Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -II

[RajeshA]

Ensuring Maritime Access to India's Northeast
Rakhine History

Published Mar, 2004
By Narinjara News
The Arakanese Student and Youth Movements: ArakanPost

The Arakanese Dilemma: What is to be done? This question haunts every
generation of the Arakanese since their national kingdom Rakkhapura lost her western
territory to the Mongol Empire in 1660 and finally independence to the Myanmar
colonialist in 1784. It came under the British rule in 1826 and lasted till 1948. Inside that
vast British Empire which ruled half the world, Rakkhapura was just a piece of broken
arrow, very insignificant and useless. She had already lost her original name and by then
was known as Arakan, her Persian name. Most historians believe that Arakan is the
English name for the Rakhaingpray. As a matter of fact it is the Persian name.
Rakkhapura entered into the world map as Arakan in the days of King Mun Saw Mwan in
1430. He was multilingual with good proficiency in Bengali, Hindi, and Persian, on the
top of his mother tongue Rakhaing. Among his advisors were a good number of highly
educated Muslims and his royal international language was Persian. Being influenced by
the Muslim Mogol Empire, the Persian language was adopted by the Rakhaing as well as
the Bama kings of those days. It was the fashion of the time. Because of this, Rakkhapura
was known as Arakan.

Deeply lost in the world of colonialism, the Arakanese did not know if they
should fight for sovereign independence or stay inside India or Burma. In fear of the
Muslims and the Hindus they opted to join hands with the Buddhist Bama (Myanmar) on
the basis common religion. It was a religious decision. The Bama (Myanmar) is seen as a
lesser threat by the Arakanase. Only a small faction, for example U Seinda party, opted
for sovereign independence to no avail. U Uttama Bhikhu was the only one who favoured
remaining part of India. Subsequently a vast majority of the Arakanese youths and
intellectuals joined Anti-Fascist and People Freedom League (AFPFL) at its birth in
1943.

The Arakanese and AFPFL. Such big figures as Sir Paw Tun, Sir Tun Aung
Kyaw, ICS U May Aung, Daw Mra Sein ( May Aung’s daughter), U Aung Zan Wai, U
Nyo Tun, and U Ba Saw (Kyauk Pyu) became active at the national level as the AFPFL
members. Regionally, Pha-Hsa-Pa-La Shwe Phaw, Daw Kra Zan, U Pyinnya Thiha, and
Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung were well known. U Nyo Tun joined the Burmese delegation that
negotiated with the Allied Supreme Command for military alliance to oust the Japanese
from Burma. He politically supervised the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. U Ba Saw
parachuted down as the Allied Secret Agent into Arakan in 1944. The guerrilla
commander-in-chief Bo Gri Kra Hla staged offensive guerrilla attacks all over Arakan
hand in hand with the Allied Forces. By the end of December 1944 the Japanese were all
uprooted from Arakan. The Bama Army led by Bogyoke Aung San entered the scene in
March 1945. The 27th of March is now observed and celebrated as the Myanmar Armed
Forces Day.

The strong Arakanese presence in AFPFL rendered credibility and strength to the
Bama leadership. Their support made AFPFL and Bogyoke Aung San successful in two
great endeavours; first, they helped to win recognition by the British government that
produced the Provisional Government of Burma, and second, the confidence of the
federating Frontier Nations. The 1947 Panglong Agreement between the federating
Frontier Nations and Burma would not have been possible in the absence of the
Arakanese in AFPFL and Aung San cabinet. Without the Panglong Agreement the
British parliament would have delayed Burma’s independence; the Union of Burma
would not have come into existence either.

[brihaspati]

RajeshA ji,
please explore the Brit connection to the Ne Win movement, and the history of the split within the Burmese communist movement. There were two factions. The transition from colony to post-colony, British role in that, and a much longer historical financial and drugs flow connection in the east-west flow (and of course, the Brit, Chinese, role in that).

Not entirely sure that it should be discussed on open forum, but why not!

[RajeshA]

Ensuring Maritime Access to India's Northeast
Rakhine History

RajeshA ji,
please explore the Brit connection to the Ne Win movement, and the history of the split within the Burmese communist movement. There were two factions. The transition from colony to post-colony, British role in that, and a much longer historical financial and drugs flow connection in the east-west flow (and of course, the Brit, Chinese, role in that).

Not entirely sure that it should be discussed on open forum, but why not!

brihaspati garu,
I'll be doing that in due course!

If you don't mind, I'll be putting up some posts on Rakhine history, to better understand the dynamics of the area, so one can better formulate some strategy!

Again this fits in with your suggestion, that India should explore attaining a corridor from Indian Northeast to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar.

By Shwe Lu Maung (Copyright owner)
Burma - Nationalism and Ideology

3.6 Arakanese vs Bhama (Page 28)

The Chin, the Kachin, the Shan, the Kaya, the Mon and the Arakanese (Rakhine) were caught unexpectedly in the great turmoil. However the Rakhine communists had started their proletariat revolution along with their mother communist parties. But the war in Arakan became furious only when Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung and his army turned against the Rangoon Government. During the Japanese occupation when the Burma Independent Army had been formed the Arakanese Battalion remained detached from General Aung San's command. In practice it was under the command of Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung who took his political direction from U Nyo Tun, an Arakanese patriot and close associate of Bhama politicians including General Aung San. The Arakanese Battalion was the first to be recognised and armed by the Allied Forces in their offensive to drive the Japanese out of Burma. As a matter of fact, the Arakanese had been given to understand that they would become independent separately according to the Atlantic Charter which promised independence to the colony which helped the Allied Forces win the war. However the political leaders who contacted the Allied Forces in India did not clarify the condition of independence as to whether it would be Arakan separately or Arakan inside Burma. Arakanese civilians and soldiers alike left this matter in the hands of a few Arakanese political leaders. The Arakanese representative U Aung Zan Wai was supposed to raise this question at the Cabinet meeting. Unfortunately before he was bold enought to raise the question, except for two ministers, one U Aung Zan Wai himself, the entire cabinet including General Aung San were killed in an assassination masterminded by Kaloon U Saw on 19th July 1947. Then again U Aung Zan Wai set the question aside in view of the national emergency and turmoil. Perhaps he was simply unlucky. He retired from politics without getting the chance to raise the question of Autonomous Arakan. The Arakanese gossip about their leader, "What had he been doing? We did not get Autonomy nor a martyr!"

Under these condtions U Nyo Tun, the politico-military leader of the Arakanese planned a military stance to make Arakan independent. He directed Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung to execute his grand idea. Accordingly Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung ordered his commanders to occupy Arakan which was guarded by the regular Burma Defence Army. Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung and his commanders were successful in seizing Kyauk Oru and Sandoway head quarters, but failed to capture Saite Tway (Akyab) - the Divisional Head Quarter. Thus, instead of becoming the Commander-in-Chief of Independent Arakan, Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung became a veteran guerrilla. He retreated from Akyab and went underground to lead the guerrilla warfare. The mastermind, U Nyo Tun, stayed back in the comfort of Rangoon. Thus Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung found himself with an army, but without a political guide. He however, wanted to remain independent as Rakhine Army. But his commanders wanted to be in the mainstream of Burma politics, and decided to join the Pyithu Yebaw und Bo Po Kun. Thus all Arakanese armed insurrection against Rangoon came under the command of the communist parties or the Pyithu Yebaw.

3.7 Islam vs Buddhism (Page 29)

The upheaval of a group of Arakanese Muslims under the banner of the Mujahidens brought about the religious ambitions of the Muslims in Burma. Jihad means a holy war in the cause of Islam, and the Mujahidens mean the soldiers of the Holy War. But the people of Burma do not understand this. To them Mujahids mean muslim foreigners.

With the establishment of Islam in East Bengal, starting from about the twelfth century, Arakan has been neighbouring muslims without any conflict. East Bengal, present Bangladesh was the biggest Buddhist center in the eastern Indian subcontinent up to the 6th or 7th century when Hinduism revived. Perhaps, it was the arrogance of the caste system that helped the establishment of Islam and Muslim Brotherhood in East Bengal. This was strengthened with the presence of strong Mughal Empire. Sultan of Gour had helped the Arakanese King Mun Saw Mon to recover his throne from the hands fo the usurpers after an interregnum of about 24 years in AD 1428. Since then Muslim soldiers had been serving in Arakan. However the actual increase in the number of Muslims took place during the British rule which integrated the whole of Burma with India. During the 1930s Muslims of Arakan were greatly influenced by the Muslim League of Mr. Jinnah of India. The formation of Pakistan as a Muslim state stimulated them to demand the same inside Burma. They believed they were supported by Pakistan and her people on the basis of Muslim Brotherhood.

