Deterrence

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Rajagopal
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Rajagopal »

shiv wrote:
SSridhar wrote:Ideally speaking, an H&D based society such as Pakistan, *MUST* have included loss of H&D as the only redline. What else can be more destroying of the Pakistani state than even a slight loss of its H&D? After all, it is for the sake of H&D that the State of Pakistan is duplicitous, perfidious, mendacious and above all a nuclear-weapon state. Why did it go to such enormous extents to possess n-weapons if it was not to match India, an H&D proposition? If that H&D is at stake, shouldn't the State use its crown jewel?

Let me just link up the relevant chapter on Pak psyche of my now decade old book
http://pakistanfailedstate.blogspot.in/ ... neral.html
Shiv: I briefly read some material from the above link and had to say it is a breath taking piece of work to be able to successfully analyze and understand a Pakistan specimen. It is like you wrote "Patanjali's yoga sutra" on pakis.

If i had a million dollars, i would publish this book and send a free copy to all senators at Capitol Hill.

Great job again. :!:
Rudradev
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Rudradev »

Let me try to make clearer what I mean re: Pakistan's Mughal Obsessed-Lens, with a little story.

You move into a house that happens to be named "Wayne Manor".

You soon learn that the guy in the neighbouring house is crazy, and that he hates you. Why does he hate you? Because he is delusional. He thinks he is Batman. Wayne Manor should be his by all rights, since the alter ego of Batman is Bruce Wayne. He dresses up in Batman costume and repeatedly tries to break into your house.

Beating him up and setting your dogs on him when he jumps over your fence at night, doesn't seem to relieve this neighbour of his delusions that he is Batman. He starts boasting that he has doomsday weapons that will take out the whole street if you don't show him the respect due to a superhero like Batman.

Beating him up in front of the other neighbours, by daylight, is a little more effective but still not effective enough. He simply claims that it never happened. After all who would mess with Batman?

Now here is an out-of-the-box solution. You YOURSELF dress up as Batman (with a much better-looking costume than his). And you send your neighbour a Robin costume. You tell him, via various ways and means: "Hi Robin, don't you remember who you are? You are my assistant Robin, of course. I'm telling you so. You better believe me, because I AM Batman. See, I wear a Batman costume and live in Wayne Manor... who else would I be but Batman? Now hurry up and do my errands for me."

Substitute "Mughal Emperor" for Batman and Delhi/Agra for Wayne Manor and you see where I think Modi is going with this. He is taking advantage of an obsessive, distorted view of history and their place in it, which Pakistan has internalized as its raison-d'etre. Instead of completely challenging the veracity of their view, he is going along with the *story*, but forcing them to accept a different *role* than the one they see themselves in. A role that will tend to compel them towards subservience towards the person in the role that they originally sought to claim for themselves. This is a sort of pisko ju-jitsu that uses the very weight and contours of their delusional Paki world against them to achieve our objectives.
Last edited by Rudradev on 05 Oct 2016 23:46, edited 1 time in total.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Namo is the Hemu that Pakis dread.
Rudradev
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Rudradev »

Ramana, exactly. Now we have to ask, what would people like Baz Bahadur, Bairam Khan, Mirza Hakim et al have done if Hemu had taken the Mughal throne and all its trappings after winning Panipat II? Some might have tried to resist but many of them would have gone into taqqiya submissive mode as content vassals of the Hindu chhatrapati. This is manageable as long as we remain institutionally vigilant and never allow the equivalent of Talikota to materialize.
shiv
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Re: Deterrence

Post by shiv »

Rajagopal wrote:
Shiv: I briefly read some material from the above link and had to say it is a breath taking piece of work to be able to successfully analyze and understand a Pakistan specimen. It is like you wrote "Patanjali's yoga sutra" on pakis.

If i had a million dollars, i would publish this book and send a free copy to all senators at Capitol Hill.

Great job again. :!:
Ha! Thanks. Actually a put it online with a "copyleft licence" - free to share with no modification and no sale. After I finished writing I discovered that it was more important to get the word out than to waste time negotiating with publishers to get a print edition out. This was before the days of Kindle
ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

A Conversation with Dr. Sannia Abdullah on Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence Note: Could not find video or transcript.
Dr. Abdullah addressed the overarching security calculus upon which Pakistan’s nuclear force posture and stated nuclear doctrines are based. However, as Dr. Abdullah noted, the stated postures and polices are fluid. “With situation change, there is policy change,” Dr. Abdullah repeated throughout her presentation. Dr. Abdullah explained that Pakistan’s belief that “ambiguity strengthens deterrence” allows the country to have more response options, but also raises the potential for uncontrolled escalation during a crisis. Dr. Abdullah concluded her remarks by stating, “Full spectrum deterrence aims to upscale the risk of violence at all levels of war – to dissuade aggression.”
ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Just what I fear.
India and the NSG Membership: What Lies Ahead - G. Balachandran
As explained above, there is a real possibility of both a discussion on “common criteria applicable to all non-NPT applicants” and the inclusion of some additional elements into the new “criteria” over and above the 2008 NSG exemption criteria. What should be India’s approach then? Should it withdraw its application for membership as suggested above by the former Foreign Secretary? Or, should India base its approach on an evaluation of whether or not such additions have any possible adverse impact on any of the real or perceived future threats to India’s national security?

