Waging war for geopolitical gains

[Pratyush]

The question is what is the gain the adversary is seeking. If it is to slap India down, then the enemy must suffer a broken nose and be missing half his teeth at the end of the game. Else we have given the enemy significant bragging rights. Detrimental to the long term Indian interests.

If the war is limited then it must be turned into another Kargil for the enemy. ie even though we are fighting on Indian land. The enemy is not able to claim even a modicum of success.

Neglecting it like natural disaster will be bad.

IOW, maintain escalation dominance and hammer him back, ignore his call for ceasefire if its acceptance is contrary to Indian interests. Keep on fighting till such time our interests are met or the strategic object of the enemy is completely frustrated. Which ever occurs first.

JMT

PS :- it is exactly why is said that the enemy may not necessarily cooperate with Indian game plan.

[abhischekcc]

I do not believe in short sharp wars, because they do not achieve anything. 1962 was effective because the dragon captured a lot of our territory. Kargil was not SSW. Nor are terror attacks SSW, because you have to consider them all together.

---------
Pratyush, the danger of excalation always exists, but these things need to be managed. 1971 could have easily excalated to annihilation of W.pakistan, but it did not.

---------
It does not matter how Naxalism started or what its character is - they will only be defeated when we put more men on ground. And the fact remains true that free-up of military from western border will help us meet all other challenges better. So, that geo-olitical benefit is assured.

[Lalmohan]

shooting your own citizens is unlikely to be a winning long term strategy

[abhischekcc]

I was talking of shooting pakistani citizens.

Do we think of pakistanis as something who are essentially Indian? Or do we think of them as something that is essentially non-Indian? That is the test of Indian identity.

[Lalmohan]

i was talking about naxals

[shiv]

The question is what is the gain the adversary is seeking. If it is to slap India down, then the enemy must suffer a broken nose and be missing half his teeth at the end of the game. Else we have given the enemy significant bragging rights. Detrimental to the long term Indian interests.

If the war is limited then it must be turned into another Kargil for the enemy. ie even though we are fighting on Indian land. The enemy is not able to claim even a modicum of success.

Neglecting it like natural disaster will be bad.

IOW, maintain escalation dominance and hammer him back, ignore his call for ceasefire if its acceptance is contrary to Indian interests. Keep on fighting till such time our interests are met or the strategic object of the enemy is completely frustrated. Which ever occurs first.

JMT

PS :- it is exactly why is said that the enemy may not necessarily cooperate with Indian game plan.

Fine. I agree. Now let me revert back to where we started. If India starts what is supposed to be a "short sharp war" and the enemy does not cooperate - then what?

In fact a lot of wars have been started by others in this way. Both 1965 and Kargil were started by Pakistan like this. Afghanistan and Iraq were both like this. I suspect that Vietnam too started like this. Also the Argentinian reoccupation of the Falklands. And Saddam taking Kuwait.

That is why I made the post linked below on page 1 of this thread.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 57#p962957

The ease with which a nation starts war (whose end point is unpredictable because the adversary will not cooperate) depends on the factors I listed in that post - resources, expendable lives and political accountability.

China in fact has been very clever. It started all its wars when lives were expendable and there was no political accountability. Right now China has resources, but expendable lives may be less easily available. I am not sure of how much political accountability China has- not a lot I'm guessing - but China is most likely IMO to start a war that is short and sharp and designed to give instant geopolitical gain against an adversary who is least likely to make it a prolonged war. Of course the US too tried exactly the same thing against various nations and succeeded in some. Panama, Bosnia and Libya were successes. Afghanistan and Iraq part failure - but the US had the clout to carry things through.

The lesson seems to be that one needs to choose one's adversary and the right time. IMO China is sure to do that.

In the Indian context - when is China most likely to see India as in a weak position and not likely to be able to hit back with vigor? One guess is that when India is embroiled in a hot war with Pakistan. So one can link (in theory) the possibility of Chinese aggression with an India-Pakistan war.

