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Deterrence

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ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 15 Dec 2017 23:39

I hope we do not take these groupings and controls too seriously and act in the expanded view of our national interests. So, if we have to provide some arms to Myanmar or Yemen, should not allow these groups to control our interests.

Joining Wassenaar is India’s latest step in the quest for the ‘responsible nuclear power’ tag

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 16 Dec 2017 05:38

+108 * 72.

MEA is full of disarmament experts instead of arms control.

Holdover of Nehruvian mindset.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 17 Dec 2017 05:38

Videos of 100+ US atomic tests. Looks like a lot of them have been recently declassified.
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=P ... -GlJ_OQND5

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 17 Dec 2017 15:37

Dynamics of nuclear escalation in South Asia - Asma Khalid, DT
In the past few decades, development in conventional and nuclear spheres have rapidly transformed the security scenario of the South Asian region. Deterrence is considered the key element to maintain stability and peace in the region. However, various ‘technical’ and ‘non-technical’ elements play a central role in determining the conventional and nuclear deterrence to achieve the aims of limited and total war strategies.

The technical elements comprise of conventional and nuclear force posture, military capabilities, strategies and operational defence postures. Whereas the non-technical elements include geography and demography. Both, technical and non-technical elements play a crucial role in determining the ‘rungs of nuclear escalation ladder’ of South Asia.

Multiple factors perform a significant role in shaping the deterrence properties and strategic dynamics of South Asia. Primarily ‘three rungs to the nuclear escalation ladder’ have increased the risk of escalation in the region. Firstly, for India and Pakistan, the existence of conventional asymmetries, security dilemma, conventional and strategic arms race, defence production gap, nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities, absence of arms control measures and threat reduction measures has increased the threat of conflict escalation or initiating conflict among regional powers; secondly, the existence of complex triangular relation among China-India-Pakistan poses a serious challenge to the security calculations of region; thirdly, the engagement of Great Powers in the region for the pursuit of their own global strategic objectives has disturbed the security calculus of South Asia.

Since the beginning, India has adopted a multi-dimensional tactic to bully Pakistan. Cease-fire violations by Indian forces have collapsed the peace talks between both states. India’s military officials justify the violation of the ceasefire agreement but maintain that Pakistan helps terrorists infiltrating into Indian Territory. Therefore, On September 29, 2016, Indian officials claimed that their troops conducted surgical strikes in Azad Kashmir against the suspected militants, as these militants were preparing to carry out attacks on major cities of India. Such rhetorical claims and tactics of India’s political and strategic elites proves their failure to understand the significance of a regional strategic equation. Such false claims and undermining of Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities shows that Indian military and political elites are strategically irresponsible and immature.

Consequently, the disturbed Balance of Power (BOP) in the region is proportional to India’s conventional and strategic force developments. Such developments have led to the increase in the arms race in the region. In order to pursue its global and regional ambitions such as covering the gap with China and superiority over Pakistan, India has increased its nuclear and missile development program. Additionally, India’s increasing military budget and military modernisation of three forces characterised by the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), loopholes in nuclear Doctrine, and Missile proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defence system (BMD) is viewed as a threat for Pakistan and for the other regional states as well.

India is pursuing offensive force posture to achieve its regional and global ambitions without realising that the evolving nuclear trends and India’s ignorant and irresponsible strategic manoeuvres may quicken the pace up to the nuclear escalation ladder.

For the moment, the shift in the US strategy in South Asia; demonstrates that India is chosen and preferred strategic ally of the US to safeguard its interest in Asia. The formation of the new Foreign Policy of the US towards India to enhance Indo-US bilateral ties has led to the formulation of new strategic poles in the region; one in the Indo-US nexus and the second is China-Pakistan’s strategic bond. Such a strategic dyad has added more complex dimensions to the power politics of South Asia.

In response to India’s multi-dimensional strategies to bully Pakistan and destabilising maniac obsession with military superiority, Pakistan has opted for a counter measure strategy of ‘maintaining nuclear deterrence’ by enhancing its conventional and nuclear military capabilities.

For instance, Pakistan developed the low-yield, battle field weapon NASR, to counter India’s pro-active strategy of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). Pakistan’s surface to surface ballistic missile; Ababeel (MIRV) is a significant contribution in the defence arrangements of Pakistan to neutralise the Indian BMD system. Development of NASR and Ababeel aims at maintaining the deterrence stability and prevent conflict escalation.

Therefore, crises in South Asia have not yet reached the conventional and nuclear escalation ladder because the India’s reckless Cold Start Doctrine and nuclear option was addressed by Pakistan’s wise efforts at maintaining credible deterrence. In this regard, full spectrum deterrence is a viable strategy, which Pakistan has adopted. It implies preventing nuclear conflict escalation. In effect, Pakistan must enhance its nuclear deterrence requirements in response to Indian nuclear developments and advancements.


The writer is currently working as Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 17 Dec 2017 15:46

Why Pakistan needs FSD capability - Beenish Altaf, DT
Pakistan is pursuing Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) as part of its broader Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) philosophy. This is aimed at safeguarding against possible gaps in the country’s deterrence capability. What it is not directed at is seeking parity with India on the nuclear front.

The National Command Authority, back in September 2013, gave full approval to the FSD. This is the civilian authority charged with overseeing research, development, production, use and security of the country’s nuclear programme. The main function of the FSD remains as a responsive deterrent to India’s Cold Start Doctrine, which may be best described as a limited war strategy designed to seize Pakistan’s territory swiftly and without, in theory at least, risking a nuclear conflict. Thus FSD capability represents a range of options available to the decision-making bodies. And at its core is the development of nuclear capability aimed at bringing all Indian targets into Pakistan’s striking range.

The net effect of this has been the taking off the table of full-scale conventional war. For this no longer a viable option for either side — given the conceptual reality of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Yet this doesn’t mean that there is no threat of conflict. There is. Noticeably, India has adopted sub-conventional warfare to achieve regional supremacy; thereby plunging South Asia into a sort of Cold War era of its own. Thus we have seen New Delhi’s hand in an ongoing proxy war along the Indo-Pak border areas. It is the same story when it comes to the western border with Afghanistan.

