Managing Chinese Threat

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rajrang
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rajrang » 06 May 2013 03:00

RajeshA wrote:
rajrang wrote:The logic is as follows. China is stronger than India, so they can capture Indian territory. This will be a permanent loss. Alternatively India in a stronger embrace of US, with a loss of some Indian independence. This will be a temporary loss.

Here is a possible analogy. The British rule of India for about 200 years was arguably a temporary loss. On its' plus side, invasions from the west came to an end. Alternatively, if the British had not been present, continued invasions from the west could have replaced Indian culture with an Islamic one (a permanent loss).


I do not agree with this logic.

In order to capture Indian territory, they have to have a significant advantage in troops and hardware. Some speak of 3:1 strength ratio for a successful invasion. This would not be really forthcoming. India has a demographic dividend which India can put into service as far as troop strength is concerned. Plus India can in the future through mandatory conscription mobilize many more troops at short notice. Second problem is the terrain in Tibet and Ladakh. Not the most hospitable for the Chinese either. Third their communication and supply lines may be long and can be cut. Fourthly we have the ability to buy technology from the West, Russians, Israelites as well if needed, but in the future we would be moving towards indigenous R&D and production more and more. So the myth of the Chinese being stronger is just that and they cannot capture Indian territory.

It is American embrace which can be a long term loss. Just look at Germany and Japan. Their strategic freedom is severely curtailed by their tight embrace with the Americans, and militarily they have become second rate powers without even a seat in the UNSC.

You really need to revise your opinion about British rule being responsible for curtailing the spread of Islam in the Subcontinent. In fact under them, Islam saw its most spread within the the population. Besides the Marathas and the Sikhs had severely hurt Islam and Hindus were coming together and pushing it out already. British just took advantage of a period where both sides had been weakened from the fight. That is all. If the British had not come, who knows we probably would have pushed Islam completely out of the Subcontinent by now!

What you speak of is a popular myth spread by the Brits and their chamchas in India!


I happy to hear your positive opinion of India's military strength vis-à-vis PLA. I have no further comments.

Regarding American embrace, both Germany and Japan rose from the ashes of WW-II to have among the highest living standards in world within a generation by the mid-seventies. I am sure that the poor of India would appreciate improved living standards notwithstanding loss of strategic freedom. True they do not have a seat in the UN security council. However, the US has promised to support India for a seat in the security council. I don't think the US embrace of India will be completely negative. However, this is India's choice. This seems like OT. Sorry if it is.

Regarding the British (perhaps this is OT), the last major invasion of India through the Hindu Kush mountains in 1761, led to the 3rd battle of Panipat between the Maharashtra (Marathas) and Afghanistan. Shortly after that the British had consolidated in Northern India. Beyond that point battles with Afghanistan were fought on the western side of the Hindu Kush mountains in Afghanistan not India. Those battles were fought with armies that were roughly 2/3 Indian. So these were British-Indian armies. It is also true that some of these battles were lost by British India. I am simply looking at history from the height of the forest. You cannot disagree that the above logic exists, though I concede that the conclusion is speculative. However, one can always ask a valid question which is - what if Britain had never come to India, then would the above mentioned invasions of India have stopped. Maybe it would have. I don't know. Again this is OT. I apologize. Don't know where this should go.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby amitvora » 06 May 2013 03:53

From what I read in local newspapers, Chinese soldiers have left DBO. They packed up and left (even though the 4th flag meeting did not succeed). If it is true, then they just showed that they can come and leave at any time they want. Indians cannot do anything. They also wanted to see our reaction times probably.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby anupmisra » 06 May 2013 04:10

India and China withdraw troops from Himalayan face off

India and China simultaneously withdrew troops from camps a few meters apart in a Himalayan desert on Sunday, apparently ending a three-week standoff on a freezing plateau where the border is disputed and the Asian giants fought a war 50 years ago.
The two sides stood down after reaching an agreement during a meeting between border commanders
But it was not immediately clear how far China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers had withdrawn
"Our troops have moved one kilometer backwards from the position they were on since April 16," said the officer, from the Indian army's Northern Command


No Comment.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby RajeshA » 06 May 2013 04:10

rajrang wrote:Regarding American embrace, both Germany and Japan rose from the ashes of WW-II to have among the highest living standards in world within a generation by the mid-seventies. I am sure that the poor of India would appreciate improved living standards notwithstanding loss of strategic freedom. True they do not have a seat in the UN security council. However, the US has promised to support India for a seat in the security council. I don't think the US embrace of India will be completely negative. However, this is India's choice.


Indians were poor because they were made poor by the British who succeeded in bringing India's contribution to world GDP from 25% down to 2.5%. Then Indians were poor because they were kept poor by the idiotic Nehruvian economics in India accompanied with Nehruvian Rate of Growth. Nehru's views were a mixture of British cultural supremacism and Marxist economics, both Western inventions.

