Managing Pakistan's failure

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Aditya_V
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Aditya_V » 29 Jan 2013 16:50

venug wrote:And then there are wolves and vultures in the form of China and US who would love to have bases in the Northern areas and may be Baluchistan. So one problem shouldn't replace any other and even by a more powerful one to deal with.


If Baluchistan is independant without a border with India, US CHina cannot use it so much against India, In fact they will probably Have problems Sindh Punjab like Afgansitan.

BD would have migrated in Large numbers even if they were part of Pakistan, imagine Paki Military Missiles and Official ISI bases in BD, We would perinially worried about a Chinese PAK attack along Siliguir and Sikkim and wasting resources. that problem has been solved .

A smaller Pakistan is always better for us.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 29 Jan 2013 17:44

Lalmohan wrote:i think the islamists have actually got a good handle on this. if they jehadi's body is disfigured, they have a get out clause. if you target their near and dear ones, they are collateral damage and martyrs for the cause. all things can be explained away. even the core tenants of the faith can be dispensed with if required. for a highly prescriptive system, they have figured out how to create enough wiggle room.

perhaps the way forward is to discredit their leaders and handlers and those who make excuses for them - shake the foundations of their belief in their leadership. and i don't mean their faith


Lalmohan ji

In that social system slavery is allowed, right-hand possessions are allowed, looting of trade caravans and thus piracy is allowed, sexual abuse of young children is allowed. You only need to uphold the five pillars of Islam, show your loyalty to Islam in some way or another, but other than that you are free to be the biggest scoundrel on the planet and it is all halaal.

So how does one discredit their leaders and handlers? The Laal Masjid episode did discredit Musharraf despite his Hudabaiyya treaties, but even if one discredit one leader, the followers simply turn to other leaders who too follow an Islamist agenda.

We will have to do it the hard way and that is by stopping their expansion into Kufr territory - their geographical, demographic, psychological expansion and then by pushing it back - hollowing out what they hold dear

  1. their resoluteness in the face of death - showing their Jihadis whimpering for mercy, ready to embrace idols
  2. respect for their martyrs and hononered dead leaders - they should get the flame
  3. their hold over their women - marrying their women and converting them to Kufr
  4. lands captured for Ummah - reoccupying them and throwing the Islamics out
  5. security of the clergy - no more hiding behind respect for religion. They are political-military ideologues, not priests
  6. Islamic teaching for their brood (of martyrs especially) - instead they will be immersed in the religion of the Kufr
  7. physical mark of their religion - anything that cannot be hidden by foreskin to be chopped off
  8. social security for the families of the martyrs - additional mistreatment unless they convert, showing the impotency of the dawas to protect them
  9. their secluded ghettos - renewed aggressive presence there
  10. monopoly over street muscle - crushed, converted or sent to their 72s

All that is needed for a successful exorcism of Jihadism from the Indian Subcontinent.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 29 Jan 2013 21:06

Negation of Two-Nation Theory And Medals


X-Posting from TIRP Thread


GopiD wrote:
The second issue is the core. The biggest threat that Pakistan’s ruling class fears to its own existence is not just the strength of the Indian armed forces or India’s growing economic clout. The main threat is that the Indian Muslim feels much safer in India than the Muslim in Pakistan. This negates the Two-Nation Theory and successive Pakistani rulers, especially from the armed forces who fancy that they are the guardians of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers, have been unable to reconcile themselves to this reality. More Muslims have been killed by Muslims in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world in the last 65 years.


This is a medal which each and every "secular" Indian goes around with pinned to his chest when talking with Pakis: "Muslims feel safer in India than in Pakistan.", "This negates the Two-Nation Theory", "Jinnah and Muslim League were wrong", "Nehru was right" and this many of us repeat and repeat and repeat! Okay it gives us some satisfaction if being right has that much value.

However all this proves is that in after Partition, in Pakistan, there weren't enough Hindus and Sikhs to sustain Islam's predatory instincts viz-a-viz the Kufr for long. When the "resources" ran out, the Muslims in Pakistan turned on themselves.

In India on the other hand, the number of Muslims dwindled to an extent where they could not show their predatory instincts too openly and had to bide time till they become demographically powerful again. Being forced in this mode, the Muslims in India enjoyed a long period of peace with the Hindus.

So basically the "secular" Indian is telling the Paki - look you were wrong to demand Pakistan. If you all had remained in India, you would have had so much Hindu fuel, that you need not have turned on each other, and even the ones who stayed need not have crouched for so long.

The "secular" Indian is telling the Paki - he was too stupid to know how to loot and kill the Kufr on a larger scale.

Yes, the "secular" Indian really deserves a chest full of medals and pats on the back! The Two-Nation Theory stands negated! :roll:

Screw the Two-Nation Theory! The "secular" reading of its negation is "suicide"!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby member_22872 » 29 Jan 2013 21:21

Rajesh garu,

I think TSP doesn't want two-nation theory's failure to gain lot of credence. When that happens, they will question the very existence of their nation obviously. May be we should keep repeating at every venue possible that the very reason for the creation of TSP is wrong and hence put the purpose of their living as a nation to question. When the hope is lost, people commit suicide. In TSP's case a natural progression of choices they made and consequences of wrong philosophy, hence a natural death.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 29 Jan 2013 21:29

venug ji,

you are quite right about destroying Pakistan's raison d'être by saying its creation did not deliver to the people what they were promised. But such strategic considerations are not really the reason why the people who keep on harping about this say it.

They often say it from a "Nehruvian" perspective, that Hindus and Muslims in such numbers could have coexisted. The past tense is used only to feel good about "being right". But what is often dangerous is the future tense they often use about doing away with borders and embracing each other like brothers, because as Two-Nation Theory is not valid, there is also no reason to have borders, border-checkpoints or visa restrictions.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 30 Jan 2013 17:35

Islamic South Asia

We often hear Indians saying, the Two-Nation Theory was wrong and it has been proven wrong by the facts on the ground - more Muslims are being killed in Pakistan every day than in India where they enjoy security of their person, property and faith.

We often hear this in discussions between Indians and Pakistanis on the Internet forums and in other media. In fact one would notice Indians of the Nehruvian bent trying to rub it in in Pakistanis.

Other Indians think, Wow, what a great train to get on and try to humiliate the Pakistanis! But this is really a huge pile of nonsense.

There are three camps here: Muslim Leaguers, Nehruvians and Bharatiyas.

The above debate is between the Muslim Leaguers and Nehruvians. Nehruvians are telling the Muslim Leaguers that they were wrong to demand a separate state of Pakistan, and history has proven them wrong, and the Nehruvians were right. But right in what?

Muslim Leaguers believed that in India, Muslims would be subdued by the huge Hindu majority and they will lose all power. Muslim Leaguers could only think like Islamics, that if there is a religious majority they would suppress the minority, garner all levers of power only for itself. Islamics would have done it like that.

Nehruvians were of the opinion that they can ensure that the Hindus would not be able to assert themselves and they can be lulled into accepting a sterilization of Bharatiya identity, civilization and cultural assertion, and they will allow Islam to take over first in the form of secularism and then in a more overt way.

This is what Nehruvians try to tell the Muslim Leaguers, that the latter made a strategic error, which can now be corrected once the Muslim Leaguers understand that there was no need to partition the Indian Subcontinent, and admit that under the guidance of Nehruvian politics, Bharat could have been undermined much more effectively than through the Partition.

Both however agree on one thing - India should purge its Bharatiya Civilization and accept Islam as its reigning ideology. Muslim Leaguers were just not confident that they could pull it off, while Nehruvians were.

Today Nehruvians are telling the Muslim Leaguers, accept our hand, let's join India and Pakistan and by sticking to the "secular" plan, we will be able to do the transformation of India into an Islamic Emirate much more easily even if it takes a little longer.

And in this debate, full-blooded Bharatiyas sometimes jump in thinking this is a triumph of the Bharatiya Civilization that Pakis are cutting themselves up, while Indian Muslims are pampered, so let's rub it in into the Pakis what morons they are. This issue is however not being discussed from the perspective of Bharatiya Civilization triumphing over Paki ideology, but rather Nehruvianian model of Islamization triumphing over the Muslim League model of Islamization.

