Deterrence

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ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

This thread is in need of a revival!!
Have not read the book yet, but will.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Which book is that?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Dilbu »

ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

It seems Tellis is opening a window to test again. His good offices can be used to further the cause.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

ShauryaT wrote:This thread is in need of a revival!!
Have not read the book yet, but will.

particularly good discussion wrt Aircraft carrier
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Thought I will post this excerpt from the book, which is most meaningful to me for India.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE SINO-INDIAN SECURITY COMPETITION
The illustrations above yield a series of important conclusions pertaining to deterrence sta- bility in the Sino-Indian dyad. First, China has the capacity to inflict appalling pain on India by employing even a small number of nuclear missiles from its larger and growing inventory. If it is assumed that China will have some 250 long-range nuclear missiles in its arsenal soon, it could target India extensively with 10 percent or less of its strategic missile portfolio, leaving the remainder for holding other Chinese regional adversaries and the United States at risk. India cannot levy equivalent fatalities on China with a comparable number of weapons because its long-range missile inventory is still very small and its nucle- ar warhead yields are much smaller than China’s in comparison.

As Table 3 indicates, the number of Indian weapons required to inflict equivalent fatalities on China, using just its five most-populous cities for comparison, is much, much higher. This constraint derives largely from the political failures of the BJP leadership and the der- eliction of Indian nuclear scientists during the 1998 tests. By obscuring the failures of their thermonuclear device design, they ended up spurring the Vajpayee government’s decision to end nuclear testing prematurely before the performance of India’s highest-yield warhead— which even at its maximum delivers just about 20 percent of the explosive power of China’s largest weapons—could be credibly demonstrated.805 As a result of this current asymmetry in Chinese and Indian nuclear capabilities, New Delhi will be extraordinarily careful to avoid confrontations with China that could precipitate any nuclear use. Consequently, the prospect of Indian nuclear first use, even if only with tactical weapons, is entirely fanciful.

Second, India will seek to increase the levels of pain that can be equivalently inflicted on China through nuclear retaliation if that be required. The quickest path to this end would be New Delhi’s return to nuclear testing, which would provide it with the opportunity to validate its higher-yield device designs and convey more credible threats. But this would also be the most provocative course of action internationally and, hence, will be eschewed unless India is confronted by a supreme emergency or is provided with the opportunity because of resumed nuclear testing by other established nuclear powers. In the meanwhile, India is likely to settle for more conservative solutions to correcting the current asymmetries between itself and China: improving its thermonuclear designs through nuclear simulations and computational tools; possibly deploying multiple warheads aboard its missiles in or- der to economize on the number of airframes required while still enabling “cookie-cutter” targeting of important Chinese cities (although no current Indian missiles carry MRVs or MIRVs); or, more likely, simply increasing its number of nuclear-tipped missiles in order to permit multiple concurrent strikes on major Chinese cities with smaller-yield warheads in an effort to increase the casualties inflicted on China.

Third, although India’s limitations with respect to Chinese population targeting are pro- nounced, the critical question is whether the significantly lower fatalities that can be poten- tially inflicted by New Delhi essentially undermines nuclear deterrence stability in the Sino- Indian dyad. Pessimists have argued that India’s inability to inflict high losses on China undermines New Delhi’s capacity to deter Beijing in any serious confrontation because the latter will always have escalation dominance as long as the current nuclear balance per- sists.806 After all, the illustrative losses that China could suffer as a result of Indian nuclear attacks, depicted in Table 2, do fall short of the immense suffering that has marked other painful moments in Chinese history.807 By the canons of rational deterrence theory, there- fore, India’s capacity to ward off Chinese pressures is thus weak and arguably doomed to fail because New Delhi can at best inflict picayune punishment on China in contrast to China’s ability to inflict massive retribution on India.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by vera_k »

There's this technical discussion of how increased deployment of Indian weapons is problematic at the moment for safety reasons.
The variable quality of Indian manufacturing, including the techniques used to fabricate its weapons, and the risks associated with the chemical explosives used in the implosion assemblies exacerbate problems that are inherent even in simpler designs. Unlike Pakistan’s
nuclear devices, most of which are designed to incorporate insertable pits for reasons of both safety and security, India’s nuclear weapons are “sealed pit warheads” that are intended to “reduce the size and weight of [the payloads], which is important for land-mobile missiles, and even more so for SLBMs—India’s two chosen modes for missile deployment.”
Although in such designs, “nuclear safety is achieved by finely balancing the quantities of fissile and [high explosive] materials so that nuclear yield would not result if the triggering assembly accidentally ignites,”442 this benefit does not obtain in the Indian case because its nuclear weapons utilize hexamine nitramene (HMX) as the high explosive, which “has a very high detonation velocity.”443 Although HMX-based explosives and their derivatives make India’s (and Pakistan’s) nuclear weapons smaller and lighter, their use indicates that “neither country may have adopted either insensitive high explosive or fire resistant pits,” thus leading one scholar to correctly conclude that, in the quest to avoid weight and size
penalties, neither Indian nor Pakistani nuclear weapons are one-point safe; as such, “if they are deployed, there may be a risk of accidental detonation.” A lengthier nuclear testing regime would have helped India address such issues systematically. This would have included exploring the incorporation of low adjustable-detonation-velocity plastic-bonded explosives or other advanced materials such as 1,3,5-triamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene (TATB) as the high explosive charge in its nuclear weapons. TATB has been described as a material “whose thermal and shock stability is considerably greater than that of any other known material of comparable energy”446 and is used, for example, in British
nuclear weapons. Additional hot testing would also have enabled India to experiment with other alternative physics packages that could be better than those utilized in its current device designs. However, political constraints have denied New Delhi this freedom. Even if the benefits of larger yields cannot be realized immediately because of these constraints, the challenges relating to safety can be mitigated, however, by procedural solutions: sequestering the pit from its high explosive detonators, as India initially intended when the early models of its force-in-being were devised, offers one way out at least in peacetime. Alternatively, the physics packages can be maintained completely within the warhead containers without the latter being inserted into the delivery system until the alerting process requires their full integration. As the degrees of separation between various components of the Indian nuclear force diminish, however—a development driven by the desire to bring to full readiness at least a few nuclear weapons quickly to enable speedier retaliation—the risk of accidents, including detonations, only increases, especially when field dispersal of landbased missiles encounters hostile conditions, particularly shock, that could adversely impact the warhead. Only a diverse and extensive test regime can thus produce weapons that satisfy the desire for reliable high yields and enhanced safety simultaneously.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Tanaji »

What is the basis for the statements in the second paragraph above related to HMX? Isnt it contradicting itself when it says Pakistani ones are safer and Indian ones arent when both use HMX?

What are the grounds for the author to make intimate design related statements on Indian nukes i.e how does he know it for fact? Or is this more kite flying hoping for a rebuttal where more info may be presented?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by S_Madhukar »

Is Tellis indirectly confirming Indian nooks will work for sure when he says 1 point failure ?! :lol:
Unless US wants to give us their ISO20001 tech or even worse flag that south Asian nooks are risky so putting us in the same bucket as Bakis while claiming Cheen has better safeguards
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

It's fishing expedition. Throwing buzzwords.
Not Worth reading.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

vera_k wrote:There's this technical discussion of how increased deployment of Indian weapons is problematic at the moment for safety reasons.
technical sounding bla bla bla .
Tallis is trying to mix technical sounding facts with mental psy op propositions to allow the PsyOp Virus enter the minds of the impressionable (Indian) readers.

