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Deterrence

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RoyG
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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 03 Jan 2017 06:25

Gagan wrote:I have a concern with deterrence and explosive yield
When people say, that even a 50 kt fbf deters, they are justifying, trying to be satisfied with the current trishanku situation. Using that analogy, even Pakistan's vapourware deters india.
Deterrence is a bigger game.
India claims a 200KT TN and so India must demonstrate one, field tested and all.
India is doing well on the delivery systems, but still some way to go. MIRV and MARV have to be field tested.

This is a game we have to play, including showing belligerence, showing a willingness to use hard military power, expanding borders to our claimed territories and a land route to CAR. It is time to end this squeamishness, otherwise we risk being a second rung power like Germany or Japan.
We have to start working towards a P3. That is the only truly stable world order there will ever be!


When you have the bomb and nifty means of delivering them, 90% of deterrence comes from the Kautilyan national comprehensive strength model. Political and cultural unity, bureaucratic efficiency, economic prowess, and a holistic national security doctrine. Anything above 100kt is enough for now which I'm sure we have.

If we have a true son of the soil as a PM, expect a resumption of testing at the appropriate time.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Prem » 10 Jan 2017 06:18

Newly declassified documents reveal how New Delhi tracked Islamabad’s pursuit of a nuclear device.
By Vivek Prahladan
http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/declassi ... ar-device/

India, for instance, has taken a keen interest in Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear device going back to the 1970s and even earlier. Based on newly declassified Indian documentation I was able to access, what follows is an account of what Indian external intelligence knew about Pakistan’s intentions between the 1970s leading up to the 1990s – the decade that would end with both countries coming out as the world’s sixth and seventh declared nuclear powers.For Indian intelligence in the 1970s, the focus in Pakistan was about its reprocessing capacity and centrifuges. This shifted in the 1980s to focus on the capability to produce an explosive device, and, finally, in the 1990s, focused on the nascent Pakistani missile program routed through China, which was eventually outsourced by China to North Korea.Soon after the 1998 tests by both countries, Indian intelligence was looking at supply chains for Pakistan’s Shaheen-II ballistic missile, almost four years ahead of its first test in 2004.There was already specific knowledge available with India on Shaheen-I, including on the hardware that was involved in steering the missile. Additionally, New Delhi was not entirely convinced that Pakistan would not use choose to use non-nuclear chemical warheads for its missiles
The trail of documents begins with a Joint Intelligence Committee Report (dated February 24, 1976) titled “Pakistan’s Capability to Produce Nuclear Weapons.” This paper was an update to a JIC Paper from March 1975. It assessed that in absence of assistance for plutonium-239 or uranium-235, “Pakistan could not be in a position to explode a nuclear device at least for four years from now.” Further, the report noted that all was not well with Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. It had developed faults due to “leakage in boiler flow down valve which resulted in reactor poisoning.” It was shut down six times in 1975 with the largest one in mid-1975 when Canadian experts were recruited to repair the leakage of heavy water from the heat exchanger.Moreover, in 1976, diplomatic cables from the Indian Embassy in Ottawa reveal that India was becoming aware of Chinese scientists’ presence in Pakistan. A Hungarian diplomat informed an Indian diplomat in Ottawa that the Canadian government was aware that Chinese scientists were being given access to facilities with Canadian material in Pakistan, despite the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP-I) coming under IAEA safeguards.
Pakistan was also sharing Canadian technical knowledge with the Chinese in return for military supplies. Henry Kissinger, then-U.S. secretary of state, had visited Pakistan in 1976, where he was attempting to forge Afghan-Pakistan rapprochement following the visit of Prime Minister Bhutto to Kabul. Kissinger’s secondary agenda was to probe the France-Pakistan nuclear agreement. According to briefings received by Indian officials in Washington, Kissinger and Bhutto agreed that on the nuclear issue, “both sides will avoid confrontation.”By September 1977, India’s external intelligence Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had begun to report on Pakistan’s plans in detail, issuing a report called “Pakistan — Clandestine Purchase of Nuclear Equipment and Materials.” Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) had set up a purchasing channel in Bonn, Germany, and Abdul Waheed, a cousin of General Zia-ul-Haq, oversaw the funds for these clandestine contracts. $11 million was already spent by Pakistan in Western Europe on plutonium technology, including the purchase of a “shearer” for use in its reprocessing facility.The Pakistan explosive device program was coming together and, in 1981, a “Monthly Report” from the Indian Embassy in Islamabad warned New Delhi that “it is very likely that Pakistan will succeed in exploding a nuclear device, possibly this year.” The embassy also informed that “Zia was extremely keen to explode the nuclear device at the earliest possible.”
In the same year, J. N Dixit, who would go on to become India’s national security advisor (2004-2005), circulated a report entitled “Pakistan race to Nuclear Weapons” to all heads of missions. The note concluded that the question of whether “Pakistan has indeed embarked on a nuclear weapons program” could be answered affirmatively. Dixit assessed that “Kahuta, Islamabad, and Sihala form a sort of protected centrifuge triangle.” Kahuta was protected with Crotale surface-to-air missile systems. Pakistan had also gained the capacity to produce uranium hexafluoride.
India anticipated that Pakistan could conduct an atmospheric or underground test in Sindh, Balochistan, or the Northwest Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa today). Meanwhile, Soviet satellites had revealed information on Pakistani tunneling in the Ras Koh range. Alternately, the Indians anticipated that China could have hosted the first Pakistani test at Lop Nor. As one former official in the office of then-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told me:…we were following AQ Khan’s movements. A deliberate subterfuge has been created by Pakistan that AQ Khan was running a rogue operation, so called “nuclear Walmart.” A.Q Khan was leading inter-governmental delegations. We knew where he went, whom he talked to i.e. each of his visits to North Korea and then his debriefings in China.A 1981 brief prepared by the Indian Embassy in Washington also revealed Indian anxieties at U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s upgrading of U.S.-Pakistan relations, fortified by a $3 billion military aid package that included F-16 fighters and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. In Zia’s talks with members of the U.S. Congress, “the nuclear question figured prominently,” the brief noted. In this year, Secretary East Eric Gonsalves had led an Indian delegation to Canada wherein India pointed out the Libyan connection to the Pakistan nuclear program. Indian information was that “Pakistan could have a plutonium-based explosion by the end of the year and have enriched uranium by 1983.”U.S. officials meanwhile assured India that Reagan had conveyed to Zia “quite clearly that Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would damage the entire new relationship worked out between the two countries.” Zia had publicly mentioned his proposal for a mutual inspection of nuclear facilities between India and Pakistan. Lawrence Eagleburger, Reagan’s undersecretary of state for political affairs, told Indian officials that “the [U.S.] administration found credibility in Zia’s nuclear disavowal,” but the Indians remained unconvinced.