This whole "Aman ki Asha" project is being sponsored by Nehruvians and a section of the Muslim Leaguers who have seen the light, that in India one gets both - Islam and Feudalism, just as what they had hoped to have in Pakistan, but are now having some trouble considering the radicalization of Pakistan.

What Nehruvians are hoping to achieve is that they want these enlightened Muslim Leaguers to talk to the Kabila - to Pakistani Army and bring them on board. The Pakistani Army however have vested interests in keeping Pakistan united and having control over the land, and they have some difficulty seeing how they can continue with their privileges in some united India-Pakistan union.

The Nehruvians have been told that for such a deal to go through, the Pakistani Army would have to be given a very big bone, where they can show some Islamic victory over the Kufr for them to make some moves on "South Asia", especially as the ultra-radicalized Pakis would consider any move by Pakistani Army to get cozy with the "South Asia" project as highly suspicious.

This the Nehruvians have been trying and trying - to sell Bharatiya jewelry to Pakistan without much outcry from the Bharatiyas. Often the Nehruvians have come quite close and then something or the other came up which thwarted their plans.

Bharatiyas have a big difficulty seeing the party that ostensibly ensured their freedom being willing to sell them off, but that is what "Aman ki Asha" and Track-II Diplomacy is all about - a sell out in order to bring Pakistani Army on board the project of slow managed Islamization of Bharat according to the Nehruvian model and a slow but steady death to the Bharatiya Civilization through the Nehruvian models of civilizational genocide - "secularism", corruption, Macaulayist education, Yuppyism, Hindu infiltration, "ahimsah paramo dharmah", dossiers, itiyaadi.

If people are not convinced that Nehruvianism is simply soft Islamism, then it is a justified skepticism. One could also call it perhaps - aggressive Dhimmiism. I call it aggressive Dhimmiism, because the Dhimmis acting to undermine Bharatiyas feel confident because they have the aggressive support of Islamists behind them, should it come to fisticuffs with Bharatiyas, (which they could avoid altogether simply by being clever enough). There is nothing wrong with skepticism. But this is a model which answers most questions, assuming one is willing to try it, and see the happenings with this lens.

One only has to analyze the actions and propaganda of UPA to see through their mask!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby devesh » 30 Jan 2013 23:32

how about Castration?

for rapists who want houris, it's a very good deterrent. they are out-of-service for the rest of their miserable existence.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 31 Jan 2013 00:38

devesh ji,

the general rule should be "foreskin protects"!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 01 Feb 2013 09:52

Iran & Baluchestan

In continuance of the post on Iran & Baluchistan

X-Posting from "Iran News and Discussions" Thread

sum wrote:Very interesting article from a very high powered person:
Lesson on diplomacy, from an Iranian

Some Indian participants, evidently upset and taking advantage of this candour, reminded the Iranian gentleman that Iran had always sided with Pakistan and asked him what it was that Iran had done for India, that Iran was buying wheat from the U.S. but was not willing to buy it from India, that Iran was spreading radicalisation among the Shia community in India, that India says Iran is important for India but Iran never says India is important for Iran, etc. Someone pointed out that Shiite Iran supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, which was a diehard Sunni movement.


The Iranian friend — we have to describe him as a friend since friends are supposed to talk frankly without worrying about offending anyone — was not nonplussed. It was not Iran which placed obstacles for Indian wheat sales in Iran; this was a matter of business considerations. He added that India could not have an unfriendly attitude towards Iran and, at the same time, expect special consideration. Iran was a land of moderation, not a land of extremism; it never exported Shia extremism to India. If there is Shia extremism in India, there is also Hindu extremism, he added for good measure. As for supporting Pakistan, he said Iran had to, since Pakistan was a neighbour and a friendly country, but Iran had never done anything against India and wanted to be helpful to both. He rubbished the reports about supporting the Taliban and added that India had been in touch with the Taliban.

The red bolded part is a term gifted from UPA to all of India's enemies which India will have to bear for the rest of its history :x :x


It is always entitlement, and Iranians show a lot of it.

Since we do not publish any surveys of Shia Extremism or have GoI statements that Iran is supporting Shia Extremism in India, even though that is the blatant truth, it becomes difficult to pin anything on Iran.

But what can be pinned down, without any hesitation is Iran's votes on Kashmir in international fora, on Jammu & Kashmir, a state in the Indian Union. And if Iran has voted against India, Iran has zero entitlement on any Indian support in international fora either. That should be made crystal clear.

Now there has been a lot of overlap of strategic interests in the past as far as Afghanistan is concerned, and India has interests in Central Asia. But the Iranians have made it amply clear that their ego has been bruised and they will use India's very mild vote against Iran as a club to pound us with. So we should say too bad. Suck it.

In any case, we know Iran is not going to give us unhindered access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, or for that matter unhindered access to them to the Indian Ocean. In the end, after 2014, most probably Iran and Pakistan with the help of China are going to cut off Central Asia for good from the rest of the world. Iran and Pakistan are going to act as the gatekeepers to Central Asia and they are going to work in sync.

India needs to gate-crash.

More and more, I feel USA would not agree to make Pakistani Baluchistan free. USA is too invested in Pakistan. So we should go for Iran's Baluchestan. There will be many countries in the world willing to help there - the Saudis, the Americans.

Liberation of Pakistan's Baluchistan comes AFTER liberation of Iran's Baluchestan. Iran simply cannot be a friend to India, not in its current theocratic form.

It is time for India to enter the fray.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 01 Feb 2013 11:38

Iranian Baluchestan Front

In continuance of the post on Iran & Baluchistan

X-Posting from "Iran News and Discussions" Thread

Carl wrote:
RajeshA wrote:Liberation of Pakistan's Baluchistan comes AFTER liberation of Iran's Baluchestan. Iran simply cannot be a friend to India, not in its current theocratic form.

That's an interesting angle. TSP is such a mess that most would logically assume that Paki Baluchestan would be first to gain independence, if anything. But given that the US interest at this point of time is more in terms of leaving the area in a sea of instability, semi-lawlessness and turmoil, that objective is mostly fulfilled in Af-Pak.


Carl ji,

in the last years, independence for Baluchistan has been of special focus of interest for me, and I and many others here, have always thought that Pakistani Baluchistan would be the first to get independence, mostly because of the anti-Pakistan focus on BRF, but Iran has escaped due scrutiny on this.

We have considered Iran a friend, or at least a country of considerable strategic importance to India.

My realization now is that we need to look at Iran objectively, and how the next decades would pan out, especially as the attention of Pakistan would shift from AfPak where it was post 9/11 as well as of Iran from West Asia as it loses its Pan-Islamic base there, with its ally Syria collapsing as a pivot of Shi'a Crescent, possibly Hezbollah being neutralized starved of logistical support from Iran, etc. Iran is going to be pushed out of its confrontation with Israel, and the Sunnis are taking over Israel portfolio.

When we look at it, Iran-Pakistan strategic understanding is a foregone conclusion, and it will happen despite the Shia deaths in Pakistan.

That cuts off India from Central Asia either completely or we would have to heavily bribe our way through, and if we do that we will be stripped of any strategic interests there.

Access to Central Asia and Afghanistan is important for India for energy and mineral resources from Russia, Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan, but also to keep Pakistan off-balance. If we do not keep Pakistan off-balance through a relationship with Afghans, we face Pakistani proxy-war in Kashmir and elsewhere.

In order to get free access, we would have to go through Baluchistan. And despite all the killing going on in Pakistani Baluchistan, India would not get any international support for its liberation - neither from the Gulf, nor from USA or the West in general, certainly not from PRC, and Russia doesn't have the will after their Afghanistan fiasco.

Since Iran is not going to partner India in any strategic sense in Central Asia, and has consistently shown anti-Indian positions, there is no need to keep ourselves back.

