Re: Deterrence
Posted: 12 May 2018 07:26
A series of short opinion pieces
https://theprint.in/talk-point/20-years ... r/57493/#4
https://theprint.in/talk-point/20-years ... r/57493/#4
New Delhi’s calculation was simple but profound: any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by Beijing against India involved a risk of nuclear retaliation from the great powers. This minimal risk rather than absolute credibility of great power response was sufficient to deter the Chinese decision-makers. This assumed both rationality and restraint on Beijing’s part. India’s historical experiences vis-à-vis Pakistan however betrayed both these assumptions. Pakistani nuclear capability was solely directed against New Delhi. Given its penchant for risk-taking, it also posed a fundamental threat to the Indian state. Therefore, to deter Pakistan, an indigenous nuclear capability was a must.
India’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis China and Pakistan therefore explain the gradual evolution of India’s nuclear weapons program in the first two decades after the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 and the catalytic response to Pakistani nuclear program thereafter. Not all nuclear adversaries are the same after all. Two decades after Pokhran-II, New Delhi’s nuclear policy is still coming to terms with two different kinds of adversaries on its frontiers, despite occasional talks of a ‘two front’ war.
Brinkmanship is the deliberate creation of a recognisable risk, a risk that one does not completely control.
Cultivating irrationality at the highest level of government benefits
a State’s bargaining power.
The Cuban blockade
was an act of brinkmanship since the US, instead of succumbing to the pressure from the USSR, decided to see how the Soviets would react to the US stopping their vessels from entering Cuba.
When non- strategic or local subjects become the drivers of brinkmanship, there is a great possibility of
loss of credibility either due to lack of interest or repetition fatigue of the international community.
The power to bargain must be credible. When a threat or demand is made, there must be reason
to believe that the adversary will agree to the demands raised and there must be credibility in the power to back the threat issued.
The 1971 Indo-Pak War was not a classic case of brinkmanship in the initial stages of the crisis.
Pakistani officials have threatened to use nuclear weapons should India invade, after India’s current Army Chief Gen Rawat admitted to having secret military plans for attacking its neighbour in the event of a crisis.
That Pakistan has not mastered the strategy of brinkmanship is evident from the many failures of the strategy in the past 70 years, and that it lost half its territory was the biggest failure.
In the past, only on one occasion was Pakistan faced with a strategic choice to threaten, or pose a dangerous option, i.e. when its integrity was under attack internally in East Pakistan, but it chose to attack India, instead of combatting the internal rebellion, and eventually lost the war.
Whilst prosecuting a proxy terror war on India, Pakistan has linked the sub-conventional domain to conventional and nuclear escalation – a strategy that is fraught with danger, as no nation in the past has done so.
In a nuclear environment, the greatest vulnerability of Pakistan is the geographical layout of the country, the linearity of its urban centres and communication systems.
An important lesson for leaders in South Asia is to understand the limits of brinkmanship, and that it cannot be a solution for all problems or policies.
Nuclear weapons are meant to ensure national security and peace through deterrence, and not support sub- conventional war.
To practise the strategy of brinkmanship, there is a critical need to develop tools to war- game the plan to
be executed. Today, advanced tools, are available to war-game situations and the escalation matrix. Once these tools are exploited, the national leadership will be in a position to develop a rational (may be, irrational) and viable strategy.
The brinkmanship strategy is a deliberate choice of a dangerous policy to achieve a strategic outcome, and is based on manipulating the shared risk of war, creating a threat to force the adversary to relent, or else, the consequences are far worse than mere loss of face.
In South Asia, nuclear brinkmanship is a strategy fraught with danger and unimaginable consequences. The Pakistan Army is not well versed in levels of statecraft that a nuclear crisis needs.
In another news:...Stifled because the thermonuclear device tested on May 11, 1998 was a dud
Immediately after the 1998 tests, and more strongly during the debate on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States, several voices, including some from within the atomic energy establishment, raised question marks over the success of the nuclear tests, especially that of the thermonuclear device. Can those debates be set to rest?
In my mind, that debate does not exist. But I know why it has arisen. It has happened because of the placement of the thermonuclear device. The fission device and the fusion device were placed in different locations, more than a mile away. The thermonuclear device was placed in a much harder environment, in much harder rock. The ground movement that you observe after the test is a very strong function of the placement. What happened is that a crater had developed at the site of the fission device, while at the location of thermonuclear device, there was a mound. Now, a crater is a sign of higher yield. As the yield increases, the ground shape that you get moves from a mound towards a crater. So the argument was that the fusion device had produced a lower yield than the fission device. the way to resolve this is to actually go by instrumental readings. We can also simulate the earth movement back to see whether the calculated ground shape matches with the actual ground shape. And all this exercise has been done.
There were constraints under which the tests were carried out. The two devices had to be tested together, because if one was tested first, it would have damaged the other. Also, the total yield had to be controlled, it could not have exceeded a certain number because there were populated villages nearby and they had to be protected.
