Deterrence

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shiv
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Haridas wrote:
ramdas wrote: If only 25 kt fission weapons are to be used, why the large 1500 kg payloads ?
Why ask difficult questions? The 1500 kg is an inconvenient data fact, that is hard to wish away who have hypothesized 25 kt armoury, and or india not needing MIRV. Head I win, Tail you lose assertion.
Actually - if India wants warheads of 25 kiloton plus - given that a lot of old experts asserted that our scientists were liars and warheads cannot be bigger - the only way out is to make HUUGE boosted fission warheads up to 400 kilotons - for which 1500 kg is a good weight estimate. Also 1 meter plus diameter. Agony is 2 meters. 1 meter ball will fit in base of cone. Until Americans came and did handholding for Brits even they were using huge boosted fission warheads. No shame in accepting the incompetence of our scientists recognized by so many stalwart experts. Radiation implosion blah blah is only for bragging rights, not for Gandhians. Boosted is proven no? Fusion-fission-fusion is not proven no? Need more tests no?

When MIRV actually comes - we can look at warhead weight and surmise the number of warheads and possible yields given that we have "proven" only 20-25 kt. That is what the experts tell me and I tend to go by that. Stuff like equations of state are of no use when forum experts don't accept that they can be used to design better warheads - because any larger warhead than 25 kt, according to "experts" of BRF is
  • 1. Not proven
    2. Scientists are lying
sivab
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Re: Deterrence

Post by sivab »

Are you saying those 300kt/350kg bums drawn by someone on BR website were fake? That is a surprisingly honest admission :lol:

Anyway here is some official info from horses mouth, but it will definitely not satisfy the fizzle fetish group.

These two slides are from a talk Dr. Saraswat gave in IITB in Oct. 2014.

Image

Image

Sorry for disturbing the narrative, continue with bashing of DAE/DRDO. This is BRF after all, always ahead of the curve. :rotfl:
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Amber G. »

shiv wrote:
  • 1. Not proven [, -- any larger warhead than 25 kt, according to "experts" of BRF is]
    2. Scientists are lying
Ahh... I do remember the great sizzle fizzle skirmish a few years ago, when Indian scientists like us were mocked for not doing math in spherical coordinates ( "in cylindrical coordinates you can do 'gol-mal'" we were told -- No I am not making it up :))
For those who did not see all the arguments, I believe the proof of above two points was done by using what is famously known in math or logic as circulus in probando

Basically for the time being assume that list item 1 is correct. (just be patient, we will prove it - see #***Note21)
Now if we only have a fizzle, and our scientists told us that we did not, they are lying.
QED ==> item 2 -Scientists are lying.

#***Note21 - Now all we have to prove the item 1.
we know (see proof above) that scientists are lying.
They claim about sizzle is thus wrong.
QED ==> item 1 - Not proven, any warhead > 25 Kt
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Amber G. »

Haridasji - Appriciate if you can answer the following - which I asked before.
Amber G. wrote:
Haridas wrote: Sub kt was to caliberate Eqn of State of verious fissile materials isotopes (except u235).
What exactly does this mean? Source? TIA.
Can you amplify and give a source? What kind of "calibration" ? Thanks in advance.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

If we have successfully validated thermonuclear design, why not simply sign CTBT and NPT and be done with it? Honest query.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

shiv wrote:
Haridas wrote: Why ask difficult questions? The 1500 kg is an inconvenient data fact, that is hard to wish away who have hypothesized 25 kt armoury, and or india not needing MIRV. Head I win, Tail you lose assertion.
Actually - if India wants warheads of 25 kiloton plus - given that a lot of old experts asserted that our scientists were liars and warheads cannot be bigger - the only way out is to make HUUGE boosted fission warheads up to 400 kilotons - for which 1500 kg is a good weight estimate. Also 1 meter plus diameter. Agony is 2 meters. 1 meter ball will fit in base of cone. Until Americans came and did handholding for Brits even they were using huge boosted fission warheads. No shame in accepting the incompetence of our scientists recognized by so many stalwart experts. Radiation implosion blah blah is only for bragging rights, not for Gandhians. Boosted is proven no? Fusion-fission-fusion is not proven no? Need more tests no?

