to 1 MT(Last Atmospheric test by any country)
17 Nov 1976 - 4 MT
17 Jun 1974 - 200kt - 1 MT
27 Jun 1973 - 2-3 MT
14 Oct 1970 - 3-3.4 MT
29 Sep 1969 - 3 MT
27 Dec 1968 - 3 MT
17 Jun 1967 - 3-3.3 MT

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Viv Sreenivasan » 21 Nov 2009 17:57

The US has conducted over 1000 nuclear tests to extensively verify the capability and effectiveness of their Nuclear arsenal. India has conducted a bare handuful and that only with low yeild weapons and you want me to believe that India has an effective deterrerant nuclear arsenal?? :roll: :roll: .

Worst case scenario- we have untested nuclear bombs that when it comes to a showdown will fizzle rather than go BANG!.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 21 Nov 2009 18:35

Viv Sreenivasan wrote:you want me to believe

Believe what you like boss. Nobody's stopping you from believing anything. India has no nuclear arsenal - so that is why the name of the thread is "deterrence" and not "nuclear war"

But I do spend a lot of time reading things (for my own information, and posting things that i think may be information for others who are interested) and I have a fair idea of who posts what information, and I have read the last 6000 or so posts on this and related threads. Thank you for posting your beliefs on this thread. If this is a shoot and scoot that is fine. If you are going to be a troll - you won't be the first, or the last. Just requesting you not to let your trolling get disruptive.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 21 Nov 2009 19:44

How long before hydrodynamic technology proliferation, isn't that easier? Can you then imagine open source "test my bomb" computer codes, isn't that even more easier? How is the nuclear deterrence supposed to hold up this way?

S

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 21 Nov 2009 20:15

samuel wrote:How long before hydrodynamic technology proliferation,

S



You know Samuel - that is why the key is fissile material

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 21 Nov 2009 22:02

The US has conducted over 1000 nuclear tests to extensively verify the capability and effectiveness of their Nuclear arsenal. India has conducted a bare handuful and that only with low yeild weapons and you want me to believe that India has an effective deterrerant nuclear arsenal?? :roll: :roll: .

Worst case scenario- we have untested nuclear bombs that when it comes to a showdown will fizzle rather than go BANG!.


Interesting post, since it actually contains multiple threads of thoughts.

From Indian deterrence PoV, everyone agrees that India has between 50-100 fission based nukes. I assume you do not consider them to be an effective deterrence. Santhanam too has stated that India has viable fission weapons. His particular concern is WRT to the TN device.

On testing
:
India: A test is conducted not just to match a yield, there are other reasonS too
India: Tests are political first, technical second
US: The US ALSO conducted MANY very low yield test. If fact I would venture to state that MOST of their tests were non-MT, and many among those non-MT were very, very low yield. Also, we have to realize and come to accept that nukes were considered for pure civilian purposes too, so low yield had non-military applications at that time in their (US) minds. So, not all 1000+ tests has military applications
US: "Over 1000 tests". And in spite of that many tests the US is gravitating towards an arsenal of smaller yield weapons and at best DAY weapons. From what little research I have done there seems to be a convergence between Indian and at least the US view of nukes back in the 90s. And, I have a good feeling that the chinese too are headed that a way. (BTW, someone had mentioned China and new MT weapons, I have still not found ANY mention about such a thinking.) In fact I would say that India followed the US and China to build much smaller yields and DAY weapons - this trend I THINK started around the mid 80s.

Worst case scenario is when an aggressor attacks India and India retaliates. It is worst case for more countries than the attacker and India actually. For India has a known arsenal of some 50-100 25-80 Kt nukes. (And, perhaps you should read Nov 29, 2009 FT - there is a single sentence out there to provide a bigger picture.)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 21 Nov 2009 22:15

- that is why the key is fissile material


You mean in the trivial sense of that being part of the bomb or in the sense of FMCT?
Either way, it doesn't matter when the nations that could far more easily deny technology proliferated and now hope that nations with far more material and little technology (say) won't. So,in what sense is fissile material key in the face of proliferation? Even if it were, you think that it is only a matter of time that technology to extract U (for example) becomes more sophisticated and then the same proliferation cycle continues to gain competitive advantage. What deterrence then?

See, for example, the potential for uranium and as the technology moves left to right, fissile material becomes that much less of a deterrence of deterrence.

Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 01:14

Gerard wrote:Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 02:22

NRao wrote:I would suggest that you use the Toman curves in the V Sunder article I posted a few posts ago to come up with a table.

