dinesh_kimar wrote:
*******None of the above factors give a STRONG reason on Doklam backing off**************
My CT: the Indians (us) displayed something which spooked the Chinese, and they climbed down in half a day. Some kind of brahmastra was brandished, along with quiet preparations, and readying the entire Indian population for hard hitting war, inspite of our media's best efforts to spook us (remember headlines like: 2600 armoured vehicles in Tibet,30 divisions can surge per day, new light tank, rocket attack, Psang-so lake attack, etc).
Dunno what the brahmastra could have been, perhaps i'm wrong.
But China has never backed down even against Japan, conventionally equivalent / stronger than us.
Maybe A-3 TELs were moved in, seen by Chinese sats ??
It's actually much simpler. Economics. Occam's Razor.
Any war, conventional or otherwise will hit their economy badly. The CPC cannot afford a weak economy, as it will lead to discontent and possibly an overthrow of the communists.
On Monday, The Hindu reported that India's only operational nuclear ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, was out of action for about 10 months last year due to an accident. The report raises more questions than it answers due to its glaring technical and operational inconsistencies. First, the news item stated that the Arihant's propulsion compartment was damaged after water entered it, as a hatch on the rear side was left open by mistake.
The submarine has no hatches there. The Arihant is based on Russian double hull design with a sealed nuclear reactor section. Except for the latest French nuclear submarines that have a hatch above the reactor for quicker refuelling, no other country with nuclear submarines have such a system.
Although the Arihant's core is not designed to operate for the submarine's lifetime and will need refuelling, it does not have a hatch. To refuel, the hull will have to be cut open and welded back, as is the case for the Russian nuclear attack submarine, the Akula-II class that India has leased and operates as INS Chakra.
There are no external hatches in the compartment that houses the steam turbine, gearbox, generator and shaft that drives the propeller. Under normal circumstances, it is not possible for sea water to enter the submarine, and certainly not via a 'non-existent hatch'. It also not possible for a modern submarine that has various sensors to not have a warning system about an open hatch in any other area of the submarine critical for its survival.
Two, the news report says that the absence of Arihant from operations came to the political leadership's attention during the India-China military standoff at Dokalam when India allegedly wanted to deploy it.
This is unlikely as this would mean an across-the-board failure of intelligence and of the checks and balances in place. It also means the armed forces not keeping the civilian leadership in the loop, which is against the former's operating procedures.
INS Arihant carries sea-based nuclear weapons handled by the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) under the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). The NCA compromises the Political Council headed by the Prime Minister and the Executive Council headed by the National Security Advisor (NSA), who advises the political council on the use of nuclear weapons.
Intelligence agencies like Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) report to the NSA. It is improbable that the NSA, arguably the most powerful person in the Indian security establishment, did not know about the status of an important strategic asset for 7-8 months, and learnt about the damage only at the time of a crisis.
Third, as sea-based deterrence requires mated warheads, it is a departure from the past when India kept its warheads and delivery systems separate. There are additional protocols to keep civilian control over the release of nuclear weapons. Which makes the news report suspect about its claim that the political leadership was not informed.
The civilian leadership asking for India's sea-based nuclear assets to be deployed during the Dokalam crisis is consistent with reports of land- and airbased nuclear assets being put in place as well. It again shows how serious the situation was at the height of the crisis.
This, despite the fact that both India and China profess a no-first use policy. It shows India's lack of trust in the declared Chinese policy that required both sides to engage in confidence-building measures (CBMs).
India asking for the Arihant to be deployed against China indicates an operational long-range submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), apart from the 750 km range K-15 SLBM that will not be able to target China from the Bay of Bengal.
India has tested the K-4 SLBM, which has a range of 3,500 km. It also indicates the level of readiness of India's nuclear weapons, which were earlier kept in demated form which entailed the warheads and the missiles being kept separate.
This requires a sophisticated command and control system and safety measures that will prevent the release of nuclear weapons without authorisation from the political leadership.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 13 Jan 2018 17:35
by Austin
That must have been a very interesting exhibition in Zarechnyy - NPO Start is a key weapon assembly plant. The big green RV below is said to be the 20 MT ICBM warhead.
Austin wrote:That must have been a very interesting exhibition in Zarechnyy - NPO Start is a key weapon assembly plant. The big green RV below is said to be the 20 MT ICBM warhead.
