Deterrence

[Gagan]

Please see the salvo testing of PII missiles and the IAF exercises to take off from highways.
And the upcoming PII and Agni I test.

It all adds up.

Indeed,
Things are all lining up. One by one, in so many different fronts.

[ShauryaT]

Escalation Control and the Case of Pakistan’s TNWs for Battlefield Use: Futility of Thinking and Judgement - Balraj Nagal

TNWs are not the panacea for all problems of the war zone. India
has many options to deal with the threat, most significantly, to eliminate
them by non-nuclear means before ground operations commence,
and ultimately employing the strategy of massive retaliation to cause
unacceptable damage. It is time for Pakistan to reassess its strategy and for
the world to analyse and assess the dangers of the path that Pakistan has
chosen to undertake – from terror to TNWs. India remains committed to
its stated no first use nuclear policy, but cannot be bullied by a revisionist
state. India has demonstrated its desire for peace and regional harmony,
however, in a changing and dangerous world, it will most certainly
not hesitate to defend its core values, national interests, and territorial
sovereignty and integrity. It is time for the world to realise the folly of
Pakistan deploying TNWs. The international community must take action
to have these eliminated by all means at their disposal.

[shiv]

Escalation Control and the Case of Pakistan’s TNWs for Battlefield Use: Futility of Thinking and Judgement - Balraj Nagal
It is time for the world to realise the folly of
Pakistan deploying TNWs. The international community must take action
to have these eliminated by all means at their disposal.

I have not read the whole article but the above quote caught my eye because it is useless rhetoric Who is the "world" to realize anything about Pakistan and wtf are the "international community"

In fact Pakistan makes frequent statements like these appealing to the entire world and international community to tackle India. I am not surprised that there is an equal equal that is being perpetuated.

If I look at those sentences kindly, I can only think that they constitute a veiled threat that Pakistan will be nuked and nuked hard by India, don't say we didn't warn you. This is great but once again this is the very language used by Pakistan - an appeal to a "third party like "world" and "international community"

[ShauryaT]

^Shiv ji: Unfortunately that is the result of the doctrine. Author ex-SFC commander and head of nuclear cell in PMO.

[SSridhar]

Escalation Control and the Case of Pakistan’s TNWs for Battlefield Use: Futility of Thinking and Judgement - Balraj Nagal

This is a very good piece and I urge everyone to read this. Coming from Lt. Gen. Balraj Nagal, Director CLAWS now and once a Chief of SFC.

The reference to the 'world community' (whatever that means and we probably can guess whom it means) does occur at a few places in a lengthy article that discusses many aspects of deterrence between the two countries and there is a context for such a reference to the 'world community' too, namely a demand to "take action to eliminate the Damocles sword that hangs over the world" from Pakistan's TNWs and a " Pakistan that is out to threaten world peace, including a nuclear winter, a mutated population and a devastated regional environment." This makes me suspect that there could be a consensus between India and the US on the Pakistani n-weapon issue, whether TNWs or strategic weapons.

A few months' back, we had discussed here the the Cold War employment of TNWs in Europe, especially the Fulda Gap in West Germany etc. and how Pakistan was mimicking that in the India-Pakistan context and the possible Indian response.

I am summarizing what he has stated. Read the entire article for a detailed exposition.

• For a variety of reasons, TNWs were not found satisfactory during the Cold War deployment in Europe (reasons such as TNWs not creating any 'real' deterrence, the attacker still had the advantage of preemption and not the defender, would still lead to strategic exchange defeating deterrence, dilemma as to when exactly deploy the TNW, the TNW having limited effect on NBC-protected mechanized infantries, the security of the TNW units themselves and lastly no conclusive understanding of their effectiveness)
• PA believes that it can use TNWs to block the Indian offensive and thereafter “control the escalation", which is a thoroughly wrong assumption by listing out how the usually well accepted escalation control mechanisms internationally would be ineffective in the India-Pakistan context.
  • mutual agreement between rivals to fight for limited stakes”. - This is not possible because Pakistan is a revisionist state and PA, not civilian leadership determines this.
  • Limited victory" or “curtailing the requirement of unequivocal victory”. - The PA with its pledge to work for "India’s break-up and destruction", embedded in its psyche, after 1971, will not settle for this. This may happen in 'conventional wars' such as 1999 but not in a nuclear exchange because it will be seen as "lowering their aim"
  • "graduated military responses within the boundaries of contrived mutual restraints” wherein the two powers agree on preventing mutual destruction and both agree to the same rules. This is again not possible with the PA for the same reasons above.
  • An agreement on “established thresholds”. Pakistan's thresholds are vague and likely ambiguously low anyway and kept deliberately so.
  • absence of escalation dominance” - Pakistan believes that TNWs are its 'escalation dominance' mechanism, a dubious circular thinking.
  • The sixth belief is that escalation control is feasible in deterrence strategies, and not in nuclear war-fighting strategies" I interpret this to mean that for Pakistan, TNWs are a deterrence tool whereas strategic nuclear weapons are legitimate war-fighting tools. That is, local Pakistani commanders can employ TNWs against advancing Indian forces and hope to deter further Indian escalation without India resorting to strategic weapons. Not only possession but also use of TNWs has only a deterrence value for the PA. It is not considered by them as amounting to a nuclear exchange.
• The author the goes on to discuss some non-classic escalation issues specific to India-Pakistan context.
  • adversaries plan differently, with each side having its own inclination” - Pakistan seeks to destroy the very identity of India, whereas Indian plans have sought a degradation of Pakistan’s military capability.
  • "lack of communication between the adversaries" - India’s political leadership will find it problematic to connect with the “deep state”.
  • "interpretation of the other side’s aims and objectives"
  • "irrationality of states during war, with political and domestic compulsions forcing states to adopt policies that prevent logical decision-making.
  • "different decision-making systems & dissimilar decision-making processes"
  • "breakdown of command and control"
  • "accidental occurrences and the fog of war" - in order not to be seen as the "losing side", PA may resort to "use them or lose them”.
  • 'opacity of the arsenal size"
• The author then discusses "Pakistan’s Employment of TNWs in the Battlefield and its Fall-out"
  • range of the NASR and Abdali provides an employment range of 60 km and 180 km.
  • No of TNWs needed will be a few thousands
  • PA will need to use them at many places within Pakistan, the majority areas being Pakistani Punjab and moderately deep inside the IB.
  • the author believes that TNW units would be detected at very early stages and Indian counter actions would eliminate or disable them. He also believes that international powers would apply force to prevent a nuclear holocaust by removing the TNWs {I presume he means the US & China here though how China would behave in a two-front war situation is moot}
• India's Response Options
  • "Attacking these with Precision Guided Munitions" (PGMs) i.e., hypersonic missiles
  • "destroying the TNWs with air power"
  • employing UAVs and UCAVs
  • "Special Forces to destroy the delivery
    systems and communications"
  • "Using irregular forces to disrupt the functioning of TNW units"
  • "Covert operations"
  • Importantly, for exercising these options, there is no necessity to initiate ground operations till the set aims are achieved, which prevents employment of TNWs in the very first place.
  • "The option of counter-force strikes till the aim of removing TNWs has been achieved.
  • "Pakistan, will, expectedly, initiate retaliatory quid pro quo strikes or exercise the option of ground operations to draw India into a situation where it can scare the world with its brinkmanship policy of nuclear war.
  • "The challenge for India and the world powers is to take out Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, before they are employed on the battlefield.
  • More than TNWs, the bigger problem will be how soon can it [Pakistan] / will it, introduce strategic weapons in a crisis.scenario?
• The Conclusion that is drawn by the author is that India has many options to deal with the threat, most significantly, to eliminate them by non-nuclear means before ground operations commence, and ultimately employing the strategy of massive retaliation to cause
  unacceptable damage.