This means several things:

• 1.India must prepare for a two front war
  2.China will do everything it can to support Pakistan to fight India
  3.India must do everything it can to bring Pakistan down without getting into debilitating conflict. India's anti Pakistan stance has to be visceral and with no quarter given - with an intent to make Pakistan suffer unless they choose to bandwagon with India
  4. India must do everything possible to threaten Chinese lines of communication and befriend China's foes
  5. India must probe and needle China if China gets busy in a spat or conflict in the far east.

The possibilities for "a short sharp war" in my view do not exist for India now - except for a retaliatory strike on Pakistan after a terrorist attack.

[Lalmohan]

war for the occupation of territory in the old model is also no longer feasible
at the least you need a proxy to 'hold territory for you'
china is unlikely to want to hold any territory of India's that does not directly facilitate its hold on Tibet or the strategic road and rail links... i am sure we can identify what these are...
1. aksai chin
2. tawang
3. ???

pakistan will remain rabid enough to want to hold territory, which will be their downfall even before they have fired a shot

[Pratyush]

The possibilities for "a short sharp war" in my view do not exist for India now - except for a retaliatory strike on Pakistan after a terrorist attack.

Shiv,

Even in that case I really don't belive that the TSP will play by our rule book, this may be the reason why it has not been punished by India inspite of all the outrages comitted by it.

[brihaspati]

Since we are considering hypothesis about why India appears to have been reluctant to push for "waging wars" for geo-political gains except partially in '71, maybe we should not rule out the possibility that sections of Indian regimes have seen preservation of a distinct and separate Pak as necessary for various reasons - both internal as well as external.

Even if some of those external reasons change, the internal reasons may not change as easily and hence as long as such thinking persists, there will be no effective steps undertaken to destroy Pak militarily and politically as an independent entity.

Possible perceptions
(1) Muslims are "aliens" in the subcontinent as people [not their ideology which has "useful" memes] and hence regions where they are concentrated more - should be kept "out" - kind of a holding pen or quarantine
(2) Any move against Pak may ignite Islamist passion in IM against existing regime.
(3) Pak as an independent entity provides an existential enemy which can be highlighted to diffuse internal dissent going out of control.
(4) Pak as an independent entity provides a sword that can be dangled as a threat on the non-muslim inside India, if non-Muslims do not support the existing regime.
(5) Destruction of Pak at Indian hands will necessitate dealing with the aftermath and the remnant territory and populations. Absorption is abhorrent if that means accepting or allowing more Muslims inside. Or fear that unified Islmaics may not prove as amenable in electoral politics and prove hostile or strike out on their own, while such behaviour will alienate the non-muslim also.

[Pulikeshi]

Just curious - what other reasons are wars waged for other than geopolitical gains?
Are there really any true ideological or other kinds of wars without geopolitical gains?

Concerning the present state of India - Does it have Mauryan or Gupta vibe?
Is it similar to the Mughal or British India? Or a combination thereof?
History since 1947 indicates that all wars that India has fought has been due to compulsion.
If there was a short way to describe Indian strategy it would be Defensive realism

[Ashoka]

Am I the only one who believes that keeping safe distance form China serves well for India's long term interests? I mean - keeping safe distance mutually - assuming they do the same. Here is why I believe that -

By all practical means, PRC is already the Asian giant which they dreamed of. That may be a bitter pill to swallow for us, but in reality they do beat us comfortably on almost every front. With the no 2 Asian competitor, India, hardly giving any tough fight, I am sure PRC is going to dream bigger & eye for that no 1 status in the world by beating US. I wouldn't be surprised if PRC has started to move in that direction strategically. Young generation of US & China have been taught that the other is their enemy. There is bound to be a big bang between those two one fine day fighting for that no 1 spot.

Now - when PRC starts to do that, they have much more to gain by not having any strategic confrontations with India, rather than having them. When they are on that world quest any day they will prefer a big neighbor who keeps safe distance from them rather than a hostile one. They will not have any considerable gains by confronting India, but will have much to lose considering India has that Tibetan ace. If I were a Chinese president, I would like to forget about India & not talk about it anymore in my strategic meetings. Because I will have a much bigger fish to fry in the form of US.

For PRC that means - letting go of their TSP dog. And I don't think that is too difficult - PRC have already milked them enough & there is just nothing more to milk. That is as good as Kashmir resolved for India. Sadly, for India it may mean that Tibet will have to take a back seat. I personally absolutely hate that, I just can not bear Tibet being part of PRC. But that is what is going to happen considering the way things are going.