To me this entire episode revolves around:

Santhanam's observations and expectations: Depth 120 meters, crater radius 72 meters, estimated yield about 25 Kt. Observed: No crater, dust rising, shaft in tact, A-frame in tact. The point being EVEN at 15 Kt yield (forget about Santhanam's estimated yield) there should be a crater. Why was there not one at yield estimates way above 15 Kt?

RC/Sikka: Depth 230 meters, estimated yield 45 Kt. Observation: No crater, shaft in tact, A-Frame in tact, some rising dust that settles with a small bulge in the middle. Point being EVEN at maximum yield of 45 Kt there can be no crater and there was none.

So, to me BOTH go against Santhanam's position. (That is not a knock on Santhanam, but I am certainly questioning his position based on numbers from both sides.)

Anything beyond that - he could have, may have, think he may have, could be that ........ is speculation beyond what we have. Which is fine, but I am really not interested in that.

I do think the one entity that can break this situation is the IA. They should have the depth to which S1 shaft was dug.


We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to. Reasonable doubt with available public data is all that is needed, and we have that.

Santhanam refused to divulge the DOB in September. He still has a tremendous level of largely self imposed sense of responsibility in him not to divulge data. Data that he has access to in spades and was in charge. He came out with the DOB information, only and only after the Ramachandran article, obviously fed by the BARC crew. If you go through Ramachandran’s previous articles, his confidential access to BARC is clear.

Another thing is the more sqeaky clean the BARC calculations appear, my sense of doubt of the underlying data being manipulated increases. KS, has not yet divulged any of the CORRTEX information or other data, he has access to. What he desires is an investigation of this entire matter, instead of a judgment call based on a few set of leaders. When the government appointed the DRDO to measure certain aspects of the test, they cannot selectively throw out certain results. When there is a case for a credible doubt, by the agency responsible, the logical answer is to retest.

This is where the timelines and the players involved comes in. For this post, I will take the liberty of treating each of the players as mere mortals and not as demi gods or evil asuras.

On May 11, 1998 the day of the TN test itself, an offer for CTBT was made. Who would instigate such a thing. Shiv’s assessment of the political leaders across the board, living in fear of sanctions, is only partly true. The real player here is the MEA. At the time of the tests, there was no minister for the MEA. It is BM that effectively handled this aspect and hence, I attribute the offer for CTBT in the very first and subsequent statements to him. The offer was reiterated on the 13th and on the 23rd, it was announced that no more test were planned. On the 28th this plan of not conducting additional tests, was surprisingly turned into a voluntary moratorium. Ask the question, who was responsible for this policy. Only two names pop out. ABV and BM.

The above was the politics of it. A set of tests to provide India with an overt minimum level of assured weapons. There was no serious assessment of what constitutes a deterrent arsenal et al. The military was not involved in these strategies on the desired set of tests.

Given the above background, who chose what is to be tested and the purpose of these tests. Unsurprisingly then the BARC chose, a single weapon and the other four were used as data collection points. RC, believing that these tests, will provide enough data points to be able to design future weapons. This view of RC is seriously challenged within BARC and outside and has no precedence. Nevertheless, RC was the leader of the recently constituted AEC and the point man for this exercise representing the scientists. He was the person APJ being the scientific adviser to the PMO went to. Now, combine BM being the point person, who is saying the tests have to be limited due to foreign pressures and RC believing that the tests were not even needed.

Given the above pre-dispositions, the results come in. DRDO presents its initial results, expressing doubt that the TN test likely failed. The BARC believes that it succeeded. (I will give the benefit of doubt to RC and crew here, that they truly believed). The political dispensation does not desire additional tests and neither does the leader of the scientists. Now note the statement of May 17, 1998. It is a joint statement of the DAE and DRDO. I sense the role of APJ in this statement, where KS is asked to stand down and APJ sides with RC.

So, a political decision not based on science was made regarding the outcome of the tests.

What happened after that is the DRDO submitted a detailed test report, a report prepared by KS that APJ did allow to be submitted as the official view of the DRDO. However, he sided with RC, do not know, the RC report was in yet.

It seems in about the 5-6 ways to determine the results of the tests, the ones that rely mostly on physics, do not pass muster.

What we have here is a case for credible doubt. Do not expect to resolve this doubt in the public domain. As for your last statement, that the IA or military could break this log jam, doubt it. For, if the GoI was listening to them, we would not be in this place, in the first place.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 03:30

ST,

I am willing to discuss points. I cannot discuss statements that are not explained.