In conclusion, Indian cold war era intelligence document reveal that Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program has thrived even in an environment of internal and regional uncertainties. Its leadership has historically fielded questionable nuclear peace proposals as a prelude to nuclear escalation. Speculative nuclear brinkmanship remains perhaps the last remaining viable argument available to the Pakistan government and military to influence new patterns of equilibrium taking place in the subcontinental region. The Cold War continuum suggests that China’s dominant voicing within Pakistan’s securitization will fasten Pakistan’s deterrence operationalization and will to re-demonstrate capability. Undoubtedly, Pakistan continues to view itself as the nuclear sword-bearer among the Islamic nation-states.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:22

Gagan wrote:Shiv ji
What you arr saying only works to a point

Isn't there a difference between a DRDO produced INSAS and a production OFB made INSAS?

The science can be gotten right in a lab
The actual engineering is only verified in a field test

A field test will often throw up a new set of variables, causing people to go back to the drawing boards. Happens all the time

When a warhead in the US is remade using new materials and a new team - it is still not tested and it is still subject to the limitations that you say and still bound by the test data of the 1970s or 1980s

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:26

ShauryaT wrote:^When doing this exercise, do not forget to ask, what damage is India willing to take and the capabilities of the enemy to inflict them.

IMO Deterrence is a form of posturing. No one wants any damage. But when one is in a situation where one gets damaged badly and does nothing about the attacking party it does not make sense to fail to threaten serious damage.

In my view it would be completely absurd to speak of deterrence and then state "We are willing to take X damage". Such discussions are only for rhetorical timepass - which I am afraid a lot of "experts" indulge in.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:32

Gagan wrote:India claims a 200KT TN and so India must demonstrate one, field tested and all.

India has not even claimed 20 kilotons officially. The only claims made are "big bum" by Vajpayee and random references to yields between 200-400 kt from various people indirectly. There are also plenty of claims of fizzle.

But I am yet to see any serious power rubbishing Indian capability to nuke them. Even Pakistan does not doubt that - but Indians do and constantly display anxiety. What surprises me is that the same Indians who doubt our own capability are confident about rubbishing Pakistan's capability. I see this as a strange phenomenon.

I need to dig out my own voluminous archives where serious papers admit that technological capability and testing are not limitations to making dangerous nukes. But the weight and diameter of the warhead are limitations to delivery in mijjiles.
Last edited by shiv on 10 Jan 2017 09:41, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:37

Reposting a post I made earlier

The graph below shows the minimum and maximum radius of a Pu implosion fission warhead correlated with weight.

Image

A 300 kg warhead correlates well with a 30 cm radius. A 10-15 Kt fission warhead would be within easy reach of Brahmos. With pinpoint accuracy however its utility would probably be only for hardened bunkers because we have no policy of counter force. For our Pakistan requirements a 1 meter diameter Prithvi and a 1000 kg warhead would allow a 50 to 80kt boosted fission warhead cheap and no need for pinpoint accuracy.

I think most megaton warheads are now legacy warheads and efficient TN warheads would be 200-250 kg and 200-400 kt. Just a guesstimate. I am sure a Google search will allow people to come up with figures different from what I have quoted off the top of my head

As a digression I want to point out that on BRF we started discussing things about Pakistan that did not become mainstream in the world, followed by India for over 10 years. I am hoping that the exact weights and yields of our warheads (with some allowance for error in yield like +/- x kt) is well known to strategic planners along with how and where they will be used as well as coordinates of those targets. I am guessing that Islamabad and Karachi offer fairly large unmissable targets[
Last edited by shiv on 10 Jan 2017 09:42, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:40

Another illustrative image of technology level versus bomb design
Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:58

For too long we have been stuck on the BRF discussions of 1998-99 thinking that getting big bum is ONLY Teller Ulam staged bomb which requires lots of tests. That is not true. Boosted fission designs to 100 plus kt can be found in literature if you search and here is something I downloaded long ago
The problem with this design is diameter. But diameter is not a problem for 2 meter diameter Agony

1.5.3 The Alarm Clock/Sloika (Layer Cake) Design

This idea predates the invention of staged radiation implosion designs, and was apparently invented independently at least three times. It was first devised by Edward Teller in the United States, who named the design "Alarm Clock". Later Andrei Sakharov and Vitalii Ginzburg in the Soviet Union hit upon it and dubbed it the "sloika" design. A sloika is a layered Russian pastry, rather like a napoleon, and has thus been translated as "Layer Cake". Finally it was developed by the British (inventor unknown). Each of these weapons research programs hit upon this idea before ultimately arriving at the more difficult, but more powerful and efficient, staged thermonuclear approach.

This system was dubbed "Layer Cake" by the Soviets because it uses a spherical assembly of concentric shells. In the center is a fission primary made of U-235/Pu-239, surrounding it is an (optional) layer of U-238 for the fission tamper, then a layer of lithium-6 deuteride/tritide, a U-238 fusion tamper, and finally the high explosive implosion system. The process begins like an ordinary implosion bomb. After the primary in the center completes its reaction, the energy it releases compresses and heats the fusion layer to thermonuclear temperatures. The burst of fission neutrons then initiates a coupled fission-fusion-fission chain reaction. Slower fission neutrons generate tritium from the lithium, which then fuses with deuterium to produce very fast neutrons, that in turn cause fast fission in the fusion tamper, which breed more tritium. In effect the fusion fuel acted as a neutron accelerator allowing a fission chain reaction to occur with a large normally non-fissionable U-238 mass. While spiking the fusion layer with an initial dose of tritium is not strictly necessary for this approach, it helps boost the yield.

