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Managing Pakistan's failure

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 06 Dec 2015 06:20

X-post..
Jhujar wrote:http://nation.com.pk/blogs/05-Dec-2015/how-balochistan-became-a-part-of-pakistan-a-historical-perspective
How Balochistan became a part of Pakistan – a historical perspective
This resulted in a communique on August 11, 1947, which stated that:
a. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with the British Government with a status different from that of Indian States.
b. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.
c. Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat. ( Jinnah's old Trick)
d. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.

Referring to a telegram of October 17, 1947 from Grafftey-Smith, the Political Department, in a note on Pakistan-Kalat negotiations, says that Jinnah had second thoughts regarding the recognition of Kalat as an independent sovereign state, and was now desirous of obtaining its accession in the same form as was accepted by other rulers who joined Pakistan. The same note mentioned that an interesting situation is developing as Pakistan might accept the accession of Kalat’s two feudatories, Lasbela and Kharan.By October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a change of heart on the recognition of Kalat as an “Independent and a Sovereign State”, and wanted the Khan to sign the same form of instrument of accession as the other states which had joined Pakistan. The Khan was unwilling to abandon the nominally achieved independent status but ready to concede on defence, foreign affairs and communications. However, he was unwilling to sign either a treaty or an Instrument, until and unless he had got a satisfactory agreement on the leased areas. Fears were also being voiced that officials of the Government of Pakistan might start dealing with the two feudatories of Las Bela and Kharan, and accept their de facto accession.By February 1948, the discussions between Kalat and the Government of Pakistan were coming to a head. The Quaid wrote to the Khan of Kalat: “I advise you to join Pakistan without further delay…and let me have your final reply which you promised to do after your stay with me in Karachi when we fully discussed the whole question in all its aspects.” On February 15, 1948, Jinnah visited Sibi, Baluchistan and addressed a Royal Durbar, where he announced that until the Pakistan Constitution is finally written in about two years’ time, he would govern the province with the help of an advisory council that he would nominate. However, the main reason for Jinnah’s visit was to persuade the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan. As it transpired, the Khan failed to turn up for the final meeting with him, pleading illness. In his letter to Jinnah, he said that he had summoned both Houses of the Parliament, Dar-ul-Umara and Dar-ul-Awam, for their opinion about the future relations with the Dominion of Pakistan, and he would inform him about their opinion by the end of the month.
When the Dar-ul-Awam of Kalat met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede, but to negotiate a treaty to determine Kalat’s future relations with Pakistan. On March 9, 1948 the Khan received communication from JInnah announcing that he had decided not to deal personally with the Kalat state negotiations, which would henceforth be dealt with by the Pakistan Government. So far there had not been any formal negotiations but only an informal request made by Jinnah to the Khan at Sibi.The US Ambassador to Pakistan in his dispatch home on March 23, 1948 informed that on March 18, “Kharan, Lasbela and Mekran, feudatory states of Kalat” had acceded to Pakistan. The Khan of Kalat objected to their accession, arguing that it was a violation of Kalat’s Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He also said that while Kharan and Lasbela were its feudatories, Mekran was a district of Kalat. The British Government had placed the control of the foreign policy of the two feudatories under Kalat in July 1947, prior to partition.

On March 26, 1948, the Pakistan Army was ordered to move into the Baloch coastal region of Pasni, Jiwani and Turbat. This was the first act of aggression prior to the march on Kalat by a Pakistani military detachment on April 1, 1948. Kalat capitulated on March 27 after the army moved into the coastal region and it was announced in Karachi that the Khan of Kalat has agreed to merge his state with Pakistan. Jinnah accepted this accession under the gun. It should be noted that the Balochistan Assembly had already rejected any suggestion of forfeiting the independence of Balochistan on any pretext. So even the signature of the Khan of Kalat taken under the barrel of the gun, was not viable, because the parliament had rejected the accession and the accession was never mandated by the British Empire either, who had given Balochistan under Kalat independence before India. The sovereign Baloch state after British withdrawal from India lasted only 227 days. During this time Baluchistan had a flag flying in its embassy in Karachi where its ambassador to Pakistan lived.
The true history of Balochistan is never shared or talked about among the general public of Pakistan. Our textbooks and other publications narrate a rhetoric which is far from the truth, and which has made the general public believe in a lie. It is the responsibility of the intellectuals, the teachers and the professors to learn and reveal the real facts according to non-tempered historical documents.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Prem » 07 Dec 2015 00:38

RajeshA wrote:This is crimea model.

Independence for Sindhudesh from PakistanJun 13, 2015


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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby devesh » 07 Dec 2015 12:13

Right. Another Bangladesh on the West. So we help create Sindh. And then wait another 60 years for it to dutifully follow in the Jihadi path, cursing the next 2-3 generations with another Jihadi protectorate in the Subcontinent...

A knowledgeable commentator has said that Hindus have a peculiar penchant for recursively tracing their own history. I'm starting to realize he probably wasn't wrong.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby johneeG » 07 Dec 2015 12:29

devesh wrote:Right. Another Bangladesh on the West. So we help create Sindh. And then wait another 60 years for it to dutifully follow in the Jihadi path, cursing the next 2-3 generations with another Jihadi protectorate in the Subcontinent...

A knowledgeable commentator has said that Hindus have a peculiar penchant for recursively tracing their own history. I'm starting to realize he probably wasn't wrong.


Bangladhesh is better than East-Pakistan. Its a question of choosing the lesser evil.

When you try to solve a problem, you break it down into manageable portions. Divide & rule. Hindhus would be fools to not help Sindh.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RoyG » 07 Dec 2015 12:29

Bangladesh is a minor nuisance now. We're now on the same page wrt jihadis. There is a great deal of cooperation between intelligence agencies, bengali culture including language is a diluting force for Islamism, good working relationship with the PM, etc. I would say that the experiment is working. Illegal immigration is as much our fault as it is theirs. Moreover, we've only started thinking seriously about our comprehensive strength and foreign policy. Independent Balochistan and Sindh can only be a good thing b/c it curtails influence of the Pakjabis and cuts them off from the sea and natural resources.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby deWalker » 12 Dec 2015 07:59

Pakistan's economy will disappoint again this year

SBP finds weaknesses in economic policies

Pakistan likely to miss GDP growth target: SBP

From the article:
The SBP report said that the GDP growth rate of the current financial year will settle between 4 to 5 percent, whereas the inflation rate will conclude below the target of 6 percent between 3.5 to 4.5 percent.

So..... GDP growth rate (not per capita, to be precise) is at the inflation rate. Since the population is growing, the average Paki is poorer this year than the last year - by about 3%, the assumed population growth rate.

Diwakar

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 12 Dec 2015 17:39

Brahui Nadu

I have a question: Why is a Dravidian region under occupation of Pakistan? Isn't it India's responsibility to liberate the Dravidians from the captivity of Pakis?