Pakistan is rattled by Gen. Rawat's statement of how IA would call the Pakistani nuclear bluff !!
Pakistan got in touch with India through diplomatic channels to protest Army chief Bipin Rawat's comments on calling Islamabad's nuclear bluff, reported The Nation, a Pakistani newspaper, quoting unnamed government officials.
"India has been told that such statements will only worsen the tension. These statements invite reaction and counter-reaction," said unnamed Pakistani foreign ministry officials to The Nation.
Last week, Rawat said "Pakistan's nuclear bogey" will be thoroughly exposed were there to be war with the western neighbour, which often brandishes its short-range Nasr (Hatf-IX) nuclear missiles as a battlefield counter to India's `Cold Start' strategy of swift, high-intensity conventional attacks into enemy territory.
"We will call their bluff. If given the task, we will not say we cannot cross the border because they have nuclear weapons," said Rawat.
Pakistan, of course, didn't like this kind of talk.
Another unnamed Pakistani official said that India was told "not to create an atmosphere of uncertainty as regional issues cannot be resolved without peace and dialogue", reported The Nation.
Officially, too, Pakistan immediately reacted to Rawat's statement on the day he made it.
Pakistani foreign minister Khawaja Asif called Rawat's statement "very irresponsible" in a tweet.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 15 Jan 2018 21:32
by ramana
What is there to protest Gen Rawat statement of facts?
Another unnamed Pakistani official said that India was told "not to create an atmosphere of uncertainty as regional issues cannot be resolved without peace and dialogue", reported The Nation.
Officially, too, Pakistan immediately reacted to Rawat's statement on the day he made it.
Pakistani foreign minister Khawaja Asif called Rawat's statement "very irresponsible" in a tweet.
Pakistan has regularly been threatening India with nuke holocaust and their NPA mullahs regularly play up nukular flashpoint BS all the time.
Gen Rawat statement is also to remove uncertainty and ensure border issues can be resolved peacefully and not by making nukular threats.
Time to shut up.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 15 Jan 2018 22:05
by krishna_krishna
ramana wrote:
Time to shut up.
Ramana guru, I would say with new year Pakistan’s “New Clear Bum” is for everyone to see.
Congratulations Shiv sir on being quoted. I read the article as well. Good that you made the point that fizzle theory has no evidence. Strengthens our deterrent.
Some months after the blasts I visited a met office in India (won't be more specific, but it is >500km from Pokhran) and the staff there was proudly saying that the Indian blasts had recorded strongly on the seismograph and in comparison the Paki blasts were insignificant. They had no reason to make this up.
This can't be a state secret because the same would have been picked up in Pakistan too... but a small point against a fizzle claim nevertheless.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 16 Jan 2018 21:02
by Akshay Kapoor
Good anecdotal evidence yensoy
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 07:09
by shiv
TacNukes in Vietnam?
Essential reading for those who think nukes might win wars
Those conclusions were eye-opening. Although a RAND Corporation study estimated that one tactical nuclear weapon equaled twelve conventional bombing attacks, the JASONs concluded that an all-nuclear “rolling thunder”–style bombing campaign would require 3000 tactical nukes a year. Not even the massive U.S. nuclear production complex could support that kind of use.
Even with such awesome firepower, the results looked unsatisfying. Wargames played under Big War conditions—massed troop and armor concentrations in Europe—indicated that each nuke would only kill one hundred soldiers. Attacks against small, dispersed forces moving under jungle cover looked even less effective.
Mountain passes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail could be shut down and large areas of forest blown down by tactical nukes very effectively, but only until the Vietnamese cleared new paths. Maintaining damage and radiation levels would require repeated nuclear attacks and as one JASON said, "a tree only falls once."
And here is something I have said several times:
In sum, the JASONs concluded that unilateral U.S. use of tactical nukes wouldn't make much of a difference to the war effort. It could, however, provoke some very nasty consequences. Says historian Alex Wellerstein, "Since World War II, the US has the strongest interest in not breaking the 'nuclear taboo' because once nukes start becoming normalized, the US usually stands to lose the most, or at least a lot."
