Managing Chinese Threat
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Pratyush ji, regarding your point about Mandarin being introduced in the CBSE syllabus, I think it actually will give future generations an essential foothold in perfectly understanding Chinese culture and way of life. Indeed, a lot can be learnt of their way of thinking by being able to understand their civilizational memes, language is a primary requirement for that.
It does not mean anything else. IMVHO this step should have been taken in the early 1980's itself.
It does not mean anything else. IMVHO this step should have been taken in the early 1980's itself.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
well Hari, no doubt he is apologising for Britain having ruled China for centuries and made them the way they are?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Well Shivji has made an important point as far as the vulnerabilities of China and its interests are concerned. The ability and opportunity to hit back are aplenty for India.Hari Seldon wrote:^^^Pray what point is that, sir? TIA.
But the counter argument is that all this is well known! Key issue or debate for us currently is "what is our threshold of pain/irritation/development/prosperity/growth before we start hitting back?".
Regards.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
That makes many things clear... Now I can see psychological trauma of Paquis; they too were ruled by Britain.
Thanks Lalmohan ji. You saved my soul...
Thanks Lalmohan ji. You saved my soul...
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Published on Nov 20, 2009 (Old Article)
Key Maritime Region by Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser: German Foreign Policy
Key Maritime Region by Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser: German Foreign Policy
Decisive for Asia
As retired Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser, former head of the Policy and Planning Staff of the German Defense Ministry wrote in an article under his byline, the Indian Ocean holds in general not only "the key to the world's seas, particularly the sea routes to the Pacific," which, in itself, is of enormous importance, given the fact that a "large part of the world's commerce" is dependent upon these sea routes. But the Indian Ocean is particularly "decisive for the future Asian power constellations, above all between India and China." This is of enormous importance, since for some time now, the west has been seeking to pit the Asian rival, India, against China, to weaken the influence of the People's Republic, the assumed future world power.
String of Pearls Strategy
In his article, Ulrich Weisser writes that Beijing has long since adapted to this situation and has quietly begun to use countermeasures. "In the Indian Ocean, China is employing the so called string of pearls strategy," the former head of the defense ministry's policy and planning staff writes. It is aiming "to secure itself a growing number of harbors and bases around India." According to Weisser, Beijing is constructing "an important naval base with extensive reconnaissance facilities" in Gwadar (Pakistan), using the harbors in Pasni (Pakistan) and in Chittagong (Bangladesh) and is securing a bunker station for itself in Sri Lanka. In Myanmar, China is constructing docks for merchant and warships." This is making the Indian Navy "nervous," because it has its own hegemonic plans for the Indian Ocean. The "maritime rivalry" between India and China "is coming more and more to the fore."
Foretaste
Concerning the People's Republic of China, Weisser asserts that "in this situation, the US Pacific Fleet is playing a major role to maintain the strategic balance. EU warships, including those from Germany, are establishing their presence in the western Indian Ocean - a welcomed side effect of the war on "pirates". In efforts to contain China, geo-strategists are placing a high priority on western presence in this Ocean - a small foretaste of conflicts to come.
Last edited by RajeshA on 20 Sep 2010 20:02, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
India? hitting back PRCmunna wrote:Well Shivji has made an important point as far as the vulnerabilities of China and its interests are concerned. The ability and opportunity to hit back are aplenty for India.Hari Seldon wrote:^^^Pray what point is that, sir? TIA.
But the counter argument is that all this is well known! Key issue or debate for us currently is "what is our threshold of pain/irritation/development/prosperity/growth before we start hitting back?".
Regards.
Where would that be? In Sri Lanka or Myanmar or Thailand or North Korea or Gwadar or Africa or Banglore,Kerala?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Battle for the Indian Ocean by Ron Fraser: The Trumpet
The latest of these should sound real warning bells to one of its chief suppliers of raw materials—Australia. A few weeks ago the strategic island nation of Timor revealed that it had signed a deal with China to build a military base on that island, which is situated only a few hundred miles off the northwest coast of Australia.
With Australia’s major population centered in the southeast of the country, its vast northern coastline lies largely unprotected by the nation’s comparatively small naval force. Australia’s security has always been challenged by the problem of how to defend its continental coastline with a force drawn from a population the size of greater Los Angeles spread across a landmass that approximates that of the United States. Australia survived the threat of invasion and occupation by Japan in World War ii only by dint of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s success in the Pacific campaign. Ever since, the globe’s largest island and smallest continent has depended on its big brother in Washington for security of the Pacific and Indian oceans, thus limiting the Asian threat from the north that is its greatest security challenge.
Now, at a time when China detects the waning of American power and the weakening of Australia, politically, as a result of its present ineffectual coalition government, it is prepared to openly march into one of Australia’s island neighbors—a nation which up to now has depended on Australia for its own tenuous security — and boldly publicize its intention to build a military base in Timor, right on Australia’s doorstep.
The fact that Timor is the sea gate that gives China direct access to Australia’s west coast, the coastline that bounds the largest diamond mines in the world, and some of the world’s largest deposits of coal and iron ore, will not be lost on military strategists. Not only that, a base in Timor consolidates China’s already significant presence at strategic passageways to the Indian Ocean.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Chinese bullying in Asia
Published on Sept 20, 2010
By Danielle Demetriou in Tokyo and Malcolm Moore in Shanghai
China retaliates in dispute with Japan as boat row escalates: Telegraph
Also Japan should move its investments in China to India.
Published on Sept 20, 2010
By Danielle Demetriou in Tokyo and Malcolm Moore in Shanghai
China retaliates in dispute with Japan as boat row escalates: Telegraph
By halting all ministerial and provincial-level contact with Japan, China has frozen official and commercial ties until the Chinese captain is released.
"When we get to the end of the year, you will see a huge effect on the Japanese economy," said Liu Jiangyong, a professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University. "China represents a lot of business for Japan and you should not treat important partners this way," he added.
On Monday there were reports that Baojian, a large Chinese domestic products company, had cancelled a trip to Japan for its 10,000 employees next month.
China has also abruptly withdrawn an invitation from Wen Jiabao, its prime minister, for 1,000 young Japanese to visit the Shanghai Expo.
Ma Zhaoxu, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, said that there would be severe drop-off in Chinese tourists to Japan.
China is at full speed pissing off the developed countries in Asia - Japan, South Korea, Australia, ~India. India should move ahead and build the Asian Security Alliance."If Japan acts wilfully, making mistake after mistake, China will take strong countermeasures, and all the consequences will be borne by the Japanese side," said the Chinese foreign ministry, which said that it does not recognise Japanese legal jurisdiction over the Diaoyu's.
Also Japan should move its investments in China to India.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Read this in context of the German Foreign Policy link posted by RajeshA.ramana wrote:PRC in Gilgit-Baltistan is like 26/11. The GOI response will be same. We need to understand that.
http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56300
RajeshA or Anyone else, can you translate Ref 5 in the above link?
--------
Now lets try to think why US wants to expose the PRC bivouacing in POK? And use an Indian friendly expert (Harrison) to release the info.Manishw wrote:The response is even worse.They tried to cover the whole thing up.The intriguing part is that the whole mess was exposed by the mouth piece of U.S.ramana wrote:PRC in Gilgit-Baltistan is like 26/11. The GOI response will be same. we need to understand that.
Nihat, If you take a 100K ft look at 26/11 it was to provoke a GOI military resposne to take care of TSP which was in a slug fest with US in Af-Pak. The immediate affect would be to embroil India in Af-Pak. Similarly by PRC moving into G-B is to provoke an Indian response. One way to look at it is PRC is using TSP to breakout of the its eastern seaboard straightjacket (Kemanade et al.) of the Pacific Fleet. And more significantly it is using TSP to become a western Central Asian power. Just as US used TSP its now being used by PRC. Indian interests are not yet harmed. They are bruised just as in 26/11.