The achievable fusion fraction is fairly small, 15-20%, and cannot be increased beyond this point. Its use of fusion fuel is also quite inefficient. This design is also limited to the same yield and yield-to-weight range as high yield pure fission and boosted fission weapons. This was developed into a deliverable weapon by the Soviet Union and the British prior to their development of the staged designs described above. The U.S. did not bother to pursue it, partly because Teller did not feel it was sufficiently destructive to be worthwhile.

The first test of this concept was a device designated RDS-6s, (known as Joe 4 to the U.S.) on 12 August 1953. By using tritium doping it achieved a 10-fold boost over the size of the trigger, for a total yield of 400 kt. The UK Orange Herald Small device tested in Grapple 2 (31 May 1957) was similar but used a much larger fission trigger (300 kt range) apparently without tritium for a total yield of 720 kt, a boost in the order of 2.5-fold. This is probably the largest test of this design.

Although apparently not used in any weapons now in service in the five declared weapons states, it remains a viable design that could be attractive to other states that do not have the resources to develop the technically more demanding radiation implosion design. Information supplied by Mordechai Vanunu indicates that Israel may have developed a weapon of this type.

This design should probably be considered distinct from other classes of nuclear weapons. This design is something of a hybrid and could be considered either a type of boosted fission device, or a one-stage type of fission-fusion-fission bomb.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 09:59

Here is information on the USs W 76 warhead
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/W76.html
Initial manufacture June 1978
Initial deployment 1978
About 3400 W76 warheads have been manufactured.
Currently in service: 3030 warheads

The first W76 warheads are approaching the end of their originally planned 30 year service life in 2008. This led to the initiation of the W76-1/Mk-4A life extension program in 2000 to refurbish the warheads for decades of further service. The first W76-1 is planned for delivery in September 2007 with completion in 2017.

Under the START II treaty 1280 W76 warheads were to be kept in service. With SORT (the "Moscow Treaty") the expected number of SLBM warheads is expected to be between 1000 and 1200, with 400 of these being the W88. The remaining 600-800 would be W76-1s.

A New York Times article by William Broad ("A Fierce Debate on Atom Bombs From Cold War") published 3 April 2005, reported the existence of a debate about the reliability of the W76:

Several factors lie behind the current worries and repair plans. The W-76 is one of the arsenal's oldest warheads. As warheads age, the risk of internal rusting, material degradation, corrosion, decay and the embrittling of critical parts increases.
The overhaul to forestall such decay is scheduled to go from 2007 to 2017. In all, it is expected to cost more than $2 billion, say experts who have analyzed federal budget figures.
Questions also surround the weapon's basic design. Four knowledgeable critics, three former scientists and one current one at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, which designed the W-76, have recently argued that the weapon is highly unreliable and, if not a complete dud, likely to explode with a force so reduced as to compromise its effectiveness.


Last edited by shiv on 10 Jan 2017 10:27, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 10 Jan 2017 10:09

More on how yields can be massively increased once you have a proven fission bomb
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-3.html
It was first devised by Edward Teller in the United States (who called the design "Alarm Clock"), then by Andrei Sakharov and Vitalii Ginzburg in the Soviet Union (who called it the "Layer Cake"), and finally by the British (inventor unknown). Each of these weapons research programs hit upon this idea before ultimately arriving at the more difficult, but more powerful, staged thermonuclear approach.

There is room for significant variation in how this overall scheme is used however.

One approach is to opt for a "once-through" design. In this scheme the escaping fission neutrons breed tritium, the tritium fuses, and the fusion neutrons fission the fusion tamper, thus completing the process. Since each fission in the trigger releases about one excess neutron (it produces two and a fraction, but consumes one), which can breed one tritium atom, which fuses and release one fusion neutron, which causes one fast fission, the overall gain is to approximately double the trigger yield (perhaps a bit more).

The gain can be considerably enhanced though (presumably through a thicker lithium deuteride blanket, and a thicker fusion tamper). In this design enough of the secondary neutrons produced by fast fission in the fusion tamper get scattered back into the fusion blanket to breed a second generation of tritium. A coupled fission-fusion-fission chain reaction thus becomes established (or more precisely a fast fission -> tritium breeding -> fusion -> fast fission chain reaction). In a sense, the fusion part of the process acts as a neutron accelerator to permit a fast fission chain reaction to be sustained in the uranium tamper. The process terminates when the fusion tamper has expanded sufficiently to permit too many neutrons to escape.

The advantage of the once-through approach is that a much lighter bomb can be constructed. The disadvantage is that a much larger amount of expensive fissile material is required for a given yield. Yields exceeding a megaton are possible, if a correspondingly large fission trigger is used. This design was developed by the British. The Orange Herald device employed this concept and was tested in Grapple 2 (31 May 1957). A U-235 fission trigger with a yield in the 300 kt range was used, for a total yield of 720 kt - a boost in the order of 2.5-fold. A variant design was apparently deployed for a while in the fifties under the name Violet Club.

The second approach was adopted by the Soviets and proven in the test known as Joe-4 to the West (actually the fifth Soviet test) on 12 August 1953 at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. This resulted in a very massive, but much cheaper bomb since only a small amount of fissile material is required.

Since there is an actual multiplication effect between the fusion reaction and the tamper fast fission, an improved yield can be obtained at reasonable cost by spiking the fusion layer with tritium prior to detonation.

The Joe-4 device used a 40 kt U-235 fission bomb acted as the trigger and produced a total yield of 400 kt for a 10-fold enhancement, although tritium spiking was partly responsible. 15-20% of the energy was released by fusion (60-80 kt), and the balance (280-300 kt) was from U-238 fast fission. A later test without tritium spiking produced only 215 kt.