ShauryaT wrote:We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to.


Why?

(I have explained why it can be.)

Reasonable doubt with available public data is all that is needed, and we have that.


Again a statement without an explanation (unless I am missing something).

Santhanam refused to divulge the DOB in September. He still has a tremendous level of largely self imposed sense of responsibility in him not to divulge data. Data that he has access to in spades and was in charge. He came out with the DOB information, only and only after the Ramachandran article, obviously fed by the BARC crew. If you go through Ramachandran’s previous articles, his confidential access to BARC is clear.


Certainly. I do NOT expect him to divulge data that he cannot.

HOWEVER, I do expect him be aware that whatever data that he does divulge will be subjected to scrutiny. And, that is all I have done. Taken an acceptable equation (used for decades) and used Santhanam's data to see where we stand. It does not fit!!! Nothing to do with me - except for the donkey work I did and expected someone else to verify it.

What Santhanam has divulged so far just does not fit - else prove that it does, which is fine with me and have requested it many a times.

Another thing is the more sqeaky clean the BARC calculations appear, my sense of doubt of the underlying data being manipulated increases. KS, has not yet divulged any of the CORRTEX information or other data, he has access to. What he desires is an investigation of this entire matter, instead of a judgment call based on a few set of leaders. When the government appointed the DRDO to measure certain aspects of the test, they cannot selectively throw out certain results. When there is a case for a credible doubt, by the agency responsible, the logical answer is to retest.


I do not agree with you on most of these things - from a technical angle. I will reserve the right (as they say) to respond at a later date.

The rest is not my cup of tea. Such things happen and the fact that the parties kept quite for so long is proof that ALL of them are part of this entire mess. Personally I did not and do not see any reason for this to surface at this point in time. As I have said (perhaps in not so few word) 1) India has deterrence, 2) CTBT is NOT an issue and 3) S1 was tending towards a sizzle, if not a total sizzle.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 03:34

We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to.


Are you saying the entire set of issues associated with S1? Much beyond depth and radius of crater, etc, etc, etc?

Yes, that is for sure. I would think we all know that.

However, any other scenario is subject to the same. MEA and all. We will never know - even if AK write a tell-all book. Who knows if even he telling the truth?

Either we accept everything and connect the dots or toss everything out and make up our own dots.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 05:32

ShauryaT wrote: RC believing that the tests were not even needed..

There is a cite from Chengappa recalling events of from 1995 in which he quotes RC and Kalam as asking PVNR for tests

There is quote from Bharat Karnad after the 1998 tests saying RC said that more tests would be needed if the GoI changed its definition of minimum credible deterrence

Both are linked on earlier pages of this thread. Do you have a cite for the above statement that you have made?
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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 05:53

ShauryaT wrote:
NRao wrote: RC believing that the tests were not even needed..


Shiv,

Fat fingers I guess, but that is actually a ShauryaT quote ..................... not mine.

NP though.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 06:12

samuel wrote:
- that is why the key is fissile material


You mean in the trivial sense of that being part of the bomb or in the sense of FMCT?
Either way, it doesn't matter when the nations that could far more easily deny technology proliferated and now hope that nations with far more material and little technology (say) won't. So,in what sense is fissile material key in the face of proliferation?


Samuel - everyone is proliferating in some sense or the other except maybe India. I think it is too late to turn the clock back on that.

The way I see it is as follows. If you need to start with raw material such as Uranium, you have a fairly long way to go because you need to enrich that Uranium first which required infrastructure technology and electric power. Plutonium is worse. You need a working reactor for years before you get Pu.

Pakistan was kick started in this area. They got :
1) Bomb grade Uranium
2) Enriched UF6
3) Centrifuge designs
4) A working design of a bomb.

This put Pakistan ahead of India in the bomb making business. But for those who start from scratch, the going can be made tough (but no impossible). Either way it will take time.

The easiest and fastest way to get a bomb is to get fissile material - i.e either 90% enriched U235 or Pu239 along with a design of a bomb. The latter is easy IMO. I was talking to someone (not a bomb designer) about Indian nukes and he said that not only is bomb making tech openly available, but even some of the more obscure aspects can be picked up by bomb-geeks talking to each other.

For example, if Columbia wanted a bomb - it would either take 10-15 years of in house development for the first bomb and the development would be openly visible to satellites. But if it got fissile material and designs material and designs it could have a two or three bombs in a year.