Fortunately, India can draw a ‘red line’ on what constitutes acceptable additions to the 2008 criteria. The considerations in this regard are:

Any additional criteria should be relevant to the NSG’s objectives, which, according to the NSG, is “to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.” The requirement of a moratorium on the production of fissile material will not fall under this objective and cannot be accepted.
The criteria should not include any practice that is not currently accepted by all the NSG members. India has already accepted certain practices not accepted by one or more members. These include: the IAEA Additional Protocol, which has been rejected by some NSG members; and, placing facilities under permanent IAEA safeguards that are not required to be so placed on the basis of any bilateral/multilateral/international agreement or treaty – a practice that is not followed by NPT Nuclear Weapons States.
India cannot agree to any requirement that would declare all its grid-connected reactors as civilian reactors. The United States and other Nuclear Weapons States had for a long period declared, and still may be continuing to do so, some of their grid connected reactors as not being used for civilian purposes. The Hanford reactor and the Tennessee Valley Authority’s tritium-producing light water reactors in the US are pertinent examples, as indeed are the RMBK reactors in Russia.
Any additional criteria should not adversely affect India’s national security.
Any criteria that adds to the strengthening of international norms relating to nuclear non-proliferation and which are accepted by all NSG members should not pose any problem.
It is very likely that NSG members would be amenable to a formula within the above delineated boundaries. In such a scenario, India will have to make a political decision whether or not to accept the additional criteria. If China feels very strongly about the non-admission of Pakistan and the admission of India at the next plenary, its strategy would be to include in the common criteria some element that would conform to all the requirements stated above and yet not be acceptable to India.
Gagan
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Gagan »

If the IA occupies the so called Azad Kashmir part of POK, without announcing it from the roof top, pakistan will most probably be seen denying any such military action ever took place, that not a blade of grass grows in Azad Kashmir.
There will be talk of N bum this and N bum that, but in the end there won't be any Bums going off.

India has to start to display belligerence in its interactions with Pakistan to bring out the reasonable side of the Generals in Pindi
ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Why does India subscribe to this International court of Justice business?


Bharat Karnad says "Whether the world is prepared or not, we are going to get nuclear war".

A sobering thought.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

ShauryaT, Can you say a few lines to summarize the talk?
Thanks,

ramana
ShauryaT
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

It was premised on the ICJ case brought by the Marshall Islands. Ofcourse the case drags in India, when the real culprit is the US, who has done over 67 tests in that region blowing islands up in its hey days before PTBT. The speculation was the US itself has probably orchestrated this to put some pressure on India, guess for CTBT.

Another thing that came out was China's role in enabling NK and Pakistan as two ends of a cat's paw. BK treats SK and Japan as near nuclear powers, restrained only by the US. Mentioned that India should nuclear arm Vietnam, as only then China will understand what others face due to its perfidies.

The other thing to note is the US itself is quite clear that they DO NOT recognize the ICJ. BK's point was only weak states do. The moderator was ofcourse trying to go on the logical path of nuclear war being bad et al leading to the final comment, "Whether the world is prepared or not, we are going to get nuclear war".
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Thanks a lot for the pithy summary.
BK is right.
Thanks to US benign neglect of China's nuke proliferation the world is closer to that singularity.
Prem
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Prem »

Gagan wrote:If the IA occupies the so called Azad Kashmir part of POK, without announcing it from the roof top, pakistan will most probably be seen
India has to start to display belligerence in its interactions with Pakistan to bring out the reasonable side of the Generals in Pindi
Few more slaps before Paki Pindits ( opposite of Pandit) get the message. As we have discussed in past, Unpredictable India under hard headed leader will shatter all geopolitical assumptions. China has shrunk its Century to decade by taking Panga with Desh on behalf of Paki.Mr Eleven and Elevn & 1/4 just have not realized it yet.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:Thanks to US benign neglect of China's nuke proliferation . . . .
and, its own too.
SSridhar
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Re: Deterrence

Post by SSridhar »

DPRK’s Nuclear Provocations and the Indian Response - Jagannath P Panda, IDSA
On 9 September 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) defied international pressure and conducted its fifth nuclear test. Criticising the test, the Government of India described it as a “matter of grave concern”.1 India not only urged DPRK to “refrain from such tests,” which gravely affect regional peace and stability, but also noted that the test violated Pyongyang’s international obligations and contradicts the denuclearization effort in the Korean peninsula. The Indian statement also expressed concern over the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies that have a bearing on “India’s national security”,2 alluding to the cooperation between DPRK and Pakistan in nuclear and missile technologies, possibly with China’s backing.

DPRK’s nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan is an established fact. Security relations between the two countries go back to the 1970s, when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited DPRK in 1976. In the 1990s, Pakistan purchased long-range missiles from DPRK and, in return, helped the latter with nuclear enrichment technologies and dual use items. Pakistan’s assistance for DPRK’s uranium enrichment programme was a globally reported matter a few years ago when the A.Q. Khan scandal broke. India, on its part, has repeatedly expressed concern over DPRK-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation. For instance, while responding to the DPRK’s nuclear test in January 2016, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also observed that the “proliferation links between North-East Asia and India’s neighbourhood are well known.”3

Yet, this Indian concern has received little attention from the US, Japan and South Korea, the three countries that are most immediately concerned by the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. From time to time, the US and South Korea have exerted pressure on DPRK to give up its nuclear programme through various means, mainly through UN sanctions, but such pressure has clearly not been effective. The regime of Kim Jong-Un seems to have an unswerving approach of defying these sanctions and carrying forward its nuclear and missile programmes. Besides, China’s soft approach on this issue does not serve as a deterrent for DPRK. What remains problematic, however, especially from the Indian point of view, is that the international community worries a great deal about DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes without actually acknowledging the expertise network that Pyongyang currently maintains with Islamabad and which may emerge as a bigger problem in future.

DPRK’s fifth nuclear test significantly advances its nuclear weapons capability, which is a source of strength for the Kim Jong-Un regime. As widely reported, the fifth nuclear test is the “biggest ever” test carried out by DPRK. Moreover, by conducting this test, DPRK claims that it has developed the expertise to mate nuclear warheads with strategic ballistic missiles.4 Debates continue among experts, however, over DPRK’s capability in this regard. What must worry the international community though is DPRK’s sustained and determined effort in this direction.