Let those who are affected sort it out this time also. No point in becoming sepoys and get robbed of our hard earned cash ($100B) for arms with monitoring chips.
More urgent task is to use that chase to rebuild and integrate our nation together instead of wasting it on far away manipulators. Even ten percent of that cash will buy up all the million mutinies even after leakages.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
It is not realistic that India can hit at Chinese bases and infrastructure at will and impunity without a Chinese retaliation, so the threshold of pain/irritation on India can be increased without much thought.munna wrote:Well Shivji has made an important point as far as the vulnerabilities of China and its interests are concerned. The ability and opportunity to hit back are aplenty for India.Hari Seldon wrote:^^^Pray what point is that, sir? TIA.
But the counter argument is that all this is well known! Key issue or debate for us currently is "what is our threshold of pain/irritation/development/prosperity/growth before we start hitting back?".
Regards.
Three factors underline this confidence:
- The indecisive and "Peace at all costs" leadership in India's first and last thrust would always be deescalation
- North India at the mercy of Nuclear Missiles located in Tibet
- Each and every outpost of China, be it Sittwe, Gwadar, Marao (Maldives) would invariably be well guarded and have almost as much strategic depth as any naval base in India, and its Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles would have the Indian Navy constantly in cross-hairs. PoK too would have the strategic depth of Xinjiang and perhaps Chinese Air bases in Gilgit and Skardu.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
ramana garu,ramana wrote:Read this in context of the German Foreign Policy link posted by RajeshA.ramana wrote:PRC in Gilgit-Baltistan is like 26/11. The GOI response will be same. We need to understand that.
http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56300
RajeshA or Anyone else, can you translate Ref 5 in the above link?
Those two articles in Ref 5 are accessible only upon subscription. But I believe that the gist of those articles has already been captured in the quote from Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I want only the German description of the articles translated. The abstract.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Peace Powers 06/09/2006ramana wrote:I want only the German description of the articles translated. The abstract.
NEW DELHI / BERLIN / PARIS (Own report) - With a new defense agreement and extensive military exports Berlin strengthens military cooperation with India. The agreement, the Indian defense minister will sign today in Berlin, is the basis for the export of German military equipment on a large scale, and provides for closer cooperation between the navies of both countries.
The third pillar 10/30/2007
NEW DELHI / BERLIN (Own report) - With a multi-day trip to India, German Chancellor tried to link a major rival of the People's Republic of China to Berlin's interests. The focus of the visit are comprehensive economic agreements and measures for the recruitment of Indian IT professionals for German industry. At the same time the federal government sought to use strategic vulnerabilities of the South Asian country to expand influence;. . . . .
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Of course. Of course....Lalmohan wrote:well Hari, no doubt he is apologising for Britain having ruled China for centuries and made them the way they are?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
RajeshA wrote: It is not realistic that India can hit at Chinese bases and infrastructure at will and impunity without a Chinese retaliation, so the threshold of pain/irritation on India can be increased without much thought.
Of course it will be painful for India. Of course China will retaliate.
But there is a series of convenient arguments that are being made about the Government of india while even the thinking that Rajesh has posted above exactly reflects the thinking that the government is accused (or believed) to have. Like people tell me "I am not scared of Bungee jumping. My wife is scared and is stopping me" Balls. Fact is that the man is feeling too macho to say he is afraid. Too many people here are too macho to say they are dhoti shivering. So they say "Goi wont retaliate"
- China provokes
India does not retaliate
Why?
because China will punish India for retaliating and the threhold of pain can be raised
What rubbish!
Please do not talk about Sittwe. China has no pipeline there. Sittwe is within range of Prithvis from India. And don;t talk about POK. The route to killing Chini aspirations in POK is getting Pakistan on our side or by taking out Pakistan va Punjab/Sindh. Not by crying over spilt POK milk provoked by an American article.
I am sure all the doomsday painting analysts on here may be wholly right and I may be completely wrong - but many of you are only expressing fears under the assumption that China will hit and India will get hit and stay hit.
reason?
Read the last 25000000000000000 years of Indian history. Pah. Gimme a break.
This is balderdash. India will hit back an hit back hard. Many of you guys may not want to believe it but I think many of you are wrong. Plain dhoti shivering is going on out in the open with accusations that someone else (GoI. Italians, Bangled Sikhs) are doing dhoti shivering.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Shiv-ji,
There are multiple issues here:
One is that India will hit back and hit back hard - That is the intent that everyone wants GOI to demonstrate as the democratic representative of Indian public. I can analyze the 2009 election to be a public mandate to hit Pakistan hard by a UPA-lead-govt instead of an NDA-lead-govt to avenge 11/26. But UPA II didn't "perceive it" that way even though it promised the nation to avenge 11/26.
Second point is undermining the threat scenario itself - this is what your posts lead others to. You cannot whitewash 100s of your psychology posts by periodically claiming that India will hit back, without giving any details, whenever others question your posts.
Third question is on the visible lack of intent or preparations by UPA II administration to protect national interests - People claim that it is out of public view, then one should be able to see at least the results. If such preparations as well as consequences can't be made public (this is what MMS-ji said during nuke-deal) then one has to worry about such leaders' mental health.
There are multiple issues here:
One is that India will hit back and hit back hard - That is the intent that everyone wants GOI to demonstrate as the democratic representative of Indian public. I can analyze the 2009 election to be a public mandate to hit Pakistan hard by a UPA-lead-govt instead of an NDA-lead-govt to avenge 11/26. But UPA II didn't "perceive it" that way even though it promised the nation to avenge 11/26.
Second point is undermining the threat scenario itself - this is what your posts lead others to. You cannot whitewash 100s of your psychology posts by periodically claiming that India will hit back, without giving any details, whenever others question your posts.
Third question is on the visible lack of intent or preparations by UPA II administration to protect national interests - People claim that it is out of public view, then one should be able to see at least the results. If such preparations as well as consequences can't be made public (this is what MMS-ji said during nuke-deal) then one has to worry about such leaders' mental health.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
yes, one fear factor expressed not only in this fourm but even from ex- military commanders is the poor status of our troops. The same reason was also stated after Mumbai 26/11for non military action.RamaY wrote: Third question is on the visible lack of intent or preparations by UPA II administration to protect national interests - People claim that it is out of public view, then one should be able to see at least the results. If such preparations as well as consequences can't be made public (this is what MMS-ji said during nuke-deal) then one has to worry about such leaders' mental health.
Shivasankar Menon in his speech raised the same point which Shiv is trying to put forward. He too said that he couldn't see any military benefit in this string of pearls strategy by China. He is a diplomat. But, whatever happening at the field level is contrary to that assertion. I haven't heard so far any military commander expressing similar opinion as that of Menon. If there is one, pls point me to that direction.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Kanson Thats is why I asked Rajaram whther China was a puzzle or a mystery? In a puzzle all the pieces are there and its a matter of fitting them together to get the picture. In a mystery we need to find the pieces.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Well apart from the standard "its 11 PM at all izz well, go to sleep" type of analysis, are there any steps that are expected from GoI towards the growing "peace and co-prosperity sphere" created by the Chinese.
Or will building toilets is all that is needed (not that this Govt is doing that either)
Or will building toilets is all that is needed (not that this Govt is doing that either)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
shiv saar,
the issue is of threshold.
From what I can discern from you posts, I make the following assumptions. Please correct me if I am wrong.
