Deterrence

The Strategic Issues & International Relations Forum is a venue to discuss issues pertaining to India's security environment, her strategic outlook on global affairs and as well as the effect of international relations in the Indian Subcontinent. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
dinesh_kimar
BRFite
Posts: 527
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Deterrence

Post by dinesh_kimar »

Haridas wrote:If only someone can get the proper context of Tesse Thomas statement.
This from Hindu talks abt Agni 4, not Agni 3. I guess you are right , Saar.

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... 3.ece/amp/
Supratik
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6470
Joined: 09 Nov 2005 10:21
Location: USA

Re: Deterrence

Post by Supratik »

This is not the article I am talking about.
Supratik
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6470
Joined: 09 Nov 2005 10:21
Location: USA

Re: Deterrence

Post by Supratik »

In any case coming back to the original argument the long range Indian missiles have a range and the lower range is stated e.g. there is no official report that Agni 5 is anything but 5000 kms missile but Chinese sources have stated that it is 5000-8000 kms range.
Supratik
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6470
Joined: 09 Nov 2005 10:21
Location: USA

Re: Deterrence

Post by Supratik »

And Agni 4 weight is I believe 17 tonnes.
Haridas
BRFite
Posts: 878
Joined: 26 Dec 2017 07:53

Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

Supratik wrote:In any case coming back to the original argument the long range Indian missiles have a range and the lower range is stated e.g. there is no official report that Agni 5 is anything but 5000 kms missile but Chinese sources have stated that it is 5000-8000 kms range.
Becoz Chinese don't look for credible reports by indian newspaper like Hindu/Frontline. They use cold info physics provides, via their own Rocket Simulator.
Haridas
BRFite
Posts: 878
Joined: 26 Dec 2017 07:53

Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

dinesh_kimar wrote:
Haridas wrote:If only someone can get the proper context of Tesse Thomas statement.
This from Hindu talks abt Agni 4, not Agni 3. I guess you are right , Saar.

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... 3.ece/amp/
Reporting context is clear here. No assertion of same payload.
krishna_krishna
BRFite
Posts: 917
Joined: 23 Oct 2006 04:14

Re: Deterrence

Post by krishna_krishna »

Posting this as it has lot of insights into porky military leadership right now , ex. SPD general :

There was a gap in the porky air defence coverage that was exploited by India and also subsequently led to closure of porky air space post Balakot (A capability gap), they may be plugged next time.

They believe (I mean seriously) that clown jewels that blanket provided is on shaky ground, they want to re-inforce in western circles that they are ready with climbing to chotu maal next time if something happens (indian action) or inaction from western powers to mediate.

From pork strategic circles, Airstrikes post Balakot has been validity of had-e-momin superiority and they have won overwhelmingly.

There would be increase in boiling of Kashmir during summer.

They just hate hindu ( I say deliberately) resurgence and assertion.

Expect same type of oneupmanship is expected in next round

Porkis know that they cannot count on international community to save their skin.They are out there to fend for themselves

They are okay with some kind of operations from India as part of their gameplan of harming India through thousand cuts, that also give some insights into what they are planning with end state of this they were viewing (I see PFI, sharjeel Imam, riots etc. everything connected to this).



https://youtu.be/bInVdvk39e0
RKumar

Re: Deterrence

Post by RKumar »

Thanks Krishana for posting the link, it is clear from the body and the talk. They are shit scared for our response in the PoK and looking for a face-saving formula from the international community. Also complaining to the western world that they are not helping them.

NaPaki being NaPaki, they are okay to build a Muslim country but not okay to have Hindustan as the Hindu state. Look at their pain for facing Modi in 6 years, India faced for 65 years.

Their No clear stuff is being called off, they are now openly stating that we will respond to India in a conventional way but with plus like balakot response. They are bluffing, that they had confirmation of Arihant in our pond :rotfl: but for the AC, subs, and boats he might be correct.

Like every time, we did not start but unlike in the past - we were ready to finish &&&. It is very clear - it was not India, who backed down from the escalation ladder.
vishvak
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 5836
Joined: 12 Aug 2011 21:19

Re: Deterrence

Post by vishvak »

Pakis come into battle with nothing to lose situation, while our sultanate minded peace loving has ensured long term harm. This time pakis got Chinese defence wares, along with Chinese maal. We blundered earlier when not cleaning up pakilands of nukes while showing benevolence to pakis. Hopefully our efforts next time would be more encompassing.
yensoy
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2494
Joined: 29 May 2002 11:31
Location: USA

Re: Deterrence

Post by yensoy »