Iranian Baluchestan's Liberation would in contrast to Pakistan's Baluchistan find a lot of takers. Americans, Saudis would be on board. Even Russia could be enticed as that would give Russians a North-South corridor not manned by any regional powers.

In fact there may be elements in Pakistan under the influence of Saudi interests who may see it in their interest to go after Iranian Baluchestan as well, and thus offer Americans some bases there.

But even if Pakistan helps, Iranian Baluchis would never be indebted to Pakistan. There is too much anti-Pakistan feeling among the Balochs.

India can enter the fray contributing a big military presence in Iranian Baluchestan once Liberation is underway. Once we have a presence in (ex-)Iranian Baluchestan, Pakistani Baluchistan would really be a piece of cake, as then Pakistani Baluchistan would have a great motivation to join the liberated (ex-)Iranian Baluchestan, and Pakistan would also lose all moral standing for not letting their Baluchistan join with the Independent Baluchestan.

Iranian regime would hate us. It doesn't change much. We can help the Iranian people much better if we share a border with them.

More importantly what we should keep in mind is that one does not get too many opportunities and whatever opportunities present themselves e.g. in this case, we should grab them.
Last edited by RajeshA on 02 Feb 2013 11:06, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 01 Feb 2013 15:44

Iranian Baluchestan Front

X-Posting from "Iran's Identity Faultlines - Islamic / Aryan" Thread

Continuing from "Iran News & Discussions" Thread

Carl wrote:RajeshA ji,

It looks like the Arabs and the US are definitely more likely to actively support trouble in West Baluchestan (Iranian-occupied) than East Baluchestan. Even in Baluchi demonstrations in the US when Ahmadinejad visited, some of them were discouraged from carrying anti-Pakistani placards along with anti-Iran ones. If they want funding, then they should focus on Iran, is the message.

Yes the iron is hot, and it should be hit.

Arabs and US are definitely interested, and India need not even be spearheading this. There is a lot of diplomatic shenanigans that we can do to show that we are involuntary participants, to keep Iranians in good humor as long as possible.

Here is a scenario. Lets say that there is a coalition - Israel, USA, Britain, France, Australia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Turkey willing to invade Iran, the coalition of the willing, all willing to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of "terrorist Shi'a regime of Iran"!

I'm including Turkey here, because Turkey too does not really have a direct land route to the Turkic Central Asian Republics as Georgia and Armenia spoil the contiguity, and Turkey could possibly want to play a bigger role there.

After the invasion and liberation comes the challenge of holding the territory, and Iran is not going to be in a mood to let Baluchestan and Sistan go. If possible they will retake the territory, whenever the foreign forces retreat.

Which country however can really stay in and hold Western Baluchestan over the long term. The Gulf cannot do it. They don't have the men. USA can do it, but would become the target of the Baloch Jihadis sooner or later and would look like an occupying power. Turkey have their own history with Kurds, another occupied minority having some ethnic connection to the Baloch, and thus may not be appreciated.

India and India alone is the power that Baloch would agree to. Why?

Because only India can promise the Baloch in West Baluchestan, that the struggle would continue to liberate East Baluchistan as well, to throw the Pakis out. No other country has the credibility to make such a promise to the Baluch. No other country enjoys Pakistan's unreserved enmity and has the wherewithal to undertake such a liberation.

Also India has some history with the region as well, with Hindu Kings having ruled over the region. We are not new to the region. And just across the border, East Baluchistan was part of India anyway.

So because we have been there, we need not be considered an occupying power. In fact we should make the promise of liberating East Baluchestan contingent on whether West Baluchestan accepts to accede to India signing an Instrument of Accession.

Carl wrote:OTOH, the Baluchi intelligentsia (which seems wholly based on E. Baluchestan) prefers that Paki-held Baluchis gain freedom first and lead the whole movement in general, rather than the W. Baluchis, for whom they seem to have disdain


Actually East Baluchi intelligentsia would have a huge stake in India being able to settle down in West Baluchestan, because their freedom depends on it, whether West Baluchestan accedes to India or not. If they do, then their liberation is certain. If the West Baluchis don't, then they may remain independent for some time and again fall under Iranian control, and Indians would be back in India, not having lost much.

So for that reason, we can be sure that we can bring in many East Baluchis to help us manage in West Baluchistan. The East Baluchistan organizations would be willing to support Indian Army in whichever way possible. The East Baluchis would have a real stake, regardless of Wahhabization of West Baluchestan. If we move in quickly and start providing relief to West Baluchis, they too can be won over to the idea of India.

The small size of the population over a large mineral-rich area, albeit desert, does allow India some leeway to keep the local population in good humor and one can open new channels of revenue to help with employment.

The East Baluchis who have a much stronger attachment to India would be a big help in West Baluchestan, especially until we are able to cultivate the sympathy and support of the locals.

Carl wrote:So far, internal lack of unity has been the bane of the Baluchi freedom struggle. This East-West difference could add to that. It would be interesting to see how the powers that are funding it will get everyone on the same page.

The East-West difference is an issue when the situation is static, with hardly any movement. When the situation becomes fluid, people start thinking again. If the game plan becomes clearer to the East Baluchis, they would cooperate.

Carl wrote:Moreover, in a case as transparent as this, an Iran-Pak-China axis is a possibility. Pak-China can easily bear down on India to deter us from participating actively. The chances of active Indian participation seem higher if TSP itself was the chief target of the first round of Baluchi liberation (East). But if W. Baluchestan is going to be the chief focus, and the co-operation of a section within Pakistan is also required, then its conceivable that - even if the break-away happens - Indian participation could be kept down.


I don't think India needs to be in the vanguard of the liberation. Americans are quite good at that. Other countries can come in after a month of the invasion. We enter the scene around 1 years after the invasion. The soldiers USA wanted India to make available for Iraq may become available for West Baluchestan instead. India can enter the scene at her leisure when everything has been secured. But we would need to lit the fires beforehand and give some assurance to the Americans that we will share the burden of consolidation.

As I mentioned, Pakistan, Iran and China want to seal the region and not let anybody else in. Russia is there but as a energy producer is cut off from the energy market in India.

W. Baluchis usually tend to be involved in drug-running or other schemes to make money, rather than a well-thought out ideology, or else they tend to focus more on Sunni Islamism and in demanding more rights from Tehran. Moreover, the E. Baluchi intelligentsia in TSP prefers to keep the ideology of Baluchi nationalism relatively non-sectarian and "secular" (relatively speaking). Since the 1800's, a lot of Baluchis became "Zikris" (a Mahdi-ist movement), plus there exist some Baluchi Shi'a. But Baluch movements focused on Iranian Baluchestan tend to be Wahhabi funded and indoctrinated. As it is, the Zikris are merging back into the regular Hanafi Sunni fold, so this added Wahhabi extremism and its macabre tactics with groups like Jondullah is even more unwelcome according to these Baluchi thinkers.

Well this can all be used as firewood to keep Iranian security forces warm and active and in any scenario would be burnt up in the initial stages of any liberation - ahh, the lure of the 72s, including 2 from this Dunya. :wink:

We can do social engineering later on, possibly with the help of East Baluchis.

Baluchistan can become another Gujarat on steroids, being on the mouth of Persian Gulf, Gateway to Central Asia, pumped up with mineral wealth, and ideologically moderate!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 03 Feb 2013 22:15

Continuing from "Iran - News & Discussions" Thread

Pranav wrote:
RajeshA wrote:In the end, after 2014, most probably Iran and Pakistan with the help of China are going to cut off Central Asia for good from the rest of the world. Iran and Pakistan are going to act as the gatekeepers to Central Asia and they are going to work in sync.


This part may be right. But that is not an entirely negative scenario. If Pak goes unambiguously into the anti-western camp it will provide some clarity to the regional situation.


The problem here is that Pak will never go unambiguously into the Anti-Western Camp. It will continue to offer services to USA/UK. One may not be able to say, Pakistan is US puppet or US puppy, but on a tactical level there would always be paid transactions, and on the strategic level, their partnership would have some substance based exactly on that fact, that paid services will always be available.

