Managing Chinese Threat

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 15 Sep 2012 11:26

China-Japan ties in choppy waters - Ananth Krishnan in The Hindu
Chinese and Japanese ships exchanged warnings on Friday near the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, after China dispatched six ships to carry out patrols near the islands amid rising tensions.

Two fleets of maritime surveillance vessels carried out patrols in territorial waters off the disputed islands on Friday, in an exercise officials said was aimed at “demonstrating China’s jurisdiction… and ensuring the country’s maritime interests”.

In Beijing, protesters raised slogans outside the Japanese embassy and in front of some restaurants. At least six Japanese were reported to have been attacked.

In Shanghai, one man was injured when hot noodles were poured on him.

The incidents prompted a statement from Japan, calling on China to ensure the safety of its citizens.

Demonstrations are also expected in coming days, in the lead up to September 18, which marks the 81st anniversary of the brutal Japanese occupation of China, a memory that still evokes strong emotions here.

With Chinese Internet users spreading calls for a boycott of Japanese goods, officials have warned of trade ties being hit. China is Japan’s biggest trade partner.

“The move will inevitably have a negative impact on Sino-Japan economic and trade ties,” Vice Commerce Minister Jiang Zengwei was quoted as saying by the official Xinhua news agency.

Chinese travel agencies have said they have cancelled tours to Japan — a move that is expected to hit the Japanese tourism industry, one-fourth of whose revenues come from Chinese tourists.


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby kmkraoind » 15 Sep 2012 20:49

[youtube]gnlr_OBN2uw&feature=related[/youtube]

5 Reasons Why the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands are NOT Chinese Territory.

Loved the original Chinese map at 14:10

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 15 Sep 2012 21:07

Excellent Strat-a-jee by the Chinese....yes, go on, annoy each and every country in your neighborhood and when they take preventive measures like forming coalitions, cry foul!!! Last thing Chinese need is armed-to-teeth Japanese Navy and Air Force. So much for their deep thought...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby shyamd » 16 Sep 2012 20:56

China Unveils *Another* Stealth Jet, Right Before Panetta's Arrival http://t.co/qKpZgWiK

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby nakul » 17 Sep 2012 18:02

The tallel than mountain fliend using non state actors to reclaim the land of their forefathers. What is Japan going to do against a swarm of 1000 fishing boats?

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201209170086

Government officials fear that Japan may be forced to arrest the captains of the Chinese fishing boats if they enter Japan’s territorial waters. If the Japan Coast Guard, which is primarily responsible for patrolling, cannot control the situation around the uninhabited islands, the Japanese government might be forced to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 17 Sep 2012 19:26

shyamd wrote:China Unveils *Another* Stealth Jet, Right Before Panetta's Arrival http://t.co/qKpZgWiK

Last time, they did the first flight test of J-20 ahead of US Def Sec. Robert Gates' visit to Beijing.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby anupmisra » 17 Sep 2012 20:21

kmkraoind wrote:5 Reasons Why the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands are NOT Chinese Territory. Loved the original Chinese map at 14:10


Now that's one heck of a sensible and logical way to present one's case. I hope MEA takes note of this and follows suit on cashmere, Siachin, Aksai Chin, and Tripura.

Also, be aware of the map in 14:40 that shows a truncated India under the chinese influence. It shows chinese intent.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Muppalla » 17 Sep 2012 21:48

Coincidentally, Japan's newly-appointed Chinese ambassador dies.

http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/17/world/asi ... ador-dead/

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby kmkraoind » 18 Sep 2012 09:23

Not trying to isolate China: Nirupama Rao

“Somebody called South China Sea as the ante-chamber of Indian Ocean... there is scope for broad-based engagement... what we are looking at is freedom of navigation, looking at trade, at humanitarian assistance to disaster relief,” said Rao at an event organised by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby kit » 19 Sep 2012 00:03

I think there is a very high probablility for a chinese attack on sikkim/arunachal in a multi pronged strike. The one way for the chinese leadership to control its populace is its defacto religion buddhism and what better to control the holiest shrines of buddhism and thus control potential unrest., this has been one of the main objectives of the politburo.The timing would be interesting ., could be the time of indian general elections,

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby shyamd » 20 Sep 2012 16:04

GoI announce setting up of hotlines between Eastern Command and PLA command in Chengdu. proposal was made by Chinese def min

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby kmkraoind » 21 Sep 2012 08:32

Treaty With Japan Covers Islets in China Spat: US Official

The uninhabited islets in the East China Sea at the center of a bitter dispute between China and Japan are "clearly" covered by a 1960 security treaty obliging the United States to come to Japan's aid if attacked, a top U.S. diplomat said on Thursday.

Chinese demonstrators set fire to a Japanese national flag during a protest over the Diaoyu islands issue, known as the Senkaku islands in Japan, in Wuhan, central China's Hubei province.

"We do not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of these islands," Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee.

Japan has controlled the rocky islets since 1895 - except during the 1945-1972 U.S. post-war occupation of Okinawa - and calls them the Senkakus. China, and rival Taiwan, maintain they have an older claim and call them the Diaoyu islands.