This focusing on sub-conventional warfare has allowed India to turn to the issue of terrorism to try and destabilise Pakistan. This, despite it being the former that is conducting continuous surgical strikes along the LoC; possibly in a bid to provoke Islamabad. Thus we may begin to see Cold Start in the following terms: a warmongering strategy whereby New Delhi directs conventional forces to perform holding attacks ahead of international intervention or else nuclear retaliation from Islamabad.

Thus this blueprint for proactive aggression, in reality, poses a far more dangerous threat to regional peace and security. It also undermines the Indian commitment to its policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. For trying to incite the other side to strike first — is a violation of the aforementioned.

And it is one which threatens Pakistan’s conventional asymmetric advantage.

Bluntly put, this country must begin preparing for the possibility of an Indian reversal of the no-first use; especially given that such hardliners as Manohar Parrikar, Ajit Davol and Sushma Sawraj are at the helm when it comes to dictating the country’s future nuclear direction. Not only that, but such belligerence on the part of New Delhi gives the impression to the international community that the entire South Asia region is permanently shackled in conflict.

And this, combined with India’s weaponry expansion as well as military enlargement, explains in real terms just how Pakistan came to actively move towards FSD. For how else is this country expected to respond to such threats at both at the tactical and counter-force level?

The answer is that it needs to cover all levels of risk. This is why Pakistan refers to its nukes as Weapons of Peace; meaning that these reduce the threat and probability of all-out war. Moreover, it must be recognised that strategic stability in South Asia does not exclusively hinge on Islamabad and New Delhi — it also involves both China and the US as external regional players.

Adviser to the National Command Authority, Lt Gen (rtd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwani, has highlighted the salient features of the Pakistan’s FSD policy. At the beginning of this month, he put it like this: “it envisages possession of a full range of nuclear weapons that could reach every part of India, having enough yield and numbers to deter rival from its policy of massive retaliation and having liberty of picking targets including counter-value, counter-force and battlefield”.

Meanwhile, India’s increasing efforts to secure membership to all the export control cartels — especially its recent admission into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as well as talk of it entering into the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) — could very well disturb the strategic balance in the region. While potentially triggering an arms competition in the Indian Ocean, too. Therefore, reassurance of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence is non-negotiable; while simultaneously observing Indian nuclear ‘political rhetoric’ regarding the introduction of new and advanced technologies, and sophisticated nukes.

The writer is associated with the Strategic Vision Institute

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 17 Dec 2017 17:43

SSridhar wrote:Why Pakistan needs FSD capability - Beenish Altaf, DT

Wow. This lady is called Benis

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Re: Deterrence

Postby sum » 17 Dec 2017 18:39

:rotfl: :rotfl:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Supratik » 17 Dec 2017 20:07

Pak does not have conventional asymmetric advantage. It had/has sub-conventional asymmetric advantage through jihad as India was playing nice. For Pak to achieve FSD it will need more Chinese help. If FSD is achieved we should move to FU and supersonic/hypersonic.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 18 Dec 2017 04:39

^one may laugh off and some may do their pisko analysis and ROFTLS but from a military standpoint, Pakistan's growing arsenal, delivery mechanisms, unconventional launch platforms, reach and its alliance with China are a credible threat to inflict massive damage.

It calls for a serious suppression of this capability using our massive strike and for India to be able to strike first and strike hard. As a backup, we need to seriously invest in BMD and the ability to withstand a strike with some serious investments in disaster management. As India is building infrastructure, we should account for such strikes and harden our infrastructure and a case to build underground shelters. Maybe some building codes can be enhanced to account for these capabilities. We need full spectrum offensive, defensive and capabilities to absorb impact to defeat TSP's designs or our conventional advantage would be difficult to capitalize on.

The TSP thought process is, I may be dead but I will ensure that many of you die too. I may not be able to win, but I will not let you win also. We should assume TSP has FBF designs in its arsenal. Its numbers will move from about 150 now to up to about 250 in 10 years. We need a strategy to bankrupt them trying to compete with us.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 18 Dec 2017 08:08

ShauryaT wrote:
The TSP thought process is, I may be dead but I will ensure that many of you die too. I may not be able to win, but I will not let you win also.

a. What has changed?
b. How is this different from our strategy vis-a-vis China?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 18 Dec 2017 09:59

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:
The TSP thought process is, I may be dead but I will ensure that many of you die too. I may not be able to win, but I will not let you win also.

a. What has changed?
b. How is this different from our strategy vis-a-vis China?
a. Capabilities (delivery platforms), numbers and yield.
b. China and India have both not been existential threats to each other. Pakistan has viewed India as an existential threat and has always desired capabilities to challenge this threat.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Supratik » 18 Dec 2017 19:19

A complete lock-down of Pak airspace is required. For that you need saturation coverage of BMD and S400. Plus saturation supersonic/hypersonic nuke delivery within seconds. The only thing left will be a sub-based capability.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 18 Dec 2017 20:00

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote:a. What has changed?
b. How is this different from our strategy vis-a-vis China?
a. Capabilities (delivery platforms), numbers and yield.
b. China and India have both not been existential threats to each other. Pakistan has viewed India as an existential threat and has always desired capabilities to challenge this threat.

I think there is sophistry in that statement. If one is actually straight and honest with facts - any nation that threatens another nation with nuclear weapons is an existential threat to the other nation. Frankly it seems almost Nehruvian blinkers to me to consider that China does not pose and existential threat and will in future fight a war to lose and not use its nukes.

It is only to be expected that Pakistan will keep on increasing its nuclear threat to India and I think that any fond hopes any Indian may have harboured that we can somehow get away in a war with Pakistan by nuking them and being relatively unscathed ourselves is completely naive. Our nuclear doctrine never was and never will be anything of that sort. Those are only "high hopes" that I hear on social media and I am surprised that you are echoing that. We just promise to nuke the shit out of Pakistan. Are we going to get hurt in the process? Of course we are. No one who even speaks about nuclear weapons should be naive enough to think otherwise. We will get hit and hit badly. But Pakistan _will_be_fucued_. They have always been invited to nuke us with that promise. That is what deterrence means.

There is an interesting side effect of people such as yourself and others somehow hoping that Pakistan can be "dealt with" in nuclear war without us getting hit significantly. That side effect is that these delusional thoughts scare the crap out of Pakistan because they believe that Indians think that they (India) are ready to nuke Pakistan and that Pakistani deterrence is not good enough. That fear explains the two articles posted above - one by Asma someone and the other by benis lady

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 18 Dec 2017 22:19

Highlighting Pak FSD salient features:

Why Pakistan needs FSD capability - Beenish Altaf, DT
Pakistan is pursuing Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) as part of its broader Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) philosophy. This is aimed at safeguarding against possible gaps in the country’s deterrence capability. What it is not directed at is seeking parity with India on the nuclear front.