I believe that every country that has bombs (other than perhaps Pakistan and Korea) are now realising that bombs are a liability . Their deterrence value is good only against rational adversaries and their deterrence value is exactly zero against an irrational adversary. And even a small bomb is too destructive. It is precisely the irrational adversary who will desire to get bombs the easy way - i.e ready made fissile material and designs.

Let me dream a little bit. Imagine that India is actually supporting Baluchistan. If we can cooperate with Iran to get a bomb into the hands of the Baluchis to be set off in Islamabad - we could derive the same degree of fun out of that as the Paki army go out of 26/11. On the other hand, if the Chinese/Pakis via Myanmar/Bangladesh put a bomb in the hands of some terrorist group who set off the bomb in Guwahati or Kolkata it would mean an irreparable loss to India. Similarly it would not be totally impossible for India to get a bomb into Tibet for Tibetan rebels to set off in a truck near a Chinese military installation.

So "deterrence" is a myth - a game played by little boys imagining that my father will bash your father because your father has lorry and my father has fire-engine. As long as nuke wielding states are few in number and play this silly game of "I'll bash you up" -"No you won't I'll bash you back" deterrence will appear as if it is holding. Once you give the magic astra to all and sundry deterrence will show itself in its true form - i.e maya onlee.

There is no other go. In the long term all nuke wielding states have to reduce fissile material and stop proliferation. The key words are "All nuke wielding states". That means US, Russia and China first.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 06:13

NRao wrote:Fat fingers I guess, but that is actually a ShauryaT quote ..................... not mine.

NP though.

I have edited my post. Thx.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 22 Nov 2009 06:21

Yes, right. Ultimately each player has to give up nuclear weapons, but I don't see that happening.
What I see happening is those with technology and those with raw material exchanging one or the other to gain what they don't have. Systems can be in place in the name of peaceful use and even if one set of parties follow one method, another can offer other solutions, e.g. China. The genie is out of the bottle. Nukes are here to stay, and spread. To me then, Deterrence by parity is the only thing that makes sense, and in the ordinary way of deterring bullies. In fact, if we don't leapfrog in technology what is likely to happen is increased marginalization after joining the club, wherever they let us or we negotiate for now.

S

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Viv Sreenivasan » 22 Nov 2009 08:08

What is actually stopping India from conducting a nuclear test tommorrow? US sanctions? BAH we got over that well enough. International opinion? BAH who cares what the EU thinks. We are a growing power and the world is coming to our doors to trade with us. Okay we may lose the Indo-US nuclear deal but really is that more important that NATIONAL SECURITY. Anyways im sure we can get Russia and France to cooperate with us regarding Civillian Nuclear Technology.

Shiv im not trolling, im pointing out the basic fact that we cant have confidence in our nuclear arsenal after a handful of tests. We dont even know if these tests involved actual missile design parameters. Just exploding a 'nuclear device' doesnt mean youve got an effective deterrant (even NK can do that). The 'device' needs to be compressed so that it can fit in a missile, it needs to be timed so that it detonates at the right time, AND it needs to be proven that its RELIABLE. If war does come tommorow with Pakistan, can we be confident that if we lauch a Prithivi missile at an armoured division across the border that the nuke will actually work?? I dont have this confidence from what ive seen.

Basic point- more nuclear tests needed ASAP.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 08:38

A couple of questions.

1) S2 was at 150+ meters deep and @ 12+ Kt and had a crater with radius (estimated) 40 meter. How come a 45 Kt would be placed at 120 meters? Just asking.
2) Any idea what soil is at 120 and 150 meters?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 08:54

Just exploding a 'nuclear device' doesnt mean youve got an effective deterrant (even NK can do that).


Missed the NYTimes on how BOTH Clinton and Bush were scared of that invisible NK nuke, eh? All in the past 10 yearish.

The 'device' needs to be compressed so that it can fit in a missile, it needs to be timed so that it detonates at the right time, AND it needs to be proven that its RELIABLE.


India proposes to do that in 2020.
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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 08:54

Viv Sreenivasan wrote:Shiv im not trolling, im pointing out the basic fact that we cant have confidence in our nuclear arsenal after a handful of tests. We dont even know if these tests involved actual missile design parameters. Just exploding a 'nuclear device' doesnt mean youve got an effective deterrant (even NK can do that). The 'device' needs to be compressed so that it can fit in a missile, it needs to be timed so that it detonates at the right time, AND it needs to be proven that its RELIABLE. If war does come tommorow with Pakistan, can we be confident that if we lauch a Prithivi missile at an armoured division across the border that the nuke will actually work?? I dont have this confidence from what ive seen.