I think it is India's best bet to keep PRC away at safe distance with mutual agreement, wait for Sino US big bang & continue to grow at 10% till that time. TSP will break within no time like a castle of cards if we can manage to take away PRC from them.

[shiv]

The possibilities for "a short sharp war" in my view do not exist for India now - except for a retaliatory strike on Pakistan after a terrorist attack.

Even in that case I really don't belive that the TSP will play by our rule book, this may be the reason why it has not been punished by India inspite of all the outrages comitted by it.

Fair enough. There is no way in which I can argue and say "No you are wrong". But assuming that you are right gives a kind of "baseline" or background hypothesis on which I would like to look at the leeway that India may have to initiate some hostilities.

I have earlier accused Pakistan of the Kargil intrusions. But India earlier successfully conducted an occupation of the Siachen region and held on. So openings are available. I don't think there is a thick red line that demarcates feasible action that does not attract a response from that which is not feasible. Timing is vital. The timing of military action "to send a signal" or "punish" can be selected with the caveat that opportunities maybe few and far between and not necessarily ideal. But we have to make a comprehensive list of "trespasses" that will aggravate an adversary and leave him angry and cursing but helpless and wait for opportunities to do that.

[shiv]

Just curious - what other reasons are wars waged for other than geopolitical gains?
Are there really any true ideological or other kinds of wars without geopolitical gains?

Like my post on page 1 - most wars have been for loot or territory. I have (for the purposes of this thread) classified wars that do not fall into the above category as war for geopolitical gain

Acts of war to "send signals" or "punish" such as the US cruise missile attack on Afghan camps in an earlier era, US attack on Khadhafi's house, the downing of a civil airliner or the sinking of a ship (as possibly done by NoKo) all fall in the category of war (or war-like acts) for geopolitical gain - with no territory or loot being directly gained or lost. But territorial loss/gain may be related to such an act.

[shiv]

Now - when PRC starts to do that, they have much more to gain by not having any strategic confrontations with India, rather than having them. When they are on that world quest any day they will prefer a big neighbor who keeps safe distance from them rather than a hostile one. They will not have any considerable gains by confronting India, but will have much to lose considering India has that Tibetan ace. If I were a Chinese president, I would like to forget about India & not talk about it anymore in my strategic meetings. Because I will have a much bigger fish to fry in the form of US.

This is possibly OT. Both the US and China will pick on the weakest first. Every nation is fair game whether they want it or not. If you are part of a small nation you have to fear both countries and tie up your fate with them. If you are a large nation it is better off not to reach any one sided conclusions such as you have done and just gear up to spoil everyone's party - be it the US or China. That is the way power works.

[abhischekcc]

i was talking about naxals

Many naxals are criminals and are guilty of murder and rape. There is nothing wrong with killing such people. But what is needed is to make the common people participants in the democratic process, in which Indian democracy has failed.

[Pratyush]

Fair enough. There is no way in which I can argue and say "No you are wrong". But assuming that you are right gives a kind of "baseline" or background hypothesis on which I would like to look at the leeway that India may have to initiate some hostilities.

I have earlier accused Pakistan of the Kargil intrusions. But India earlier successfully conducted an occupation of the Siachen region and held on. So openings are available. I don't think there is a thick red line that demarcates feasible action that does not attract a response from that which is not feasible. Timing is vital. The timing of military action "to send a signal" or "punish" can be selected with the caveat that opportunities maybe few and far between and not necessarily ideal. But we have to make a comprehensive list of "trespasses" that will aggravate an adversary and leave him angry and cursing but helpless and wait for opportunities to do that.

Shiv ji,

If Siachin is the model, then I agree that space exists to do what you are suggesting if we are able to gurantee conventional escalation dominance. Both in theater and elsewhere. But the introduction of nukelear weapons makes the result difficult to predict.

JMT

[abhischekcc]

The deployment capability of IA.

IA has planned for and has strengthened to meet the following simultaneously: a was with pakistan in which pakis are defeated comprehensively, a war with CHina in which they are held at the border, as well as a full blown insurgency. This is the strategic constraint of India.