Supratik wrote:In any case coming back to the original argument the long range Indian missiles have a range and the lower range is stated e.g. there is no official report that Agni 5 is anything but 5000 kms missile but Chinese sources have stated that it is 5000-8000 kms range.
At 8000km range, the missile could target US and that becomes a big headache for us because some automatic clause will kick in within the Pentagon which will try to neutralize any threat to its territory, even if so called threat is to the frigid, far northern reaches of Alaska. It's better to say 5000km, that sends the message loud and clear to whom it is intended.
dinesha
BRFite
Posts: 1211
Joined: 01 Aug 2004 11:42
Location: Delhi

Re: Deterrence

Post by dinesha »

Neighbours’ mind games: India, Pakistan must initiate dialogue between nuclear experts
The establishment of credible mutual deterrence between two nuclear rivals, by diminishing the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack, forms the basis of what is termed “strategic stability”.
Written by Arun Prakash | Updated: February 19, 2020 11:34:01 am
Even as thorny issues of force-modernisation, budget-prioritisation and joint command structures engage the attention of our newly anointed Chief of Defence Staff, he will, sooner than later, in his capacity as the first-ever Military Adviser to the National Command Authority (NCA), have to address India’s nuclear deterrent. When he does so, he might ponder over US strategist Bernard Brodie’s prescription for preventing a nuclear conflict: “Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”
https://indianexpress.com/article/opini ... t-6274778/
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Admiral Arun Prakash is talking through his hat. In most of the article he refutes Lt Gen Khalid's claims and suddenly says need to have dialog! How to have dialog with a delusional leader?

For example Ghauri test triggered the 1998 tests.
No mention of TSP acquiring missile delivery systems in the 1990s.
nam
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4712
Joined: 05 Jan 2017 20:48

Re: Deterrence

Post by nam »

https://www.wsj.com/articles/possible-c ... _lead_pos4

I always suspected that countries who have access to remote locations can easily carry out sub-kt or low kt nuke test, without ever getting noticed.

US, Russia, China all large countries with easily available remote locations.

If we could find one such corner in the Himalayas and dig a big enough hole..


Pretty sure the Big 5 have ground penetrator bomb with sub-kt warhead to destroy really deep bunkers.
Aditya_V
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14331
Joined: 05 Apr 2006 16:25

Re: Deterrence

Post by Aditya_V »

Or Andamans of Lakwadeep ISlands
Tuan
BRFite
Posts: 440
Joined: 16 Oct 2008 01:26

Re: Deterrence

Post by Tuan »

US monitoring intelligence that North Korean leader is in grave danger after surgery
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics ... index.html
SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 25085
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

Humbug article.
Sea-based deterrence is the universally accepted best for those countries which have a NFU and need a second strike capability. There can be no argument against it by advising for more road/rail mobile assets. Balderdash.
sanjaykumar
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6088
Joined: 16 Oct 2005 05:51

Re: Deterrence

Post by sanjaykumar »

The agenda is to minimise potential threats to the continental US. They don’t understand India has no interest in threatening the US.
Cyrano
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5461
Joined: 28 Mar 2020 01:07

Re: Deterrence

Post by Cyrano »

Poorly researched article, peddling a dumb viewpoint
RKumar

Re: Deterrence

Post by RKumar »

SSridhar wrote:India is building nuclear submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 billion mistake.
The four types include approximately 10 Agni-III missiles, which have a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, stationed in Assam in northeast India; around 16 Agni-II missiles, eight of which are stationed in India’s northeast and another eight stationed in central India, each with a range of around 2,000 kilometers; about 20 short-range Agni-I missiles; and 24 short-range Prithvi-II missiles stationed close to the Pakistan border.
By their standard, we have consumed more than 30% of our stock on re-validating the missiles. Not very clever Hindus :rotfl:

It's better to leave it obscure. :mrgreen:
Mollick.R
BRFite
Posts: 1033
Joined: 15 Aug 2016 10:26

Re: Deterrence

Post by Mollick.R »

India’s global opportunity. The decay and collapse of diplomatic arms control restraints are unshackling nuclear weapons capabilities the world over.This presents an opportunity for India to lead a global resistance to this trajectory,bolstered by its strategic sufficiency against Pakistan and China.

The Indian government might begin with unilateral restraints in range and deployment numbers, starting with a pledge not to deploy missiles with a longer range than that of the Agni-III, or about 5,000 kilometers. A voluntarily restrained Indian nuclear force would place India in a strong position to lead global calls for reviving and strengthening arms control talks, including among itself, Pakistan, and China.

Taking upon itself a voluntary leadership role on nuclear restraint would confer additional benefits. First, it would allow India to reassert the credible minimum deterrence nature of its nuclear force, which is increasingly under domestic and international question.