So there wasn't really anything Bharatiya about Indian poverty except our military and political weakness and to some extent our naivety in understanding the British and their manipulations in India.

Neither Germany nor Japan needed the Americans to return to prosperity, nor the Indians needed the Americans to do so.

American embrace or rather bear-hug is thus completely superfluous for any strategic advantage and in fact very harmful for our strategic independence especially as an independent and resurgent civilizational pole.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby SSridhar » 06 May 2013 07:09

Nepal may turn to China for its satellite programme - Ananth krishnan, The Hindu
As Nepal finally goes ahead with long-overdue plans to examine the feasibility of launching its first satellite before 2015, the country may turn to China, which has in recent years helped a number of developing countries, including some of India’s neighbours, with financial and technological assistance for their satellite programmes.

Officials in Kathmandu told China’s official Xinhua news agency on Sunday that Nepal was open to the idea of leasing its first satellite “to either China or India or both” for commercial purposes.

They were quoted as saying Nepal had recently formed a committee “to study the feasibility of launching its first satellite.” An orbital slot provided by the International Telecommunication Union to Nepal many years ago will expire in 2015, prompting Kathmandu to embark on the long-discussed project with new-found urgency.


In the case of Sri Lanka, for which again China is building the satellite, even its orbital slot is in the name of China Satcom which makes it technically legal for China to operate the satellite. We do not know what the case is with Nepal.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Prem Kumar » 06 May 2013 08:01



I heard he even changed the color of his turban from blue to dark blue, conveying an even stronger message. Its no coincidence that China immediately withdrew its troops from Indian territory to a point further away in Indian territory

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Prem » 06 May 2013 08:47

http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharn ... -revision/
China Should Not Hyperventilate Over Japanese Constitutional Revision

I am in Shanghai. Turning on CCTV news last Thursday morning, May 3, I was expecting to see reports of Chinese May Day holidayJapan's socialist party chairwoman Mizuho Fukushima (R) joins a die-in protest in front of the prime minister's official residence in Tokyo on June 7, 2012. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda held a meeting late June 7 to discuss whether his government should approve restarting two nuclear reactors in western Japan. traffic jams and crowds at resorts. Instead, I was served with an exceptionally well produced but hyperbolic twenty minute alarum on the threat to Asia and China posed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s plan to amend Japan’s “Peace Constitution.” May 3, besides being the first day of Japan’s Golden Week holiday, is also Constitution Day, the day in 1947, during the U.S. Occupation, that the U.S.-written constitution in which “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation” (Article 9) was imposed on Japan. This year, more than any other I can remember, the questions of whether to amend the constitution, and what might be changed, are being posed in public forums, in the Diet, and in the consciences of Japan’s electorate.

Last year Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) adopted as part of its Lower House election campaign platform a draft amended constitution (see my earlier post). Since December, having won over two-thirds of the Lower House Diet seats, thus securing the votes needed to pass amendments to the constitution in that body, Abe has been campaigning and building a coalition of right-leaning parties in hopes of capturing two-thirds of seats in July’s Upper House election. If he can do this, he plans to move quickly to amend Article 96, which stipulates a requirement of two-thirds votes of both Diet houses–as well as majority of popular votes–to amend the constitution. Article 96 would be changed to a simple majority vote within each Diet chamber. This would vastly lower the bar and ensure relatively easy constitutional change.Yesterday morning, May 4, Chinese national news carried a second installment of the Japanese Constitution Day report, this one graphically recounting, with historical graphics and newsreel footage, Japan’s brutal aggression against China and Asia, beginning in the Edo period and continuing through Meiji and Showa. The inescapable message was of Japan’s warlike national character, temporarily suppressed by WWII defeat and the U.S.-imposed peace constitution, but now resurgent and seeking release under the leadership of Abe and his right wing allies, with amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution the critical enabling step.
I should say that I strongly disagree with the Chinese position (but not the history) here and consider egregious and gratuitously provocative the spewing of this kind of propaganda aimed at inflaming anti-Japan popular sentiment. Japan has been since 1945 and will continue to be deeply pacifist. To deny this is to deny history. I can think of no nation on earth more committed to safeguarding peace and avoiding war, including Sweden. Abe, a romantic nationalist, is proving a problematic, and potentially disastrous leader for Japan in its relations with its neighbors (and increasingly, I suspect, with the United States). Both in character and mentality he and his coterie are yesterday’s men, not the forward looking leaders Japan needs. Abe seems to be willfully antagonizing China and Korea by equivocating on the definition of “aggression,” subtly backing away from the apology for aggression issued in 1995 by former prime minister Maruyama, signaling support for members of his government to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, and numerous other words and deeds that are increasingly alienating Japan from the region and from the U.S. Japan’s high level relations with China and South Korea are close to rupture. Last week both countries’ finance ministers and PBOC governor Zhou Xiaochuan boycotted the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank’s annual meeting and coincident “Asean plus three” meeting in India, sending instead vice ministers. The rebuff was clearly aimed at Japan, represented by Abe’s alter ego, Finance Minister and Deputy Premier Aso Taro, with whom in past years the ministers would have held important substantive meetings.