This means that if India has two insurgencies at the same time, it puts us under strategic pressure.

This is known to all countries. That is why pak tries so hard to start a second insurgency in India. Gujarat 2001 was a similar attempt. So was Punjab in later years. This is also the reason COAS had refused to participate in anti-Naxal operations - citing inability to maintain strategic posture against China and pak, if IA is deployed against Naxals.

It is to break this strategic log jam that Vajpayee had indulged in bus diplomacy, even risking humiliation in Agra with the butcher of Kargil. But nothing has worked.

Ironically, it is the failure of all these peace efforts, as well as pakistans' contyinuing and increasing intransigence that is justifying a case for war against pakistan.

[Pratyush]

Could we try to replicate Iraq between 91 and 2003? What will the consequences of this action be. Assuming that we have attained independence where military consumables are concerned.

[shiv]

Could we try to replicate Iraq between 91 and 2003?

I am unable to understand this question. Could you explain please?

[RajeshA]

You know we had this WTF moment, when we suddenly find a Chinese living under our bed, as happened in PoK with the 11,000 PLA soldiers reported there. And then we start asking ourselves, how come we did not notice the creep creeping all over our backyard.

We have had similar moments when the Chinese cornered Shwe Gas Fields from right under our noses, after we had found gas deposits there. Or when we found out that the Chinese Navy would be having a big presence in Sittwe, Hambantota and Gwadar. Or when we found out that Chittagong, a loss of territory and strategic freedom that India has long mourned is suddenly going to be a Chinese commercial port. Or when we found out that the Chinese have built up an impressive infrastructure on their side of Tibet. Or when we found out that Tibet is just full of missiles pointed at India. And earlier when we found out that China had been testing and gifting nuclear weapons to Pakistan. Also can we remember the time when we were puzzled that China did not want to sanction JuD as a terrorist organization even after Mumbai 26/11 and insisted on more evidence? Even China's sudden resistance to Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal during the NSG negotiations in Vienna in 2008 after the pipsqueaks had shut up came as a surprise to us as if out of the blue. We, Indians, even get surprised when we find out that China is not enthusiastic about India's candidacy for a UNSC Permanent Seat. 1962 India-China War simply the precursor of more surprises.

We Indians keep on thinking that China would take into consideration India's core concerns, but the Chinese keep on pushing the envelope. We keep on thinking China will not go that far to antagonize India, and then we are unprepared and surprised. We

So here is the next WOW moment coming up in the next 3-4 years. The Terai Plains would be awash with Chinese people doing business in Nepal and setting up shop and residence there. They will be having a direct train service from Kathmandu to Beijing in a couple of years after that. In 6-7 years we would be seeing a PLA army base in Nepal at the invitation of the Maoists in Nepal.

So GoI is good at observing. In the coming years GoI probably would give out press briefings at regular intervals that we have had discussions with the Nepalese Government and they have satisfied our concerns. There is no need to worry. We are observing the situation closely. When the PLA Army Base comes up in Nepal 3-4 km from Indian territory, all of us would suddenly wake up to the danger and be in panic. After a month GoI will go back to the same routine of observing and talking.

The question is: is the GoI going to do something about it? Do we want PLA to be sitting in the Indian Subcontinent? And here is a hint. There is no way around this without getting our hands very dirty.

Let's remember, in Pakistan, an Islamism-infested country, PLA would dare not get involved directly, but Nepal is Maoist only so no problem. We will soon be seeing a DMZ coming up between Nepal and India. The Maoists would be asking for Chinese help because for some reason or another they would be pleading they see themselves threatened by India. Indians will try to ameliorate their concerns but there is satisfying when it is all for show. Then the Maoists would ask for Chinese help and China would be willing to introduce PLA into the Terai plains.

So if India wants to do something, while there are people in Nepal like Royalists who do not particularly like the Maoists, then the time is now, while China does not have the capability to project land force south of the Himalayas.

India has a ready made reason to attack Nepal and occupy it - the Maoists were supplying weapons to Naxalites in India. India needs to consolidate the Indian Subcontinent before the Chinese become too strong in 'South Asia'.