"We do acknowledge clearly ... that Japan maintains effective administrative control ... and, as such, this falls clearly under Article 5 of the Security Treaty," Campbell said at the panel's hearing on Asian territorial disputes.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 21 Sep 2012 10:23

kit wrote:I think there is a very high probablility for a chinese attack on sikkim/arunachal in a multi pronged strike. The one way for the chinese leadership to control its populace is its defacto religion buddhism and what better to control the holiest shrines of buddhism and thus control potential unrest., this has been one of the main objectives of the politburo.The timing would be interesting ., could be the time of indian general elections,

IMO, PRC may not attack Sikkim until it gets hold of access to Chumbi Valley which is the wedge between Bhutan & Sikkim. Of course, it has been demanding Bhutanese lands there in exchange for deepening Bhutan-China relationship. Even then, I doubt if a there would be a frontal attack on Sikkim, which China has ambiguously accepted as Indian territory. They will surely nibble away the border lands as they do along the LAC.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 21 Sep 2012 10:25

kmkraoind wrote:Treaty With Japan Covers Islets in China Spat: US Official
The uninhabited islets in the East China Sea at the center of a bitter dispute between China and Japan are "clearly" covered by a 1960 security treaty obliging the United States to come to Japan's aid if attacked, a top U.S. diplomat said on Thursday.

The first test for the newly enunciated 60:40 'pivot'al role for the USN in these areas.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby nakul » 22 Sep 2012 15:38

The US declaration that the treaty between US & Japan obliges it to come to Japan's aid has changed China's tune

China woos neighbours in sea spat with Japan

China's president in waiting Xi Jinping on Friday extended a hand of friendship towards its sea neighbours including Vietnam and the Philippines, who are engaged in disputes with Beijing over the ownership of islands in the South China Sea.

But Xi, who is at present the vice president, also sent a signal that China is unlikely to give up its claims on the issue of territory. He was speaking at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the southern Chinese city of Nanning. "We are firm in safeguarding China's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and are committed to resolving differences with neighbours concerning territorial and maritime rights and interests through friendly negotiations," Xi said.

The remark shows China is prepared to tackle disputes on different fronts though it is at present involved in sword clanging with Japan over an island in East China Sea.

It is trying to take away an island, which is at present under control of Vietnam. India's ONGC is involved in oil exploration in this disputed island.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 22 Sep 2012 15:57

China seeks to allay tension with ASEAN
China’s Vice-President Xi Jinping on Friday assured his country’s neighbours that Beijing wanted peaceful relations and would not “behave in a hegemonic manner”, amid rising concerns in some quarters about its assertiveness in handling regional disputes.

Mr. Xi — expected to succeed Hu Jintao as the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) General Secretary following next month’s Party Congress — told a meeting of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries that China would seek closer economic linkages with them and wanted to settle all disputes peacefully.

Mr. Xi attempted to address those fears in a speech to a China-ASEAN business meeting that opened in southern Guangxi on Friday. “We are firm in safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and are committed to resolving difference with neighbours concerning territorial land, territorial sea and maritime rights and interests peacefully through friendly negotiations,” he was quoted as saying by the State-run Xinhua news agency.

“We will never seek hegemony,” he added, “nor behave in a hegemonic manner.”

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby nakul » 01 Oct 2012 21:19

Has the oft proposed attack window in 2012 closed yet? The Chinese don't have much time if they are serious about teaching India a lesson. Perhaps the Japanese make for better students.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Kukreja » 01 Oct 2012 21:40

Work resumes on stalled Sino-Indian border project
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Punjab/Ch ... 37917.aspx
After being stalled due to threats from the Chinese side of Line of Actual Control, work on an irrigation project along the Indus river in the border town of Nyoma in north of Jammu and Kashmir has resumed with additional security cover provided by Indian forces.


I think this is the same project that the chinese have been trying to stop since 2009
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120820/j ... GnC5JjA8bI
“The work was sanctioned in 2005-06 and half of it is done,” he said.

Most people in the area live by rearing cattle; the water was meant for their pastures.

In 2009, the Chinese army had forced the state to stop work on a road in the same area. A year later, the Chinese forced suspension of work on a few passenger sheds in the area.


from a 2009 article
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1256251 ... 2481.html#
When villagers were constructing an irrigation canal a few years ago, Chinese soldiers tried to wave them off, says Rigzin Spalbar, chairman at the time of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 05 Oct 2012 11:40

The message from the north - Prashant Jha in The Hindu
After decades of dealing with the Indian hand in their country’s domestic affairs, Nepali politicians are now confronted with another assertive neighbour — China. Moving from a relatively detached approach to high-profile engagement, Beijing has now started making its views known about Nepal’s political transition.

In the past, efforts by sections of Nepali politicians to play the “China card” — by projecting China as a stakeholder to counter Indian influence and pressure New Delhi — usually failed. Both the former King, Gyanendra, and the Maoist chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda,” tried it — the former when he imposed an autocracy against Indian advice, and the latter while stoking an “ultra-nationalist” campaign.

China made it clear to both that it could not be a substitute for New Delhi. It did not show interest in getting enmeshed in the messy Kathmandu political theatre, was happy to work with any government in power, and stayed away from contentious political issues.

Accumulating influence

But over the last five years, Beijing has also worked to deepen contacts with the Nepali state apparatus, political class, and non-state actors.

High-level Chinese delegations of the Communist Party, government departments, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), business chambers and academics have visited Nepal. Not a fortnight passes without a set of Nepali politicians, bureaucrats, security officials, businessmen or journalists, travelling to the northern neighbour. Chinese development assistance has increased. A Chinese company has signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a major hydro-power project, West Seti, with the Nepal government. Beijing is keen to develop an international airport in Pokhara, and a Chinese non governmental organisation has expressed interest in investing $3-billion to develop the greater Lumbini area — both projects have however hit roadblocks. Chinese tourists to Nepal have increased, while more Nepali students are going to China for higher studies.

Beijing has used its increasing influence for a clear purpose — to ensure zero “anti-China,” read pro-Tibet, activities in Nepal. In March 2008, “free Tibet” protests had erupted in Kathmandu. The Chinese government was unhappy with what it thought was Nepal’s unwillingness, or inability, to come down on the protests ruthlessly.