CCTV’s two day barrage somewhat contradictorily strove to persuade its audience that Abe’s campaign is opposed by a majority of Japanese. It cited a poll by the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun in which a majority of respondents registered such opposition. It aired interviews with anti-amendment demonstrators and the head of the Japanese Social Democratic Party, Ms. Fukushima Mizuho, who warned of a slippery slope toward Japanese involvement in America’s global wars.
In fact, opponents of revision may be in the minority. On May 2 and 3, Japanese media carried news of a Nihon Keizai Shimbun/TV Tokyo poll in which 56% of respondents agreed that “the Constitution should be revised” while only 28% answered “leave it as it is.” To the same questions asked in April 2012 53% supported amendment, while 33% wanted no change. Clearly, on the general issue of amendment public opinion has been trending in support of Abe.I have written before that I support Abe’s intended change in Japan’s constitution because I see it as a necessary step toward a Japanese foreign and defense policy and capability independent of the United States, eventual abrogation of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense alliance, and pursuit by Japan of a Swiss-like (non-nuclear) armed neutrality between the U.S. and China, the only position for Japan that is likely to be stable, sustainable and in Japan’s interest over time. My sense is that at a visceral level, this is the sentiment, if not clear vision, informing much of the popular support for revision seen above. From my perspective, then, China’s hyperbolic treatment of Japan’s constitutional debate is misguided and very likely against its longer term interests, as well as Japan’s.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 06 May 2013 10:08

From Orbat.Com

Part-1

For those who like to know these things, the entire East Ladakh Line of Actual Control with China is under 3 Infantry Division at Leh. The division was hastily raised in 1962, and took over two brigades. One brigade, 114, was raised in 1959 when the East Ladakh crisis first erupted, with two battalions of locally raised troops, the Jammu & Kashmir Militia. Later, two regular army battalions were inducted. 70 Brigade arrived as a reinforcement after the war began. Later, 163 Brigade was pulled from the Pakistan border and given to 3 Division as division reserve. Still later, 121 (Independent ) Infantry Brigade was raised at Kargil, and put under the division’s command. At some point after 1963, the East Ladakh LAC was bifurcated between 22 Sector north of the Changchemo River, with 114 Brigade at Chushul and 70 Brigade at the southern end of the line at Demchok. 22 Sector has at least two subsectors, with Sub Sector North being responsible for DBO possibly down to the Galwan River.

· Strictly speaking, our intrepid South Asia correspondent Mandeep Bajwa should be telling you all this, as he knows much more about the independent Indian Army’s history that the Editor. The above is to Editor’s best recollection, but likely he’s made errors as he was always more concerned with orbats than history. Still is. But Mandeep is mad at Editor for some reason (he won’t explain why) and refuses to answer emails and chat requests. Please twitter him @MandeepBajwa and tell him to get with the program.


· Okay. In 1971 163 Brigade was withdrawn to Foxtrot Sector in the Punjab for the forthcoming Pakistan War, and it was not replaced because it was appraised there was no longer a China threat. In 1984, 102 (Independent) Brigade was raised at Thoise for the Siachin sector facing Pakistan, and 121 Brigade went under the newly raised 28 Division at Nimu. 102 Brigade was put under 3 Division.

· In 1999, on account of the Kargil War, 70 Brigade went to 8 Division, a formation brought in for the Kashmir Counter Insurgency from Eastern Command and stationed in Kashmir. 28 Division, minus 121 Brigade, went to Kupwara in the Kashmir Valley for the CI. So when the Kargil thing blew up, for operational reasons it was decided not to shift 28 Division back; instead 8 Division took over. Editor believes that 114 Brigade was also withdrawn for a time, leaving the China front denuded of regular troops. Anyway, 114 Brigade came back, and now, 14 years after leaving Demchok, 70 Brigade has come up. So you can see how seriously India was taking Chinese incursions. I.e., not at all seriously.