[Pratyush]

What I am trying to say is that we need to bring down the TSP state power. In 91 Iraq was too powerful for the khans to bring it down in one go. So we had the no fly zones and occasional military stikes in Iraq "proper" from time to time. The net effect as I saw was that it weakened the Iraqis ability to resist the Khans in 2003. As most of their military hard ware that mattered had been destroyed between 91 and 2003. (I am not addressing post 2003, as it was the yanks stupidity that aggravated the matters).

If India was to try and implement some thing similar, cause we need to alter the boundary in the west and eliminate the TSP. I also feel that this cannot be done in an aar paar ki ladai. This will have to be a long term war of attrition. Fought between India and TSP. No one battle will inflict enough damage to be construed as having crossed a red line. Yet the cumulative effect of each battle will be telling. Also, if we are able to maintain escalation control. The TSP will not be able to hurt India too badly, short of JDAM.

In this situation, I believe even the 3.5 will not be able to replenish the losses of TSP short of ruining themselves or coming out in the open in fvour of the TSP. Which is in India's favour as it tells the Indian population who are our friends and enemies.. Over the long term.

This is why in my original post I had mentioned assuming the independence in military consumables. As while doing this to TSP we will be brought under sanctions by the “International community”. To reduce our military potential through sanctions.

JMT

[Pratyush]

You know we had this WTF moment, when we suddenly find a Chinese living under our bed, as happened in PoK with the 11,000 PLA soldiers reported there. And then we start asking ourselves, how come we did not notice the creep creeping all over our backyard.
SNIP...
India has a ready made reason to attack Nepal and occupy it - the Maoists were supplying weapons to Naxalites in India. India needs to consolidate the Indian Subcontinent before the Chinese become too strong in 'South Asia'.

Agree in toto Nepal has to be reclaimed.

[RajeshA]

I am coming to the opinion, that there is a lot of smoke and mirrors that has been put up by China:

1. Kashmir: The 'Azadi' movement in J&K has been in full force since 1989. We have had the Hurry-Rats and so many groups all fighting for 'azadi'. Pakistan has been using proxies and non-state actors, and claiming plausible deniability for the Western press. The disturbance in Kashmir has diverted India's attention to other problematic areas, like Naxalism.
2. Pakistan: All this has been taking place under the shadow of Pakistani nukes, gifted to them by China. The vehemence shown by Pakistan, the daring shown by Pakistan has all been due to the protective hand of PRC. In fact PRC has used Pakistan's tendency to be open and vocal about its enmity with India, to mask that PRC is responsible for the consistency in Pakistan's attitude. More importantly Pakistan has succeeded in diverting India's attention away from other major areas in our periphery which are sliding out of India's influence, chiefly Nepal and Myanmar.
3. Nepal: Nepal would be used to divert India's attention away from Sri Lanka.
4. Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka would be used to divert India's attention away from Maldives.
5. ityadi, ityadi....

India's enemies have forced India's security forces to become fire-fighters, but the job of arsonists is infinitely more easy than that of fire-fighters. No country which is constantly in fire-fighting mode would ever think of consolidation of its periphery, much less entertain geopolitical ambitions.

Therefore India's desire for national consolidation would fail unless we stop the routes, the arsonists use to supply more oil to those fires, raging in India. When China set out to do nation building, first and foremost China consolidated and hardened its periphery and then the middle, which is still work in progress. India on the other hand tried to do it the other way round, to harden the middle before venturing into our periphery. India's North-East is still a forgotten region. This strategy has however allowed external forces to take over our periphery, and then continue their drive to sabotage our national consolidation project, as we have both a shrunk core and a weak peripheral defense. This allows others to walk through our outer gate and attack India in the living room.

We have to change this paradigm. Only if we reassert control over the periphery, would we have a chance at national reconciliation.

[Pratyush]

Rajesh,

The view I hold is that we need to expand outwords to assimilate the nations of the near abraod. Only then will we have the kind of security that we are seeking.

Indian Subcontinant is India. That ought to be our moto.

[RajeshA]

At the root of the problem we are discussing is that we have not defined, as a nation, what our objectives are, what is it that we want. And at the root of THAT problem is that we have not defined who we are as a nation. Are we a secular nation, or are we a cultural nationalist nation? In the former, we define ourselves in western terms. In the latter, in Indian/Bharatiya terms. In the former, we are a nation state. In the latter, we are a civilisation state.