When MIRV actually comes - we can look at warhead weight and surmise the number of warheads and possible yields given that we have "proven" only 20-25 kt. That is what the experts tell me and I tend to go by that. Stuff like equations of state are of no use when forum experts don't accept that they can be used to design better warheads - because any larger warhead than 25 kt, according to "experts" of BRF is
  • 1. Not proven
    2. Scientists are lying
You summed it eloquently. Thank you Shiv ji :)
Last edited by Haridas on 21 Jan 2018 23:51, edited 1 time in total.
Haridas
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

Amber G, I am talking/discussing w Shiv ji not you. Thank you in advance.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

Haridas wrote:Amber G, I am talking/discussing w Shiv ji not you. Thank you in advance.
:lol:
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Re: Deterrence

Post by PratikDas »

sivab wrote:Are you saying those 300kt/350kg bums drawn by someone on BR website were fake? That is a surprisingly honest admission :lol:

Anyway here is some official info from horses mouth, but it will definitely not satisfy the fizzle fetish group.

These two slides are from a talk Dr. Saraswat gave in IITB in Oct. 2014.

Image

Image

Sorry for disturbing the narrative, continue with bashing of DAE/DRDO. This is BRF after all, always ahead of the curve. :rotfl:
Where in those two slides is the equation between warhead efficacy and weight? How is it pertinent to the discussion?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Amber G. »

Haridas wrote:Amber G, I am talking/discussing w Shiv ji not you. Thank you in advance.
Your original talk about EOS was a response <see here> to ArujnPandit. It is odd that you think you are having private discussion with Shivji only.

In any case, don't you think it is strange to say "you are not talking/discussing with me'? I just was curious about what exactly you were saying about 'validation of EOS' and what was your basis/source to reach that conclusion.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Amber G. »

RoyG wrote:If we have successfully validated thermonuclear design, why not simply sign CTBT and NPT and be done with it? Honest query.
Did India EVER say/imply that it will sigh CTBT/NPT if and only if India validates thermonuclear design?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by PratikDas »

Amber G. wrote:
RoyG wrote:If we have successfully validated thermonuclear design, why not simply sign CTBT and NPT and be done with it? Honest query.
Did India EVER say/imply that it will sigh CTBT/NPT if and only if India validates thermonuclear design?
India didn't say that but Occam's razor does indicate that, at least vis-à-vis CTBT. We have to decide whether we want to let logic dictate our conclusions or use it only when convenient.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

@Amber Why not? I can understand the hold out on NPT, but what's the point in keeping CTBT door open? Everything worked fine apparently so sign the latter.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Amber G. »

May be someone more knowledgable will weigh in and give their perspective.. but from what I think -

- India did not sign the NPT because it had to do so as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State - something which is discriminatory and not acceptable. (ditto Israel etc).. and If India signs the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State, India cannot even keep a minimal nuclear deterrent.

- For CTBT some have indeed have suggested that India unilaterally and voluntarily sign the CTBT (since we have all we need, they say) .. But if nothing else there is inertia ( India's policy on CTBT has been firmly set – to support it in principle but not do anything about joining it until other major players, like the US and China, ratify it first).. It makes sense to me.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Amber G. wrote: using what is famously known in math or logic as circulus in probando
:D Interesting. My grandfather who was an advocate used to use the expression petitio principii
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Re: Deterrence

Post by sanjaykumar »

- India did not sign the NPT because it had to do so as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State - something which is discriminatory and not acceptable. (ditto Israel etc).. and If India signs the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State, India cannot even keep a minimal nuclear deterrent.