Much to India’s concern, these repeated tests have helped DPRK develop expertise in the use of plutonium, which enables the miniaturisation of the warhead for fitting into a missile system.5 Given the history of DPRK’s cooperation with Pakistan, apprehensions abound about Pyongyang sharing this expertise with Islamabad. Such cooperation will boost Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability, primarily its ability to miniaturise nuclear warheads. That, in turn, will enhance Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons programme and enable it to employ short- and medium-range missiles mated with nuclear warheads for battlefield purposes.

India is of the view that Pakistan failed to conduct a plutonium device test in 1998. Since then, Pakistan has been continuously trying to develop weapons-grade plutonium devices so that nuclear warheads can be miniaturised. This deficiency in Pakistan’s nuclear capability may be filled by DPRK’s assistance. Even though Pakistan has received significant Chinese assistance for its nuclear programme, particularly in terms of designing and supplying the Khushab heavy water reactor and the Chasma nuclear reactor complex which houses the plutonium reprocessing facility, it is not yet fully established whether such Chinese assistance has helped Pakistan acquire the capability to develop plutonium-based miniaturised nuclear warheads. Also, the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is a worrying factor for India, given the plethora of extremist groups operating inside that country, some of which moreover have carried out significant attacks against key military installations with impunity.

Of even greater concern is China, a P-5 member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which shows no concern about the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and DPRK. Instead, China strongly backs Pakistan’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This amply indicates that China endorses Pakistan-DPRK nuclear cooperation. In fact, China’s approach towards the DPRK has always been complex and highly nuanced. Like most major and important regional powers, China has condemned DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. But it differs with them on how to handle the issue including the implementation of UN sanctions. Despite the growing international pressure on DPRK, Beijing has constantly backed Kim Jong-Un’s regime by supplying food and other assistance. Notably, China continues to be the biggest trading partner of DPRK. In some ways, Beijing’s ‘special’ relations with Pyongyang have encouraged the regime in DPRK to further pursue its nuclear and missile programmes.

Given all this, the international community needs to take a fresh look not only at DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes but also at the Pakistan-DPRK nuclear cooperation which has a subtle Chinese endorsement. India’s concern on DPRK’s nuclear connection therefore needs fresh contemplation. India has so far severely and repeatedly condemned DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. This has not, however, served New Delhi’s purpose. India has to do a lot more to make its concerns count. Expressing “deep concern” over DPRK’s rocket launch on 8 February 2016, the Government of India called on Pyongyang to refrain from such launches that affect regional peace and stability.6 Similarly, India condemned DPRK’s 6 January 2016 self-declared thermonuclear test.

Despite such stern condemnations, scepticism has recently been expressed in the media about India’s adherence to UN sanctions on DPRK. It has been contended that India is allowing science students from DPRK to study in Dehradun, ostensibly in violation of the norms of UN sanctions.7 Terming such reports as “baseless”, the MEA has asserted that “India is fully aware of its obligations under the UN Charter and has been exemplary in its implementation of UN sanctions including those related to DPRK.”8 New Delhi has also clarified that the enrolment of North Korean students in Dehradun was with the prior knowledge of UN representatives. Finally, the MEA also pointed out that India is a “victim of proliferation in its extended neighbourhood” and it is therefore incorrect to suggest that India supports in anyway a violation of UN sanctions on DPRK.9

Overall, India’s stance on DPRK’s tests rests on three broad premises. One, DPRK tests violate its international obligations. Two, such tests affect regional peace and stability, and thus India’s security as well. And, three, DPRK must refrain from further tests. A response of this nature is, however, customary. Neither does it create the required diplomatic space to discuss with the major powers the possible effects of DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes in India’s immediate neighbourhood nor does it create a condition for exerting pressure to prevent further DPRK-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.

How should India then approach the issue? First, India needs to strengthen DPRK-specific bilateral dialogues with the US, Japan and South Korea, countries that are most concerned about Pyongyang’s repeated tests. New Delhi’s approach has not been effective in this respect. India has a “global partnership” with the US, but DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests have not really figured in India-US bilateral dialogues even though nuclear issues have been the dominant aspect of most of their bilateral talks in recent years. Having an exclusive discussion on DPRK’s nuclear tests will be in the interests of both countries since they are both affected by the former’s provocative nuclear behaviour. India must therefore develop a more nuanced understanding with the US on DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests since both adhere to the goal of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime.10 This will help India highlight its concerns more intently.

Similarly, with Japan, India should not only have a shared understanding but also carry out a specific dialogue on the consequences of DPRK’s tests. Both India and Japan have expressed concerns over the “uranium enrichment activities” of DPRK but only periphrastically. More needs to be done to concretise these concerns in terms of sharing information and forging bilateral discussions. This will help India raise its concerns about DPRK-Pakistan nuclear cooperation more purposely. Besides, it will also encourage India and Japan to forge ahead in bilateral talks on a civil nuclear agreement, an issue which has not progressed much between them.

In addition, DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests must also become an important point of India’s discussions with South Korea. Both India and South Korea have often discussed and expressed mutual concerns over the deteriorating security situation in the Korean peninsula. But this discussion has been generic in nature and lacks concreteness. New Delhi and Seoul decided to establish a 2+2 dialogue mechanism on 18 May 2015 during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Seoul, but no substantial progress has taken place to push ahead this dialogue mechanism.11 DPRK’s tests as well as matters concerning the network of nuclear relations between Pyongyang and Islamabad must be priorities in these discussions. Further, establishing a stronger intelligence sharing mechanism relating to the Korean peninsula will be in the interests of India and South Korea.

Apart from strengthening bilateral dialogues with countries that are most concerned about DPRK’s continuing nuclear and missile tests, India concurrently needs to consider how it can effectively raise the matter in regional forums. Identifying appropriate regional mechanisms, partaking in it and forming a dialogue mechanism will help India highlight its concerns regionally. One such mechanism is the North-East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). The Park Geun-hye administration in South Korea initiated the NAPCI process to foster peace and cooperation within an ambit of “infrastructure of trust” in North-East Asia. India should try and become a part of this process, and it must pursue its participation in this process with South Korea. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Park have agreed to “find complementarities” between India’s Act East policy and South Korea’s NAPCI initiative. India is not part of the NAPCI, while countries such as United States, China, Japan, Russia and Mongolia are part of this process.