· To show how urgently India reacted to the threats in the decade 2001-2010, after opening DBO airfield not a single An-32 flight took place. Sub Sector North continued to be protected by outposts of the Indo Tibet Border Police, a high-altitude mountain warfare force raised after 1962 for patrolling the China border with Ladakh, Himachal, and Utter Pradesh. After the 1962 War, a new locally recruited force was raised, the Ladakh Scouts. These used to operate in companies, but after their steller performance in 1999 Kargil, they were given the status of a regular regiment and have, Editor thinks, six battalions. Sub Sector North is protected by 5 Ladakh Scouts, but till the other day this was not forward deployed. The rest of 22 Sector consists, as far as we know, by an infantry battalion, a Ladakh Scouts battalion, and a heavy mortar battery (12 x 120mm mortars), now for some peculiar reason called a heavy mortar regiment.

· After the Operation Trident fuss in 1986-87, India stationed a tank regiment and a mechanized battalion at Leh, under 3 Division; these became part of Corps troops when XIV Corps (Leh) was raised after the Kargil War. After the 2000s Chinese intrusions, India decided to sanction an armored brigade for Ladakh, which is now being raised, slowly. A T-90 tank regiment has gone to Leh and presumably it, plus the mechanized battalion, will form the nucleus of the new independent armored brigade, which will be under HQ XIV Corps as far as we know. India also okayed the raising of an infantry independent brigade group for the middle part of the Ladakh LAC with China. Something is happening, but we don’t know what since Mandeep is unavailable. Our assumption is that this will be based around Changchemo.


India is probably slowly building up to a new division HQ for North Ladakh, leaving 3 Division for South Ladakh. With these new raisings you cannot have a single division HQ controlling the entire 440-km or so Ladakh frontier. Is a third brigade being provided to bring 3 Division to strength? Don’t know – Mandeep will know, but he may not be free to speak, as the information is not released to the public. Sub Sector North also needs to become a separate sector, and the rest of 22 Sector put under a new brigade HQ with a third battalion added. Then 102 Brigade, DBO subsector, the new brigade in lieu of 22 Sector, and the new independent brigade could become part of a new division. But what the Indian Army needs and the bureaucrats agree to are two different things.


Part 2

Last Friday we detailed Indian deployments in Ladakh, current and planned. On China’s side the situation is quite simple. The Lanzhou Military Region has two army corps, one of which has been reduced to three independent brigades. The Xinjiang Military District has an unusually large number of independent formations, giving the MR 1 armored, 3 motorized or mechanized, and 1 infantry division, plus seven infantry, mechanized or motorized, and armored brigades.

· There is no particular reason why today these seven division equivalents cannot be deployed against India in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Personally, we have doubts about the efficiency of these troops, who have spent decades in (relatively) comfortable garrisons, have no experience in mountain warfare, and except a few senior generals have never heard a shot fired in battle. But none of this matters, because China does not intend to fight India in the high mountains as in 1962.

· Primarily it counts on Indian political cowardice to forestall any aggressive action on India’s part. But should that fail, the Chinese plan to let India comes down from their mountains to the plains of the plateau, and crush them there using light and medium armor. Not a bad strategy given they lose very little if they lose their high altitude outposts, because their mountain positions are shallow.

· To reiterate, in Ladakh we had postulated that soon there will be the equivalent of two infantry divisions and an armored brigade. It may appear on the surface of it that India is outnumbered three-to-one and in a very bad situation. At least the political types and Ministry of External Affairs, who are always holding out olive branches to the Chinese, would like Indians to believe that. Impressing on the nation its weakness reduces domestic pressure to take a hard line, and lets people believe “well, we have no choice but to compromise”. Naturally, Indians who cannot remember what happened yesterday and have zero interest in tomorrow, don’t ask why after 50-years and after the creation of the world’s largest mountain warfare force this should be so. No one who operates in a western frame of logic can explain anything India and Indians do.

· In reality there is no 3-1 superiority for China because if we are talking of the Xinjiang theater, India can, without difficulty, reinforce Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarkhand with additional divisions to quickly bring itself up to parity in the theatre.

· To problem is, what then? China is not about to launch a full-scale attack on India. The Chinese are arrogant and run their mouths like sewing machines, but they are not fools. They will get nowhere with an attack because their troops will have to dismount and slog it out in the mountains, where they will be at tremendous disadvantage. India is not about to attack China because of the lack of political will.

· But, readers will object, aren’t you forgetting the highly unfavorable Indian logistical situation. So we can push additional divisions into the Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarakhand sectors, but how are we going to support an offensive? The days are gone when an Indian mountain division needed just 200-tons of supplies a day. Back in those days a Chinese division got by with 50 or less because their divisions had little artillery (in the mountains) and few vehicles. Ah yes, simpler times – Editor gets quite nostalgic. Now the division artillery alone would need 200-tons/day in the attack. Moreover, how is India going to get artillery and vehicles to the mountain passes and across down to the Tibet plateau when roads are lacking?