The National Command Authority, back in September 2013, gave full approval to the FSD. This is the civilian authority charged with overseeing research, development, production, use and security of the country’s nuclear programme. The main function of the FSD remains as a responsive deterrent to India’s Cold Start Doctrine, which may be best described as a limited war strategy designed to seize Pakistan’s territory swiftly and without, in theory at least, risking a nuclear conflict. Thus FSD capability represents a range of options available to the decision-making bodies. And at its core is the development of nuclear capability aimed at bringing all Indian targets into Pakistan’s striking range.

The net effect of this has been the taking off the table of full-scale conventional war. For this no longer a viable option for either side — given the conceptual reality of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Yet this doesn’t mean that there is no threat of conflict. There is. Noticeably, India has adopted sub-conventional warfare to achieve regional supremacy; thereby plunging South Asia into a sort of Cold War era of its own. Thus we have seen New Delhi’s hand in an ongoing proxy war along the Indo-Pak border areas. It is the same story when it comes to the western border with Afghanistan.

This focusing on sub-conventional warfare has allowed India to turn to the issue of terrorism to try and destabilise Pakistan. This, despite it being the former that is conducting continuous surgical strikes along the LoC; possibly in a bid to provoke Islamabad. Thus we may begin to see Cold Start in the following terms: a warmongering strategy whereby New Delhi directs conventional forces to perform holding attacks ahead of international intervention or else nuclear retaliation from Islamabad.

Thus this blueprint for proactive aggression, in reality, poses a far more dangerous threat to regional peace and security. It also undermines the Indian commitment to its policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. For trying to incite the other side to strike first — is a violation of the aforementioned.

And it is one which threatens Pakistan’s conventional asymmetric advantage.

Bluntly put, this country must begin preparing for the possibility of an Indian reversal of the no-first use; especially given that such hardliners as Manohar Parrikar, Ajit Davol and Sushma Sawraj are at the helm when it comes to dictating the country’s future nuclear direction. Not only that, but such belligerence on the part of New Delhi gives the impression to the international community that the entire South Asia region is permanently shackled in conflict.

And this, combined with India’s weaponry expansion as well as military enlargement, explains in real terms just how Pakistan came to actively move towards FSD. For how else is this country expected to respond to such threats at both at the tactical and counter-force level?

The answer is that it needs to cover all levels of risk. This is why Pakistan refers to its nukes as Weapons of Peace; :rotfl: meaning that these reduce the threat and probability of all-out war. Moreover, it must be recognised that strategic stability in South Asia does not exclusively hinge on Islamabad and New Delhi — it also involves both China and the US as external regional players.

Adviser to the National Command Authority, Lt Gen (rtd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwani, has highlighted the salient features of the Pakistan’s FSD policy. At the beginning of this month, he put it like this: [b]“it envisages possession of a full range of nuclear weapons that could reach every part of India, having enough yield and numbers to deter rival from its policy of massive retaliation and having liberty of picking targets including counter-value, counter-force and battlefield”.[/b]

Meanwhile, India’s increasing efforts to secure membership to all the export control cartels — especially its recent admission into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as well as talk of it entering into the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) — could very well disturb the strategic balance in the region. While potentially triggering an arms competition in the Indian Ocean, too. Therefore, reassurance of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence is non-negotiable; while simultaneously observing Indian nuclear ‘political rhetoric’ regarding the introduction of new and advanced technologies, and sophisticated nukes.

The writer is associated with the Strategic Vision Institute

ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Postby ramana » 18 Dec 2017 22:23

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote:a. What has changed?
b. How is this different from our strategy vis-a-vis China?
a. Capabilities (delivery platforms), numbers and yield.
b. China and India have both not been existential threats to each other. Pakistan has viewed India as an existential threat and has always desired capabilities to challenge this threat.



ShauryaT, The day Pakistan had one nuke its goal was FSD. So noting has changed.

If you recall in KRC documented the four occasions when Pakistan delivered nuke threats to India. And Pakistan was under both military and civilian leaders during those threats.
Even recently Mushy stated he contemplated nuking Delhi while the Lok Sabha attack was going on in 12/13/2001.

We ignore all those statements and rely on bogus military officers and their pets statements.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 19 Dec 2017 07:11

Shiv ji: Just because someone dares to have a different view than your lordship does not make the other crooked, dishonest and bereft of facts or in some other areas too clever by half. There is nothing much to say, under those adjectives.

It is the SU-USA who took the view that you take of anyone threatening with nuclear weapons as an existential threat, leading to both acquiring over 30K warheads each under the MAD doctrine. (If I would have said anything of that nature, your retort would be “too clever by half” and read much of western material on the internet!!)

Thankfully, both China and India did not develop these weapons with that view of MAD and neither has either of them armed themselves with capabilities to make such an existential threat credible and sustained to each other via nuclear signaling and deployments. My post above is not a pure theoretical assessment of the threat, which you seem to be making apparently devoid of differentiating judgment but a realistic assessment based on intent, actions, and capabilities of the adversary. Maybe you are using the word existential in a very different way than I do. So, I will state again. China is a geopolitical threat and a threat to sovereignty not an existential one to the Indian nation-state, let alone its peoples.

Hoping China to be a “friend” is what Nehru did, assuming them to be an existential threat, where any future “war” with them will result in nukes with an assured destruction paradigm is the other extreme of the spectrum. Paranoid and non-realistic, I did say and dare I say my view is congruent with the pre-dominant view out there on China-India. Both China and India maintain an NFU stance and have never threatened each other with nukes and neither have alluded to this capability in defense of their national interests or to defend their sovereignty. If you do indeed have a realistic assessment to the contrary, please feel free to present your case and hopefully without castigating other viewpoints with unkind and worse wrong adjectives.

What to expect from Pakistan was not what the post was about. Hoping is not a strategy for Pakistan. What is Pakistan increasingly capable of or will be and preparing to meet and defeat that threat is what the post was about. There is a certain point at which the cumulative set of capabilities acquired by an enemy warrants a relook at our plans to meet these threats. I am looking for assurances from our security planners towards such plans.