This design has a maximum achievable yield of perhaps 1 Mt (if that) before becoming prohibitively heavy. The USSR may never have actually deployed any weapons using this design.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Gerard » 11 Jan 2017 02:44

The Israeli weapon mock up photographed by Mordechai Vanunu appears to be a sloika type design rather than Teller Ulam

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 11 Jan 2017 07:07

Gerard wrote:The Israeli weapon mock up photographed by Mordechai Vanunu appears to be a sloika type design rather than Teller Ulam

Ultimately for an engineering team what matters is to get the bang with a design that is least likely to fail. The Teller Ulam design was no doubt "elegant" and allowed for small, light warheads. But if they require much testing for proof - there are other solutions that are less "elegant" and more "sure-fire". The articles do say the Israelis went for the layer-cake design. That aside the South Africans had a plain ol U 235 gun type "sure fire" fission bomb that they "boosted" to several hundred kilotons. So this constant Indian caterwaul "We have failed. We are not there. We cannot get there. We must measure only when erect" needs to be tempered 18 years after Pokhran 2. All nations that did a lot of tests are now rebuilding old warheads and have no way of hot testing them no matter what data they got in the 70s-80s. Unless we trust our own engineers, chemists and physicists to actually know their stuff we will continue to have confidence in every one else other than us. :|

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Re: Deterrence

Postby disha » 12 Jan 2017 09:57

We are the only ones who constantly dhoti-shiver and call our bums as fizzle and want to prove that it is a fizzle. In spite of all the evidences presented., if the dhoti-shivering SDRE mind does not want to be convinced that it is not a fizzle., it will not be convinced.

Even with a full on open atmospheric test. If the measured yield comes out to say 48 KT for say a projected 50 KT warhead., and wipes out nearby 10-15 villages., the SDRE dhoti-shiverer will not be convinced and we will have continuous caterwauls for the next decade.

This reminds me the story of the brahmin and the goat. This panchatantra story needs to be read again and again.

Most of the SDRE Dhoti-shiverers here need to read and re-read and re-re-read the way nuclear weapons are made and the mathematics, physics and chemistry that go behind it. There is engineering involved., but there is as much mathematics and physics and chemistry involved.

For example., all the fission primaries in the declared NWS and India are fusion-boosted-fission primaries. Case in point., India is one of the largest producer of tritium.

Second and it is very important to note that teller-ullam designs are considered to be highly efficient and scalable. One can basically sequence the TU design without any limit to 100 MT Tsar Bomba (tested to 57 MT) but does one need it? Delivering the unwieldy 50 MT device weighing @25 tonnes will be unwieldy. It is only for show and also for attacking some aliens on July 4.

Ideal WDM munitions are <500 Kg and packing a punch of 200kt-300kt and more importantly deliverable.

Put it this way., what is the point in having a MT size WDM if you cannot deliver it effectively? In 1998., the only successful IRBM we had was Agni (now called Agni II) and a nuclear deterrence using a rail containerized Agni was called out. This I call it as strike back. The containerized Agni can be hidden in the vast Indian Railway network and it required to be atleast mated to a warhead which can be delivered.

The Shakti-II test was to test a deliverable warhead and not a scientific device. Also it gave sufficient data to model true Teller-Ulam designs., one can see that modeling in the X-Ray telescope we sent into space. It is basically capturing various X-Rays and focusing it on a point. Demonstrated in space. If one can do that in harsh environments of space., doing it in a container is trivial.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rakesh » 24 Jan 2017 22:15

Under Rajiv Gandhi, India was ready with H-Bomb to counter Pakistan's Nukes
http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=250063

India under Rajiv Gandhi made preparations in 1985 to test a hydrogen bomb in response to Pakistan’s nuclear programmes, recently released US documents showed. Concerned about the possibility of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the Ronald Reagan administration wanted to send an emissary to mediate between the two neighbours and help ease tensions.

About 930,000 declassified documents, running into more than 12 million pages and recently posted online by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), provide interesting insights into India’s nuclear weapons capabilities during the 1980s and Delhi's increasing concerns over Pakistan's nuclear programme at the time.

In one of the documents, the world’s premier intelligence agency said it faced difficulties in gathering details of Delhi’s nuclear programme as Indian security was “extremely tight”.

The spy agency said the hydrogen bomb that the government of Rajiv Gandhi was preparing to explode was much stronger than the one tested 11years earlier, when his mother Indira was the Prime Minister. India at the time was also far ahead than Pakistan on nuclear technology, it noted.

While Rajiv Gandhi was initially hesitant to pursue his mother’s plan to push the nuclear programme, his mind changed when he got reports in early 1985 that Pakistan was making progress with nuclear weapons, according to the CIA. On May 4, 1985, he stated that Pakistan’s persistent efforts to join the nuclear club had compelled India to review its nuclear policy.

The agency said the H-bomb was created by a team of 36 scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre near Mumbai. The CIA also claimed that India was stockpiling plutonium for nuclear arsenal. “A rapid series of Pakistani tests would compel New Delhi to develop nuclear weapons and touch off a nuclear arms race between the two,” assessed a CIA document.

But, according to CIA assessment, fear of international political and economic reprisals would deter India from conducting an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. “China and not Pakistan is perceived as a long-term threat to the Indian security,” it noted.

On sending an emissary, a document said while India was not warm to the idea, it nonetheless was not against giving the person an audience.

The agency had suggested that the emissary should meet Rajiv Gandhi but refrained from predicting an outcome. On the other hand, Islamabad would welcome a US representative, according to the spy agency.

At the time, Pakistan was seen as a key ally of the US in South Asia, and India as a friend of the Soviet Union.

The Rajiv Gandhi government didn’t go ahead with the testing. It was in 1998 under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that India again conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan followed with its own testing. The CIA documents, posted online on January 17, were declassified after the mandatory 25 years.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 24 Jan 2017 23:41

No wonder the Pakis tested their bomb in China's Lop Nor and US kept quiet!!!!


Rajiv Ga(n)dhi's peacenik image was retained.

Also recall he went ot US on a state visit in '85 or 86 and is mentioned in
Barbara Bush's biography of having a nice impression on him.
And she was VP Bush's wife.