Up to 1955 the Mujahiden posed a serious law and order problem, though they did not have much significance as a military threat to Rangoon as posed by other antigovernment forces. In general, the local Arakanese Buddhist community suffered a great deal of atrocities inflicted by them. This left a scar in the relation between the Buddhist and Muslim communities, especially in Arakan.

The Mujahiden failed to achieve the support of other Arakanese and Burmese Muslims, and their insurrection came to an end around 1955. Had they been successful, they might have annexed Maung Daw and Bu This Daw area with Pakistan. It would not be wrong to see the Mujahiden upheaval as an activity of Islamic expansionism.

Although the Mujahiden faded away, the inspiration of the Muslims in Arakan to maintain their separate identity did not evaporate. From religion, they took refuge in nationalism as will be discussed in the sections under the heading of "War of Independent Burma - Second Phase".

6.4 Religions in War (Page 60)

However Muslim movement in the British India for separate Muslim Nation brought about great impact upon the Muslims of Burma. Especially Arakanese Muslims, being in touch with the Muslim League in East Bengal, were very much motivated with the idea of an independent Muslim state.

The motivation generated into Jihad or Holy War in 1948-54 after independence. The Mujahids demanded a separate Muslim state inside Burma. It is not wrong to see the movement of the Mujahideens as a continuation of the struggle of the Muslim League which was successful in creating a Muslim state in the name of Pakistan. Muslims inside Arakan were stimulated and patronized by the Muslim League and Pakistan. They wanted to form a country under the name of Arakanistan. They believed that the Maung Daw and Bu Thi Down townships could be separated from Burma and annexed to Pakistan as an autonomous state. But this was such an unrealistic dream that they failed. The majority of Arakanese Muslims were not sure what it was they wanted. While it was true that they were in the minority, and the Arakanese Buddhists in the majority, they were not religiously suppressed. They had as many mosques as the Buddhists had monastries. The Buddhists happily partook of the Muslim Kurubani meat during Bakari Eid. As such there was no basis for a war based on religion. Subsequently the Mujahidens failed. But later they revitalized their struggle under the flag of Nationalism with the name of Rohingya.

While the Mujahiden subsided, East Pakistan faced poverty and famine and an amazing rate of population growth. Her next-door neighbour, Arakan in Burma was the rice bowl of the number one rice exporter of that time. Logically and naturally enough the East Pakistanis entered Arakan for their survival and possible future. This was helped by the corrupt immigration, army, police and civilian officers. As all the officers were Bhama, the Arakanese took it as a manipulation of the Bhama to destroy them. This view could be said to be true in the context of the 1978 Muslim refugee crisis which will be mentioned later.

Worst of all, U Kyaw Nyein, then Minister of Home Affairs, himself was believed to have masterminded the illegal entry of East Pakistanis into Arakan. He managed to smuggle in thousands of Muslims from East Pakistan to help vote for his party and candidate in the elections of 1956 and 1960. Maung daw and Bu Thi Down had been the stronghold of U Kyaw Nyein. When the AFPFL split into two, this border area remained loyal to U Kyaw Nyein. The Arakanese regard U Jyaw Nyein as their main enemy. The fact must not be overlooked that most of the Buddhists moved out that area during the Mujahid insurrection. Thus the vacant land was easily occupied by the newcomers who found their lives much more comfortable tha in East Pakistan.

After a short period of prosperity, every thing started a degenerate as the Burmese Way to Socialism came in. As Arakan is the least developed province in Burma, the economical hardship was worst here. Subsequently a large number of people, Buddhists and Muslims alike, migrated into Burma Proper, Rangoon and lower Burma have been the most developed areas.

The 1963-64 nation-wide census revealed a large number of Arakanese Muslims scattered about in Rangoon and Delta area. This caused considerable alarm to Bhama Buddhist authorities. The the Ne Win regime imposed a law which restricted the movement of Muslim in Arakan, especially prohibiting the movement out of Akyab District towards east. Thus the Muslims were put into a sort of imprisonment since 1964. The authorities however, could not stop all migration effectively as all the routes could not be closed. The late 1960s saw a sharp decline in economy, bringing about large-scale smuggling across Burma-Thai border. Arakan became the poorest province in the country, with an annual per capita income about $90.00, that is, well below the national standard of about $120.00 at that time.

Thus the Arakanese were forced to move out of their area. Especially those who had to struggle hard, left for the new, green pastures which were rising in eastern Burma such as the Shan and Karen states and the Moulmein area.

In the 1974 census, the authorities again found out that Arakanese Muslims had spread up to these eastern borders and other commercially mobile areas such as Mandalay, Pegu, Prome, Moulmein, Bassein, etc. Ne Win, the socialist, did not want that. The Muslims should be in Arakan only so that the Arakanese Buddhists and Arakanese Muslims could be used against each other. This was the best way to keep the national liberation movement of the Arakanese checked. The authorities were not prepared to allow the Muslims to compete and occupy their Bhama commercial spots. It should not be overlooked that General Ne Win drove out all Indian, Pakistani and Chinese businessmen after confiscating their properties. This example was copied by General Idi Amin of Uganda about a decade later. Subsequently, the military regime imposed tighter restrictions on the movement of the Muslims. They could not even move inside their township or from village to village. Thus they were virtually imprisoned.

Gradually the Muslims came to realize that they had to forge unity with the Arakanese Buddhists and oppose the military regime together. With this vision, many Muslims joined the Arakan national liberation forces. There were about 50 Muslim guerrillas in the Arakan National United Organisation led by Bo Gri Kra Hla Aung during 1967. Similarly the Arakan National Liberation Party led by U Maung Scin Nyunt patronised Muslim guerrillas who emerged under the name of Rohingya.

Such an alliance alarmed the Rangoon regime. Meanwhile the emergence of the Arakan Independence Organisation/Army and Arakan Liberation Party under the collaboration with Kio and KNU respectively added much worry to the junta. In 1977 the Ne Win forces wiped out the main army of the AIO and ALP, killing their leaders San Kyaw Tun and Khaing Moe Lung respectively along with about 300 men. This event spread a cloud of misery over the Arakanese population. At the same time, a coup attempt by the Arakanese was foiled. This coup had been planned by Aung Sein Tha, Htin Lin and Kyaw Hla (a Muslim). The elites of the Arakan were put on trial with much torture.

Aware that the deaths of their leaders would generate an armed retaliation General Ne Win launched a major offensive under the code name of "King Dragon Offensive" against the remnants of the Arakanese liberation forces. In Arakan as in many other parts of Burma various small villages spread along the river valleys and mountain ranges according to the convenience of fishing and different kind agricultural interest. These villages were the main sources of the food supply and served as contact points of the national liberation forces. On the other hand the army could not be spread that wide to watch the movement of the villagers, who were the sympathisers of the guerrillas. In order to control things, Ne Win ordered that small villages be abolished and concentrated in one large village which was fenced and stockaded with only one gate. Subsequently, hundreds of villagers were uprooted by force and driven into the stockaded villages. Opposition and disobedience were met with stern and severe punishment.

The report of the Arakan National Liberation party which was dispatched directly from the head quarters gave atrocities of theis campaign which is still going on.

About 200,000 Muslim refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 1978 will testify to it. In fact the ANLP failed to collect the data from the Muslims properly as they were also fleeing. As evidenced from the number of refugees, the Muslim villages destroyed could be much more than what is given here. Bangladesh was the witness. The Muslims were lucky. "Thanks to Almighty Allah", that there was a Muslim country next door, and Muslims of the world care for other Muslims at least during a crisis. However for the Arakanese Buddhists there was no place to run and the struggle continued between the Arakanese Buddhists and Bhama Buddhists. No help came from any part fo the world. Only the Arakan National Liberation Party has tried to record the atrocities as far as they could. They have even the names of the victims of rape and murder. In some cases even the names of the army officers who committed the crimes are available with dates and places. In the remote places of Arakan, Ne Win's army has been commmitting the worst crimes as the Arakanese are isolated from the rest of the world. Who knows what is happening in the interior of Burma?