· And what about an even greater problem: India has almost no east-west interconnectivity because of the mountains. Every sector has deployments like the open fingers of a hand, each finger proceeding up a steep, narrow valley, but the fingers cannot switch forces between them. For the Chinese that is no problem because they are on the plateau and have an excellent east-west main trunk road, plus other roads.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby chaanakya » 06 May 2013 10:28

Quid pro quo behind India-China de-escalation?
Rajat Pandit, TNN | May 5, 2013, 11.02 PM IST

NEW DELHI: It seems there was some sort of "a quid pro quo" behind the mutual withdrawal of Indian and Chinese troops from the 16,300-feet face-off site in the Depsang Bulge area of northern Ladakh on Sunday evening.


With India furiously working the diplomatic channels ahead of foreign minister Salman Khurshid's visit to Beijing on May 9, in preparation for Chinese premier Li Keqiang's trip to India on May 20, two back-to-back flag meetings were held between local commanders at Spanggur Gap area between Daulat Beg Oldi and Chushul sectors on Saturday and Sunday afternoons.


By 7.30pm on Sunday, the two forces - with 30 to 40 troops each - had begun to withdraw from the 20-day-old standoff site along the Raki Nala, which India perceives to be 19-km inside Indian territory, after a handshake between the two local commanders at the fifth flag meeting held earlier in the day.

Though there was no immediate official word on what were the exact terms of disengagement but sources said "there was some give-and-take" to resolve the face-off. "There had to be some face-saver for the Chinese," said a source. ( and none for India since we dont have face anyway)

China, since the very beginning and through the first three flag meetings on April 18, 23 and 30, had remained adamant that India should dismantle its forward observation post at Chumar in eastern Ladakh since it overlooks Chinese highways and can detect any troop movement there.

India, in turn, was demanding that the over 32 Chinese troops, who had pitched tents at the face-off site and were getting their supplies through regular vehicular support, should return to their pre-April 15 positions. India was worried about the deep Chinese intrusion in the Depsang Bulge area, a table-top plateau, since it threatened to cut its access to around 750 sqkm area in the region.

The face-off site was just about 40-km south of the strategic Karakoram Pass, which is at the tri-junction of China-Pakistan-India borders, and overlooks the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge to the west and the Indian observation post in the Chumar sector to the east. ( If you sell off Siachen-Saltoro Ridge to Pakistan the necessity to have Chumar post will cease to exist . Some of us inlcuding most in UPeeA have advocated it as track-II diplomacy. The mistake of such an idea should be obvious to us though. Karakorum pass is important for us as it would need to be cut off during war.)

Though already angry with India's re-activation of advanced landing grounds at Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyoma and building of other infrastructure along the LAC over the last four-five years, China had made the dismantling of the Chumar post as a pre-condition for de-escalation.

The Chinese, in fact, had earlier even tried to "immobilize" the surveillance cameras positioned at the Chumar post by cutting wires there. In June last year, Indian troops had intercepted two Chinese personnel on mules across the Chumar post. Though they were subsequently let off, with language being a barrier, China got hugely irritated about the incident. Holding that the two Chinese were from its revenue department, Beijing since then has been pressing hard for the Chumar post to be dismantled.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby RajeshA » 06 May 2013 14:06

shyamd wrote:At the moment the partnership slowly forming is - India Singapore Japan Aus - with Indonesia Vietnam Thailand pretty much bilaterally joining into the union. Still things are at a very initial stage though. Much work to be done.

This problem with PRC provides us with an opportunity to - (a) move forward with the Aryavarta Union (b) Test our Nuc's. So I think we should take advantage of the prevailing situation. If PRC was smart they would sue for peace.


I think a more Bharatiya dispensation at the center should in fact translate this fact.

1) Āryāvarta Union - This requires a certain civilizational glue, and thus a government in power at the Center which unashamedly advocates Bharatiya Sanskriti. Without putting the Sanskriti in the middle, these alliances would really have little supplying the level of trust and integration that would be needed to meet the security challenges in Asia.

2) Nuke Testing: We know it is easy to provoke the Chinese, even if we show aggressive defensive posture. Next time, this is exactly what we should do, and use Chinese belligerence to do Nuke testing.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby shyamd » 06 May 2013 14:17

1) Always follow interests first which are fundamentals of relationships and are more important. For trust and integration religion can be used amongst other techniques but interests will be the most important
2) Agreed

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Singha » 06 May 2013 14:25

the Chumar post being talked about is nowhere near DBO...its on the JK-HP border, near demchok. chinese helis had overflown this post recently
https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/imag ... eOvldjx2Gj

the approach from the chinese side is wide and easy and flows into the manali-leh highway. perhaps his position acts as a gate guardian there and cheen wants to build up logistics to flow through chumar and demchok and target this road.

the main chinese highway parallel to nepal called G219 seems to be around 50kms from demchok-chumar...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby RajeshA » 06 May 2013 14:45

shyamd wrote:Always follow interests first which are fundamentals of relationships and are more important. For trust and integration religion can be used amongst other techniques but interests will be the most important


Well for that one would have to get philosophical about "national interests"! Who defines them? If it is the elite, then one needs to know how well the elite is in sync with the general populace. How well they are in sync with the civilizational culture on which the Rashtra is based?