What does not constitute a threshold:
The point is when our fictitious threshold is reached, we would see that we are in serious military disadvantageous position, because we allowed China to expand unchecked.
So what logic says that India would retaliate from a disadvantageous position, when it did not retaliate when it had ample reason and opportunity.
My theory is that even if there is a skirmish between Indian and Chinese Navy, perhaps provoked by the Chinese Navy and the Chinese Navy sinks an Indian ship, there will be loud protests from Delhi, Chinese Ambassador would be ordered to the Office of the Defense Minister, India would stop cooperation with China, and ask for apology. After waiting for 3 months for an apology that never comes, India would send a couple of senior Ministers to Beijing and plead with them to restart normal relations. After that the GoI would tell the Indian Navy to avoid certain waters in IOR and keep away from Chinese ships. To the Indian people, GoI will tell "War is not an option", "Talks must continue", "It was all a misunderstanding in the seas"!
By next naval skirmish in IOR, China would demand an apology from Delhi, and Delhi would willingly give one and admonish the captain of the Indian ship.
That is how the game is played between the bully and the bullssshit.
So if India has to make a stand and claim the IOR as our 'core interest', it has to be now, before the Chinese take it over.
I am really interested to know what is this illusive threshold when 'India would hit back and hit back hard.'
the issue is of threshold.
From what I can discern from you posts, I make the following assumptions. Please correct me if I am wrong.
What does not constitute a threshold:
- China strengthening its military position around India - Nuclear Missiles in Tibet, PLA in PoK
- China supplying Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles and other military hardware
- China virtually occupying an area which till now was only in dispute between Pakistan and India and which India claims on the basis of history and Law (PoK)
- China co-opting the ruling elites in our neighborhood, so that they spread anti-Indian propaganda (Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives), making them immune to any requests or political pressure from India
- China replacing India as the biggest economic and trade partner for other South Asian countries.
- China questioning the status of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, J&K
- China establishing Naval Bases throughout IOR - Gwadar, Sittwe, Marao, Timor, etc.
- China establishing forward bases on the Indo-Myanmarese border under the pretext of securing transport corridor between Sittwe and China
- China having a big Naval presence with ships in IOR.
- China placing missiles that can hit India in those naval bases
- China overrunning Chittagong through the Commercial Port built there
- China continuing or expanding support to Maoist guerrillas in India
- China supporting North-East Indian separatists - Nagas, ULFA, etc.
- China supporting Pakistan's aggressive posture and proxy war in India
The point is when our fictitious threshold is reached, we would see that we are in serious military disadvantageous position, because we allowed China to expand unchecked.
So what logic says that India would retaliate from a disadvantageous position, when it did not retaliate when it had ample reason and opportunity.
My theory is that even if there is a skirmish between Indian and Chinese Navy, perhaps provoked by the Chinese Navy and the Chinese Navy sinks an Indian ship, there will be loud protests from Delhi, Chinese Ambassador would be ordered to the Office of the Defense Minister, India would stop cooperation with China, and ask for apology. After waiting for 3 months for an apology that never comes, India would send a couple of senior Ministers to Beijing and plead with them to restart normal relations. After that the GoI would tell the Indian Navy to avoid certain waters in IOR and keep away from Chinese ships. To the Indian people, GoI will tell "War is not an option", "Talks must continue", "It was all a misunderstanding in the seas"!
By next naval skirmish in IOR, China would demand an apology from Delhi, and Delhi would willingly give one and admonish the captain of the Indian ship.
That is how the game is played between the bully and the bullssshit.
So if India has to make a stand and claim the IOR as our 'core interest', it has to be now, before the Chinese take it over.
I am really interested to know what is this illusive threshold when 'India would hit back and hit back hard.'
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
What Rajesh is advocating is Indian version of Roosevelt corollary of Monroe Doctrine. There is merit in it. We need to become that much capable to carry it through, if need be.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
RajeshA ji,
The accepted wisdom is that GOI lacks the ability (read political will) and foresight to tackle the Chinese and hence, the Chinese will simply walkover us. Add to it the proclivity to grant Chinese the ability to achieve all the scenarios that you've painted. Have you or anyone else tried to game the ability of the Chinese to achieve what has been taken as granted? And secondly, the vulnerability of Chinese and their assets in these ports?
The problem here in our discussions is more than simply the Chinese moves. And it is as follows:
(a) Is the GOI cabable of taking on the Chinese in our backyard and any where else? If the answer is no, then this thread denegrates into a whine fest. Pure and simple. On the contrary, if we consider the GOI can and will tackle the Chinese, then we can enumerate various ways of taking on the Chinese.
(b) The some what mythical ability that we give to Chinese to simply achieve our worst fears. Without any analysis of the problems associated with it. And whether it can come true. Let us for a start also analyse the ability of Chinese to achieve the said scenarios.
Time does not permit me to do a detailed analysis but I'll take one of your posts as an example.
So, this again boils down to GOI and it's ability to tackle Chinese. The problem is not military but political will. Without it, Chinese do not need to build massive infra - they can gain control of SLoC with minimum effort. And we seem to have taken for granted that India is a lost cause. If that was the case, Chinese would not take baby step into Indian Ocean - if we're all so wimps, they simply need to just come over. Niceties be damned.
(b) How does presence of Nuclear missiles in Tibet than in mainland China make a difference? These missiles have been there for good 15+ years and have been moved into Tibet only over last couple of years. Do nuclear tipped 10 ICBMs in main land China somehow constitute lesser threat than 50 Nuclear tipped IRBMs in Tibet? And will 1-2 nuclear IRBMs hitting Indian Soil be lesser damage than 5 or 10? Another thing - Whether Chinese base these IRBM/MRBM in Tibet openly or move them into Tibet prior to or during conflict, does it make any difference to our threat perception? The fact that Chinese have these missiles is good enough to be factored into our security equations - basing in Tibet not with standing.
Similarly, will Chinese not factor into account Indian Agni-X IRBM just because we have not openly based them in NE or North India and there are not google earth images to the effect? Those missiles are a threat in being which both countries need to factor into equation.
(c) Ah! the famous Chinese Anti-Ship BM....this is a classical example of giving the Chinese mythical abilities. Does anyone know any thing about the missile? What is the infra required to support these missiles? And the foot print of this infra? Another thing - as per info available on the net, this AShBM is based on DF-21 IRBM - which itself has a range of 3,000 kms. Why will the Chinese base such long range missile in Indian Ocean where they are seriously suseptible to Indian counter or first strike? Given the range, Chinese can place them in main land and target the enemy ships? Missiles in Central and Western Tibet can tackle the Persian Gulf also.And these are Carrier Killers and IMO, will not be wasted on other ships. After all, DF-21 inventory itself is expected to be in range of 60-80 missiles.
Contrary to taking the Chinese AShBM for granted, any Indian capability to take on the Chinese will some how be put down immediately. Assume there is a stand-off - What is the ability of the IN to neuteralize the Sittwe Port and Chinese Infra? Cannot we take on the Chinese and blow the entire facility of Chinese and PLAN Ships in these waters? Has any one ever though about it?
As for the bases in Skardu and Gilgit, these are within the combat radius of bases in Northern India. And we have strategic depth in entire India as compared to Xinjiang. So, how come the strategic depth is some how more sinister in case of China while ineffective in case of India?
The accepted wisdom is that GOI lacks the ability (read political will) and foresight to tackle the Chinese and hence, the Chinese will simply walkover us. Add to it the proclivity to grant Chinese the ability to achieve all the scenarios that you've painted. Have you or anyone else tried to game the ability of the Chinese to achieve what has been taken as granted? And secondly, the vulnerability of Chinese and their assets in these ports?