Basic point- more nuclear tests needed ASAP.


Viv Sreenivasan may I with respect point out that you are the nth person to come on to this very thread (and previous threads) and point out exactly the same things that everyone already knows.

Do you have answers? Everyone has the same questions. Despite the extreme boredom that it might entail the basic courtesy of having a brief glance through earlier pages of this thread will tell you what others have to say on the issue.

You asked "Do you expect me to believe...?"

I presume that was a rhetorical "you" to whom you were addressing your question. As I said what you believe is your belief. What others believe has already been stated by many in the previous pages of this thread. Do you have any new questions or answers?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Viv Sreenivasan » 22 Nov 2009 10:07

Shiv do you have any answers buddy?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 10:24

NRao wrote:>>ShauryaT
>>We are not going to solve this issue with the Toman curves or with data available to us in the public domain, is the realization I have come to.


Why?

(I have explained why it can be.)


Are you saying that expecting a crater of 60-70 meters at a burst at DOB 120 meters with about a 45KT yield is absolutely wrong for Pokhran?

I understand that you are trying to make sense of a test of X yield at a DOB of 120 meters and how it could not form some crater, but that is again trying to figure out what was that X yield. The 12 KT was the fission primary, who knows what actually happened, if the TN failed. Also, at 12 KT and the lack of a crater, should not surprise us (you have said, it should form a small crater, which i take to mean that if it does not there could be enough variances in the soil and other conditions, where it would not). The 60% success from KS is not necessarily a yield translation.

But, there is a larger point.

- It cannot be resolved because we have two very divergent data points from two sources and not enough of all of it to do so
- The powers that be rejected one of these data points, this rejection was a political and not a scientific decision

I have a larger issue and this selective leakage of data points through Ramachandran smells bad.

>>Reasonable doubt with available public data is all that is needed, and we have that.


Again a statement without an explanation (unless I am missing something).
Simple. Key data points are in "dispute". The people disputing them are credible and from multiple sources. The people with counter data points are not making outrageous and impossible claims. All anecdotal evidence, such as the likelihood that a TN weapons has not been deployed being true supports their case. There has never been a scientific resolution of the dispute.[/quote]



>>Santhanam refused to divulge the DOB in September. He still has a tremendous level of largely self imposed >>sense of responsibility in him not to divulge data. Data that he has access to in spades and was in charge. He >>came out with the DOB information, only and only after the Ramachandran article, obviously fed by the BARC >>crew. If you go through Ramachandran’s previous articles, his confidential access to BARC is clear.


Certainly. I do NOT expect him to divulge data that he cannot.

HOWEVER, I do expect him be aware that whatever data that he does divulge will be subjected to scrutiny. And, that is all I have done. Taken an acceptable equation (used for decades) and used Santhanam's data to see where we stand. It does not fit!!! Nothing to do with me - except for the donkey work I did and expected someone else to verify it.

What Santhanam has divulged so far just does not fit - else prove that it does, which is fine with me and have requested it many a times.[/qoute] Answered above.

>>Another thing is the more sqeaky clean the BARC calculations appear, my sense of doubt of the underlying data >>being manipulated increases. KS, has not yet divulged any of the CORRTEX information or other data, he has >>access to. What he desires is an investigation of this entire matter, instead of a judgment call based on a few set >>of leaders. When the government appointed the DRDO to measure certain aspects of the test, they cannot >>selectively throw out certain results. When there is a case for a credible doubt, by the agency responsible, the >>logical answer is to retest.


I do not agree with you on most of these things - from a technical angle. I will reserve the right (as they say) to respond at a later date.

The rest is not my cup of tea. Such things happen and the fact that the parties kept quite for so long is proof that ALL of them are part of this entire mess. Personally I did not and do not see any reason for this to surface at this point in time. As I have said (perhaps in not so few word) 1) India has deterrence, 2) CTBT is NOT an issue and 3) S1 was tending towards a sizzle, if not a total sizzle.
The bolded is incorrect. KS, did not keep quiet. He let it be known loud and clear to the powers concerned, that he did not believe the TN was a success and followed that with a detail report. He chose not to go public. It is clear that he did speak with many people on the issue through the years, although not publicly. There are others very senior, who doubt the success of the TN.

On the points 1 and 2. Do not agree. I am sure we will go into it in more posts. On 3.

All I am saying is, if you are looking for a nice little technical equation that fits, all around and across, then we are unlikely to have it with us in the public. There are enough holes in the BARC story and these holes are well documented and nearly every data point disputed.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 10:31

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote: RC believing that the tests were not even needed..