The problem with logic is that it is (as far as is known) universal. Ergo, logically, India must withdraw from the UN because the P5 membership is discriminatory. Or perhaps India does not mind discrimination in some fields. The discrimination argument is sophistic, and ultimately self-defeating. Yes of course it is discriminatory is the retort, get used to it. Just as a human being within US borders can consume 20 times the resources of a human being without those borders, there is nothing egalitarian about political structures.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

Amber G. wrote:
Haridas wrote:Amber G, I am talking/discussing w Shiv ji not you. Thank you in advance.
Your original talk about EOS was a response <see here> to ArujnPandit. It is odd that you think you are having private discussion with Shivji only.

In any case, don't you think it is strange to say "you are not talking/discussing with me'? I just was curious about what exactly you were saying about 'validation of EOS' and what was your basis/source to reach that conclusion.
I did not read in the forum rules the requirement that one has to respond to all Tom Dick and Harry's question/request. I responded to a question to Arjun Pandit, he has free choice to admit me in the conversation or not.

Please do not pester me to respond to you, else i will simply block you off in my forum reading. Thanks in advance.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by prasannasimha »

^ Moderator note - please do not have personal exchanges. This is an open public forum that all can read. If one wants a private conversation do it privately. Also no attempts to score brownie points at each other. Old issues are done and over with. No point taking it up. Every one can have a civil discussion.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Amber G. »

@Haridasji - Calm down. No one is pestering you. If you like to respond and share your perspective/knowledge, please do, if not -- No problem. Over and out.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

Haridas wrote:
Amber G. wrote: Your original talk about EOS was a response <see here> to ArujnPandit. It is odd that you think you are having private discussion with Shivji only.

In any case, don't you think it is strange to say "you are not talking/discussing with me'? I just was curious about what exactly you were saying about 'validation of EOS' and what was your basis/source to reach that conclusion.
I did not read in the forum rules the requirement that one has to respond to all Tom Dick and Harry's question/request. I responded to a question to Arjun Pandit, he has free choice to admit me in the conversation or not.

Please do not pester me to respond to you, else i will simply block you off in my forum reading. Thanks in advance.
Hey Shiv, soon you'll have irrefutable evidence for another 'fizzle' and then you'll have to treat us all to scotch :D
Amber G. wrote:May be someone more knowledgable will weigh in and give their perspective.. but from what I think -

- India did not sign the NPT because it had to do so as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State - something which is discriminatory and not acceptable. (ditto Israel etc).. and If India signs the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State, India cannot even keep a minimal nuclear deterrent.

- For CTBT some have indeed have suggested that India unilaterally and voluntarily sign the CTBT (since we have all we need, they say) .. But if nothing else there is inertia ( India's policy on CTBT has been firmly set – to support it in principle but not do anything about joining it until other major players, like the US and China, ratify it first).. It makes sense to me.
This doesn't make sense to me considering Russia, France, and England all signed and ratified. If India didn't feel comfortable for whatever reason it could've easily signed but not ratified like Israel. It would have been at least one more checkmark in a long list, however insignificant, for NSG membership. Instead we instituted voluntary moratorium aligning ourselves w/ the treaty in question instead of simply signing.

Something doesn't sit right w/ me -> Impose a voluntary moratorium essentially aligning ourselves w/ the treaty in question but don't sign and ratify (despite 3 P5 members doing it), chuck the second thermonuke awaiting testing in 1998 (why have it to begin with?), and keep that 81 yo geezer R Chidambaram chugging along occupying special advisory chair well after retirement.

Strange...
RoyG
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

Mark Fitzpatrick: Why China will wait on nuclear test ban ratification

Date: 28 October 2013

To understand what lies behind China’s positions on arms-control issues, a roundtable in Beijing with non-government experts was not a bad start. Joining a delegation organised by the UN Association of the United Kingdom, I was fortunate to have that experience on Friday, courtesy of the UN Association of China and the Chinese Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA).

Why can’t China exercise leadership on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ratify it without waiting for the US Congress to go first, I asked our hosts, embarrassing as that would be for me as an American. Because the United States has conducted over 1,000 nuclear-test blasts and China only 45, they replied. By signing the CTBT in 1996, China made a huge sacrifice, we were told, stopping its testing programme at an early stage in the learning curve. Needing more tests to ensure reliability of its nuclear arsenal, China has no incentive to ratify before the United States does so.