The definition of "national interests" happens a bit too arbitrarily depending on who does the defining.

I agree "Religion" is irrelevant, if it is looked upon as a 'sampradayik path'!

The problem arises when people however start defining "national interests" independently of our Sanksriti and Sabhyata. There is absolutely no "national interest" which can be defined if it is not in some way or another shown to be nurturing Sanskriti and Sabhyata. Everything else is ephemeral or simply a biological impulse.

--

X-posting to "The Bharatiya - Identity, Vision, Agenda, Proposition" Thread, where such "structural" and "fundamental" issues are tackled.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby chaanakya » 06 May 2013 15:58

Singha wrote:the Chumar post being talked about is nowhere near DBO...its on the JK-HP border, near demchok. chinese helis had overflown this post recently
https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/imag ... eOvldjx2Gj

the approach from the chinese side is wide and easy and flows into the manali-leh highway. perhaps his position acts as a gate guardian there and cheen wants to build up logistics to flow through chumar and demchok and target this road.

the main chinese highway parallel to nepal called G219 seems to be around 50kms from demchok-chumar...


Yes, it is mentioned that Chumar post is about 40 kms from KKM pass and is near Demchok. CHina wanted India to vacate in lieu of their vacating Raki nala near DBO. I feel Raki nala occupation by China is/was not sustainable in the long run being on lower ground but for the time being it directly threatened DBO airstrip.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Singha » 06 May 2013 16:04

>> Yes, it is mentioned that Chumar post is about 40 kms from KKM pass and is near Demchok.

take a look at any map for "karakoram pass"

thats not possible. KKP is next to DBO. demchok is 100s of km away to south and chumar is near it to the left.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 06 May 2013 16:28

chaanakya wrote:<SNIP>Yes, it is mentioned that Chumar post is about 40 kms from KKM pass and is near Demchok. CHina wanted India to vacate in lieu of their vacating Raki nala near DBO. I feel Raki nala occupation by China is/was not sustainable in the long run being on lower ground but for the time being it directly threatened DBO airstrip.


For reference:

Chumur (South-East Ladakh) - http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=32.667052&lon=78.594561&z=13&m=h

KK Pass - DBO Sector (North-East Ladakh):http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.512527&lon=77.822514&z=13&m=h

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Singha » 06 May 2013 16:37

if http://mapcarta.com/14893546 is causing khujli, it can only mean they have already crept across and are constructing roads in the sandy plain that lies within the LAC to the south-west of this post! this post can likely overview it directly.
this is another depsang plain type area that is within our LOC but an adjunct to the plains of tibet.

looks like their strategy is grab all such plain areas where we can build helipads or launchpads for logistics , drive us back into the hills...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Pranav » 06 May 2013 16:58

Singha wrote:looks like their strategy is grab all such plain areas where we can build helipads or launchpads for logistics , drive us back into the hills...

Actually they talk about having the boundary along the watershed dividing lines (i.e. ridges and peaks), which would give them the mountain slopes overlooking the Tibetan plateau (See http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... s/1111675/ and http://week.manoramaonline.com/cgi-bin/ ... d=13943800). That is why they are refusing to give maps of their perception of the LAC. They want to create a fait accompli at the opportune time.

This lack of clarity can work both ways, but the party with better infrastructure and national resolve will end up benefiting.

If we strengthen infra and show resolve then they may hasten to sign an LAC accord.
Last edited by Pranav on 06 May 2013 17:11, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 06 May 2013 17:01

Singha wrote:if http://mapcarta.com/14893546 <SNIP>


Thanks for sharing the website...never knew about it. Will help in exploring the terrain and the area better.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby chaanakya » 06 May 2013 17:03

Singha wrote:>> Yes, it is mentioned that Chumar post is about 40 kms from KKM pass and is near Demchok.

take a look at any map for "karakoram pass"

thats not possible. KKP is next to DBO. demchok is 100s of km away to south and chumar is near it to the left.

You are correct. I misread the news. Cumar post overlooks Chinese Highway across. DBO being in Leh would be nearer to KKM obviously. I should have been more careful. Thanx for correcting faus pas.

Also thanx Rohitvats
Last edited by chaanakya on 06 May 2013 17:05, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Pranav » 06 May 2013 17:05

rohitvats wrote:
Singha wrote:if http://mapcarta.com/14893546 <SNIP>


Thanks for sharing the website...never knew about it. Will help in exploring the terrain and the area better.