Yes, I speak of Brahui Nadu, also known as Balochistan!

Brahui Nadu should be a part of India, where Brahuis and Baloch can together experience freedom and empowerment.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby devesh » 13 Dec 2015 13:19

johneeG wrote:
devesh wrote:Right. Another Bangladesh on the West. So we help create Sindh. And then wait another 60 years for it to dutifully follow in the Jihadi path, cursing the next 2-3 generations with another Jihadi protectorate in the Subcontinent...

A knowledgeable commentator has said that Hindus have a peculiar penchant for recursively tracing their own history. I'm starting to realize he probably wasn't wrong.


Bangladhesh is better than East-Pakistan. Its a question of choosing the lesser evil.

When you try to solve a problem, you break it down into manageable portions. Divide & rule. Hindhus would be fools to not help Sindh.


how would it be manageable? without dealing with the core problem of Islamic theocracy, there is no "solution". only way to deal with theocracy is is you gain sovereignty over the land. do we have sovereignty of BD? how do you intend to solve the problem of theocracy in Sindh once it separates?

This is a critical failure to understand Islam.

Let us remember: Under Bajirao's intense attack on North India, the Mughals did crumble, but the political expression of Islamist interest simply morphed into a bunch of subehdars. It did not make the task of crushing these subehdars any more "manageable". Also, the Islamist infrastructure of theocracy did not vanish with the crumbling mughals.

This is a critical failure to understand Islam. There are 2 dimensions to defeating Islam in the long run: inflicting crushing military defeats which shows that their vaunted Allah is no where to be seen, and then the liquidation of the theocracy. These 2 have been the only ways that Islam was rolled back.

"separate Sindh" under the current rubric: you'll see that it achieve neither of the above 2 dimensions. On the contrary, the Islamist virus simply another secular-pretending State to hide in and regenerate Jihad in a future generation, while continuing it internally anyway.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby devesh » 13 Dec 2015 13:25

in a way perhaps it is better to keep talking of Balochistan and Sindh to keep Paki focus there. as a purely tactical move. not actually supporting "separatism" in any concrete way. the actual focus will be the opposite area from those 2. once that corridor is cleared, then next phase of achieving "sovereignty" over the entirety of Pak in a single sweep. not piecemeal.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby krishna_krishna » 10 Jan 2016 20:11

krishna_krishna wrote:Guru'sWe need also some discussion on current "sau - irn " conflict and TSP nuts getting cracked. We can get a lot done if we become creative wrt TSP. Think NS life was saved by them but now he is is at the top and not able to deliver even not openly saying that they are against "IRN". Many possibilities

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 07 Apr 2016 23:37

Sub-conventional War with Pakistan

Cross-posted from the "Sunni Terrorist Fragments of Unstable Pakistan-Jan 24, 2016" Thread

shiv wrote:I do agree that some raids across the border and some visible retribution would be satisfying to me and to everyone else. But if I put myself in Modi/Doval's shoes I would expect the result of such punishment to only goad Pakistani jihadis and the army to continue more attacks and terrorism as "retribution for Indian aggression" apart from using Indian aggression as a call to the international community to take note.


The trick is to conduct subconventional war like the Pakistanis are doing. It is a war where the attacker can shrug one's shoulders and smile at the same time, whereas the attacked party has to feel the pain and just stuff it and not be able to raise the level to full-scale conventional. All the attacked party can do is to run from one superpower to another and cry, "cheating"!

So what is our sub-conventional war?

I think the answer to that is pretty clear:

- Bad Taliban (supari)
- Baluchistan (arms supply & diplomatic support)
- Border firing (uninterrupted and uninterruptible)

That is all subconventional stuff, but it is more than enough to make Pakistan bleed from its musharraf!

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 08 Apr 2016 13:39

Let's Ignore Mirage of Army-Civilian Faux-Divide and Explore Real Divides

Cross-posted from the "Sunni Terrorist Fragments of Unstable Pakistan-Jan 24, 2016" Thread

Published on Apr 07, 2016
By Jyoti Malhotra
Modi Has Won Round 1 Against Pak Army. He Must Keep At It.: NDTV

SSridhar wrote:Rajagopal, Jyoti Malhotra is another one in the Mani Shankar Ayyar mould of 'uninterruptible & uninterrupted' relationship with Pakistan. What a turn of events that such people, diehard venom spewers against Modi, have started to sing tunes of praise !

She wants more concessions to be given to Pakistan. She feels that would sharpen the divide between the Army Generals the People of Pakistan.

Now, that is where she makes the mistake, by equating Nawaz Sharif with the People of Pakistan. Then, what does she expect the People to do? Rise in revolt against the Generals for having misled them for 68 years?


This is the kind of divide State Dept, Western media and Thinktank chatteratti like to look for in "unpleasant" countries in order to further color revolutions - looking for a divide between an authoritarian military regime and the "PEOPLE" represented by a few civilian faces and then using a people's movement a la Tahir Square, bring about electoral democracy.

It is intellectual laziness. In Pakistan, people have been given so much of "electoral democracy", that I don't think they are interested anymore. Sure after a few years, people's hopes of Army solving any problems would fade, like it always does, and they may start hoping for another round of civilian govt., but all that is still time pass and for all purposes, useless for India, as it doesn't change the dynamic. The Army has and would continue to hold all controls over security and aggression.

Every once in a while, Army takes a back seat to frontal rule, so as to renew its strength and popularity among the people. This is no different. It doesn't change the dynamic.

What India needs to do is to overwhelm the Pakistani Army, and not allow it any room for taking a break. Pakistani Army needs to implode.

The divide we are looking for is not between Army vs Civilian. That is a mirage.

We should be exploiting ethnic divides - Balochistan, Gilgit, Pushtunistan, Sindh, Ahmadi-non-Ahmadi, etc. These are the serious divides.

GoI should stop investing time and energy on playing some useless Army-Civilian chess.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby member_29350 » 08 Apr 2016 22:22

We should be exploiting ethnic divides - Balochistan, Gilgit, Pushtunistan, Sindh, Ahmadi-non-Ahmadi, etc. These are the serious divides.


This.

Take the paki appalam(popudom for angrezi folks), smash it into smithereens. & Take the bits that you want. East Pakiland was cleaved. next is Sindh and balochistan

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Akshay Kapoor » 08 Apr 2016 23:17

devesh wrote:how would it be manageable? without dealing with the core problem of Islamic theocracy, there is no "solution". only way to deal with theocracy is is you gain sovereignty over the land. do we have sovereignty of BD? how do you intend to solve the problem of theocracy in Sindh once it separates?

This is a critical failure to understand Islam.

Let us remember: Under Bajirao's intense attack on North India, the Mughals did crumble, but the political expression of Islamist interest simply morphed into a bunch of subehdars. It did not make the task of crushing these subehdars any more "manageable". Also, the Islamist infrastructure of theocracy did not vanish with the crumbling mughals.