U.S. nuclear strikes in Vietnam might have compelled the USSR and/or China to respond. The Soviet Union could not afford another loss of face only four years after the Cuban Missile Crisis and might well have supplied North Vietnam with tactical nukes. Such weapons, the JASONs noted, were just the sort of military forces the U.S. deployed to Vietnam in large bases and ports and large troop concentrations.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 08:05
by ShauryaT
^Kind of misleading study by a self-admittedly biased group. If they really wanted to go nuclear to end the war, value targeting would have been used, like in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not the claim of 3000 tac nukes! Value targeting would have either ended the war or escalated it. Escalation was a risk with the tac nukes also but without the benefit of the possibility of ending it. Tactical nukes can be effective against a far superior conventional force in a permissible geospatial context. It needs a strong capability to inflict further damage using counterforce and counter value targeting with multiple strike capabilities for tac nukes to have any meaningful effect. Its effects would be limited but that is its purpose. This is what Pakistan banks on.
The demolition munitions is a limited option for India just in case we ever find ourselves so weak-kneed and defenseless on the border that a PLA force is simply threatening steamrolling down the Assam plains or Ladakh. Better to defend ourselves with such weapon than face a 1962 repeat but do not think we will ever need them.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 10:27
by shiv
ShauryaT wrote:^Kind of misleading study by a self-admittedly biased group. If they really wanted to go nuclear to end the war, value targeting would have been used, like in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not the claim of 3000 tac nukes! Value targeting would have either ended the war or escalated it. Escalation was a risk with the tac nukes also but without the benefit of the possibility of ending it. Tactical nukes can be effective against a far superior conventional force in a permissible geospatial context. It needs a strong capability to inflict further damage using counterforce and counter value targeting with multiple strike capabilities for tac nukes to have any meaningful effect. Its effects would be limited but that is its purpose. This is what Pakistan banks on.
The demolition munitions is a limited option for India just in case we ever find ourselves so weak-kneed and defenseless on the border that a PLA force is simply threatening steamrolling down the Assam plains or Ladakh. Better to defend ourselves with such weapon than face a 1962 repeat but do not think we will ever need them.
You have failed to
1. Rebut the numbers and effectiveness of tac nukes
2. Comment on the second paragraph above
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 10:50
by ArjunPandit
^^Shiv sir,
One of the reasons of dropping Nukes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (as were one documentary, BBC IIRC) was the city structures were primarily of wood and paper. Some of the concrete structures not few miles away from the center, though damaged were not obliterated. Your point may be one of the reasons to maintain this. Also, soviet countered this this few times by making soldiers walk after nukes were dropped/detonated
Shivji awesome work. The reason for coming back again and again to BRF has always been to learn from rational thinkers like you. My pranams Sir
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 17:54
by nam
ShauryaT wrote:^Kind of misleading study by a self-admittedly biased group. If they really wanted to go nuclear to end the war, value targeting would have been used, like in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not the claim of 3000 tac nukes! Value targeting would have either ended the war or escalated it. Escalation was a risk with the tac nukes also but without the benefit of the possibility of ending it. Tactical nukes can be effective against a far superior conventional force in a permissible geospatial context. It needs a strong capability to inflict further damage using counterforce and counter value targeting with multiple strike capabilities for tac nukes to have any meaningful effect. Its effects would be limited but that is its purpose. This is what Pakistan banks on.
Value target the cities or other places? US cannot value target Vietcong who are spread around the forest. What if NV refuse to surrender and ask Soviet to provide nukes to retaliate?
The tactical nuke output in KT is close to "strategic nuke" used on Japan.
Either ways, Russia would have given nukes to viet cong, as US would have already shaken the "apple cart".
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 19:04
by ShauryaT
shiv wrote:
You have failed to
1. Rebut the numbers and effectiveness of tac nukes
2. Comment on the second paragraph above
What I was rebutting is the concept and approach of trying to use tactical nukes to achieve strategic ends like "end the war". 3000 nukes a year! whatever, without knowing more on targeting, yields etc, difficult to say, what calcs they had in mind. The issue is the definition of tactical nukes widely varies from sub KT to even a few 100 KT's. It varies based on who you speak to, when and situation. So, nothing much to comment on those numbers, except to note, why will you do a tac nuke campaign for multiple years!!! I just found the basic approach ludicrous.
On the 2nd para, there are two comments, since the US has a desire to use its conventional power to achieve great power goals, the "normalization" of WMD is an unacceptable level of damage to them so, agree with that view, from a US perspective. On the reaction part, I already said tactical or value targeting, reaction to WMD use has to be factored in.