A Chinese think tanker recalled that 15 years ago, a senior US official testified that the test-ban treaty would lock in other nuclear-weapons states to their lower place on the nuclear learning curve. For the United States, a few more tests would make no significant difference, but for China, even one or two additional tests would benefit its nuclear programme.

A former Chinese military officer put the point more directly: stopping China’s testing programme was one of the main reasons for the United States to push for a CTBT. He wondered if, having achieved that objective, Washington now felt complacent and wanted to keep its own options open by not ratifying. He suggested that China should consider saying that it was fed up with the US position and would give up on the treaty unless the US ratified. Hinting partial seriousness, he said maybe such a position would spur a US sense of urgency.

Such a threat is not the party line, however. In China these days, one can hear different opinions. Another academic said it is a cultural trait that, having signed the treaty, China will continue to honour it. But there are uncertainties. Beijing will wait on ratification for an appropriate moment when it can be used as an incentive for others to ratify, he said.

With regard to the other would-be international treaty on the minds of arms controllers, our Chinese counterparts insisted that China was not hiding behind Pakistan’s obstruction of a ban on fissile material production for nuclear weapons. Having heard that accusation many times before, they did not need much of a prompt to reiterate Beijing’s denials. China used to link support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to its desire for a treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space, but broke this linkage a decade ago, they said.

Then why doesn’t China join the other four permanent members of the Security Council in declaring a unilateral end to fissile-material production, I asked. This time the answer did not come easily. One professor deferred to another, who also pleaded lack of knowledge. The retired military officer indicated such a declaration was being held as leverage for future negotiations. One of the professors then voiced a personal opinion that, since China’s fissile-material stockpile is the smallest among the nuclear-weapons states, it is not as easy for Beijing to declare a moratorium as it is for nations that have an excess. Another of the Chinese participants said he assumed China has enough fissile material for its military purposes. It was ready to go along with an FMCT that would apply to all countries. They all agreed that Chinese nuclear scientists were willing to accept verification measures in such a treaty.

The roundtable discussions were not entirely harmonious. We clashed, for example, in our perceptions concerning Iran and North Korea, as well as over Japan’s alleged nuclear intentions. But the transparency of the Chinese positions, even when explaining China’s lack of nuclear transparency, was refreshing. It didn’t hurt that the dense smog that was suffocating Harbin was nowhere in sight in Beijing. With unusual blue skies prevailed during our visit, it was hard not to feel upbeat.
http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%2 ... china-162e
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Singha »

China is testing its smaller warhead designs via north korea now

Unlike a missile which goes into the sky and its speed and emissions be recorded and analyzed, a n test only gives the yield not the device details... the noko h bomb casing could hige anything
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Singha wrote:China is testing its smaller warhead designs via north korea now

Unlike a missile which goes into the sky and its speed and emissions be recorded and analyzed, a n test only gives the yield not the device details... the noko h bomb casing could hige anything
Singha - even the yield is guesswork. It used to be easier when atmospheric tests were done but seismic results mean zilch without accurate information about local rock structure. It is comparable to "phrenology". Ultimately the exact "result" of the test can come only from drilling and getting the radioactive "leftovers" of the blast
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

Singha wrote:China is testing its smaller warhead designs via north korea now

Unlike a missile which goes into the sky and its speed and emissions be recorded and analyzed, a n test only gives the yield not the device details... the noko h bomb casing could hige anything
I was thinking the same thing. Makes sense that the US is really upset at China. They validate through proxy. After 1-2 more tests, take a lead role on CTBT in UN and make US look stupid. Also takes the pressure off of them for blocking our NSG membership. If they want to get nasty, once they are comfortable get Pakistan to agree in principle with FMCT and all of a sudden India looks like the bad guy in the room, especially considering that Israel began expressing interest in ratification in 2016. Easy for them considering they enjoy a US security blanket.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