Besides, India must also establish special communications with members of the Six-Party Talks – South Korea, North Korea, US, China, Japan and Russia. Although the Six-Party Talks process has become irrelevant at present, there is hope that it might be revived at some stage. Moreover, having a dialogue with members of the Six-Party Talks will serve India’s interest since all these countries, with the exception of DPRK, have a ‘strategic partnership’ with India. Also, given China’s special relations with Pakistan and lately Russia’s growing relations with Pakistan, India may find it apposite to raise its longstanding concerns at this forum.

Finally, India needs to adopt a savvier approach towards DPRK. Its policy towards DPRK has so far been measured and it has maintained a balance between ‘two Koreas’. Even as India has developed a relationship with South Korea that is ‘strategic and special’, it has also managed to maintain a good understanding with DPRK. Taking advantage of this understanding, India must initiate a pointed discussion with Pyongyang on its concerns about DPRK-Pakistan nuclear cooperation with a view to arriving at a mutual accommodation of each other’s concerns and expectations.
GShankar
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Re: Deterrence

Post by GShankar »

From the above, a short summary could be made such as -
  1. China is trying to warn/intimidate mostly USA and little bit Japan and SK (SK-NK different issue) to back off from encircling it
  2. US doesn't care due to knowledge that NK can only make noise and use all these provocations to build up more capability in bases in SK/JP including missile defense
The rest of them countries, looking from the outside in, derive different lessons whereas the real lesson is - you need to create a BIG problem for someone if you need something from them. Countries like China, US, UK, etc. only vary in how this strategy is implemented.

When will Indian get into that bandwagon and open a new front for every existing and potential adversary?
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Re: Deterrence

Post by DavidD »

GShankar wrote:From the above, a short summary could be made such as -
  1. China is trying to warn/intimidate mostly USA and little bit Japan and SK (SK-NK different issue) to back off from encircling it
  2. US doesn't care due to knowledge that NK can only make noise and use all these provocations to build up more capability in bases in SK/JP including missile defense
The rest of them countries, looking from the outside in, derive different lessons whereas the real lesson is - you need to create a BIG problem for someone if you need something from them. Countries like China, US, UK, etc. only vary in how this strategy is implemented.

When will Indian get into that bandwagon and open a new front for every existing and potential adversary?
Sticks alone won't work, you need carrots too. Both China and the U.S. can and do offer a lot of carrots to go along with the stick, India needs to do that as well.
GShankar
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Re: Deterrence

Post by GShankar »

^^Make in India is one such big carrot for US, Russia, China, etc. some like it and others don't. For them, we need to tell them that we do have other carrots and of course, sticks.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by wig »

http://www.newsx.com/national/43962-new ... ns-arihant

India completes 'nuclear triad' with INS Arihant.
In an exclusive information accessed by NewsX, India in its mission to empower its navy has joined "Nuclear triad" club of superpowers who can launch nukes from air, land & air.

In February 2016, India's 1st indigenously built nuclear armed submarine INS Arihant was declared as ready for operations. In August 2016, Prime Minister Modi had quietly commissioned INS Arihant into the Indian Navy and since then it is fully-operational.

INS Arihant's commissioning into the Indian Navy has put India in a group of elite nations. India becomes the 6th country & joins the elite "nuclear triad" club. Earlier, only 5 countries in the world USA, UK, France, Russia and China have developed nuclear-armed submarines.

India has "No First Strike" policy, but Pakistan has a "First strike" policy meaning it is prepared to use nuclear weapons even if India doesn't.

The main advantage of sea-based nukes, especially on submarines, is that they are harder to track and destroy as compared to land and air nuclear launch platforms.

But now, INS Arihant gives India a power to hold the threat of a "second strike," a nuclear counter attack, even if the country is wiped out.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Manohar Parrikar on nuclear weapons: Why say we won’t use it first
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on Thursday said that instead of saying ‘India won’t use nuclear weapons first’, it should be said that ‘India is responsible nuclear power’. The Defence Minister made the comments in a conversation with news channel India Today Television. While he clarified that the statement doesn’t mean ‘India must use nukes’.
Speaking on the issue, Parrikar said: “If written down strategy exists or you take a stand on a nuclear aspect,I think you’re actually giving away ur strength in nuclear. People say India has not first used nuclear concept.I should say that I’m a responsible nuclear power&I’ll not use it irresponsibly” Parrikar said.
Clarifying that this is ‘his’ policy, Parrikar said: “This is my thinking. Some may say that Parrikar says nuclear doctrine has changed, it has not changed in any Govt policy.”
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Supratik »

I think we can change NFU specifically for Pak now that the doctrine is offensive-defence.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by wig »

http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/india-has-t ... eststories

Everything Nuclear, Pakistan Been Far Cleverer Than India
It is well known that unlike India, China became a nuclear weapon state well before the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in March 1970.
As such, in the NPT, China was recognized as a nuclear weapon state and India was put in the category of non-weapon states, which could not acquire or posses nuclear weapons ever in the future. Unfortunately, China has not shown any respect for the obligations and responsibilities which came with its status as a nuclear weapon state. It found a clandestine way to escape these conditionalities and continued to violate them with impunity. It wanted to help its two close friends, Pakistan and North Korea, in the area of nuclear and missile technology. So it worked out a neat and convenient arrangement with them under which it agreed to supply nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and missile technology to North Korea. Pakistan and North Korea were then supposed to exchange these technologies and arm themselves with both nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them at the desired destination. The world soon came to know about this clandestine trade, but turned a blind eye to it with consequences, which are there for all to see today.
When India went for its nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan was already a nuclear weapons state. The tests enabled India to only establish strategic parity with Pakistan in the area of nuclear weapons, not to overtake it. The Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 were a sham only to enable it to come out of the closet. While the Indian nuclear development programme has all along been an entirely indigenous programme developed by Indian scientists with very little help from elsewhere, the Pakistani nuclear programme has been based entirely on charity by China and the theft of nuclear technology and equipment from other sources, AQ Khan notwithstanding. No wonder, therefore, that India has always been regarded as a responsible nuclear state and Pakistan as an irresponsible violator of all norms. It is a pity therefore that China is playing into the hands of Pakistan and opposing India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is even more surprising that imitating India as it always does, Pakistan has also become a candidate for the membership of the NSG, and India has found it fit to say that it has no objection if Pakistan is also admitted as a member.