Second, it would place the global spotlight upon China and Pakistan. Despite its larger nuclear arsenal, China claims that its less-caveated no-first-use policy demonstrates that its nuclear practice is closer to nuclear minimalism than that of India.


Finally, as India seeks to join both the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a permanent member, such an initiative would also support its foreign policy goals of strengthening global nonproliferation efforts outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signaling its nuclear restraint, and highlighting its status as a responsible rising power.

Authors are high on weed, writing purely from their agenda pov. They want to see India in Nehruvian era.
Only the Indians supposed to follow and honour all 3 or 4 letter international treaties and our enemies gives a f()ck about them.

Also we have not forgotten USA chose to look other way during paki nuclear program due to their own strategic interest at Afghanistan & after two decades once again did same when Xerox Khan's deeds were open in public.

When A-6 comes into testing, India should tell A-6 has a range of 5011 km range only and troll them on their face.
Last edited by Mollick.R on 22 Apr 2020 23:26, edited 1 time in total.
kit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6278
Joined: 13 Jul 2006 18:16

Re: Deterrence

Post by kit »

Mollick.R wrote:
India’s global opportunity. The decay and collapse of diplomatic arms control restraints are unshackling nuclear weapons capabilities the world over.This presents an opportunity for India to lead a global resistance to this trajectory,bolstered by its strategic sufficiency against Pakistan and China.

The Indian government might begin with unilateral restraints in range and deployment numbers, starting with a pledge not to deploy missiles with a longer range than that of the Agni-III, or about 5,000 kilometers. A voluntarily restrained Indian nuclear force would place India in a strong position to lead global calls for reviving and strengthening arms control talks, including among itself, Pakistan, and China.

Taking upon itself a voluntary leadership role on nuclear restraint would confer additional benefits. First, it would allow India to reassert the credible minimum deterrence nature of its nuclear force, which is increasingly under domestic and international question.

Second, it would place the global spotlight upon China and Pakistan. Despite its larger nuclear arsenal, China claims that its less-caveated no-first-use policy demonstrates that its nuclear practice is closer to nuclear minimalism than that of India.


Finally, as India seeks to join both the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a permanent member, such an initiative would also support its foreign policy goals of strengthening global nonproliferation efforts outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signaling its nuclear restraint, and highlighting its status as a responsible rising power.


Authors are high on weed, writing purely from their agenda pov. They want to see India in Nehruvian era.
Only the Indians supposed to follow and honour all 3 or 4 letter international treaties and our enemies gives a f()ck about them.

Also we have not forgotten USA chose to look other way during paki nuclear program due to their own strategic interest at Afghanistan & after two decades once again did same when Xerox Khan's deeds were open in public.


When A-6 comes into testing, India should tell A-6 has a range of 5011 km range only and troll them on their face.
Definitely weed and quite misleading. In geopolitics ONLY might is respected and listened to , unilaterally compounding oneself to stupid restrictions will mean both nuclear armed neighbouring countries will have a field day
Rony
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3512
Joined: 14 Jul 2006 23:29

Re: Deterrence

Post by Rony »

American analyst view

How Different is the “New Normal” from the Old Normal in South Asian Crises?
A February 2020 speech by Lt. Gen. (retd) Khalid Kidwai, the former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, is noteworthy in this regard.

In remarks focused mainly on the Balakot crisis, Kidwai hammered repeatedly on the centrality of nuclear weapons to escalation calculations. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Kidwai asserted, “deterred India from expanding operations beyond a single unsuccessful airstrike” at Balakot, through the “cold calculation that nuclear weapons come into play sooner rather than later.” He warned that “while it may be easy [for India] to climb the first rung on the escalatory ladder, the second rung would always belong to Pakistan, and that India’s choice to move to the third rung would invariably be dangerously problematic in anticipation of the fourth rung response by Pakistan.” Finally, he cautioned that the Indian air strike “was playing with fire at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum and Armageddon at the upper end.”

If nuclear deterrence sounded the base notes in Kidwai’s speech, his observations on India’s “irrational, unstable and belligerent internal and external policies” provided the shrill tones. He railed against the “extremists and religious fanatics of the RSS and the BJP [who] are the real time state and the government,…and in firm control of India’s nuclear weapons, with a track record of strategic recklessness and irresponsibility.” He also castigated Indian military leaders as “too meek, or equally reckless, to offer sound professional advice” and for giving in to the “irrational pressures of their political masters.”