Why was the thermonuclear device so important to us?
Well, there were people who did not want the thermonuclear tests. There was this argument that if you carry out two similar tests successfully, you establish the reliability better. But then, it would have also meant that we restrict our deterrence capability to only 15 kilo tons. Nuclear weapons are called the weapons of peace, because of the deterrence they offer. If you want an effective deterrence, you must have a capability higher than your opponent.
wig wrote:http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/commen ... 87347.html
Analyst Vipin Narang, MIT-based nuclear analyst, writes that even as the majority of Pakistani strategists see the TNW mindset as providing ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ and a counterweight to deter Cold Start ambitions, others like former SPD, Brigadiers Naeem Salik and Feroz Khan doubt whether Pakistan has the ‘wherewithal for battlefield management and escalation control’. Analyst Micheal Krepon backs the majority global view that TNWs are ‘unwise’ and ‘strategically unsound’. This opinion is reinforced by simulation studies of TNW hit tank losses which have been found insignificant. This is because the overpressure of 45psi needed to destroy tanks will need a literal rain of TNWs which is not possible.
Let ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons be Pakistan’s favourite oxymoron even as the newly-formed Defence Planning Committee refines NFU/Cold Start. Work is also needed on our SIOP for the time when the nuclear armageddon dawns.
probably because blast radius is too small to take out a column if the tanks are not closely clustered together.Rudradev wrote:Why is 45 psi overpressure needed to destroy a tank? Does it need to be physically disintegrated?
The heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. For the Pakis, TNWs are a far better option than any conventional shell or ATGM to effectively kill large columns of advancing Indian armour.
The "immediate" heat produced (within seconds) which is good enough to roast right-away is mainly due to gamma rays which will be blocked by tank's armor. Temperature inside the tank will go higher later due to secondary fires and conduction/convection but that may take time - minutes-- and may be not serious enough if the tank is fire-proofed with good insulations or people may have time to get out.I would think the heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. In WW2, flamethrowers and even molotov cocktails were efficient tank killers for this very reason.
A TNW depending upon how one factors it but in most cases, less than 5 KT has a "blast" radius of only about 120 M. A tank regiment about 50 tanks would easily occupy a formationRudradev wrote:Why is 45 psi overpressure needed to destroy a tank? Does it need to be physically disintegrated?
I would think the heat produced by a TNW will roast alive the crew of every tank in its blast radius. In WW2, flamethrowers and even molotov cocktails were efficient tank killers for this very reason.
For the Pakis, TNWs are a far better option than any conventional shell or ATGM to effectively kill large columns of advancing Indian armour.
If I understand you correctly this is not the case..Rudradev wrote: Also, as I understand it the radius wherein thermal radiation fro. a nuclear explosion is enough to set structures on fire is considerably larger than the radius in which kinetic blast effects are enough to physically destroy those same structures. May be true of tanks as well?
Chart shows the damage radius of nukes of different yields. Subkiloton Tac Nukes <1kt not even listed
Bingo!! A key point missed by many, many "experts". The Warsaw tank force numbered in the 10's of thousands and the landscape, huge swaths in central Europe. Another key point often missed is, it was easy for US to transfer its tac nukes to the European front but soon the Europeans realized who's land will be made unlivable and they were the first ones to howl against these TNW's and get them out of commission.ramana wrote:
I have said elsewhere that nuke powers need space or area to be able to use the nukes against invading forces.
I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji: A couple of comments. The paper below estimates a yield of up to 10 KT within that 30 CM frame, based on the W-33 design. Since much of this miniaturization needs advanced designs, which requires testing to be credible, we can probably discount the sophistication of Pakistani TNW and IMO, rule out sub KT yields.
Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability
Thank Amber G. Will add this paper to my large collection of nuke related materialAmber G. wrote:Shiv: saw the video. only comment: very good.
Also please see, if you have not, the paper I posted for tanks (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a112303.pdf).
The data is old but still very valid. (we can fairly accurately model the effect etc without trying an actual bomb) Modern tanks are better (much better) shielded so radiation damage is less than than the paper says.)
For blast radius/damage etc type of bomb (fission vs fusion vs dirty/non-dirty) obviously matters a lot.
Not really, you could cold test the flying plate design. DAHRT can probably help. Regardless, I don't think Pakistan would ever use it against Indian forces nor would India think about seriously launching incursions past 15-20 km. They probably reached some sort of city buster threshold which Massa and Israelis aren't comfortable with so they are just building these sling shot weapons. I still think they are more threatening against Punjabs adjoining territories which are itching for independence. A hit from one of these things on Karachi could probably kill 50,000 people. So perhaps it could indeed be a necessity given the constraints imposed upon them. Can't think of any other reason why Pakistan would build them.shiv wrote:I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji: A couple of comments. The paper below estimates a yield of up to 10 KT within that 30 CM frame, based on the W-33 design. Since much of this miniaturization needs advanced designs, which requires testing to be credible, we can probably discount the sophistication of Pakistani TNW and IMO, rule out sub KT yields.
Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability
Basically that Plutonium has to be squeezed to make it explode. The best method to squeeze it is a ball - with explosive packed around a plutonium ball and some other stuff to help. This typically requires a big ball. Ball is worst shape for small diameter. If you try and make the ball smaller by putting less explosive (which is the bulkiest part) then you get a fizzle. Of course - you could use a city buster on the battlefield - but that screws own forces as well. Most tactical nukes are deliberate fizzles and are expensive in terms of wasted Plutonium. The low yield makes sure that own forces are not blinded and killed by one's own nuke.
There are other non ball designs for TNW- but those require testing. One this is called a "flying plate" which Hoodbhoy mentioned in an article long ago. But I doubt if Nasr has flying plate design. Another design is oval rather than ball but that is tricky and requires much testing
It is easier to build city busters than small TNWs that work. The city buster threshold was crossed by Pakistan long ago. Of course I consider 10 kt as city buster because I would not like to see 50,000 dead in Bengaluru and then laugh at the puny yield.RoyG wrote: Not really, you could cold test the flying plate design. DAHRT can probably help. Regardless, I don't think Pakistan would ever use it against Indian forces nor would India think about seriously launching incursions past 15-20 km. They probably reached some sort of city buster threshold which Massa and Israelis aren't comfortable with .
This also fits in well with the Chinese connection where flying would be frying rotiramana wrote:I think in honor of Pakis begging for roz ki roti whe should call the it 'flying roti' concept.
shiv wrote: This also fits in well with the Chinese connection where flying would be frying roti
I was not thinking of a fizzle derived sub kt yield, quite ingenious even for Pakis to come to those levels. My read of the situation leads me to be inclined towards an HEU based gun-type design for the NASR and not a linear implosion Pu device, let alone a boosted Pu device. I also lean on the theory that they have taken the basic CHIC-4 design they received from the PRC and have sought to miniaturize it for their various missiles including the NASR. I also leave open the possibility that the NASR threat is a bluff. Their WG Pu stocks are quite limited and due to the high inefficacy of yield ratios for those dimensions and the untested nature of their designs, unlikely the Pakis are using a Pu based device in such a miniaturized form. Their best bet without testing is to field some showcase HEU based NASR's.shiv wrote: I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.
HEU derived gun design is very unlikely because of the size. It will not fit into Nasr. Gun designs do not need compression but the mass of Uranium total will have to be about 50 kg or more. Even if the mass is divided into 2 equal halves to be joined up on firing the radioactive shielding required and the gun barrel and the end bit where the Uranium that is shot in would have to be strong enough to withstand a 15-20 kg Uranium artillery shell type shot. The mass has to come together very quickly to explode, and for that it is literally an artillery shell mass of HEU fired into another one - so the other one should not disintegrate and needs to be housed in an appropriately strong container while carrying enough shielding for the damn mass to not be radiating everything around. Lead is great for shielding but too soft otherwise. We are talking a lot of metal there. If the HEU masses are too close they radiate each other and may start glowing. Too big for Nasr. A 50 kg ball of Uranium is nearly 7 inches in diameter and highly radioactive. Radiation is detectable from the outside with even 4 inches of lead shielding and that would up the diameter to more than 30 cm and the weight far more than the Nasr can carry. Makes zero sense to use a gun design HEU for tac nuke of Nasr dimensions.ShauryaT wrote:I was not thinking of a fizzle derived sub kt yield, quite ingenious even for Pakis to come to those levels. My read of the situation leads me to be inclined towards an HEU based gun-type design for the NASR and not a linear implosion Pu device, let alone a boosted Pu device. I also lean on the theory that they have taken the basic CHIC-4 design they received from the PRC and have sought to miniaturize it for their various missiles including the NASR. I also leave open the possibility that the NASR threat is a bluff. Their WG Pu stocks are quite limited and due to the high inefficacy of yield ratios for those dimensions and the untested nature of their designs, unlikely the Pakis are using a Pu based device in such a miniaturized form. Their best bet without testing is to field some showcase HEU based NASR's.shiv wrote: I think you have got it wrong about subkiloton and sophistication. It requires great sophistication to squeeze 10 kt out of a 30 cm diameter missile. It is the diameter that is the problem. Plutonium has to be squeezed efficiently from all directions to get the maximum yield. Or else it will be subkiloton. It is not that difficult to get a subkiloton yield if the bomb is a fizzle.You can plan 10 kt and get 0.1 kt.
You mean megatonne languageRoyG wrote: BK needs to chill with the megaton language.
shiv wrote:You mean megatonne languageRoyG wrote: BK needs to chill with the megaton language.