Furthermore Pakistan's service as a check on Indian power would always be available to the US.

Even if Pak goes overtly into the Sinic camp, the above scenario would still be true.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 04 Feb 2013 02:05

RajeshA and SSridhar,

Try to read the Pakistan & Afghanistan chapters (4 &5) in the book "The Dust of Empire"
by Karl E Meyer.

A version of the book is in Google Books.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 04 Feb 2013 14:40

ramana garu,

I looked it up. Those chapters are not viewable on Google Books. Will however put it on my reading list.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 04 Feb 2013 14:50

Iranian Baluchestan Front

In the next years after 2014 one would increasingly see China putting pressure on Pakistan to curb the Uyghurs, but also try to bring about an alliance whose sole purpose would be to seal Central Asia from India, ... and from the West.

The Iran-Pakistan Gates would be shut.

For all three it is important that neither the West nor India get access to Central Asia. For China of it is a matter of cornering all the resources. But beyond that all the powers - Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan know that their instability comes from Central Asia.

For Russia it is their soft underbelly, where rising Islamism can overturn the apple-cart, and usually USA/UK often have a hand in fomenting Islamism along with their friend Saudi Arabia.

For China similarly there are concerns that the West would try to incite the Uyghurs through their presence in AfPak directly and indirectly.

For Iran, the danger comes both from Taliban, which is not under control, and from Baluchi Nationalism.

Pakistan knows that if it does not have Afghanistan under its thumb, sooner or later the whole country can unravel. Baluchistan is also a cause for concern.

Whereas Russia has its concerns, but China, Pakistan and Iran have an increasing alliance with the aim closing Central Asia to outsiders.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization was an effort by China to both increase its reach into Central Asia, but also to prepare the countries to help China close the gates.

For India it becomes increasingly important to break down these gates and to do it through Baluchistan.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Supratik » 06 Feb 2013 23:21

It will depend on which model US follows if it decides to take out the Iranian regime - the Yugoslav model or the Afghanistan model of an allied Islamist state. If it is the latter then Iranian-Baluchestan may not get independence. Kurdistan did not get independence from Iraq. US under Obama has decided to co-opt democratic Islamist regimes as allies in replacement of fickle or unpliable dictators who kept the Islamists at bay. We should also consider what India should do or not do or is unable to do in Pak Baluchestan.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 06 Feb 2013 23:36

Iranian Baluchestan Front

Supratik ji,

The Afghanistan or Iraq model is impossible in Iran. When Iraq and Afghanistan were invaded their population was around 25 million. Today both are around 31 million. Iran today has a population of 3x that - 75 million.

Iraq was ruled by a coterie around Saddam Hussein, of course with an Army. Afghanistan was ruled by a motley bunch with rifles and rods. They were easy to break. Iran however has a broad-based government - theocratic but they have an elected President, a Parliament and an experienced Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Not easy to bring down.

So a full-scale invasion and occupation of Iran is simply impossible.

The only possibility is for a US-led Coalition is to attack the nuclear facilities and go back, but the Iranians can rebuild again. If they want to take away that capacity, they will have to do either a regime change in Iran bringing in a West-friendly regime or do a Yugoslavia which means they would need to invade and occupy areas they want "liberated". This could include Khuzestan, Iranian Azerbaijan, Iranian Kurdistan and of course Iranian Baluchestan. They can only occupy an area, which has a population friendly to it and is not too densely populated.

So I would say if occupation is foreseen, then a Yugoslavia solution would be the template.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Supratik » 06 Feb 2013 23:48

Rajesh, I think they will put an allied Islamist regime in place and keep Iran intact. You should also consider other ways in which Pak-Bchstan can get independence and what role India can have specially in a nuclear environment.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 06 Feb 2013 23:49

Iranian Baluchestan Front

venug wrote:
India and India alone is the power that Baloch would agree to. Why?


Rajesh garu,

This is fine with an Indian perspective for hoping that Balochistan wants to take India's help. Iranian-Balochistan is far away removed from any Indian influence geographically or otherwise. I can understand if India can exert it's influence and wants to play a role through Pakistani-Balochistan. More over, Balochis take help from anyone, they are not India-centric when it comes to asking help. Secondly, India has been pushed out from Afghanistan very easily, we are silenced just like that. Now we want to play an active role in Iranian-Balochistan, what gives us the edge over other countries like US, Russia and Arabian nations which too want to de-stabilize Iran more than India? Clouds gather before the rain, where are Indian clouds over Iranian-Balochistan?


Well the other countries can contribute to destabilizing Iran if they want and of course they want and will do if they could, and in my opinion they should. Balochis should in fact take help from others. That makes the outcome for us much more easier.

But Afghanistan and Iranian Baluchestan are two different things. Our biggest problem with Afghanistan was that we shared no borders with them. As far Iranian Baluchestan is concerned, after the US, we are the biggest Navy in the Indian Ocean, and Iranian Baluchestan for Indian Navy is just a stone-throw away.

India can do only so much in Pakistan Baluchistan directly, for India follows the US diktat on this. Of course if we stop following we can do a lot, but then we run up against Amreeka and the international order (UNSC) which does not want to see Pak break.

But as far as Iranian Baluchestan is concerned, US and the Arabs would have no reservations and may even be happy to see it happen, unless of course one runs into some deep US balancing act game here.

venug wrote:And even though Balochistan wants independence, it has a muslim majority, they have long forgotten their Indian roots, I think they moved on to become TFTA central Asians on horse backs. They don't have the feeling of nostalgia for them to touch base with their Indian roots. They simply don't care.


Let's forget all this Hindu-Muslim stuff when it comes to strategy. If it helps India expand, and bring down Pakistan I don't even mind sending Owaisi as our representative somewhere.

Moreover if the Baluchis want to live in one country, united, then India is really their only play. No other country would take on Pakistan.

There are no clouds anywhere! But weather can change anytime!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby member_22872 » 07 Feb 2013 00:04

we are the biggest Navy in the Indian Ocean, and Iranian Baluchestan for Indian Navy is just a stone-throw away.


Rajesh garu,
Even though we are biggest navy after US, this operation planning will take months, even years to come to fruition, we can't just depend on our navy to pull this off and we are too far away by land or air (with hostile enemy's aerospace in the middle) to make a difference. While US is already in the vicinity, they along with Arab nations will want the Balochi-pie for themselves, why will they even invite India or share their spoils of victory, given the strategic value of Balochistan?

Moreover if the Baluchis want to live in one country, united, then India is really their only play. No other country would take on Pakistan.

But we are talking about a move which makes inroads into Iranian-Balochistan first. How much traction do we have with Iranian-Balochis? how much do they trust us?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 00:06

Iranian Baluchestan Front

Supratik wrote:Rajesh, I think they will put an allied Islamist regime in place and keep Iran intact. You should also consider other ways in which Pak-Bchstan can get independence and what role India can have specially in a nuclear environment.


Well Iran already has an Islamic Theocratic Regime, a Shi'a regime in a majority Shi'a country. All other Islamists, at least the Shi'a kind are more moderate, and "reformers". That means their chances are zero.