Warnings of “Hindustan’s quest for regional domination” could be read as part of the battle for international public opinion in South Asia. However, the juxtaposition of Kidwai’s arguments for the success of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence with his charges of “strategic recklessness” by India’s “ideologically driven leadership” suggests real concern about the “irrationality” of Indian actors in future crises. Modi appears to personify the threat on which Pakistani strategic culture is built and perpetuated by Pakistan’s security establishment. Indeed, Modi features prominently in the Pakistan Army’s 2020 Green Book, which from the first page argues, “Mr Modi has not only endangered the immediate neighbourhood, but has also raised the ante for the entire World.”

Since 2002, and perhaps earlier, military planners in Pakistan could count on Indian leaders exercising crisis restraint. There seemed to be consensus in New Delhi that engaging in military conflict with Pakistan, regardless of the cause, was detrimental to India’s larger economic and global status-building project. (Pakistanis may not agree with this assessment, but the record of crises between 2002-2016 appears to bear it out, as do many Indian narratives, including from critics of the current ruling party.) Indian restraint made the effectiveness of Pakistan’s deterrent a relatively foregone conclusion, no matter how Pakistan postured its nuclear arsenal.

Pakistani analysts argued that “full spectrum deterrence” – the posturing of nuclear weapons for use in tactical, operational, and strategic roles – had closed the space for India to conduct even limited (proportionate) military operations against Pakistan. However, Indian restraint in countering terrorist attacks even as provocative as the Lashkar-e-Taiba assault on Mumbai in November 2008, may have owed more to the outlook, priorities, and disposition of Indian leaders than to Pakistan’s deterrent. Indian governments prior to Modi sought to avoid war for many reasons and used the risks of escalation to a nuclear conflict to justify their restraint. The military space for Indian reprisals always existed, which India’s very limited Balakot air strike demonstrated, even if the strike was neither as successful or paradigm-making as Indian advocates of the “new normal” profess.

Yet the real fear in Pakistan is that Modi’s rhetoric and domestic policies during and after his May 2019 re-election indicate a level of zealotry and irrationality that might lead to deterrence failure. Modi’s campaign-trail allusions to a Qatal Ki Raat (night of the murder) and blustery warnings that India isn’t saving its nuclear weapons for Diwali could be dismissed as electioneering. But subsequent decisions by Modi to change the legal and political status of disputed territory in Kashmir and to target the citizenship of Indian Muslims are interpreted as state-directed bigotry that will also infuse India’s national security institutions.
Islamabad can be responsible and measured in its responses in the face of Indian recklessness, yet the world continues to side with India. Though Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may, as Kidwai argues, “bring the international community rushing into South Asia to prevent a wider conflagration,” they do little to dissuade an aggressive, bigoted, and ideologically motivated Indian leadership from taking calibrated military actions against Pakistan.
Nuclear weapons will continue to deter major war with India and catalyze international crisis intervention, as they have always done. Yet, if the “new normal” is not substantially more dangerous and prone to a nuclear exchange than the old normal, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do little to diminish or deter the endemic threats lurking on Pakistan’s doorstep – economic failure, political disarray, international isolation. Such weaknesses are far easier for India to attempt to exploit than any perceived gaps in Pakistan’s military capabilities.
Mort Walker
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10032
Joined: 31 May 2004 11:31
Location: The rings around Uranus.

Re: Deterrence

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^Unfortunately India does not enjoy a 2 or 3:1 air superiority on its northwestern front. Pakistan has at least 10 squadrons within 50 nautical miles (nm) of its border and India has about 13 squadrons. True, India can move more aircraft in quickly, but to launch any air offensive, India needs to have at least 2:1 air superiority within 50 nm. This can't be done with foreign purchased fighter aircraft and must be done with LCA Tejas. The IAF minimum squadron size must change from 18 to 20 aircraft and 7 more squadrons of LCA Tejas must be brought to the northwestern front.
SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 25085
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

China’s Dual-Capable Missiles: A Dangerous Feature, Not a Bug - Ankit Panda, The Diplomat
Over at Popular Science, Peter W. Singer and Ma Xiu draw attention to China’s DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The DF-26 is not only notable for being a system tailor-made for payload delivery to the U.S. territory of Guam, but for its dual capability. It is currently the longest-range system in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force explicitly designed for compatibility with conventional and nuclear payloads alike.

As Singer and Ma note, this creates more than a few dangerous scenarios: for instance, in a conflict, the United States would be tempted to target DF-26 battalions to ensure that it could sustain operations into the Western Pacific and past the First Island Chain from its military facilities on Guam. But conducting such an attack would amount to nuclear counterforce given that any given DF-26 launcher could play a role for nuclear retaliation by China.