While the villagers were suffering, Ne Win tried to get the support of city folks by showing that they were driving out Kalas - a word used derogatively for foreigners. This was entertained by some ignorant Arakanese in the cities. Meantime in 1978 the number of Muslim refugees reached the 200,000 mark. While the Dhaka government pleaded for help, the Arakanese refugees in Bangladesh who had taken refuge there from the invading Bhama in 1784 and stayed there since then, faced the wrath of the local Muslims. The Arakanese Buddhists owe a debt of gratitude to the Government of Bangladesh and the people including the then President Zia ur-Rahman. Especially the regional military commanders, police officers and civil administration must be given full credit for maintaining law and order.

The Arakan Independent Organisation believes that the Ne Win regime started thinking about pushing the Muslims out into Bangladesh after the 1974 census which revealed the migration fo the Muslims into Burma Proper and Eastern border. Whatever their origin, they are Burmese officially, and they have every right to move inside their own country from place to place, form east to west or from north to south. The restriction of their movement since 1964 and final forceful expulsion of the Arakanese Muslims is the infallible proof of the racist nature of the Bhama Military regime led by General Ne Win.

Since the day of independence, the Rangoon government has been keeping the Muslim population in Arakan as a balancing force against the Arakanese Buddhists to put down struggle for the National Liberation. But since 1964 the Buddhists and Muslims of Arakan forced unity. This caused alarm in Rangoon. When a group of Arakanese planned a coup with the alleged involvement of the Military Attache of the Bangladesh Embassy at Rangoon, Ne Win lost his temper and perhaps decided to teach a lesson to the Muslims and Bangladesh. But he overlooked the fact that Bangladesh had the Islamic world and the international community of justice behind.

At the peak of the refugee crisis, the Bangladesh Army stood with their fingers on the triggers of the border. Artillery, tank and armoured personnel carriers were urgently move to Cox's Bazar and Chittagong. Bangladesh though just 8 years old then, was not a weakling. At that time she had about 150,000 men in the regular army more or less the same size as the Rangoon Army. But Rangoon, in the presence of anti-government armed forces especially strong in the east, was not in a position to make war with young Bangladesh. Eventually Ne Win gave in to the international pressure and took back the Arakanese Muslims. But under what condition they are kept and how fairly they are treated is not known.

This was the great defeat for General Ne Win and his junta. Internationally he unveiled his true nature and at home in Arakan he left many villages burnt, many people killed, many women raped. Out of these atrocities the understanding and unity is the benefit brought about to the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Arakan. This was the first time both communities suffered from the cruely and torture of the Rangoon regime. On previous occasions the Rangoon Bhama governmetn played the game in such a way that if the Muslim community was at an advantage the Buddhist community suffered, and vice versa. This technique really is well-known divide and rule policy of the British colonists. The practice of this policy is just another evidence of colonialism exercised by Rangoon Bhama civilian or military regime upon non-Bhama population. Especially this Bhama colonialism became worse under General Ne Win who as a genius learnt military brutality from his Japanese masters, and administration brutality from the British.

It it the common practice of Ne Win to divert economic crisis into a concern of national security provoking patriotism. In 1967, during the rice crisis, he created the Chinese-Burman riots to defuse the crisis. When Muslims and Buddhists were gaining understanding among each other in the late 1960s and early 1970s he put a wedge between them, creating the Kala-Bhama and Kala-Rakhine issues and driving out the Muslims of Arakan in 1978, tacitly signalling that he wanted Burma free of Muslims. It was also whispered around that Arakan would be swallowed up by the Muslims with the backing of the neighbouring Muslim country, Bangladesh and the international Islamic organizations.

On the other hand, Ne Win started patronizing Buddhism by giving favours to elder monks and by building a Wizaya Pagoda in the early 1980s in conformity with the traditions of the Buddhist rulers of the past. This aroused religious fervor all over the country. Muslim-Buddhist riots broke out in many areas of lower Burma. Such religious colouration has great impact upon Arakan where the density of the Muslim population is the largest in Burma and the voice of an Islamic State is in the air. Thus the Arakanese became very protectively cautious and inclined towards Rangoon Regime as the protector of Buddhism whereas the Muslims became more Islamic. This is a vey sad event for Arakan as the first mosque and the first church of Burma were build around 1404 AD and 1630 AD by the Arakanese Buddhist Kings at the Capital Mrauk-U of the ancient Dhannyawadi Kingdom.

The discriminatory measures of the military regime have practically destroyed the Arakanese Liberation Movements due to the suspicion that has grown among the two communities. Since the crack-down of 1978 the Arakan guerrilla forces have not been able to make any come-back yet. This has helped Ne Win regime because the operation of even a number as small as 500 guerrillas in Arakan (west Burma) would have great strategical disadvantage to Rangoon in the face of the threat of 26,000 combined guerrilla forces in East and North Burma.

With the flaring up of the segregation feeling, the regime enforced in 1984 the new citizenship act which requires a person to have up to 200 years of family tree in Burma to become a first class citizen. This is aimed at the Chinese, Indian and Bengali immigrants.

Thus Ne Win utilizes religion and ethnicity as a weapon to remain in power. Such religious disharmony and discrimination violate the basic social and civil rights of Burmese citizens.

Summary:

• First Arakanese nationalists were in favor of Independence.
• Then they agreed to stay in Burma because of common Buddhism. But not all agreed, especially as Bhamans continued with step-motherly treatment of Arakanese.
• Then, the Bhama (Burmans) encouraged Bangladeshi immigration into Arakan, in order to create communal tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Arakan, so that the Arakanese Nationalists (Buddhists) do not succeed in getting independence.
• When the Muslims migrated into Burma Proper and East Burma in search of further economic prospects, and when Arakanese Buddhists and Arakanese Muslims (incl. immigrants) joined hands in opposing Bhamans, Bhamans became alarmed and started pushing Muslims out of Burma altogether.
• Then Bhamans tried to sell this policy based on preventing Islamization of Burma, or Muslim state in Arakan, which the Arakanese Buddhists also accepted and got closer to Bhamans.

[PrasadZ]

New Burma port 'to become trade corridor'

Ital-Thai Development, Thailand's half-century old construction firm, is building a deep-sea port linked to an industrial estate, with oil and gas pipelines, roads and railways on 40,000 hectares in Dawei, previously called Tavoy, in southern Burma.

A port on the south-western edge of mainland South East Asia would allow goods which are currently shipped from China, southwards around Singapore and through the Malacca Straits, to reach Suez and Europe by skipping a whole loop of sea travel.

[abhishek_sharma]

Ansari’s Bangladesh visit brings to the fore Tagore-Nazrul debate

[brihaspati]

^^^No worries! XXX billion Rupee investments in BD will take care of all that. Even if such demands are placed, they shoudl be ignored, almost as if they do not exist. Make it an article of faith, that such things do not exist, have no political undercurrent of support, and that the "Rabindrasangeet" being sung is an overwhelming sign of the permanent overwhelming dominance of Indophile, waning-Islamism, advanced linguistic and cultural manifestaion of the Indic - Bangladeshi "culture".

[brihaspati]

The "Arab spring" will not affect Pak - that is more or less our consensus. But can we really rule out effects of the unrest to the west within sections of Pak populations? It may not have pretensions of "liberal/proto-democratic" aspirations, but could it go against the "civilian regime" as a softer target compared to the PA? It would converge a lot of interests together - sections of the PA, the Dawaists, as well as so-called "liberals". Significant regime changes happen when most "interest" groups find it convenient to work towards eliminating a common "weaker" target or make a scapegoat.

[SwamyG]

An old video, which I hope many have watched before. For others who have not watched.....

[brihaspati]

In Bangladesh, the judiciary has finally declared "fatwa" to be acceptable - but it should only be acceptable from someone sufficiently "qualified" to do so. Moreover, it cannot be used to physically punish or humiliate someone and any intended punishment awarded has to be first taken to the courts.

What it appears to be is an inherently complex formulation of something that can never be clearly outlined. Fatwa is a legal and Islamic jurisprudential verdict - which is claimed to be valid as a law on all Muslims in the given region, and it becomes the duty of the Islamic state to carry it out or implement it. Fatwas need not be civil only, and could easily go into physical punishments for "crimes" that we mostly no longer treat as capital offence outside of mullahcracy.

Given the realities of BD society, it virtually acknowledges - even if in a very innocent way - the future potential growth of parallel authority of mullahcracy in parallel to the formal "modern" state, given that from Islamic viewpoint state is a fusion of theological, political and military repression and power in a single and preferably-theologian dictated authority.

But BD giving more space to the mullahs is actually good. It will help removing the wool which is often sought to be put on our eyes about BD long term trends.

[Klaus]

I wonder if we have modeled Iran meddling with or aiding the Hans in Sinkiang. After all, the Azeri Turks are part of the larger Turkic body including the Uighurs. Iranian duplicity is not very well known on the forum, largely because Paki duplicity appears so much closer (and larger) on the dorsal mirror!