There is no more Islamic card to play in Iran for US. Whatever card they had they already played in 1979 and did not go out too well.

a) They could of course invade Iranian Baluchestan and install some Jondolla Islamist regime there, but if it Islamist and even installed with American help, it would still not be able to allow American military presence on its soil. That is just how they tick.

b) Bringing in some Islamic monarchy is simply out of fashion, but one which may allow American presence to continue, even though it may still be unpopular, and one could see again a Taliban resurgence there simply on premise that there are American soldiers there who need to be shunted out, and that would destabilize any monarchy or some "democratic" regime there.

c) America could of course set up some government in an independent Iranian Baluchestan and go home, but Iran would simply take over the region again, and quite easily too.

d) Another possibility is for Iranian Baluchestan to merge with Pakistan and thus be together with Pakistani Baluchistan, but that too is impossible because the Pakistani Baluchis have nothing but hate for the Pakis and they would rather separate than consider staying inside Pakistan.

e) The other possibility is for Iranian Baluchestan to try a merger with Afghanistan even though Iranian Baluchestan and Afghanistan only share a small sliver of border. But would the Pakis allow that, especially as they would be controlling Afghanistan. If they allow that, that means they are willing to let their Baluchistan go as well and join up with Afghanistan. Hardly a scene they would prefer.

f) So the only possibility I see is for Iranian Baluchestan to consider merging with India. We did not march into Kashmir without an Instrument of Accession, and we certainly would not march into Iranian Baluchestan without an Instrument of Accession, unless of course it is sanctioned by the UN and is short term only. But short term does not guarantee that Iran will not take over later on. So an Instrument of Accession agreed upon through a referendum of the Iranian Balochis is the only way Iranian Baluchestan can hope remain independent of Iran, and not have some groups fighting for freedom from some occupation. More importantly it is the only way Iranian Balochis can hope to get Pakistani Baluchistan join it as well later on.

Are there other ways to liberate Pakistani Baluchistan?

Well this thread is full of ways but they always break down because US would not acquiesce.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 07 Feb 2013 00:15

RajeshA et al, A couple of books to read and understand
- "Europes Vanished States" by Norman Davies
- "Dust of Empire" - Karl Meyer

Both talk about how maps change in history as states rise and fall.


To me it looked like a lot of history of not much relevance to us.

However the key facts are:

- States rise and vanish as the idea of the state becomes important or loses importance.

- And states are created and not formed.


So use these two facts to channel your ideas and thoughts.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 00:20

Iranian Baluchestan Front

venug wrote:
RajeshA wrote:we are the biggest Navy in the Indian Ocean, and Iranian Baluchestan for Indian Navy is just a stone-throw away.


Rajesh garu,
Even though we are biggest navy after US, this operation planning will take months, even years to come to fruition, we can't just depend on our navy to pull this off and we are too far away by land or air (with hostile enemy's aerospace in the middle) to make a difference. While US is already in the vicinity, they along with Arab nations will want the Balochi-pie for themselves, why will they even invite India or share their spoils of victory, given the strategic value of Balochistan?


Well actually it is not really far off for our air force. I don't know - an hour or so flying, and we can do that without needing to fly over Pakistan.

Secondly I imagine we will not be participating in the invasion itself. That may indeed remain something that the US does with its own coalition effort, some Gulf countries, Jordan, Morocco, etc.

So what is actually the Baloch Pie for the Arabs? The Arabs have a good access to Central Asia through Pakistan. They can do without Iranian Baluchestan. The question is one of holding the territory. The Arabs cannot do it on their own. The Iranians would devour them.

For the Arabs the biggest prize is not the land for themselves. They have enough desert, as it is. The biggest prize for the Arabs would be the weakening of Iran and that of Shi'a threat.

If Iranian Baluchestan unites with India, they know that there will be tensions between India and Iran, and they get a new ally as India on their side. Of course we can work it out with Iran after the accession of their Baluchestan with us. Sure there will be a lot of bad blood, but they would rather have a peaceful India on their east than some fundamentalist Sunni regime always attacking it, or America playing some further strategic games with them.

venug wrote:
RajeshA wrote:Moreover if the Baluchis want to live in one country, united, then India is really their only play. No other country would take on Pakistan.

But we are talking about a move which makes inroads into Iranian-Balochistan first. How much traction do we have with Iranian-Balochis? how much do they trust us?

We would be having the Pakistani Baluchis to do the marketing for us. After all if the Pakistani Baluchis want freedom then India is their best bet, especially an India sitting in Iranian Baluchestan, because no other country would come to their aid.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 00:21

ramana wrote:However the key facts are:

- States rise and vanish as the idea of the state becomes important or loses importance.

- And states are created and not formed.


So use these two facts to channel your ideas and thoughts.

Interesting ideas!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 17:00

An interesting lesson from Syria is that the West and the Sunnis are trying to bring down Bashar al-Assad using their proxies, and American Secretary of State pleads that they have to increase their aid to the rebels, for if they don't do it, Assad would fall at the hands of Al Qaeda, and thus power will shift from Assad to Al Qaeda, and American and GCC proxies would not get say. The attempt is not to bolster Assad to fight back Al Qaeda, but to make him fall at the hands of their proxies.

But this lesson we are not applying to Pakistan. Pakistani Army can fall at the hands of the Taliban, so why not have it fall at the hands of some proxy we (or America) trusts`(more)?

However one can whoever one sets up, they would ultimately fall to the radicals anyway! But that is not an argument one hears from Washington w.r.t. Syria, so why would it be valid for Pakistan either.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 17:46

Finishing Off Pakistan: The 360° Containment Noose

This is of course an old subject of discussion, especially on this thread. But there is wisdom gained by looking at the various possibilities.

And one wisdom gained is that many wouldn't work because of three very important factors

a) US will not allow Pakistan to fall!
b) India may have an interest in destroying Pakistan but doesn't have the will to do so and it is much less when one factors in US resistance to it.
c) The internal forces would tear Pakistan apart, but would not wipe it off the map nor would Pakistan's enmity for India change regardless of the transformations there.

So if internal forces wouldn't manage it, India wouldn't do it and US wouldn't allow it, how does one go about destroying Pakistan as a threat?

Pakistan is actually a very precarious state, always on the edge, and still nobody is willing to break its knees! It is quite pathetic actually. Pakistan's biggest asset is that it has allowed itself to become an asset for the powers that be and even as it has also become a pain in the a$$, it has successfully sold itself as too big to fail, in fact, sold it even to its enemies like India.

We have seen Pakistan go full paranoid about Indian presence in Afghanistan. That was for a reason. Pakistan is extremely vulnerable from the West and North, even as they have set up their forces on the Indian border.

So I would want the readers to imagine one scenario in which India controls ALL four sides of Pakistan and has the potential to squeeze it at will and have it in our hands how to calibrate the pressure on Pakistan.

  1. East - We have our forces in the East. On the LoC we can make it hot when we want to.
  2. South - We can destabilize Karachi, set up a Naval Blockade in the Arabian Sea, take down Pakistani Navy. Sure we have not done so, but we could if necessary
  3. North - What if we have enough reach and influence in Afghanistan to institutionalize assassinations of Pakistani Army personnel and terrorists, The Supari Plantation Solution! That is what gives Pakis the jitters, the creeps. May be Pakistan can control much of Taliban, but they will not be able to control all of them.
  4. West - Till now Pakistan has felt little pressure here. The Baluchistan problem is something that Pakistan can afford to ignore, as Baluchis don't really have enough firepower to change the map or to threaten the Pakis in their heartland. Also Iran is a stabilizing factor for Pakistan on the Baloch question. But what if this changes? What if West of Baluchistan, it is not Iran, Pakistan sees one day, but Kaala Bhoot INDIA again. What if India sits in Iranian Baluchestan and looks down upon Pakistan, making a military out of Baluchistan's rag tag force, forcing a defacto no-fly zone over Pakistani Baluchistan? What if India had direct access to Afghanistan over Iranian Baluchestan and could make all Paki horrors come true one day? Yes, what if?

With a 360° containment noose around Pakistan even if we sneeze, Paki would jump and hit his head on the ceiling! That is where the TSPA should be - in perpetual paranoia, diminishing military strength and options and their balls in our fist.

And one fine day, we just gobble up their Baluchistan leaving a sliver of Pakistan running North-South along the Indus - to the North the Pushtun bounty hunter, to the East - Indian Sikhs, to the West - Indian Baloch, and to the South - Indian Sharks.

At the moment the situation in Pakistan's East has become ossified. Neither the Pakis can change anything for India is too strong, not can Indians change anything, for India is too law-abiding! But to Pakistan's West and North, there everything can be in flux and that is the play we ought to make.

But this scenario depends on India getting control over Iranian Baluchestan! In a way, that is a much easier nut to crack! Why? For that we look at the three reasons stated above which have been in Pakistan's favor.