It is basically Google imagery, also available via Google Maps and Google Earth. Google Earth is best for 3D visualization.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 06 May 2013 17:12

Marten wrote:Rohit, when you have the time: http://mapcarta.com/14894514 shows Chepzi as part of India, whereas the line of control shows further north. Which of these is wrong?


Marten - the land lies in Tibet from the map. Someone could have entered the details wrongly.

Coming to maps - I rely on maps hosted at Texas University (at Austin). These are pretty old maps from early 50's/60's but damn accurate as far as land features are concerned. Were made by Army Map Service of US Army Engineers. I'm yet to see a single Indian source which such detailed maps.

Check the link here: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/

Click on the numbers on the map for larger and detailed maps.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ShauryaT » 06 May 2013 17:20

No deal struck with China on border dispute, say Government sources

Sources say India put intense pressure on China and said "we are willing to let the relationship (between the two countries) sink."

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby kmkraoind » 06 May 2013 17:22

Plans to Harness Chinese River’s Power Threaten a Region

China Sells Helicopter Gunships to UWSA: Report

Image
Image

PRC is ruthless when it comes to its interest, it will not hesitate to trouble even its perceived allies.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 06 May 2013 17:23

Pranav wrote:It is basically Google imagery, also available via Google Maps and Google Earth. Google Earth is best for 3D visualization.


I know that...but the terrain feature is not there on GE (at least I've not come across the same). Also, the same GE maps on Google or Wikimapia take relatively more time to load and zoom-in and out. Plus, places are marked more clearly with link to possible pictures of the sites.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby rohitvats » 06 May 2013 17:31

Marten wrote:Rohit, when you have the time: http://mapcarta.com/14894514 shows Chepzi as part of India, whereas the line of control shows further north. Which of these is wrong?


The map from Texas University show the place as just within India...someone seems to have marked the site wrongly.

See this map: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/ni-44-13.jpg

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby krithivas » 06 May 2013 19:24

China failed miserably in its latest land grab effort and its bloated ego has been punctured. Chinese become very reclusive after a public shaming such as this.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby RoyG » 06 May 2013 19:42

krithivas wrote:China failed miserably in its latest land grab effort and its bloated ego has been punctured. Chinese become very reclusive after a public shaming such as this.


The Chinese wouldn't have withdrawn without some concessions from our side...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Klaus » 06 May 2013 19:48

rohitvats wrote:
· But, readers will object, aren’t you forgetting the highly unfavorable Indian logistical situation. So we can push additional divisions into the Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarakhand sectors, but how are we going to support an offensive? The days are gone when an Indian mountain division needed just 200-tons of supplies a day. Back in those days a Chinese division got by with 50 or less because their divisions had little artillery (in the mountains) and few vehicles. Ah yes, simpler times – Editor gets quite nostalgic. Now the division artillery alone would need 200-tons/day in the attack. Moreover, how is India going to get artillery and vehicles to the mountain passes and across down to the Tibet plateau when roads are lacking?

· And what about an even greater problem: India has almost no east-west interconnectivity because of the mountains. Every sector has deployments like the open fingers of a hand, each finger proceeding up a steep, narrow valley, but the fingers cannot switch forces between them. For the Chinese that is no problem because they are on the plateau and have an excellent east-west main trunk road, plus other roads.


Rohitvats ji, many thanks for bringing out these nuggets of info. Helps clear out clogs on many levels.

It does look like extensive tunneling will be required to provide an east west connectivity for military logistics. An added benefit of tunneling through the mountains is that India can position its road mobile and canisterized ballistic missile units as well as TEL's to directly target Lanzhou military district.

Urgent need to start geology and seismic studies here.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ramana » 06 May 2013 19:49

Considering the credibility of UPA govt is very low, it would be a huge boost if the govt starts designating a named spokesman who is authorised to give his name, instead of these anonymouse soures who will turn around and say they were misquoted. These sources are giving so many versions that its tantamount to spin. For their careers or minsiters or the nation?