A separate scenario concerns China launching a conventional DF-26 during a conflict. With space-based early warning sensors able to notify the United States of a launch, planners may reason that such a launch could be a nuclear one. Here, China’s stated posture of No First Use might have little to do in shaping U.S. assumptions, especially as many in the U.S. government (certainly in the Trump administration) already view China’s No First Use declaration with skepticism.

This “pre-launch ambiguity” problem is very much a feature for the DF-26, however, and not a bug, per se (see a recent monograph on this topic by James Acton for more). Singer and Ma draw attention to a fascinating CCTV report from a few years ago that boasts of the dual-capable nature of a missile presumed to be the DF-26. According to their translation of Zhou Lusheng, a brigade political commissar, cited in the report: “Our mission is the two major operations, the two major deterrences [a reference to both nuclear and conventional capabilities]… A nuclear-conventional dual-use brigade must train to simultaneously possess two different operational postures… meaning that personnel of such a brigade have a higher workload.”

Even more interesting is the training procedure described in the article. According to the authors, “The article even describes a drill in which the brigade practices firing a precision missile, then rapidly switches over to a nuclear posture for a counter-strike mission.” People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) training protocols are known to only involve nuclear exercises that simulate retaliatory strikes (to keep No First Use credible) so the implication in this exercise is that a conventional DF-26 strike might invite nuclear use from an adversary.

In the end, the co-mingling of conventional and nuclear capabilities is designed to create a calculated form of ambiguity that might cause the United States to think twice. There’s some evidence that American planners are taking these risks seriously. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2019 report on Chinese military capabilities emphasized the ambiguity problem, including by drawing attention to internal debates on how China’s doctrine might need to be modified.

“Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself,” the 2019 report notes, adding, “There has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s existing NFU policy.”

“China’s commingling of some of its conventional and nuclear missile forces, and ambiguities in China’s NFU conditions, could complicate deterrence and escalation management during a conflict,” the 2019 report added. “Once a conflict has begun, China’s dispersal of mobile missile systems to hide sites could further complicate the task of distinguishing between nuclear and conventional forces and, thus, increase the potential for inadvertent attacks on the latter.

It remains unknown how the Chinese leadership precisely views the question of retaliating for conventional, long-range precision strike on dual-capable strategic systems like the DF-26, but the capability for the system itself is an important feature. The United States and China remain no closer to the sort of dialogue on strategic stability that would allow for an authoritative qualification by the Chinese side on how it views this important question.
vishvak
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 5836
Joined: 12 Aug 2011 21:19

Re: Deterrence

Post by vishvak »

..The DF-26 is not only notable for being a system tailor-made for payload delivery to the U.S. territory of Guam, but for its dual capability
Why should we or anyone pay for Chinese deterrence with ambiguity over land or sea.

Better be careful also for sure about neighbours who pretend to be normal and then copy such practices to create mess like Chinese.
nam
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4712
Joined: 05 Jan 2017 20:48

Re: Deterrence

Post by nam »

I don't know which world do these "analyst" live in.

US has a on impact nuke response policy. Same as everyone else. If their ABM system does not knock off in coming ICBM, they will obviously have no choice but to wait for impact.

This lot had been banding around that India is planning counterforce! In response another one writes, India cannot do counterforce, because we are incompetent!

I really hope this lot is not allowed anywhere near professionals.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Don't know what Kidwai is bolivating about Paki deterrence. They don't have more than half a dozen large bombs and mostly ping pong balls.
Mort Walker
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10032
Joined: 31 May 2004 11:31
Location: The rings around Uranus.

Re: Deterrence

Post by Mort Walker »

ramana wrote:Don't know what Kidwai is bolivating about Paki deterrence. They don't have more than half a dozen large bombs and mostly ping pong balls.
When and if Pakistan can launch a rocket and put a satellite in a stable orbit with a working transponder, similar to Sputnik in 1957, would a Paki deterrence have any credibility. Even the Iranians were able to put a satellite in LEO, but the transponder failed. The pakis have done nothing of the sort and haven't translated the manuals from the Chinese on how to do this right.
Suraj
Forum Moderator
Posts: 15043
Joined: 20 Jan 2002 12:31

Re: Deterrence

Post by Suraj »

GoI should carefully craft plans to resume and conduct anything it needs done while this geopolitical space is open:
The Trump administration reportedly considered conducting the first nuclear test explosion in 28 years in response to China and Russia
The Trump administration considered whether to conduct the first US nuclear test explosion in 28 years in a recent meeting with top security officials, according to the Washington Post.

The prospect of restarting testing reportedly came up in a meeting with officials from top national security agencies on Friday, May 15, after Russia and China were accused of performing low-yield nuclear tests — allegations both countries have denied.