The problem here in our discussions is more than simply the Chinese moves. And it is as follows:
(a) Is the GOI cabable of taking on the Chinese in our backyard and any where else? If the answer is no, then this thread denegrates into a whine fest. Pure and simple. On the contrary, if we consider the GOI can and will tackle the Chinese, then we can enumerate various ways of taking on the Chinese.
(b) The some what mythical ability that we give to Chinese to simply achieve our worst fears. Without any analysis of the problems associated with it. And whether it can come true. Let us for a start also analyse the ability of Chinese to achieve the said scenarios.
Time does not permit me to do a detailed analysis but I'll take one of your posts as an example.
Again, the inability of India to take on the Chinese. How about reversing the argument? Can Chinese hit India from these forward bases without retaliation from India? A listening post on Coco Island to keep track of traffic is one thing - a ful fledged Naval Base in Myanmar is another. If they can track Indian Navy movement, so can we, right? If they can hit us, so can we. If they can irritate us, so can we. And mind you, they are in my backyard and not other way. I have more muscle then he has.RajeshA wrote: It is not realistic that India can hit at Chinese bases and infrastructure at will and impunity without a Chinese retaliation, so the threshold of pain/irritation on India can be increased without much thought.
So, this again boils down to GOI and it's ability to tackle Chinese. The problem is not military but political will. Without it, Chinese do not need to build massive infra - they can gain control of SLoC with minimum effort. And we seem to have taken for granted that India is a lost cause. If that was the case, Chinese would not take baby step into Indian Ocean - if we're all so wimps, they simply need to just come over. Niceties be damned.
(a) I will not go into 1st point at this moment - it is one of those points which can be discussed ad infinitum and we'd not reach anywhere.Three factors underline this confidence:
[*] The indecisive and "Peace at all costs" leadership in India's first and last thrust would always be deescalation
[*] North India at the mercy of Nuclear Missiles located in Tibet
[*] Each and every outpost of China, be it Sittwe, Gwadar, Marao (Maldives) would invariably be well guarded and have almost as much strategic depth as any naval base in India, and its Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles would have the Indian Navy constantly in cross-hairs. PoK too would have the strategic depth of Xinjiang and perhaps Chinese Air bases in Gilgit and Skardu.
(b) How does presence of Nuclear missiles in Tibet than in mainland China make a difference? These missiles have been there for good 15+ years and have been moved into Tibet only over last couple of years. Do nuclear tipped 10 ICBMs in main land China somehow constitute lesser threat than 50 Nuclear tipped IRBMs in Tibet? And will 1-2 nuclear IRBMs hitting Indian Soil be lesser damage than 5 or 10? Another thing - Whether Chinese base these IRBM/MRBM in Tibet openly or move them into Tibet prior to or during conflict, does it make any difference to our threat perception? The fact that Chinese have these missiles is good enough to be factored into our security equations - basing in Tibet not with standing.
Similarly, will Chinese not factor into account Indian Agni-X IRBM just because we have not openly based them in NE or North India and there are not google earth images to the effect? Those missiles are a threat in being which both countries need to factor into equation.
(c) Ah! the famous Chinese Anti-Ship BM....this is a classical example of giving the Chinese mythical abilities. Does anyone know any thing about the missile? What is the infra required to support these missiles? And the foot print of this infra? Another thing - as per info available on the net, this AShBM is based on DF-21 IRBM - which itself has a range of 3,000 kms. Why will the Chinese base such long range missile in Indian Ocean where they are seriously suseptible to Indian counter or first strike? Given the range, Chinese can place them in main land and target the enemy ships? Missiles in Central and Western Tibet can tackle the Persian Gulf also.And these are Carrier Killers and IMO, will not be wasted on other ships. After all, DF-21 inventory itself is expected to be in range of 60-80 missiles.
Contrary to taking the Chinese AShBM for granted, any Indian capability to take on the Chinese will some how be put down immediately. Assume there is a stand-off - What is the ability of the IN to neuteralize the Sittwe Port and Chinese Infra? Cannot we take on the Chinese and blow the entire facility of Chinese and PLAN Ships in these waters? Has any one ever though about it?
As for the bases in Skardu and Gilgit, these are within the combat radius of bases in Northern India. And we have strategic depth in entire India as compared to Xinjiang. So, how come the strategic depth is some how more sinister in case of China while ineffective in case of India?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Rohitvats, with all due respect, you are missing the point if you are accusing RajeshA of exaggeration, since he obviously is talking about the worst that can be by his own admission.
Having said that, even if we are talking of less than extreme situation, and no mythical weaponry, with Skardu and Gwadar and what not, the Chinese are multiplying the points from which they can hit us, and progressively moving to areas which remove their previous restrictions, such as high altitude airfields in Tibet can be supplemented with lower altitude airfields.
The Chinese have the numbers (and are adding numbers) to be able to operate from each of these, India OTOH will be hard pressed to fend each new direction of threat. We are not talking of two front war any more, we are talking about a 360* war.
That is the import, we could check it now, if we took Hamnabota, or stop Maldives from renting ports to the Chinese or work with Burma to stop Chittagong. If we cant do it now, when will we do it? (note no one is talking war)
Having said that, even if we are talking of less than extreme situation, and no mythical weaponry, with Skardu and Gwadar and what not, the Chinese are multiplying the points from which they can hit us, and progressively moving to areas which remove their previous restrictions, such as high altitude airfields in Tibet can be supplemented with lower altitude airfields.
The Chinese have the numbers (and are adding numbers) to be able to operate from each of these, India OTOH will be hard pressed to fend each new direction of threat. We are not talking of two front war any more, we are talking about a 360* war.
That is the import, we could check it now, if we took Hamnabota, or stop Maldives from renting ports to the Chinese or work with Burma to stop Chittagong. If we cant do it now, when will we do it? (note no one is talking war)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
rohit, this no-end-in-sight discussion aside, what do you make of this
p.s. the chinese ASBM thing and the fear dance some Indians do around it is the most ridiculous thing I've seen for sometime. now this is a weapon that is vapourware by definition, especially vis-a-vis the IN and yet it is accorded almost fictional capabilities.
>> Each and every outpost of China, be it Sittwe, Gwadar, Marao (Maldives) would invariably be well guarded and have almost as much strategic depth as any naval base in India, and its Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles would have the Indian Navy constantly in cross-hairs. PoK too would have the strategic depth of Xinjiang and perhaps Chinese Air bases in Gilgit and Skardu.
really ? as much strategic depth and as well guarded as IN bases ? with what ? toy ships ? what is the strength of PLAN's capital fleet might I ask ?
these comments can only be made after specifics are pointed out, it's as easy to blow up the shadow of your adversary as it is to diminish your own and vice versa. neither serves any concievable purpose other than talking points.
even w/o the overrunning scenario I've been thinking for sometime if a case can be made of moving EC from kolkata to somewhere in NE or even forming a new command there ?Carl_T wrote:We could establish a unified theatre command in the NE region, one that can operate autonomously even if the Chinese overrun the Siliguri area. It may require a big troop and a/c presence, backed up by a lot of stored fuel, and AAMs/BMs based in various sites.
p.s. the chinese ASBM thing and the fear dance some Indians do around it is the most ridiculous thing I've seen for sometime. now this is a weapon that is vapourware by definition, especially vis-a-vis the IN and yet it is accorded almost fictional capabilities.