I am looking for a re-assessment of our doctrine and capabilities, as promised in this government’s election manifesto. I am looking for a re-assessment of the failed IUCNA deal, which has locked our qualitative capabilities. I am looking for delivery platforms, specifically MIRV and standoff capabilities, I am looking for a better articulation of these security challenges by our NSA and for him to put more sweat in institutuions such as the NSAB and SFC. I am looking for holes to be fixed in our NCA. I am looking for a public articulation of our intent to destroy their arsenal. I am saying it is time to take BMD and ability to absorb damage more seriously than before. I am looking for a credible case for the escalation dominance ladder under a nuclear umbrella known to the public (these are not just words, they translate to numbers and capabilities). I am looking for a credible plan articulated that does reassure our population that our war planners are keenly aware of the levels of threats posed and are prepared (not just the chiefs making a political statement) to meet the challenge with dominating power, when and if the balloon goes up. I am looking for investments in our capabilities who’s slide from a budgetary and execution standpoint have reached pathetic levels, at least for capital assets.

How Pakistan takes it and reacts is quite frankly not my major worry as no way, we should rely on their reaction (which will always be there as we all agree) as a reason not to put our defense capabilities in place. I cannot believe you would even suggest this. I would first and foremost ask for these hard capabilities to be in place, everything else is secondary. Hope the thrust of my post is clear now and less dishonest to you?

PS: My presence on SM is very light, so am not sure what you are alluding to there. Also, my posts have nothing to do with the above articles, these things have been accumulating in my assessment for a while now. The articles are only a trigger to post something, which I thought needed to be said. If not credible to you, it is fine, I think it is to the nation.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 19 Dec 2017 07:47

The two statements made by you quoted below as statement 1 and statement 2 are directly interlinked and any pretence that they are not linked is exactly the sophistry that I was referring to. Will explain below


Statement no 1
ShauryaT wrote:I am looking for a re-assessment of our doctrine and capabilities, as promised in this government’s election manifesto. I am looking for a re-assessment of the failed IUCNA deal, which has locked our qualitative capabilities. I am looking for delivery platforms, specifically MIRV and standoff capabilities, I am looking for a better articulation of these security challenges by our NSA and for him to put more sweat in institutuions such as the NSAB and SFC. I am looking for holes to be fixed in our NCA. I am looking for a public articulation of our intent to destroy their arsenal. I am saying it is time to take BMD and ability to absorb damage more seriously than before. I am looking for a credible case for the escalation dominance ladder under a nuclear umbrella known to the public (these are not just words, they translate to numbers and capabilities). I am looking for a credible plan articulated that does reassure our population that our war planners are keenly aware of the levels of threats posed and are prepared (not just the chiefs making a political statement) to meet the challenge with dominating power, when and if the balloon goes up. I am looking for investments in our capabilities who’s slide from a budgetary and execution standpoint have reached pathetic levels, at least for capital assets.


Statement No 2
ShauryaT wrote:What to expect from Pakistan was not what the post was about. Hoping is not a strategy for Pakistan. What is Pakistan increasingly capable of or will be and preparing to meet and defeat that threat is what the post was about. There is a certain point at which the cumulative set of capabilities acquired by an enemy warrants a relook at our plans to meet these threats. I am looking for assurances from our security planners towards such plans.
<snip>
How Pakistan takes it and reacts is quite frankly not my major worry


Statement 1 is a call to prepare seriously for nuclear war. I have no objection to that as a valid opinion. One might argue and debate its merits but it is a view that you hold

Statement 2 is complete nonsense: This entire idea of preparing for nuclear war is based on Pakistan's reactions to India.You said " I am looking for a public articulation of our intent to destroy their arsenal. I am saying it is time to take BMD and ability to absorb damage more seriously than before" And all further preparations on India's part _will_definitely_ be met with counter preparations for nuclear war from Pakistan. It is essential to accept that and mull over what that will mean for us. In my view - assuming that "We should be like the US and beggar Pakistan" is an ignorant viewpoint (I am not saying that you hold it) is misplaced. If the USSR showed concern for its economy and its people - that same concern cannot be expected from Pakistan.

I am also in disagreement over the semantics and wordplay about existential threats. Your thoughts are astoundingly Pakistan centric while claiming that you are unconcerned about how Pakistan reacts. Pakistan's ability to continue to be an existential threat to India have been aided substantially by the US and China and I laugh out at the irony of your seeing those two nations like friendly bunnies in comparison with the hated Pakistan. Both those countries know fully well that we are tied down by Pakistan and their hand in this is deep and inextricable. By all means make some nuclear doctrine or speak of clarity in Indian thought but pretending that Pakistani capabilities can be looked at in isolation or that their reactions can be ignored is a huge hole in your view, in my opinion.

Our nuclear doctrine has to take into account what the US and China are doing. Even today the US is looking away helplessly from Pakistan while blowing hot and cold about North Korea - while pretending to have some capability against the latter country. In my view (and this is a view that I have stated several times before) - it is worth doing an analysis of nuclear war between two countries other than India and Pakistan, say US and North Korea - to understand the value of all the preparations and statements that you demand from the Indian nuclear establishment. I am not saying they are right but I want to know why you are right. The Indian nuclear establishment is less Pakistan centric than you are in its understated goals and obfuscation.
Last edited by shiv on 19 Dec 2017 08:15, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 19 Dec 2017 07:56

It is no longer possible or correct to divorce China from Pakistan and look at the latter stand-alone.

It is foolish not to link threats from Pakistan to China just as it is foolish not to link threats from North Korea to China as well.

Indian security planners are *NOT* making this mistake and that is why various Indian sources have repeatedly referred to two-front war. The two-front war, by no stretch of imagination, is limited to conventional war alone.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 19 Dec 2017 08:49

I am not absolving anyone US or China in the role they have played and continue to play in arming Pakistan, said so in the first post itself. Neither have I said we need to make our program Pakistan centric but quite frankly in reality except for some token capabilities against China, it has been so far. I can wish for the moon, but I will make the charge at this stage that our capabilities and investments do not come even close to what China fields and is likely to field as far as nuclear assets go.