An anonymous senior administration official told The Post that a US "rapid test" could offer leverage in arms negotiations with Russia and China, as the White House pushes for a trilateral arms control deal.

It would be the first time in 28 years since the US conducted a nuclear test explosion.
Manish_Sharma
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5128
Joined: 07 Sep 2009 16:17

Re: Deterrence

Post by Manish_Sharma »

^^Saurav Jha is also hinting towards it:

TWITTER

@SJha1618:
America has already accused Russia and China of possibly conducting positive yield tests over the course of the last 12 months. As such, grounds for America's own withdrawal from the CTBT are being laid...
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/126 ... 84737?s=19
Of late, America has been developing new plutonium pits for emerging warhead designs such as the W87-1 (for GBSD) & has also been looking to certify the W80-4 warhead that will arm LRSO. Sub-critical testing will suffice for both. But there are other designs that require more.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/126 ... 65217?s=19
This growing aversion towards the CTBT in America, Russia and China is driven by the need to develop & therefore 'test' warheads of new design for the new generation of hypersonic weapons under development. Simulations, hydronuclear testing etc. won't cut it.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/126 ... 39648?s=19
Look, CTBT is dead. All three, i.e. America, Russia and China are now more or less ready to give up on it. India should also give up its 'voluntary moratorium' and do what needs to be done.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/126 ... 35713?s=19
Ultimately, thwarting China requires a renewed focus on India's nuclear deterrent.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/126 ... 27233?s=19
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

These guys get stuff from sources and write as if it's their gnan!
ArjunPandit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4053
Joined: 29 Mar 2017 06:37

Re: Deterrence

Post by ArjunPandit »

would indian govt want to be the first mover in this..unless there is a direct nook threat from pakistan or china i doubt that....we anyways are still far off from the hypersonic game (at least based on public information)
ricky_v
BRFite
Posts: 1134
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Deterrence

Post by ricky_v »

https://www.defensenews.com/2020/05/21/ ... ays-envoy/
Arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea announced Thursday he is in nascent talks with his Russian counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. The news comes a month after Moscow signaled readiness to include some of its latest nuclear weapons in the last remaining arms control pact between the two countries, if the U.S. agrees to extend the treaty.

Arms control advocates and some lawmakers have worried that the Trump administration could let the 2010 New START arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia expire in 2021, leaving no limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.

Speaking at a Hudson Institute event, Billingslea emphasized the talks must be based on U.S. President Donald Trump’s vision for a trilateral arms control agreement that includes China along with the U.S. and Russia.
During a call with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on April 17, Ryabkov said that Russia’s new Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle could be counted along with other Russian nuclear weapons under the treaty.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

History of POKII shafts


viewtopic.php?p=2435114#p2435114
VinodTK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2976
Joined: 18 Jun 2000 11:31

Re: Deterrence

Post by VinodTK »

India Has Lots of Nuclear Weapons
Key point: India has a good nuclear arsenal. But they want to upgrade it to ensure their deterrence is credible.

India has 130 to 140 nuclear warheads—and more are coming, according to a new report.

“India is estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140,” according to Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. “Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities.”

In addition, “India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least five new weapon systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems.”

Unlike the missile-centric U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, India still heavily relies on bombers, perhaps not unexpected for a nation that fielded its first nuclear-capable ballistic missile in 2003. Kristensen and Korda estimate India maintains three or four nuclear strike squadrons of Cold War-vintage, French-made Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS/IB aircraft targeted at Pakistan and China.

“Despite the upgrades, the original nuclear bombers are getting old and India is probably searching for a modern fighter-bomber that could potentially take over the air-based nuclear strike role in the future,” the report notes. India is buying thirty-six French Rafale fighters that carry nuclear weapons in French service, and presumably could do for India.

India’s nuclear missile force is only fifteen years old, but it already has four types of land-based ballistic missiles: the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II and the intermediate-range Agni-III. “At least two other longer-range Agni missiles are under development: the Agni-IV and Agni-V,” says the report. “It remains to be seen how many of these missile types India plans to fully develop and keep in its arsenal. Some may serve as technology development programs toward longer-range missiles.”

“Although the Indian government has made no statements about the future size or composition of its land-based missile force, short-range and redundant missile types could potentially be discontinued, with only medium- and long-range missiles deployed in the future to provide a mix of strike options against near and distant targets,” the report noted.

India is also developing the Nirbhay ground-launched cruise missile, similar to the U.S. Tomahawk. In addition, there is Dhanush sea-based, short-range ballistic missile, which is fired from two specially-configured patrol vessels. The report estimates that India is building three or four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which will be equipped with a short-range missile, or a bigger missile with a range of 2,000 miles.

