Put out some thoughts on this. Nothing like the IDSA paper linked above, but very basic stuff instead. Drawn on Shivji's research on the likely impact of tactical nukes.
A key priority must therefore be to reinforce deterrence at the regional level. That will require strengthening U.S. and allied conventional military capabilities, ensuring the credibility of the forward-deployed and -deployable components of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, and maintaining the solidarity and resolve of U.S. alliances. It will also require modernizing U.S. central strategic systems and supporting infrastructure, which remain the bedrock of U.S. deterrence policy, both in extending deterrence and providing assurance to U.S. allies, and in deterring direct attacks on the American homeland.
Prem wrote:US deterrent views
https://www.brookings.edu/research/meet ... uirements/A key priority must therefore be to reinforce deterrence at the regional level. That will require strengthening U.S. and allied conventional military capabilities, ensuring the credibility of the forward-deployed and -deployable components of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, and maintaining the solidarity and resolve of U.S. alliances.
Prem wrote:US deterrent views
https://www.brookings.edu/research/meet ... uirements/A key priority must therefore be to reinforce deterrence at the regional level. That will require strengthening U.S. and allied conventional military capabilities, ensuring the credibility of the forward-deployed and -deployable components of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, and maintaining the solidarity and resolve of U.S. alliances. It will also require modernizing U.S. central strategic systems and supporting infrastructure, which remain the bedrock of U.S. deterrence policy, both in extending deterrence and providing assurance to U.S. allies, and in deterring direct attacks on the American homeland.
SSridhar wrote:Prem wrote:US deterrent views
https://www.brookings.edu/research/meet ... uirements/
The US must therefore loosen the technology transfer constraints in certain areas with a country such as India, though India and the US do not have an alliance let alone a military alliance. Yet, deterrence does not merely stop with a nuclear triad or ABM these days. It goes into cybersecurity, space & satellite-denial capabilities, economic opportunities or penalties etc as well. War with China is inevitable for at least three countries, India, US and Japan. Therefore these three countries must move towards a networked-deterrence even if the US can take care of itself without the other two at the present time in most areas. But, in future, the US would be found wanting vis-a-vis China as its power vanes. Similarly, as the gap between India-China or Japan-China increases in favour of the latter in the medium term, it is only the combined deterrence that could stop the juggernaut from its c. 2049 goal of being the Middle Kingdom once again after two hundred years of humiliation and shame.
Even if Pakistan and the US are able to reconcile their divergent positions on Afghanistan, the emerging strategic alignments that will shape policies in Asia are unlikely to change. The US has chosen India as its major strategic partner in Asia to counter the rising power of China. The resulting escalation in the Indian threat to Pakistan’s security is either irrelevant for the US or part of its strategic plan to weaken Pakistan’s opposition to Indo-US regional domination. The recent visit of the US defence secretary to India has confirmed and reinforced their strategic alliance and intention to collaborate in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s ability to resist Indian diktat and to disagree with America’s strategic design flows from one principal source: its nuclear and missile capabilities. Without this, Pakistan would have been attacked like Iraq or sanctioned like Iran. On the other hand, North Korea, despite its isolation, has been able to thumb its nose at America because of its demonstrated nuclear and missile prowess.
An Islamic nuclear power was always anathema for America and much of the Western world. The US worked ceaselessly — even when Pakistan was a close ally — to retard and reverse its nuclear and missile programmes. This endeavour has intensified since the emergence of the American alliance with India. Apart from the discriminatory technological and political restrictions it has long imposed against Pakistan’s strategic programmes, the US now demands that Pakistan unilaterally halt fissile material production and the development and deployment of short- and long-range nuclear-capable missiles. Meanwhile, it is actively assisting India in enlarging and modernising its nuclear arsenal, its missile and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, its air and naval forces, as well as satellite and space capabilities.
There are credible and not-so-secret reports that the US has formulated plans to seize or destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in a crisis. American think tanks have concocted scenarios of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or, even more absurdly, of the Pakistan Army turning into an ‘extremist’ or ‘jihadi’ force. Indeed, such scary scenarios could be engineered as an excuse to execute the ‘seize or destroy’ plans.