India entered into binding commitments, even compromising on its sovereignty, when it entered into the nuclear deal with the US. When the deal was being negotiated, we were told that India would be able to get from the US and other countries sensitive and sophisticated technologies specially in the area of enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel. India had even agreed to set up a separate reprocessing facility to ensure that the civilian nuclear programme was kept completely away from its weapons programme. It also agreed to place this new facility under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The US has already gone back on this commitment and ensured that no other country also would be able to supply such technologies to India by encouraging the NSG to impose a ban on the transfer of such technology to non-NPT states in 2011. India has not only kept, quiet but has also gone ahead with the implementation of this flawed and now broken deal.


And what has Pakistan done?

It has quietly entered into arrangements with China under which it gets what India gets under the nuclear deal with America and more, but without any of the conditionalities which cripple us under the US deal. Obviously, once again Pakistan has been cleverer than us. According to informed reports, it has more nuclear bombs than India and unlike us, no commitment of no-first-use. Despite the NPT of which China is a signatory, Pakistan continues to get nuclear technology and equipment from it and despite the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). it continues to get missile technology from Beijing and North Korea.

King's College of London has now come out with a startling report which damns both China and Pakistan fully and completely. The Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College undertook a project called Project Alpha. This project was established in 2011 with funding from the British Government to counter illicit nuclear proliferation-related trade. Extracts from the report, which have been published by the Hindustan Times, and generally ignored by the other newspapers, clearly establish the nexus which exists between China and Pakistan as far as illegal trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technologies is concerned. According to this report, Pakistan maintains a network of at least 20 trading companies in mainland China, Hong Kong, Dubai and Singapore and uses them to covertly funnel dual-use goods to its strategic programmes. These companies procure these goods from manufacturers in Europe, US, China and elsewhere and then export them to Pakistan. The report says that the scale of Islamabad's procurement of sensitive material from Beijing is so substantial that it must be concluded that the Chinese state is either complicit in supplying Pakistan's programmes, or negligent in its control over state-owned enterprises. China is the most important supplier of all forms of goods to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes. Chinese private firms are big suppliers, so are the state-owned enterprises, and they knowingly supply Pakistan's strategic programmes with sensitive equipment. Pakistan's claim that it is a responsible nuclear state stands completely destroyed by these deceptive and clandestine operations. The report concludes 'Pakistan cannot expect to be welcomed into the NSG when it continues to secretly and systematically undermine NSG members' national export systems through the use of front companies and other deceptive techniques.'

For India, this is a God-sent opportunity to expose both China and Pakistan. It should use this report to the hilt to ensure that Pakistan is never admitted into the NSG and should withdraw its ill-considered advocacy of Pakistan's case.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Aditya_V »

So in Hindsight the our Nuke tests were a real game saver. Remember in 1998 how all the secular forces said thanks to our Nuke tests Pakistan also has Nukes and how stupid it was of us Yada yada, and when we retorted the Pakis already had Chinese Nukes and their tests were just a shame- people just ignored us.

Shows that restraint never worked for Indians.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by wig »

http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-new ... XTAoI.html
the article above refers to a report published by the Hindustan Times on a study published by "experts of King's College of London" which is reproduced hereunder

UK nuclear report nails Pakistan’s lies, China’s complicity
Pakistan’s continued use of front companies and other deceptive methods to obtain dual-use goods for its nuclear programme means it cannot “expect to be welcomed” into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a new report by experts at King’s College of London has said.

The report contends that the scale of Islamabad’s procurement of sensitive material from Beijing is “so substantial that it must be concluded that the Chinese state is either complicit in supplying Pakistan’s programmes, or negligent in its control over state-owned enterprises”.

“Pakistan’s strategic nuclear and missile industries”, prepared by Project Alpha of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College, concluded Pakistan has a “deliberate strategy of using deceptive methods to obtain dual-use goods” that has been demonstrated by its “systematic use of front companies to supply its strategic industries”.

Islamabad also maintains a network of at least 20 trading companies in mainland China, Hong Kong, Dubai and Singapore that it uses to “covertly funnel dual-use goods to its strategic programmes”.

“While the full extent of their overseas operations are not clear, these trading companies probably purchase goods from manufacturers in China, Europe, the United States and elsewhere and then arrange their export to Pakistan


The deceptive methods of acquiring dual-use goods undermines “Pakistan’s claim that it is a responsible actor in the non-proliferation domain: Pakistan cannot expect to be welcomed into the NSG when it continues to secretly and systematically undermine NSG members’ national export control systems by targeting companies through the use of front companies and other deceptive techniques,” the report said.

The conclusion is significant as Pakistan recently applied for entry to the NSG, an elite club that controls trade in nuclear technology and materials, soon after India’s bid for membership. However, Pakistan’s close ally China effectively blocked India’s application.

Project Alpha was established in 2011 with funding from the British government to counter illicit nuclear proliferation-related trade. It is headed by Ian Stewart, who was seconded to King’s College from Britain’s defence ministry.