[brihaspati]

^^^No reason to think of them as specially pure. I pointed out before that from their viewpoint - taking control of both sides of the gulf is a first priority, and second priority is to get rid of the beachhead of the west in ME - Israel. These are the two major traditional routes by which they were threatened, and they will do anything to try and capture. My projection was that they would even back up AQ or Talebs or Pak - whichever guarantees retreat of US from the gulf regions. Pak has a dual game to play - but why should not Iran use all the coins it has in its pocket?

[brihaspati]

Will Afghanistan return to a Taleban regime?

Apart from recent media reports of continuing, "more serious" efforts by the US to get the Talebans to negotiations, the Talebs appear to have adopted an overtly flexible approach in regards to social control.

http://theglobalrealm.com/2011/04/13/ta ... oft-power/

A Taleban leader was recently quoted by Afghan media outlets as saying the movement was not opposed to education and would protect schools in areas they controlled.

The announcement was welcomed by the education ministry in Kabul, and by President Hamed Karzai, who told university graduates that “if it is proved that [Taleban chief] Mullah Omar has really ordered the Taleban not to prevent children from accessing education, I will thank him”.

In a telephone interview, Taleban spokesman Zabiullah Mojahed told IWPR that his movement was not against education and was keen to have public support.
[...]
When the Taleban were in charge of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, schools and colleges only accepted male students, and women and girls were routinely denied access to education. At the time, the Taleban said they were not opposed to female education, just to mixed-sex classes.

After the Taleban were ousted in 2001, insurgent groups often attacked schools, set them on fire and forced them to close down. In recent months, however, schools in areas they where they operate have been allowed to reopen.
[...]
The Taleban’s more flexible approach is not restricted to education. Insurgent groups used to obstruct and derail reconstruction projects in many parts of the country, but now they appear to be allowing certain projects to go ahead.

The thing is even the Afghans themselves recognize the potential for a deliberate tactical deceit.

Abdul Ghafur Liwal, who heads the Afghanistan Regional Studies Centre, believes the Taleban are making pragmatic choices so as to present themselves as a more viable alternative.

“If the Taleban want to prepare the ground for a better political future, they have to build up their authority and win popularity among the people,” he said. “That’s the reason they have started becoming more flexible.”

Law lecturer Nasrullah Stanekzai agreed with this analysis.

“The Taleban’s flexibility is deliberate,” he said. “They want to get people behind them to position themselves politically in future, should they come to power either through negotiations or through military action.”

India is investing a lot into Afghanistan, even perhaps military training. If US is placing a section of the Talebs back in power - through a negotiated power sharing arrangement - either selling the whole process as a separation between Pashtun racial constructs and Pak control, or really believing in its own propaganda [as formulated by some sub-sub-desk of some sub-sub agency], the consequences for India are not really that transparent.

Is GOI simply hoping to strengthen HK's hands in the coming power struggle and /or buy the Talebs out? But Talebs will continue to get support from Pak who will in turn will get support from US, and get support from PRC. So what really is the calculation, if any?

[svinayak]

Will Afghanistan return to a Taleban regime?

Apart from recent media reports of continuing, "more serious" efforts by the US to get the Talebans to negotiations, the Talebs appear to have adopted an overtly flexible approach in regards to social control.
A Taleban leader was recently quoted by Afghan media outlets as saying the movement was not opposed to education and would protect schools in areas they controlled.

The announcement was welcomed by the education ministry in Kabul, and by President Hamed Karzai, who told university graduates that “if it is proved that [Taleban chief] Mullah Omar has really ordered the Taleban not to prevent children from accessing education, I will thank him”.

The question I have is how is that Taleban figure out that schools need to be destroyed

[brihaspati]

The "schools" were not "Islamic" enough for them. Moreover, the schools represent the presence and existence of an alternative state - and that state is directly communicating with the younger generation. The Talebs realize the importance of ideological control and state presence is an obstacle for them. This is the same thinking in the Kashmiri militants. If you can destroy more modern educational installations then as in Kashmir valley, more children will grow up under the beards of the mullahcracy in the madrassahs.

[brihaspati]

Obama's speech about "pre 1967 borders" have drawn the expected round of flak. But two things are emerging clearly from the entire "Arab spring" and the current "1967 borders" cacophony :
(1) The Islamic leadership has not yet been able to claim or establish that the "Arab spring" was all about "Palestine".
(2) No "independent" or even "semi-independent" Palestine state will be possible unless either Hamas is completely dismantled and erased, or the state of Israel is wiped out of existence.

Where does India stand in all this? Well, we already perhaps have had a conscious policy of showing solidarity with the ruling autocrats of the Gulf region, and have succeeded in reducing ourselves to the level of the Pakis in competing with them to appear as "Saudi monarchy friends". We have succeeded in showing ourselves willing to kiss the other cheek in being soft on Iran. Therefore we have succeeded in showing ourselves as unreliable allies to both camps.

More importantly we have exposed our limitations to forces in the ME as being a "hostage" country to its "Islamic" populations, and that India will always remain paralyzed in foreign policy initiatives about ME, and what is more, may actually act to strengthen one or more parties in a confused and frightened swing from party to party. In its turn this means that the respective theological institutions - which are far more strongly involved in state policy in the ME Islamic countries - will try and activate their respective theological extensions and connections inside India, in battle over greater control over Indian regimes.

Islamist strength and through it foreign Islamist political interests will grow in WB, Assam, Kerala under the new regimes there [a continuation really of previous regimes acts on ground but now Islamists will manage to expand on the earlier achievements], and what has already been established in Maha, UP, Bihar, and Kashmir Valley, will expand too.

[RajeshA]

X-Posting from West Asia News and Discussions Thread

-----------------------------------------------------
A must read article on KSA viewpoint. KSA/US - Oil for security is over.

Amid the Arab Spring, a U.S.-Saudi split

KSA means business this time, it can't F around with Washington this time. Its getting surrounded with problems and Iranian meddling. Its a real great opportunity for India to pick up. But the KSA has looked at PRC for its maal this time. Medvedev is shouting at his generals for not seizing this opportunity. For India, we did the right thing to offer our strategic mijjile cooperation during MMS visit. Our interests and KSAs don't necessarily converge on some things (KSA can't afford to trust Desh on N issue imo). But our defence relations will be strong. India has a chance now to really prove itself. It needs to expand its ship building facilities and start pumping out those P17s - integrate AAD's, PADs etc. Need to work double hard.

-----------------------------------------
KSA is busy delivering a strategic slap to Iran. Iran may lose Asad and mil logistics support for hezb. Iranians are now desperate.

This in fact could be a huge strategic catastrophe for India.

What we are looking at is the Indian Ocean being given on a platter to the Chinese! Can we even imagine, what happens if China becomes the mainstay of Saudi and thus GCC security?! Can we imagine how much of the Gulf Oil would go into financing and justifying Chinese Navy buildup in the Indian Ocean Region?!

Pakistan may be a basket case of country, but it would then have managed its next biggest coup in its history

• Partition of India (1947)
• US-Chinese Rapprochement (1971)
• Procuring Nuclear Weapons Technology (1980s/90s)
• Soviet Retreat from Afghanistan (1989)
• US boosting Pakistani Military (Post 9/11)
• Saudi-Chinese Alliance ??? (2011)

Each accomplishment has taken place at a huge cost to India. Do we really want a Saudi-Chinese Axis to come up in the Indian Ocean, because that gives China a sanction to build a huge Navy presence supporting all the Muslim countries from Indonesia to Malaysia to Bangladesh to Maldives to Pakistan to UAE to Saudi Arabia to Yemen to Somalia!

India would lose that what we consider our most valuable domain of dominance - the Indian Ocean Region! Plus on top we would be helpless to counter that alliance because of internal political factors - the Indian Muslim vote. But the question is why should we even try to counter such an alliance. Why should we not stop it from coming up in the first place?

If Americans are worried about these developments, no wonder they are asking Bibi to accept 1967 borders!

If India wants to even dream of killing the demon next door some day, we better offer Saudi Arabia a complete strategic alliance! Yes it would have been good if an Arab Shia State would have taken over Al Ahsa Province of Saudi Arabia and Khuzestan of Iran and established a new Arab Shia Oil Power monopoly! However we don't have the luxury of that dream, and we have to leave that to other forces of politics. As long as Pakistan exists as a country under the Pakistani Establishment, India needs to be very close to Saudi Arabia.