[svinayak]

The Recent Declassification of India's Secret 'Long Telegram' Shows Why It Went Nuclear

The nuclear specter of China has always been India's overwhelming consideration.
Vivek Prahladan
December 9, 2016
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“The main argument in favor of India going nuclear is the Chinese threat” — L.K. Jha (Secretary to Prime Minister) March 5, 1967
“A nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible” — P.N. Haksar (Secretary to Prime Minister) 1968

The Counsel of History
Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar recently made a controversial “personal” comment that perhaps India must revisit its no first-use nuclear policy. However, the only available document on Indian nuclear policy has been the “Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” which has fostered perpetual speculation on the vector and valences of Indian strategic doctrine. We have had little historical perspective on how Indian doctrine has absorbed Chinese and Pakistan nuclear threats ever since India carried out its first underground nuclear test — “Smiling Buddha” — in May 1974. There is still no consensus on what the historical reasons were for India to cross the no-bomb line or what internal discussions were taking place between the scientists and the prime minister’s office. However, newly declassified documents from the prime minister’s office, which include letters between the prime minister’s office and the Department of Atomic Energy, as well as correspondence between the prime minister and scientists help establish the specific considerations that went into the making of India’s nuclear doctrine. It revises arguments such as those of George Perkovich, that, in the second half of the sixties, “the (Indian) scientists acted without benefit of a national security strategy or requirement.” The documents reveal disquiet among India’s strategists about China’s repeated nuclear tests from 1964 onwards.

India’s “Long Telegram” and Crossing the No-Bomb Line
Perhaps the single most important document for establishing the evolving history of India’s nuclear weapons policy comes from P.N. Haksar, Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that may be dated to 1968. The note is titled “Need for India In a Changing World to Reassess her National Interest and Foreign policy.”
The revealing document tends to defy most assumptions held about India’s nuclear policy regarding the level of “stand-off capability” that was being considered in the Prime Minister Secretariat. P.N Haskar wrote:
i. the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium range (2,000-3,000 miles) capable, from sites within India’s frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centers of population
ii. The development simultaneously of submarines driven by nuclear power fitted out to carry nuclear missiles
iii. This nuclear arms program should be based on adequate stockpiling of those sensitive instruments and machinery…. which will be difficult to import from abroad increasingly
Haksar distinguished between the role of nuclear India as opposed to other nuclear powers. Haksar also reveals his thought that India’s nuclear ambition should be clearly communicated with the United States at a relevant time. The nuclear specter of China remained the overwhelming consideration. Haksar seemed to appreciate nuclear balancing in Europe and wrote of India’s “own security require that she becomes a nuclear power to establish a genuine balance of power with China.”

[rsingh]

^^^
Very informative article. We had visionaries in those time. My father and Uncles talked bad about Haskar (he we controlling IG, he was foreign agent). They were wrong. great respect to this guy.

[ShauryaT]

India's Nuclear Doctrine | Professor Bharat Karnad

In this podcast, Bharat Karnad​,​ Professor of National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research​ (CPR), ​New Delhi​ speaks to IPCS on issues such as India's no first use (NFU) policy and doctrinal ambiguity in light of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar's recent remarks.

[ramana]

The Recent Declassification of India's Secret 'Long Telegram' Shows Why It Went Nuclear

Posting in full as its very important and shreds the Perkovich and the 'liberal' deluded Indian elite bakwas. The declassified letter is from Pran Nath Haksar. He was supposedly a leftist and if this was his advice then the whole Praful Bidawi types are toast.


Image of Jaguar omitted as its only good for show. it was the Mirage 2000 that operationalized it. This Jaguar was only good for kickbacks and killing the HF-24.

The main argument in favor of India going nuclear is the Chinese threat” — L.K. Jha (Secretary to Prime Minister) March 5, 1967

“A nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible” — P.N. Haksar (Secretary to Prime Minister) 1968

The Counsel of History

Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar recently made a controversial “personal” comment that perhaps India must revisit its no first-use nuclear policy. However, the only available document on Indian nuclear policy has been the “Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” which has fostered perpetual speculation on the vector and valences of Indian strategic doctrine. We have had little historical perspective on how Indian doctrine has absorbed Chinese and Pakistan nuclear threats ever since India carried out its first underground nuclear test — “Smiling Buddha” — in May 1974. There is still no consensus on what the historical reasons were for India to cross the no-bomb line or what internal discussions were taking place between the scientists and the prime minister’s office. However, newly declassified documents from the prime minister’s office, which include letters between the prime minister’s office and the Department of Atomic Energy, as well as correspondence between the prime minister and scientists help establish the specific considerations that went into the making of India’s nuclear doctrine. It revises arguments such as those of George Perkovich, that, in the second half of the sixties, “the (Indian) scientists acted without benefit of a national security strategy or requirement.” The documents reveal disquiet among India’s strategists about China’s repeated nuclear tests from 1964 onwards.



{In 1998 tests ABV wrote to Bill Clinton about the China factor in deciding to test again at Pokhran. Again Indi awas consistent in threat perception. It was US based NPA propaganda fed by deluded fools like IPCS head Chari and his coterie. Shows they were out of the loop.}
India’s “Long Telegram” and Crossing the No-Bomb Line

Perhaps the single most important document for establishing the evolving history of India’s nuclear weapons policy comes from P.N. Haksar, Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that may be dated to 1968. The note is titled “Need for India In a Changing World to Reassess her National Interest and Foreign policy.”


{Long verbose title guided by old school British practices. Could have been shortened to "Need for India to reassess Foreign Policy" as national interests don't get reassessed.}

The revealing document tends to defy most assumptions held about India’s nuclear policy regarding the level of “stand-off capability” that was being considered in the Prime Minister Secretariat. P.N Haskar wrote:

i. the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium range (2,000-3,000 miles) capable, from sites within India’s frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centers of population

ii. The development simultaneously of submarines driven by nuclear power fitted out to carry nuclear missiles

iii. This nuclear arms program should be based on adequate stockpiling of those sensitive instruments and machinery…. which will be difficult to import from abroad increasingly
[/I]

Haksar distinguished between the role of nuclear India as opposed to other nuclear powers. Haksar also reveals his thought that India’s nuclear ambition should be clearly communicated with the United States at a relevant time. The nuclear specter of China remained the overwhelming consideration. Haksar seemed to appreciate nuclear balancing in Europe and wrote of India’s “own security require that she becomes a nuclear power to establish a genuine balance of power with China.”