1) In Iran's case, the so called "international community" comprised of West and Gulf are aligned and in full favor of putting down Iran. None of this so called international community would be willing to move against Pakistan.

2) India and Iran have had some, I repeat some, alignment on question of Afghanistan, Iran exports Oil and Gas to us, but it has often sided with Pakistan on Kashmir and Pakistan's wars against India. Today there is really little love for India in the Islamic regime in Iran and much of the relationship is transactional. It is only from India's side that we keep on harping on civilizational ties and good relations. We need to overcome that, and we shall see, as Iran's Pan-Islamic moorings through their involvement in West Asia get weakened (loss of influence in Syria, Hezbollah, Palestine, etc.), they will move closer to Pakistan and become rabidly anti-Indian and basically close-off Afghanistan and Central Asia for India altogether. All our investments in Chahbahar Port and roads are going to sink like an iron cannon ball in water. We have been putting our eggs in the wrong place.

3) Sure the Western Baloch cannot kick out the Iranian regime from Western Baluchestan on their own, but with the help of the "coalition" (West + Gulf) it should be possible, and with the help of Indian military and Eastern Baloch they should be able to consolidate their freedom and help us with their nation building.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 19:09

Iranian Baluchestan Front

The possibility that any "international coalition" would decide on occupying Iranian Baluchestan as such doesn't make sense, as the nuclear facilities in Iran are elsewhere.

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However attacking the facilities would only delay the nuclear program of Iran

A former chief of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, acknowledged that air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites will only delay the project by two years at the most. However, in a recent interview, Dagan admitted that an air strike or regional war will result in people getting behind the regime and hence extending its life. Many US, GCC and Israeli officials agree with the view expressed by Dagan


Published on Jan 21, 2013
By Reza Kahlili
Covert Op to Target Iran's Nuclear Plants: WND

The second way is to get rid of the Iranian regime. Till now the West thinks it could do so by putting Iran under economic sanctions till the people rise up against the regime and overthrow it.

This is really believing in the tooth fairy. Just look at North Korea. If the regime hasn't fallen there, it need not fall in Iran either.

The third way is to dismember Iran, cause such cataclysmic change in Iran that pursuit of nuclear weapons become meaningless for a middling power like cut-up Iran. It is in this scenario that taking over Iranian Baluchestan makes sense, along with Khuzestan, Iranian Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan.

The fact that Turkey seems to be going for some peace settlement with PKK using Abdullah Ocalan means Turkey would be feel more confident and less likely to hinder a liberation of Iranian Kurdistan.

The fact that Iraq is getting more money from its own Oil now means Iranian control over the militias (Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army and SCIRI's Badr Corps) may wane, and thus there can be a new Khuzestan gambit.

Iran and Azerbaijan don't really see eye to eye that much, so despite Al Khamanei being an Azeri, Iranian Azerbaijan too could be prepared for liberation.

So if one is serious about stopping Iran's efforts to attain a nuclear bomb, then the only sure way is to dismember Iran, and put other things on Iranian regime palette to worry about than nuclear bombs!

---------

Perhaps one important reason, the Saudis may be keen on India moving in into Western Baluchestan may be because it would set up India as another power in the region with which Iran would be enemies with, since India would be holding territory which was previously Iranian.

Of course we can look at it as a trap, but this is a trap we should willingly walk into. We would find a way later on on how to pacify Iran, perhaps given them some territory back or give them credit line or something.

What is important is to get the Saudis to get this rolling and to finance the party.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 21:17

Iranian Baluchestan Front

From Baloch Homeland

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 07 Feb 2013 21:34

So if we go by true single ethnic state principle a remake of West Asia will include emergence of Kalat.
I think by naming it Balochistan the antiquity of the idenity is obscured.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 21:37

Iranian Baluchestan Front

Iran's Demographics 2004


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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 07 Feb 2013 21:40

When did Iran get to grab parts of Kalat?

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 21:50

Iranian Baluchestan Front

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Bandar Abbas/Gemeron was a Hindu port city

The king from Gemeron
In 630 CE, Maharaja Derbar Raja of Gemeron (now known as Bandar Abbas) in Persia was defeated in battle and escaped to Sri Lanka, and he was later blown off course by a storm to the remote shores of Kuala Sungai Qilah, Kedah. The inhabitants of Kedah found him to be a valiant and intelligent person, and they made him the king of Kedah. In 634 CE, a new kingdom was formed in Kedah consisting of Persian royalty and native Malay of Hindu faith, the capital was Langkasuka.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 22:04

Books for the Library

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The Baloch and Balochistan
Author: Naseer Dashti
Publication Date: 11 September, 2012

Description
Three thousand years ago, a group of Indo-Iranic tribes (called Balaschik at that time) settled in the northwestern Caspian region of Balashagan. Circumstances forced them to disperse and migrate towards south and eastern parts of Iranian plateau. In medieval times, they finally settled in present Balochistan where they became known as the Baloch. During their long and tortuous journey from Balashagan to Balochistan, the Baloch faced persecutions, deportations, and genocidal acts of various Persian, Arab and other regional powers. During 17th century, after dominating Balochistan culturally and politically, the Baloch carved out a nation state (the Khanate of Kalat). In 1839, the British occupied Balochistan and subsequently it was divided into various parts. In the wake of the British withdrawal from India in 1947, Balochistan regained its sovereignty but soon Pakistan occupied it in 1948. The historical account of the Baloch is the story of a pastoralist nomadic people from ancient times to mid-twentieth century. The author outlines the origin of the Baloch state and its variegated history of survival against powerful neighbors such as the Persians, the British and finally, Pakistan. This fascinating research work discovers the background of the long drawn-out conflict between the Baloch and Pakistan and Iranian states.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Feb 2013 22:11

Iranian Baluchestan Front

ramana wrote:When did Iran get to grab parts of Kalat?


The British Division of Balochistan and the Incorporation of its Western Part into Iran 1860-1928

This chapter will deal first with the British division of Balochistan in 1871 and then the eventual incorporation of its western part into Iran in 1928. It is a historical analysis of events, which preceded the incorporation of western Balochistan into Iran, beginning with the rise of British colonial hegemony in the region and the ensuing division of Balochistan into western and eastern halves in 1871. This is essential for a better understanding of the present Balochi national movement, which is rooted, in their anti-colonial struggle for reunification of Balochistan. In this regard, the following brief narrative is adopted largely from the official documents found in the British archives as well as the writings of British authorities involved in shaping and implementing those policies. These documents are the only major recorded sources on the internal events in Balochistan during the period between 1860 and 1928

The Anglo-Persian Policies and the Division of Balochistan

Western Balochistan is bounded by the ''Lut ''Desert and the Iranian province of Khorasan in the north, by the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea stretching from the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz to the port of Gwadar on the south and northwest, by the province of Kerman on the west, and by the Goldsmith Line separating Pakistani and Afghani Balochistan on the east. Ethno-geographically it comprises the Jazz Murian agricultural basin in the center and northwest, the Sarhad highlands in the north, the Mashkel lowlands and the Sarawan agricultural oasis on the east, the coastal region of Makuran in the south, and the western-most districts of ''Byaban ''and Bashkard. To this one can add the Helmand Depression inhabited by a mixed ethnic population of Baloch and Seistanis?
Historically, as the original homeland of the Baloch, western Balochistan is the cradle of their past history and the focus of their ancient heroic ballads and popular poetry. It was from here that their ancestors began to spread to, and consolidate their power in eastern Balochistan during the period between the thirteenth and the fifteenth century as mentioned in the previous chapter. The territory was the center of the Rind-Lashari Tribal Confederacy prior to the shift of its power to eastern Balochistan under Amir Chakar Rind in the late fifteenth century. It was also united with the rest of the country under the rule of the khanate of Kalat for the greater part of the eighteenth century.