We have other priorities at the moment and that is to save the Indian Ocean from Chinese domination!

[Samudragupta]

This in fact could be a huge strategic catastrophe for India.

What we are looking at is the Indian Ocean being given on a platter to the Chinese! Can we even imagine, what happens if China becomes the mainstay of Saudi and thus GCC security?! Can we imagine how much of the Gulf Oil would go into financing and justifying Chinese Navy buildup in the Indian Ocean Region?!

Pakistan may be a basket case of country, but it would then have managed its next biggest coup in its history

• Partition of India (1947)
• US-Chinese Rapprochement (1971)
• Procuring Nuclear Weapons Technology (1980s/90s)
• Soviet Retreat from Afghanistan (1989)
• US boosting Pakistani Military (Post 9/11)
• Saudi-Chinese Alliance ??? (2011)

Each accomplishment has taken place at a huge cost to India. Do we really want a Saudi-Chinese Axis to come up in the Indian Ocean, because that gives China a sanction to build a huge Navy presence supporting all the Muslim countries from Indonesia to Malaysia to Bangladesh to Maldives to Pakistan to UAE to Saudi Arabia to Yemen to Somalia!

India would lose that what we consider our most valuable domain of dominance - the Indian Ocean Region! Plus on top we would be helpless to counter that alliance because of internal political factors - the Indian Muslim vote. But the question is why should we even try to counter such an alliance. Why should we not stop it from coming up in the first place?

If Americans are worried about these developments, no wonder they are asking Bibi to accept 1967 borders!

If India wants to even dream of killing the demon next door some day, we better offer Saudi Arabia a complete strategic alliance! Yes it would have been good if an Arab Shia State would have taken over Al Ahsa Province of Saudi Arabia and Khuzestan of Iran and established a new Arab Shia Oil Power monopoly! However we don't have the luxury of that dream, and we have to leave that to other forces of politics. As long as Pakistan exists as a country under the Pakistani Establishment, India needs to be very close to Saudi Arabia.

We have other priorities at the moment and that is to save the Indian Ocean from Chinese domination!

RajeshA ji

Are the Chinese ready to take on the Persians? Also isn't it result with the 3I (India-Iran-Israel) natural axis in Asia?

[brihaspati]

If we suck up to the KSA royalty, just two questions:

(1) How long do we think the KSA royal house will last into the future? If you are investing not only resources but political capital too - you need to know how secure will it be. Are we absolutely sure that once the theocracy in Iran get anaemic, that the KSA theocracy-royalty alliance will stand?

(2) Even if we extend a "full" security cooperation guarantee to the KSA royals, what control will we have on their ability to hedge things by helping out Pakis on the sly? Or prevent their hobnobbing with PRC? They can simply channel their funds through well established alternate routes over which India will have no control.

Is it impossible to recognize the tactical necessity on the part of the KSA royals to maintain the Pakis - all the more so if India extends cooperation - as a point of pressure on India to keep supporting the royals?

[RajeshA]

If we suck up to the KSA royalty, just two questions:

(1) How long do we think the KSA royal house will last into the future? If you are investing not only resources but political capital too - you need to know how secure will it be. Are we absolutely sure that once the theocracy in Iran get anaemic, that the KSA theocracy-royalty alliance will stand?

brihaspati garu,
I'll try to answer the questions as well as I can.

The KSA royal house should stand as long as they have money for its upkeep, and that is as long as Oil flows. After that nobody cares what happens to the Sauds! As long as Oil flows, great powers would continue to pander to them.

KSA royal house and friends are themselves such huge investors in global extremism, that the Wahhabis know they don't need really to usurp them, as long as there are no Kaffir boots in the land of the two holy mosques, and their drinking and partying does not get too much publicity.

The only ones in KSA who would really speak up would be Shias.

I personally would welcome should the Shias in Saudi Arabia throw away the yoke of subjugation under which they live and take control of Ghawar Oil Field, but that is easier said than done. There is no credible Shia movement which is capable of changing the status quo. So the two most favorable outcomes are either if the Oil reserves of Saudi Arabia run dry in the future or are they taken over by the Arab Shias in the mid term. As long as that is not the case, Saudi Arabia is a power, and we can't have it aligning with China. By making this alliance, Pakistan would become another invaluable node in that axis, and would receive support from both sides.

The House of Saud, as far as I feel, stands independent of the political system in Iran.

(2) Even if we extend a "full" security cooperation guarantee to the KSA royals, what control will we have on their ability to hedge things by helping out Pakis on the sly? Or prevent their hobnobbing with PRC? They can simply channel their funds through well established alternate routes over which India will have no control.

Is it impossible to recognize the tactical necessity on the part of the KSA royals to maintain the Pakis - all the more so if India extends cooperation - as a point of pressure on India to keep supporting the royals?

Yes, but the game can be played two ways. If the threat level to the Sauds increase, then they would be even more dependent on Indian support in the framework of their alliance with us. As we know, when the Americans came to AfPak to fight terrorists, their fight had "unintended" consequences, and now there are even more terrorists. So just because in the framework of the alliance we would be giving substantial support, it does not mean that the threat would reduce.

As far as their aid to Pakistan is concerned, it would be at a much lower level than right now, and with two and a half friends having left Pakistan, it would be easier to do what is our primary objective - to break up Pakistan and get control over its constituents. What we need to do is to ensure that Pakistan remains stuck in the downward spiral, and does not get another get-out-of-jail card free. A Saudi-Chinese alliance would however give it an escape route.

The question of Saudis keeping the threat of Pakistan alive in order to get our cooperation, would be relevant if India were doing absolutely nothing to break up and further destabilize Pakistan. But that hopefully would not be the case. An Indian-Saudi alliance would give us sufficient time to see to it that Pakistan falls apart.

Earlier I had contended that an Indian-Bangladesh merger would go a long way in making the Indian proposal for an Indian-Saudi alliance credible, as then only Muslim soldiers would be serving in Saudi Arabia. Considering that there are not many takers for letting Bangladeshis in into India, we can explore a far more specific proposal - of India raising regiments within the Indian Army itself by recruiting non-Indians from Muslim countries, namely Afghanistan AND Bangladesh. Both Afghan Regiment and Bangladesh Regiment of Indian Army after training can be deployed to Saudi Arabia under the Indian flag and command.

Yes they can still hobnob with the Chinese, but in any such hobnobbing especially under American eyes, the Saudis and the Chinese would need to use the Pakistanis as a go between, so as not to raise to much hostility amongst the Americans. If we however quarantine Pakistan from any (or rather much) sustenance from Saudi Arabia, we will be making Saudi-Chinese hobnobbing a lot more difficult. Secondly if we are offering full security umbrella to the Saudis, it also comes at a price. Sure they can hobnob with the Chinese, but it would be a different matter altogether that the Saudis would become the patrons of PLAN. A security alliance is not something we give to them as if it was some diamond and need to fear they will run away with it. A security alliance would feed from how well we cooperate in securing the other's national interests. It will always remain a work in progress.

[brihaspati]

Perhaps the first signs of a growing confidence of the fallouts of GOI's ardent espousal of KSA :

Not more than 48 miles unescorted

Muslim women 'should not travel more than 48 miles from home without male chaperone'
Muslim women have been banned from traveling more than 48 miles from their homes without being chaperoned by a male relative, according to a fatwa issued by one of Islam's leading universities.
By Dean Nelson, New Delhi 7:23PM GMT 09 Mar 2011

The ruling was made by the Darul Uloom Deoband, the leading Islamic university founded in northern India in 1866, which has millions of followers from Bangladesh and Pakistan to Muslim communities in Britain.

Its fatwa was issued after a female follower had asked: "Is a married woman permitted to travel to another country with her female sibling?"

In a reply on the Deoband website, she was told:"She cannot travel without a 'mehram' [male relative]. It's mentioned in the Hadees that a woman should not travel for more than 48 miles except in the company of a 'mehram' relative."

[brihaspati]

Palestine is not "Kashmir" - we are reassured by people on both sides of the "p-secular" divide. But for me, supporting an independent Palestine state has always meant supporting a base for a future armed Islamic camp that has full international recognition and therefore means of supporting its Jihad against Israel. They want to clear the land of all non-Muslim resistance to subjugation to Islamic authorities. Jews are just one of their obstacles, just as non-Muslims of India are to a section of Islamic leadership on the subcontinent.

Here is a first sign of what lies in the mind of the planners of the Palestinian "independence" :

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/144283
Published: 05/18/11, 1:44 PM / Last Update: 05/18/11, 2:14 PM
Hamas MP: Jews Ingathered for Us to Annihilate Them

by Gil Ronen
Follow Israel news on Twitter and Facebook.