This is a critical failure to understand Islam. There are 2 dimensions to defeating Islam in the long run: inflicting crushing military defeats which shows that their vaunted Allah is no where to be seen, and then the liquidation of the theocracy. These 2 have been the only ways that Islam was rolled back.

"separate Sindh" under the current rubric: you'll see that it achieve neither of the above 2 dimensions. On the contrary, the Islamist virus simply another secular-pretending State to hide in and regenerate Jihad in a future generation, while continuing it internally anyway.


When did we ever liquidate theocracy. I don't think Maratathas or Sikhs ever did that. Did they ? I agree with you...but we have never done this AFAIK.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Akshay Kapoor » 08 Apr 2016 23:20

RajeshA wrote:
So what is our sub-conventional war?

I think the answer to that is pretty clear:

- Bad Taliban (supari)
- Baluchistan (arms supply & diplomatic support)
- Border firing (uninterrupted and uninterruptible)

That is all subconventional stuff, but it is more than enough to make Pakistan bleed from its musharraf!



I have given many examples (TSP thread and IA thread and border watch thread) of isolated instances of 3rd that have been very successful in the local area. I have also given options for a sustained , carefully planned campaign with endgame. But some posters have loudly called in knee jerk reaction.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby sukhish » 09 Apr 2016 02:42

even after five years people will be writing theories about pak and nothing else. had it been that easy India would have taken action by now.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 29 Apr 2016 00:25

Continuing from "India-US Relations : News and Discussion- II" Thread


Viv S wrote:
RajeshA wrote:India should make the case that a Pakistan split in 5 parts is the best guarantee, that Pakistan would give up its nukes, if they have any. A smaller Pakjab would not need nukes and would not have the resources to take care of their nukes.

Being a new kid on the block, Trump may be open to new arguments.

Lets assume we make that argument and lets assume they accept it. Then what? Who's going to bell the cat? The US certainly isn't going to come do it for us. They haven't laid a finger on North Korea, they certainly aren't going to lay one on Pakistan.

But lets assume Trump got elected, got on-board and somehow managed to swing the Congress to support the policy, again... how do you go about it? Any overt military action that effectively threats Pakistan's existence as a nation-state, risks the nukes in question actually being employed.

Lets again assume that covert action can be brought to bear resulting in an insurgency that the PA simply cannot cope with (unlikely) raging across regions (Baluchistan & Gilgit are relatively simple.. Sindh & KPK not so much), it still doesn't achieve the original aim of denuclearizing Pakistan.

Best case scenario, you have an embittered unstable Punjab with bleak economic prospects but a firm control over its nuclear assets. Worst case scenario, you get three of four new unstable nuclear powers sharing hundreds of nuclear weapons that may well get passed onto individuals without the 'normal' human instinct for self-preservation and a hankering for the promised luxuries of the afterlife.


Well first of all "three of four new unstable nuclear powers sharing hundreds of nuclear weapons" is not foreseeable, as the only group who would have control over the nukes is the Pakistani Army, which would be pushed back to effectively become the Pakjabi Army.

Yes it is possible that the Pakjabi Army itself becomes destabilized or for profit ends up giving their nukes to third parties, as you stated. This is where American deep connections to the jernails come in and as thus they can possibly prevent this scenario. Some crore-commanders can be co-opted.

Like Yugoslavia, Pak too can be broken in two stages. Sindh and KPK can be taken up a little later.

Let's not forget that good guerrilla tactics and weaponry in the hands of the Mujahiddin had a role to play in Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. In Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan, such a movement can go a long way in pushing TSPA on the back-foot. Important is only that the use of air-force should be denied to the Paki Army.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Viv S » 29 Apr 2016 03:39

RajeshA wrote:Well first of all "three of four new unstable nuclear powers sharing hundreds of nuclear weapons" is not foreseeable, as the only group who would have control over the nukes is the Pakistani Army, which would be pushed back to effectively become the Pakjabi Army.

Punjabis being the most numerous ethnicity in Pakistan do form the greater part of the PA (about 50%) but that still leaves the Pashtuns, Baloch, Sindhis, Kashmiris & Baltis comprising the other half. Pashtuns, in particular, are over-represented in the Army including the officer corps (four previous chiefs have been Pashtuns incl. Ayub Khan & Yahya Khan). Point being, any disintegration of Pakistan will necessarily be preceded by the disintegration of the Pakistani Army.

Yes it is possible that the Pakjabi Army itself becomes destabilized or for profit ends up giving their nukes to third parties, as you stated. This is where American deep connections to the jernails come in and as thus they can possibly prevent this scenario. Some crore-commanders can be co-opted.

May have been true in the 80s and perhaps early 90s. Its questionable, how strong those connections are today after 15 years a farcical alliance with both sides having actually engaged in outright 'hostilities' (read: combat) against each other multiple times. Between the OBL humiliation, Salala incident and the Haqqani group functioning as a 'veritable arm of the Pakistani ISI', there's not much goodwill remaining in the military spheres.

And while there will still be those within the PA who can be bribed or a (much smaller) minority that can be convinced that denuclearization is in the country's best interests, but with over a hundred nuclear warheads at stake, each one capable of killing millions, banking on them is not a gamble anyone would be willing to take.

Like Yugoslavia, Pak too can be broken in two stages. Sindh and KPK can be taken up a little later.

For all practical purposes, Yugoslavia had already disintegrated by the time NATO entered the picture. In Pakistan's case, the US may be willing to sanction a (preferably covert) military operation to secure Pakistan's nukes if the country was already in an advance stage of collapse, but they have no incentive to deliberately destabilize a nuclear power (even after the Af-Pak withdrawal is complete) without cast-iron certainties about the end-game.

They (and whether we like it or not, this goes for the GoI as well) recognize that as bad as the current state of affairs is, the alternative has the potential to be truly horrific.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 29 Apr 2016 13:23

Viv S wrote:
RajeshA wrote:Well first of all "three of four new unstable nuclear powers sharing hundreds of nuclear weapons" is not foreseeable, as the only group who would have control over the nukes is the Pakistani Army, which would be pushed back to effectively become the Pakjabi Army.

Punjabis being the most numerous ethnicity in Pakistan do form the greater part of the PA (about 50%) but that still leaves the Pashtuns, Baloch, Sindhis, Kashmiris & Baltis comprising the other half. Pashtuns, in particular, are over-represented in the Army including the officer corps (four previous chiefs have been Pashtuns incl. Ayub Khan & Yahya Khan). Point being, any disintegration of Pakistan will necessarily be preceded by the disintegration of the Pakistani Army.


The issue here is who are in control of the nukes and where are the nukes stationed. Also a split in the country does not really mean that the Pakistani Army would also be split on ethnic lines necessarily. The officer corp in the Army may not necessarily rebel. Many of these Pushtuns like Imran Khan etc are in fact called Punjabi Pakhtuns, who have moved over to Punjab with family etc.