It’s an ambitious program. “The government appears to be planning to field a diverse missile force that will be expensive to maintain and operate,” the report points out.

What remains to be seen is what will be the command and control system to make sure these missiles are fired when—and only when—they should be. And, of course, since Pakistan and China also have nuclear weapons, Indian leaders may find that more nukes only lead to an arms race that paradoxically leaves their nation less secure.
vsunder
BRFite
Posts: 1353
Joined: 06 Sep 1999 11:31
Location: Ulan Bator, Mongolia

Re: Deterrence

Post by vsunder »

^^^ The article on digging the Pokharan shaft reveals what I knew years ago and codified in an article in the old BR Monitor 2002. I had said then the shaft was around 210 m-225m deep. This was based on work by Nordyke and the scaling laws he had found in his work at Nevada test sites which he tabulated for IAEA. This depth translates to around 680 feet. The author ^^^ says the shaft was over 600 feet. As an additional check in my article from 2002 I used the fact that Chengappa in his book had stated the amount of steel needed to line the shaft. This provided a second check on the depth that was trivially computed via Nordyke's scaling laws. SS who was a forum admin at that time, even sent my article to some external people at BARC for review. So as far as I am concerned there is nothing new in what the author says except the mechanics of how to dig a deep shaft without adequate institutional support, and related high jinks in the desert with water diviners.

My article explained in great depth how scaling laws are found and the difference in cratering between chemical and nuclear explosions. It is actually all curve fitting with very little serious mathematics if at all. For example in very hard granite a certain event at Nevada allowed Nordyke to show that a Retarc is formed(reversed crater) if the emplacement depth is 60Y^{1/3}, why 60 and why the cube root, there is no mathematics involved here, just taking 70 events and plotting. Naively the cube root is possibly related to the volume, this sort of analysis is what engineers like and called dimension analysis. If it is a an equation like Navier-Stokes then one scales all the variables and arrives at say the Reynolds number in such a reasoning. It is the reason why wind tunnels sort of work. In such crater analysis there is not even a Navier-Stokes equation, just a guess that explosive forces will move soil a certain way. For example one could also use Y^{1/3.3} if you please and adjust the 60 to 75. There were graphs in that article and also a partial list of events from Nevada test site which formed a basis for Nordyke's papers. Most of the research was done in the heady days when people thought they could use such explosions for peaceful purposes and the IAEA was even on board for such studies. This was the so-called Plowshares Program. The test Sulky which was conducted in dry granite with a basalt overlayer surprised people as a retarc was formed instead of a subsidence crater. It determines the scaling law above. S-1 at Pokaran had a retarc, but one has to be careful as there was water in the shaft as Chengappa states in his book and this latest report corroborates and so I made adjustments in the scaling law in my article for BR Monitor. Test Baneberry which was conducted in a shaft 1010 feet deep and so far deeper than S-1, but about 60kt, had a stemming failure and vented with serious spread of radioactive Iodine.

As far as tunneling goes I grew up around engineers who did amazing things in a newly independent India and taught me the concept of excellence. Dad helped them indirectly as he was always one for an engineering challenge. Project diagrams would sometimes be unfolded over the dining table in the mid 1960s when these projects were being done. Dad's slide rule bought in 1951 lies on my desk and is always a reminder to what excellence is all about. Projects done chief engineer A. R. Raichur, project advisor Mayashanker Pattani, Consulting engineer P. V. Keskar, some of the finest, funniest and intelligent people I knew. Some projects above gentlemen did, not that anybody here or in Eendia will ever care, but some do.

1. DBK Railway, 58 tunnels the highest broad gauge railway in the world then, now Kashmir railway is higher. Project came in under budget and before time. Never happened in IR since. Started in 1962. Beautiful Araku valley

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kothavala ... andul_line

Most of the tunnels were over 500m and in very difficult terrain, in what is now Naxal infested parts. Dantewada is on the Kirandul line.
2. Kalagarh twin diversion tunnels Ramganga hydel project started in 1964. (Corbett National Park, those days nobody knew what the heck was this park) Two tunnels were constructed. The Ramganga was diverted through those two tunnels and the dam built. Later one tunnel was used for the hydroelectric equipment, Penstocks etc and the other one is used for drawing irrigation water. Each tunnel was 9.45 m in diameter.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramganga_Dam

This was in the Siwaliks and lower Himalayas with peculiar unstable geology. In 1964 I am amazed how they managed to do it. Same with #3 below, it was difficult with massive cave ins.