BTW this report does not reconcile with the general story of the Indian bomb.
It was PVNR that gave the authorization in early 1995 and took 18 months to complete.
All from Weapons of Peace by Chengappa.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby rgosain » 25 Jan 2017 00:24

ramana wrote:No wonder the Pakis tested their bomb in China's Lop Nor and US kept quiet!!!!


Rajiv Ga(n)dhi's peacenik image was retained.

Also recall he went ot US on a state visit in '85 or 86 and is mentioned in
Barbara Bush's biography of having a nice impression on him.
And she was VP Bush's wife.

BTW this report does not reconcile with the general story of the Indian bomb.
It was PVNR that gave the authorization in early 1995 and took 18 months to complete.
All from Weapons of Peace by Chengappa.


Correct but for one small point: The device that was tested in 84/85 was a Chinese device.
Today the Chinese have outsourced their testing to the Nk of the w88 primary. I suppose that can be called progress

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 25 Jan 2017 00:31

Agreed.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 27 Jan 2017 00:58

Deleted
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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 27 Jan 2017 00:58

RoyG wrote:Rakesh wrote:
India already has an effective missile defence shield to intercept Pakistan's 'Ababeel' missile
http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=250099

Well this is a first (AFAIK)....guess even bullshit has a limit....

Meanwhile, tall claims made by Pakistan have again raised doubt within Indian science community. Dr Chander wonders if Pakistan's claim regarding MIRV technology in a short-range missile with a range of just 2,200km is true. According to veteran missile scientist, use of such technologies in a short range missile is difficult. Primarily, it is used in long range missile. So we need to wait for more substantial inputs to verify Pakistan's claims.



I have reason to believe that it is MRV capable like the Polaris. They are clustered to hit a common target but they are NOT independently targeted (MIRV) which require sufficient midcourse glide and maneuvering bus. This missile is revealing for the following reasons:

* SPD has come to the logical conclusion that it CANNOT expect a graduated response up the escalation ladder due to SFC massive retaliation protocol thereby limiting any chance of deescalation.

* India's maturing capability to counter force along w/ development of ABMs and emerging sea borne deterrent has prompted SPD to place a premium on w/e remaining deterrent left after a first strike perform adequate counter value for a given target. Given that they face yield limitations it makes sense to cluster the warheads to do this.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 27 Jan 2017 02:34

Given that they face yield limitations it makes sense to cluster the warheads to do this.


You mean three ping pons balls are better than one?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 27 Jan 2017 03:09

ramana wrote:
Given that they face yield limitations it makes sense to cluster the warheads to do this.


You mean three ping pons balls are better than one?


Yes. More damage due to dispersal even w/ smaller yield per warhead and less likely endoatmospheric intercept. MRV is also accomplished by linear release vs MIRV which gives more deployment flexibility b/c of maneuvering bus. SS-18 can do linear release on a massive scale w/ decoys and literally pulverize huge swaths of territory in one go.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Gagan » 27 Jan 2017 04:31

This essentially goes back to the M-11 missile design philosophy of the 2nd stage descending down with the warhead, which has separated from it. The missile itself forms a bigger radar and optical target than the warhead itself.

This is entirely up the Pakistanis engineering ability to have 2-3 warheads on top of each other and let them essentially fall down in the same area.
Takes care of their grave CEP related, and the very poor yield related issues to some extent.
They may also be trying to bunch a couple of different designs to mitigate failure, the latest NoKo test design will soon make its way to Pindi.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 27 Jan 2017 06:17

Gagan wrote:This essentially goes back to the M-11 missile design philosophy of the 2nd stage descending down with the warhead, which has separated from it. The missile itself forms a bigger radar and optical target than the warhead itself.

This is entirely up the Pakistanis engineering ability to have 2-3 warheads on top of each other and let them essentially fall down in the same area.
Takes care of their grave CEP related, and the very poor yield related issues to some extent.
They may also be trying to bunch a couple of different designs to mitigate failure, the latest NoKo test design will soon make its way to Pindi.


I doubt they'll place any new major warhead design outside a pure fission or FBF on the missile anytime soon. However, once their DARHT facility comes online, they may begin substituting them partially w/ TN designs.

3 X 35-50kt will put any major city out of commission. I think this a logical development.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Gagan » 07 Feb 2017 22:16

Someone's deterrence just went up in smoke!
Sandeep ‏@SandeepUnnithan 10h10 hours ago

'Yield of Pak N tests couple of KTs...their (tactical N) doctrine born out of necessity?' Dr Anil Kakodkar @FINSHQ

Pakis have been trying to make virtue out of failure.
All they have are fizzles. They call them "tactical warheads"
:rotfl:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Gagan » 07 Feb 2017 22:17

Sandeep ‏@SandeepUnnithan 10h10 hours ago

'India has tested 3 sub-KT weapons 0.2- 0.5 KT (in 1998). Capability created if reqd' Dr SK Sikka @FINSHQ
Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 07 Feb 2017 23:55

Looks like the conference details are coming out.

Incomprehensible position on N-testing - Bharat Karnad

In an interesting Meet on “Revising the N-doctrine”hosted by the Foundation for Integrated National Security headed by Lt Gen DB Shekatkar, former chairman, AEC, Anil Kakodkar, and SK Sikka ex-N weapons group, maintained that there was no need whatsoever for renewed explosive testing if, per Sikka, one has only “evolutionary” weapons in mind to develop rather than “revolutionary” weapons, which will require new tests. Further, Kakodakar mentioned in an aside to me, that simulation and hydronuclear tests, etc. can, more than adequately, replace actual testing. He also denied — and this is a digression — that at least during his tenure in office CAT, Indore, where the Indian Inertial Confinement Fusion unit is in great disrepair, was in fine fettle, when actually owing to active discouragement, deliberate under-funding, and lack of interest, the ICF had, when Chidambaram headed the DAE 29 years back, had already slid into a state of rack and ruin. ICF is integral to fashioning new thermonuclear weapons w/o testing by facilitating miniature fusion explosions using a multitude of laser beams. The most talented scientists in Indore were hounded out, at least one of whom that I know, is right now packing his bags to re-locate to Beijing where he is promised oodles of money, a brand new lab, and a select team of bright local scientists to aid him in his researches in complex networks and similar cutting edge areas!