The researchers analysed information that was till now “fragmented and uncollated”, including trade data, academic papers, contractor websites and corporate newsletters, and developed a representation of the organisational structure of Pakistan’s strategic industries and their procurement entities.

Some of the material is so sensitive that Project Alpha only made public a redacted version of its report.

China is the most important supplier of all forms of goods to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes, and most procurements from China are “probably from unwitting private suppliers”.

“But, on a smaller scale, Chinese state and private entities continue to knowingly supply Pakistan’s strategic programmes with sensitive equipment,” the report said.

Islamabad’s reliance on Beijing for sensitive technologies is “not surprising” as Pakistan is a strategic ally of China. “However, it does nonetheless raise questions about China’s commitment to the principles of the export control regimes which it claims to subscribe,” the report added.

Pakistan wants to expand its civil nuclear programme with outside assistance and “perhaps even to become a nuclear exporter” and “yet does not want to accept the international rules associated with responsible non-proliferation behaviour”, the report said.

Islamabad has rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. “It continues to keep most of its nuclear fuel cycle off-limits to IAEA inspection. These refusals in themselves make Pakistan’s push to join the NSG hard to accept,” it added.

Pakistan’s extensive procurements of dual-use goods from abroad suggests its “strategic industries are not as self-sufficient as Islamabad has long claimed”, the report said. Pakistan has named less than a dozen of the main organisations involved in its nuclear and missile programmes and it “has certainly not made reference to the web of clandestine front companies that these organisations use to conduct procurement activity”, it said.

Islamabad “continues its forty-year history of covert procurement for its nuclear weapon programme largely unabated” and Project Alpha’s study showed that Pakistan “continues to engage in deceptive procurement tactics aimed at defeating national export controls in countries across the world in order to build strategic capabilities at home”.

“Pakistan has questions to answer about how it will reconcile these activities with its goals of joining the NSG – and most NSG members are likely to be sceptical of any response. Islamabad has only a few allies in its quest to build strategic capabilities, albeit ones whose commitment is not wholly known,” the report said.

“Our analysis shows that China continues to aid Pakistan’s missile programmes through repeated sales of sensitive dual-use technology. If Beijing has intended for these exports to be clandestine, it has failed in its tradecraft. If Beijing is unaware of the extent that its state-owned enterprises are supplying Pakistan’s missile industries, then it has failed in its oversight.

“Either way, Beijing will need to adjust its sales relationship with Pakistan in order to avoid international criticism.”

Pakistan, which is said to have the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal, also continues to improve its fissile material production facilities, develop tactical nuclear weapons and work on enhanced nuclear delivery systems, “probably including submarine-based second strike capability”.

It added, “In secret...Pakistan continues to procure dual-use technology from abroad for its nuclear weapon and missile programmes on a vast scale.”

Pakistan targets companies worldwide for nuclear and missile-related dual-use equipment, often through “layers of middlemen and front companies”. Virtually all state-controlled entities in Pakistan’s strategic programmes “maintain front companies, most likely for the purpose of defeating export control efforts in other countries”.

Analysis by Project Alpha of Pakistani procurements revealed hundreds of imports over the past five years, with most imports made by front companies not obviously affiliated with strategic industries.

“It has been possible to identify these as procurements for nuclear- and missile-related end-users mostly because of poor tradecraft on the part of Pakistani procurers: they use common addresses; common telephone numbers, and repeatedly use the same, limited network of suppliers abroad for dual-use technologies that can be clearly identified as for missile-related or nuclear-related purposes,” the report said.

IAEA safeguards too have limited reach in Pakistan, which has an agreement with the UN watchdog whereby only six facilities and specific materials are subject to safeguards.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

wig, Despite the mounting evidence the same suppliers still supply Pakistan with nuke related materials and West agencies look aside.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by kumarn »

Statement by Sudeheendra kulkarni - t's as irresponsible of #Parrikar to deviate from India's 'No 1st-Use Policy' as it'll be suicidal& sinful of India to be 1st to use N-arms.

With such kinds of wooly headed idiots surrounding our top leaders no wonder we are always queasy about exercising power.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Parrikar’s remarks can be mistaken: Experts
Vipin Narang, Associate Professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology felt that Mr. Parrikar created “confusion” by voicing a contradictory position. “Mr. Parrikar is the Defence Minister. His personal opinions run the risk of being interpreted as official policy on this matter, which I can assure you now China and Pakistan will do,” he added.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by uddu »

That's what CCP is saying and the newspaper went to search for people who have some pro-China view or just published those things given to them by CCP. :D Condition of some newspapers in India. :rotfl:
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

Manohar Parrikar has not changed our nuclear policy, he only stirred a storm in a teacup
In fact, in my considered view, the Modi government should go for a formal review of the country’s NFU policy. Let me explain why. In the strict sense of the term, India does not have a proper nuclear doctrine. I think that it is a part of our strategic culture to keep things and policies as ambiguous as possible, leaving them to many and different interpretations....

All these are very tricky but vital questions. But answers to them cannot wait anymore. The future Indian government cannot sit on them.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Prem »

Policy on first use of nuclear option should be retained by us, says BJP MP Subramanyan Swamy

http://www.financialexpress.com/india-n ... TE.twitter
Firebrand Indian politician of the Bharatiya Janata Party today said that that while No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapon is okay but if faced with a crazy leadership in Pakistan then the policy of first use should be retained by India. This coming from someone like Subramaniyan Swamy is no surprise, but the question is how different would it be even if India exercises its present status quo.
India’s NFU policy is part of its nuclear doctrine. Under the doctrine, India has a policy of credible minimum deterrence based on a ‘No First Use’ posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. This means that India won’t be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. In contrast, Pakistan does not have an NFU policy for its nuclear arsenal

Subramanian Swamy ‏@Swamy39 Nov 11
No first use of nuclear weapons is normal. But if faced with a crazed leadership as in Pakistan, first strike option must be retained by us
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Re: Deterrence

Post by dinesha »

Breaking the N-silence
by Arun Prakash
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinio ... r-4383076/
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

More, Mr. Parrikar - Bharat Karnad
Deterrence is a mind game. Nuclear deterrence is even more psychologically weighted because at stake, quite literally, is a nation’s survival as a “social organism”, to use the words of the geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder.