Since then, China has extracted repeated commitments from all Nepali leaders to the “one-China policy.” It has also developed links directly with Nepali security agencies and bureaucracy. As a result, long-term Tibetan residents have found it difficult to exercise refugee rights; Nepal has been firm in not allowing any Tibetan political activity; Chinese pressure, among other reasons, led to the exit of the United Nations Human Rights Office, which it saw as being sympathetic to Tibetan protesters. China also kept vigil in the northern Nepal districts that border Tibet, where communities share linguistic-cultural links with Tibetans.

Now, domestic politics

In recent months however, China’s diplomacy in Nepal appears to have entered a new phase — of seeking to influence the domestic political issue of federalism. Several high-level political sources, all of whom spoke to The Hindu on the condition of anonymity, revealed the image of a more interventionist Beijing. Despite repeated attempts, the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu did not respond to requests for an interview.

At the end of June, a month after Nepal’s Constituent Assembly failed due to differences on the issue of federalism, Ai Ping, a senior Chinese party official, visited Nepal. Political leaders who met him say that China clearly communicated it had “security concerns” if Nepal adopted federalism. A very senior Maoist leader told The Hindu : “Their message was China prefers a unitary Nepal, but if federalism has to happen, it should not be based on ethnicity. This is the first time that China has intervened so directly in our domestic affairs.”

After his meeting with the visiting official, Maoist chairman Prachanda, who supports identity-based federalism, is understood to have been taken aback. He had spent some days with Mr. Ai in Shanghai a few years ago, and both the nature of the message and its curt delivery surprised him. Subsequently he called in the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, and told him federalism was necessary given Nepal’s diversity, and expressed displeasure at the Chinese advocacy against it.

A Nepali Congress (NC) leader, who is close to the influential Koirala family, added: “China has told us not to go for federalism. If at all we do so, there must be as few states in the north as possible. They don’t want to deal with multiple power centres across their border, in the same manner as India too would prefer as few states in the south [of Nepal].” A similar message was passed to the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist), with which Beijing has shared close traditional links. This was music to the ears of NC and UML leaders, who are — at best — “reluctant federalists.” Chairman of the radical Maoist splinter outfit, Mohan Vaidya “Kiran,” also visited Beijing soon after splitting from the parent party. On his return, he told reporters, “China is not against federalism but it is opposed to foreign interference on the issue of federalism.” Beijing has been engaging closely with Mr. Kiran’s outfit, which has kept open the possibility of reverting to violence and has adopted a stridently “nationalist” — read “anti-India” — political posture. Incidentally, the NC, the UML and Mr. Kiran’s party have recently joined hands to organise a movement against the Baburam Bhattarai-led government.

Two reasons

Observers point to two reasons for China’s concerns. First, Beijing fears “ethnic” states in the mid-hills and north could become a base for Tibetan unrest. They also see ethnic politics as funded by “western powers,” and conclude that politicians from indigenous groups would do their bidding.

And two, China calculates that federalism will result in an increase in the political power of the Madhesis. A senior Madhesi leader, who has dealt with foreign affairs and visited China, says, “China is influenced by the old Nepali nationalist mindset which sees Madhesis as Indians. So they think a Madhes state means that Indian influence will expand. China will support royalists, hill chauvinists of mainstream parties, and so-called nationalist leftists.”

Political scientist and State Restructuring Commission member, Krishna Hachhethu, responded to China’s concerns in an article in the English daily, Republica . He noted that Chinese diplomats were getting “influenced” by “those defaming identity-based federalism, by calling it ethnic federalism.” Provinces in Nepal would not be created on a solely ethnic basis and no group will have preferential rights. Instead, he argued, what is being proposed in Nepal is aimed at ending inequality between social groups.

He warned that the failure to address Janjati aspirations that could breed an ethnic conflict in the hills.

Geo-political balance

China’s entry into the tricky territory of domestic politics could divide the Nepali political class and society right down the middle. Sources say that Beijing is providing political support to groups which are pro-unitary system or territorial federalism, and encouraging an alliance among such forces. But their move is sure to be resisted by another section, particularly the Prachanda-led Maoists, and marginalised social groups like the Madhesis and Janjatis backing identity-based federalism.

The new Chinese assertiveness has implications for Delhi, which has refrained from getting involved in constitutional debates despite lobbying by contending Nepali factions. In a rare role reversal, as the “China card” becomes a potent political reality in Nepal, India is watching quietly. But there is a likelihood that the two powers will end up backing rival political groupings.

A highly placed Indian diplomatic source says, “We have stayed away from the federalism debate, and have not pushed a line either in public or private. It is for the Nepali people to decide what form this will take. But we recognise the inevitability of federalism, and feel it should happen quickly if Nepal is to be stable. If there are forces pushing an anti-federal agenda, the risk of a conflict increases.”

China’s attempt to back Nepal’s conservative forces threatens to complicate the country’s political transition, as well as jeopardise the fragile geo-political balance in the new republic.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Pratyush » 05 Oct 2012 12:16

^^^

It seems that Okinawa is now a disputed island. With the Japanese in illegal occupation of it. At this rate, the Japanese will be in an illegal occupation of the Home Islands and Tokyo it self.