I did the same to Americans (using more of facts and far smaller subtle propositions) on Indian ballistic missiles capabilities, that caused great stomach pain takleef to Richard Speier the Ayatollah of MTCR, with my publications in Indian Defense Review (Editor & owner Capt Bharat Verma)

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006-03 ... bm-trouble

U.S. Space Aid to India: On a "Glide Path" to ICBM Trouble?
ARMS CONTROL TODAY
Richard Speier
CHRONOLOGY: U.S. Missile Nonproliferation Policy and India’s Path to an ICBM Capability
The one report of a mobile ICBM based on a combination of PSLV and Agni technology makes more military sense.[7] Yet, as described below, it entails other serious concerns.
Why would India want the Surya? Its reported ranges suggest the answer.

A 5,000-kilometer Surya-1 might overlap the range of a reported 5,000-kilometer upgrade of the Agni missile.[8] Surya-1 would have only one advantage over such an upgraded Agni: a far larger payload with the ability to carry a large, perhaps thermonuclear warhead or multiple nuclear warheads. India has no reason to need a missile of this range for use against Pakistan. The missile’s range is arguably appropriate for military operations against distant targets in China: the range from New Delhi to Beijing is 3,900 kilometers; the range from New Delhi to Shanghai is 4,400 kilometers; and the range from Mumbai to Shanghai is 5,100 kilometers.


An 8,000-to-12,000-kilometer Surya-2 would be excessive for use against China, although the distance from New Delhi to London is 6,800 kilometers; to Madrid, 7,400 kilometers; to Seattle, 11,500 kilometers; and to Washington, D.C., 12,000 kilometers. In 1997, an article based on information from officials in India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) or higher levels of India’s defense establishment stated flatly, “Surya’s targets will be Europe and the U.S.”[9]


A 20,000-kilometer-range Surya-3 could strike any point on the surface of the Earth.
Indian commentators generally cite two reasons for acquiring an ICBM: to estab lish India as a global power and to enable India to deal with “high-tech aggression” of the type demonstrated in the wars with Iraq.[10] Because there is no obvious reason for India to want a military capability against Europe, there is one target that stands out as a bull’s-eye for an Indian ICBM: the United States. The reported 12,000-kilometer Surya-2 range is tailor- made to target the United States.


ENDNOTES

1. 2. 3. 4. ....

7. See Arun Vishwakarma, “Agni-Strategic Ballistic Missile,” April 15, 2005. The report states that India is taking a different ICBM approach: developing a 1.8-meter-diameter, solid-fuel rocket that will extend the Agni to intercontinental range and that could be the basis for a longer-range ICBM. The 1.8-meter-diameter rocket represents a combination of PSLV and Agni technology. Such a lighter ICBM makes far more military sense than a PSLV-sized missile. The lighter ICBM might be mobile and able to survive a first strike. However, Vishwakarma consistently reports far higher ranges for the existing Agni missiles than have been reported elsewhere. Given this reporting bias, Vishwakarma may be describing the wish lists of Indian engineers or programs that have not yet been funded. The PSLV exists, and the existence of a 1.8-meter-diameter missile has not yet been reported except by Vishwakarma. The impending test of the Agni-3 may reveal whether a 1.8-meter-diameter rocket stage, which could make possible a mobile ICBM, has been developed. See “Missile Plan,” Bangalore Deccan Herald, November 26, 2005; Rajiv Nayan, “Agni Three Missile: Sino-Centric?” Bangalore Deccan Herald, December 12, 2005; Sayan Majumdar, “Defense Developments for 2006,” New Delhi India Defence Consultants, January 13, 2006.
One of the good ways to cast PsyOp illusion by mixing lots of facts with intended malicious fiction to instigate the target to react. Above example shows it works even on knowledgeable, hard to crack Ayatollah .
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

Very interesting read Arun. Especially when indias nuclear deterrence owes in part to its ambiguity!!.. Not a big fan of Tellis, he is just doing his job. I am though curious about his timing with bum not hydrogen . Of note is that the latest Indian IRBMs are MIRVed , are the Americans looking at possible indian warhead designs and explosive power ?.. that would be absolutely top secret !!... also india does have simulation models that was mentioned in a report after the second Buddha smile. My one paisa contribution :mrgreen:
SLBMs carrying fusion payloads are Americas worst dream scenario.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

Firstly Americas or Europe are not Bharat's adversary.

ChinCom China, TSP-Pakistan and their chamcha's who have actively helped these two, are Bharat's adversary (E.g. Turki, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia ...)


Secondly Indians can sleep in peace not worrying about Bharatiya H bum atop its astra.
It will be infinitely naïve of any country to be on the receiving end of the "prabha" of the Bhartiya "Aaditya".

Yamrika interested in Yindian simulation is like carrying coal to castle field. Wise to contain surge of pride so it does not become "false pride" (for its easy to kill/destroy such beasts).
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Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

PLA adopts nuclear deterrence to stop foreign intervention on Taiwan: analysts - South China Morning Post
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted nuclear deterrence to try to stop the United States and Japan from directly intervening in a possible clash over Taiwan, but would exercise caution to avoid full-blown conflict, according to analysts.

Days before Beijing kicked off unprecedented war games near Taiwan in the wake of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taipei tour earlier this month, video footage of two vehicles carrying the two-stage liquid-fuel Dongfeng 5B intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) circulated on mainland social media platforms Weibo and WeChat.

Videos showed other Dongfeng nuclear-capable missiles – including the road-mobile DF-27, DF-16 and DF-15B – moving through city streets.

All Dongfeng-series missiles are capable of delivering nuclear warheads, while the DF-5B ICBM has a range of up to 15,000km (9,321 miles), enabling it to hit North America.

“It is aimed at warning the US and its close ally Japan not to intervene in the Taiwan issue, reminding them Beijing has the most powerful weapon that could give [them] a deadly strike,” said Yue Gang, a retired PLA colonel.

Yue compared it with Russia’s nuclear threats after the invasion of Ukraine which, he said, had been successful in deterring the US and Nato from directly intervening in the war.

“Putin’s experience inspired Beijing that it’s a workable strategy to stop the US and Japan’s possible intervention in a future Taiwan contingency,” Yue said.

Zhou Chenming, a researcher from the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank in Beijing, said China would not change its long-standing “no-first use” nuclear policy.

He said Beijing had stated that the military exercises were against Taiwan’s “pro-independence” camp.

“The missiles displayed on streets and those fired in war games are all conventional weapons … aimed at preventing the Taipei government from turning the Taiwan problem into an international issue, something similar to a ‘Ukraine issue’ for Beijing.”

Zhou said Beijing would stick to the rule that nuclear weapon development should aim to stop a war – not trigger one.

He said the navigation records of the US nuclear-powered carrier USS Ronald Reagan and the PLA’s well-regulated war games and precision strike missile tests over the past few weeks indicated that “both the Chinese and Americans are not keen on fighting”.

On August 4, the USS Ronald Reagan sailed northeast and maintained a distance of at least 1,000km – the range of DF-15B and DF-16 missiles – from Taiwan as the PLA rocket force launched the missiles near the island.

During four days of drills, the PLA fired at least 11 ballistic Dongfeng missiles into six “danger zones” around the self-ruled island, with five landing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Okinawa.

Cheung Mong, an associate professor with the School of International Liberal Studies at Waseda University in Japan, said the nuclear deterrence strategy would not only push Tokyo closer to Washington but also encourage the Japanese government to expand its military capability.

“It’s very risky to copy the Russian mindset and strategy – it would only backfire to encourage Japan to accelerate military expansion,” Cheung said.

Perceiving a threat from a rising China, the administration of former prime minister Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had suggested reinterpreting the country’s post-war pacifist constitution to permit a greater role for its Self-Defence Forces and to change Article 9, which renounces war and bans Japan from maintaining armed forces with aggressive capabilities.