>> Each and every outpost of China, be it Sittwe, Gwadar, Marao (Maldives) would invariably be well guarded and have almost as much strategic depth as any naval base in India, and its Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles would have the Indian Navy constantly in cross-hairs. PoK too would have the strategic depth of Xinjiang and perhaps Chinese Air bases in Gilgit and Skardu.
really ? as much strategic depth and as well guarded as IN bases ? with what ? toy ships ? what is the strength of PLAN's capital fleet might I ask ?
these comments can only be made after specifics are pointed out, it's as easy to blow up the shadow of your adversary as it is to diminish your own and vice versa. neither serves any concievable purpose other than talking points.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
sanku ji, hit us with what ? what force can PLAN or PLANAF spare for out of home engagements ?
let's not forget that a 3 ship anti-piracy task force is PLAN's first out of home assignment and that is about the extent of what they can spare. in such sizes any such force will be mincemeat if it comes anywhere near IN's playground and PLAN is not foolish enough to risk it. these numbers are not going to increase by any considerable margin in the future, considering that both PLAN's regional adversaries as well as IN is not sitting idle.
let's not forget that a 3 ship anti-piracy task force is PLAN's first out of home assignment and that is about the extent of what they can spare. in such sizes any such force will be mincemeat if it comes anywhere near IN's playground and PLAN is not foolish enough to risk it. these numbers are not going to increase by any considerable margin in the future, considering that both PLAN's regional adversaries as well as IN is not sitting idle.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Whether China is indulging in "Operation Fortitude" with its PRC "1st Army Group"?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
It is the not the threat scenarios that I have issues with - it is the ease with which they are accepted as given. Has any one done any analysis of the circumstances and dynamics which need to come into play for these threats to mature?Sanku wrote:Rohitvats, with all due respect, you are missing the point if you are accusing RajeshA of exaggeration, since he obviously is talking about the worst that can be by his own admission. <SNIP>
Another point - are these threats going to be suddenly there one fine morning? How about analysis of threats in being and how the same can mature into something more dangerous? Like some timelines and what can be the nature of these threats at each stage of evolution. At least, then we can think of devising strategy to checkmate these progressions at each stage. For example, how long will it take the Sittwe port to become Chinese colony with couple of million hans and 100-200K PLA Troops? How come it is accepted as given? How will the ethnic Burmese react to it? Can it lead to an insurgency situation in these areas? Can we do something about these insurgencies?
Also, what will be the standing of India and it's forces in such a period and political clout?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Rohitvats-ji,
Those threats are a reality yesterday!
Aren't the list of aggressions that RajeshA-ji posted above a reality already? Why don't you outline the true "threshold" that you think PRC should cross before India can start preparing itself?
You, yourself mentioned a 5-8 time frame to assert India's presence in POK. How much lead time India would need to tackle PRC head-on-head?
Look at your post above. First you ask a rhetoric question on the possibility and time it it will take PRC to have 786,000,000 han PLA troops in Sittwe Port. You follow that with a counter strategy option of supporting a Burmese insurgency, which you question by bringing moral and ethical issues at the end of your post. So the best alternative for you (that is what your post comes down to) is to do nothing hoping that PRC will be scared of India.
Is that strategy for you?
Those threats are a reality yesterday!
Aren't the list of aggressions that RajeshA-ji posted above a reality already? Why don't you outline the true "threshold" that you think PRC should cross before India can start preparing itself?
You, yourself mentioned a 5-8 time frame to assert India's presence in POK. How much lead time India would need to tackle PRC head-on-head?
Look at your post above. First you ask a rhetoric question on the possibility and time it it will take PRC to have 786,000,000 han PLA troops in Sittwe Port. You follow that with a counter strategy option of supporting a Burmese insurgency, which you question by bringing moral and ethical issues at the end of your post. So the best alternative for you (that is what your post comes down to) is to do nothing hoping that PRC will be scared of India.
Is that strategy for you?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
The latest issue of the magazine that shall not be named on BRF presents a snippet that Services have asked for move towards Theater Commands to achieve higher level of inter-service harmony.Rahul M wrote:rohit, this no-end-in-sight discussion aside, what do you make of this
even w/o the overrunning scenario I've been thinking for sometime if a case can be made of moving EC from kolkata to somewhere in NE or even forming a new command there ?Carl_T wrote:We could establish a unified theatre command in the NE region, one that can operate autonomously even if the Chinese overrun the Siliguri area. It may require a big troop and a/c presence, backed up by a lot of stored fuel, and AAMs/BMs based in various sites.
<SNIP>
As for the EC move to somewhere in NE, that is something which can been aired by very many defence personnel but I don't know why it has not happened. Shillong with Eastern Air Command or Guwahati can be ideal choice for this. As for the troops and logistical support to be based in NE to cater to any contigency, afaik, that is exactly the case. The Ia would have gamed such a situation and accordingly placed supplies in these areas for a certain period of conflict.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Indian leaders have been making the same strategic mistakes that we are famous for.Imagine Indian Army doing something like that!!! This is the kind of Army India is up to - unscrupulous!
in 1000 A.D. when 25% of the world trade was India and when Europe was still living in Dark Ages., our Rajputana
Armies strategic behaviour was this.
Startup:
Raja Pithora makes strategic blunder by abducting Sanyogita his ally Jaichand's daughter. Jaichand successfully
gathers some allies to oppose Raja Prithviraj Chauhan. In current context, Srilanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Burma
are out allies who are just like Jaichands, sitting on the fence as long as we are good with them.
Meanwhile Ghori attacks again.
After all diplomacy is over battle lines are drawn again in 1192 at Tarain now
called Taravri in (Currently Karnal District, Haryana). Both armies are facing each other.
Code of War: At this point enemy (Ghori) is familiar with India's code of war which is as follows, just like China.
Brahmin cooks woke up at 3:00 AM before prayers they travel to a stream closeby to bathe, etc and to get water
for Rajputana army food. Ghori already know about this and thus had killed cows on the stream as far up as Brahmins can see.,
Rajputana Armies will have to fight hungry as our honor does not let us cook the food with cow blood water., it is better
to die than cook/drink water laced with cow blood. Just like now modern day! our armies are so GOOD that they won't even touch these drug
dealers even if these drug dealers are selling drugs to their own kids. Our leaders won't touch these Chighoris until they
will be almost sitting at Gurgaon/Panipat/Noida dealing with Raja of Pataudi.
So Rajputana armies get ready and march to battle field before sunrise (as per Desi war code) and then wait till the first
light of sun comes on (Remember We are Surya Vanshi)., then Bugle is sounded and war starts and proceeds until sunset.
So!! Ghori decides to attack before sunrise when Rajputs are sleeping!! what to do!! Even if this is against India War Ethic.
We must loose.
Just like now!! Chighoris are attacking day and night while leaders in power are sleeping.
and this strategic blunders have been repeated ad nauseam ever since!!
If china is building ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan., our thinking is that It is okay since China
is spending out of their pocket let our brothers in Lanka, Banga and Panga prosper a little bit. We are so close
to these that sooner or later they will have to fear us and derail this.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Rohit, Rahul,
RamaY's post has speaks for me, a lot has already happened and we cant deny it, if we do nothing there is no reason to assume that when Gwadar and CT are ready, Chinese will also have ships to man it.
We are talking for 20-30 years time line. Can something happen in meantime to spoil their party? Heck yes, I can also make 1000 of "what can go wrong" predictions, but there are two critical things
1) They are proactive and doing things, repeatedly, that approach (for any country) is bound to succeed a certain number of times out of total efforts
2) We are (to all available information) doing next to nothing (assuming being in denial is not really an action)
Reminds me of Prithvi Raj and the Turuksha's, on paper, he had all the reasons to win, indeed he did many times, but ultimately the Turks had the advantage of being the ones to push and finally won.
That is the bigger point. In the end initiative wins.