Viv S wrote:
Yes it is possible that the Pakjabi Army itself becomes destabilized or for profit ends up giving their nukes to third parties, as you stated. This is where American deep connections to the jernails come in and as thus they can possibly prevent this scenario. Some crore-commanders can be co-opted.

May have been true in the 80s and perhaps early 90s. Its questionable, how strong those connections are today after 15 years a farcical alliance with both sides having actually engaged in outright 'hostilities' (read: combat) against each other multiple times. Between the OBL humiliation, Salala incident and the Haqqani group functioning as a 'veritable arm of the Pakistani ISI', there's not much goodwill remaining in the military spheres.

And while there will still be those within the PA who can be bribed or a (much smaller) minority that can be convinced that denuclearization is in the country's best interests, but with over a hundred nuclear warheads at stake, each one capable of killing millions, banking on them is not a gamble anyone would be willing to take.


The three reasons Pakistani jernails would want to retain nukes are:

1) To scare anybody who wants to come and invade the country or to come to help of various oppressed ethnic minorities with the threat of retaliation.

2) To sell the nukes to the Saudis and others for profit.

3) To blackmail USA to continue to fund Pakistani Army, putting a gun/nuke to its own head, for otherwise the nukes can land in more Jihadi hands.

If Pakistani Army is meeting severe conventional military resistance from various ethnic militias, say now times 1000, which have been armed to the teeth by other powers, and the casualties on the Pakjabi side are great, it is a question of time, when the Pakjabi foot-soldiers decline to keep on fighting for the benefit of the crore-commanders. 6-7 years of fighting can cause a lot of demoralization. Pakistani Army cannot resolve civil-war using nukes.

I am not saying the force responsible for the protection of nukes should be destabilized. Just that the conventional army units should be beaten to pulp.

India can help the ethnic militias simply by keeping a steady bombardment on the Punjab border.

Viv S wrote:
Like Yugoslavia, Pak too can be broken in two stages. Sindh and KPK can be taken up a little later.

For all practical purposes, Yugoslavia had already disintegrated by the time NATO entered the picture. In Pakistan's case, the US may be willing to sanction a (preferably covert) military operation to secure Pakistan's nukes if the country was already in an advance stage of collapse, but they have no incentive to deliberately destabilize a nuclear power (even after the Af-Pak withdrawal is complete) without cast-iron certainties about the end-game.

They (and whether we like it or not, this goes for the GoI as well) recognize that as bad as the current state of affairs is, the alternative has the potential to be truly horrific.


This destabilization of a military power is being looked at too abstractly. We should separate the conventional Paki Army from those protecting nukes. Paki Army can be butchered and the nukes would still be safe. It is a controlled destabilization, where only parts of the whole are affected.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Prem » 29 Apr 2016 21:42

Sudden removal of Sarakari Pakhtuns can create huge void right now when Mango Pushtun is Armed, Alienated and ready to receive Indian alms in plenty. While Balochi can give thousand cut, rebellion in KP can give mortal wound. It's potential is equal to India's Punjab problem multiplied by hundred and it will be huge drain on already empty Paki treasury. Few Arab Rupees a year spent on Pak now will keep them on right boiling temperature for decades. They should always be tottering, neither failing nor succeeding till the Roaches reach 400 Million in number.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 03 May 2016 05:00

KSA economy is collapsing. They wont need nukes or cukes.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Prem » 03 May 2016 05:22

ramana wrote:KSA economy is collapsing. They wont need nukes or cukes.


https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-saud ... 13782.html

Saudi fear that value of their oil assets may be much less that they thought of and want to hedge..

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby SaiK » 03 May 2016 19:01

pakis are trying to hyper-drive their thundars towards gargantua from where both the chinese driver and their g-force will have no point of return to condomizing more gotus muffat products and services.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 05 May 2016 20:18


Kashi
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Kashi » 06 May 2016 05:02

sukhish wrote:even after five years people will be writing theories about pak and nothing else. had it been that easy India would have taken action by now.


Thank you so much for your "meaningful" contribution to this discussion.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Arjun » 07 May 2016 18:59

Xpost:

Havent read this article in detail but seems to have the right prescription in place, more so after the launch of CPEC:

http://www.eurasiareview.com/07052016-i ... -analysis/

Strategically, India must view China and Pakistan, that is the deep state and its acolytes as a conjoined whole.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 03 Oct 2016 09:38

Indian #SurgicalStrike in POK has erased the Paki nuke redlines. Pak is now facing existential crisis. The kabila is in disarray and confusion. Only China is standing by and even that is not sure. Pak is walking dead. Its only when not if.
We need to explore what measures India should take.

Added....

26/11 began with Obama and NaMo response is with Obama still in office.

TSP miscalculated very badly. They thought by pulling off another attack on an Army camp instead of a civilian target like Mumbai they can get away. As I said in the Pakistan: managing Failure thread, all their redlines are erased and they are in state of shcock. even their supporters abandoned them after realizing this. Only China is still with them and for how long we have to see. Right now TSPA is like that evil Prince in Bahubali walking with head cut off. Its matter of time for it to fall and break up.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 08 Nov 2016 00:59

Link:
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/ ... unter.html


Countering Pakistan-Supported Terrorism: The Military Options
by Jon P Dorschner


Expert observers have written reams of material concerning the never-ending confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The issue leaves the radar screen during quiet periods, only to return when an incident touches-off another cycle of violence. The two countries are currently in the midst of another confrontation that again threatens to escalate into open military conflict.

This latest round started on September 18, when four terrorists from Jaish e Mohammed - JeM (an Islamist group based in Pakistan), attacked an Indian Army base in Uri, just 10 kilometers from the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Indian and Pakistani controlled Kashmir. The terrorists killed 18 Indian soldiers before being killed in a protracted firefight. The Indian government states it has conclusive proof that the terrorists infiltrated into India from Pakistan with assistance provided by the Pakistan Army.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads the Hindu-Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government currently in power in New Delhi. The BJP has long pledged to take a strong stance against Pakistan supported terrorist attacks. Just hours after the Uri attack, Modi stated that "I assure the nation that those behind this despicable attack will not go unpunished."1 Although Modi promised quick action, there was no Indian military response for 11 days. On September 24, the Prime Minister "made a speech that many interpreted as a call for strategic restraint."2

The situation changed dramatically September 29, when Lt. General Ranbir Singh, India's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), announced that Indian troops had carried out "surgical strikes" on a number of "terrorist launch pads" across the line of control. General Singh provided few specifics, but later press reports citing anonymous sources, confirmed the attacks were carried out by Indian Special Forces on 5-6 targets, located from 2 to 3 kilometers inside Pakistani territory. The Indian forces reached their destination on foot and in helicopters. The sources claimed that up to 30 militants and two Pakistani soldiers were killed in the five-hour long night time operation and that there were no Indian casualties.3

Pakistan denied there was any such operation, claiming only that two of its troops were killed in "unprovoked shelling." Both countries are now preparing for further escalation. India has reinforced its paramilitary forces along the India/Pakistan border and ordered villages within 10 kilometers of the India/Pakistan border evacuated.