Uphold International Consensus on Nuclear-Test-Ban, Safeguard International Peace and Security

——Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Qun, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the 2017 Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the CTBT
2017/09/23
(New York, 20 September 2017)

Mr. President,

Please allow me, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, to congratulate Iraq and Belgium for their election as the co-presidents of this Conference. I would also like to express my thanks to Kazakhstan and Japan as outgoing co-presidents, to the PTS of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Treaty (CTBT), and to the organizations and individuals that have made unremitting efforts for the early entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Mr. President,

Since its conclusion twenty-one years ago, the CTBT has become one of the pillars of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and has made indelible contribution to forestalling nuclear arms race, reducing the risks of nuclear war and safeguarding international peace and security. We are pleased to see that since the last Conference, the Treaty has become more universalised, and the preparation for its implementation has come a long way with an enhanced international consensus on supporting the Treaty. And it has become an overwhelming consensus and subsequently concerted action of the entire international community to oppose nuclear test explosions.

In the meantime, the international community has also seen more complexity in the current international security landscape, with mounting challenges to global strategic stability. Certain individual countries still conducted nuclear test explosions even after the conclusion of the Treaty, while certain other country is considering to reduce its financial support to the PTS. All such negative trends have made it even more urgent for the early entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Despite the abundant efforts by the international community put into promoting the entry-into-force of the CTBT, the final goal is still elusive. We should nevertheless not lose our confidence, we should, instead, adopt a positive, rational and dialectic approach in looking at the prospect of the Treaty. Our unremitting efforts in enhancing global security, it should be noted, are gradually paying off, and has subsequently laid a solid foundation for a further enhanced international arms control and nonproliferation regime. In promoting the early entry-into-force of the CTBT, it is even more imperative that the authority, universality and effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) be safeguarded and enhanced in earnest, with the caveat that the indefinite extension of the NPT constituted an important prerequisite for the conclusion of the CTBT, and these two factors are closely linked with each other. To adopt multiple standards or take a utilitarianist attitude towards the NPT are utterly undesirable. Moreover, such a practice will seriously undercut international endeavors to achieve the goal of total ban on nuclear test explosions.

Mr. President,

Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his address at the United Nations Office at Geneva last January, outlined the Chinese notion of "building a community of shared future for mankind, and achieving shared and win-win development", and championed to build a world of lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity through dialogue and consultation, and to cooperate for shared benefits and a win-win situation. Facilitating the early entry-into-force of the CTBT represents an important step in promoting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. To this end, China would like to propose the following:

Firstly, to pursue security for all and do away with any root causes of the possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons, so as to foster a favorable international security environment for the early entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Secondly, to intensify institutional build up for the entry-into-force of the CTBT, refrain from practices of utilitarianism or multiple standards, and work in concerted efforts to safeguard the authority and effectiveness of the existing international nuclear nonproliferation system.

Thirdly, to inject political vitality into the CTBT. The P-5 should honour the moratoria commitments they have entered into on nuclear test explosions. And it is essential all countries support the Treaty in a complete and comprehensive manner.

Fourthly, to strengthen capacity building efforts in advancing the preparation for the implementation of the CTBT in a steady manner, and enhancing technical support of the entry-into-force of the Treaty.


Mr. President,

China has been steadfast in its pursuit of a path of peaceful development. Since the very first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has solemnly declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstance. China has also undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The nuclear test explosions China conducted are the least vis-a-vis other Nuclear-Weapon States. Since its declared moratorium in 1996, the Chinese Government has all along honored its commitment, and has never vacillated its political support to the CTBT. Meanwhile, China has, in its own way, made due contribution to the preparation for the CTBT implementation, to international cooperation related to the CTBT and to the facilitation of its early entry-into-force. The Chinese Government, for its part, will continue to do its utmost to push China's ratification of the Treaty.