“The Ukraine war has brought great impact to many Japanese, especially their security thinking, with mainstream pacifists starting to doubt whether their beliefs would lead to an invasion,” Cheung said.

“The pacifist mindset would be completely changed if a Taiwan contingency takes place, as a recent war game scenario showed Japan couldn’t escape if US military bases in the country were attacked by the PLA.”

Andrei Chang, editor-in-chief of the Canadian magazine Kanwa Asian Defence, said alert levels on the PLA Rocket Force’s missile bases had been elevated, triggering suspicions that Beijing was moving closer to a fight over Taiwan.

Chang described it as “very similar to Putin’s nuclear deterrence tactics, but it’s an unusual move in peacetime in areas across the Taiwan Strait”.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by JE Menon »

@Haridas,

From a psyops point of view, but with technical validity, could it be argued that the need for a lighter ICBM is because this will enable a long-second strike against traditional adversary (China-Pak) from a distant submarine location in the Atlantic or the far Pacific?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

JE Menon wrote:@Haridas,

From a psyops point of view, but with technical validity, could it be argued that the need for a lighter ICBM is because this will enable a long-second strike against traditional adversary (China-Pak) from a distant submarine location in the Atlantic or the far Pacific?
Not clear your question : Lighter ICBM payload? Or lighter ICBM with very long range due to lighter high yield payload?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Ek dhakka aur do – topple the NPT regime, skewer China!
Posting in full. {I} are mine.
It was only appropriate that Russia, the country that proved just how foolish and ridiculously naive Ukraine was to trust the trio of the United States, Russia, and Britain and surrender its share of the erstwhile Soviet Union’s thermonuclear arsenal,Prof: John Mershaimer shares this view courtesy the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, prevented a consensus “final document” from emerging at the 10th edition of the five-yearly UN Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon).

This conference to periodically to assert the primacy of the NPT regime, delayed for a couple of years by the COVID pandemic, began in New York August 1 and concluded August 26. Considering how relations between Russia and the US are heading south, the Russian action, in effect, kicked the RevCon into life support, bringing the future of the NPT itself into question. Russia did so to protest the reference in the draft paper to the alleged Russian attacks on or near the Zaphorizhzhya nuclear power station. Many European states felt that even an accidental strike could create a Chernobyl-like nuclear catastrophe. In other words, Moscow used an issue unconnected with nonproliferation to damage the NPT regime. And, a damned good thing to happen from India’s strategic point of view!

As observers at these RevCons, Indian diplomats dish out the usual disarmament pablum produced by the DISA (Disarmament and International Security) Division in MEA. Just as well that nothing, if anything, of any note was said by them because otherwise it’d have been reported at least in the Indian Press (even if no other media takes notice). The correct thing for Delhi to have done from the time of the first RevCon in May 1975 was to give it a miss. And it should have been followd up by boycotting the subsequent RevCons to signal India’s unhappiness with the global nuclear order lorded over by the five “NPT recognized” weapons states — the US, Russia, UK, France and China. Instead, while not being a signatory to the NPT and therefore not bound by its rules, India has acted all along as if it is a bonafide member of this treaty that was, incidentally, originally designed by Washington in the Sixties to keep India from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold!

Delhi is in the forefront of the worldwide nonproliferation effort just so it is in America’s good books, eager to burnish its image as, what else, a “responsible” state. We want to be loved not feared!To be perceived as such has required grave compromises to be made by various Indian governments. Such as refraining from selling and exporting entirely indigenously developed technologies related to the Bomb and to 220MW heavy water-moderated light water reactor-based power plants. China should long ago have been paid back in kind for its policy of nuclear missile arming Pakistan in the early 1980s by transferring nuclear-warheaded Prithvi and later Agni ballistic missiles and Brahmos cruise missiles to countries on China’s periphery. It is an option I have been advocating from 1998 and my time in the (First) National Security Advisory Board, but which is now getting shut down because the Indian government seems intent on shackling itself to the do’s and don’ts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group — an offshoot of the NPT, and entry into which group, ironically, is subject to a Chinese veto!

The 2008 civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the US — negotiated as I keep reminding everyone, by the then Joint Secretary (Americas) in MEA and now foreign minister, S Jaishankar, furthers Washington’s twin nonproliferation goals of ensuring that India sticks by the “voluntary moratorium” on nuclear testing announced by Atal Bihari vajpayee in May 1998, which capped the Indian N-weapons tech at the simple fission 10-20 kiloton level. Except, without new and open-ended nuclear tests, the Indian strategic deterrent will be minus proven thermonuclear weapons (because the fusion device tested in the 1998 tests was a dud). This deal was supposed to enable India access to US N-tech. Except, India never really needed US civilian nuclear technology in the first place what with Trombay having mastered all three fuel cycles (uranium, plutonium and thorium). But this rationale provided the Manmohan Singh government with political cover for signing the deal which actually is a strategic liability. Especially so, considering Manmohan Singh’s promise of “20,000 MW by 2020” was predicated on India buying multi-billion dollar Westinghouse AP 1000 reactors that the US Atomic Energy Commission refused to certify as safe!These threads have a long memory and those who supported the deal should ponder if it was in Indian interests at all, for the promise of a nuclear energy led bloom has not materialized and unlikely to be None of this matters now, because the aim of successive governments Narasimha Rao’s onwards was less to buy anything from the US than to pacify Washington by deliberately keeping India a sub-par nuclear weapons state.

A government that means to push India into global reckoning as a country that will get to the top by any and all means, and only abide by treaties and conventions it negotiates has, to-date, not emerged. Instead of putting the fear of God into the P-5 and the big power NPT managers that either India gets what it wants or it will strive to bring down the whole UN caboodle, and particularly the unfair and inequitable NPT-based international nuclear order, like the barrage of explosive charges (in a 9-second TV spectacle last Sunday) did the illegal 30-storey structure in Noida, India talks big, acts small and helps the US and the West perpetuate the status quo.

If Modi wants to change things, do right by India, and pitchfork the country into the ranks of meaningful powers — if only as a spoiler on the world scene, he can and should break out of the system of self-restraint and, firstly, resume nuclear testing; secondly, waste no time in ignoring the NPT-NSG restrictions and onpassing nuclear weapons technology and N-power reactors — perhaps as a package! — to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Philippines and whoever else wants it, and is willing to pay for it. These two actions will instantly destroy the NPT order, and begin seriously to unravel the UN. North Korea with its regular nuclear and missile tests has long offered provocations, as do the nuclear buildup plans of the P-5 with the US, Russia and China in the lead. This development, by the way, directly contravenes Article VI of the NPT mandating nuclear weapons stockpile reductions by the Five NPT-acknowledged powers in return for the rest of the 191 members of this treaty regime foreswearing the Bomb.This is avery good reason to torpedo the NPT.

The plea here then is for India to be disruptive like China is. Ambassador Fu Cong at the RevCon, extolled the virtues of “self-defence” while Chinese strategic forces are on an overdrive to achieve the 2,500 thermonuclear weapons/warheads strength by 2030 — a deterrent size and timeline laid down by President Xi Jinping. This is where our CMD will break down. We do not have a proven TN weaponized arsenal and the commitment to revved up numbers. The time to act is now or it will be again be too lateIn other words, China, unlike a discombobulated India that takes its nonproliferation pledges seriously, is determined to be the equal of the US and Russia in this and every other respect. Meantime, Modi’s India appears content to be bested by Pakistan, its 150 nuclear warheads/weapons beaten by 160 Bombs in the latter’s employ.