There is a cite from Chengappa recalling events of from 1995 in which he quotes RC and Kalam as asking PVNR for tests

There is quote from Bharat Karnad after the 1998 tests saying RC said that more tests would be needed if the GoI changed its definition of minimum credible deterrence

Both are linked on earlier pages of this thread. Do you have a cite for the above statement that you have made?
I have seen those quotes, posted by you earlier. The Chengappa quote, I recall, I interpreted them differently.

Contrast these quotes with what AN Prasad has said and there is an entire BARC board resolution, questioning RC's stand. The BK quote of RC can also be interpreted as, if you change the "minimum" part, then we need to test, otherwise fission/boosted, we can deliver and are OK!

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 10:38

NRao wrote:A couple of questions.

1) S2 was at 150+ meters deep and @ 12+ Kt and had a crater with radius (estimated) 40 meter. How come a 45 Kt would be placed at 120 meters? Just asking.
2) Any idea what soil is at 120 and 150 meters?
The 150 meters is a leaked BARC data point. The counter data point we have is that the yield of S2 was 20-25 KT. The key data points of BARC are suspect. Do we really expect to resolve the soil conditions at varying depth levels before there is agreement on other key data points.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 10:52

Only one side here is looking to build a sqeaky clean case. The other side is not looking to build a complete counter case. They seek to put in enough doubt in the BARC story, to let the powers that be consider and review.

The request of KS goes out directly do the PM and Parliament of India. I have little hopes from these bodies.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 11:10

ShauryaT wrote:
Contrast these quotes with what AN Prasad has said and there is an entire BARC board resolution, questioning RC's stand.


Shaurya - I need to know where these statements have been made or reported so i can read them myself and archive them as I have been doing every source.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 11:16

Viv Sreenivasan wrote:Shiv do you have any answers buddy?


Buddy have you taken the trouble to read the hundred plus posts I have made and the other posts. If you do your own reading (on or off the forum) you will reach some conclusions. You seem to have reached the conclusions that you are comfortable with. I have reached some conclusions based on my reading. Whether they are the correct answers or the answers you want to hear is moot.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 14:38

ShauryaT wrote:The request of KS goes out directly do the PM and Parliament of India.


Shaurya what request are you talking about? I do not recall reading any such request by KS.

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Life after testing

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 19:23

Life after testing

On the subject of maintaining a nuclear arsenal without testing or with minimal testing
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing
Experts disagree on whether states can have reliable nuclear arsenals – especially ones using advanced warhead designs, such as hydrogen bombs and miniaturized weapons – without testing, though all agree that it is very unlikely to develop significant nuclear innovations without testing. One other approach is to use supercomputers to conduct "virtual" testing, but the value of these simulations without actual test result data is thought to be slim.


About maintaining an arsenal of old weapons withou repeated testing to ensure their reliability:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing
Nuclear testing has since become a controversial issue in the United States, with a number of politicians saying that future testing might be necessary to maintain the aging warheads from the Cold War. Because nuclear testing is seen as furthering nuclear arms development, many are also opposed to future testing as an acceleration of the arms race.


Reliability issues without testing:(USA)
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/str ... tTRDoc.pdf
We are at a critical juncture that requires the U.S. to invest now in the capabilities
needed to maintain a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons.
Without assuming serious risk, further reductions in the total stockpile are only
achievable with a responsive nuclear infrastructure. Without a responsive nuclear
infrastructure, the United States must continue to manage the technical risks
associated with an aging stockpile of Cold War-era nuclear weapons, and the geo-
political uncertainties of the years ahead, by maintaining a sizable inventory of
reserve weapons to support the operationally deployed force. This is an increasingly
expensive and potentially risky approach to stockpile stewardship. Successive efforts
at extending the service life of the current inventory of weapons drives these weapons
farther away from the original source data derived from underground nuclear tests,
and risks incorporating or accruing technical changes that could, over time,
inadvertently undermine their reliability and performance. The skills and
technologies needed to refurbish and maintain these older weapon designs are
increasingly difficult to sustain or acquire. Furthermore, some of the materials
employed in these older weapons are extremely hazardous. Moreover, it is difficult to
incorporate modern safety and security features into Cold War-era weapon designs.
Finally, as the United States continues to observe a moratorium on underground
nuclear testing, it becomes increasingly difficult to certify the existing stockpile of
weapons.