I am compelled to congratulate the PRC at the foreign policy successes that it has had. It has now all but assured, that Japan will form the nucleus of any anti PRC alliance which forms in future.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby shyamd » 06 Oct 2012 06:05

France will build (not operate) a new base in Vladivostok to station the Mistral etc or has been offered to do so. But deal is being kept under wraps because of ongoing tensions in that area.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby chanakyaa » 08 Oct 2012 21:51

Ghana Gold Rush Sparks Conflict With Illegal Chinese Miners

Oct. 8 (Bloomberg) -- When a patch of land on the edge of Nweneso No. 1 village was bought by a Ghanaian who said he wanted to search for gold, few residents objected. Then dozens of Chinese moved in with excavators, wrecking farmland and turning the local stream into a trickle of mud.

Melted ore is poured out for testing at the Newmont Mining Corp. gold quarry mine located on the Carlin Trend west of Elko, Nevada. The biggest gold companies operating in Ghana are Greenwood Village, Colorado-based Newmont Mining Corp., which is developing its second mine in the country, and Johannesburg’s AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. and Gold Fields Ltd. Photographer: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg
The Chinese destroyed our land and our river, they are sitting there with pick-ups and guns, plenty of guns,” Maxwell Owusu, acting chief of the village in the central Ashanti region, said last month. “They operate big machines and it makes it very difficult to reclaim the land for farming when they are done.”
As global gold prices climb amid economic uncertainty in Europe, Ghana is facing an influx of illegal small-scale miners from China using machinery villagers say they can’t afford. The operations are raising concern over environmental damage in Africa’s second-biggest gold producer and sparking anger among Ghanaians who say they sold their farmland without knowing Chinese gold miners would move into camps nearby.
When the Chinese miners are preparing to depart to sell their gold in Ashanti regional capital, Kumasi, they fire their weapons into the air to ward off potential highway robbers, Owusu said.
The inspector-general of police set up a committee in August with the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Minerals Commission to investigate illegal mining. About 20 Chinese miners arrested without residential and work permits will be tried soon, said Frank Koffi, operations director of the Criminal Investigation Department. Thirty-eight were deported last month, China’s embassy in Ghana said in a statement on its website dated Sept. 30.

‘Environmental Devastation’
“The involvement of the Chinese has changed the dynamic of small-scale mining,” Toni Aubynn, head of the Ghana Chamber of Mines, said in an interview in the capital, Accra. “They use bulldozers, pay loaders and really heavy machinery. They have in fact mechanized artisanal mining and as a result the level of environmental devastation is huge.”
The biggest gold companies operating in Ghana are Greenwood Village, Colorado-based Newmont Mining Corp., which is developing its second mine in the country, and Johannesburg’s AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. and Gold Fields Ltd. The price of gold more than doubled since 2008. Gold for immediate delivery traded $1,769.48 as of 9:42 a.m. in London.
Small-scale mining is reserved for Ghanaian nationals as the law allows foreigners only to provide goods and services to Ghanaian miners. Chinese-made gold mining equipment has quickly become popular in mining towns including Tarkwa, which is near Ghana’s biggest gold mine, run by Gold Fields.

Small-Scale Miners
“They haven’t encroached upon our mines yet, but of course we are aware of the problem because the Chinese operations are relatively big and it’s clear that they cause a lot of damage,” Peet van Schalkwyk, executive vice president for West African operations at Gold Fields, said in an interview in Tarkwa on Sept. 14.
About 30 percent of Ghana’s total output is produced by an estimated 1 million small-scale miners who use shovels and picks, according to the Chamber of Mines, which has asked the government to tighten industry regulation. Output is expected to reach 3.9 million ounces in 2013 from 3.6 million ounces this year, said Benjamin Aryee, chief executive officer of the Ghana Minerals Commission, the industry regulator.
Often, Ghanaians secure plots of land and partner with Chinese who have funds to “bring in the bulldozers and all the other big equipment, and then they go in some sort of working arrangement with the local miners,” said Aubynn.

Chinese Trade
The Chinese sell small rock-crushing machines, known as Shang Fa, at about 1,700 cedis ($897) each, and run large operations in the Ashanti and Western regions, notably on the Ankobra river, which shows signs of heavy pollution, according to Van Schalkwyk.
Ghana has a fast-growing Chinese population, with Chinese shops and restaurants cropping up in the Ashanti Kumasi. Bilateral trade between the two countries jumped to $3.47 billion last year from $2 billion in 2010, according to the website of the Chinese Embassy in the capital, Accra.
In July, Chinese men mining near the village of Manso- Nsiana fired warning shots when residents protested their presence, Koffi said. He couldn’t confirm a report published in Accra’s state-owned Daily Graphic newspaper in July that two Chinese nationals have been killed this year in a mining dispute.
No one answered the phone at the Chinese embassy in Accra when calls were made last month and Oct. 5. A request made in person to speak with the secretary of the ambassador was declined on Sept. 18. A written request to speak with the ambassador, delivered at the embassy on Sept. 20, wasn’t answered.

Muddy Pits
In Nweneso No. 1, two separate groups of Chinese men arrived “led by Ghanaians” about three months ago, acting chief Owusu said. They set up wooden barracks on the edge of the village, barred entry with a bamboo pole and used excavators to unearth muddy pits of at least 10 acres (4 hectares) each in what used to be palm-oil and cocoa plantations.
In Nweneso No. 2, the adjacent village that’s connected by a bumpy, unpaved road, young men used sticks and machetes to chase away a small group of Chinese miners who had shown interest in the area, Tony Yeboah-Asare, the head of the village assembly, said in an interview.
Enforcement Agencies
“We will do everything to protect our land from the Chinese,” he said, preparing to plaster walls and electricity poles with warning notices from the Minerals Commission explaining that land is not to be bought or sold without government approval.
Better checks on visa applications and cooperation by local residents with law enforcement agencies is needed, Foreign Affairs Minister Alhaji Mohammed Mumuni told reporters on Sept. 20.
“In some areas, there is some kind of unholy alliance between some of these aliens and our own citizens,” he said. The illegal mining “is affecting our environment in a very deleterious way and we need to work hard to stamp it out.”