{So those frenetic world wide visits by L.K. Jha were just that. There was no way India would have come under any umbrella even if it was offered. It so happens such an umbrella was not offered and show the P-5 had India as a scape goat or a target in mind}

Haksar wrote this for the benefit of the Indian prime minister almost fifty years ago. This was India’s equivalent of George Kennan’s “long telegram” to the State Department. The long telegram also carried an unsparing assessment of Pakistan as “an unstable state contrived artificially” whose internal logic compelled the “inevitable and chronic hostility of Pakistan to India.” Haksar was India’s Kennan and much of what he assessed has become part of India’s enduring strategic culture. A study of it is central to any constructions of Indian strategic thought. The Indian long telegram assesses the great power approach to Indian nuclear ambition. Haksar acutely felt a “growing convergence of interest in Washington, Peking and Moscow of keeping India under pressure and using Pakistan for the purpose.” He also wrote of both Moscow and Washington having similar a view on balancing India and Pakistan: “making the development of nuclear arms by her (India) that much more difficult by providing measured quantities of arms to Pakistan.” It also gives a window to understanding the Russia-Pakistan rapprochement that was taking place, which had implications for China’s nuclear strategy towards both India and Soviet Union. Haksar grappled with Soviet attempts to gain leverage with Pakistan with the argument that Russia was weaning away Pakistan from China for its own reasons because “close understanding between Pakistan and China may bring nuclear tipped missiles aimed not only at India but the Southern flank of Soviet Union.” Therefore, the dangers of Pakistan and China colluding were not only for India but also for the Soviet Union, and that too in nuclear terms. Haksar self-reflection shows a strategist forming his thoughts rather than a draft where the thoughts are already complete. Uncertain of Soviet strategic intentions, Haskar’s writing reveals a realist exploration of the limits of Indo-Soviet cooperation even as in this same year (1968) military cooperation between India and Soviet Union had begun in earnest. The larger subcontinental strategy of Soviet Union was still not clear.


{Even after collapse of former Soviet Union its not clear even now.}

The Haskar “long telegram” cites Bhutto being under house arrest at the time but acknowledges the possibility of the “flamboyant” Bhutto taking Pakistan closer to China as indeed turned out to be the case. Ayub was seen by both the United States and Russia as a counterweight to India and neither of them wanted to strengthen the war-making capacity of Ayub, but rather his war-deterring capacity towards India.


Another immediate provocation for this “long telegram”: in 1968 Pakistan was looking to set up a nuclear reactor in East Bengal and was holding discussions with Westinghouse before ultimately withdrew. After Soviet statesman Alexei Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan in the same year, it settled for commissioning a feasibility study by Soviet “Technopromexport.” Soviets considered the cooperation a pure commercial transaction in the manner that France described much of its arms and nuclear sales. One of the reasons why Westinghouse withdrew from the bid was because, according to the Indian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan wanted to retain used fuel rods. If Pakistan had succeeded in creating the impression that it had a nuclear explosive device in East Bengal or even a nuclear facility in East Bengal that would have made any intervention by India in that region out of question. This is not to give the impression that India had designs on breaking off East Bengal much before 1971, but it was a factor that could not have been taken lightly by India.

{On the contrary Indian resolve to sever East Pakistan and limit the 1971 war to the East makes lots of sense. To deny a future nuclear plant infrastructure for Pakistan would be a strategic objective of the 1971 war.}

By 1967, as revealed by a cable from External Affairs official J.S. Mehta from the Indian embassy in Washington to the Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Prime Minister Secretariat that there were differences between the U.S. administration and Congress on the ICBM capability of the Chinese nuclear program. The administration felt that Chinese ICBM would only be ready by 1971-72 and miniaturization of warhead would have to precede any ICBM capability. Congressional hearings revealed that China was still struggling with submarine missile launch. Sidney Graybeal, an advisor to President Kennedy during Cuban missile crisis and a CIA expert on Chinese rocketry, informed Indian EZ official K.P. Jain that China was going to test an ICBM by placing a satellite in orbit irrespective of the size of the payload. The missile test itself would be into the Indian Ocean off the coast of Tanzania and the CIA was monitoring the presence of Chinese technicians in Tanzania. It was also apparent that the Cultural Revolution had not slowed down Chinese nuclear program. In April 1970, K.R. Narayanan (Policy Planning Division-MEA Ministry of External Affairs) wrote on the launch of the earth satellite by China as a follow up to his 1964 paper when he was Director of the China Division. At about this time Haksar had written that India’s “India’s future status in the world and her own security require that she becomes a nuclear power so as to establish a genuine regional balance of power with China.” In March 1969, the Government of India answered in Lok Sabha that it “did not consider it necessary to seek any nuclear umbrella.” (MEA, 1969) As a former Chairman of Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. M.R Srinivasan told the author, “no one in current memory knows that an Indian thinker as P.N. Haksar was already thinking in terms of a triad and it has till now remained hidden in the archives.”


{MRS truly jests. By that time Sarabhai had setup ISRO. Dr. Nag Chaudhri had started exploring Valiant at DRDL. Submarine feasibility studies were underway. I guess unless they seen in writing they don't want to connect any dots.}

The April 1970 satellite launch established that China had acquired MRBM range. Indian agencies were all basing their nuclear calculation around China. China’s nuclear program established the success of the Communist leadership in navigating through domestic political and economic upheaval while keeping the nuclear program a consistent priority. Subramanian Swamy had written in the October 1970 issue of United Service Institution of India Journal that in a nuclear conflict with a major power, China would have to rely on second strike with fifteen to twenty missiles to undertake assured destruction. (Swamy, 1970) Ten would be decoys and ten pointed at cities to penetrate Nike-X. Calculating for eluding sprint missile detonation height among other things, it would succeed in destroying at least three cities by radioactive fallout, which was a sufficient deterrent for China. This argument was a way of arguing that even a smaller number of missiles with appropriate strategies could give sufficient deterrence for counter value massive retaliation. This was a counterpoint to the United Nations study on the minimum deterrence, which placed the arsenal at one hundred warheads, thirty to fifty aircrafts and fifty missiles.

{Also by then the Ussuri River clashes between FSU and PRC were already over. And PRC had tested the CHIC-4 design which was later passed on to Pakistan.}


There was also an argument at the time that India should go in for a tactical weapon arsenal instead of strategic systems. As the PMO documents reveal, this was considered head on by the Department of Atomic Energy. The Indian atomic establishment argued that if China were to meet determined resistance from our ground forces while crossing the Himalayas, she could make use of tactical nuclear weapons and demoralize our troops. It concluded that the argument that India could impact the military situation by possessing only tactical weapons was a fallacy and that India needed to focus on developing strategic delivery capability rather than settling for a small tactical arsenal.


If China is using a nuclear weapon to bully or to annihilate our forces, we can expect China to escalate the conflict if the limited use is successfully countered by us. China is known to be developing a strategic nuclear weapon system involving long range guided missiles. Therefore, the only way by which we could deter Chinese escalation would be to ourselves have a strategic system capable of inflicting an unacceptable damage on China.


The only way to stop China from escalating was to have second-strike capability inflicting unacceptable damage. According to the Department of Atomic Energy, “paper tigers do not provide security, that is, you cannot bluff in regard to your military strength.” India would require a total defensive system rather than a prototype by a scientist. However, since Indian cities were within range of China’s intermediate missile arsenal, India would require longer ranges missile to bring Chinese cities within their striking capacity. The completion of the reprocessing facility at Tarapur, which had begun in 1968, was a pointer in the direction the prime minister’s office was thinking.


{Now we know why the Agni range and payload weight were given to Dr. Kalam when IGMP was began in 1984. He had proposed a small Re-entry Experiment (REX) and was given the range and payload weight objectives and asked to work it in. BTW in his ISRO days he used to do system architecture studies under Sarabhai guidance. No other supervisors.}

In conclusion, it would be a mistake to ascribe the wisdom of Indian nuclear doctrine and strategy merely to those who came in at the weaponization/operationalization stage. The archival history establishes that doctrinal inquiries went back to the mid-1960s. China was and remains the main nuclear threat for India. Indian nuclear doctrine considers China to be its main nuclear rival. Former National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon told the author that since Pakistani delivery platforms are essentially based on Chinese systems, it made them an extension of the Chinese nuclear threat.