Thirdly, India should needle China all it can and on every issue that riles Chinese sensibilities. Thus, India should be in the forefront of publicizing the UN report accusing China of gross human rights, genocidal, abuses of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang using tactics honed by the PLA in Chinese-occupied Tibet, and repeatedly urge Beijing to respect the nationalist urges of the Uyghurs seeking an independent East Turkestan, and get under the Chinese skin that way. Simultaneously, Delhi should with much fanfare and public hoo-ha celebrate Taiwan and support international efforts to solidify that country militarily and symbolically even offer Taipei “strategic weapons technology”– not that Taiwan needs any help in crafting nuclear weapons of its own . Taiwan’s own N-weapons programme was compelled by the US into a state of dormancy, but if activated can produce a weapon inside of 3-6 months. In the interim, India can offer Taipei some 2 dozen warheads as deterrent for fitting into the nosecone geometries of Taiwanese mssiles. This measure combined with Delhi’s publicly disavowing the “one China” paradigm on the basis of China not respecting the “One India” concept encompassing all of Jammu & Kashmir, including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Baltistan, and the principalities of Hunza, Gilgit, Chitral et al in the “Northern Areas”, will put the fat on fire. The message is really about a change in approach even if some of the above do not pan out

And, finally, what will it take for Prime Minister Modi to shut down Chinese access to the Indian consumer market where Chinese companies continue to make a killing? And why does his government continue to ease the rules for Chinese firms? Like the exemptions the Finance Ministry announced for Chinese companies yesterday exporting green energy tech and components to India? Would it take another round of military clashes in Ladakh or in Arunachal? Why are Jaishankar and his MEA promoting the idea of Modi’s meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit to be held mid-September? Is Modi really all that much of an innocent, and has no clue about what’s what with Xi and China? And that the PM’s interest in somehow restoring a pre-Galwan clash-like normalcy to his personal relations with the Chinese supremo and to bilateral relations, cannot be realized without hurting India? The faster we recognize China as a principal competitor in a win-loose game and primary threat the better off we will be
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Lots of drivel by Karnad.
Sad
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Re: Deterrence

Post by titash »

ramana wrote:Lots of drivel by Karnad.
Sad
A few over-the-top rants for sure

However, if the PLA is on an overdrive to match the US/RUS arsenal, that is a problem. We need to (1) match up to 25-50% of the PLA arsenal, and (2) unambiguously and overtly communicate a PLA capability threshold to the UN/P5 at which point India will resume thermonuclear and MIRV live testing in the southern oceans - the NPT be damned
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Re: Deterrence

Post by S_Madhukar »

https://youtu.be/AfLV-8Xrud8

Some things that we are already aware of.
Brig Sahgal says we need to revisit our strategic doctrine. More emphasis on rocket forces, long distance precision conventional missile strikes, Chipak nooks as one threat, revisit tactical strike options for nook happy Bakis. Bottom line we are not on the right track and not moving fast enough
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Some of the drivel turns into gospel, in a few decades. He is doing his job.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Interesting the Brigadier claims the Pakistanis have "deployed" TN weapons of yields 300-500KT using Chinese supplied data and/or designs. So as of now the Pakistani arsenal is more potent and credible than India's. Sad that we are unable to muster strength to do what is needed and *CAN* be done for India's security.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Varoon Shekhar »

ShauryaT wrote:Interesting the Brigadier claims the Pakistanis have "deployed" TN weapons of yields 300-500KT using Chinese supplied data and/or designs. So as of now the Pakistani arsenal is more potent and credible than India's. Sad that we are unable to muster strength to do what is needed and *CAN* be done for India's security.
Any corroboration for this? Wouldn't the US and other countries have revealed information about Pak thermonuclear weapons by now? Why would this claim come out of the blue, and that too by only one individual( Brig Sahgal)
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

Lets keep the Indian nuclear deterrence as it is ., ambiguous. There is more than enough fissile material for more than a few thousand warheads, but we are a peaceful nation ( sic! )

Do we need to test? .. maybe to refine some designs, Russia would only be happy to share some!!

India can exponentially increase its arsenal without testing "anything" ., and in fact it is.

These "news" drivels are just like Tellis trying to instigate information. NOT happening.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

ShauryaT wrote:Interesting the Brigadier claims the Pakistanis have "deployed" TN weapons of yields 300-500KT using Chinese supplied data and/or designs. So as of now the Pakistani arsenal is more potent and credible than India's. Sad that we are unable to muster strength to do what is needed and *CAN* be done for India's security.

They can deploy $hit. One should not care what it says in open media about the paki arsenal. They are eating grass for it anyway.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

JE Menon wrote:@Haridas,

From a psyops point of view, but with technical validity, could it be argued that the need for a lighter ICBM is because this will enable a long-second strike against traditional adversary (China-Pak) from a distant submarine location in the Atlantic or the far Pacific?
If you have a highly accurate missile., you can have a smaller yield producing same "effect" . Two 250 kiloton weapons are better than a 500 KT bomb in its destructive effect. There are just too many studies to this effect.

India can and should increase its IRBM and SLBM inventories. Beyond a threshold numbers won't matter., as it comes to overkill.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

ShauryaT wrote:Interesting the Brigadier claims the Pakistanis have "deployed" TN weapons of yields 300-500KT using Chinese supplied data and/or designs*. So as of now the Pakistani arsenal is more potent and credible than India's. Sad that we are unable to muster strength to do what is needed and *CAN* be done for India's security.
Isn't this the same message that Tellis gives that the Indian arsenal is not credible?
If it is not credible it's no threat to the US and they can STFU.

As for PRC and TSP they won't take chances to find out if the Indian arsenal is credible or not.

Most such analyses are paper analyses and do not take into account real-world situations.

Tellis is again on a fishing expedition and proof is Coupta hosting him.

* I may be wrong but, the 45 Chinese tests are of higher yields than this range of values except one in 1967 CHIC-3.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_n ... s_of_China

When throwing such numbers they have to be credible.
Brig Sehgal is a very informed officer and don't know why he said this.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

ShauryaT wrote:Interesting the Brigadier claims the Pakistanis have "deployed" TN weapons of yields 300-500KT using Chinese supplied data and/or designs. So as of now the Pakistani arsenal is more potent and credible than India's. Sad that we are unable to muster strength to do what is needed and *CAN* be done for India's security.
Can Pakistan build a successful TN-weapon simply based on supplied data?
If China has supplied the design, assisted the assembly of the weapon and done Cold tests, that would be a different matter then.
Or, better still if PRC had transferred some TNs through KKH as it did for the 1998 tests.
Short of these, it may simply be the usual Pakistani bluster and bravado.
But, we must use it to justify our responses.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

vera_k wrote:There's this technical discussion of how increased deployment of Indian weapons is problematic at the moment for safety reasons.
The variable quality of Indian manufacturing, including the techniques used to fabricate its weapons, and the risks associated with the chemical explosives used in the implosion assemblies exacerbate problems that are inherent even in simpler designs. Unlike Pakistan’s nuclear devices, most of which are designed to incorporate insertable pits for reasons of both safety and security, India’s nuclear weapons are “sealed pit warheads” that are intended to “reduce the size and weight of [the payloads], which is important for land-mobile missiles, and even more so for SLBMs—India’s two chosen modes for missile deployment.