RamaY's post has speaks for me, a lot has already happened and we cant deny it, if we do nothing there is no reason to assume that when Gwadar and CT are ready, Chinese will also have ships to man it.
We are talking for 20-30 years time line. Can something happen in meantime to spoil their party? Heck yes, I can also make 1000 of "what can go wrong" predictions, but there are two critical things
1) They are proactive and doing things, repeatedly, that approach (for any country) is bound to succeed a certain number of times out of total efforts
2) We are (to all available information) doing next to nothing (assuming being in denial is not really an action)
Reminds me of Prithvi Raj and the Turuksha's, on paper, he had all the reasons to win, indeed he did many times, but ultimately the Turks had the advantage of being the ones to push and finally won.
That is the bigger point. In the end initiative wins.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
i wonder what more it would take for there to be "effective military deterrence" in Ladakh?RajeshA wrote: India's defense postures in Ladakh, however, cannot be assessed as forcefully strong in terms of imposing dissuasion or generating "effective military deterrence" on China and Pakistan not to entertain any aggressive designs against the Ladakh Sector.
Having just recently traveled there, I noticed that there was an indian military presence just about everywhere in Ladakh (btw, the army guys were very hospitable everywhere I saw them, especially those that I spoke with in Gurdwara Pathar Sahib!). Crudely put, Ladakh was basically one un-passable mountain range after the other, followed by a valley which had a military base and formidable indian army presence, followed by another set of un-passable mountains, etc.... If the chinese are just going through roll through Ladakh, I wonder how they would do it? Would those soldiers in all those bases I saw just be sitting around with their thumbs up their a-holes while the chinese/pakistani troops just roll through?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
sanku ji, my comment was not based upon any 'hope' that PRC will derail but based on what they have right now and the way they are modernising. pardon me for saying so but I do keep and eye on PLA's capabilities and the scenarios being painted are alarmist to the verge of being ridiculous.
if you think I'm wrong why don't you present your figures for what you think PLAN's force levels will be like in 20-30 years ? just assuming that someone has a ferrari because he is negotiating for garage space is not quite logical.
@ ramay sahab,
>> Those threats are a reality yesterday!
Aren't the list of aggressions that RajeshA-ji posted above a reality already?
simply put, they are not. bangladesh has as much capability of overtly attacking India as I've of becoming the president of US. sittwe, gwadar are a loooong way away from being a chinese military threat to India, if they ever will be and the ASBM is vapourware that is propped up by USN and pentagon for their own purposes. we would be stupid indeed to fall for the results of US' internal machinations that have no bearing on us.
just get hold of Adm Mehta's statements on it and you will get the idea.
if you think I'm wrong why don't you present your figures for what you think PLAN's force levels will be like in 20-30 years ? just assuming that someone has a ferrari because he is negotiating for garage space is not quite logical.
@ ramay sahab,
>> Those threats are a reality yesterday!
Aren't the list of aggressions that RajeshA-ji posted above a reality already?
simply put, they are not. bangladesh has as much capability of overtly attacking India as I've of becoming the president of US. sittwe, gwadar are a loooong way away from being a chinese military threat to India, if they ever will be and the ASBM is vapourware that is propped up by USN and pentagon for their own purposes. we would be stupid indeed to fall for the results of US' internal machinations that have no bearing on us.
just get hold of Adm Mehta's statements on it and you will get the idea.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Your interpretation of my post is 180 degrees opposite to what I have said.RamaY wrote:Rohitvats-ji,
Those threats are a reality yesterday!
Aren't the list of aggressions that RajeshA-ji posted above a reality already? Why don't you outline the true "threshold" that you think PRC should cross before India can start preparing itself?
You, yourself mentioned a 5-8 time frame to assert India's presence in POK. How much lead time India would need to tackle PRC head-on-head?
Look at your post above. First you ask a rhetoric question on the possibility and time it it will take PRC to have 786,000,000 han PLA troops in Sittwe Port. You follow that with a counter strategy option of supporting a Burmese insurgency, which you question by bringing moral and ethical issues at the end of your post. So the best alternative for you (that is what your post comes down to) is to do nothing hoping that PRC will be scared of India.
Is that strategy for you?
First things first, the last line of my post was in reference to numerical strength of Indian Armed Forces and political clout of India. I don't have any moral hang-ups when it comes to India - what is good for India and it's people needs to be done. Morality be damned.
Secondly, India does not need thresholds to arm itself or any Chinese hanky-panky. I agree in toto with what Kayani said about India - "We go by capability and not intentions". That is why I said that those IRBMs became threat the day they were inducted-basing them in Tibet is immaterial. Indian needs 10-11 Mountain Divisions and couple of Armored and Mechanized Divisions as of yesterday.
The other thing is about grading Indian response as the threat emerges and keeping one step ahead of it. What is the development timeline from Chinese constructing port on Sittwe and it evolving into Chinese territory? And what all the Chinese will need to acheive this? And what all can go wrong? Or made to go wrong?
Rather than taking or giving the maximalist position to the Chinese and assuming that it will happen - please see what can happen from present to future. And please put down the threat in as clear a manner based on some serious research and not "yeh ho jayega or woh ho jayega". For example, suppose Sittwe emerges as han colony in next 10-years. What will be the force level of PLAN in that period? What will be our force level? Will be have or can we have a SSGN armed with 40-50 LACM and obliterate the Chinese port and infra? Why always assume things as given for Chinese and not for us?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
It is a long term beach head. After 2025 all these will wither away since PRC will decline in population.Rahul M wrote: sittwe, gwadar are a loooong way away from being a chinese military threat to India, if they ever will be
Beach head can be developed to create a hostile population against India. Indian population will become the target of all these countries. That is the main intention.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
rohitvats ji,
your input was seriously needed in this thread, where strategical doctrines and military strength interweave into each other.
Just to let you know where I am coming from, I am basically conducting some psyops here. One needed many elephant trumpets and drums to awaken Kumbhkaran. I am using paranoia on fellow Indians.
So even as I am keeping myself as objective as possible, and trying to structure my arguments as logically as possible, once in a while some rhetoric does creep in. In the post you responded to there was 10% more rhetoric than what I consider easily defensible. So bear with me. Having said that, I'll try to answer.
1) We are talking about taking on China in our backyard, not in China's backyard. In any battle whereas China's losses would be a few bases far away from their mainland, our losses would indeed be on our mainland. This alone should make it an unequal context.
2) I am sure the Indian Military is capable of taking on the Chinese Navy in IOR right now, when their naval infrastructure in IOR has not come up, or when their naval ships do not look that threatening, from features PoV.
3) Once all their naval infrastructure is there, and they have built the industrial, logistic, and military corridors from Sittwe back to Yunnan, when they have a naval base in Marao, when they have Gwadar to control Oil supplies from the Gulf, then I presume, Indian Navy would be fighting a far more sturdier foe.
4) GoI does not instill me with confidence right now, simply because they are neither publicly acknowledging the Chinese danger and their intrusions into South Asia, nor have they undertaken any action to neutralize the Chinese march into IOR. Their plans are proceeding without any hindrance.
5) Once Chinese Naval Presence in IOR is established, my confidence in GoI would have reached its nader. Some expression to that nader, I have given in a previous post.
6) This is not a whine thread. That would exactly the opposite of the intention.
This mythical ability of the Chinese I prescribe to mostly their sense of their nationhood, their leadership, and their ambitions. I do not believe for a moment that they are in any way superior or that they are invincible, but they allow themselves freedom to pursue their goals unscrupulously where as others, in this case, India has bound itself in layers and layers of considerations, into a straitjacket.
So they have thousand chinks in their armor but they have neutralized the ability or the willingness of the others to exploit them. That is their mythical ability, not their armor.