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Philip » 09 Oct 2012 07:44

http://www.suntimes.com/business/156304 ... hreat.html

U.S. panel: China tech giants pose security threat

ASSOCIATED PRESS October 8, 2012

WASHINGTON — American companies should avoid doing business with China’s two leading technology firms because they pose a national security threat to the United States, the House Intelligence Committee is warning in a report to be issued Monday.

The panel says U.S. regulators should block mergers and acquisitions in this country by Huawei Technologies Ltd. and ZTE Corp, among the world’s leading suppliers of telecommunications gear and mobile phones.


PS:Will India follow suit?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ramana » 10 Oct 2012 04:25

its a non-tariff barrier and will be thrown out in WTO.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby svinayak » 10 Oct 2012 23:28

PRC is not a free market economy and there is no transparency.
Ownership of PRC based companies are unknown.
Hence WTO rules do not apply

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby kmkraoind » 11 Oct 2012 14:32

China’s posturing keeps the world guessing - The Hindu Business Line

China is encircled by a ring of islands, known as the First Island chain, that looms large in the psyche of strategists in the US and China. The US has always wanted to keep control of that string and does so not only with its naval fleet scouring the waters, but also from bases on Okinawa, in Japan, and a part of the island chain. The writings of Alfred Mahan, a US strategist who believed that a nation’s greatness is linked to its naval power, long influenced US policy. Dominance over the seas gave a nation power both during peace (for commercial purposes) and during war.

In a recent presentation in Boston, Toshi Yoshihara, a professor at the US Naval War College, argued that although Mahan’s thinking seemed to be on the wane in the US, the Chinese appear to have adopted it.

This can explain the Chinese interest in fighting over un-inhabited islands for it is a preamble and useful posturing for the country as a naval power.

The domestic anti-Japan protests need not be taken too seriously for the government can usually set them off with a wink and a nod, and control it as easily.

But nationalistic demonstrations can presage something else. The Economist, a British magazine, in a recent editorial, warned that a similar situation where nationalism combined with a dictatorial government (read Germany) did not turn out too well for the rest of the world.


Worth reading in full.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 11 Oct 2012 19:06

Didn't Stephen Cohen remark adversely on India's concerns about Chinese telecom or electronics companies?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ShauryaT » 12 Oct 2012 02:39

Revisiting 1962, with ifs and buts
Many years ago, Air Marshal B.D. Jayal (Retd), former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Western Air Command, one of the most thoughtful airmen around, recalled how he and his mates of 1 Squadron sat in their transonic Mystere IVA fighter-bombers lined up on the Tezpur airfield in Assam, their frustration mounting by the minute, awaiting the order to take off against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that never came. Jayal’s experience came to mind when reading Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne’s comment on the 50th anniversary of the 1962 war that but for the non-use of Indian Air Force (IAF) India might not have lost. It is an arguable thesis.

Had the IAF been ordered into action, the advance of PLA across the Thag La Ridge would have been hindered but not halted. Indian planes would have fought unopposed in the air, leaving the pilots to concentrate on releasing the on-board ordnance at the right moment in their dives, but only until the Chinese interceptors and bombers arrived on the scene. Air intelligence passed on by the British to the Indian government had indicated no active Chinese air activity in Tibet, and indeed very few serviceable air strips — no more than three or four on the entire plateau. But the IAF aircraft would have had to contend, especially in the East, with steep mountainsides, and the bomb drops very likely would have missed their targets, most of the time. It wouldn’t have helped that the targets were mainly infantry columns, foot soldiers making up the “rifle and millet corps” comprising the PLA at the time. For reasons of terrain, the IAF aircraft might have been more effective in the West in the Aksai Chin, where the relatively gentler mountain topography would have permitted sustained strafing runs to negate swamping PLA infantry tactics.

The outcome of the war, in other words, may not have been very different even with the IAF in full cry. But this assumes Mao Zedong, who had invested his personal political capital in “teaching India a lesson”, would have desisted from deploying the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) once it became clear that affording the IAF a free run could cost him success. In that situation, the IAF would have had to deal with the more numerous Chinese MiG-15s as against the fewer, but more advanced, Hawker Hunter and the Mysteres — MiG-17 equivalent — in its own employ. One cannot be too sure how that face-off would have turned out, considering the Chinese Air Force had greater, and more recent, operational experience of flying against the US Air Force and carrier-borne US Navy aircraft in the Korean War (1950-53).

This to say that the result of using the IAF might not have been all that clear-cut as Browne suggests, even with the other advantage Indian pilots had of taking to the air, fully fuelled and loaded, unlike their Chinese rivals who, because of the thin air of the Tibet plateau would have compromised on ammunition (for on-board 23mm canons on MiG-15s) and quantum of fuel. The only way India could have secured a distinct tactical advantage is, if in the first hours of the Chinese invasion, New Delhi had sanctioned IAF bombing runs on the PLA staging areas in Tibet with the Canberra medium-bombers, 70-80 of which aircraft were in the Indian inventory by then. That would have had a devastating effect of taking out pre-positioned stores for the planned invasion. It would have demoralised the PLA troops going into battle but also, most definitely, have brought the PLAAF in and the region would have witnessed a major air war. The IAF Canberra medium-bombers would have outshone the Chinese Illyushin-48s, and the Indian Hawker Hunters — one of the finest fighter aircraft of its generation — and Mysteres might have had the better of the Chinese MiG-15s, the first of the swept-wing fighters that had given the American F-86 Sabres a run for their money in Korea. But one cannot be certain. It is an interesting scenario to game to determine the “what might have-beens”.