{Clearly he doesn't know but makes sweeping assertions! The separate pit from the warhead is a joke and is his idea of recessed deterrence. Only the most naive will try to assemble a weapon during wartime conditions and hope it works! This basically neuters the nuke power. Now he is most worried about SLBM warheads as the Arihant class gets deployed. So he is raising questions about safety and reliability of the deterrent.}

Although in such designs, “nuclear safety is achieved by finely balancing the quantities of fissile and [high explosive] materials so that nuclear yield would not result if the triggering assembly accidentally ignites,”442 this benefit does not obtain in the Indian case because its nuclear weapons utilize hexamine nitramene (HMX) as the high explosive, which “has a very high detonation velocity.”443 Although HMX-based explosives and their derivatives make India’s (and Pakistan’s) nuclear weapons smaller and lighter, their use indicates that “neither country may have adopted either insensitive high explosive or fire resistant pits,” thus leading one scholar to correctly conclude that, in the quest to avoid weight and size penalties, neither Indian nor Pakistani nuclear weapons are one-point safe; as such, “if they are deployed, there may be a risk of accidental detonation.” A lengthier nuclear testing regime would have helped India address such issues systematically. This would have included exploring the incorporation of low adjustable-detonation-velocity plastic-bonded explosives or other advanced materials such as 1,3,5-triamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene (TATB) as the high explosive charge in its nuclear weapons. TATB has been described as a material “whose thermal and shock stability is considerably greater than that of any other known material of comparable energy”446 and is used, for example, in British nuclear weapons. Additional hot testing would also have enabled India to experiment with other alternative physics packages that could be better than those utilized in its current device designs. However, political constraints have denied New Delhi this freedom. Even if the benefits of larger yields cannot be realized immediately because of these constraints, the challenges relating to safety can be mitigated, however, by procedural solutions: sequestering the pit from its high explosive detonators, as India initially intended when the early models of its force-in-being were devised, offers one way out at least in peacetime. Alternatively, the physics packages can be maintained completely within the warhead containers without the latter being inserted into the delivery system until the alerting process requires their full integration. As the degrees of separation between various components of the Indian nuclear force diminish, however—a development driven by the desire to bring to full readiness at least a few nuclear weapons quickly to enable speedier retaliation—the risk of accidents, including detonations, only increases, especially when field dispersal of landbased missiles encounters hostile conditions, particularly shock, that could adversely impact the warhead. Only a diverse and extensive test regime can thus produce weapons that satisfy the desire for reliable high yields and enhanced safety simultaneously.
Rest is techno babble about properties of explosives about which he has no clue.
As an aside India is a big mfg of CL20! So there.

Wasn't he one of the NPA crusaders claiming Indian warheads are heavy due to lack of testing?

One doesn't know whether he is telling the truth in which case he should be prosecuted under US Atomic Energy Act or if he is lying.
I think since the former is not happening it is the latter.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

See India's challengers are the neighborhood fed by US proliferation eg CHIC-4 and Nelson Eye to PRC transfer of weapons to Pakistan etc.
So it doesn't matter what the yields are!
Now the US still is on the CRE crusade for a variety of reasons: own dominance like sending Task Force 74 into the Bay of Bengal, preserving NPT, assurance to PRC for help in dismantling FSU etc, etc.
So any joker questioning Indian deterrent plays into that CRE agenda.
GOI and its challengers are confident of its credibility.
So suggest talking about other programs.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

In the chapter on India, Tellis constantly says that Indian deterrence relies on possession and not on actual use.
That's silly for actual use will signal the breakdown of deterrence!
So his logic is flawed on the meaning of deterrence.

And he force fits US strategy onto India as if that's the only strategy there is.

For instance, he says India thinks nukes are political weapons as if the US thinks they are military weapons!
There is no instance where the US can and will use nukes unless faced with a peer power like Russia. And even there can't escape retaliation. So what's the point? This is what led HAK to negotiate SALT.

Tellis would benefit if he researches the Cuban Missile crisis.
It is not for nothing that leaders trust their own judgment more than that of experts who have no consequences for their advice.
Arthasastra.
And talks sophisticated stuff about credibility.
Credibility is dependent on the challenger.
Under no circumstance does either Pakistan or China thinks the Indian deterrent is not credible.

Yes, the credibility of the deterrent is regardless of the yield, for use of even a small yield crosses the threshold of no use since Nagasaki.
This is lost on experts who run the think tank circuit.
Think what global circumstances/factors will lead to such a breakdown of no use?

And makes a CHSO4 argument that India should not retaliate after it has placed so many constraints on its arsenal!
"they view any concerns that may arise about their willingness to retaliate—an important
concern during the Cold War—as completely misplaced"
Does he know about GH Bush's Expanded deterrence in 1991 in Gulf War?

And the jury is not out on the 1993 plague outbreak which is suspected to be a Pak bio attack.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Tellis has outdone Perkovich in his sheer idiocy.
What the heck is token nuclear employment? that means deterrence has broken down.
Token nuclear employment who decides its token? Tellis?
Some of the TNW with the US is as big as Hiroshima!!
Sounds like an excuse for Pakis to use nukes.
I always suspected these nuke experts were closet India haters.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Vayutuvan »

kit wrote:If you have a highly accurate missile., you can have a smaller yield producing same "effect" . Two 250 kiloton weapons are better than a 500 KT bomb in its destructive effect. There are just too many studies to this effect.
Bin packing problem in combinatorial optimization.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

Vayutuvan wrote:
kit wrote:If you have a highly accurate missile., you can have a smaller yield producing same "effect" . Two 250 kiloton weapons are better than a 500 KT bomb in its destructive effect. There are just too many studies to this effect.
Bin packing problem in combinatorial optimization.
Therein lies the importance of the newer MARVed warheads !!.. anyone who thinks Indian arsenal is not "enough" or not large enough is well living in a lala land.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

kit wrote:Lets keep the Indian nuclear deterrence as it is ., ambiguous. There is more than enough fissile material for more than a few thousand warheads, but we are a peaceful nation ( sic! )
My Rajasthani marwadi friend remarked during engineering collage days that it is impossible to loot a Marwadi, becoz the decoits can never find all the places where family wealth is hidden, and the total wealth amount.

For Bharat, its much different and better than that, half cooked samosas in sahastra and cooked lotus samosas in even greater qty in refrigerator.

India can flip that inventory from (hidden) capabelity to intent at blink of an eye. Chin Porkies will shit bricks just knowing that.
Do we need to test? .. maybe to refine some designs, Russia would only be happy to share some!!
Aisaay mammlay may gyan bekaar, only vigyaan is trusted. (We did the vigyaan).

India covered its bases on integrity of its high yld weapons. Chin Porkies can try walk into their own doom by crossing the rubicon.

Btw Roos is a realist power and no emotional bafoon.
India can exponentially increase its arsenal without testing "anything" ., and in fact it is.
Loud and clear.
These "news" drivels are just like Tellis trying to instigate information. NOT happening.
Tellis best years are way past expiry date. Only useful to Culinary institute as a white skinned pinata, just in case some treats fall off its carc_ass.

Image
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Gungadin at least provided water for the soldiers.

Nothing worse than a useless Gungadin.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

In a recent interview of the EAM, he cites the indecisiveness and delays to go nuclear as one of the three big causes for India not achieving great power capabilities. Keeps the hopes alive that a government with his influence will do the needful, hopefully sooner than later.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Important article by Atul Aneja

https://t.co/XZh0gLOvLH

Glad he quit The Hindu
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Link: https://jnu-matrix.tripod.com/conv-war.html

from JNU School of International Relations
A study of China under Mao and how it reacted with two nuclear powers US and FSU.
Conventional War in the Nuclear Age

Lessons From the Korean War (1950-53) and the Sino-Soviet (1969) Conflict


G.V. Vaidyanatha


Introduction

Nuclear deterrence has become the catchword for security since the cold war era. Nuclear weapons are regarded as absolute weapons, which promise total security to a state. It is argued that they are not weapons of war, but primarily, instruments of deterring war. The fear of 'mutually assured destruction' contributes to the stability of deterrence. In essence, as nuclear weapons cannot be used to bring any reasonable military gains, but only to inflict maximum punishment, they cannot be rationally used in the event of a war. But, when a state is threatened with war, it will obviously use nuclear weapons if the alternative is total surrender.