Effects of aging in a nuclear bomb
https://www.llnl.gov/str/Kolb.html
For weapon primaries, the Livermore team is evaluating changes that occur over time to the pit's special nuclear materials and to various types of high explosives. For example, plutonium irradiates itself and, given enough time, may change shape ever so slightly.
..

The Livermore team then characterized the material standards associated with various weapon systems. It found that many of the compounds absorbed in some high explosives may be traced to the use of other materials. For example, significant levels of toluene arise from its use as a solvent in the synthesis of the high explosive TATB.

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Life after testing

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 19:31

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/g ... C44B27.php

However, the Air Force general expressed concern that a time would come when confidence in one or more "families" of weapons in the arsenal would diminish, perhaps due to the discovery of a serious problem. It could be that the prospects for fixing such a problem without explosive testing would be dim, he said.
Nuclear weapons currently fielded are "all well past" their 15-year design lives, Chilton said at a breakfast speech sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association. "They're not static. When they're sitting on the shelf, they're actually little chemistry experiments that are cooking away."
Gradual degradation of the chemicals inside an atomic weapon can "affect the non-nuclear components that are associated [with] -- and are absolutely critical to -- the function of the weapon system," he said.
Thus, Chilton said, "I sense there's a cliff out there someplace, and I don't know how close I am to the edge of that cliff."

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 19:59

Relationship between fissile material and weapons
http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21391.pdf
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments (2006)

Acquiring fissile material — plutonium-239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU) —
is the key hurdle in nuclear weapons development.3 Producing these two materials is
technically challenging; in comparison, many experts believe weaponization to be
relatively easy.4

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 22 Nov 2009 20:04

ST,

I am not sure where the confusion is in all this. It is rather simple when you stand away from this entire mess and take a look at what is there on the table - without taking sides.

Will try an answer a few ................... need to run.

The key data points of BARC are suspect.


Again, you make a statement without providing any data to back it. See below, as far as I can tell they are as close to perfect as can be.

Do we really expect to resolve the soil conditions at varying depth levels before there is agreement on other key data points.


You and me can ONLY do an analysis on what is known to both of us. From that perspective we can come up with a decent picture of what is right and what is wrong. The ONLY things we seem to have right now is the Toman graphs. I certainly do not understand the radio-chem, or what ever that is and seismic data, etc. Which is why I stick with Toman.

The 150 meters is a leaked BARC data point.


Santhanam's - by that standard - is also a leak.

The counter data point we have is that the yield of S2 was 20-25 KT.


"Counter points" need to add. Or better still ALL points need to add up. My point is that what Santhanam has provided does not add up.

IF either or both sides are manipulating the data then - like I said before - the BARC side has done a fantastic job of making absolutely sure that - from what is in open source (equations and data) - that everything adds up. Santhanam on the other hand is no where close OR needs to settle the data to make it come close. Santhanam (conversely) has done a horrendous job - so far - of 1) Communicating his ideas and 2) making his fudged data add up (NOTE: I am assuming that BOTH Santhanam AND BARC are fudging data).

On soil: that is my way of giving Santhanam the benefit of doubt and willingness to see if there is another angle where I can prove what he says is right.

Even when one leaks they better be careful to make sure that the fudging is near perfect in both data and over time. Tech will always catch up - 50/100 years from now to either prove you or disprove you.

Are you saying that expecting a crater of 60-70 meters at a burst at DOB 120 meters with about a 45KT yield is absolutely wrong for Pokhran?


Simple straightforward answer - Yes (assuming soil composition - which is why I brought up 120 vs. 150, etc). (BTW, ranges like 60-70 may be trivial to most of us, but that is a very large deviation. Even 70-72 meters radius is sometimes very large. So, please be very, very careful in your posts. Please stick to what Santhanam has stated. Similarly with depths too.) (After all it is a matter of proving/disproving something.)

Not just that. (And, for the nth time - please read posts carefully, it is getting very tiring.) Even we accept that it was a fizzle, but the primary worked? So, the primary at 15 Kt SHOULD have produced a crater - NO MATTER what soil type. And, it DID NOT. So, what gives (I am open to a technical answer, NOT some assumption, interpretation, whatever.)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 22 Nov 2009 20:27

Raogaru - a long time ago a mysterious person called LakshmiC appeared on this forum and stated that in a Thermonuclear bomb the approximate ratios of primary to secondary yield could be broken up into the following 4 components. He made no explanations and the figures are unavailable outside of BRF.

Yield ratio 2:4:1:6 for Fission primary:fusion:spark plug:fissionable tamper

Assuming that is correct.