Even better, though, would be to game the exact situation, but update the gaming parameters by incorporating the latest aircraft in the two air forces and the rival border infrastructures. The question in 1962, however, as in all conflicts the Indian military has been involved in since, remains the same — the infirm political will of the Indian government. On the Chinese side was Mao, a stalwart military leader of repute and resolve. On this side was Jawaharlal Nehru with, and this is not widely known, a keen military sense — his take on the Indian Army progress or the lack thereof during the 1947-48 Kashmir operations are incisive, but non-existent will. He was collaterally unnerved by the prospect of Indian air action broadening the war, perhaps, inviting retaliatory Chinese bombing raids on Calcutta, which the then chief minister of West Bengal, B.C. Roy, warned would lead to the end of the Congress Party rule in that state come the next state elections.

Update the scenario and we have Hu Jintao in China — not as bloody-minded as Mao for sure but no shrinking violet either when it comes to using force. Political commissar, Hu, dealt ruthlessly with the helpless Tibetans in their benighted country under Chinese military occupation since 1949. And in New Delhi, we have Manmohan Singh who, as a senior official in the National Security Council secretariat told me, believes it is good for the country to possess hard power — latest guns, ships and combat aircraft — but not to use it. If conventional military capability, too, is to be reduced to the same unusable deterrent status as India’s nuclear weapons, then it will face the same dilemma — what happens if it fails to deter? The conventional military, fortunately, can be fielded; it just needs a bit of prime ministerial spine. Indian nuclear armaments, in contrast, have no such fallback position what with over-zealous adherence to the “no first use” principle and Indian government officials and military Chiefs of Staff iterating the self-defeating view that these are not weapons for war fighting, reducing what little credibility they have.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ShauryaT » 12 Oct 2012 02:40

Lesson from 1962: India must never lower its guard
The 50th anniversary of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war should be an occasion to look to the future rather than commiserate about the past. It seems odd that the 50th anniversary appears to be generating more commentary and reminiscences than the earlier decadal anniversaries, despite the longer passage in time. Since time is said to be a great healer, why do the wounds of the past continue to fester?

All history is viewed through the prism of our present. The 1962 war is no different. It has acquired a contemporary salience precisely because rising China looms larger on our radar screen than ever before. As the respective economic and military capabilities of India and China continue to expand outwards, beyond their frontiers, it is inevitable that they will bump against each other, particularly in Asia. This may sharpen the sense of rivalry between them. The 1962 border war becomes a metaphor for this competition and possible conflict.

While this may be understandable, it is necessary to break out of this tendency to look at India-China relations narrowly through the military prism. This reduces the competitive dynamics to a numbers game, counting military capabilities and limits the possibilities for significant and substantive opportunities for collaboration, both in bilateral as well as multi-lateral context.

A lesson of the 1962 war is that India must never let down its guard. It must deploy sufficient military and logistics capabilities to deter any 1962-style surprise attack. We are better prepared than ever before, but this is not a static. We need to have the ability to respond effectively as China upgrades its own capabilities and logistics in Tibet. We need to maintain our current edge in the maritime domain. Our recent Agni-V test and the development of submarine-based nuclear forces have imparted greater symmetry between Indian and Chinese nuclear deterrence capabilities. But it is important to locate these efforts in a broader strategy for managing India-China relations in all its dimensions.

What are the elements of such a strategy? We must acknowledge that adversarial elements currently dominate in India-China relations. China will continue to constrain India through proxy powers such as Pakistan and through exploiting apprehensions our immediate neighbours have of Indian dominance. Our counter to this must be a better management of our own periphery, extending assurance where possible, giving our neighbours a stake in our own prosperity and leveraging the considerable cultural affinity we share with them. It is pointless bemoaning Chinese inroads in our neighbourhood, if we leave wide open spaces for them. After all, do we not try and leverage similar opportunities in China's neighbourhood — as we must?

Beyond this, we should seek to expand possible convergences with China so that adversarial instincts on either side are contained and, in time, diminished in their intensity. Bilateral trade between the two sides has been growing rapidly, soon to cross the $75-billion mark. True, the trade balance remains heavily in China's favour, but that would matter less in a broader economic relationship that encouraged trade in services, in which India has strengths, and investment, where India could prove an attractive destination for Chinese capital. Over the past couple of decades, China's frenetic investment in infrastructure has left it, today, with a huge excess capacity in this sector. This coincides with our own requirements for infrastructure investment of a trillion US dollars over the next decade or so. Is a long-term strategic partnership with China in India's infrastructure development possible? There will be security concerns, particularly in certain strategic sectors such as high-end telecommunications or port development close to our naval bases. However, if India were to clearly define such sensitive areas, where foreign investment would be restricted, without being China-specific, there could be a vast area where Chinese capital and affordable equipment and technology could help realize India's own dream for building world-class infrastructure.

On the political side, both India and China are emerging powers, with convergent interest in the reform of global governance and international institutions, so that their growing footprint and influence are acknowledged and they can participate more fully in decision-making in those institutions. The two countries have a long-standing record of working together effectively in WTO and climate change negotiations. In the G-20, there is now regular consultation and coordinated diplomacy in evidence on issues such as financial and banking reform and a restructuring of the Bretton Woods institutions. BRICS has emerged as another emerging countries' platform, where India and China can work together in pursuing collaborative projects such as the proposed BRICS Development Bank. These actions have remained ad hoc, without an overall framework of strategic cooperation. Fashioning such a framework together would strengthen each others' hand in shaking loose the entrenched practices of the Western-dominated economic order. It would also help in shaping the architecture of a new order that is more responsive to our interests.