The logic of nuclear deterrence to prevent nuclear war is relatively simple. But can nuclear weapons prevent conventional conflicts? Some strategic thinkers argue that, as there is always the threat of conventional conflicts escalating into a nuclear conflict, they will deter conventional wars as well. They argue that for deterrence to be established the threat need not be absolutely credible. Any war may develop into a full-scale war. What may be done is as effective as what would be done. But other strategists disagree. It is here that theory of nuclear deterrence can be questioned on rational grounds. What nuclear weapons guarantee is annihilation for both the parties. Hence rational states will be extremely reluctant to use nuclear weapons. But, for deterrence to work, the commitment to use nuclear weapons should not be doubted. As Henry Kissinger comments "deterrence is greatest when military strength is coupled with willingness to employ it." But in many cases, such a commitment is difficult even to promise.

This is because not all values a state wants to preserve are of equal importance. Every State is bothered about its own security and survival. It would not be willing to risk its survival to preserve 'lesser interests'. Peace established by nuclear deterrence can be 'thwarted by the impossibility of combining maximum destructiveness with limited risk". But at the same time these interests have also to be preserved. Especially during the cold war preservation of hegemonic interests became very important for both the superpowers to maintain the general balance of power. Thus, nuclear weapons could not deter conventional wars for the same reason they deterred nuclear wars- they were instruments of mutual annihilation and, therefore, could not be used.

The fear of being caught between " eaten piecemeal or nibbled to death" caused preparations for what is called 'limited wars'. For example, the US policy makers feared that the Soviet 'Salami tactics', though not individually provoking enough to justify 'massive retaliation', might collectively tilt the balance of power in Soviets favour over time. Therefore, every attack had to be met with the same level of response. This led to limited wars.
John Garnett identifies four types of Limited wars- wars limited in geography, objectives, means and targets. But regional wars though limited for the super powers can be unlimited for the regional powers. Further means and targets are only instruments of war and have to be understood only within the broader context of goals of war. Thus, it is the objectives, which really define the nature of limited wars. As Kissinger comments-'A limited war is fought for specific political objectives...(and) reflects an attempt to affect the opponents will, not to crush it. Of course it is true that wars are limited by definition in the nuclear age because of the means- the nuclear weapons. But, limited means have conditioned the goals of war as well. Thus, while in the conventional wars, victory is the goal in the nuclear world, defeating the enemy might be dangerous as there is the possibility of the loser escalating the war to a higher level. Thus the logic of limited wars can be easily understood. But, what happens in the case of asymmetric nuclear balance, that is, when a nuclear weapons state is facing a non-nuclear opponent? Can the nuclear weapons really deter the non-nuclear weapon states in all the cases? In fact, theoretically it can be easily argued that the non-nuclear weapons states faced with the threat of 'mutual annihilation' will easily succumb. But historical examples prove these theoretical assumptions a myth. The best illustration is the Korean War, where the United States clearly did not deter Chinese from entering the conflict. Though the nuclear weapons did play an important role in the ending of the conflict, it clearly did not prevent the war itself.

This paper attempts to analyse two important cases in this respect- the Korean War of 1950-1953 and the Sino-Soviet border clash of 1969. Both the cases are vastly dissimilar, but they definitely point to the fact that nuclear weapons do not automatically prevent violent conflicts. Nevertheless, the course of both the wars differed in fundamental ways. While the Korean stalemate dragged on bloodily for more than three years, the Sino-Soviet conflict ended with just two clashes. But importantly, when both the conflicts ended they stuck to the status quo. This paper attempts to explain the causes for the failure of deterrence, and the role of nuclear weapons and the threat of escalation in re-establishing peace.

The Korean War (1950-53)

The Korean War represents a turning point in the history of the nuclear world. It symbolised the transformation from the conventional age to the nuclear age. It was also the first of the many 'limited war' cases of the cold war period.
The war happened through many stages, each of which signified a step in escalation. First, North Korean communist forces, trained by the Soviet Union, attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950. Within three days, Seoul fell and there was a threat of North Korea overrunning South Korea. At first, the President of the United States, Harry Truman, pledged only air support and naval forces, but later, realising the relevance of preserving South Korea, sent in ground troops. That changed the course of the war- though only temporarily. Mac Arthur army not only vacated the North Korean army from the south, but crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the North, to finish the war, on 24 November. The fall of North Korea army and the continuing offensive of the United Nation forces towards the Yalu provoked the Chinese to enter the war. On 26 November, the Chinese forces started a major counter offensive and pushed back the United Nation forces behind the 38th parallel. The major battles of the war were over within the first year but the 'bloody war' dragged on for more than three years with both sides leading no major offensives but getting struck in a series of localised but costly conflicts. By the end of 1952 the US casualties alone read 21,000 killed over 91,000 wounded and 13,000 missing which made it fourth bloody conflict in the history of US. The war was terminated in 1953 with both the parties accepting the 38th parallel as the boundary.
A war, in a fundamental sense, represents a failure of deterrence. In the Korean War, there were three stages in which deterrence broke down. First, US failed to deter North Korea, secondly China failed to deter US from entering the war and finally, US failed to deter China from entering the war. As we are concerned about the role of nuclear weapons in conventional war (or avoiding them-deterrence) we will concentrate on the first and third instances of deterrence failure. Why, the US with its Nuclear weapons did not deter Nuclear Korea in the first place, and later, China?

The outbreak of the war (1950)

Most historians argue that US failed to prevent North Korea from attacking because US did not commit itself to the preservation of South Korea. In fact, South Korea fell out of the 'defence perimeter' in the Far east as articulated by Secretary of State- Dean Acheson in his January 12, 1950 speech. Thus, Alexander George and Richard Smoke argue that it was a case of 'failure to employ deterrence rather than deterrence failure'.
Historical facts suggest that this interpretation is correct. The US not only recalled most of its troops from South Korea as a result of massive demobilisation ordered after the second world war but also gave no indication that it will risk its military forces to defend the South Korea. In fact there was no major domestic debate about South Korea and even after the Acheson's speech there were no opposition voiced against the exclusion of South Korea from the defence perimeter while there was considerable resentment for having excluded Formosa (Taiwan) similarly. In fact, even the Joint Chief of Staffs opined that "from the stand point of military security, the US has little interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea...". The argument was that in the event of another general war, South Korea would be only a liability because forces in Korea could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Thus South Korea had no military or strategic importance for the United States. Therefore, even though there was strategic warning regarding the possibility of North Korean attack (but there was no tactical warning), the US did not take any steps to counter it. Thus, war could not be stopped because there was no 'commitment' to deter.
In this context the more important question is why did the US intervene at all? The answer gives a clue to the nature of war in the coming cold war period. It can be best explained in terms of the 'domino' theory. The US thought that if one of its satellites is given up easily, even without a war, it might provoke the enemy to cause more aggressions, thus, changing the status quo and, in the long run, affecting the balance of power. Thus, now wars have to be fought for strictly political reasons. War always had political goals- war is an act of force our enemy to do our will. But now wars had to be fought only political ends without expecting any military gains.
The lack of major military gains is a characteristic of most wars during the cold war. Here, role played by nuclear weapons in deterring an escalated war is fundamental. Nuclear weapons made war possible, but also limited them as well. Political goals were there but the means (nuclear weapons) 'limited' those goals.
Thus it can be argued that wars were fought in the cold war because there was 'less interest' at stake for the super power. But what was 'limited' for superpowers was definitely not so for the regional actors. Thus, for both North Korea and South Korea they were unlimited wars. Therefore, especially South Korea strongly resented the truce as US was comfortable with 'limited' political goals but its own vital interest was at stake-its survival. Eventually South Korea accepted the truce because of US pressure.