Upon the death of Nasir khan I, in 1805 and the subsequent deterioration of the central authority in Kalat, the Balochi chieftains (hakims and sardars) of the distant western provinces were the first to succumb to their centrifugal tendencies, which were in turn a function of their tribal/feudal loyalties, and declare their independence. Of these, the most important were the principalities of Dizaks, Pahra (Iranshahr), Bampur, Baho-Dashtiari, Geh, Sarbaz, Kasserkand, and the chieftainates of Sarhard and Bashkard. However, the Narui hereditary rulers of Pahra enjoyed a paramount position among the rulers of these principalities, a position that was held by them until about 1849. At the time of his visit in 1810, Sir Henry Pottinger, a British officer, found western Balochistan independent and the rule of Shah Mehrab Khan Narui acknowledged from Dizak in the southeast to Bazman bordering Kerman in the north. ~2~ In 1839 Haji Abdul Nabi, an Afghan sent by the British to collect intelligence on the political conditions of the country, reported that the Naruis-then under Mohammed Ali Khan were still ruling from Bampur, but observed that Muhammad Shah, the Hakom of Sib, had emerged as the strongest Balochi ruler even though he had no superior position among other chiefs.

Such were the political conditions in western Balochistan in the mid-nineteenth century when Britain began to move into Kalat, then reduced to eastern Balochistan, to establish her forward defense lines against the growing Russian expansion in Central Asia. This objective was accomplished by the Treaty of 1854, which reduced Kalat to a subordinate position by bounding her to abstain from any negotiation with other powers without British consent and gave Britain the right to station troops in whatever part of the country she deemed necessary, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The move was part of an overall strategy to forestall Russian
Southern expansion toward India and the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean by securing Iran and Afghanistan as buffer states, separating the British Indian Empire from Russia. Consequently, control of Balochistan placed the borders of the Raj as contiguous to Iran and Afghanistan, thus enabling Britain to counter Russian moves in the two countries whose buffer status was regarded as essential to the defense of India. Moreover, Balochistan was also viewed by Britain as a significant line of communication linking India with her bases in the Middle East and Europe.

Historically, the consolidation of British power in eastern Balochistan, which started with the occupation of the Kalat for a short time in 1839, coincides with the beginning of Iranian encroachments on western Balochistan during the reign of Nasir-u-Din Shah (1848-1896) of the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925). In 1849, an Iranian force was sent to punish the Baloch incursions into Kerman, defeating the latter and capturing Bampur, a major Balochi town on the edge of Kerman. The Qajar expansion, however, intensified after the extension of the Indo-European Telegraph Line from Karachi to Gwadar in the domains of Kalat and then up to Jack on the coast of western Balochistan in 1861. By the time the line was completed in 1869-70, Iranian forces had advanced as far as Sarbaz between the coast and Bampur. “These conquests, however, wrote Lord Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and a principal architect of the British policies at that time, “testified to no more than the superior might of the victors, while they left a number of bordering Balochi states in a position of semi-dependence, which had no sanction save that dictated by fear.
During the course of the British investigation for the construction of the telegraph line, they were confronted by conflicting territorial claims to western Balochistan by the Shah of Persia, Khan of Kalat, and Sultan of Muscat. At the beginning, the British took a neutral stand by avoiding accepting pretension of sovereignty by any side. On March 11, 1862, the government of India warned the Secretary of State for India that by entering any arrangement with Persia as to the recognition of her claim, “we could not expect those chiefs (Balochi) to look without suspicion at such an engagement between our government and that of Shah, although it does not in terms prevent us from neutrality between themselves and Persia.”

Another official report, dated December 9, 1863 prepared by the British Commissioner Sir Frederick Goldsmith (then a colonel in charge of telegraph negotiation) for the Secretary of State for India in regard to the Persian claims, places the question into historical perspective, thus, given in extensor;
As to her (Persia) right, I know of none but of the strong over the weak, of the prestige of a high sounding monarchy over the obscurity of a small chiefdom. More than one hundred years ago Nadir Shah appointed Nasir Khan Brahui, the Governor of the whole of Balochistan, inclusive of Makuran, and in such capacity he was no doubt to some extent a feudatory of Persia, but it is also more than a hundred years ago that he exchanged the quasi service of the Shah for that of the Afghan King. His allegiance to Kandahar was no less binding than to Persia. It was the allegiance exacted by a stronger arm than his own. When the Afghan monarchy fell to pieces, the service ceased; but Balochistan also fell to pieces, and its chiefs set up claims of independence for themselves... Of late years she has, perhaps been more than usually active in this re-assertion of Makkuran sovereignty. The present state of affairs in Kalat must be especially favorable to her views. Anarchy in that quarter cannot but afford occasion for intrigue, if not for the actual advance of troops. But no new argument will be needed to show that anything like the dismemberment of Kalat would be as advantageous to Persian interests as detrimental to our own.

If possession for a period of years must necessarily imply “acknowledgement by the local rulers” it is the acknowledgement of helplessness. I do not for a moment believe that the Persian yoke is acceptable to the Sardars of Makkuran west of Kalat. (7)~

Subsequently, the British side-stepped the questions of territorial sovereignty and signed separate agreements with the Shah of Persia in 1858, Sultan of Oman in 1865, and the Balochi chiefs of Bahu, Dastiari, Geh, and Jask in 1869. These agreements dealt only with the question of the protection of telegraph wires and stations, and in each case the British undertook to pay a fixed subsidy to the separate parties involved. The agreements with the Baloch chiefs, which are discussed by Mahmud Mahmud, a contemporary Iranian historian, under the heading of relations between the British Government and the savage Balochi tribes, were entered because Persia, in spite of her claims, had no authority in that part of Balochistan and, as such, the British had to negotiate directly with the independent Baloch chiefs as well as to depend on them for the protection of-the telegraph lines and stations.

Moreover, the British were well aware that any acknowledgment as to the Persian claims on their part would have been taken by the independent Balochi chiefs as well as the Khan of Kalat as a sign of Anglo-Persian collaboration and that would have endangered the success of the telegraph negotiations which they had to enter with the Balochi chiefs. Colonel Goldsmith, then serving as Chief Director of the Indo­ European Telegraph and deputed to Tehran to help negotiate a telegraph treaty, reported to the government of Bombay on October 4,1865, that although there were objections to the plan by Persia on the basis of her demand for an arrangement as to the acceptance of her claims on Britain’s Part, the Baloch opposition constituted the sole obstacle to the scheme. Referring to this difficulty, he stated that;
The sole difficulty that I see in the way, is the discontent likely to be raised among the petty Baloch chiefs on the west of Kalat line, who may look upon themselves as given over to Persia by this arrangement. The point is, no doubt, one of great delicacy, but it is presumed that the question must be met if the telegraph line is to be run eventually through these tracts of country. I cannot but believe that we might come to a satisfactory understanding with the Persians to the effect that up to the long strip of Coast formed by the Imam of Muscat, of which Bunder Abbas is the western extremity, we treat the local chiefs as independent in regard to any subsidy given; but carefully stipulate a policy of non-interference in the general question of sovereignty, in which we neither acknowledge or disown the Persian claim.

Once the telegraph line was completed and its security assured by the Balochi chiefs, the British began to shift their policy of neutrality in favor of Persia. The official explanation was that Persian encroachment was threatening the security of Kalat as a protected state of British India and as such, a settlement with Persia would serve the interests of Kalat as well. Meanwhile, Persia took advantage of the British Presence in western Balochistan to consolidate its conquests as well as to further her expansion in order to enhance her claims and strengthen her bargaining position. It was during this time that Persian troops first advanced as far as Sarbaz and then suddenly the Wazir of Kerman was officially entitled by his sovereign as Sardar of Balochistan around 1866. With the completion of the telegraph line in 1869, the road was paved for an official investigation suggested by Lord Mayo in the same year and the subsequent formation of a joint boundary commission by Persia, Britain, and Kalat was instigated by the Shah in 1870. Consequently, General Goldsmith was appointed as the British Commissioner on the boundary commission.