What makes nuclear deterrence work is the ambiguity and opacity shrouding its every aspect. These range from weapons/warheads, delivery systems, their deployment pattern, command and control system to details about storage, reaction time, and physical, electronic and cyber security schemes, the weapons production processes, the personnel involved and policies relating to all these elements. The more anything remotely connected with nuclear hardware and software, strategy, policies, plans and posture is a black hole, the greater is the uncertainty in the adversary’s mind and the unpredictability attending on the deterrent. Moreover, pronouncements emanating from official quarters that obfuscate matters and generate unease, especially about India’s nuclear weapons-use initiation and nuclear response calculi, enhance the sense of dread in the minds of adversary governments. Dread is at the heart of successful nuclear deterrence.

It is the responsibility of the Indian government to make the ambiguity-opacity-uncertainty-unpredictability matrix denser, not make it easier for adversaries to plumb its political will and to read its strategic intentions by clarifying nuclear issues. The adversaries one needs to keep in mind are as much the obvious ones — China and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan — as the “friendly” countries, such as the US. The US, in particular, was at the forefront of preventing India from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold, failing in which enterprise, it has done everything to ensure India stays stuck at the low-end of the nuclear weapons technology development curve. It insisted that India does not resume underground nuclear testing, or depart from the US understanding of limited nuclear deterrence. It may also be recalled that, for geopolitical reasons of containing India to the subcontinent during the Cold War, Washington disregarded its own proliferation concerns and watched China nuclear missile-arm Pakistan even as it preached responsible behaviour to New Delhi.

In this context, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s wondering why no-first-use (NFU) is assumed to be a restraint on the Indian nuclear forces is just the monkey wrench that needed to be thrown into the Western considerations of this country’s nuclear security. American think-tanks help the US government to achieve its nuclear non-proliferation objectives, propagating, for instance, the hollow India-Pakistan “nuclear flashpoint” thesis that Washington has often used to pressure a usually diffident and malleable New Delhi. Pakistan naturally supports this thesis as a means of legitimating its fast-growing nuclear arsenal, as do many Indian analysts for their own reasons.

No surprise, then, that Parrikar’s stray thoughts on NFU have shocked the large community of flashpoint believers and acted as bait for George Perkovich, one of the stalwart proponents of this idea, to rise to it. He uses the morality card — the loss of India’s supposed “high ground” which has been sufficient by itself in the past to subdue the Indian government — and labels Parrikar’s statements as “superficial, perhaps, dangerously so” (see his “Impolitic musings”, The Indian Express, November 15, at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinio ... y-4375606/). The truth, however, is that Perkovich — and by extension, Washington — is worried that Parrikar has upended the US-qua-Western nuclear construct for South Asia.

But NFU is less of an issue for Perkovich than his desire to get Parrikar to explain “whether and how” India means to enlarge its nuclear forces and infrastructure and “revise its operational plans” contingent on New Delhi’s apparent jettisoning of NFU. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that besides its intelligence agencies, Washington has always relied on American think-tankers and gullible Indians to help winkle out details of the Indian nuclear deterrent — Perkovich’s primary intent. I recall that at a 1.5 track meet held under the US government’s aegis in San Diego in December 1998 the hosts called in a surviving Manhattan Project biggie, Herbert York, to impress on the Indians there the dangers of the nuclear course India was embarked upon. They banked on an Indian patsy — the joint secretary (Americas), MEA — to repeatedly ask K. Subrahmanyam and me to speculate about what weapons strength constituted a “minimum” deterrent.

Indeed, far from being under any obligation to throw light on NFU or any other nuclear issue, Parrikar is almost duty-bound to air his “personal views” more frequently on the subject and thus keep confounding assessments regarding India’s deterrent.
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Re: Deterrence

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Confusion is risky - Vipin Narang , Christopher Clary
There are no plausible scenarios for which the first use of nuclear weapons might be useful. India’s nuclear forces are strictly to deter a WMD attack, and can, therefore, be oriented entirely for retaliation....

NFU, therefore, injects a critical buffer in the decision-making cycle so that a state like Pakistan does not have an even more dangerous itchy finger on the trigger, and has the time and space to consider the catastrophic consequences of using nuclear weapons and facing the full brunt of India’s nuclear retaliation.

There have been multiple internal reviews of NFU by both BJP-led and Congress-led governments. Each of these reviews has concluded that retaining the NFU pledge is in India’s security interest. ...

This was put to rest when candidate Narendra Modi publicly settled the issue, stating that “No first use was a great initiative of Vajpayee — there is no compromise on that....

If it is not official nuclear policy, then Parrikar has a duty to the nation to keep any personal opinions that differ from official policy to himself. After all, China and Pakistan, who already doubted the veracity of India’s NFU will now rightly be able to point to a sitting defence minister as having disavowed it....

A confused NFU policy would force Pakistan (and China) to have no choice but to believe the worst case: That India’s NFU is a myth regardless of official doctrine and, therefore, any imminent conflict may force them to use their nuclear weapons early and massively, or risk losing them......

There are reasonable national security arguments for why India may wish to abandon NFU, though we believe that the stabilising benefits of NFU outweigh them and that it is a critical pillar of India’s claim to being a responsible nuclear power....

If not, however, PM Modi must publicly reaffirm India’s NFU pledge, and prevent members of his government from contradicting official policy whenever they feel like it. The clarification cannot be issued by a foreign secretary or foreign minister since that will only muddy the issue. Enough of reading tea leaves with something as serious as nuclear doctrine. India finds itself in the worst possible situation now — confusion about what India’s official policy and posture on NFU is. It is imperative that the issue is unambiguously settled by the prime minister himself.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Minimum deterrent is that which deters the enemy the maximum.