Indian public opinion has been almost universally supportive of India's military response. Although India is deeply divided politically, all parties are expressing support. This latest confrontation has revealed a deep level of frustration among the Indian populace. After suffering decades of terrorist attacks originating in Pakistan, there is strong public support for military measures to convince Pakistan to abjure its support for terrorism.

This is not the first time the two countries have been locked into a confrontation that threatened to escalate into a military conflict. India responded to a December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by activating its armed forces and threatened to launch a retaliatory attack against Pakistan.

At that time I published an article outlining possible military responses to the attack.4 I examined four options:
1. Air strikes against camps known to be harboring and training terrorist fighters in Pakistan Kashmir.
2.Ground and/or heliborne attacks across the Line of Control (LoC) against those camps closest to the LoC.
3.A covert campaign of bombings and/or assassinations against the principal Pakistan-based terrorist groups.
4.An extended air campaign against terrorist targets in the Pakistani state of Punjab, most notably the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Toiba in the city of Muridke.5

I determined that having examined "the options available to the Indian military,…none of them are very attractive and they are unlikely to cause serious damage to the terrorist infrastructure located in Pakistan controlled Kashmir, or in Pakistan proper."6

It now appears that in response to yet another terrorist attack, the Indian military opted for option two on my 2001 list. However, India has obviously chosen to conduct only a limited military strike with limited objectives.

India hopes this operation will pacify Indian anger, demonstrate resolve, and unite the population behind the government. New Delhi also hopes to send a clear message to Pakistan that it is no longer business as usual and that Pakistan can no longer mount terrorist attacks against India with impunity. India also wants to make it clear that should Pakistan chose to mount a military and/or terrorist response to the latest Indian military action and conduct an attack on India, the Indian armed forces will respond in kind.

General Singh, in his September 29 statement, reiterated that India preferred a peaceful situation in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan, and "sought the support of the Pakistan Army in erasing the menace of terrorism."7 General Singh has contacted his Pakistani counterpart in hopes that the two militaries can open a channel to negotiate a reduction of hostilities.

As indicated in my 2001 article, Indian military planners have devised a number of military responses to Pakistani supported terrorism. These have been calibrated to enable India to tailor its operations to the evolving situation. Should Pakistan ratchet up hostilities with its own operation, India will then up the ante by increasing the intensity of its response. At each stage, India will hold out the prospect of negotiations to ratchet down hostilities and avoid military escalation.

The object is to obtain an agreement from Pakistan to end its support of terrorist attacks directed against India. This latest series of events is significant, in that India has conducted military operations across the LoC. India has never done this in the past, no matter how provocative the terrorist attack. Once this option has been used, it opens up the prospect for further attacks against terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan controlled territory.

It appears that India did not use airpower in its most recent "surgical strikes." Pakistan is well-aware that this is a potential Indian option. Press reports indicate that Pakistan has taken over civilian airfields in Pakistan controlled Kashmir, and is preparing to move Air Force assets into these new bases, to resist potential Indian airstrikes. Should the military conflict escalate, India is likely to seriously examine this option, as well as the possibility of a combined air and land operation aimed at causing serious damage to terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan controlled Kashmir.

India's September 29 military operation was conducted solely against militants forming up to be infiltrated into Indian controlled Kashmir to conduct further terrorist attacks. The object of the operation was to break up the planned attacks and inflict as many militant casualties as possible. Indian forces met both of these objectives.

Future Indian military operations could have wider objectives, such as to destroy militant training and logistics facilities, grab documents and hard drives and mine them for intelligence, capture militants to take back to India for debriefing, and killing or capturing the leadership of terrorist organizations. These escalated attacks would be aimed at inflicting severe damage on terrorist infrastructure to send a clear message to Pakistan that it is facing ever-expanding consequences for its actions.

Since 2001, the number of military options available to India has expanded. For example, there have been rapid increases in missile technology. India now has the capability to use missiles based in India and/or drone strikes to attack specific targets within Pakistan and Pakistani controlled Kashmir. This adds a new dimension, in that India can inflict severe damage without risking pilots or soldiers.

In addition to the four options laid out in my 2001 paper, India has hinted strongly that it is examining the possibility of providing covert and overt support to the independence movement of Baluchistan. Baluchi separatists have been engaged in a protracted uprising with the goal of separating from Pakistan and establishing a new state in South Asia that would enjoy friendly relations with India.

The Pakistan Army has been deeply mired in protracted counter-insurgency operations to crush this uprising and end Baluchi separatist aspirations. Prime Minister Modi hinted at this option when he chose to express support for the people of Baluchistan in his Independence Day address, which was warmly welcomed by the leadership of the Baluchistan independence movement.8

The Pakistani armed forces and the people of Pakistan consider the separation of the Pakistani province of East Pakistan from Pakistan in 1971 and the subsequent creation of an independent state of Bangladesh, with the support of the Indian armed forces, the absolute low point for Pakistani fortunes. After that defeat, the Pakistani military determined that it would never again allow one of its provinces to be detached.

Such an outcome could undermine the very survival of Pakistan as a state. The original Pakistan, created in 1947 with two wings (West and East Pakistan) separated by over 1,300 kilometers of Indian territory, did not prove to be viable and was perhaps stillborn from the very beginning. West Pakistan was able to absorb the loss of its Eastern wing and continue to survive as a viable state. However, should the truncated Pakistan that emerged from the 1971 war be further subdivided, it could result in the total break-up of Pakistan and its replacement by a group of mini-states with widely divergent agendas.

This underlies Pakistan's relentless suppression of the Baluchistan independence movement with its accompanying string of grievous human rights violations. When Pakistan tried the same tactics against the rebellious Bengalis, it only roused the Bengali population to further resistance and provided India with a target of opportunity. Some in India are arguing that history is repeating itself and that a similar target of opportunity could be emerging. Should the current conflict persist and escalate, the Baluchistan option will loom large in Indian thinking, and would be viewed by Pakistan as an existential threat.

In my estimation, India has a broader range of military options than Pakistan. This is because the Pakistani military is already overstretched. Pakistani forces are combatting a vicious Islamic Jihadi insurgency carried out by a number of disparate groups operating under the umbrella of the Pakistani Taliban (The Tehrik-i-Taliban, Pakistan – TTP) from bases in Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistani troops are tied down combatting the persistent separatist insurgency in Baluchistan. In addition, the Pakistani Army continues to view India as the principal threat and sees the need to keep sufficient numbers of troops along the Indo/Pakistan border to meet any possible Indian aggression.