Vivek Prahladan is a visiting researcher at Keio University in Japan.

svinayak thanks for posting this.


I would like to see those declassified material for we can understand better the decisions.

[Rammpal]

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 971731.cms

Why is it still called Wheeler Island ?

[wig]

Dilemma over the N word by G Parthasarathy -India needs to make its nuclear doctrine relevant
http://tribuneindia.com/news/comment/di ... 36812.html

EVER since India commenced building a nuclear arsenal after the Pokhran tests of 1998, queries have been raised about what the size of its arsenal should be, accompanied by a discourse on how to fashion its nuclear doctrine. Quite clearly, India’s nuclear weapons have to be primarily targeted on its two neighbours, Pakistan and China, which possess nuclear weapons and with whom India has serious territorial and other differences. This strategy has also to take into account the fact that while Pakistan has relatively limited indigenous research and development capabilities, its nuclear weapons and missile programmes are predominantly based on Chinese designs and technology transfers.
India’s nuclear doctrine, first officially enunciated on January 4, 2003, asserts that it intends to build and maintain a “credible minimum deterrent”. While adopting a policy of “no first use”, the doctrine clarifies that India’s nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against an attack on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which nuclear weapons are used. India also retains the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of attacks on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which chemical or biological weapons are used.
Pakistan has not officially enunciated its nuclear doctrine. It justifies its entire nuclear weapons programme as being an equaliser to balance Indian conventional military superiority. More importantly, it constantly uses nuclear blackmail by threatening to use nuclear weapons if India responds to cross-border terrorist attacks by military action on its soil. The sad reality is that substantial sections of our so-called “intellectual” and “liberal” elite panic at such Pakistani tantrums. Pakistan’s generals live too comfortably to commit collective suicide. Moreover, one has to rationally analyse what needs to be done to deal with Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, bluster and blackmail. One hopes some reality has dawned on this “elite” after the recent surgical strikes across the LoC. Pakistan should not be allowed to get the impression that this was a one-time occurrence.
While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority, told a team of physicists from Italy’s Landon Network that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. According to the report of the Landon team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation.
General Kidwai, who is highly regarded internationally, enunciated these views over a decade ago, when he was head of the Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command. He has since retired. But, anyone who understands the strategic thinking of the Pakistan army, realises that the “red lines”, enunciated by General Kidwai, especially in regard to the fallout of an Indian attack, would remain the basic parameters of current strategic thinking. There is, however, one significant difference in Pakistan’s capabilities since then. Thanks to Chinese assistance, Pakistan has now built plutonium reactors and reprocessing facilities in the Fatehjang-Khushab plutonium complex, enabling it to assemble an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons and miniaturised plutonium warheads. But, in practical terms, Pakistan cannot use these tactical nuclear weapons in the Punjab area, which is densely populated. They can perhaps be used in the Sind/Rajasthan desert, with Pakistan presuming that such an attack will not prompt India to resort to a full-scale nuclear conflict as enunciated in India’s nuclear doctrine, as this would result in mutual destruction.
Viewed in a global context, the entire theology of a nuclear “no first use”, which was enunciated by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and rejected by the US and its NATO allies, has few adherents today. The Russian Federation does not subscribe to “no first use” of nuclear weapons. The US and NATO now aver that NATO members can use nuclear weapons against states armed with biological and chemical weapons, even if those states have signed the NPT. China has expressed its readiness to sign “no first use” agreements with the other “recognised” nuclear powers and affirmed its commitment not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, China thus appears to have maintained a measure of ambiguity on whether its “no first use” pledge will be applicable to India. An unambiguous clarification on this issue has to be sought from China.
The BJP manifesto in 2014 had declared that it would “study in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and revise and update it to make it relevant to the challenges of current times. The manifesto spoke of a credible minimum deterrent in tune with “changing geostrategic realities”. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s response at a book launch in Delhi on November 10, 2016, brought the issue into public focus. Referring to India’s “no first use” doctrine, he said: “Why should I bind myself [to the nuclear no first use doctrine]? I should say I am a responsible nuclear power and I will not use it irresponsibly”. Given the change in the strategic scenario since the transfer of plutonium facilities from China to Pakistan for developing tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons, it is imperative to have a serious internal debate on our nuclear posture to consider available rational options. Moreover, our nuclear deterrent will not be “credible” in Chinese perceptions till the Agni 5 missile is operationalised and our sea-based nuclear missiles are positioned on the INS Arihant and future nuclear submarines built by us.
India has played an active role in nuclear disarmament. This gave us a moral stature. We should continue to initiate and promote measures for universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Moreover, there is growing concern in many parts of the world about the endless production in Pakistan of dangerous fissile material which could fall into wrong hands. We should join others to push for a non-discriminatory treaty ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. We should also reiterate our commitment for de-alerting all nuclear weapons and separating nuclear warheads from their explosive packages. Interestingly, the US and its NATO allies are likely to be the main opponents of such a move.

[ramana]

G. Parthasarathy is still stuck in Nehruvian old school kumbaya construct which collapsed in October 1962.

No body is going to de-alert nukes and all that.

Once India stops that nonsense the world will take India seriously.

Pushing for all those four letter treaties will boomerang on India just like Bill Clinton tried to make PVNR commit to them in his 1993 visit.

Has GP forgotten all that?

Its very sad that all these folks were tutored by K. Subrhamanyam and G.P.'s father and P.N. Haksar and still spout vakra niti of disarmament.

What is the point of having access to great teachers when the pupil is still a buddhu?

Pox on that generation of IFS since the 1960s.
So glad that GP did not become NSA under NaMo.

[ramana]

Philip thanks for finding this article.
X-posting with my comments in end....

https://in.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than ... ent_657434

Gunboat diplomacy: Revisiting the Enterprise incident
14 December 2016 RAKESH KRISHNAN SIMHA
Exactly 45 years ago the US despatched a powerful naval task force into the Bay of Bengal to prevent India from overrunning Pakistan. While a military threat was implied, there is some evidence that the American political leadership contemplated a nuclear strike on India. This is an analysis of that incident, which led to a dangerous standoff with a nuclear armed Russian fleet.

Sweeping mines, salvaging looted gold after the 1971 War
1971 War: How Russia sank Nixon’s gunboat diplomacy
Toasting legacy of 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty

During the 1971 War, as the Indian Army launched its blitzkrieg into East Pakistan – present day Bangladesh – US President Richard Nixon had a terrible idea. Under the pretext of evacuating American citizens from the warzone, Nixon ordered the US Seventh Fleet’s Task Force 74, led by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, to proceed towards the Bay of Bengal. He was spurred on by Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor.

Nixon’s rash move – which became America’s greatest PR disaster in India – was dictated by the condition of the Pakistani military, which was taking a hammering in East Pakistan. More than 100,000 Pakistani soldiers were trapped between the Bay of Bengal and the rampaging Indian Army. Of these 97,000 would soon surrender, making it the largest capitulation since World War II.

The Indian Army had not yet made any major attacks in the western sector, but a CIA mole in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s cabinet had leaked her plan to bomb Pakistani military capability into the Stone Age. Hassan Abbas writes in ‘Pakistan's Drift into Extremism’ that “India's plans possibly included the final destruction of the country, as a CIA report had indicated".

Nixon – who was working to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in China, with Pakistan acting as the middleman – asked Beijing to mobilise troops on the Indian border. He even contemplated “lobbing nuclear weapons” at the Russians if they retaliated by going to war with China. But as Moscow had moved its crack army divisions to the Chinese border, Beijing decided it was not going to sacrifice itself at Nixon’s bidding. At any rate China considered East Pakistan a lost cause.