It would also serve the media well if they refuse the crumbs from the govt sources who appear to be managing their careers and not the govt position.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Singha » 06 May 2013 19:51

india has no lack of knowledge in siesmic, geology and civil engg intersection. the univ of roorkee (now iit) is one such big repository of excellence in these topics.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Klaus » 06 May 2013 21:08

^^^ We can really add a lot of colour and suaveness to the geological explorations in Aksai Chin (as compared to the Chinese who use the same monotonous and beaten to death methods), send out droves of scholars and students to carry out digs for fossil bones, create a fresh new rung of humint on the ground by sending in anthropology and other humanities students on research trips to the Ladakh, Leh and Aksai Chin areas getting them to carry out various research surveys and generally increasing their interaction with isolated communities, perhaps even obtain a few converted nomad/shepherd spies (through whom the Chinese always make their initial forays prior to every probe/incursion). Intended benefits will trickle down into India's humanities division, whose students are relatively starved of field work as compared to their western counterparts. Sprucing up India's humanities edu departments also has long term spill over effects on the nations intel setup and robustness.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby g.sarkar » 06 May 2013 21:16

India should be thankful to China for this border incident. As it should be thankful for the the border wars in Ladakh and NEFA back in the early 60s. China has done enough to try to wake Delhi up. What it can not do is make the the Indian leaders to grow cojones, for the lack of a better word. I am afraid they will go back to their scams and petty feuding and the incident will be forgotten in no time.
Gautam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Prem » 06 May 2013 21:43

rajrang"quote="Philip wrote:First of all,as I have been saying and doing for aeons,stop calling the Indo-China Sea the South China Sea! This entire region of Asia has been historically known as Indo-China,therefore, so too must the maritime waters contiguous to the region be called .AtI like "Meddling Kingdom" Good one!


Mad-Evil Kingdom and Indo Pacific Ocean.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby sanjaykumar » 06 May 2013 22:45

Meddle kingdom.

Middling kingdom.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby ShauryaT » 06 May 2013 23:22

Klaus wrote:It does look like extensive tunneling will be required to provide an east west connectivity for military logistics. An added benefit of tunneling through the mountains is that India can position its road mobile and canisterized ballistic missile units as well as TEL's to directly target Lanzhou military district.
Really no need for this type of an expensive project in largely uninhabited areas to serve only a military purpose. There are far better ways these days. Aerial monitoring with the help of UAV's, rotary and other fixed wing surveillance assets can play a role of the traditional road based patrols. Forward air fields, if well maintained can serve the needs of a local emergency. Missiles induction in large enough nuumbers, both air and land based can replace the need for artillery backed fire power, until such time that mobile and light artillery can be moved to these forward airfields and other rotary lifted areas. We have to be smart about where do we spend the monies. Infrastructure is best built for dual use. I guess most important is the certain knowledge on the part of the adversary that we will defend and respond. It should be clear to them, we have the capability and will to do so.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Sanku » 07 May 2013 14:21

The scar of Depsang will remain

Tarun Vijay
The Chinese return to their previous position is a lesson that we will have to learn if we want to live as a proud and powerful nation. A weak and meek government is neither respected by its electorate nor by the neighbours whom it wants to befriend, says Tarun Vijay


I disagree with Shri Tarun Vijay on one count, our electorate has shown no signs that it is aware or is concerned about national issues, our electorate has not moved beyond the equations of simplistic electoral calculus, held in thrall by snake oil salesmen.


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby svinayak » 08 May 2013 10:32

Some comments from other continents. Check how they perceive the conflict similar to Indo Pak
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archiv ... picks=true
angos SDtriton • 8 hours ago −
Ease up. The article hints at the India China nuclear flash point.----------
----------------------

There is some speculation that this latest incursion is due to upcoming meeting of foreign ministers. China is basically flexing it's muscle and saying: 'This is not a meeting of equals, you're (India) still a junior partner.'

India will accept the humble pie for now, but may not in the future.
20 1 •Reply•Share ›

sangos vkg123 • 8 hours ago −
Matter of fact it can happen right now. China has grown to be a big boy in the neighborhood because of the stability from USA's presence in Asia Pacific. That said China's bullying tactics can send the next big boy India to tip the US pivot. Already they are warming up to the Japanese.


Karim1234 RaiseTheBlackFlag • 30 minutes ago −
Do you really think the word chink is insulting to us? LOL!

Like Whites, it is impossible to hurt our feelings with racial insults or ethnic stereotypes.

We are more successful, affluent, and intelligent, and so we don't have the obsessive need (like Indians) to engage in a battle of, "who has a larger inferiority complex?"

On the other point, I was merely stating that India has more border disputes than China. It's a simple fact. I don't care for the reasoning behind it, I simply said it in response to the hordes of butthurt Indians which claim that China has more border disputes than any other country on Earth.

Also, the original poster said that, "China has border disputes with each and every country that borders China".

Again, simply wrong. Just another butthurt Indian.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 09 May 2013 02:40

^^^
Informed Indians need to get on those blogs/boards and make it clear that India does not have disputes with 'all its neighbours'. They also should forcefully state that China has a history of real perfidy in SE Asia i.e supporting or being an ally of the genocidal Khmer Rouge, attacking Vietnam because it was taking action against that genocidal regime, and being the staunchest supporter of the Myanmar junta( where India initially took a highly principled stand, but was later forced to deal with the junta).


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