OT PS: I have a very low opinion of US strategic thinking, for crying sake they did not realize that Vietnamese were fighting for their own freedom against a foreign power in their own land. The subsequent rise of the Khmer Rouge in neighboring Cambodia, leading to the death of a further million+ is also to an extent due to the actions/missteps of the US. While they just watched the carnage, it was the Vietnamese, who ended the Khmer Rouge regime.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 19:19
by ShauryaT
nam wrote:
Value target the cities or other places? US cannot value target Vietcong who are spread around the forest. What if NV refuse to surrender and ask Soviet to provide nukes to retaliate?
The tactical nuke output in KT is close to "strategic nuke" used on Japan.
Either ways, Russia would have given nukes to viet cong, as US would have already shaken the "apple cart".
Once you target command and control and population centers, what is there for any army to protect, except vast pieces of land?
Reactions are to be factored in when using a nuke, tactical or strategic. The Soviets have to factor a reaction to their own population centers too!! What would have happened has very little certainty to it? The only thing I agree with in the report is once this genie is out of the bottle, controlling its action-reaction sequences is extremely difficult. The US is better served to exercise its power without a WMD escalation and as proven by N. Korea, one of the best ways to keep the US out of your zone of influence is to acquire nukes and be willing to use them like a mad animal with no care for life or limb. N.Korean regime future is safe from a conventional attack!!
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 18 Jan 2018 20:42
by nam
The escalation is the precise reason US could not use nukes. Tactical or not.
There is no wining the war, after counter value targeting. US was not going to go home "victorious" after nuking NV cities.
It is a apple cart. If Pakistan uses TNW and gets away with it, then TNW will become a acceptable war fighting weapon. The only way big powers can make nuke not worth it is by keeping the non-war fighting.
North Korea nukes don't matter. They were under Chinese nuke umbrella anyway. If US really wanted to bring down the NK regime, they would have done it long back.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 00:59
by ramana
nam you got it right.
In 1999 ACM Mehra was asked by some chatterrati at Stan madrasa was India developing TNW based on those low yield tests?
He said India considers the use of nukes at strategic as it takes it to wholly different level of warfare. And its only question of low and high yield.
That shut up all further questions.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 01:31
by ArjunPandit
ramana wrote:nam you got it right.
In 1999 ACM Mehra was asked by some chatterrati at Stan madrasa was India developing TNW based on those low yield tests?
He said India considers the use of nukes at strategic as it takes it to wholly different level of warfare. And its only question of low and high yield.
That shut up all further questions.
Ramana sir,
didnt p2 involve testing of Sub kt device for TNW?
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 03:42
by Rudradev
This must be seen in the light of the balance of military power during the 1990s.
Desert Storm cast its shadow over that decade: the spectre of a United States that had got over its post-Vietnam reluctance to engage in military adventures overseas, which was no longer deterred by the threat of military challenge from a now-defunct Soviet Union, and which had amassed so much military-technological superiority over other countries during the 1980s that it could make short work of Saddam's army (a well-trained, well-equipped, large, and battle-hardened fighting force by most standards).
Now consider this passage from the article posted earlier by Shiv:
If weapons comparable to the Honest John battlefield missile or the Davy Crockett nuclear bazooka made it into Viet Cong hands the results would have been catastrophic. "If about 100 weapons of 10-KT yield each could be delivered from base parameters onto all 70 [US] target areas in a coordinated strike," wrote the JASONs, "the U.S. fighting capability in Vietnam would be essentially annihilated [emphasis added]."
Even a few VC retaliatory nukes fired from time to time rather than all at once would have seriously degraded U.S. military capacity in Vietnam.
Therefore: a few tac nukes in Saddam's hands would have changed the course of the 1991 Persian Gulf War completely, making it much more costly for the Americans to win.
Desert Storm haunted military planners in many countries, including India. In purely conventional warfare, it seemed in the 1990s that the US was supreme, and no country could challenge or resist it. Add to this the increasing appetite of the US and its NATO allies for getting involved in foreign wars to balkanize other nations, including Yugoslavia. Also add the motivated campaign being waged by Robin Raphel and others on Pakistan's behalf to separate J&K from India.