Any credible prospect for India-China relations to transcend their current adversarial character demands the mutually satisfactory resolution of the boundary issue between the two nations. The events of 1962 do hold lessons for India. An important factor which triggered the open hostilities was the revolt in Tibet in 1959, the escape of the Dalai Lama to India and the heightened Chinese concern over its threatened control over the newly-occupied territory. A border dispute which had hitherto spawned only small scale skirmishes became part of a larger threat to China's newly-defined territorial integrity. India failed to take measure of this change in Chinese threat perceptions. By the same token, it is likely that any prospect for a border settlement may well be linked to what happens in Tibet, which remains a region of ethnic tensions and potential large-scale violence. An Indian strategy for seeking an early resolution of the border may need to include some understanding with China over managing the issue of Tibet. There are signs that China is beginning to acknowledge that its twin policy of material inducement and political repression have failed to diminish Tibet's cultural and ethnic identity. There is growing restiveness among Tibetan youth both on the Chinese and the Indian side. India could play a role in encouraging a more accommodating Chinese polity towards Tibet and conveying what is obvious to any objective observer that His Holiness the Dalai Lama may offer the best and perhaps the only prospect for reconciliation of Chinese sovereignty with the Tibetan people's deep rooted attachment to their unique culture and religious values. This was tried before in the early 1980s, inspired by a more far-sighted Chinese leader, Hu Yaobang. It achieved positive results, including the commencement of a dialogue between HHDL's personal representatives and the Chinese government. The senior most Chinese leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, reportedly expressed his willingness to consider all issues other than Tibetan independence in these talks. This phase was short-lived and after Hu Yaobang's departure, the old repressive polices came back with renewed rigour. With a major leadership transition underway in China, it may be worthwhile for India to explore whether the time is ripe to engage in a discreet dialogue over Tibet and thereby set the stage for a border settlement. The psychic charge that the 1962 war continues to generate to this day in India may then finally begin to lose its intensity in our collective consciousness.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 13 Oct 2012 10:29

For serious India-China watchers, this IDSA collection is a must read

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby harbans » 14 Oct 2012 05:08

Long time no say this..best way to change the GoI mindset. The present mindset is based on reducing 'disputed' territories. I say let us increase 'Disputed' territories. Let us broaden the areas of dispute. Once that is accepted, GoI will put in it's claim on Kailash and Mansarover. That is legitimate and historical Indian territory and in no way Han, or even Tibetan. Not that it would matter if Tibet was independent, but Han no way. That is where all major river systems in Asia originate, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, many Thai river systems and so on. It also is the abode of Lord Shiva..whose nationality now is Chinese. If we accept that, then it is OK not to stake claim on K-M. If we don't, a clamor must start for the K-M region that is almost the size of J & K. Every time China mentions Arunachal we must make sure we mention K-M 8 times.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ramana » 14 Oct 2012 05:27

Please X-post in the Inder Malhotra thread which is the defacto repository for the 1962 war.

Thanks,
ramana

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby chaanakya » 14 Oct 2012 09:49

harbans wrote:Long time no say this..best way to change the GoI mindset. The present mindset is based on reducing 'disputed' territories. I say let us increase 'Disputed' territories. Let us broaden the areas of dispute. Once that is accepted, GoI will put in it's claim on Kailash and Mansarover. That is legitimate and historical Indian territory and in no way Han, or even Tibetan. Not that it would matter if Tibet was independent, but Han no way. That is where all major river systems in Asia originate, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, many Thai river systems and so on. It also is the abode of Lord Shiva..whose nationality now is Chinese. If we accept that, then it is OK not to stake claim on K-M. If we don't, a clamor must start for the K-M region that is almost the size of J & K. Every time China mentions Arunachal we must make sure we mention K-M 8 times.

Well I second that. Had been in my mind for quite some time.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 25 Oct 2012 05:59

India & China should become inseparable strategic partners
India and China, both emerging countries, should become “inseparable strategic partners” overcoming the “deep scars” inflicted by the 1962 war and should make its 50th anniversary a starting point for a promising bilateral cooperation, state-run media said today.

“Famous Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore used to describe China as a brother country. (Jawarharlal) Nehru encouraged people to sing “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai,” a write-up in Global Times on the 50th anniversary of the war, one of the few that appeared in the Chinese media on the event said.

“Unfortunately, the war in 1962 greatly affected the friendly relationship between the two countries, and the relationship didn’t pick up until decades later. Friendly relationship between countries needs careful cultivation. But once destroyed, it takes a great deal of time and energy to restore it,” it said.

While this year marked the 50th anniversary of the war it is also the “Year of China-India Friendship and Cooperation” announced by Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “a move delivering a clear signal that both countries would like to hide the deep scars brought by the historical conflict”, it said.

“Despite the unpleasant history and development gap between China and India, both have a profound culture and diplomatic wisdom. As newly emerging countries, they hold similar stances in issues such as the global order, economic development and climate change.

“The two should become inseparable strategic partners,” it said.

The article also at length dwelt about how India influenced China for centuries with the entry of Buddhism, which it said contributed to the unification of China.

“The civilisation of both China and India originated from the Himalayas and the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. And there was no conflict during their historical change that last thousands of years.”

“Sages brought India’s ancient culture to China. After the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), China faced collapse.

“Buddhism contributed greatly to China’s unification. Today Indians have to come to China for documents if they want to know their cultural past,” it said.

“Both China and India are emerging countries in the current international arena, and they face challenges from the outside world. The population of both countries together makes up 40 per cent of the world’s total. Their prosperity will benefit the whole world,” it said.