China has, in the meantime, also advanced its domestic preparation for the implementation of the CTBT. With the joint efforts with the PTS, several CTBT monitoring stations in China have proceeded to the key stage of testing and certification. The Lanzhou Radionuclide Station has completed the certification by the PTS in December last year, thus breaking the "zero-certified-station" history in China. Last week, the Guangzhou Radionuclide Station also has been certified by the PTS. At the same time, China has been consistently deepening its cooperation with the PTS, we co-hosted with the PTS a number of training courses and workshops in China in recent years, and actively contributed to the capacity building of regional countries.

Mr. President,

Upholding global nuclear-test-ban consensus in promotion of the early entry-into-force of the CTBT represents our shared responsibility for the future. China, for its part, will continue to work vigorously with all parties and to make relentless efforts towards the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. President.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1496518.shtml
Boom. Coincidence?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Rudradev »

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump ... le/2647261

Trump's nuclear weapons plan: 'Low-yield' bombs set off furious debate
by Jamie McIntyre | Jan 28, 2018, 12:01 AM
A draft copy of the new Nuclear Posture Review that leaked out this month has set off a flurry of hand-wringing in Washington, especially since the draft says the administration is interested in enhancing its arsenal with smaller “low-yield” nuclear weapons.

The posture review will be released at the end of this week. In the meantime, policy experts are debating whether the changes mean the future of civilization is at greater risk, or whether the world is made safer if the U.S. nuclear umbrella has a broadened range of capabilities, not just multi-megaton weapons that could destroy life on the planet as we know it.

Where the experts and arms control advocates come down on this question depends largely how they view the bedrock premise underlying the rational use of nuclear weapons, namely that the sole purpose of having them is to ensure they are never used, a principle that goes by the simple word, “deterrence.” Deterrence, military strategists say, is not determined so much by what capabilities you have, but how your potential adversaries perceive that capability and how it affects their calculus.

Here are some of the arguments, pro and con.

1. Low-yield nukes are higher risk. The draft of the NPR envisions two new types of low-yield nuclear weapons. In the near-term it would add a smaller warhead to submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and then sometime in the future, develop a low-yield submarine-launched cruise missile. The U.S. already has a nuclear weapon with a variable yield option, the B-61 gravity bomb, which will be carried by stealthy F-35 fighters jets and the future long-range B-21 Raider heavy stealth bombers. The argument goes, large nuclear bombs aren't a deterrent if adversaries think the U.S. will never use them. Bombs that cause less destruction are more likely to be used, the theory goes, making them a more credible threat.

Pro: “Our goal is to convince adversaries they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the use of nuclear weapons,” the draft NPR says. “In no way does this approach ‘lower the nuclear threshold.’ Rather, by convincing adversaries that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can countenance, it raises that threshold.”

Con: “I find that argument simply incredible. The U.S. today has this robust deterrent. It is capable of being employed anywhere in the world in defense of our interest and our allies within a matter of minutes,” said Joan Rohlfing, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said at an Arms Control Association event this week. "Rather than raising the bar for nuclear use as they assert in the review, I believe it lowers the bar and makes their use more likely. This is destabilizing, not stabilizing.”

2. The triad is overkill. Like previous Nuclear Posture Reviews under former Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the Trump review affirms the necessity of maintaining all three legs of America’s nuclear triad: bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles. “The triad provides the president needed flexibility while guarding against technological surprise or sudden changes in the geopolitical environment,” the draft NPR states.

Pro: All of America’s commanders have endorsed keeping all three options available to the president. Submarines are the stealthiest option, intercontinental ballistic missiles the fastest, and bombers the most flexible because they can be recalled. “Eliminating any leg of the triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs,” the draft NPR says.

Con: Critics, most notably former Defense Secretary William Perry, argue that land-based ICBMs are too dangerous because the speed at which they can be launched risks miscalculation. "If you’re going to blow up the whole world, what is the hurry?” Perry told the PBS Newshour in 2016. “Why do you mind waiting another 20 minutes to do that? I don’t see either the common sense or even the strategic argument for doing that.”