Yunis al Astal, a member of the Palestinian Authority parliament, spelled out his organization's vision for the genocidal annihilation of the Jewish people in a television interview last week. The interview was broadcast on Hamas Al Aqsa TV and monitored by incitement watchdog group MEMRI. Al Astal described the ingathering of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel in terms of a divine plan that would give the Arabs "the honor" of annihilating "the evil of this gang."

In a few years' time, he predicted, the Zionists will understand that they were brought here for the purpose of being slaughtered in "a great massacre."

Using Hitleresque language, he said that the Jews are more dangerous than all of the world's lethal birds of prey, dangerous reptiles and lethal bacteria combined.

Hamas and Fatah have signed a pact of cooperation, yet the Israeli government refuses to assign enemy status to Fatah, which controls part of Judea and Samaria. Rather, it sees it as a partner in security cooperation and possible peace talks. As part of the accord between Fatah and Hamas, Hamas's Al Aqsa TV is allowed to broadcast in Judea and Samaria.

State formation demands by overwhelming majority Muslim population areas always leads to ethnic cleansing of non-Muslims in the territory over time, and in some cases appears to important refuges and bases for carrying out Jihad on neighbours. Obama's statements and Hamas and its friends among non-Jewish [and some Jewish dhimmis] groups will lead to outright war over the next few years - if USA does not back out of this line. If the line succeeds, expect a similar method to be tried out in KV.

[SaiK]

http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 040140.ece
ouch!

[RajeshA]

RajeshA ji

Are the Chinese ready to take on the Persians? Also isn't it result with the 3I (India-Iran-Israel) natural axis in Asia?

Samudragupta ji,

The question of more importance to India is not what the Chinese can do for the Saudis but what the Saudis can do for the Chinese. Chinese military hardware and leadership with Pakistani military manpower can certainly be of interest to the Saudis. We have to remember that the Chinese need not make their own hands dirty all the time, as they can let the Pakistanis do the dirty work. Pakistan is already quite involved in the region. But Pakistan in itself may not inspire confidence considering its own state of affairs. China can allow Pakistan to take the lead and show itself as the formal face of Saudi security while China gets to keep the benefits.

What one could see is China providing the naval backbone of a Pakistani security guarantee to the Saudis, as well as nuclear umbrella, SIGINT, and conventional military hardware, and let the Saudis pick the bills. Moreover with the Chinese providing the naval backbone, China gets to set up a whole naval network of bases and listening posts in the Indian Ocean.

Should it come to fisticuffs the Chinese can allow the Pakistanis to do most the work against the Persians, while themselves continuing to do business with the Persians in peace time.

India on the other hand does not have a cat's paw in the Indian Ocean. We have to do the work ourselves and cannot delegate to some other Pakistan. As such we would have to offer the Saudis a package which more than rivals that of Pakistan and China combined.

India should however offer a partnership to Iran in Afghanistan and Central Asia, but not make it dependent on India's stance in the Gulf.

[brihaspati]

If Pakistan allows Chinese naval base in Pak, India should make it clear that it is going to help out Persians - no matter how soft the palm of As Sudias was at the handshake at the dinner. Blackmail is a game two can play - unless of course one has already sold his soul.

[RajeshA]

brihaspati garu,

The ideal strategy is one which would ensure

• complete Indian dominance over the Indian Ocean Region,
• a group of dependent republics in Pakistan Occupied West India,
• Islam as discredited political ideology for the future
• Arabs without influence
• smaller Persia
• China forced to accept Indian core interests

If Pakistan allows Chinese naval base in Pak, India should make it clear that it is going to help out Persians - no matter how soft the palm of As Sudias was at the handshake at the dinner. Blackmail is a game two can play - unless of course one has already sold his soul.

I agree completely with you that should a Saudi-Chinese Axis come about with Pakistan as one of its nodes, then India should throw her lot with the Shias. As you see, I do not say Iranians but I also don't rule them out. Then India should follow a singular course of action, and that is for the Ghawar Oil Field in Saudi Arabia to change hands and pass on into Arab Shia hands.

However this path or even the path of alignment with Iran does not guarantee us any success, simply because the Shias are not ready as yet to do the needful. Moreover any Indian alliance with Iran in the Gulf would turn the Sunnis totally against India! We also have to look at our own vulnerabilities.

Also Iran is quite isolated in the world right now, with both the Sunnis and the West bearing strongly onto them. So it is questionable how much Iranians can do to change the overall equations in the Indian Ocean Region in India's favor.

[RajeshA]

Exploring further India's desired strategy in West Asia:

The best outcome from India's PoV would be if the Ghawar Oil Fields in Saudi Arabia changes hands to the Arab Shia. However this needs to be done without giving the Chinese some pretext to bolster their presence in the Indian Ocean Region and to build alliances there for the purpose.

Now if India helps with the first goal, we could seriously jeopardize our future Indian Ocean domination. If we don't, we remain vulnerable to the long term Saudi Wahhabization project in the Indian Subcontinent. At the same time, we need to get a handle on the headache to the West.

If the decision is not to be taken by us, but is imposed on us, that is, the Saudis decide to hitch their wagon to the Chinese inviting them in, then the path for India to take is clear. Then we invest as much as we can, possibly through Iraqi Shi'ite militias or the government there, in training Saudi Hezbollah. We get every healthy Shia male we can from Al Ahsa Province and turn him into a commando.

If we have to take the decision, we establish an alliance with the Saudis, keep the Chinese away from our pond, and work to unravel Pakistan. In that case we allow the Al Ahsa transformation to be undertaken by other forces.

[RajeshA]

Actually India has got a big leverage over the Saudis, and that is a possible Indian military support to the Arab Shias.

What is happening in Syria is very positive from the perspective of Israel. Saudis have been trying to get rid of the Alawite President Bashar Al-Assad, and allow Sunnis to take over the government. That would be a body blow to the Hezbollah, as it would stop Hezbollah's supply lines from Iran.

shyamd ji also writes that Saudi Arabia is intent on taking on Hezbollah now. It means the war has already started. So even as Syria's jump into the Sunni column helps Israel viz-a-viz Hezbollah and Iran, it also means that there would now be less qualms on Israel's side against cooperation between Israel and the Iranians, as Iranians now cannot threaten Israel to the same extent. In fact, by overthrowing Assad's regime in Syria, Saudis are enabling an Israel-Iran rapprochement.

In essence, it means 2 things:

1. Any support given to the Shia militias does not automatically constitute hurting Israel
2. The Shia much closer to home in Saudi Arabia would be more open to start a front against Saudi Arabia

This allows Shi'ite militantism to shift from Lebanon to Gulf. This allows Shi'ite militantism to turn from anti-Israel to anti-Saud.

Now enhancing military cooperation between India and Iran would not sit too well with USA and Israel. It does not mean we should not do it, but it does mean we should be careful of unwanted consequences. But India should increase our military cooperation with Iraq manifold. We should contribute to enhancing the capacity of Iraqi Army, and various Shi'ite militias there. Even "Saudi Hezbollah" can be trained in Iraq under the very noses of Americans. When the time comes, the Shi'ite militias should be in a position to bring the whole of Al Ahsa region of Saudi Arabia under the control of the Arab Shia, with similar outcomes in Bahrain and Kuwait.

Now that is a desired outcome, and perhaps this outcome can be made possible even as India establishes herself in the opposite camp - the camp of the Sauds, for that is needed to unravel Pakistan and to keep China out of the Indian Ocean Region.

Once the Arab Shias get control over the Ghawar Oil Fields in Saudi Arabia, the Sunni extremists would lose a valuable source of funding, and not just the militants but Pakistan itself would lose a rich patron.

[brihaspati]

Saudis will hitch their wagon to PRC - because they know that even doing that is not going to hamper the sucking up from Indian side. India is already a captive about its own propaganda of tolerance of its large Islamic population and their potential "sentiments" about what happens in the Gulf. In fact it is in Saudi interest to see to it that the current regime sustains.

[abhischekcc]

I do not think Indo-PRC rivalry figures much in Saudi calculations, mainly because both countries need KSA oil and they know it. Moreover, the Indo-PRC rivalry is more a figment of imagination, as compared to US-PRC rivalry.

FWIW, KSA approached India first to arrange security for it. When we hemmed and hawed, then they started looking further afield. PRC was the second choice, logical because it is the only country willing to take an overt stand against the US on various issues. Overt, but not actual stand - but this point is often missed.