The commission, however, was not able to hold a joint meeting due to a strong sense of ill feeling displayed toward the Kalat delegate by the Persian commissioner Mirza Ma’sum Khan, who refused to meet with his Baloch counterpart. As a result, General Goldsmith became the sole actor and arbitrator on the issue. In 1871 he received detailed instructions from the Viceroy in Council, who had carefully outlined the limits of a proposed boundary line to be suggested for approval by Persia, but had also added that “a very liberal view may, therefore, be taken of Persian claims to the west of that line. The proposed line was, in turn, based on Goldsmith’s own previous suggestions and reports, which had been prepared in connection with his mission concerning the Makuran telegraph. In one of these reports prepared for the government of Bombay and the Secretary of State for India on April 27,1864, he had underlined the basic historical argument for recognizing the Persian claims as to the latest conquests in western Balochistan. The report stated:
I. That, in my opinion, the claims of Persia to Makkuran generally are based upon somewhat tradition conquests of former years, more or less substantiated by the formal disposal of the province to Mohbut Khan Brahui in the middle of the last century; that the later rise of a new Government and enterprise of a new Chief in Balochistan virtually dispossessed Persia of her never well-defined Makuran territories; but that forcible reassertion of the Shah’s sovereignty over certain parts of Makuran, so for as hitherto carried out, however warrantable in accordance with the rule of European politics, is not a matter with which we can interfere upon a bare principle of justice and equity. In this view, such Makuran territories as Persia now holds in tributes, are hers by mere right of possession.

II That those portions of Makuran obeying the authority of the Khan of Kalat are that chiefs by possession and also by acknowledgement of the local rulers. They are part of an inherited Balochistan state, held, at first, in quasi-feudal tenure from Persia, subsequently from Kandahar, but in reality on a basis of independence, The revolutions which distracted the province after the death of Nasir khan in 1795 can only effect such petty chiefdoms as have been successful in permanently throwing off their allegiance. Those, which revolted and were afterwards subdued, still remain component parts of the inheritance of the Khans.

It is interesting to note how, at the time, the report had equated the claim of Persia to the territory with that of Kalat, a Balochi state, thus leaving the door open for the later recognition of Persian claims. Eventually, the proposed boundary line as sketched by Goldsmith was accepted by Persia and was embodied in a treaty signed between the two sides in September 1871, hence known as the Goldsmith Line separating Eastern and Western Balochistan. At present it forms international boundary between Iran and Pakistan. Reflecting on the ambitions of the Persian empire in western Balochistan and her attitude as to “the small and unknown state of Kalat,” General Goldsmith wrote in the final report of his proceedings to the Secretary of State for India on November 9, 1871, that “these traits, had they power to be independent, would be independent; not having power to be independent, they are as fair prey to the strongest neighbor. (’4) Thereafter, the name “Persian Balochistan replaced “Western Balochistan” in the official colonial documents.

There are several Principal reasons for the aforementioned change in British policy and her decision for the division of Balochistan in favor of~ Persia. The most important was related to the strategic developments in Central Asia at the time. In this regard, the late 1 860s coincided with the rapid Russian expansion toward the Merv in Central Asia as reflected in her conquest of Bokhara in 1866 and of Samarkand in 1869, an event which was particularly alarming to the British strategic interest in South Asia. These developments doubled her resolution to strengthen and defend the buffer status of Persia and Afghanistan against the Russian southward thrusts. Thus, by officiating the Persian claims in western Balochistan, the British helped strengthen her buffer status. In one of his later lectures on Central Asia, Goldsmith has pointed out that since Persia had lost a large portion of her territory to Russia in the north, checked by the Ottoman Empire in the west and by the British in Afghanistan, the only avenue for her expansion was in western Balochistan, where the constant feuds between the petty chiefs had made the land an easy prey to the Persian designs. Second, the British welcomed the Persian advance ~ the territory as a further assistance in pacifying the unruly and independent minded Balochi tribes which were viewed as a constant source of threat to their lines of communication. As we shall see, the British joined hands with Persia in launching several joint expeditions for suppressing the constant tribal revolts in Balochistan throughout the Qajar rule. Third Persian control and pacification of western Balochistan would have prevented the spread of the tribal revolts to the eastern part ruled by the British.

Therefore, the Persian expansion in western Balochistan would not have taken place had it not been for British approval and support. “Persian Balochistan (which) in its present shape,” wrote Lord Curzon in 1892. “Is the creation of the last thirty years, and to a large extent owes its existence to the intervention and the recognition of the British government. Thus, once Persia acquired British recognition of her claims in 1871, she began to extend her power farther in the region by seizing the district of kohak in 1872, expelling the Arabs of Muscat from the port of Chah Bahar, which they had held since 1789, annexing the independent Balochi principality of Bashkard in 1874, and then gradually moving toward Sarhad in northern Balochistan. In spite of these military moves, the Qajar rule in the country was more nominal than real and was directly limited to Bampur, then the capital of Balochistan. The rest of the country remained independent or semi-independent to be disturbed only by periodic military expeditions sent to levy taxes.

ramana
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 07 Feb 2013 22:43

RajeshA, Confirms my statement, "States are created and maps are made!"


Always find a British hand at perfidy.

BTW bandar means port

Porbandar, Gujarat, Home town of Mahatma Gandhi

Bandar = Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh the gateway for the Mughals in Bay of Bengal

Bandar Aceh in Indonesia, site of the Asian tsunami

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Supratik » 08 Feb 2013 00:12

So there are two nations without a country - Kurds and Baloch. We could potentially lethaly arm the Pak-Baloch as we did the mukti bahini but may be we are not doing it or unable to do it due to US pressure. Since this is about Pak the Taliban uprising in FATA and NWFP has great potential. If the Pak-Taliban makes a move for an Islamic North Korea then coupled with the Baloch, Pak could break along vertically. We have to see how far the US goes to keep Pak intact.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby lakshmikanth » 08 Feb 2013 00:24

I was thinking that Pak-Balochs could be armed by Iran (since Iran is already under US sanctions anyway), but Iranians are even more suppressive of the Iranian Balochs. We need to consider the Iranian equation (and thus the US-Iran and Iran-Sunni equation as well) for developing a right strategy, since an independent Balochistan would end up being a war ground for Bakis, US and Iranians for influence and control.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Supratik » 08 Feb 2013 00:36

IIRC, the heaviest concentration of Baloch are in the Pak portion.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 08 Feb 2013 15:09

Supratik wrote:So there are two nations without a country - Kurds and Baloch. We could potentially lethaly arm the Pak-Baloch as we did the mukti bahini but may be we are not doing it or unable to do it due to US pressure. Since this is about Pak the Taliban uprising in FATA and NWFP has great potential. If the Pak-Taliban makes a move for an Islamic North Korea then coupled with the Baloch, Pak could break along vertically. We have to see how far the US goes to keep Pak intact.


There are a few differences:

1) With the theater of operations of Mukti Bahini, East Pakistan, we had geographical contiguity, and so both arming them and militarily coming to their aid was easier, whereas for the enemy - (West) Pakistan, it was much more difficult. In the case of Balochistan, it is the other way round. The enemy, Pakistan sits next door, while we have no land border.

2) The other major difference is of course, that once one starts giving them aid in a major way, one raises the expectations of the other people. You tell them we are there for you. But when the crunch comes and they start getting butchered by a far better armed army - TSPA, and we don't show up with our fighter jets and tanks, then there is also a big let down. That gives rise to much more mistrust and disappointment than what may be the case right now.

3) Considering what the Balochis have been able to achieve till date - a complete cultural and physical alienation from the Pakjabis and the Pakistani forces on the ground as well as internal consolidation is laudable. If India however comes and puts up a fortress in West Balochistan, which is presently in Iran, the liberation of East Balochistan becomes a certainty.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 08 Feb 2013 15:12

lakshmikanth wrote:We need to consider the Iranian equation (and thus the US-Iran and Iran-Sunni equation as well) for developing a right strategy, since an independent Balochistan would end up being a war ground for Bakis, US and Iranians for influence and control.

Not unless Balochistan through a Instrument of Accession joins the Union of India, giving it all the freedoms and rights available to any other state and people in India.


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