China enters the war

Wars can be controlled because they are limited political objectives for the major powers in the game, but wars do not start if there are only limited interests at stake. In fact one can turn the point and argue that conflicts happened because there was a vital interest at stake for the regional power-allies. And greater the stake greater is the possibilities of conflicts. This reason helps to explain both the North Korean attack and more importantly, the Chinese decision to enter the war overtly.
The Chinese decision to enter the war is important because it really signified the breakdown of deterrence. By that time not only was United States' commitment to defend South Korea was not in question but that could not doubt the 'credibility' of the commitment. US forces were already fighting in the Korean peninsula.
There are two major arguments for the failure of US to deter China. Firstly, the supporters of MacArthur argue that United States should have threatened with air strikes on Chinese mainland. Thus it was a failure to commit one's forces for escalation. Secondly, Truman's supporters argue that China entered the war because MacArthur's 'end of the war offensive' towards Yalu river threatened Manchuria and the security of China, forcing the latter's entry into war. They argue that United States forces should have left a buffer between themselves and the Yalu river. Thus it was a failure to provide reassurance.

It is important to note the difference between the two arguments. Strictly speaking, deterrence depends on the threat to inflict punishment only. Therefore even re-assurance which is a concession means the failure of deterrence. But the necessity of re-assurance gives a clue to the political dynamics of the way deterrence functions in practice. Mao's war cables conclusively prove that the decision to enter the war was made atleast by 2 October because '...if we (the Chinese) allow the United States to occupy all of Korea...the American invaders will run more rampant with negative effects for the entire Far East.' More importantly, China was conscious of the threat posed by the United States and thus Mao said, "We must be prepared (for the fact) that the United States may, at a minimum, use its Air Force to bomb many cities and industrial centres in China."

Therefore it can be seen that deterrence that is the threat of punishment,is not always effective. For China, the crossing of the 38th parallel by the UN forces meant that the security of the Chinese State is at stake. Manchuria would be threatened, the Northeast defence forces will be stressed, the south Manchurian elective power would be controlled by the enemy and also the presence of enemy so close to the border might be used by the reactionaries to stir up trouble at home. Thus, China was willing to take on the United States, which was a nuclear power. One can also argue that it had the backing of the Soviet Union, which had tested atomic bomb in 1949 but clearly Soviets did not have the capacity to deliver on American homeland. Of course, they could have started a war in Europe, and in fact, that fear is one of the reasons for the restraint of the United States in Korea. This does not mean that deterrence -threat to punish- has no role at all. In fact the ending of the Korean conflict can be ascribed to 'deterrence by punishment'. Eisenhower came to power with the objective of ending the Korean War. War perse- in terms of major battles has ended long time back but localised conflict-rarely involving over a battalion- had been continuing. There were no major gains to be made. China had preserved its borders and the United States had preserved South Korea. But war continued because nobody knew how to end it and Eisenhower saw only one way to end the war- the threat of escalation. Increasing ground forces would lead only to more war with no signs of victory. Therefore, war had to be expanded and to "keep the attack from becoming overtly costly we would have to use atomic weapons".
The threat of escalation worked and China accepted the same proposals, which it had rejected before, and it involved a major concession on the part of China, that is, giving up insistence on forced repatriation of soldiers.
The important question-why did the threat of escalation work in 1953 but did not deter in 1950? China, which consciously disregarded the possibility of nuclear escalation in 1950, was deterred by the same in 1953. In the former instance, the question of Chinese security was at stake, while in the latter only unification of Korea was at stake, and neither the United States nor the Chinese had much to bother about it. At best it was an ideological issue. Thus, even nuclear weapons may not deter war if state survival is at stake.

The Sino-Soviet conflict (1969)

The Sino-Soviet boundary clashes of 1969 are regarded as another instance of failure of deterrence. The clashes themselves were minor. There were only two major engagements- on 2 March, and 15 March. Though the dispute remained for many years afterwards, there were no armed clashes.
Most historians believe that China started the conflict on March second. So, the essential question is how did the Chinese not feel deterred by the superior power and nuclear power of the Soviet Union and secondly- why and how did the conflict conclude so early?
The border dispute between China and the Soviet Union was there since a long time though Chinese raised the issue publicly only in 1963. While China before 1949 was too weak to raise the issue, the Communist China kept its silence on the issue in the 1950s due to its dependence on Soviet for economic and technological assistance. The growing rift between the Soviet Union and China in the late 50s brought into open the subsumed dispute.
But to face the superior Soviet Union was not an easy task. Mao's strategy between 1959-66 was one of provoking the Soviet Union by sending unarmed groups to the Soviet side of the border. These 'aggressions' did not involve a change in the status quo in terms of possession of territories. Thus they were intended to test Soviet response. The Soviet responded accordingly-intercepted these groups and sent them back. Since 1966, coinciding with the great proletariat cultural revolution, Mao adopted a more aggressive stand though it did not involve a major clash. That was to come only in 1969 with the surprise attack on Chen Piao (Damonasky) island. Major Soviet counter attack came on 15 March, with considerable casualties on the Chinese side. The Soviet had clearly 'escalated' the conflict and even threatened the use of nuclear weapons. The clashes ended there.

There are many reasons for the clashes of 1969. The Chinese had an interest at stake- repossession of territories. How important was these to them could only be a conjecture but definitely it was not as important as to involve the question of State survival. Thus they were willing to take risks but not wage a war. They were comfortable with the status quo if the alternative was an escalated war.
The above analysis faces the risk of over simplification. Mao in fact believed that even the `Soviet Union fears China.' China's strength was in numbers- the infantry. Soviet's had superior arms and therefore any land battle would have been an infantry armour battle. Even though it would be difficult to predict the outcome of such a war, China clearly fancied its chances. This explains the initial Chinese attack on 2 March. Even here Chinese chose a limited conflict and did not extend the area of conflict. Thus the purpose was to test the Soviet reaction.
Soviets responded strongly. While on 2 March, there was only a 'skirmish' involving about 100 soldiers on either side and 31 dead on the Soviet side, 15 March witnessed a nine hour regular battle, involving at least one regiment-about 1500 soldiers- on either side. The Chinese casualties were estimated to be about 800. It was considerably higher than the Soviet casualties on March second.

Concurrently, Soviet leaders sent out threats of further escalation. Thus, Soviet leaders consistently emphasised that Soviet Union has a superior force with rockets and nuclear weapons which will be used if the occasion demands. Thus, on 15 March, a radio peace and progress broadcast to China (in Mandarin) warned that 'the main striking force of the Soviet forces is their rocket units capable of carrying nuclear warheads (which were) many times stronger than all the explosives used in the past wars put together...(Also) atomic powered submarines can be launched directly from beneath the Sea (and) the Chinese have no such weapon". The radio repeated the warning on March17.
The Chinese response to the Soviet nuclear blackmail is interesting. The Hsinhua domestic news service characterised Soviet Union as a 'nuclear tyrant' and that, 'the Soviet nuclear ballistic missile units stationed at Lower lake Baikal and along the Sino-Mongolian border have 'made good preparations' and are 'ready at any time' to launch "all out destructive nuclear counter attacks against China". But then the argument shifted to political rhetoric. " The 700 million Chinese people, armed with Mao's thought will (not) be intimidated by their nuclear blackmail." There was not even a threat of counter attack. While the Soviet threat (radio broadcast) was directed against China, Chinese reply was directed at domestic audience and it was more an attempt to assuage fears rather than any counter measure to meet the Soviet blackmail.