That means that if the primary is 15 kt, you get 30 kt fusion from secondary with 8 kt from spark plug and 90 kt from fissionable tamper for a total of about 150 kt

Now how would you scale that down?

if you remove the fissionable tamper you get 60 kt

But if you remove the spark plug you are risking a fizzle with no fusion. At best you can get 45 kt. But with no spark plug, if you get more than 15 kt - you have some fusion. With 60% efficiency - you get about 30 kt.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 23:18

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:
Contrast these quotes with what AN Prasad has said and there is an entire BARC board resolution, questioning RC's stand.


Shaurya - I need to know where these statements have been made or reported so i can read them myself and archive them as I have been doing every source.
Page 68 from BK's book, scanned and available in this thread.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 23:26

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:The request of KS goes out directly do the PM and Parliament of India.


Shaurya what request are you talking about? I do not recall reading any such request by KS.


Worse, the DAE has tried to hide facts from successive governments, Parliament and the people, causing damage to our nuclear programme and national security. The Prime Minister and the Union Cabinet must help stop this. The nation waits with bated breath if they can or will.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Nov 2009 23:55

NRao wrote:Again, you make a statement without providing any data to back it. See below, as far as I can tell they are as close to perfect as can be.
You are missing the entire point of KS, if you are trying to make it fit into a neat equation. That is not this goal. He is doing just enough to bring into question key data points and hence the BARC story thereof. He is not doing this, so that you and me can understand this. He is doing this so the leaders of the nation are pressured to undertake a scientific review. For, in his view, this has gone too far and is willing to take the issue public.


>>The 150 meters is a leaked BARC data point.

Santhanam's - by that standard - is also a leak.
What standard? Santhanam, did not have to go and ask anyone for the DOB information and neither did he have to get that information inserted into a book. A book, by the looks of it sympathetic to the BARC story. He has provided the DOB for S1 directly and under his own name. Do not view that as to be the "same standard".


>> The counter data point we have is that the yield of S2 was 20-25 KT.

"Counter points" need to add. Or better still ALL points need to add up. My point is that what Santhanam has provided does not add up.
For the nth time. It is not KS intent to build a counter story in the public. It will be nice to have that, but i do not think, that is what he is after.

IF either or both sides are manipulating the data then - like I said before - the BARC side has done a fantastic job of making absolutely sure that - from what is in open source (equations and data) - that everything adds up. Santhanam on the other hand is no where close OR needs to settle the data to make it come close. Santhanam (conversely) has done a horrendous job - so far - of 1) Communicating his ideas and 2) making his fudged data add up (NOTE: I am assuming that BOTH Santhanam AND BARC are fudging data).
What is KS's motive to fudge? Until, I do not see a case for a motive, I am not willing to say all are h**aamis of the same order.


>>Are you saying that expecting a crater of 60-70 meters at a burst at DOB 120 meters with about a 45KT yield is absolutely wrong for Pokhran?

Simple straightforward answer - Yes (assuming soil composition - which is why I brought up 120 vs. 150, etc). (BTW, ranges like 60-70 may be trivial to most of us, but that is a very large deviation. Even 70-72 meters radius is sometimes very large. So, please be very, very careful in your posts. Please stick to what Santhanam has stated. Similarly with depths too.) (After all it is a matter of proving/disproving something.)
Being as careful as I can. Here you go. the DRDO calculated a 60-70 meter diameter crater should have been formed by the latter fully confirmed by the ARC.

Not just that. (And, for the nth time - please read posts carefully, it is getting very tiring.) Even we accept that it was a fizzle, but the primary worked? So, the primary at 15 Kt SHOULD have produced a crater - NO MATTER what soil type. And, it DID NOT. So, what gives (I am open to a technical answer, NOT some assumption, interpretation, whatever.)
Be careful now: 15 May 1998 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram announces that India tested a thermonuclear device on 11 May 1998. According to Chidambaram, "the fission trigger produced about 12 kilotons to activate the thermonuclear core to ultimately yield 45 kilotons."

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 23 Nov 2009 01:29

ST,

For the time being I will would not like to go any further because I do not see ANY points being valid enough to change my position - so far. IF something changes in the future I will reeval then.

Thanks.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby vera_k » 23 Nov 2009 02:03



Well, this is not news if anyone has been following the targets announced by DAE for the nuclear power program. One can wonder how this department gets such a long rope, but perhaps they perform better when compared to other PSUs - and then there's the TINA factor.


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