Veto No.100: How Russia blocked the West on Kashmir
A livid Nixon stressed he would not allow India to break up Pakistan’s core territories in the west. He warned the Indian ambassador L.K. Jha in Washington: “If the Indians continue their military operations (against West Pakistan), we must inevitably look toward a confrontation between the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan.”

Not satisfied with the envoy’s reply, Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal.

Enterprise steams towards India
Former Indian Navy Commander Raghavendra Mishra, a research fellow at the New Delhi-based National Maritime Foundation writes in a paper titled ‘Revisiting the 1971 USS Enterprise Incident’ that the nuclear powered, nuclear capable carrier’s entry was an instance of gunboat diplomacy.

In the paper, published by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, he writes: “A broad plan of action emerged which included cutting off economic aid to India, and transfer of military equipment from other US regional allies to West Pakistan. These were to be supported by a possible naval deployment and a simultaneous move by the Chinese military along the border. The aim was to put pressure on the Soviet Union which, in turn, would prevail upon India from expanding the conflict. Nixon directed Kissinger to explore the option of US naval deployment with Chinese representatives before taking a final decision.”

The first mention of an aircraft carrier deployment comes up in Kissinger’s memorandum to Nixon on December 8, 1971. That was the night when the Indian Navy had made a bonfire of Karachi, with its second successive missile strike on coastal installations. The Pakistani port had been burning since December 4 after being hit by the Indian Navy’s Russian missile boats. These strikes in the west plus news about the collapse of the Pakistan Army in the east had greatly upset the Nixon-Kissinger duo.

Kissinger suggested that Nixon should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – the highest-ranking and senior most military officer in the United States armed forces – to move naval Task Force 74, then deployed in the South East Asian theatre, to the Bay of Bengal immediately via the Singapore Straits under the pretext of “prudent contingency measures”.

On December 9, Nixon wanted the US and China to jointly move against India. That same day, during his meeting with the Chinese delegation led by Huang Hua, China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to Canada (as the US did not have diplomatic relations with China), Kissinger apprised his counterpart about the US naval task force move through a map showing the deployment of the US and Soviet forces.

Mishra writes: “Kissinger agreed the Pakistani military had collapsed in the East and the same was anticipated within two weeks in the West. Emphasising the importance of West Pakistan’s continued existence for regional dynamics, Kissinger sought military moves by China along the border to restrain India and the Soviet Union. Huang Hua, while expressing solidarity for the common cause, made no formal commitment, stating that he would convey the US proposal for consideration of Beijing.”

By December 11 the carrier Task Force 74 led by the Enterprise was moving as scheduled and the first media reports about its possible deployment in the Bay of Bengal had started circulating in India.

On the same day, a major development took place. Around 4.00pm, an Indian parachute brigade was dropped at Tangail and the race for Dhaka had begun. With the Pakistani military and political leadership in panic mode, Kissinger informed Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that Task Force 74 would be crossing the Straits of Malacca by December 12-13.

War in the east
A week into the war, it was clear the Pakistan Army in the East was about to capitulate. The Americans also realised to their dismay that China was not prepared to move even a column of trucks on the Himalayan border.

Overcame by his hatred, the reckless Nixon was even prepared to sacrifice the concept of détente that would soon be the cornerstone of US-Russia ties. He asked Kissinger to inform the Russians about the increasing probability of a major war involving both the superpowers. Moscow was told that its continued backing of New Delhi would endanger the planned strategic arms reduction talks.

It is unclear if Nixon’s threat worked or whether the Russian leadership was unduly sensitive about global opinion, but soon Russian ambassadorial staff informed Kissinger that a delegation from Moscow had arrived in New Delhi for consultations, and that India had agreed not to expand its military operations in the Western theatre.

During his meeting with Chou En-Lai in Beiing in February 1972, Nixon had said that in the early stages of the conflict the Russians “were doing nothing to discourage India in its actions against Pakistan. It was only after we made a very strong stand – I personally intervened with (Russian President Leonid) Brezhnev, and Dr Kissinger made a statement that was widely quoted in this respect – they took a more reasonable attitude and a more moderate position in the United Nations.”

Commander Mishra adds: “At this stage, the US administration possessed reasonable proof that West Pakistan would not be attacked by India. However, in a meeting attended by senior state and defence department officials, Kissinger decided to go ahead with the naval deployment, which was expected to traverse the Straits of Malacca in the evening and could arrive off East Bangladesh on the morning of December 16.”

On December 13, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, General Raza, requested the US Seventh Fleet deployment in the Bay of Bengal as well as in the North Arabian Sea to deter further attacks by the Indian Navy. This proposal was repeated by the President of Pakistan to Nixon, stating: “The Seventh Fleet does not only have to come to our shores but also to relieve certain pressures which (we are) not in a position to cope with. (We) have sent a specific proposal…about the role the Seventh Fleet could play at Karachi which, I hope, is receiving your attention.”

(This excerpt from the conversation between Nixon and his assistants is from December 15, 1971, 8:45-11:30 am.)

Kissinger: The Russians came in yesterday giving us their own guarantee that there would be no attack on West Pakistan.

Nixon: A letter from Brezhnev.

Kissinger: An addition – an explanation of the letter to – of Brezhnev saying, they, the Soviet Union, "guarantees there will be no military action against West Pakistan". So we are home, now it’s done. It’s just a question what legal way we choose.

Nixon: Well, what the UN does is really irrelevant.

Kissinger: Well, it’d be, the ******** (he’s referring to the Indians), of course, have broken promises before. It’d be better to have it on public record. We might be able to do it in an exchange of letters between Brezhnev and you. That is made public, in which you say you express your concern, and he says he wants to assure you.

Nixon: Well, what does that do now to the Chinese?

Kissinger: Oh, the Chinese would be thrilled if West Pakistan were guaranteed.

Nuclear standoff: Enter the Russian Navy
Based on an Indian intercept of US communications, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) prepared a six-page note, which said: “The assessment of our embassy reveals that the decision to brand India as an 'aggressor' and to send the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal was taken personally by Nixon.”

1971 War: How Russia sank Nixon’s gunboat diplomacy
The MEA felt that “the bomber force aboard the Enterprise had the US President's authority to undertake bombing of Indian Army's communications, if necessary”.

Following this assessment, India secretly activated a provision in the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, according to which either party would come to the defence of the other. A Russian naval task force from the Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok, consisting of a cruiser, a destroyer and two attack submarines under the command of Admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov intercepted Task Force 74.

Sebastien Roblin writes in War is Boring that Kruglyakov revealed in a Russian TV interview about “encircling” the task force, surfacing his submarines in front of the Enterprise, opening the missile tubes and “blocking” the American ships.

Mishra notes: “The Soviet Indian Ocean naval component also got a lucky break with three of their ships near the Straits of Malacca, on their return passage to their Pacific homeport when the information about the possible US naval deployment to the Indian Ocean became general knowledge. These were retained and reinforced by two further task groups that arrived in the Indian Ocean on December 18 and 26. These Soviet naval assets continued to shadow the TF 74 off Sri Lanka until its return passage to the Pacific theatre on January 8, 1972.”

In addition, 12 other Soviet naval ships were present in the Indian Ocean. However, none of these Russian vessels were in the vicinity or heading for the Bay of Bengal or North Arabian Sea, where the Indian Navy was continuing with its operations.