It seemed clear that the US had to be deterred from any sort of conventional military adventurism against India. Deterring the US' conventional strength with strategic nukes was out of the question (we didn't have anything like a credible delivery mechanism with sufficient range, let alone a nuclear triad, at the time). The strategic nukes were for Pakistan and China, period.
So what would deter the US from mounting a "Desert Storm" against India on Indian territory? Only the capacity to massively punish their deployments in areas of high concentration... with tactical nukes.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 04:48
by ramana
Arjun Pandit. No.
Their purpose was different.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 05:27
by ShauryaT
RD: Does not square up. The word tac nukes are really not a factor of yield. The US, the original practitioner of tactical nukes had active plans to stop a Russian armored thrust (they had 20K+ tanks at one time) with air dropped gravity bombs of multiple 100KT's and termed them as tactical nukes. The context originally seems to have been as long as it does not reach population centers or C&C. India's POK1 OTOH was partially in reaction to the 1971 sailing of the USS Enterprise into the bay with a message that we do have an answer now and know how to keep you off bay.
As ramana says, the sub KT's (chotus) were for other reasons not TNW.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 05:49
by Rudradev
ST,
It's fine for Mehra saab to say that we see nukes as strategic onlee, and stop the conversation, when Stanchors try to pin him down to some specific doctrinal position on India's part. Fact is, a capacity once demonstrated (whether at POK1 or POK2) speaks for itself. Then anyone can think what they like. The range of options that were formerly in their pocket have become limited.
Nobody said tac nukes are about yield, btw. They are about specific mode of weaponisation, capacity for deployment at different nodes of the C&C structure than strategic nukes, etc.
I will add that the picture w.r.t. US is entirely different today than it was in the 1990s. America's stalemates/defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan have completely removed the sheen of invincible and irresistible conventional military supremacy. Russia with its victories in Georgia and Ukraine, and most dramatically its successes in Syria, has OTOH shown itself to be a very capable conventional military power.
India is a step away from gate-crashing into the super exclusive club of countries with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with the successful "first pre-induction trial" of Agni-V that, with a range of over 5,000 km, brings all of Asia and China within its nuclear strike capability.
The range of the missile places parts of Europe and Africa within reach but India's security concerns are closer home. Sources said India's most formidable missile will undergo one more pre-induction trial "within this year" before it is inducted into the Agni-V regiment already raised by the Tri-Service Strategic Forces Command (SFC) with the requisite command and control structures.
Once that happens, India will rub shoulders with countries the US, UK, Russia, China and France. While a belligerent North Korea over the last six-seven months has rattled US with tests of its two new ICBMs - Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 - expert opinion is divided whether they are fully-operational and deployed as of now.
On Thursday, in its first pre-induction trial conducted by the SFC, the 17-metre Agni-V was launched from a canister atop the road-mobile launcher from the Dr Abdul Kalam Island off the Odisha coast at 9.53am. The three-stage missile zoomed to a height of over 600-km in its parabolic trajectory and then splashed down around 4,900-km away towards Australia in the Indian Ocean barely 19 minutes later.
The missile's canister-launch version makes it deadlier because it gives the armed forces the requisite operational flexibility to swiftly transport and fire the missile from anywhere they want. "Since the missile is already mated with its nuclear warhead before being sealed in the canister, it drastically cuts down the response or reaction time for a retaliatory strike...only the authorised electronic codes have to be fed to unlock and prime it for launch," said a source.
India, of course, wants a credible strategic deterrent against an aggressive and expansionist China, which has a large arsenal of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The SFC already has regiments of the Prithvi-II (350-km), Agni-I (700-km), Agni-II (2,000-km) & Agni-III (3,000-km) missiles, which are mainly meant to deter Pakistan from any misadventure. The Agni-IV (4,000-km) and Agni-V (over 5,000-km), in turn, have been developed with China in mind.
Designed to carry a 1.5-tonne nuclear warhead, Agni-V has been tested four times in "developmental or experimental trials" earlier.
The missile was tested in an "open configuration" in April 2012 and September 2013, while it was test-fired from hermetically sealed canisters mounted on transport-cum-tilting launcher trucks in January 2015 and December 2016.
"The missile's flight performance was monitored by radars, range stations and tracking systems all through the mission. All mission objectives were successfully met. This successful test of Agni-V reaffirms the country's indigenous missile capabilities and further strengthens our credible deterrence," said a defence ministry official.