3. The triad is unaffordable. The ambitious modernization plan to upgrade all three legs of the aging Cold War triad with new submarines, long-range bombers, intercontinental and cruise missiles, which was embarked on during the Obama administration is estimated to cost $1.2 trillion over the next 30 years.

Pro: “Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we were unable to deter. Maintenance costs for today's nuclear deterrent are approximately 3 percent of the annual defense budget. Additional funding of another 3 to 4 percent, over more than a decade, will be required to replace these aging systems.”

Con: “It is clear to anyone observing the budget process that the current price tag of at least $1.2 trillion is completely unrealistic, and that adding to it would further draw resources away from capabilities and training that we need to most effectively counter our near-peer adversaries,” said Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., said in a statement “How President Trump plans to pay for these programs remains a mystery.”

“It's not a question of whether it's affordable, it's a question of whether it is sustainable, and it is a question of whether it's advisable,” Jon Wolfsthal, former National Security Council senior director under Obama, said at the ACA event. “It's a laundry list. We want every capability that's possible. … But none of these things are going to come in on budget or on time.”

4. This NPR is a major break with the past. Most of the draft document tracks with the kind of language you will find in the Bush NPR in 2002 or the Obama review in 2010. But critics say the changes, while subtle, are significant in both their substance and tone and have real world implications. In particular, they cite talk of an expanded role for nuclear weapons including responding to non-nuclear threats including that of a massive cyber attack.

Pro: The Lexington Institute’s Loren Thompson said Trump’s NPR approach is simply “an evolution that adjusts the posture in response to recent changes in the threat environment.” Writing in Forbes, Thompson argues that fielding low-yield warheads to discourage Russia from contemplating using similar weapons is not a major change. The draft report, he notes, labels the proposed additional weapons as “modest supplements” to the Obama plan.

“These supplements will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies,” the draft NPR states, citing Russia's limited nuclear first-use doctrine as a mistaken perception that must be corrected.

Con: “For years, the United States under successive presidents of both parties has consistently narrowed the circumstances under which an American president would contemplate use of nuclear weapons. For the first time in a long time, instead there is an expansion, an explicit expansion of the circumstances under which the president would consider such use,” countered Thomas Countryman of the Arms Control Association. The draft of the NPR “fails to give a convincing rationale why it has changed. It does not explain why the U.S. nuclear arsenal, still the most powerful and diverse possessed by any nuclear weapon state is insufficient to match threats on both the nuclear and the non-nuclear level.”

At the end of the day, the debate is always about how to prevent the use nuclear weapons by anyone in any circumstance, because any use would be a failure. And as for the concept of low-yield, tactical weapons, Air Force Gen. John Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command, told Congress last March that that’s a myth.

“I just fundamentally disagree that there is such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon,” Hyten told the House Armed Services Committee. “I believe that anybody that employs a nuclear weapon in the world has created a strategic effect; and all nuclear weapons are strategic.”

ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Now they all are talking like Air Chief Marshal P.K. Mehra (R) at Stanford long ago.
- Nuke use is strategic.
- Strategic vs. tactical is question of yield.
- Indian doctrine has expanded deterrent as it include BCW.
-Massive retaliation assures the adversary they won't survive after threshold is crossed
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Haridas »

ramana wrote:Now they all are talking like Air Chief Marshal P.K. Mehra (R) at Stanford long ago.
- Nuke use is strategic.
- Strategic vs. tactical is question of yield.
- Indian doctrine has expanded deterrent as it include BCW.
-Massive retaliation assures the adversary they won't survive after threshold is crossed
My salute to ACM S K Mehra. The first wielder of Indian Brahmastra.
I had opportunity to have two long meetings with him at his home.
prasannasimha
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Re: Deterrence

Post by prasannasimha »

I always suspected that the Santhanam statement was purposely put by Govt of India timed to issues with our admission to some international treaties at that time. The obfuscation allowed us to be grey. Also we will not sign NPT but may espose No first use. That allows us to revise at the time of our choice if beed be
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Rudradev wrote:http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump ... le/2647261