Pakistan must also contend with advances in military technology, which act as force multipliers for India. Unlike Pakistan, India enjoys friendly relations with fellow democracies around the world, and has entered into quasi alliances with principal arms suppliers. This is increasingly giving India access to advanced military technology not always available to Pakistan (which increasingly must rely on China for its military hardware). These factors help ensure that India has a wider array of military options.

India is again involved in a confrontation with Pakistan over Kashmir. It has already crossed the Rubicon and opted for the military option, carrying out a military strike, this time within territory across the LoC. Whether the Indian "surgical strikes" will prove to be last military exchange between the two countries in the current round depends on decisions made in both New Delhi and Islamabad.

It is common when writing about the Indo/Pakistan rivalry to emphasize that both states are "nuclear armed," and that every military conflict between them has the potential to escalate into a nuclear exchange. While this is true, it may be over-emphasized. Pakistan, with its relative decline in conventional military capabilities vis a vis India, likes to play upon these fears. Pakistan is investing much of its national treasure to construct its rapidly-growing nuclear arsenal, seemingly confident that this will preclude any military retaliation from India. This confidence in nuclear weaponry is too simplistic and over-stated.

We have seen that there are a wide range of military options available to India (both covert and overt). The resort to nuclear weapons by any state, can only be seen as a desperate measure taken as a last resort. This is particularly true in the South Asian context where a nuclear exchange would be catastrophic for all states in the region, including Pakistan.

A knee-jerk resort to nuclear weapons is not a viable response in all circumstances. Indian attacks on terrorist infrastructure based in Pakistan and in Pakistan-controlled territory do not pose a threat to Pakistan's survival. It cannot therefore constantly threaten to resort to the nuclear option. If Pakistan intends to provide a military response to India in a tit for tat exchange, it must devise measures that fall far short of threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

India has already made its decision. Pakistan must now determine how it will respond. The nature of the Pakistani response will determine whether the current conflict will escalate or not and which option India will choose when crafting its counter-move.bluestar

Notes



1. "Kashmir Attack: India 'launches strikes against militants,'" BBC News, 30 September, 2016


2. "India claims 'surgical strikes' against militants in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir." The Washington Post, September 29, 2016


3. "Surgical strikes across LoC: India prepares for possible Pakistani retaliation," The Times of India, September 29, 2016.


4. Jon P. Dorschner, "An Indian Assault on Terrorism," Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2003


5. This last option in retrospect, is not really viable. The LeT Headquarters complex is home to many families, including many women and children, and therefore is not a genuine military target.


6. I.B.I.D., page 1


7. The Hindu, September 29


8. "Narendra Modi's Independence Day Speech: PM Throws down Balochistan gauntlet," The Indian Express, August 16, 2016, "Welcome and Thanks to Indian PM," The Baloch Channel, August 14, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DG2sNXMZeKU



Author A native of Tucson, Arizona, Jon P. Dorschner earned a PhD. in South Asian studies from the University of Arizona. He currently teaches South Asian Studies and International Relations at his alma mater, and publishes articles and books on South Asian subjects. From 1983 until 2011, he was a career Foreign Service Officer. A Political Officer, Dr. Dorschner's career specialties were internal politics and political/military affairs. He served in Germany, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, the United States Military Academy at West Point and Washington. From 2003-2007 he headed the Internal Politics Unit at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. In 2007-2008 Dr. Dorschner completed a one-year assignment on an Italian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Tallil, Iraq. From 2009-2011 he served as an Economic Officer, in Berlin, Germany.





ramana
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 28 Mar 2017 05:26

X-posted from GDF thread...

sanjayc wrote:
habal wrote:Ok, if Gandhi were so silly, pussilanimous, sissy, dhimmi and India was full of heroes who could save the country by fighting British with swords then pray why after battle of plassey since 1757 to 1910 nobody could successfully challenge the brish!t's and throw them out of India. It's almost 150 years to Gandhi, why there were no mard e momeens who could save the country when even 3% of awakened population then would have wiped brisht or any other force out of the country.
what was lacking here ? weapons, men, courage, spirit ?


Do you remember 1857? Over 10,000 Brits were slaughtered. How about Subhash Bose's INA? The revolutionaries who were assassinating British officials? The Sanyasi Rebellion of late 18th century on which the novel Anand Math is based? The wars of Maratha kings with Brits? Wars of the Sikhs?
Ever heard of Birsa Munda? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birsa_Munda
Or of Barrackpore mutiny of 1824? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrackpo ... ny_of_1824
Or Massacre of Benares https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacre_of_Benares
The revolts of Tribals https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tribal_re ... dependence
Indigo revolt https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indigo_revolt
The Santhal rebellion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santhal_rebellion
The Bhil uprising http://www.britainssmallwars.co.uk/conf ... -1833.html

From 1763 to 1856 there were more than 40 major rebellions in India, apart from hundreds of minor ones.

Gandhi hijacked the freedom movement, and squandered the energies of the people in mindless mumbo-jumbo of non-violene, achieving nothing, much to the delight of Brits. He delayed freedom by at least 25 years. Brits called Gandhi their best policeman in India. Look at Gandhi's associates in South Africa - they were all missionaries. The man was being groomed. Once his profile was sufficiently built in SA, another missionary "friend" of his Charles Andrews gently suggested to him to go to India and continue his work of non-violence at all costs.


In 2010 an American Professor Erica Chenoweth studied how and why civil disobedience works. She looked at violent and non violent movements through out the 20th century. She found non-violent ones had a success rate of 52% and also had democratic aftermath. Her major conclusion was that 3.5% of the population supports the civil disobedience movement it has success rate.
Title of her book is "3.5% rule and Civil Disobedience" . It was a best seller when it came out and most commentators sais she proved Gandhi right!!!!

Now think about why Pakistan is a failed state.

It had no non-violent freedom movement. It was based on killing Hindus.
Only place there was a non-violent freedom movement was in NWFP under Frontier Gandhi and his red shirts.
It was overwhelmed and we have the Taliban there.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Neilz » 28 Mar 2017 11:23

ramana wrote:X-posted from GDF thread...

In 2010 an American Professor Erica Chenoweth studied how and why civil disobedience works. She looked at violent and non violent movements through out the 20th century. She found non-violent ones had a success rate of 52% and also had democratic aftermath. Her major conclusion was that 3.5% of the population supports the civil disobedience movement it has success rate.
Title of her book is "3.5% rule and Civil Disobedience" . It was a best seller when it came out and most commentators sais she proved Gandhi right!!!!

Now think about why Pakistan is a failed state.

It had no non-violent freedom movement. It was based on killing Hindus.
Only place there was a non-violent freedom movement was in NWFP under Frontier Gandhi and his red shirts.
It was overwhelmed and we have the Taliban there.