Conclusion

The two case studies unambiguously point to the fact that though nuclear weapons deter, it is not automatic, and it also depends on the context. George and Smoke argue that deterrence cannot be an effective substitute for a sensible foreign policy or be utilised to cover up gross foreign policy errors. For deterrence to work there has to be an unambiguous 'commitment' as well as capability to make that 'credible'.
But deterrence even nuclear deterrence cannot deter all wars. What nuclear deterrence fundamentally attempts to do is to maintain the status quo. It is a situation in which both the parties agree to coexist not peacefully but without wars.
The status quo can be favourable to one party than the other. Parties cannot allow the 'change in status quo' because once it is changed then the victor will have more incentives to commit more aggressions.

In Korea the status quo was the 38th parallel. In fact when UN committed its forces to cross the parallel, the explicit purpose was only to repel the North Korean aggression. It was only because of MacArthur's adventurism that the policy was changed later. On 7 October, the UN General Assembly met again to authorise the extension of war thus trying to unify Korea by force. In fact one can even argue that if China had not intervened, Soviet Union might have intervened there for the domino theory applied to them as well.
Again when Mao decided to enter the war, it was to "combat the enemy who dares to advance and attack north of the 38th parallel". Of course, like MacArthur, he would have liked to inflict a full defeat on the enemy and 'destroy the American forces within Korea itself, and effectively resolve the Korean problem. But that was only a long term goal-more political than military in nature. Anyway, it did not involve a vital security interest in the way, which could threaten the Chinese State. Thus it was not a vital interest for which China could risk a United States nuclear attack. Further, even the United States agreed not to cross the 38th parallel. Thus, China agreed to have the 38th parallel as the ceasefire line.

On the other hand the Sino-Soviet conflict, China was probing the commitment of the Soviet Union to the nature of the battle. If the battle was to be a continuous land battle China had fancied its chances. Even this proved to be difficult as the Soviet counter attack on March 15 exposed weaknesses in the Chinese army. Nevertheless it was the threat of escalation to the use of air power and nuclear weapons which decided the course because China had no capability either to defend or retaliate. Even though China had conducted a nuclear blast in 1964 it had no capability to deliver them on the Russian mainland. Only by 1971, China had developed a modest number of medium range ballistic missiles (e.g., DF-3A missiles). By 1973 it had developed a partial nuclear deterrent against a Soviet attack. Thus faced with a threat of escalation Chinese withdrew.
In fact Chinese versions of the border clashes, quite predictably accuse the Soviets as having committed aggression. Nevertheless it has to be remembered that it is the Chinese State which was the revisionist power. It was China, which was dissatisfied with the border. Thus, even if one concludes that Soviets committed aggression the essential question for deterrence remains- why did China not escalate the conflict? Especially if it is true, as they claim, that they had repulsed the Soviet attack of March 15? The answer unless one can argue about the 'inherently peaceful nature of the Chinese' is that the costs of war was not worth taking the risk. Status quo was preferable to assured destruction.
Status quo is important in another fundamental sense. Both the cases we have referred to above are asymmetric cases, that is, where only one of the parties was a nuclear power. We analysed why even a stronger power with nuclear weapons may fail to deter the weaker power. But what happens if even the other power acquires nuclear weapons?
The cold peace of the Cold War has led many analysts to argue that nuclear weapons deter even conventional wars. But that is the case only with the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course there has been no third world war. But it is also important to realise that they did not have any vital interest at stake. Therefore even their conflict was 'ideological', or rather political and homogenous. But hegemony has to be preserved. It was regarded as an essential national interest but by no means can be regarded as having involved with the question of threat to territorial security as in the case of China in 1950 and to a limited extent to the Soviet Union in 1969.

But, faced with the threat of nuclear weapons, states are willing to sacrifice some national interests provided it did not involve threat of the state's survival. Thus, China realising even after having a deterrent capability against United States is not willing to wage a war to annex Taiwan. Soviet Union during the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1957-58 refused to support China. Clearly, Soviet Union did not want to risk the alteration of status quo, as it did not contribute any of its vital security interests. For China, Taiwan is part of unfinished history but trying to rectify it might even risk its present. This is also the reason why Sino-Soviet border remained quite for twenty years after the 1969 clashes.

Thus, the presence of nuclear weapons definitely deters nuclear wars but the same may not be true of 'limited wars'. The logic of nuclear weapons is different from the logic of conventional world. Nuclear weapons have only 'deterrence by punishment', that is, the threat and capacity to inflict nuclear punishment. In the conventional world it is deterrence by denial, "the capability to deny territorial gains", which are more important.

In general, 'deterrence by punishment' should deter all wars. But when a vital interest of a state is involved the alternative might also involve similar costs. Thus, a conventional conflict may start when a change in status quo involves vital interests. But the threat of escalation almost always works to end the war, provided status quo is restored. Thus, even while nuclear weapons helps to reserve status quo, nuclear deterrence is also a condition of the same status quo.

Bibliography

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Christensen, Thomas J.,"Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The lessons of Mao's telegrams", International Security, Vol.17, No.1, Summer 1992 pp.122-150.
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Having read this account of Korea and Ussuri River clashes what lesson can we take with regard to India and China since 2008?
The early salami slicing was to test the Indian response after the IUCNA (2008) to see how India would respond.

The Indian response to Galwan is what re-set the trajectory.
All these commander-level talks are to restore the status quo. And are by nature slow as its a long border.

In the short, Galwan clash and subsequent Kailash ranges takeover is a replay of the Ussuri River clashes.

Just like at the Ussuri River clashes, there was an element of "India fears China" working during Galwan.

India did not make nuke threats but did take the response to the economic front which also hurt China and further escalation would be on a slippery slope.
So both China and India are nuke powers. And kept the incidents at the clashes or skirmishes level. No limited war rhetoric.

What India did was exhibit firm resolve at Galwan and subsequent places like Kailash ranges and kept repeating status quo ante of April 2020 must be maintained.
Along with these steps, India imposed economic measures on China's trade and investments in India. This transferred the pain to mainland China which saw both the Galwan casualties and job losses. In other words escalation at the LAC border has consequences inside China.
In what way? The above article says China backs down when survival is at stake.
But border clashes at LAC how could they affect China's survival?

Here comes the mapping of Communist China as another Chinese Empire and the CPC as another Chinese dynasty.
Looses at LAC would weaken the Mandate of Heaven of the CPC.
XJP in the 19th Congress in 2017 had made CPC the State in a Louis the XIV moment. ""L'Etat c'est a moi": Louis XIV and the State"
So further escalation during the pandemic could weaken the party hold and we see in the 20th Congress the Hun Jintao faction was purged.
Now add US pressure via Quad, and Taiwan. All these could bring back memories of COH.

This is the most logical explanation that fits why PRC is agreeing to talks with India.
If this is right then Taiwan which can affect the CPC's ideological status quo will be a hot spot.
And in his speech to the 20th Congress XJP referred the most times after Security.
I submit security and Taiwan are both related.
SSridhar
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Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:Link: https://jnu-matrix.tripod.com/conv-war.html

from JNU School of International Relations
A study of China under Mao and how it reacted with two nuclear powers US and FSU.
Fabulous work.
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