It is an indication of how serious the Russians were about defending India that Moscow started despatching naval detachments from across the globe to Indian waters. Kissinger referred to unconfirmed reports about Soviet Mediterranean Fleet units being directed to the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, but these warships were unlikely to arrive in time.

The reason Russia was able to quickly direct all this heavy naval firepower into the warzone was the Soviet Navy had rapidly grown into an impressive blue water force under Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov.

John B. Hattendorf writes in ‘US Naval Strategy in the 1970s’ that the year 1970 was a seminal one as the Soviet Navy carried out the first of its OKEAN global war games that involved combined and joint forces for defensive, offensive and expeditionary operations. “The 200-ship exercise covered the four major theatres of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans as well as the Mediterranean Sea. This was also period that the majority of the US Navy was approaching en masse obsolescence. The increase in Soviet naval presence was especially notable in the Indian Ocean which far outstripped the US Navy deployments, although it is qualified that most of these deployments were in the North and South-West Indian Oceans.”

With such massive forces at its disposal, the Russian military forces were confident of repelling any American adventurism. Mishra says the Russian ambassador to India had dismissed the possibilities of the US or China intervening by emphasising that the Russian fleet was also in the Indian Ocean and would not allow the Seventh Fleet to interfere; and if China moved in Ladakh, Russia would respond in Xinjiang. As Nixon raged in the White House, a million Russian troops were stationed on the Chinese border.

At this point, Task Force 74 was east off Sri Lanka and this naval deployment had generated considerable anti-US feeling in India. Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh said that if the US invaded, the Indians would trap the Americans in a disaster greater than Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani media was still publishing speculative reports about a possible naval intervention.

Nuclear threat: Real or imagined?
Ties with Pakistan not against India
There are military experts – both Indian and foreign – who deny the US had plans to launch military attacks, let alone a nuclear strike, on India. However, before second guessing Nixon’s intentions, let’s look at the components of Task Force 74.

Commander Mishra lists the following:

1 Nuclear powered strike carrier – USS Enterprise, 90 aircraft

4 Gearing class destroyers

3 Missile destroyers

2 Amphibious assault ships with 2000 Marines

1 Nitro class ammunition ship

1. Replenishment oiler

1 Nuclear attack submarine (SSN)

There are several reasons pointing to the seriousness of the threat. One, the availability of such potent assets was itself a temptation for the use of force by proto-neocons like Nixon and Kissinger.

Secondly, both Kissinger and Nixon were consumed by an intolerable hatred of India. Ironically, while Nixon was personally fond of Pakistani President Yahya Khan, who had massacred 3 million of his own Bengali citizens, the US President referred to Indians as “slippery, treacherous people”. Of Indira Gandhi, he was recorded as saying, “The old bitch. I don’t know why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn country, but they do.”

Kissinger liked Yahya as he had been the intermediary who had helped the Americans reach out to China. It was clearly a role the Pakistani dictator relished. “Yahya hasn’t had such fun since the last Hindu massacre!” Kissinger remarked.

Thirdly, Nixon and Kissinger were mired in the Vietnam War which was proving to be a meat grinder for Americans troops. Massive US strategic bombing hadn’t broken the spirit of the Vietnamese but had in fact steeled their resolve to hit back harder. Because of this, Nixon’s popularity had plummeted at home. India had backed a number of UN resolutions condemning the US bombing of Vietnam, and Nixon was looking for a way to pay New Delhi back.

However, the biggest factor was China. Nixon knew that only a breakthrough in Beijing would salvage his presidency and rescue him from the proverbial dustbin. He was, therefore, prepared to bet the farm on this one factor. Besides, in his view, the humiliation of an American ally by a Russian ally would send the wrong signals to the rest of the world.

To get an idea of Nixon’s intent in despatching the Enterprise, see this still partly censored excerpt from the Nixon-Chou meeting.

Nixon: "In December when the situation was getting very sensitive in the subcontinent – I'm using understatement – I was prepared..... (Sanitised)."

Since Nixon was by all standards a crook and a braggart, he may have well said he was prepared to nuke India.

(During their December 15 conversation in Washington DC, Nixon and Kissinger had given plenty of indication of their desperate intent. Having received a guarantee from Brezhnev that the Indian Army won’t advance into West Pakistan, the US duo is in a triumphant mood.)

Nixon: How do you do it?

Kissinger: It’s a miracle.

Nixon: How do you get the formalisation of letters between Brezhnev and me [unclear].

Kissinger: It’s an absolute miracle, Mr President.

Nixon: Did you try to work that out? That we – I’d like to do it in a certain way that pisses on the Indians without, you know what I mean? I mean, we can’t [unclear] we have an understanding, an understanding with West Pakistan. Well, I don’t know. If you think it’s a good idea. I – don’t ask me.

Kissinger: No, I think it’s a good idea. But we have – I have this whole file of intelligence reports, which makes it unmistakably clear that the Indian strategy was –

Nixon: To knock – oh, sure.

Kissinger: – to knock over West Pakistan.

Nixon: Over the line of control here. Most people were ready to stand by and let her do it, bombing Calcutta [sic] and all.

Kissinger: They really are ********.

Nixon: The son-of-a-bitch [unclear] –

Kissinger: Now, after this is over we ought to do something about that goddamned Indian Ambassador here going on television every day –

Nixon: He’s really something.

Kissinger: – attacking American policy. And –

Nixon: Why haven’t we done something already?

Kissinger: And I – I’d like to call State (Department) to call him in. He says he has unmistakable proof that we are planning a landing on the Bay of Bengal. Well, that’s okay with me.

Nixon: Yeah, that scares them.

Kissinger: That carrier move is good. That –

Nixon: Why, hell yes. That never bothers me. I mean it’s a, the point about the carrier move, we just say fine, we had a majority. And we’ve got to be there for the purpose of their moving there. Look, these people are savages.

Kissinger: Mr President, an aggregate –

Nixon: ….we cannot, the United Nations cannot survive and we cannot have a stable world if we allow one member of the United Nations to cannibalise another. Cannibalise, that’s the word. I should have thought of it earlier. You see, that really puts it to the Indians. It has, the connotation is savages. To cannibalise –

Gunboat diplomacy
The Enterprise incident reinforced the image of the “Ugly American” in Indian minds. The political leadership became intensely anti-US too. The incident is reminiscent of the behaviour of former colonial powers.

War of attrition: How the outgunned IAF beat the PAF
Commander Mishra wonders whether the US could have gained much more by doing nothing. “Considering the international milieu where its stock was low by the Vietnam overhang, the emergence of a technologically improved and numerically robust Soviet Navy under Admiral Gorshkov, and the necessity of sending a reassuring signal to its allies, mandated some visible proof. The naval deployment was a gesture of solidarity for a formal ally (Pakistan) and an indicator to a future partner (China), that the US could be relied upon to abide by its formal commitments.”

At the same time, the incident highlights the impotence of US sea power against the gains made by a determined India on the ground. “Another takeaway from 1971 is that ‘strategic punditry is no substitute for tactical aggressiveness’ and, hence the importance of professional skill sets,” Mishra notes. “The importance of a cogent national/military strategy is paramount; nevertheless, it needs to be complemented in equal measure by decisive force application at operational and tactical levels.”

Strategic spinoffs
The 1971 War had several strategic lessons – especially in the area of sea power – for India. The brilliant performance of the Indian Navy in setting ablaze Karachi led to a sea change in the political leadership’s thinking regarding sea power. The navy had hit Karachi not once but twice. A third strike to completely obliterate the port didn’t happen as the war ended too quickly.