I have different take on this. Purely from Indic point.. We had armed struggle no denial of that.. but it was not MINDLESS killing spree. Heck even those who betrayed was not killed like hoe left does. It was on path of fare war, just like what IA doing in Kashmir right now. Even ANI with all it might, chose to fight in fare square.. never even for moment target family of the worst butchers. Only very few cases where collateral happen it was due to bad luck/timing and purely unintentional. And that built the character of our country. Even the British Indian Army was way more discipline than their contemporary cousins. And even in ancient Indian warfare was not so much about pillage and mayhem, Likes of Kalinga are exception, because kings fought to win and rule the won kingdom as their own.. not as colonial subject ... Gandhi has literally nothing to do with it. The ideology of making colony is where no ruler take responsibility of owned subjects well being. Same is PAK, Jinnah and ilk was all wanted a colony, and Taliban / ISIS / LTTE / Left follow the same.. these ideology never paused and thought what next after win. And that makes a huge difference. We Indian stands on virtue of our civilization wisdom, persistence. Not all are so lucky.

Added:
One more point was, Indian freedom movement was very clear from day one, what it is to be independent, what all we can do if we gain independence. It was never for a moment was driven by just to end a misrule, or something to be avenged off. It was always tied with some kind of post independence vision. Be it a 15 year old Khudiram Bose form Bengal or Bhagat Singh of Panjab, Birsa Munde of tribal, Mangal Pandey, Laxmi Bai, Durga Rani... they were wise and aware of their action and consequences. They chose a path well crafted, which all added in nation building, even before independence was earned.

Bangladesh if still has hope to turnaround that anarchy it is because of this resilience of Mujibur Rahaman and numerous of Bengalis and their uncompromising moral character and vision for nation building. Same is the case of Baluchistan... Otherwise it could have gone down the drain just like PAK and numerous African or Middle east nation.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby SSridhar » 28 Mar 2017 13:49

ramana wrote:Title of her book is "3.5% rule and Civil Disobedience" . . . . Now think about why Pakistan is a failed state.

Pakistan also had 3½ Friends who further helped its downfall.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby SSridhar » 28 Mar 2017 13:55

Neilz wrote:Purely from Indic point.. We had armed struggle no denial of that.. but it was not MINDLESS killing spree.


The simple point was that the Indian struggle was most dharmic even when it involved some violence. That was what was important.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 13 Apr 2017 08:09

Mohan Guruswamy in Facebook on Pakistan

https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_ ... ment_reply

Please post text here for discussion.

Thanks.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby Philip » 13 Apr 2017 11:21

Pak is like a diabetic sore.Relations with Pak will NEVER heal as long as the military call the shots.and there's little hope that the civilian political establishment will for decades to come gain control given their corrupt DNA. In such a situ,India can either decide to feel the pain and respond by sending "befitting replies" (which tickle the Pakis no end!).Our political masters and babudom excel at being flatulent and impotent windbags. Once in a decade or so we send over the border a few spl. forces to singe a hair or two on the beard of the jihadis,and make such a hullabaloo about such singular raids s if we've won a great war.

With due respect to Mr.Modi,after demonitisation he said that he had "defeated terrorism" (Probably in allusion to stopping fake currency emanating from Pak,but the fake currency has returned say official sources!) .Then what is happening in the Valley today? Please,let's not fool ourselves like a good Paki does.Pakistan is a grave problem in that if the diabetic sore is allowed tofester further,gangrene will set in on the patient (India) and we will be in great danger of losing the limb (J&K).

Therefore serious long-term measures have to be taken as far as Pak is concerned. This "failed state cannot be managed!"
It has gifted away the vital port of Gwadar to the PRC,who already have a base at Djibouti,from where they can-with Gwadar,interfere in Indian shipping from the Gulf,carrying our vital oil supplies. This is why the Trinco Oil Farm deal with SL is so vital.We can transport huge qtys. our oil,part for for strat. reserves and store them at Trinco,not on Indian soil,where the Chinese wouldn't dare of attacking.

Said before,Pak has to be disbanded,rent asunder by any means.We must encourage every fissiparious entity within Pak.Baluchis,Sindhis, Mohajirs,Tribals ,etc.to work towards the creation of their individual separate states. This of course will take time and we must be patient like the vulture!
As for repeated Paki acts of cross-border terror,we need to return the compliment by a graded mil. response,arty/MBRL firing,uAV and stand-off missile strikes too.

On the Dpl. and eco front there are many options which we've never used. Scaling down dpl. relations to consular level,setting up a new regional eco forum, "SAFE",as described earlier and launching a global dpl campaign against Pak for sanctions to be imposed upon it,expulsion from world bodies,etc.
If the intl. community's response is lukewarm,then we need to take matters into our own hands,as ultimately,only India has to do the biz.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 13 Apr 2017 20:49

Philip, Is your post in response to the Facebook post or a stand alone post? It has major agreements with MG's Facebook post.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby SSridhar » 19 Apr 2017 08:14

We have discussed along similar lines many times before. With the world situation going the way it is, with China overtly & unabashedly showing its enmity & hostility towards India and consequently its duplicity through Pakistan, there is uncertainty all around. Pakistan feels that all these are helpful to its agenda. It will as usual take quick and unscrupulous advantage of the situation. Indian diplomacy must not be lethargic and must not follow its timeless & staid policies which would do no good. We must have shunned our 'Vasudeiva Khutumbakam' ideas a long time back. We must up the ante against Chin-Pak several notches. I do not hear enough noise being made on Gilgit-Baltistan, for example. Our External Affairs Ministry spokesman must issue statements everyday on China like the way the Chinese spokespersons do. I hear that only once in a while. Make these press meets high profile like what the Chinese do. Khulbushan Jadahav may be a diversionary tactic to make Indian diplomacy concentrate on that one issue while surreptitiously China & Pak go ahead on other fronts. We must therefore increase the heat all over Pakistan immediately. Let us become a rogue nation, if we have to. Enough of this 'goody, goody goobledygook' inaction or reaction of seven decades. We must set the agenda for Pakistan to keep firefighting everyday everywhere, like it is doing in Kashmir these days. Pakistan must burn.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ArjunPandit » 19 Apr 2017 08:28

SSridhar wrote:We have discussed along similar liness many times before.

Off late, one of the thing that has started to amuse me about BRF is the apparent reactiveness. We need to not seize the opportunity but create the opportunities for ourselves. Rather than waiting for a terrorist attack. We should be proactively attacking the positions. Given that for a foreseeable future we will not be able to impose costs on the western border of napakistan so we have to increase the intensity on their eastern border.
1. Launch MBRL's on the terror camps
2. Ensure no sowing is done in the right season through artillery barrage
3. No stocking is performed in positions at height in winters
4. Make them squirm even at the crackling foliage in their areas to fear any SF is coming
5. Chew their lands of post by post
6. Ignore any flag meetings
7. Occasionally destroy a ship or a sub. Buying and making such capital intensive assets is beyond their capacity. The idea should be destroy their navy (if there is one, brown water one) in peace, disable their airforce before hostilities break and annihilate them during a full fledged war.
Make sure H&D becomes horror and dismay for them. with advent of CPEC Status quo is not in our favor. We need to make their mushes on fire. After crimea and SCS the UN is also going the League of nations way. It's better to maximize our gains in case there is any dislocations in such organizations to get our seat at the high table.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RajeshA » 02 May 2017 17:09

Halaling Policy

The way to deal with Pakistan is: go the halal way, make Pakistan bleed continuously. Uninterrupted and uninterruptible cross-border precision firing from India should become the status quo. When Pakistan misbehaves, we need to give the knife a couple of more turns, let them feel the hurt still more.