“The border issues, historical problems and trade frictions are only a small part of Sino-Indian relations,” it said adding that the anniversary of the 1962 China-India conflict should become a starting point for the promising cooperation between the two countries.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 26 Oct 2012 07:13

China will not accept LAC as solution to border dispute: says commentary
China will not accept the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — the effective current boundary with India — as an eventual settlement to the long-running border dispute, according to a commentary published in a newspaper with ties to the Communist Party.

The commentary said a solution to the boundary dispute was unlikely in the foreseeable future as China, as well as India, would not accept the LAC.

As the LAC would not be an acceptable boundary to China, the article ruled out the likelihood of a status quo settlement to the long-running dispute.

With boundary talks failing to achieve a breakthrough after 15 rounds, the commentary suggested both sides instead look to jointly develop disputed regions rather than focus on a solution to the dispute.

Commentaries in Chinese State-run media rarely discuss the specifics of the on-going negotiations over the border, over which 15 rounds of talks have been held. The article was published on Thursday by the Jiefang Daily , or Liberation Daily , a newspaper with close ties to the Communist Party in Shanghai.

The timing of the commentary, on the anniversary of the 1962 war, made it unlikely that it could have been published without the party’s approval. According to two journalists at prominent State media organs, media outlets have been told to follow an unofficial directive “to not play up” the anniversary, and only use Xinhua dispatches in coverage. However, a few outlets, such as the nationalistic Global Times , which is published by the People’s Daily but seen as less authoritative, and the Liberation Daily , have been given some leeway to publish pieces.

Status quo settlement

China had, in the past, suggested it might accept the LAC as a status quo settlement to the boundary dispute. In 1980, the former leader, Deng Xiaoping, hinted that China might be open to a swap deal that saw India give up its claims to Aksai Chin, which is currently administered by China. China would, in return, give up claims to the eastern sector and Arunachal Pradesh.

But since the mid-1980s, China has begun to increasingly voice claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and particularly on Tawang, referring to the State as “south Tibet” in official commentaries.

The Jiefang Daily article was authored by Wu Yongnian, a researcher of the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Wu said as China and India would not accept the LAC, a settlement to the boundary dispute would remain unlikely.

‘Problem is too complex’

The border problem, he said, was too complex. With more than a dozen round of negotiations failing to achieve a breakthrough, he suggested there was a perception in some quarters that talks were at a dead end.

Economic development zone suggested

He said one way to deal with the dilemma would be to create an economic development zone that would link Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet, and shelve the boundary dispute temporarily. He suggested it could serve as a new model to resolve boundary disputes, and might pave the way to an eventual settlement. {Are we fools ?}

He said the timing for such an unconventional move was right, with both India and China focused on economic development. With the border dispute remaining an obstacle to overall ties, he suggested the move would be a breakthrough for the relationship.

While it is unlikely that Mr. Wu’s article could have been published without the approval of party censors, it is unclear whether his proposal has received backing from any sections of the Chinese government.


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ramana » 26 Oct 2012 19:27

C Rajamohan has a new book on India-China rivalry in the seas called "Samudra Manthan". Haven't read it but might get a copy for his guru's sake.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Christopher Sidor » 02 Nov 2012 00:37

ShauryaT wrote:Lesson from 1962: India must never lower its guard
....
....
With a major leadership transition underway in China, it may be worthwhile for India to explore whether the time is ripe to engage in a discreet dialogue over Tibet and thereby set the stage for a border settlement. The psychic charge that the 1962 war continues to generate to this day in India may then finally begin to lose its intensity in our collective consciousness.

Fat chance. China continues to occupy indian territory, the region of northern ladakh. Unless ALL the land lost to PRC in 1962 is returned, there will not be any border settlement with China. Furthermore China could have border agreements with its neighbors only when they were weaker compared to China. That will never happen with respect to the border with India. But we have to be on our guard. Once PRC solves Taiwan issue to its satisfaction, either via one nation - two systems policy or some other more violent mechanism, then it will be India's turn.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Christopher Sidor » 02 Nov 2012 23:46

Clinton Warned of Military Danger in China-Japan Dispute ---- Bloomberg Dated 2-Nov-2012

The Americans had sent a fact finding mission to Japan and China regarding the Japanese islands that China and Taiwan Claim.
poor communications and serious misunderstandings between China and Japan increase the risk that the territorial dispute could escalate if their ships collide or there’s some other mishap
....
....
China and Japan need to improve communication at a variety of levels, from heads of state down to the local coast guard commanders whose vessels are patrolling in the vicinity of the islands.


One thing I find strange, please read the points highlighted in bold
the delegation’s message that the U.S. recognizes Japan’s administrative control of the islands, so it’s bound by Article V of the Japan-U.S. security treaty to consult with Japan “whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”

Not Japans sovereignty but administrative control. And only "consult" not take action together. Just as certain European nations consulted while the nazis marched.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 14 Nov 2012 13:29


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 16 Nov 2012 18:05

China to Launch satellite for Sri Lanka. India missed the chance ? - Ajay lele, IDSA
China’s engagement with Sri Lankan signifies the inroads it is making into the South Asian region via space diplomacy. The region is home to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—a group of mainly poor but strategically important states from China’s point of view. It is an irony that the only ‘developed state’ in this grouping, India, which is also a credible space power, has allowed China to use space diplomacy in the region effectively. Sri Lanka is not the first country in the region that China is assisting in the space arena. In August 2011, China had launched a communications satellite for Pakistan as well. Now, using the Sri Lankan example, China is reaching out to Afghanistan and Maldives too.

India still does not possess the expertise to launch satellites in the category of three tons or more and hence is unable to help developing countries launch communication satellites.


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