Also China plans on being a superpower. Putting up massive infrastructure is useful because it becomes a self-supporting outpost, with sufficient strategic depth just in the case of conflict. Moreover Oil & Gas Terminals, commercial Cargo-handling ports, Pipelines, Industrial and Logistics Corridors, Chinese service providers, Chinese populations in these outposts, all go to consolidating Chinese presence. None of it is negative, so why not aim high. Powell doctrine was also to go in with overwhelming force.
Secondly the remote positions of these IRBMs allow a bigger more expansive structure to be built around them to house them, far away from prying eyes. The structure may allow a bigger more strengthened underground complex for housing those missiles, making it harder for Indian attacks to penetrate the structures.
Thirdly, as these missiles are much closer to India, their flight time would also be much shorter, giving Indians much less time to prepare ourselves for the impact or take counter measures with our air defenses.
Conducting a war over Tibet where there is Tibetan population may also not appeal to India.
I am not saying the Chinese do not need to factor in Agni IRBMs, but as far as I know, their reach is as yet not such that they can reach the East Coast of China, especially if they are not located in India N-E.
Having said that the deployment of IRBMs in Tibet is a sharp reminder to Indian Leadership, that they are constantly under threat, so they should think very carefully when they wish to escalate things.
However I maintain that the Chinese should have as little business in IOR as we have in the Pacific. India does not have any Naval Bases in the Pacific and neither should we allow Chinese Naval Bases in our backyard.
It is a question of not allowing them in, claiming our 'core rights' in the area. But we are not doing that, so any war between Chinese and Indian Navy in IOR would do Indian Mainland more harm than Chinese Mainland. Chinese losses would in bases which are not even part of China.
At the end of the post, I feel you already know what I have dished out. My effort was just to defend the post I made, which you took as an example. I am not sure whether I have really added much in this post that requires responding to.
your input was seriously needed in this thread, where strategical doctrines and military strength interweave into each other.
Just to let you know where I am coming from, I am basically conducting some psyops here. One needed many elephant trumpets and drums to awaken Kumbhkaran. I am using paranoia on fellow Indians.
So even as I am keeping myself as objective as possible, and trying to structure my arguments as logically as possible, once in a while some rhetoric does creep in. In the post you responded to there was 10% more rhetoric than what I consider easily defensible. So bear with me. Having said that, I'll try to answer.
A couple of points here.rohitvats wrote:(a) Is the GOI cabable of taking on the Chinese in our backyard and any where else? If the answer is no, then this thread denegrates into a whine fest. Pure and simple. On the contrary, if we consider the GOI can and will tackle the Chinese, then we can enumerate various ways of taking on the Chinese.
1) We are talking about taking on China in our backyard, not in China's backyard. In any battle whereas China's losses would be a few bases far away from their mainland, our losses would indeed be on our mainland. This alone should make it an unequal context.
2) I am sure the Indian Military is capable of taking on the Chinese Navy in IOR right now, when their naval infrastructure in IOR has not come up, or when their naval ships do not look that threatening, from features PoV.
3) Once all their naval infrastructure is there, and they have built the industrial, logistic, and military corridors from Sittwe back to Yunnan, when they have a naval base in Marao, when they have Gwadar to control Oil supplies from the Gulf, then I presume, Indian Navy would be fighting a far more sturdier foe.
4) GoI does not instill me with confidence right now, simply because they are neither publicly acknowledging the Chinese danger and their intrusions into South Asia, nor have they undertaken any action to neutralize the Chinese march into IOR. Their plans are proceeding without any hindrance.
5) Once Chinese Naval Presence in IOR is established, my confidence in GoI would have reached its nader. Some expression to that nader, I have given in a previous post.
6) This is not a whine thread. That would exactly the opposite of the intention.
Yes I do believe in the mythical ability of the Chinese to achieve what they want, and I also believe that what they want corresponds exactly to my worst fears. Of course they can go beyond them as well.rohitvats wrote:(b) The some what mythical ability that we give to Chinese to simply achieve our worst fears. Without any analysis of the problems associated with it. And whether it can come true. Let us for a start also analyse the ability of Chinese to achieve the said scenarios.
This mythical ability of the Chinese I prescribe to mostly their sense of their nationhood, their leadership, and their ambitions. I do not believe for a moment that they are in any way superior or that they are invincible, but they allow themselves freedom to pursue their goals unscrupulously where as others, in this case, India has bound itself in layers and layers of considerations, into a straitjacket.
So they have thousand chinks in their armor but they have neutralized the ability or the willingness of the others to exploit them. That is their mythical ability, not their armor.
Where are the Indians hitting the Chinese? Are we hitting them in Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai?rohitvats wrote:Again, the inability of India to take on the Chinese. How about reversing the argument? Can Chinese hit India from these forward bases without retaliation from India? A listening post on Coco Island to keep track of traffic is one thing - a ful fledged Naval Base in Myanmar is another. If they can track Indian Navy movement, so can we, right? If they can hit us, so can we. If they can irritate us, so can we.RajeshA wrote: It is not realistic that India can hit at Chinese bases and infrastructure at will and impunity without a Chinese retaliation, so the threshold of pain/irritation on India can be increased without much thought.
That has to be qualified by using a time frame. It may sound blasphemous, but my contention is that they can have almost just as big a naval presence as the Indians in the IOR, in say 20 years. As it is the future, and I don't have the naval ship building and acquisition plans of the two navies in front of me, I'm just going to let this statement hang in the air, without proving it. What I know, is that they are investing significant amounts of money in their naval modernization.rohitvats wrote:And mind you, they are in my backyard and not other way. I have more muscle then he has.
Their abilities may be 'mythical' according to me, but they are not 'magical'. Everything takes time. Rome was not built in one day. I still think they have been extremely quick to enter agreements with various regimes in IOR to set up bases. Slow introduction of Chinese naval forces have the advantage that others do not get excited all of a sudden. Giving others time to prepare for Chinese domination is a far more recommended way, than a sudden upsurge.rohitvats wrote:So, this again boils down to GOI and it's ability to tackle Chinese. The problem is not military but political will. Without it, Chinese do not need to build massive infra - they can gain control of SLoC with minimum effort. And we seem to have taken for granted that India is a lost cause. If that was the case, Chinese would not take baby step into Indian Ocean - if we're all so wimps, they simply need to just come over. Niceties be damned.
Also China plans on being a superpower. Putting up massive infrastructure is useful because it becomes a self-supporting outpost, with sufficient strategic depth just in the case of conflict. Moreover Oil & Gas Terminals, commercial Cargo-handling ports, Pipelines, Industrial and Logistics Corridors, Chinese service providers, Chinese populations in these outposts, all go to consolidating Chinese presence. None of it is negative, so why not aim high. Powell doctrine was also to go in with overwhelming force.
Well for one thing, if India considers neutralizing these threats from IRBMs, we would be pounding their positions in Tibet, which are far away from Chinese population centers, so the losses are minimized.rohitvats wrote:(b) How does presence of Nuclear missiles in Tibet than in mainland China make a difference? These missiles have been there for good 15+ years and have been moved into Tibet only over last couple of years. Do nuclear tipped 10 ICBMs in main land China somehow constitute lesser threat than 50 Nuclear tipped IRBMs in Tibet? And will 1-2 nuclear IRBMs hitting Indian Soil be lesser damage than 5 or 10? Another thing - Whether Chinese base these IRBM/MRBM in Tibet openly or move them into Tibet prior to or during conflict, does it make any difference to our threat perception? The fact that Chinese have these missiles is good enough to be factored into our security equations - basing in Tibet not with standing.
