Was hoping that the news would be picked up and discussed on the TSP or AFG threads. But here it is,
Karzai invites Taliban to peace talk of elders: Secret preliminary gathering held Jan. 8 with U.N. envoy
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 ... of-elders/
This was something I had expected and written about long ago. On the point of confirming the cliche about the supposed tendency in some of us to preen ourselves in referring back to our previous predictions - I have tried to consistently make people consider the sequence:
(1) Obama admin's desicion to "stabilize" the AFG front as a front to eventual evacuation and abandonment of AFPAK.
(2) An apparent increase in military presence in AFPAK to discount impressions of eventual withdrawal.
(3) Talebjabis initiate their plan to use the AFPAK border and its connected Pakjab, Swat, POk as the core for a future neo-Caliphate.
(4) The Talebjabi thrust is towards southern AFG in one direction, and the POK+Pakjab in the east. The AFG elections, and the US pressure on TSPA to take action against Talebs is used by the TSPA and Talebs to provide cover for a retreat into the planned expansion directions. The TSPA can "pursue" the Talebs north-west and north-east-east and leave "prisoners/MIA" and military hardware in the base areas of the Talebs for the future use by Talebs.
(5) Obama admin will discover that there exists a "good Taleban". If it does not exist, KSA and TSPA/ISI will help to invent one. The US admin needs a politically correct justification to withdraw from AFPAK. The strategic need of the neo-Caliphate and the political need of US admin coincides to initiate plans to have a "government of national consensus" in AFG including the "good Taleban".
(6) The US admin completely fails to understand the true military-political-ideological viciousness of Jihadi Islam and the long term Caliphatic tendency of the newly resurgent Islamic militancy - with a good deal of stupid pontification from academic sociologists and historians influenced by "vulgar Marxism" thinking that all human activity is determined by economic motives. So the formal policy initiated is economic appeasement of Jihad, which is exactly what Jihadi Islams tactical objective has been right from its formation. At its core Jihad's policy has always been to apply terror and trauma consistently and persistently over very long periods of time on societies which are more productive than the Islamic ones - so that the "peace tax" can be used to extract resources from the compromising societies to strengthen the Islamic one towards the next stage of Islamic expansion.
(7) The "all terrorism vanishes when economic prosperity comes" blunder-theory is applied n AFPAK, and international "peace tax" is collected by the Talebjabis in TSO and AFG in preparation for consolidation of the core of the neo-Caliphate for the next planned expansion into Indian subcontinent in the east primarily into northern-India and north-west into most of AFG.
(8) The KSA and Iranian theocracy get involved in a competition to claim leadership of the newly resurgent Islamic militancy and the future Caliphate. Ironically this does not lead to weakening of the pan-Islamic militancy but the militant leadership bargains with both and gains from both. KSA and other "monarchy" based ME Islamic regimes will be increasingly forced to appease the militants but still unable to turn back the tide towards Islamic-theocratic-democracy in the model of Iran.
(9) Pan-Islamist militancy gradually moves the strategic confrontational chess-pieces along a line running from Phillipines, Indonesia, through Malaysia, BD, northern India, AFPAK, Yemen, Egypt+Sudan+Somalia, Horn of Africa. They need to clear off the breach-head into the near East from the Mediterranean - Israel. Already, the "western forces" are on a retreat, and are being pushed back south-and west along this line. Behind this push is reflected the rising political and economic clout of thr troika of China, Russia and Iran -each perhaps not wanting the ultimate victory of Islamic militancy - but being sicked into virtually letting Jihadis have a field day because of complex and interconnected national startegic objectives.
These can be deemed pessimistic or "paranoid" vision of the future, but I have seen nothing so far that has contradicted the projections I had made at least a year ago.