Statement 1 and 2 above are indeed interlinked. You allude to sophistry as if there is any denial. The approach I have articulated on the issue vis-a-vis Pakistan is indeed vested in escalation dominance. Let me know, what do you propose instead? Also, you can put your thoughts on why China's threat is to be viewed as "existential". Indian military planners or Chinese origin papers would be most appreciated, if you have them on the issue.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 19 Dec 2017 09:14

ShauryaT wrote: The approach I have articulated on the issue vis-a-vis Pakistan is indeed vested in escalation dominance. Let me know, what do you propose instead? Also, you can put your thoughts on why China's threat is to be viewed as "existential". Indian military planners or Chinese origin papers would be most appreciated, if you have them on the issue.

Let me answer the second part first. One must look at civilizations and long term, and not short term wars. All nuclear deterrents are existential threats. They threaten the very existence of a nation or civilization by causing massive casualties and making previously livable places unlivable. Any nation who can wield nuclear weapons against India poses an existential threat to us. As a deterrent it behoves us to mirror that threat against them.

In fact the US is perhaps the most dangerous entity because we simply cannot threaten them with even a fraction of the mayhem they can wreak on us if they choose. But you know what - the US is now really scared of both China and North Korea because both those nations can wreak unacceptable havoc on the US despite the US having all the weapons and structures that you stated that you want to see with India.

Now please excuse me if I am mistaken, but what you have stated could be construed as simply ignoring the threats that are posed by China and the US while preparing for war against Pakistan. You made the statement

There is a certain point at which the cumulative set of capabilities acquired by an enemy warrants a relook at our plans to meet these threats. I am looking for assurances from our security planners towards such plans.

If one stops seeing Pakistan as the sole or most important threat and includes China and the US, that "cumulative set of capabilities" that you speak of has already crossed anything that we can hope to "defend" against. That leaves us with exactly the same solution that you came up with as a Pakistan origin solution:

The TSP thought process is, I may be dead but I will ensure that many of you die too. I may not be able to win, but I will not let you win also.


This is what we must promise anyone who threatens us. We cannot do this to the US yet

I am afraid that what you wrote (quote below) is impracticable given that Pakistan, China and the US are all part of the same threat matrix that India is faced with
We should assume TSP has FBF designs in its arsenal. Its numbers will move from about 150 now to up to about 250 in 10 years. We need a strategy to bankrupt them trying to compete with us


The philosophical point that needs to be looked at is whether nuclear weapons are to win wars or to destroy other nations/civilizations. This topic merits debate. If Pakistan seeks to destroy us as a civilization, should we look at our weapons as war winning weapons or a means of destroying an enemy civilization. In war we expect to survive and win. In destroying an enemy civilization we are saying nothing about our own survival The whole business of "third leg of triad" is about hitting the other even after your civilization is destroyed

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 19 Dec 2017 09:31

I am not sure if this paper was posted. Apologies if this is a repeat.It has some high level scenarios but not detailed enough.
A New Equation of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weaponisation - Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee
India’s strategic nuclear weapons deter Pakistan from first use of nuclear weapons while India’s superior conventional power deters the repetition of Pakistan’s past conventional aggressions. However, India has no deterrence against Pakistan’s sub-conventional aggression; whatever there was in the form of conventional retaliation, is sought to be neutralised by Pakistan’s induction of TNWs. That allows Pakistani strategists to brandish “full spectrum deterrence” on India. Resultantly, India’s can be rid of Pakistan’s relentless animosity only by retaining its conventional power to punish Pakistan’s sub- conventional war. The issue of India’s strategic nuclear posturing, TUNWs, and, indeed, the mainstay of all safety harness, conventional military power, have to be seen in that light. In that, the cardinal principles to be appreciated are:
y Even if it takes a two or more to ght, one rogue is enough to start it. This adage ts both of India’s neighbours who, by innate compulsion, cannot desist from altering the stable status quo, and so are inclined to use politics to impose a military solution, rather than vice versa.
y Even if it takes weeks and months to start a war, it takes decades to prepare for it. This one ts India’s placid policies on its defence preparedness.


Notes
1. Most Pakistani and many Indian analysts speak of India’s ‘superiority’ over Pakistan in terms of conventional military forces. That assertion, howsoever pleasing to Indian ears, needs to be taken with some realism of military logic. Indeed, defence analysts point out that India’s edge in the comparative ‘combat ratio’ has reduced from more than two:one to just over one:one, which is well below what is statistically considered to be the factor of success. Besides, in the extent of war zones, state of military hardware, process of mobilisation, network of strategic communications, military and political solidarity from co-religious and strategic allies, and, above all, the ranks of the suicidal fth column, the level of India’s conventional superiority may turn out to be disturbingly misconceived.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 19 Dec 2017 10:14

ShauryaT wrote:I am not sure if this paper was posted. Apologies if this is a repeat.It has some high level scenarios but not detailed enough.
A New Equation of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weaponisation - Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

Am reading the paper.

These retired jernails seem to have interns do research for them leading to publishing of GIGO that takes away some of the purpoted seriousness of the paper. read this and see the glaring errors that evoke dismay in me - as a person who has been studying this stuff without interns to help for decades
the first step would be to examine the technical and tactical efficacy of Pakistan’s present TNW capability, as well as of what it could acquire in the coming days. Presently, the Hatf IX (Nasr) Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) system and ground emplaced Nuclear Demolition Munitions (NDMs) form the inventory of Pakistan’s TNWs, though at later stages, induction of more alternate delivery means may be envisaged.In the context of Pakistan’s TNWs, it is reported to be a sub-kiloton warhead set inside a 300 millimetre cylindrical shell weighing around 25 to 35
kg..The shell is launched to a strike range of 60 km from a four or twin-tube multi-barrel rocket launcher mounted on a 8x8 ‘transport-lay-launch’ vehicle of fair mobility. Assuming that 15 kiloton equivalent nuclear shells would have an immediate killing zone of 550 metres radius, and considering the usual distribution pattern as well as the overlap of the ki


First he says "sukiloton warhead" within a 30 cm shell weighing 25-35 kg. Then he makes it 15 kilotons and talks about 15 kilotons.

This is complete nonsense. Will you be kind enough to tell him Shaurya?