Hitching with India makes more strategic sense to KSA. India's large muslim population gives KSA a sense of security that China's enthusiastic treatment of Uighurs does not.

[abhischekcc]

>>Once the Arab Shias get control over the Ghawar Oil Fields in Saudi Arabia, the Sunni extremists would lose a valuable source of funding, and not just the militants but Pakistan itself would lose a rich patron.

There will be a bloodbath in Arabia before such a thing happens. What such a bloodbath will do to the global and India economies is anybody's guess.

[RajeshA]

Saudis will hitch their wagon to PRC - because they know that even doing that is not going to hamper the sucking up from Indian side. India is already a captive about its own propaganda of tolerance of its large Islamic population and their potential "sentiments" about what happens in the Gulf. In fact it is in Saudi interest to see to it that the current regime sustains.

Indian establishment only feels obliged to sing paeans to tolerance, Islam and friendship between India and Saudi Arabia in public. That however does not stop India from pursuing strategies which may not ingratiate us with the Saudis.

Giving guerrilla training and arms to Saudi Hezbollah and Mehdi Army in South Iraq could constitute one such policy.

It should be made more than clear to the Saudis that if they invite the Chinese into the Indian Ocean, India would see to it that they are finished as a power. It need not be done so openly and publicly but it should be done.

[RajeshA]

Once the Arab Shias get control over the Ghawar Oil Fields in Saudi Arabia, the Sunni extremists would lose a valuable source of funding, and not just the militants but Pakistan itself would lose a rich patron.

There will be a bloodbath in Arabia before such a thing happens. What such a bloodbath will do to the global and India economies is anybody's guess.

Well, we will be forced to change our energy mix, the sooner the better.

[RajeshA]

I do not think Indo-PRC rivalry figures much in Saudi calculations, mainly because both countries need KSA oil and they know it. Moreover, the Indo-PRC rivalry is more a figment of imagination, as compared to US-PRC rivalry.

FWIW, KSA approached India first to arrange security for it. When we hemmed and hawed, then they started looking further afield. PRC was the second choice, logical because it is the only country willing to take an overt stand against the US on various issues. Overt, but not actual stand - but this point is often missed.

Hitching with India makes more strategic sense to KSA. India's large muslim population gives KSA a sense of security that China's enthusiastic treatment of Uighurs does not.

If KSA chooses the Chinese as their next protectors, it would not be in order to spite India, but rather to put pressure on USA. India's interests would simply be collateral damage about which the Saudis couldn't care less.

An Indian security alliance with KSA should have the unspoken corollary that they would deliver Pakistan's head to us on a platter, that India would be able to tap in into KSA network in Pakistan to influence the place as and how India deems fit. If KSA agrees to that then India can proceed and sign off on such a pact.

[brihaspati]

This is what Xinhua officially reported on 18th March :
http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-03/1 ... 174664.htm

Chinese president meets Saudi king's special envoy
Xinhua, March 18, 2011
Chinese President Hu Jintao met on Friday with special envoy Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz of Saudi King Abdullah, and exchanged views on China-Saudi relations as well as the current situation in the Middle East and the Gulf region.

Affirming the remarkable growth of China-Saudi relations in recent years, Hu said China treasures its friendship with Saudi Arabia, and considers the country a reliable good friend and a sincere partner.

"We are willing to make joint efforts with Saudi Arabia, to consolidate political trust, enhance strategic coordination and substantial cooperation, to boost bilateral strategic and friendly ties to a new high," President Hu said.

Followed up with

http://securityandintelligence.wordpres ... -in-china/

Saudis buy advanced Chinese nuclear-capable missiles

Bandar recently paid a secret visit to China and clinched terms for CSS-3 DF-3 ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to replace the hardware Saudi Arabia bought from China in the 1980s.

US intelligence discovered the first transaction in 1988 when those Chinese missiles were installed outside Riyadh and positioned to face Tehran. Our intelligence and military sources reveal the transaction Bandar negotiated provides for the sale of two types of Chinese missiles: the DF-21 (NATO-designated CSS-5), which is a two-stage, solid-propellant, single-warhead medium-range ballistic (MRBM) system developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronis Technology Academy.

The DF-21 is capable of delivering a 500kT nuclear warhead over a distance of 1,800 km. Its purchase underlines the Saudi royal family’s determination to have its own nuclear arms and missiles ready for launch in the face of an approaching nuclear-armed Iran.

The second missile, the DongFeng 15 (Export name M-9; NATO-designation CSS-6) is a solid-fuel, short-range ballistic (SRBM) system developed by CASC China Academy of Rocket Motor Technology ARMT, the 4th Space Academy.

Our information is that the Saudis purchased the improved variants of DongFeng 15 B and DongFeng 15C, recently sighted in service with China’s Popular Liberation Army (PLA). During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, those variants, which were launched as a warning to Taiwan, won a reputation for accuracy and effectiveness.

That range is only 2/3 say of the average distance between points in KSA and western India. However within range for Tehran. But the nuclear maal needs to be loaded on. It will be too close for comfort if in KSA given the US bases who will sniff it, so the maal if at all - has to be in more difficult to reach [for US] territories. Which means the missiles to be effective for nukes - must be held on Pak soil. Average distance from around Slumadbad however is within range for Tehran.

[brihaspati]

With western societies more or less turned hostile or suspicious to Islamist movements - even on loud claims of innocence and peace - which are the societies/countries outside of Islamic countries that can serve as good hosts for Islamism? I will try to explore this after quoting an article on the Tablighi Jamaat.

Here are some relevant points from a BD origin author: (although he writes mainly keeping USA in context - the relevant points apply generally)
http://www.weeklyblitz.net/759/rauf-and ... round-zero

Leaders of Tablighi Jamaat claim that the movement is strictly non-political in nature, with the main aim of the participants being to work at the grass roots level and reaching out to all Muslims of the world for spiritual development. Tablighi Jamat seeks to revitalize Muslims around the world. It is claimed that their ideology and practices are in strict accordance with Qur'an and Sunnah. Despite their affiliation and influence of the prominent scholars of Deoband, they do not focus any particular sect or community.
[...]
Tabligh maintains an international headquarters, the Markaz, in Nizamuddin, Delhi and has several national headquarters to coordinate its activities in over 80 countries. Throughout its history it has sent its members to travel the world, preaching a message of peace and tolerance. It organizes preachers in groups [called Jamaats, meaning Assembly]. Each group, on average, consists of 10 to 12 Muslims who fund themselves in this preaching mission.

The second largest gathering of Muslims after the Hajj [the pilgrimage to Mecca] is known as Bishwa Ijtema, a non political gathering of Muslims from all over the world hosted by the leaders of "International Tabligh Jama'at". It takes place in Tongi which is on the outskirts of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

The Tablighi Jamaat was founded in the late 1920s by the well known scholar Maulana Ilyas [Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Kandhelvi] in the Mewat province of India. The inspiration for devoting his life to Islam came to Ilyas during his second pilgrimage to the Hejaz in 1926. Maulana Ilyas put forward the slogan, 'Come O Muslims! Be Muslims'. This expressed the central focus of Tablighi Jamat, which has been renewing Muslim society by renewing Muslim practice in those it feels have lost their desire to devote themselves to Allah and the Islamic prophet, Muhammad. Maulana Ilyas was a prominent member of the movement and throughout Tabligh's history there has been a degree of association between scholars of Deoband and Tablighi Jamat.
[...]
Although the movement first established itself in the United States, it established a large presence in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. It was especially prominent in France during the 1980s. The members of Tablighi Jamat are also represented in the French Council of the Muslim Faith. Tabligh's influence has grown, though, in the increasing Pakistani community in France, which has doubled in the decade before 2008 to 50,000-60,000.

However, Britain is the current focus of the movement in the West, primarily due to the large South Asian population that began to arrive there in the 1960s and 1970s. By 2007, Tabligh members were situated at 600 of Britain's 1350 mosques. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the movement made inroads into Central Asia. As of 2007, it was estimated 10,000 Tablighi members could be found in Kyrgyzstan alone.

By 2008 it had a presence in nearly 80 countries and had become a leading revitalist movement. However, it maintains a presence in India, where at least 100 of its Jamaats go out from Markaz, the international headquarters, to different parts of India and overseas.

celebrated personalities associated with this movement:

These include the former Presidents of Pakistan, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar and Farooq Leghari [Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari], and former President of India, Dr. Zakir Hussain who was also associated with this movement. Major General Ziaur Rahman, former President and Chief of Army Staff of the Bangladesh Army, was a strong supporter and member of Tablighi Jamaat, and popularized it in Bangladesh. Lieutenant General [R] Javed Nasir of the Pakistan Army and former head of Inter-Services Intelligence along with former Prime Minister of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq have also been linked with the movement.