But to revert to the theme of this post, Sikka during lunch explained to me that in-built scalability in the nuclear and thermonuclear weapons designs tested in 1998 and enhanced simulation techniques together have made testing redundant, and referred to the correlation between the decline in testing generally with the phenomenal rise in computing speeds. He said — and this astonished me — that based on the 1998 data Indian designers could even design “yield-dialed” weapons by, as Sikka said, simply reducing/increasing the fissile material and changing the mass of chemical explosives to set off the fission implosion in the first stage.

In the formal session where a fairly large number of serving military officers were present (perhaps, because of Gen Shekatkar’s proximity to defence minister Manohar Parrikar), I evinced grave doubts about India’s deterrence based on untested weapons and intent to carry on without N-testing by staying, as Kakodkar said, within the limits of the N- deal and other restrictive agreements signed with the US and other states. As evidence of how closely the Indian military thinking hews to the reigning political view, were the statements made by two recently retired military officers on one of the panels. The army man (an LtG) talked up the virtues of not “rocking the nuclear boat”; the naval person (an RADM), more sensible, nevertheless mentioned shaping a “minimum deterrent” for a 2-front N-war w/o outlining the force structure he had in mind.

In an offline conversation, Kakodkar revealed to me that the Meghalaya uranium reserves estimated at “tens of thousand of tons”, relatively “rich” in uranium constituting some 1% of the ore, were prevented from being strip-mined by a combine of unscrupulous local politicians eager to extract/extort large sums as royalty and extraneous payments, Christian missionary orgs, and environmental NGOs. That GOI cannot at a stroke remove all hindrances at state level by declaring it a strategic resource and imperative, indicates the degree of infirm political will. Kakodkar stated that Ur is fairly abundant in Andhra but is less rich (0.5%), and that infrastructure is under construction to mine and refine Rare Earth Minerals — now that China is slowly strangling RRE flow to the outside world from sources on the Tibetan plateau.

Kakodkar also disclosed that Modi’s government had approved the setting up of ten Indian designed and developed natural uranium fueled 700MW Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors all over the country. He was not clear where the money for these power projects would come from, and was not convincing in refuting my assertion that there’d be paucity of funds for the indigenous 700MW plants because of the priority accorded the purchase of imported American, French and Russian enriched uranium reactors by the Manmohan Singh government and now the Modi regime.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 08 Feb 2017 04:43

Gagan wrote:Someone's deterrence just went up in smoke!
Sandeep ‏@SandeepUnnithan 10h10 hours ago

'Yield of Pak N tests couple of KTs...their (tactical N) doctrine born out of necessity?' Dr Anil Kakodkar @FINSHQ

Pakis have been trying to make virtue out of failure.
All they have are fizzles. They call them "tactical warheads"
:rotfl:


This guy is full of sh*t. They didn't lower the 2nd design copy down the shaft b/c the first one fizzled. My guess is we have plans to cluster the debugged (simulation) designs w/ the heavier FBF ones on the MIRV bus. And now we're supposed to believe his assertion that Pakistan doesn't posses at least 15kt design especially given the proliferation from China and NK...

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ranjan.rao » 08 Feb 2017 05:23

^^royG who? if you mean BK, then why shoot the messenger, he's not saying something on his own, "Fizzle side" scientists did put logical reasons. which side is true false that is a question but why shoot the messenger. Ignoring his history, this guy is now firmly rooting for Tejas

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 08 Feb 2017 06:33

ranjan.rao wrote:^^royG who? if you mean BK, then why shoot the messenger, he's not saying something on his own, "Fizzle side" scientists did put logical reasons. which side is true false that is a question but why shoot the messenger. Ignoring his history, this guy is now firmly rooting for Tejas


Kakodkar not bk.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 08 Feb 2017 08:49

ShauryaT wrote:
ICF is integral to fashioning new thermonuclear weapons w/o testing by facilitating miniature fusion explosions using a multitude of laser beams.



One does not have to search very hard to see Karnad bullshitting. Kakodkar mentions hydronuclear testing and Karnad speaks of laser containment of fusion. Karnad does not understand even rudimentary physics let alone advanced physics. Hydrodynamic and hydronuclear testing are a completely different ball game and cannot be conducted in a lab in Indore. Pokhran or some army/airforce weapon testing range would be the place.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 08 Feb 2017 09:01

ranjan.rao wrote:^^royG who? if you mean BK, then why shoot the messenger, he's not saying something on his own, "Fizzle side" scientists did put logical reasons. which side is true false that is a question but why shoot the messenger. Ignoring his history, this guy is now firmly rooting for Tejas

Karnad's support of the Tejas is different from his criticism of nuclear bombs which I am certain he does not understand - from his articles and from personal interaction with him

If we must use Tejas as a analogy, Karnad's attutude towards Indian nuclear bombs would be "Why on earth are we concentrating on Tejas when the world is moving to F-35 and the J-20"

The rhetoric in his article is as revealing as it is informative:
maintained that there was no need whatsoever for renewed explosive testing if, per Sikka, one has only “evolutionary” weapons in mind to develop rather than “revolutionary” weapons, which will require new tests.


This statement is crystal clear. If Indian continues to develop what we have - we can have a deterrent. If we want to develop new "revolutionary weapons" - (don't know what that means ) then we need further testing.

Then Karnad goes and talks about "Inertial Containment" of fusion using lasers. This is a "science project" and has nothing to do with deterrence or nuclear weapons as applicable to our deterrence needs

read more on Wiki
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_ ... ent_fusion

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Re: Deterrence

Postby RoyG » 08 Feb 2017 09:58

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:


One does not have to search very hard to see Karnad bullshitting. Kakodkar mentions hydronuclear testing and Karnad speaks of laser containment of fusion. Karnad does not understand even rudimentary physics let alone advanced physics. Hydrodynamic and hydronuclear testing are a completely different ball game and cannot be conducted in a lab in Indore. Pokhran or some army/airforce weapon testing range would be the place.


He has been caught bullshitting from time to time but I think there is enough evidence to show that the the secondary underwent partial fusion.