There is plenty of open source material to show that you cannot get a 15 kiloton warhead weighing 25-35 kg. Even subkiloton warheads of that size are nearly impossible given that one would need 10kg of Plutonium to get a subkiloton fizzle Add conventional explosive on top of that

Like writing about cow tied to coconut tree" when one is supposed to write about coconut tree - this article goes on and on about a 15 kt warhead while talking of sub kt Nasr

Will read more and post if there is anything for me to say. But if the premises are wrong it leaves a bad impression on me.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 20 Dec 2017 08:45

United States urges Pakistan to prove it's a 'responsible steward' of its nuclear missiles
While the US can wax eloquent in their policy documents asking Pakistan to assure that its weapons are "safe" - meaning not in terrorist hands that could be used against them or their allies. It is India that has to deal with Pakistan and the perfidies of its masters. I say, let these weapons slip to terrorist hands or still better give Pakistan the Agni V. (OK, half joking).

So, how does India plan to deal with the increasing numbers, platforms and qualitative capabilities TSP is putting in place. Let US concerns go to hell, it is my house under threat. Leave aside all other tools of waging war, I need to know what hard assets and force levels are in place and planned to DEFEAT this threat.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 23 Dec 2017 23:13

In case anyone doubted why we needed our own fleet of SSN's, yesterday.

Up-close with Yulin, China’s most vital nuclear sub base that’s a big threat to India COL. VINAYAK BHAT (RETD)

Yulin Bay in China’s Hainan Island in the south is the only base from where Chinese submarines, especially the nuclear ones, can move into the deep ocean without being detected or intercepted.

An analysis of Google Earth images of 1 September 2017 shows how this base has grown in importance since its construction began in 2001 to become one of the most critical for the Chinese Navy with strategic implications for India.

Yulin is a strategic nuclear ballistic missile-carrying submarine base with an underground tunnel facility for storage and maintenance. This base provides China’s nuclear subs ease of access to the South China Sea and thus to the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and in turn to the Indo-Pacific waters without being detected.

It is, at present, the only base with a permanent deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines of Type 94 Jin class and Type 91 Han class and/or Type 93 Shang class.

The unchallenged access to IOR will allow the PLA Navy (PLAN) to closely monitor all Indian Navy traffic, especially India’s second-strike capabilities at sea, and an opportunity for interception whenever the need arises.

Yulin is also significant because of the ease with which it allows PLAN to launch its boats against Indian targets, both at sea and on land.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 24 Dec 2017 00:19

A long paper on China's nuclear deterrent. Wish an Indian think tank would produce this quality from an exclusively Indian perspective on China's deterrent.

China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent

This report examines the key drivers, including both external and internal forces, that will shape Chinese nuclear decisionmaking over the next ten years. While it pays particular attention to China’s strategic relationship with the United States, which remains Beijing’s primary focus in formulating policy, it also considers the role that developments in third countries might play—a topic other studies have seldom treated and never systematically. In this context, China’s emergent nuclear relationship with India and dynamics on the South Asian subcontinent are likely to be particularly important. e analysis of internal drivers addresses the potential impacts of bureaucratic politics, organizational processes, and the availability of resources. is research should be of interest to nuclear specialists, Asian foreign policy and security experts, policymakers, military officers, and anyone interested in Chinese or nuclear issues.

The work was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE. The draft report was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. Air Force subject-matter experts.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 24 Dec 2017 09:56

The Fuzzy Nuclear Postures of Indo-Pak: A Great Threat to PeaceThis guy seems to be an alarmist with a lot of equal-equal bad and mad.

Thus, it is clear with the help of several studies on India-Pakistan nuclear brinkmanship that there is possibility of nuclear omnicide in South Asia. The organizational biases, blurry nuclear doctrines of no-first use and first-use of nukes, poor accountability of nukes, advantage of missile defence systems, intense rivalry, unresolved Kashmir dispute, and close borders might become the reasons for the failure of nuclear deterrence in South Asia.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby pankajs » 24 Dec 2017 13:07

Usual baki *public diplomacy* offensive against India. Sounding alarmist is the usual baki strategy to get the world interested in the subcontinent. Re-packaged *Nuclear flashpoint* argument to get Kashmir back on the international plate.

There have been quite a few such posts / talks in recent months mostly from Baki / Baki pasand *analysts*.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 27 Dec 2017 04:06

On this one issue, I wholeheartedly agree that India should follow the US lead :)

Promote education, not nuclear weapons: Dr Mitra

Now, it is time that India shuns nuclear weapons and takes initiative to convince nuclear weapons states to join the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons to phase out these weapons of mass destruction to save the earth.
This was said by Dr Arun Mitra, Co-President IPPNW ( International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) while addressing a seminar on Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN – Tasks Ahead at Circuit House.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby kit » 27 Dec 2017 05:10

ShauryaT wrote:On this one issue, I wholeheartedly agree that India should follow the US lead :)

Promote education, not nuclear weapons: Dr Mitra

Now, it is time that India shuns nuclear weapons and takes initiative to convince nuclear weapons states to join the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons to phase out these weapons of mass destruction to save the earth.
This was said by Dr Arun Mitra, Co-President IPPNW ( International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) while addressing a seminar on Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN – Tasks Ahead at Circuit House.

:mrgreen: the US will never do it .. they are close to beginning of spending close to another trillion on their nuke triad :mrgreen:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ArjunPandit » 27 Dec 2017 05:15

ShauryaT wrote:On this one issue, I wholeheartedly agree that India should follow the US lead :)

Promote education, not nuclear weapons: Dr Mitra



MS Bhatia, Co-convener Social Thinkers Forum, agreed that there was a need for schoolchildren and youth aware about the efforts made so far to stop the use of nuclear weapons.

To stop the use...does that mean they are being used now too????

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 28 Dec 2017 18:11

Glad we are ending the year with a BMD test. It is time to graduate this "project" to a weapon with user involvement. We should look to deploy this and then perfect. It seems the endo-atmosphere version may be more ready than the exo one?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby ShauryaT » 28 Dec 2017 20:15

Another Pakistani view. This is exactly where we want them to be. Confused and paranoid - spending more than they can afford on national defense. Although I do think all these claims on nuclear security procedures being extolled are towards making an equal-equal claim at the NSG with China's assistance. One possible interpretation of the US NSS document could be to tell Pakistan that if you behave maybe US will acquiesce to the NSG admission. It would make sense for the US and NPA community.

Significance of nuclear weapons
To conclude, Islamabad ought to upgrade its nuclear arsenal. Without modernizing nuclear weapons, Pakistan cannot deter India from launching an all-out punitive offense against it, especially after the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense shield. Thus, any compromise on its nuclear arsenal advancement would be perilous for Pakistan’s national security.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 29 Dec 2017 07:35

In August 2017, a Russian news agency claimed that India has deployed its BMD at two places in Rajasthan, Alwar & Pali.