Without the constant pain of bleeding, Pakistan very quickly forgets the pain and they go back to terrorism. Like some moderate Muslims in the West tend to calm others by saying, West should learn to live with constant terrorism, so too India needs Pakistan to learn to live with constant pain on the border and elsewhere.

So
1) Uninterrupted and uninterruptible cross-border precision shelling from India
2) Regular attacks on Pak military using internal subversives, large scale when Pak misbehaves
3) Surgical Strikes upon any terrorist attacks on India, without waiting for results of any investigations
4) All out support to Baluchistan's Freedom Struggle.

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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby ramana » 04 May 2017 20:57

X-Post...
SSridhar wrote:China is making the same risky errors in Pakistan that US made - Bloomberg
When President Xi Jinping announced in 2015 that China would pump $46 billion worth of investments into Pakistan, the recipients of his largesse seemed less surprised than one might have expected. The military and political elites of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have long extracted aid from outside powers in return for keeping a lid on things at home. As far back as April 1948, barely eight months after independence, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan assured Pakistani military commanders that three-quarters of the new nation's Budget would be devoted to defence -- fully expecting that the US would underwrite the pledge.

China's Silk Road

Xi will no doubt tout the Pakistan investments -- which include a network of road, rail, power and port projects that are collectively known as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPECBSE -- at his massive "Belt and Road" conference later this month. The Chinese argue these projects won't just link China to markets and suppliers from Europe to Southeast Asia, but also promote stability and development in the countries on its periphery. Indeed, even the International Monetary Fund hopes that China's billions will ease Pakistan's chronic supply-side constraints and perhaps reduce the pressure on the country's development budget.

That, however, reflects the sort of blind optimism to which Pakistan's US sponsors have succumbed for decades. If the Chinese aren't careful, they, too, will find that their money has bought them little more than headaches.

As part of CPEC, Chinese loans will flow into Pakistan for urban transport infrastructure, for power plants and for ports and highways. The first tranche focuses on power -- $18 billion is earmarked for the sector, particularly for coal-fired plants -- and $10 billion has been promised for highways, ports and Pakistan Railways.

China usually struggles to live up to such big promises, of course. But the numbers being bandied about have already seized Pakistan's imagination. Sectors like cement have started growing in response, boosting the Karachi Stock Exchange, which was the world's best-performing last year. Real estate prices have increased, too.

For China, the benefits of the corridor seem obvious. Much of its grand strategy rests on trying to avoid the "Malacca dilemma": 80 per cent of its oil, and much of its trade, flows through a narrow chokepoint at the Straits of Malacca that would be dangerously easy for the US, say, or India to blockade. One way to reduce that dependence would be to land oil or goods at China's new Arabian Sea port at Gwadar, in Pakistan's Balochistan province, and move them overland to Xinjiang province. In the process, Chinese analysts insist, China might well be able to improve Pakistan's economy, stabilize its politics and render it a bit less troublesome than it currently is.

Such reasoning overlooks several lessons of the past. The first: Don't ignore Pakistan's domestic politics. Already the whole program has become tangled in an internal tug-of-war. Leaders from restive Balochistan complain that CPEC, which was originally supposed to run mostly through their province and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, now looks to benefit mostly the richer eastern provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Protesters say the route was changed to benefit Punjab in particular; the province is the stronghold of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and is ruled by his brother Shahbaz.

For the Chinese, these are uncharted waters. They will have to balance gains to the ruling elites in Islamabad and Lahore with those to the locals in Balochistan, who are more than capable of violently disrupting work on the corridor. If China fails to do so, Pakistan will end up more unstable, not less.

The second lesson is to beware of the Pakistan Army. Decades of foreign support have only further entrenched the military at the center of not just Pakistan's state, but its economy and society.

Pakistan is noisy and disputatious enough to make Chinese planners wonder whether the army might not make a better partner than the civilian government or the private sector. Already, CPEC has exacerbated civil-military disputes in a country that saw its first peaceful democratic transfer of power only a few years ago. Military organisations have begun much of the corridor's work, especially road-building. CPEC was at the top of the agenda when Pakistan's Army chief visited Beijing last month. And the Army has cited the task of securing the corridor as an excuse to raise an entire new division of nine battalions and six "civil wings." {This reminds me of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. In order to defeat the Indian army, he devised a plan to raise five-and-a-half Divisions with modern weapons, amounting to a quarter million soldiers, with the help of the US under the various defence treaties. Of course, these divisions were 'meant' to counter the communists like the USSR & China! That effort needed a large scale recruitment and prompted the UK High Commissioner Sir Morrice James, to remark “It is not so much the case of Pakistan having an Army but the Army having Pakistan”. Let us wait to see where the CPEC cloak takes the Pakistani Army to.}

The pattern is familiar to many in Washington: Money sent to Pakistan has a habit of winding up further bolstering the Army's power. Meanwhile, the civilian government is quietly but rapidly losing enthusiasm for CPEC projects, which it correctly recognises may wind up draining its resources instead of increasing them. For two successive years, the government has stepped in to reduce the amount of Pakistan's own money committed to the corridor.

The stronger the Army, and the weaker the incentives for the civilian government to open up the economy to countries other than China, the less likely Pakistan is to prosper in the coming decades. There's no question a more stable and prosperous Pakistan is vital for South and West Asia, for China and for the world. But it's far from certain that CPEC will produce one.


RohitAM
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Re: Managing Pakistan's failure

Postby RohitAM » 09 May 2017 00:29

There's no question a more stable and prosperous Pakistan is vital for South and West Asia, for China and for the world. But it's far from certain that CPEC will produce one.


I disagree - a completely destroyed, fragmented, and wrecked Pakistan which no longer exists as a country or a coherent entity, deprived of its armed forces and its nuclear weapons, is what is vital for the world. I would take a collection of tribal warlords running helter-skelter across the NWFP, SWAT, and Pakjab, who we can demolish whenever we want, over the Paki military brandishing its nuclear weapons at us with impunity while indulging in terrorism, because it wants to bleed India with a "thousand cuts". Four or five swipes dismembering Pakistan into its constituent states would be enough to bring about long term stability and peace in the Indian subcontinent, and ensure that China decides to keep its now-bloodied nose out of the subcontinent for good. The breakup of Pakistan will also bury China's CPEC and OBOR dreams six feet under, with no headstone to mark the grave of those failed endeavours.


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