India probably has secret underground subcritical and hydronuclear testing facilities. Doubt we have a hydrodynamic capability in the form of DARHT facility. They can only give India high confidence in primary and only marginal confidence in full secondary burn needed for TN.

Have no clue about India's simulation capabilities. Perhaps you might be able to shed some light on it. NWS depend on past consistent full test performance data coupled w/ simulation.

Then Karnad goes and talks about "Inertial Containment" of fusion using lasers. This is a "science project" and has nothing to do with deterrence or nuclear weapons as applicable to our deterrence needs


Actually there is some utility in it. NIF is part of the stockpile stewardship. Simulations use the data from the fusion experiments. Russia, France, and China have active LIF programs and are following the path taken by the US for design of next gen warheads w/o full scale testing. It probably isn't an immediate need for us but at some point we'll probably have to construct one.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 08 Feb 2017 10:04

shiv wrote:
One does not have to search very hard to see Karnad bullshitting. Kakodkar mentions hydronuclear testing and Karnad speaks of laser containment of fusion. Karnad does not understand even rudimentary physics let alone advanced physics. Hydrodynamic and hydronuclear testing are a completely different ball game and cannot be conducted in a lab in Indore. Pokhran or some army/airforce weapon testing range would be the place.


Are you so anxious to claim Karnad is bull shitting. Quoting the author's relevant parts below.

Further, Kakodakar mentioned in an aside to me, that simulation and hydronuclear tests, etc. can, more than adequately, replace actual testing. He also denied — and this is a digression — that at least during his tenure in office CAT, Indore, where the Indian Inertial Confinement Fusion unit is in great disrepair, was in fine fettle, when actually owing to active discouragement, deliberate under-funding, and lack of interest, the ICF had, when Chidambaram headed the DAE 29 years back, had already slid into a state of rack and ruin. ICF is integral to fashioning new thermonuclear weapons w/o testing by facilitating miniature fusion explosions using a multitude of laser beams.
Karnad is commenting on the ICF comment by Kakodkar and has no further comment on hydronuclear tests in the article, except for stating what Kakodkar told him. Did Karnad claim that hydronuclear testing is done in a lab, as you allege?

You find Sikka claiming yield dial weapons based on sim tests of 1998 credible? You find the claims of a continuously under delivering organization credible? Just to jog your memory, these scientists were OK to not test even pre 1998, with RC et al claiming the same theory. The theory maybe fine for the scientists, national security demands proving the theories and thereby reduce risks and move the scale towards assured results and efficacies.

The problem is not Karnad's understanding of nuclear physics, read his works and know his antecedents and your doubts will be cleared. But, your choice to base your view of him based on one interaction, not to your satisfaction. BTW: Karnad does not claim to be a technical expert, but again, your view that someone commenting on the topic has to know the science to understand its national security dimensions. Does not compute in my head but what do I know.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 08 Feb 2017 10:13

ShauryaT wrote: Karnad is commenting on the ICF comment by Kakodkar and has no further comment on hydronuclear tests in the article, except for stating what Kakodkar told him. Did Karnad claim that hydronuclear testing is done in a lab, as you allege?

Read my post again. Karnad is bullshitting by bringing in the state of ICF and laser fusion when he speaks of nuclear testing. If we need ICF for stockpile stewardship it means we alread have Teller-Ulam TN bombs - which you and everyone else is constesting. If we don't have them, the ICF may be a partial time waste. hydrunuclear'hydroynamic testing will suffice. Neither Sikka, nor Kakodkar, nor Chidambaram claimed that we have a Teller-ulam design thermonuclear device. there are other designs and no one has stated that we don;t use other "easier" but bulkier devices. My feeling is that our 1 meter 1 ton missiles are suited for heavier, bigger diameter devices that are not of the Teller-Ulam design



ShauryaT wrote:You find Sikka claiming yield dial weapons based on sim tests of 1998 credible? You find the claims of a continuously under delivering organization credible? Just to jog your memory, these scientists were OK to not test even pre 1998, with RC et al claiming the same theory. The theory maybe fine for the scientists, national security demands proving the theories and thereby reduce risks and move the scale towards assured results and efficacies.

The problem is not Karnad's understanding of nuclear physics, read his works and know his antecedents and your doubts will be cleared. But, your choice to base your view of him based on one interaction, not to your satisfaction. BTW: Karnad does not claim to be a technical expert, but again, your view that someone commenting on the topic has to know the science to understand its national security dimensions. Does not compute in my head but what do I know.
[/quote]
You are entitled to your views. A person who knows very little physics should not make a public ass of himself by talking about nuclear weapon design as Karnad is wont to do. If one doesn't know the connection between physics and nuclear bombs one is in a hole so deep that one cannot comprehend what is going on. And that statement may apply to people other than Karnad too.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 08 Feb 2017 11:00

Shiv ji: I read the below in no other way, other than a claim of teller-ulam.

He said — and this astonished me — that based on the 1998 data Indian designers could even design “yield-dialed” weapons by, as Sikka said, simply reducing/increasing the fissile material and changing the mass of chemical explosives to set off the fission implosion in the first stage.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 08 Feb 2017 15:28

ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji: I read the below in no other way, other than a claim of teller-ulam.

He said — and this astonished me — that based on the 1998 data Indian designers could even design “yield-dialed” weapons by, as Sikka said, simply reducing/increasing the fissile material and changing the mass of chemical explosives to set off the fission implosion in the first stage.

This is because you have convinced yourself that "dial a yield" means a Teller Ulam design. In fact from that fateful day May 8th 1998 the "experts" of BRF instantly stated that what was later called as a fizzle was a Teller Ulam design. I recall being the one and only guy to question this but no one paid any attention. Then the doubts and questions set in and everyone started weeping and beating their breasts howling "All nations have succeeded in first shot of Teller Ulam. India has failed We are useless. We are worthless Chidambaram is a fool. Vajpayee is a liar" - in other words - based on an assumption we started howling and self flagellating

Not even once in the last 19 years have I heard anyone from the nuclear establishment say that a Teller Ulam design was tried. But I digress.