If it was not entirely true, it is probably closer to truth, accuracy or otherwise of the location notwithstanding.

Three tests were conducted in 2017 emphasising the urgency of the BMD programme. All these were successful and all these were 'direct hits' proving the reliability of the kill vehicle. Two endo & one exo.

After the Feb 2017 exo test, DRDO said, that it was now possible to deploy the two-tier ballistic missile defence shield.

So, we must assume that Phase I of the BMD for TBMs is at fruition now.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby rsingh » 29 Dec 2017 20:08

Intersting input. Pali is full of western wild life and village life photographers who use drones to take shots. latest issue of "GEO" magazine has some pics;

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 01 Jan 2018 08:21

These are very interesting times. World order, economic order and now nuclear order, are in flux.

Former Joint Chiefs chairman: Nuclear war with North Korea closer than ever

Earlier this month, Graham predicted that there is a 30% chance Trump orders a first strike on North Korea to prevent the rogue nation from acquiring a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the United States.

"I would say there's a three in 10 chance we use the military option," the South Carolina Republican first said in an interview with The Atlantic and later confirmed to CNN. If the North Koreans conduct an additional test of a nuclear bomb — their seventh — "I would say 70 percent," he said.

While Graham, an Air Force veteran who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, is widely considered a Republican foreign policy hawk, he repeatedly said in the interview with The Atlantic that he hopes military options are never employed and advocated meeting with the North Koreans in pursuit of a peaceful resolution to tensions between the two nations.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 01 Jan 2018 22:11

Two standoffs and some nuclear lessons - A.Vinod Kumar, IDSA Comment
The politics of nuclear weapons have always been complex and enigmatic. A testament to this reality came during the course of the current year, which not only saw a little over a quarter of UN member states agreeing to a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty, but was witnessed two major standoffs between nuclear-armed states, with one of these threatening to escalate into a nuclear conflagration.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons could be viewed in two ways. One view is that the imperative of disarmament and total elimination of nuclear weapons is necessitated by the indomitable risk of nuclear war that would always hang like a Sword of Damocles as long as nuclear weapons exist. The other view is that the underlying rationale of the treaty lies in the palpable progression towards a post-proliferation world – that proliferation risks have substantially diminished, that nations are less likely to go to nuclear war and that the time is ripe for progression from non-proliferation to disarmament and total elimination. Inherent in both views is the role of nuclear deterrence – either its efficacy in mitigating nuclear conflict and nations finding it as a means to security and power, or its potency in sustaining the urge to acquire nuclear weapons capability. The irony about nuclear affairs – be it about the causes of proliferation or the impact of deterrence – is that there is ample empirical evidence to support and make convincing both these arguments.

The same applies to the Asian stand-offs: the India-China tussle over Doklam, and the unrelenting face-off between North Korea and the US and its East Asian allies. The crisis in the Korean peninsula is marked by enormity: a nuclear-armed despot tacitly backed by two great powers that switch sides according to the geo-strategic situation taking on a coalition led by the hegemon and its allies spearheading a global resistance against the despot’s brinkmanship. The gravity in this theatre lies in the fact that all the primary actors are either nuclear-armed, nuclear-capable, or under a nuclear umbrella. By all means, the situation has been fragile enough for both sets of parties to desist from firing the first bullet.

The Doklam dispute, on the other hand, was not a nuclear confrontation by any measure and had only the slightest hint of escalation to even a conventional war despite a girding of loins on both sides during the two month stand-off. Yet, the fact that the confrontation was between two nuclear-armed nations that are already competing for strategic space in the Asian landscape and along their periphery made the situation vulnerable to an escalation. Why then did these two nuclear powers resort to any action that could have led to a military confrontation? While there was a great deal of mudslinging and sustained derogatory campaigns (though largely one-sided) during the crisis, why was it that no nuclear threat was issued or for that matter why was there no talk of a nuclear conflict at any point of time? It is also tempting to note that this abstinence from nuclear posturing stands in contrast to the high dose of escalatory dynamics that marks interactions in the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad.

The two stand-offs thus offer some unique insights into how nuclear deterrence has evolved, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence and what all this entails for disarmament.

Deterrence diversities


Deterrence parity need not bring stability: The long-standing debate between proliferation optimists and pessimists has been about the role of deterrence in shaping the strategic dynamics of a nuclear dyad in terms of the degrees of instability, causes of conflict and escalation potential. While pessimists cite numerous limited wars and low-intensity conflicts to highlight the instability caused by competitive deterrents (numerous Cold War frontlines as well as in South Asia), optimists contend that none of these conflicts ever escalated to the nuclear level despite instances of brinkmanship (South Asia and DPRK). Kim Jong-un’s rapid acquisition of retaliatory capabilities, even while creating a mutual assured destruction (MAD) equation in the Korean peninsula, has not facilitated crisis stability though it is worth noting that both sides are yet to pull the trigger fearing a nuclear conflagration. Thus, while this condition may prima facie support the pessimist contention of ‘instability remaining a constant’, the fact that a full-fledged war has been stymied despite prolonged fragility also provides substance to the notion that nuclear deterrence has prevented the outbreak of military hostilities which both sides have consistently threatened to unleash. Kim’s nuclear behaviour, thus, provides the basis to assume that MAD equations need not necessarily be stable and instead could be exploited for political ends by an actor who sees space for brinkmanship, resulting in continued instability. South Asia too has witnessed a similar scenario with Pakistan practising brinkmanship aided by its postural ambiguity, though its degree of irrational behaviour was aimed at influencing international opinion and inviting external intervention in its favour. {and also make India shrink away from a response to its audacious provocations and actions} But the North Korean case differs on this aspect given the international isolation that it faces amid mixed signals on what it actually seeks through its nuclear posturing – sustenance of the Kim regime or recognition of its nuclear status.