Matters are more likely to come to a head in the event of another war between Pakistan and India. Kashmir is an ongoing dispute and a nuclear flashpoint. Every India-Pakistan war game confirms the likelihood of a rapid escalation of a conflict to the nuclear level due to the asymmetry in conventional forces. A war should thus be unthinkable. Yet, India’s political and military leaders continue to speak of ‘surgical strikes’ and a ‘limited’ war against Pakistan. If India does ever decide to go to war with Pakistan, it would have to first conduct a pre-emptive strike to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Or, would the US be prepared to do so on India’s behalf? Pakistan must be prepared for both contingencies.
Islamabad must presume that in the course of its past (ill-considered) ‘cooperation’ with the US to enhance the ‘safety and security’ of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, the US has gained considerable intelligence about Pakistan’s strategic assets. However, Pakistani officials correctly discount America’s ability to seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. These are too many, and too widely dispersed and well protected, thus not amenable to any seizure or strike. But nuclear delivery systems are more difficult to hide and protect.
In a crisis, it is the delivery systems that will be the prime target of a pre-emptive strike. These are most likely to be detected when, in a crisis, they are being ‘mated’ with the separately stored warheads. Furthermore, as revealed during the current Korean drama, missile launches can be sabotaged by cyberattacks and other technical means.
In the emerging strategic scenario, nuclear deterrence is Pakistan’s ultimate assurance against external aggression and coercion.
Pakistan needs to take several measures so that the credibility of its nuclear deterrence is assured. One, the massive deployment of artillery and short-range missiles (à la North Korea) as the first line of conventional deterrence and defence against an Indian Cold Start attack. This would deter Indian attack and also raise the nuclear threshold. Two, the multiplication of long-, medium- and short-range nuclear-capable missiles to ensure the penetration of any ballistic missile defence systems that India deploys. Three, the continued production of fissile materials to provide warheads for the enlarged missile force.
Then, there is the need to ‘mate’ at least some warheads with delivery vehicles, their dispersal and disguise, or protection in hardened silos, to respond to a pre-emptive strike. Eventually, submarine-launched ballistic missiles could provide an assured second-strike capability. Five, the deployment of effective air defence systems plus a limited number of advanced (and expensive) anti-ballistic missile systems to protect command and control centres. Six, the development of offensive and defensive cyber-warfare capabilities.
Following this, Pakistan needs the acquisition and deployment of early-warning capabilities — satellites, surveillance aircraft and drones. In the meantime, Pakistan should utilise Chinese early warning capabilities. Lastly, greater integration and inter-operability with Chinese land, air and naval forces to enhance conventional and strategic deterrence, quickly and cheaply.
Once Pakistan can demonstrate the complete credibility of its nuclear deterrence posture, its offers to negotiate peace and security in South Asia and to resolve the Kashmir dispute may evoke a more positive response from both India and the US. Pakistan will then also be able to pursue its socioeconomic objectives free from the threats of external coercion, intervention and aggression.
JohnTitor wrote:The part of the article that got me was this
Meanwhile, it is actively assisting India in enlarging and modernising its nuclear arsenal, its missile and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, its air and naval forces, as well as satellite and space capabilities.
Is the US really helping india modernising its nukes??? Seems a little hard to believe. I don't think even Russians are willing to do that
JohnTitor wrote:Meanwhile, it is actively assisting India in enlarging and modernising its nuclear arsenal, its missile and anti-ballistic missile capabilities, its air and naval forces, as well as satellite and space capabilities.
Is the US really helping india modernising its nukes??? Seems a little hard to believe. I don't think even Russians are willing to do that
SSridhar wrote:Terroristan's deterrence goes for a toss.
IAF Chief indicates that IAF can locate, target & neutralize Terroristan's nuclear weapon locations, not only TNWs but ANY target, he says.
Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa on Thursday said the IAF has the capability of locating and striking nuclear and other targets in Pakistan.
The comments by the chief of the Indian Air Force came when he was asked at a news conference about global concerns over the safety of Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons and whether IAF would be able to disarm Islamabad of its nuclear assets if necessary.
"We have a draft nuclear doctrine. It is answered in that - what happens when the enemy decides to use nuclear weapons on us. As far as IAF is concerned, it has the ability to locate, fix and strike and that is not only for tactical nuclear weapons but for other targets across the border (as well)," he said.
Dhanoa said the IAF has the capability to carry out "full spectrum" of offensive at a "short notice" to thwart any security challenge facing the country.
"The IAF is prepared to fight at short notice in full synergy with other two sister services should the need arises. IAF has the capability of sustaining operational preparedness for a prolonged period," he said, referring to overall threat perception facing the country.