A draft copy of the new Nuclear Posture Review that leaked out this month has set off a flurry of hand-wringing in Washington, especially since the draft says the administration is interested in enhancing its arsenal with smaller “low-yield” nuclear weapons.
Precisely what I had mentioned in several posts - low yield=restricted fallout but deadly on the target provided there is pinpoint accuracy. This was not a prediction - there have been numerous reports that the US is heading in that direction.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by nam »

prasannasimha wrote:I always suspected that the Santhanam statement was purposely put by Govt of India timed to issues with our admission to some international treaties at that time. The obfuscation allowed us to be grey. Also we will not sign NPT but may espose No first use. That allows us to revise at the time of our choice if beed be
Our ex-PM was probably going to sign the CTBT. He was the first foreign leader to be hosted by the Obama administration. CTBT must have been the quid pro quo for this privilege.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by JE Menon »

prasannasimha wrote:I always suspected that the Santhanam statement was purposely put by Govt of India timed to issues with our admission to some international treaties at that time. The obfuscation allowed us to be grey. Also we will not sign NPT but may espose No first use. That allows us to revise at the time of our choice if beed be
One can be fairly confident that India is no amateur at playing these games of tactical and strategic deception in response to threats posed to our national security of like dimension using similar methods.

RoyG - in my understanding of the NPT/CTBT issue, the first is a matter of principle. The second is a matter of irrelevance. CTBT is not exercising minds much anymore, except among non-proliferation think-tankers trying to keep jobs with incrementally fantastic predictions, etc... In short, CTBT will stay where it is, in limbo. Plus, why should countries hamstring themselves at a permanent position of disadvantage - the Chinese are right about that.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by rsingh »

Is it true that we have fewer aitem bum then Bakistanis? Time, economist and other old world media repeats this all the time.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Good no? Only PM knows.
nam
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Re: Deterrence

Post by nam »

rsingh wrote:Is it true that we have fewer aitem bum then Bakistanis? Time, economist and other old world media repeats this all the time.
Very happy to know, if it is true. Need to encourage the Paks to build even more.

I really want them to have more than 1000 warheads...
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ArjunPandit »

ramana wrote:Good no? Only PM knows.
whose indian or paki :lol:. paki being paki will exaggerate even if their bombs are fuss(as in hindi)
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Re: Deterrence

Post by RoyG »

ramana wrote:Now they all are talking like Air Chief Marshal P.K. Mehra (R) at Stanford long ago.
- Nuke use is strategic.
- Strategic vs. tactical is question of yield.
- Indian doctrine has expanded deterrent as it include BCW.
-Massive retaliation assures the adversary they won't survive after threshold is crossed
With advanced fusing and <100 m CEP you need 100kt or less to take out the most hardened silos. Counterforce strategy is what is driving the US to move to lower yield weapons on their boomers. They aren't getting rid of the higher yield weapons housed in bomber bays or sitting on top of Minuteman missiles.

Mehra didn't invent anything. Everyone knows nuke use is strategic. In the case of the US, retaliation shifted to counterforce after Soviet Union collapse.
Last edited by RoyG on 03 Feb 2018 10:34, edited 1 time in total.
pankajs
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Re: Deterrence

Post by pankajs »

nam wrote:
rsingh wrote:Is it true that we have fewer aitem bum then Bakistanis? Time, economist and other old world media repeats this all the time.
Very happy to know, if it is true. Need to encourage the Paks to build even more.

I really want them to have more than 1000 warheads...
My feeling are exactly the same. Infact we should suggest to Bakis that to have TRUE parity with India they need 7x the Indian arsenal because India is 7x bigger in terms of land mass.

Just having numerical parity means that while the whole of bakistan is destroyed while 6/7 the of India will remain untouched assuming similar bum quality and power.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by pankajs »



Don't know this guy but is he is commenting on a forum he must have some kind of qualification but an interesting listen. He talks of some war-game simulation done in US.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by pankajs »

A larger file from the same. Just started listening.

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