NFU has a stabilising effect: Unlike most nuclear dyads which have fragile strategic equations owing to asymmetry of capabilities or offence-defence imbalances, the India-China nuclear relationship is a study in contrast. The Chinese test of 1964 and subsequent build-up of its nuclear arsenal is supposed to be one factor in India’s peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) of 1974 as well as in its strategic calculus during the covert nuclearisation phase from the late 1980s. Since India’s 1998 nuclear tests and pursuit of a credible minimum deterrent, there have been numerous standoffs over border disputes. But none of these involved a nuclear overhang during the crisis phase nor did the nuclear equation decisively influence the subsequent de-escalation. The Doklam flare-up, however, had the inherent potential for a military conflict owing to proactive intervention by Indian troops in an area claimed by China and Bhutan, and hence treated by the Chinese as ‘aggression’ demanding a military response.

Many conventional military factors – including the localised nature of the stand-off, recurring contexts of territorial tussles, China’s own apprehensions about being seen as a bully and habitual land ‘aggrandizer’, and the diplomatic burden of hosting the BRICS Summit – might have been reasons for the de-escalation. Yet, the stand-off is an eye-opener on how two nuclear-armed states, both with a defensive nuclear posture attributable to their No-First-Use (NFU) doctrines, behave in conflict situations. That the NFU posture has significant import in the India-China nuclear dynamics cannot be understated as the postural framework implies that conventional conflicts need not graduate to the nuclear level since both countries do not intend to use nuclear weapons first. Nothing exemplifies this better than the fragilities of the other dyad in this region wherein the dissonance created by Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear posture (inclined towards first use) negates the stabilising effect of India’s NFU posture. Further, the ‘equaliser effect’ of NFU in the India-China nuclear relationship also needs emphasis considering the enduring conventional and nuclear force asymmetries notwithstanding India’s attainment of retaliatory deterrence with its Agni-V system.

Insights for the disarmament movement

What are the takeaways from the two standoffs for disarmament, and by consequence the nuclear weapons prohibition treaty? First, the efficacy of deterrence remains a contested landscape with defensive deterrence providing for more stable nuclear dyads in contrast to offensive deterrence which continues to incentivise nuclear weapons and their exploitation by maverick leaderships. While deterrence continues to mitigate conventional hostilities, if not prevent their outbreak, , the North Korean case is proof that reliance on nuclear deterrence will not just continue to fuel the appetite of newer nuclear-aspirant states but also make great power arsenals redundant and effete when confronted by determined nuclear-armed pigmies. {especially when backed by bigger nuclear powers. Pakistan also confirms this thesis.}

Second, the India-China dynamics, with its conflict resolution features sans a nuclear overhang, has an emphatic message for the disarmament movement – the significance of a global NFU regime. Considering that the efforts to universalize the prohibition treaty has been hampered by the non-participation of nuclear weapon states, the catalysts behind this exercise could take a leaf out of the Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) which envisages the implementation of a global NFU regime as a key stimulus to a credible disarmament process. Even if the nuclear-armed states are not expected to easily discard their deterrence-centric strategies, a global NFU will be an ideal measure to ensure a stable crisis management framework for conflicts involving nuclear powers.

Lastly, the two standoffs have latent messages for the non-proliferation regime, especially the discriminatory nature of its normative structures. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was negotiated in the 1960s, most nations that have now voted for the nuclear weapons prohibition treaty had then preferred to bandwagon with the unbalanced treaty drafted by the superpowers. The fifty year history of the NPT has not just been about efforts to universalise the non-proliferation norm, but also the resistance put up by a handful of outliers against perpetual discrimination by allowing nuclear weapons in the hands of a few. Though over 120 nations have now decided to call the bluff on the commitment of the P-5 states to move towards disarmament, North Korea stands out as a reminder that no discriminatory system can ever be totally universalised.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby dinesh_kimar » 01 Jan 2018 23:14

Many conventional military factors – including the localised nature of the stand-off, recurring contexts of territorial tussles, China’s own apprehensions about being seen as a bully and habitual land ‘aggrandizer’, and the diplomatic burden of hosting the BRICS Summit – might have been reasons for the de-escalation.


See, this part is interesting. Why , indeed, did China compromise in Doklam?

> Localised nature of stand-off mean nothing to it. China has aggressively hit Korean and Philippines naval ships in local South China Sea (or Indo China sea?) disputes. She has dismantled IA structures with impunity, especially during the UPA regime.

> China cares not for "recurring context of territorial disputes". She thrives on a crisis and always deals with flexibility , something we sadly lack. China likes an edgy existence, in contrast to our hope of a well ordered neighborhood.

> She cares not about being a bully, and has vast database of "tit-for-tat" responses for US. Smaller fry are ignored.

> China wont stop being land aggrandizer after Doklam, no argument there.

> "BRICS diplomatic burden" doesnt cut it. China can say that many land disputes with India, and border mechanism ensures"peace and stability, as admitted by Indians". With help of various assets in Indian media, China could arm twist India to attend. And, India not attending one summit means nothing, other summits in future will always be there.

*******None of the above factors give a STRONG reason on Doklam backing off**************

My CT: the Indians (us) displayed something which spooked the Chinese, and they climbed down in half a day. Some kind of brahmastra was brandished, along with quiet preparations, and readying the entire Indian population for hard hitting war, inspite of our media's best efforts to spook us (remember headlines like: 2600 armoured vehicles in Tibet,30 divisions can surge per day, new light tank, rocket attack, Psang-so lake attack, etc).

Dunno what the brahmastra could have been, perhaps i'm wrong.
But China has never backed down even against Japan, conventionally equivalent / stronger than us.

Maybe A-3 TELs were moved in, seen by Chinese sats ??

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Re: Deterrence

Postby SSridhar » 02 Jan 2018 07:15

dinesh_kimar, deterrence is a funny game.

For example, whether NFU would hold or not at the most critical point cannot be said with any certainty by anybody. However, NFU is a useful signalling tool during other times.

During the early part of his Presidency, Xi gave certain innocuous indications of giving up the NFU. But, since then, that seems not to have been the case.

As for your CT, well that is just a CT. Just nobody thinks that India would ever act so recklessly & dangerously and China would backdown too upon that.

An enemy country is deterred not just by our mere possession of n-weapons and delivery systems but a host of other things too.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby pankajs » 02 Jan 2018 10:11

Which country adds the maximum absolutely GDP per year today? China
Where is the maximum in absolute additional GDP going to be added over the next 50 years? India or China

Which of the 2 is more dependent on export to fuel it's domestic growth? China
Which country has talked of open markets most in recent years? China
Which of the 2 fears a slowdown and its impact on its social fabric the most? China

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Prem » 06 Jan 2018 02:57

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