Many patsies are coming out of woodwork after Parrikar's musings.

India can have different deterrent doctrines for different challengers.

It can have selective NFUs with certain powers like UK, France, Russia, and US.
It can suspend NFU with states that have border disputes and in the neighborhood.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

There is no confusion in India or in any power circles.

Its only in NPA circles of US.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:Minimum deterrent is that which deters the enemy the maximum.

Many patsies are coming out of woodwork after Parrikar's musings.

India can have different deterrent doctrines for different challengers.

It can have selective NFUs with certain powers like UK, France, Russia, and US.
It can suspend NFU with states that have border disputes and in the neighborhood.
Yes, absolute flexibility is needed to changing threats and scenarios. At the root of it the written doctrine has to go, coupled with mandatory exercises to evolving gaming scenarios involving apex decision makers, so that the polity and bureaucracy learns what it means to wield power and its uses.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Please see the salvo testing of PII missiles and the IAF exercises to take off from highways.
And the upcoming PII and Agni I test.

It all adds up.
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Re: Deterrence

Post by Rudradev »

Seems that after a very long time, US nuclear hawks are waking up and spreading their wings.

The rising popularity of this kind of thinking in D.C. may incidentally benefit India by making it more difficult for poseurs like George Pervertovitch, Michael Krap-on etc. to continue their bak-bak without sounding eminently hypocritical.



Trump's Nuclear Deterrence Challenge
by Franklin Miller and Keith B Payne
November 20, 2016
The Wall Street Journal
http://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-nucl ... 1479680000

President-elect Donald Trump will soon be working with his national security team to establish priorities on security and defense policy. Two challenges will demand immediate and unrelenting attention.

Throughout the campaign Mr. Trump emphasized the need to destroy Islamic State, also known as ISIS, as a functioning terrorist organization. Since there is no way to negotiate with or reliably deter medieval zealots willing to murder and die for their misbegotten cause, military force is the only answer at this point. The next president also must keep the defense and intelligence communities focused on preventing the remnants of ISIS from obtaining weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear weapons.

But Mr. Trump has inherited the even greater threat of an increasingly precarious nuclear balance. All three elements of America’s nuclear triad—land-based and sea-based missiles, and bombers—are now approaching obsolescence. A hostile Russia that miscalculates U.S. will and deterrence capabilities poses a mortal nuclear threat to our existence.

President Vladimir Putin has set out to re-establish Russia’s domination of the lands previously under the Soviet Union, changing European borders by force and occupying neighboring territories militarily. Russia has also made explicit threats to initiate nuclear war against the U.S., our allies and even neutral European states.

Nuclear first-use—a policy that includes the threat of initiating a nuclear war and the option of doing so—is a key part of Mr. Putin’s expansionist political and military strategy. First-use is emphasized in open Russian military statements, at least as far back as the official 2003 Russian military doctrine. Backing up this doctrine, Russia is deploying new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ballistic-missile submarines and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles launched from the ground, sea and air.

Russia also is developing a new ICBM that will carry “no fewer than fifteen” nuclear warheads each, according to Russian descriptions. Its size and payload suggest the missile is specifically designed for nuclear first strikes. Mr. Putin has overseen “snap,” i.e., sudden, nuclear exercises to demonstrate the ability of his nuclear forces to strike instantly. Moscow has even begun to practice Cold War-style nuclear-survival drills on a massive scale.

Mr. Putin also has allowed his most-senior officials to issue threats of nuclear attack not heard since the days of Nikita Khrushchev. A chilling example came on March 16, 2014, two days before Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Dmitry Kiselyov, the Putin-appointed head of the government’s international news agency, boasted on his TV show that “Russia is the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S. into radioactive ash.” Subtle.

Early this month, in response to the planned deployment in 2017 of 330 U.S. marines to Norway, Frants Klintsevitsj, a deputy chairman of Russia’s defense and security committee, said, “This is very dangerous for Norway and Norwegians. . . . We have never before had Norway on the list of targets for our strategic weapons. But if this develops, Norway’s population will suffer.”

China is also in the process of a major nuclear buildup while pursuing similarly aggressive, expansionist policies in the South and East China Seas at the expense of U.S. allies. China is destabilizing the region and has threatened Japan with war.

The danger is that Russia or China will misinterpret America’s aging nuclear capabilities as a lack of will and an invitation to aggression. To prevent such miscalculation, the U.S. strategic nuclear forces remaining from the Cold War must be modernized.

This modernization could have begun in the George W. Bush administration, but did not, and the Obama administration further delayed it during its first term, based on the mistaken view that nuclear weapons are irrelevant after the Cold War. The administration has since begun the program, but current plans will not place a new U.S. bomber, strategic submarine, cruise missile or ICBM in the field until the mid-to-late 2020s.

Finding a way out of this dismal situation is President-elect Trump’s challenge. As seriously as he considers how to deal a death blow to ISIS, he and his advisers need to make swift decisions about how to sustain much-needed nuclear modernization. As the military-service chiefs have testified, deterrence is our highest priority, and our nuclear forces are the essential foundation for deterrence and all other military operations. This is especially important for preventing further Russian, Chinese and North Korean adventurism.

Effective deterrence is the product of the necessary capabilities and manifest political will. Our national safety depends on being able to communicate these to the world, especially to the Kremlin. A good start would be for the Trump administration to work with Congress to repeal the application of the Budgetary Control Act to the Defense Department, thus ending the budget-cutting demands on defense of sequestration—and to direct the Pentagon to move U.S. strategic nuclear-force modernization plans forward without delay.
ramana
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Re: Deterrence

Post by ramana »

Both US and Russia have START.

Trump and Putin need to get China into START.

Para 11 is plain wrong.
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