Other well-known politicians such as Dr. Arbab Ghulam Rahim the former chief mininster of Sindh, and Muhammad Ijaz-ul-Haq, former Pakistani Federal Minister for Religious Affairs have strong ties with the Tablighi activities. Many well-recognized writers and scholars, such as Dr. Nadir Ali Khan [famous Indian writer] and others are deeply related with it.

Among Pakistani cricket professionals, Shahid Afridi, Saqlain Mushtaq, Inzamam-ul-Haq, Mushtaq Ahmed; and the former Pakistani cricketers Saeed Anwar, Saleem Malik are active members. It is also widely believed that Pakistani middle order batsman Mohammad Yousuf embraced Islam with the help of the Tablighi Jamaat. Others include South African batsman Hashim Amla. This movement also includes eminent directors and producers including Naeem Butt.

Former renowned singer and pop star Junaid Jamshed has close links with Jamaat, and his departure from professional singing career is attributed as the result of his inclination towards this movement. Many famed actors and models including Moin Akhter, Hammad Khan Jadoon and many others are strongly affiliated with the movement. Several business men, industrialists, millionaires are actively serving in the movement.

Secrecy and deliberate "innocent" facade : why academics can whitewash the Tablighs

As a result, academics tend to describe the group as an apolitical devotional movement stressing individual faith, introspection, and spiritual development. The austere and egalitarian lifestyle of Tablighi missionaries and their principled stands against social ills leads many outside observers to assume that the group has a positive influence on society. Graham Fuller, a former CIA official and expert on Islam, for example, characterized Tablighi Jamaat as a "peaceful and apolitical preaching-to-the-people movement." Barbara Metcalf, a University of California scholar of South Asian Islam, called Tablighi Jamaat "an apolitical, quietist movement of internal grassroots missionary renewal" and compares its activities to the efforts to reshape individual lives by Alcoholics Anonymous. Olivier Roy, a prominent authority on Islam at Paris's prestigious Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, described Tablighi Jamaat as "completely apolitical and law abiding." Governments normally intolerant of independent movements often make an exception for Tablighi Jamaat. The Bangladeshi prime minister and top political leadership, many of whom are Islamists, regularly attend their rallies, and Pakistani military officers, many of whom are sympathetic to militant Islam, even allow Tablighi missionaries to preach in the barracks.

Yet, the Pakistani experience strips the patina from Tablighi Jamaat's façade. Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif [1990-93; 1997-99], whose father was a prominent Tablighi member and financier, helped Tablighi members take prominent positions. For example, in 1998, Muhammad Rafique Tarar took the ceremonial presidency while, in 1990, Javed Nasir assumed the powerful director-generalship of the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's chief intelligence agency. When Benazir Bhutto, less sympathetic to Islamist causes, returned to the premiership in 1993, Tablighis conspired to overthrow her government. In 1995, the Pakistani army thwarted a coup attempt by several dozen high-ranking military officers and civilians, all of whom were members of the Tablighi Jamaat and some of whom also held membership in Harakat ul-Mujahideen, a U.S. State Department-defined terrorist organization. Some of the confusion over Tablighi Jamaat's apolitical characterization derives from the fact that the movement does not consider individual states to be legitimate. They may not become actively involved in internal politics or disputes over local issues, but, from a philosophical and transnational perspective, the Tablighi Jamaat's millenarian philosophy is very political indeed. According to the French Tablighi expert Marc Gaborieau, its ultimate objective is nothing short of a "planned conquest of the world" in the spirit of jihad.

The Tablighi Role in the Global Jihadism:

However, there are indeed some links between Tablighis and the world of jihadism. First, there is evidence of indirect connections between the group and the wider radical/extremist Deobandi nexus composed of anti-Shiite sectarian groups, Kashmiri militants and the Taliban. This link provides a medium through which Tablighis who are disgruntled with the group's apolitical program could break orbit and join militant organizations.

One apparent manifestation of this nexus was a purported militant offshoot of TJ, Jihad bi al-Saif [Jihad through the Sword], which was established in Taxila, Pakistan. Members of this group were accused of plotting a coup against former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1995. Yet, because of the organization's extreme secrecy, little is known about it other than that it is believed to have developed in reaction to the TJ's apolitical, peaceful stance.

The TJ organization also serves as a de facto conduit for Islamist extremists and for groups such as al Qaeda to recruit new members. Significantly, the Tablighi recruits do intersect with the world of radical Islamism when they travel to Pakistan to receive their initial training. We have received reports that once the recruits are in Pakistan, representatives of various radical Islamist groups, such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Taliban and al Qaeda, are said to woo them actively — to the point of offering them military training. And some of them accept the offer. For example, John Walker Lindh — an American who is serving a prison sentence for aiding the Taliban in Afghanistan — traveled with Tablighi preachers to Pakistan in 1998 to further his Islamic studies before joining the Taliban.

Because of the piety and strict belief system of the Tablighis and their focus on calling wayward Muslims back to an austere and orthodox Muslim faith, the movement has offered a place where jihadist spotters can look for potential recruits. These facilitators often offer enthusiastic new or rededicated Muslims a more active way to live and develop their faith. Although the TJ promotes a benign message, the same conservative Islamic values espoused by the Tablighis also are part of jihadist ideology, and so some Muslims attracted to the Tablighi movement are enticed into becoming involved with jihadists.

Additionally, because of its apolitical belief system, TJ seems to leave a gap in the ideological indoctrination of the individual Tablighi because it essentially asks the novice to shun politics and public affairs. The problem in taking this belief system from theory to practice, however, is that some people find they cannot ignore what is happening in the world around them, especially when that world includes wars. This is when some Tablighis become disillusioned with TJ and start turning to jihadist groups that offer religiously sanctioned prescriptions as to how "good Muslims" should deal with life's injustices.

Chowdhury actually gives some important insights. But more importantly he provides us with a new angle to think upon - how countries like India can become increasingly attractive as a new base for global Islamist expansion. There are several factors that can help this.

India has a sympathetic dominant political culture towards Islamism, India's "multiculturalism/tolerance" and "secular" character as well as "modern democracy" can serve as a good cover for those Islamists wishing to use it for international acceptance, India's dominant political regimes will do nothing that can be lobbied to be represented as "hurting" Islamic "sentiments" (a la Shah Bano). In fact in India, Islamism can feel safer than in Islamic countries - where factional infighting within mullahcracy could be murderous, and whose regimes dependence on the "west" might make things hot for this or that faction - but in India, Indian political regimes will go out of their to accommodate Islamism.

RajeshA ji, your dream might even come true!

[RajeshA]

RajeshA ji, your dream might even come true!

I don't know. Charlize Theron has, for sometime now, not been returning my calls!

brihaspati garu,

sideswipe aside, I am sure you do know, that I do not approve of the current Islamism appeasement in India.

[brihaspati]

Sorry! should have added a smiley! Got a big frown in using smileys in the nuke dhaaga. Apparently onlee select co-back-scratchers or same-party-birathers have the right! Seriously, I know you are a blood-brother.

[Prem]

RajeshA ji, your dream might even come true!

I don't know. Charlize Theron has, for sometime now, not been returning my calls!
brihaspati garu,
sideswipe aside, I am sure you do know, that I do not approve of the current Islamism appeasement in India.

Now i know why she have been complaining of miss calls at late nights.

[Samudragupta]

Considering the severe backlash against Islamism in both Europe and America the global Islamism needs a nurturing period and place for its further expansion in the West....Nothing can be more suited than the Indian subcontinent and SE Asia and control the trade route connecting the East and West.

[shyamd]

That range is only 2/3 say of the average distance between points in KSA and western India. However within range for Tehran. But the nuclear maal needs to be loaded on. It will be too close for comfort if in KSA given the US bases who will sniff it, so the maal if at all - has to be in more difficult to reach [for US] territories. Which means the missiles to be effective for nukes - must be held on Pak soil. Average distance from around Slumadbad however is within range for Tehran.

Nope its deployed in KSA. Israeli's say it is held in 2 different bases south of Riyadh. THey only have around 25 to 30. It cost them around $3b including construction of silo's and infra. Looks like there have been "indigenous" (i.e. paki or PRC) improvements to accuracy and probably range too.

Rumour has it he concluded a similar deal recently.