Task Force 74’s menacing move convinced India about the need to have assets at sea to counter a threat of this nature. Observing how effectively the Russian subs had enforced a naval blockade and stopped the American fleet, India’s political leadership quietly gave the green light to the nuclear submarine project.

There were other valuable spinoffs from the war. Not only did it change the political geography of South Asia with the creation of Bangladesh, but according to Mishra, it gave a jolt to the supremacist psyche harboured by the Pakistan military vis-à-vis the Indian armed forces.

Comments:

- Read this article with P.N. Haksar memo Mrs. Indira Gandhi...

Despite China being the threat since 1962, the Haksar memo being written in 1968, it was only in 1974 that India exploded the PNE at Pokhran in 1974. In one of Inder Malhotra's article in the other thread he writes Mrs. Gandhi authorized the PNE on December 31st 1971. PNE was conducted in May 15th, 1974.

If you read the tea leaves you see that: US was willing to use nukes against India without fear of direct retaliation. American leadership had already demonized Indian leadership to same levels as Imperial Japanese: name calling. sub-human comparison etc. etc.
Next the USSR pressure on India to not escalate the war which is in its own interests, shows nuke umbrella from another power is there only for sprinkles and not for a cyclone. Hence the only way to deter a nuke power is with nukes. Hence even though the persistent threat is China the eminent threat was US. China stood down in 1971 crisis.

- Read this article with periodic US officials handing out nuke threats to India. Karl Inderfurth a former SD official, in a seminar/war game in early 2000s decides to nuke India first the prevent escalation!!!! This is same old Nixon playbook. Nothing has changed.

- CMU has a decision making template based on probabilities and paths and will work on to see how should Nixon have played it? In the end he caused the nuclearization by India. And he wasn't even aware of it.

----

Can some one find the full article by Cdr. Mishra?

Cdr. Mishra article

[ramana]

If you read this link you will get why Nixon was going after India.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/pub ... _trap.html

They don't like rising powers.

By 1971, US had put India into the category of rising powers and was doing its utmost to hinder it strategically.

Thanks Rudradev.

[Gagan]

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 971731.cms

Why is it still called Wheeler Island ?

Its name has been changed to Abdul Kalam Island a long time ago...

[ramana]

Here is CDR. R. Mishra's paper

Revisitng the USS Enterprise Incident in 1971

[Rammpal]

Its name has been changed to Abdul Kalam Island a long time ago...

Exactly, but why does ET use the gora ref. then ?!!
Possible to sue ET, and make some money out of it ?

[shiv]

Its name has been changed to Abdul Kalam Island a long time ago...

Exactly, but why does ET use the gora ref. then ?!!
Possible to sue ET, and make some money out of it ?

We are all goras at heart. The idea of correcting a mistake by suing and making money is itself a gora superpower idea that everyone knows does not work in India, but serves as a sort of ideal to follow.

[ShauryaT]

Nuclear History Project

A compilation of documents by IDSA. Many Raja Sabha Q&A's on the matter, dating to the 60's.

[ramana]

The P.N. Haksar policy paper is not there.
Lots of MEA idealistic bakwas.

[Prem]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na ... story.html?

Donald Trump says he wants to ‘greatly strengthen and expand’ U.S. nuclear capability, a radical break from U.S. foreign policy

President-elect Donald Trump on Thursday called for the United States to expand its nuclear arsenal, after Russian President Vladi­mir Putin said his country’s nuclear potential needs fortifying, in what would reverse decades of efforts to reduce the number and size of the two countries’ nuclear weapons.In a tweet that offered no details, Trump said, “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.”Trump’s tweet came shortly after Putin, during a defense ministry meeting, talked tough on nuclear weapons.“We need to strengthen the military potential of strategic nuclear forces, especially with missile complexes that can reliably penetrate any existing and prospective missile defense systems,” he said.Russia and the United States have worked for decades at first limiting, and then reducing, the number and strength of nuclear arms they produced and maintained under a Cold War strategy of deterrence known as “mutually assured destruction.” Both Republican and Democratic presidents have pursued the policy of nuclear reduction, said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.Currently, the United States has just under 5,000 warheads in its active arsenal, and more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, a number that fluctuates. Under the New START Treaty, the main strategic arms treaty in place, both the U.S. and Russia must deploy no more than 1,550 strategic by February of 2018. Both countries are on track to meet that limit, which will remain in force until 2021, when they can decide to extend the agreement for another five years.Since President George H.W. Bush’s administration, it has been U.S. policy not to build new nuclear warheads. Under President Obama, the policy has been not to pursue warheads with new military capabilities.It has been estimated that modernizing the aging nuclear arsenal will cost $1 trillion over 20 years, said“If Donald Trump is concerned about the rising costs of the F-35, he will be shocked by the skyrocketing costs of the current plan to modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal,” Kimball said. “Trump and his people need to explain the basis of his cryptic tweet. What does he mean by expand, and at what cost?”

[SSridhar]

Trump, Putin call for expanded nuclear weapons capabilities

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump called on Thursday for the country to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities until the world “comes to its senses” — a signal he may support costly efforts to modernise the ageing U.S. nuclear arsenal.

His comments came on a day Russian President Vladimir Putin called for his country to reinforce its military nuclear potential.

“We need to strengthen the military potential of strategic nuclear forces, especially with missile complexes that can reliably penetrate any existing and prospective missile defence systems,” the Russian leader said, adding: “We must carefully monitor any changes in the balance of power and in the political-military situation in the world, especially along Russian borders, and quickly adapt plans for neutralising threats to our country.”

Expensive affair

During the next decade, U.S. ballistic missile submarines,bombers, and land-based missiles — the three legs of the nuclear triad - are expected to reach the end of their useful lives. Maintaining and modernising the arsenal is expected to cost about $1 trillion dollars over 30 years, according to independent estimates.

“The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes,” Mr. Trump tweeted.

Mr. Trump gave no details about what prompted his tweet. Representatives for his transition team did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Defence stocks changed little after Mr. Trump’s tweet, but shares of small uranium miners including Uranium Resources Inc and Uranium Energy Corp rose sharply.

Shoring up defences

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, meanwhile, said that next year four additional S-400 anti-missile defence systems will be delivered to the army, and Russia would pay particular attention to its Western flank and the Arctic. “We will continue to increase military capabilities... take measures to reinforce troops in the western, southwestern and Arctic strategic sectors,” he added. — Reuters & AFP

[Gagan]

US and Russia will probably try to test their next gen nukes.
India will still be perfecting its 70s design TN

[shiv]

US and Russia will probably try to test their next gen nukes.
India will still be perfecting its 70s design TN

Gagangaru - needless self flagellation

[Gagan]

Why did we stop testing !!!

Need to resume testing, and not stop until both the BARC scientists end user is completely satisfied. No politicial meddling

[Aditya G]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oACSin1nRUc


~
Parts of the discussion pertain to validity of NFU. At ~00:23:00 a speaker (ex-IA) comments on how human decision making comes under pressure under fire. He alludes to the risk of MR not being exercised by political leadership.

These debates are important, so that the political leadership knows that the options in front of them have been examined by the society at large (or at least its knowledgeable members) and not officials.

Do follow the speakers remarks on deterrence as well.

We take nuclear triad to be composed of only machines capable of delivering warheads from air, sea and land. This is too simplistic.