Though the DRDO has often proclaimed it can develop missiles with strike ranges of 10,000km to match the Chinese DF-31A (11,200km) and DF-41 (14,500km) missiles, the Indian defence establishment believes Agni-V is sufficient to take care of existing threat perceptions. There is, however, interest in ongoing DRDO work on developing "manoeuvring warheads or intelligent reentry vehicles" to defeat enemy ballistic missile defence systems, as well as MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) for the Agni missiles. An MIRV payload means one missile can carry several warheads, each for different targets.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 10:34
by shiv
ArjunPandit wrote:
didnt p2 involve testing of Sub kt device for TNW?
Subkiloton device was to prove the use of reactor grade Pu in bombs.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 19 Jan 2018 13:04
by Haridas
ArjunPandit wrote:didnt p2 involve testing of Sub kt device for TNW?
Sub kt was to caliberate Eqn of State of verious fissile materials isotopes (except u235).
Now where all would one apply that ?
Make a system or a system of systems!
There is, however, interest in ongoing DRDO work on developing "manoeuvring warheads or intelligent reentry vehicles" to defeat enemy ballistic missile defence systems, as well as MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) for the Agni missiles. An MIRV payload means one missile can carry several warheads, each for different targets.
Oh my God...
Indian deterrence never planned for & would never need high yield weapons , nor MIRV , certainly not MaRV, such gyan was preached to the unwashed. Reality has presented crows for breakfast, lunch & dinner
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 02:08
by ArjunPandit
Haridas wrote:
ArjunPandit wrote:didnt p2 involve testing of Sub kt device for TNW?
Sub kt was to caliberate Eqn of State of verious fissile materials isotopes (except u235).
Now where all would one apply that ?
Make a system or a system of systems!
Sir, With my little googling, I am not able to find any of this.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 03:26
by Amber G.
Haridas wrote:
ArjunPandit wrote:didnt p2 involve testing of Sub kt device for TNW?
Sub kt was to caliberate Eqn of State of verious fissile materials isotopes (except u235).
Now where all would one apply that ?
Make a system or a system of systems!
What exactly does this mean? Source? TIA.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 04:41
by ramdas
@haridas: I would agree that A-5 was never meant to be MIRV. Are you saying that India would never develop MIRV when even TSP is doing the same ? Deterrence would never be credible down the line without MIRV (even if it is today). If only 25 kt fission weapons are to be used, why the large 1500 kg payloads ?
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 13:48
by Haridas
Ramdas ji, I was only scoffing at some web foroum honerables who were proffing the quoted wisdom to unwashed beings on the forum, some years ago during sizzle fizzle skirmish.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 17:37
by ramdas
Haridasji,
1) Understood. The large single warhead payloads appear to be something not tested in 1998 (maybe a smaller version of these was tested). Boosted fission weapons would expend fissile material unless they are sloika type...
2) Ultimately what is required is the ability to destroy every PRC provincial capital. This alone will ensure credible deterrence that covers up for our conventional weakness as well...
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 20:12
by shiv
ramdas wrote: If only 25 kt fission weapons are to be used, why the large 1500 kg payloads ?
How about 3 puny 25 kts MIRV to land on 3 parts of a megacity. Will have the effect of one 150 kt
Assuming that our nuclear scientists remain morons/liars and expressions like equations of state are only for showing off and they can't get anything better than Pokhran 1.5
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 21:00
by RoyG
shiv wrote:
ramdas wrote: If only 25 kt fission weapons are to be used, why the large 1500 kg payloads ?
How about 3 puny 25 kts MIRV to land on 3 parts of a megacity. Will have the effect of one 150 kt
Assuming that our nuclear scientists remain morons/liars and expressions like equations of state are only for showing off and they can't get anything better than Pokhran 1.5
At some point we'll know for sure. Until then we will continue to have adequate deterrence against China. The fact that India is still around is a testament to it. If we need to test we'll do it when the time is right.
Re: Deterrence
Posted: 20 Jan 2018 22:50
by Haridas
ramdas wrote: If only 25 kt fission weapons are to be used, why the large 1500 kg payloads ?
Why ask difficult questions? The 1500 kg is an inconvenient data fact, that is hard to wish away who have hypothesized 25 kt armoury, and or india not needing MIRV. Head I win, Tail you lose assertion.