Similarly, will Chinese not factor into account Indian Agni-X IRBM just because we have not openly based them in NE or North India and there are not google earth images to the effect? Those missiles are a threat in being which both countries need to factor into equation.
Secondly the remote positions of these IRBMs allow a bigger more expansive structure to be built around them to house them, far away from prying eyes. The structure may allow a bigger more strengthened underground complex for housing those missiles, making it harder for Indian attacks to penetrate the structures.
Thirdly, as these missiles are much closer to India, their flight time would also be much shorter, giving Indians much less time to prepare ourselves for the impact or take counter measures with our air defenses.
Conducting a war over Tibet where there is Tibetan population may also not appeal to India.
I am not saying the Chinese do not need to factor in Agni IRBMs, but as far as I know, their reach is as yet not such that they can reach the East Coast of China, especially if they are not located in India N-E.
Having said that the deployment of IRBMs in Tibet is a sharp reminder to Indian Leadership, that they are constantly under threat, so they should think very carefully when they wish to escalate things.
I am grateful to you for putting the issue of AShBM in perspective.rohitvats wrote:(c) Ah! the famous Chinese Anti-Ship BM....this is a classical example of giving the Chinese mythical abilities. Does anyone know any thing about the missile? What is the infra required to support these missiles? And the foot print of this infra? Another thing - as per info available on the net, this AShBM is based on DF-21 IRBM - which itself has a range of 3,000 kms. Why will the Chinese base such long range missile in Indian Ocean where they are seriously suseptible to Indian counter or first strike? Given the range, Chinese can place them in main land and target the enemy ships? Missiles in Central and Western Tibet can tackle the Persian Gulf also.And these are Carrier Killers and IMO, will not be wasted on other ships. After all, DF-21 inventory itself is expected to be in range of 60-80 missiles.
Contrary to taking the Chinese AShBM for granted, any Indian capability to take on the Chinese will some how be put down immediately. Assume there is a stand-off - What is the ability of the IN to neuteralize the Sittwe Port and Chinese Infra? Cannot we take on the Chinese and blow the entire facility of Chinese and PLAN Ships in these waters? Has any one ever though about it?
As for the bases in Skardu and Gilgit, these are within the combat radius of bases in Northern India. And we have strategic depth in entire India as compared to Xinjiang. So, how come the strategic depth is some how more sinister in case of China while ineffective in case of India?
However I maintain that the Chinese should have as little business in IOR as we have in the Pacific. India does not have any Naval Bases in the Pacific and neither should we allow Chinese Naval Bases in our backyard.
It is a question of not allowing them in, claiming our 'core rights' in the area. But we are not doing that, so any war between Chinese and Indian Navy in IOR would do Indian Mainland more harm than Chinese Mainland. Chinese losses would in bases which are not even part of China.
At the end of the post, I feel you already know what I have dished out. My effort was just to defend the post I made, which you took as an example. I am not sure whether I have really added much in this post that requires responding to.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
I will give you benefit of doubt on that.rohitvats wrote: Your interpretation of my post is 180 degrees opposite to what I have said.
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Rather than taking or giving the maximalist position to the Chinese and assuming that it will happen. Why always assume things as given for Chinese and not for us?
Don't you think that is what you should do when it comes to your adversary?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat
Interesting discussion. Many thanks to all participants. Peace.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
You don't need to do any such thing. I was very clear in what I said and meant and only explained the same for your benefit.RamaY wrote:
I will give you benefit of doubt on that.
Don't you think that is what you should do when it comes to your adversary?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat
RajeshA wrote:
What does not constitute a threshold:I presume all this may be considered aggressive, but would not constitute crossing of a threshold. So India would have allowed China to place its chess pieces all over South Asia without any reaction.
- China strengthening its military position around India - Nuclear Missiles in Tibet, PLA in PoK
- China supplying Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles and other military hardware
- China virtually occupying an area which till now was only in dispute between Pakistan and India and which India claims on the basis of history and Law (PoK)
- China co-opting the ruling elites in our neighborhood, so that they spread anti-Indian propaganda (Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives), making them immune to any requests or political pressure from India
- China replacing India as the biggest economic and trade partner for other South Asian countries.
- China questioning the status of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, J&K
- China establishing Naval Bases throughout IOR - Gwadar, Sittwe, Marao, Timor, etc.
- China establishing forward bases on the Indo-Myanmarese border under the pretext of securing transport corridor between Sittwe and China
- China having a big Naval presence with ships in IOR.
- China placing missiles that can hit India in those naval bases
- China overrunning Chittagong through the Commercial Port built there
- China continuing or expanding support to Maoist guerrillas in India
- China supporting North-East Indian separatists - Nagas, ULFA, etc.
- China supporting Pakistan's aggressive posture and proxy war in India
India is positioning missiles in Arunachal Pradesh aimed at North Arunachal (Tibet) and cities like Chengdu and strengthening its military position. Chini Missiles don't have to be in Tibet. China can hit us from Beijing - why is everyone so scared of missiles in Tibet? Danger from missiles in Tibet is like saying man without underwear is more dangerous than man with underwear. Bogey.China strengthening its military position around India - Nuclear Missiles in Tibet, PLA in PoK
So is the US. This is an old story. India is prepared for a 2 front war. There is a therad fro that in which I have stated my views.China supplying Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles and other military hardware
"Virtually occupying?" Er what's that? Please show me some images and maps of thee extent of "occupation? Don't show me a New York times article.China virtually occupying an area which till now was only in dispute between Pakistan and India and which India claims on the basis of history and Law (PoK)
You are welcome to believe this. Your god is your god. "immune" etc is balderdash. Needless Yindoo dhoti shiveringChina co-opting the ruling elites in our neighborhood, so that they spread anti-Indian propaganda (Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives), making them immune to any requests or political pressure from India
You mean with Nepal, Pakistan and Maldives! Wow. Are you suggesting this is a threshold for war? Saar India has a negative trade balance with China and more than one person on here says we should make that trade balance even worse for India by not exporting the little we have to export to China. With this kind of Chankianism dhoti shivering is the correct reaction.China replacing India as the biggest economic and trade partner for other South Asian countries.
LOL Questioning the status? So what? Anyone can question the status. Yoohoo. Come and get it! I am questiong Anjelina Jolie's accession to Brad Pitt.China questioning the status of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, J&K
Where are the logistics lines to keep the Chinese prepared? India controls that. Some of these bases are equal equal with India's base in Tajikistan.China establishing Naval Bases throughout IOR - Gwadar, Sittwe, Marao, Timor, etc.
India establishing naval and air bases in South India to control sea lanes in the Indian OceanChina establishing forward bases on the Indo-Myanmarese border under the pretext of securing transport corridor between Sittwe and China
Because they are scared. they have no other go. All the Chings missiles and all the Chings men will not help get oil to China if the lanes are blockedChina having a big Naval presence with ships in IOR
Bogey dhoti shiver alarm. China can hit India more easily from China They don't need to ship missile to places that are within hitting range of Indian military.China placing missiles that can hit India in those naval bases
Chinese dams in Tibet will soon flood Chittagong during rains, Self goal. They can have Chittagong or the dams. Either way we get the Bangladeshis.China overrunning Chittagong through the Commercial Port built there
India continuing to improve the lot of Indian so China will not have it as easy as India has allowed. India maintains a huge Tibetan communityChina continuing or expanding support to Maoist guerrillas in India
See above. China taking advantage of Indiots. Making war with China is not a substitute for good governance.China supporting North-East Indian separatists - Nagas, ULFA, etc.
This is a repeat of an earlier post to fluff up the listChina supporting Pakistan's aggressive posture and proxy war in India