From open source literature I am informed that "dial a yield" works as follows - in a series where the first 3-4 steps are fission and/or boosted fission alone. The last 2 steps can involve a Tellr Ulam design

If you have Pu ball surrounded by explosive lenses and the Pu ball has a "pit" for Tritium boosting, the lowest yield (subkiloton yield) can be obtained by doing a deliberate fizzle in which only one of two onion layers of conventional explosive is set off leading to partial compression and a deliberate subkiloton fizzle

The next step up would be to explode (i.e implode) the whole lens and get adequate compression to get full paisa vasool of fission onlee. No Tritium boosting.

The third step up in yield would be to introduce Tritium gas into the Pu ball core to get boosted fission. The amount of Tritium can be varied - i.e 50% or 100% to get higher but different yields. The small amount of fusion that occurs here makes the fission very effective giving a bigger bang.

Note that so far it is fission and boosted fission alone and just this design can get 100 kilotons or more

Next (as the US does) is to place the above variable yield gizmo inside a Teller Ulam design. A mechanical shield can stop the fusion from working and if fusion is required the shield is removed and you get the thermonuclear part.

Finally if this Teller Ulam thing can be placed in a fissile U 235 tamper (instead of a lead tamper) so that thermonuclear part causes the tamper itself to serve as a fission bomb. Most of the explosive force of a 1 megaton bomb is from fission, Not fusion

Unfortunately lack of some basic physics knowledge will lead to the above being incomprehensible to the person who has never studied or kept in touch with physics. It is no coincidence that the Amreekis call the inner core of their bombs a 'Physics package" - not "rhetoric package" or "history package"

The first "accepted" thermonuclear bomb was a Sloika (not Teller Ulam) design called Joe 4 done by the Soviets which gave 400 kilotons of which about 15% was fusion.
Last edited by shiv on 08 Feb 2017 18:59, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 08 Feb 2017 15:33

I just wonder what Barat Karnad would say to this
The Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon in America's Arsenal
“In 1985, a single U.S. ICBM warhead had less than a 60 percent chance of destroying a typical silo… Today, a multiple-warhead attack on a single silo using a Trident II missile would have a roughly 99 percent chance of destroying it.”

Yet the most dangerous nuclear bomb in America’s arsenal may be the new B61-12.

Much has been written about the B61-12, most of which has focused on its enormous cost. And for good reason—it is the most expensive nuclear bomb project ever.

In terms of sheer destructive capability, the B61-12 is nowhere near America’s most dangerous nuclear weapon. Indeed, the bomb has a maximum yield of just 50-kilotons, the equivalent of 50,000 tons of TNT. By contrast, the B83 nuclear bomb has a maximum yield of 1.2 megatons (1,200 kilotons).

What makes the B61-12 bomb the most dangerous nuclear weapon in America’s arsenal is its usability. This usability derives from a combination of its accuracy and low-yield.

In terms of the former, the B61-12 is America’s first nuclear-guided bomb, As Hans Kristensen of FAS notes, “We do not have a nuclear-guided bomb in our arsenal today…. It [the B61-12] is a new weapon.”

Indeed, according to Kristensen, existing U.S. nuclear bombs have circular error probabilities (CEP) of between 110-170 meters. The B61-12’s CEP is just 30 meters.

The B61-12 also has a low-yield. As noted above, the bomb has a maximum yield of 50 kilotons. However, this yield can be lowered as needed for any particular mission. In fact, the bomb’s explosive force can be reduced electronically through a dial-a-yield system

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Gagan » 08 Feb 2017 21:22

One big problem with our scientists, is their inability to use precise language.
They all seem to have dementia, mix words and statements, use hyperbole, have some problems with the english language to a certain extent. Their use of the language is limited to the words used in scientific journals - see them fumble when they have to talk to an ingliss speaking dork reporter who is looking for inconsistancies.

Has anyone seen Manohar Parikar talk? He is India's best defence minister to date.

Now to take these statements given out by such people, one can make just about any argument because these guys have given imprecise and contradictory statements that are all over the place.

The TN underperformed, no one in the fauj trusts the scientists on this. Every one is OK with the fact that the Fission is proven, weaponized and is scalable.

Fact remains that India will someday test its TN, and prove it.
Then all these guys will come on media admitting with sly smiles saying, "Wot to do onlee! State secret onlee! Official secrets act wonlee"

The TN fizzled and underperformed.

Revolutionary weapons probably refers to 3rd Gen (neutron weapons) and 4th Gen (Pure fusion weapons - using lasers/antimatter) per Sikka ji. Though a few weeks after the Paki tests, when the Chinese claimed that they have Neurton bomb capability, Indian scientists retorted back saying, "we too have it"

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 08 Feb 2017 21:56

Gagan wrote:
no one in the fauj trusts the scientists on this.

No one in fauj is interested whether it is fissan or fujan. Only we are obsessed. They want to know how much bang can be delivered and how. They want functionality not technical mumbo jumbo

Tomorrow if NoKo nukes LA no one is going to feel happy that it was fission and not Teller Ulam. Only BRF are masters of rona dhona on this issue.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 08 Feb 2017 22:18

Guess where the B61-12 has been "tested" so to say. Also, why is the B61-12 not based on Teller-Ulam, in your view? It is based on radiation implosion. Are you saying the basic design of the B61 is not based on the Teller-Ulam or are you saying the 12th derivation is not?

Regardless, you somehow think that all the critics who have questioned the scientists are mistaken and since as you claim the "establishment" has not claimed the TN device to be based on Teller-Ulam then it probably is not. You further claim that "yield-dial" may not refer to Teller-Ulam. Between these uncertainties are some hard facts. Facts based on easily understandable proofs such as proven yields that only tests can provide. You are right, my mind has been made up on what will serve Indian interests and no amount of scientific weapon design arguments - is going to change the same. To be clear, I do think the TN design tested was a fizzle. Who is hiding what, where and why is a mystery. I have stated this before, even if the TN device worked as per design 100% - my position is further tests are needed to secure India's deterrence needs. You and I have differed and I have no wish to litigate the case again.


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