Triad also comprises of:

1. Protocols to deliver these nuclear weapon
2. Command structures to relay the instructions
3. Training on the above
4. Doctrine to package all of this

I am concerned that we lack on #1 to #3. While it is the Prime Minister who will press the proverbial button, a man in uniform is the one who is actually going to do it. We have created a SFC, but the commander seemingly does not report to COSC or Chairman COSC. There is an impression that PM will take the decision, but he has no 4-star military advisor to guide him in the decision, instead he will rely on a committee of decision makers, who are mostly or solely civilian. When we are hit by a first strike, say by a tactical nuke on armoured corps in Pak territory, the squealers in this committee will give advise on the lines "oh it was not on our soil" ,"withdraw the army", "they have called our bluff" itiyadi.

Pakis on the other hand have created a nuke command in each of the services, including the Navy which at the moment has no delivery mechanism. It has created a specialist unit the size of a division to guard and man these units.
...............

[ramana]

Read along Haksar paper:

http://www.spsnavalforces.com/story.asp?mid=51&id=1

Sub design program began in 1970s.

[svinayak]

US and Russia will probably try to test their next gen nukes.
India will still be perfecting its 70s design TN

India is 98" vintage design

[JohnTitor]

Question to the learneds here..

The US (and very likely Russia and other nuclear powers) now test new atomic weapons using both simulations as well as special equipment - such as lasers to create the environment (I'm not familiar with the details).

Does India have such equipment (both physical & computer based) to create simulations for improving Indias nukes? I've not been able to find any public information which would indicate that this is non-existent.. Any comments?

[kit]

Question to the learneds here..

The US (and very likely Russia and other nuclear powers) now test new atomic weapons using both simulations as well as special equipment - such as lasers to create the environment (I'm not familiar with the details).

Does India have such equipment (both physical & computer based) to create simulations for improving Indias nukes? I've not been able to find any public information which would indicate that this is non-existent.. Any comments?

You need to have the raw data to have simulation tests..nothing beats an actual test btw. Either that or some one loans you the test data to do simulations. Now assuming India has test data for Neutron , fission and fusion weapons ( which i believe the sakti tests were all about ) and given the necessary computing power ( more the better) ..the software models ..its doable

[JohnTitor]

Question to the learneds here..

The US (and very likely Russia and other nuclear powers) now test new atomic weapons using both simulations as well as special equipment - such as lasers to create the environment (I'm not familiar with the details).

Does India have such equipment (both physical & computer based) to create simulations for improving Indias nukes? I've not been able to find any public information which would indicate that this is non-existent.. Any comments?

You need to have the raw data to have simulation tests..nothing beats an actual test btw. Either that or some one loans you the test data to do simulations. Now assuming India has test data for Neutron , fission and fusion weapons ( which i believe the sakti tests were all about ) and given the necessary computing power ( more the better) ..the software models ..its doable

yes - agreed. Raw data is required to setup the simulation. I'm assuming we have some, however unlike the other nuke powers, our data is limited. I am hoping beyond hope that they are getting around this either through research or data provided by Russia (not sure how likely that is)..

One can hope that Trump will kick start the next round of testing, giving us a chance to do the same. Though unlikely

[shiv]

You need to have the raw data to have simulation tests..nothing beats an actual test btw.

Well I was an economist 5 minutes ago in the Demonetization thread. Let me join the nuclear weapons experts here with my own fresh warm yellowcake.

"Nothing beats an actual test" has now been used for too long to flagellate ourselves and shiver in our dhotis. Tests are of course useful but we don't like to give space for our people to have done cold tests.

Also while we spend a lot of capital praising those who did a lot of tests and jealously admiring them, we also tend not to think about everything else that can go wrong - including the expiry dates of the conventional explosive in old warhead, the effects of constant radiation on the materials inside a stored warhead. Al this leads to the need to remake the warhead. And when warheads are remade it is now being discovered that some of the original materials of "proven by testing" warheads are no longer available to those specifications. New warheads have to be fashioned using new materials using simulation data only because no one is doing any tests other than cold tests.

I think it is high time we went beyond flagellating ourselves and beating our breasts about lack of hot test data and accept that we are able to field warheads of 200 kt at least. if anyone bothers to go through hundreds of pages of open source material on the subject it will become clear that the only gains that the more "technologically advanced" nations have is the ability to field smaller and lighter warheads. If you look at a warhead weight to yield graph - you find that it does not make one whit of a difference whether your 200 kt warhead weighs 200 kg or 1 ton as long as you are able to deliver that 1 ton warhead. Even NoKo will get there soon enough.

The limiting factor is NOT absence of testing but the need for more fissile material in bulkier warheads. Because we get so much info out of Amreeka we talk like unless we are equal to Amreeka we are nowhere. We are the biggest echo chambers for American exceptionalism. Time to get out of that cage and think with a free mind about what we can actually do with working warheads rather than worrying about whether our warheads work or not

[Gagan]

Shiv ji
What you arr saying only works to a point

Isn't there a difference between a DRDO produced INSAS and a production OFB made INSAS?

The science can be gotten right in a lab
The actual engineering is only verified in a field test

A field test will often throw up a new set of variables, causing people to go back to the drawing boards. Happens all the time

[Gagan]

The '98 test is living proof of this

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji has a different point.

Time to get out of that cage and think with a free mind about what we can actually do with working warheads rather than worrying about whether our warheads work or not

The question is what can we deter with 200KT BF weapons? Deterrence is a two way/multi way game. The US wanted a guarantee that not even a single nuclear strike will be successful against them in previous scenarios, they have experienced. Mao in 1958 was willing to loose half his population and still keep fighting. I am providing two extreme examples to prove a point. The point being to understand what will deter our adversaries and then go about doing a cold calculation based on these assessments and then figure, if what we have (200 KT) --- for argument's sake, would deter our adversaries or not or at least understand to what degree.

[RoyG]

200 kt+ is enough to deter any adversary. Idea of 50 200kt warheads air bursting above all major chinese metropolitan cities and industrial centers will send shivers down the CCP.

[ShauryaT]

^When doing this exercise, do not forget to ask, what damage is India willing to take and the capabilities of the enemy to inflict them.

[ramana]

Welcome back RoyG.

[RoyG]

Welcome back RoyG.

Thank you Ramana.

^When doing this exercise, do not forget to ask, what damage is India willing to take and the capabilities of the enemy to inflict them.

One is unacceptable. Nations won't undertake such an exercise including Pakistan. We've debated this to death. I think its about time we put this particular topic on pause until we hear something new.

IMO, testing will come at some point during the first term if our security environment degrades precipitously or if PMO is doubtful of a general election win.

Until then achieving deterrence against the West will be only a pipe dream. However, we've achieved a stable deterrence wrt to China, Pakistan, and ME w/ Agni series. This is all that matters in the short to medium term.

We'll have to begin some research on some electromagnetic rail gun system coupled w/ hypersonic maneuverable delivery to ensure that we stay ahead of ABM tech.

[Gagan]

I have a concern with deterrence and explosive yield
When people say, that even a 50 kt fbf deters, they are justifying, trying to be satisfied with the current trishanku situation. Using that analogy, even Pakistan's vapourware deters india.
Deterrence is a bigger game.
India claims a 200KT TN and so India must demonstrate one, field tested and all.
India is doing well on the delivery systems, but still some way to go. MIRV and MARV have to be field tested.

This is a game we have to play, including showing belligerence, showing a willingness to use hard military power, expanding borders to our claimed territories and a land route to CAR. It is time to end this squeamishness, otherwise we risk being a second rung power like Germany or Japan.
We have to start working towards a P3. That is the only truly stable world order there will ever be!