3. Giri-Bata project Nahan, HP

Hahahaha I remember this

https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... ATA_TUNNEL

4. Doubling of Itarsi--Nagpur line 1966, Maramjhiri-Ghoradongiri on Chennai-Delhi line. The newer double line displays the legend 1966 on the tunnel portals.

https://www.irfca.org/gallery/Trips/cen ... A.jpg.html?

The original line was from 1929 when the Angrez built it to finally connect Chennai and Delhi. These guys did not blame the Illuminati, The Knights Templars, Nehru, illiteracy of 20% for the woes and wait for foreign advisors etc to come in the 1960s and 1970s, they built it with their brains and with what equipment they had and with what they could do best and dam it it has stood 60 odd years and will last for a long, long time. Now some guy digs a shaft and run to a magazine to say Hey look what a good boy am I and this in the late 1980s. The list is partial, I can go on. Even with Navier-Stokes I can go on .... :rotfl:

Keskar and Pattani had a chess game going where they would write a postcard everyday with their move when both were in Mumbai. The rule was never to talk about the game when they met at work etc.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Maj Gen Mrinal Suman built those two shafts/tunnels in the 1980s with primitive equipment and without being detected. Kudos to you for determining the actual depth based on Nordyke's formula.
I think the scientists didn't expect the depth to be calculated when they told Raj Chengappa the square foot of the steel liner.
Should never reveal such things.

Yes, Applied Physics can get you very far.
If I didn't get into engineering I would prefer to be an Applied Physicist.
Mort Walker
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10032
Joined: 31 May 2004 11:31
Location: The rings around Uranus.

Re: Deterrence

Post by Mort Walker »

ramana wrote:Maj Gen Mrinal Suman built those two shafts/tunnels in the 1980s with primitive equipment and without being detected. Kudos to you for determining the actual depth based on Nordyke's formula.
I think the scientists didn't expect the depth to be calculated when they told Raj Chengappa the square foot of the steel liner.
Should never reveal such things.

Yes, Applied Physics can get you very far.
If I didn't get into engineering I would prefer to be an Applied Physicist.
You should study engineering physics. Stanford has such a program:
https://physics.stanford.edu/academics/ ... ng-physics
vsunder
BRFite
Posts: 1353
Joined: 06 Sep 1999 11:31
Location: Ulan Bator, Mongolia

Re: Deterrence

Post by vsunder »

^^ Ramana, good advice was always available for General Suman in the India of the 1980s. It is their cussedness that they never asked. They could have swallowed their ignorance and found out efficient ways to dig shafts in perfect secrecy. I gave you links when far longer tunnels were dug in the 1960s with even more primitive equipment so what is so special about a shaft that is 200m and change. Yes Atlas Copco was around in the 1960s in India and pneumatic drills were used besides that not much else certainly no one knew NATM quite the rage now (New Austrian Tunneling Method for non-cognoscenti)
That has been the story of Indian military and their adoption of technology even mundane things, leave alone path breaking ones. I have already told you offline what the Air Force does here today, and how they go about funding projects.

In another story, in 2005 I was invited to the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research TIFR for a month at their Bangalore center which those days occupied a building next to the IISc computer center and about 500m from Raja Ramana's think tank NIAS(National Institute for Advanced Study). I had decided to lecture on problems I was grappling with those days, the mathematics of Composite materials and free boundaries and mathematical Material Science. One day in the afternoon there was a knock at my office door and a person walked in and introduced himself, and said he was told by no less than S. K. Sikka(who was the lead in the H bomb design) to ask me to speak at the NIAS on Cratering etc etc. I was extremely polite and declined, and pointed out that TIFR was also a DAE institute directly under the PMO under whose auspices I was in Bangalore and lecturing.
Much later I had a few email exchanges with Sikka about seismic data from Chinese tests at Lop Nor. But by then I had really lost interest in the problem which was amusing for a while. There is a connection still between this and hiding submarines at depth esp. ballistic ones. I think the mathematics involved as explained to me is quite pretty. But I doubt anybody in IN has taken the pains to ask somebody about it.

^^^ I made an error about the Baneberry test above. It was 10kt and buried at 270m/885 feet feet and still vented due to a stemming failure. So much less strength than S1 and far deeper emplacement of the device and still there was a problem. Things can go horribly wrong in testing underground.
80,000 curies of radiation was vented into the air, and the widows of servicemen involved (86 of them were affected) in the test carried out in 1970 filed suit. It was resolved in 1996.

Regarding S1, they should also not publish pictures where the retarc is clearly seen, and comments about the "mound" in Chengappa's book should have been redacted, even that is enough to calculate too. Steel lining is corroboratory evidence. There was way too much info in that book.
Post Reply