Last month, Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi had said his country has developed short-range nuclear weapons to counter the 'Cold Start' doctrine of the Indian Army.
sudhan wrote:I remember the constant stream of statements from the service chiefs before the Doklam incident was made public. The IAF Chief himself had sent out a curt letter asking his pilots to be ready for ops in short notice. I suspected something was up for the top guys to drop statements like that. This one seems very much like that, something must be up not revealed yet to the public. The IAF chief would not be making a statement like this lightly.
Something is up..
ramdas wrote:Could it be, as claimed by Prasun Sengupta, that Pak has only a dozen or so non tactical nukes donated by PRC ? It also makes sense from the PRC's point of view. PRC would not want to end up as a victim of one of their own nukes. If the number is on such a small scale, then talk of the ability to preempt these assets makes sense. Maybe, the NPA claim of Pak having a vast, rapidly growing arsenal is a lot of hot air ?
ramana wrote:Even now OFB factories are stymied by lack of CNC machines and are far behind factory modernization. Year after year CAG reports bemoan this fact yet nothing happens as the industrial policy is in doldrums with import mentality.
‘Overall, strategic stability is a complex multi-political and multidisciplinary problem that requires the constant attention of political and military leaders, national experts who research national security issues, and scientists representing different fields. Therefore Strategic Stability concept is rooted in many disciplines/domains, to include International Relations, Political Science, Psychology, military theory and doctrines, weapons and technology, development of forces, C4I2SR. the last three aspects though terrestrial and located essentially at secure locations are now linked to space in a major way hence, ‘space is to be viewed in the context of continuation of terrestrial situation or nuclear stability’.....
Strategic Stability is intertwined with space stability in an extremely complex manner, beginning with early warning to damage measurement by own weapons, making it very vital devise means and methods to understand the complexities and intricacies involved. Space stability can maintain strategic stability unless political stability is disturbed and becomes the overriding factor for movement up the escalation ladder. Very limited understanding has been reached between nations to put in place treaties and agreements to keep space free from o ensive actions which may result in loss of space stability and consequently Strategic Stability. On the contrary, leading space nations are in the race to establish their lead or supremacy before any substantive agreements or treaty is discussed which may preclude to offensive actions in space. This makes it important that progress is made on reaching an understanding before some nations achieve dominant positions akin to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and then dictate terms. China is well ahead of India in space systems, and India too must increase its assets to meet the needs of national security by developing anti-satellite capabilities on priority. This is not difficult since India already has tested its BMD capability, which is more precise and complex vis-à-vis ASAT. In addition, India must keep ready many reserve satellites for launch on demand to cater for losses to first strike. There is an urgent need to develop capabilities for EW against adversaries for non-permanent kills and defence of own assets. Progress is required in cyber warfare to prevent space attacks. Own satellites must now be designed for constellations to ensure continuity under attack and defeat temporary loss of a few satellites. Emerging technologies o er great scope for developing new capabilities that are more resilient and robust and even self-generating, additive manufacturing and advanced materials are some examples. For India, it is extremely important to match China if not be ahead, time is not too far when Chinese assets will be available to Pakistan for the asking or use by China to perform tasks required by Pakistan, including o ensive actions against India’s space assets.
Air-launched weapons like cruise missiles must endure hours of sub-freezing temperatures at high altitudes while riding their carrier aircraft. Weaponeers successfully subjected the W-80’s components – including the IHE – to temperatures down to -65 Fahrenheit – during development.
But when actually tested in Shot Baseball during Operation Guardian in January 1981, the W-80 fizzled. The new nuke failed to ignite its fusion secondary and produced only a fraction of its intended yield. The IHE proved to be the culprit. It didn’t burn well at very low temperatures.
The last U.S. nuclear test – Shot Divider of Operation Julin – occurred in 1992. The preparations for the follow-up test Shot Icecap still stand in the Nevada desert, slowly rotting away. Like much of the U.S. nuclear-weapons industrial complex, it would need complete refurbishment before use.
In today’s climate, a unilateral resumption of U.S. nuclear tests could set off a surge of testing around the world. It would make the Iran nuclear deal even more controversial. After all, the existing nuclear weapons states have all legally pledged to get rid of their nukes … someday.
No hopeful person would want to conduct such tests, but relying on untested weapon systems – especially nuclear weapons systems — seems a chancy way to go about deterrence. But there’s the rub — deterrence requires that one’s opponents believe that your nuclear weapons will work as advertised.
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