Who we are will define what we want, which is turn will define what needs to be done to get it.

abhishekcc ji,

a good post indeed!

India needs an Indian Subcontinent Doctrine. It should say (for the time being):

India considers herself as the caretaker of the cultural, political and demographic heritage of the Indian Civilization, which has prospered in the Indian Subcontinent and its periphery. This civilization has been ruled by the Mauryas, Guptas, Mughals and Britain, among others. Even as India understands that multiple states can be the inheritors of a civilization and India accepts the sovereignty of the current ones, India would not allow that any political enemy of India or of the Indian Civilization gains a foothold on the Indian Subcontinent, either through deceit or through some agent. India retains a veto in this regard. Also any efforts of any other inheritors of the Indian Civilization to undermine the security interests of India, the main inheritor of the legacy, will not be tolerated.

[RajeshA]

Rajesh,

The view I hold is that we need to expand outwords to assimilate the nations of the near abraod. Only then will we have the kind of security that we are seeking.

Indian Subcontinant is India. That ought to be our moto.

Pratyush ji,

Even though I agree with you, that is an agenda that the GoI cannot really make as its official policy, given the current international system based on nation-states and sovereignty.

I think, India can however pronounce an Indian Subcontinent Doctrine, which allows multiple states to co-exist here, the current ones anyway, but reserves for herself the right to decide the foreign policies of other countries with respect to other powers viz-a-viz security. This is something the other powers would understand, and they too often extol similar policies - USA's Monroe Doctrine, Russia's Near Abroad, China's Core Interests.

Basically at the moment, that is all we need to come down heavy on our neighbors and their allures of their sovereignty while living in India's backyard.

[Pratyush]

Bro,

If you are going to play by the international order as it exists then you are running with both feet tied. No need to do this. The idea is not mearly to use force but all available means. If that means becoming an EU so be it.

Also, If the international order is not conducive the how does one explain the recognition of Kosovo,Sikkim, BD etc.


If it can happen in the not too distant past, no reason why it cannot happen in the future. Also, having the doctrine could create more problems. Any 2 bit leader in the near abroad with khujli will embrace the PRC as a protector, if they fear a threat from India.

The only way to remove the threat is to assimilate the nations as they exist. This is the unfinished agenda of partition.

Posession is 9/10th of the law. We must look forward to altering the status quo and presenting the world with a fate accomply when we move.

The advantages are as follows, gives unristricted access to north east. That cannot be disrupted. Re-opens the CAR for India through Afghanistan as the TSP no longer exists, etc.

This may take 50 of a 100 years but that is the game that needs to be played. If you are not going to play this way. Stay at home. Cause these nations will always be used by powers hostile to India to try and tie India down.

JMT

[shiv]

May I point out that the thread is entitled "Making war for geopolitical gains". Making war for territorial control is a completely different ball game. We have had a lot of discussions about "Attack POK", "Take over POK, "attack Tibet""Take over Tibet". That is all very well but this thread is discussing something that (ideally) is not even 10% as difficult as taking over a country and holding it. It is about giving the appearance of control and presence by smart moves and minimum force.

War for geopolitical gain if times well may be far easier than war for territorial gain. One can theoretically exert hegemony over territory without formal control by symbolism, threats and posturing.

The US tries that all the time. It sometimes fails and it sometimes does not, but the US can go past failures and persist in ways that even China cannot.

Pakistan too has tried that several times and failed. Pakistan has tried war for symbolic gain as well as war for territorial gain. It has been supported by the US and China - even if it has generally failed.

China has already done that in some places.

Exactly what is it that India can do in this regard?

[RajeshA]

Pratyush ji

I think you misunderstood me.

I am talking about India's official policy which can be sold to the people of India. Any war that we wage in the neighborhood, which is apparently initiated by us, needs to have the support of the Indian people in toto. India needs to lay down the red lines, the Lakshman Rekha, and these have to be made the red lines of the nationhood. Only if the Indian people are incensed at their violation, would they be willing to support 'invasions' of our neighbors.

These red lines have to be expressed in "till here and no further" terms, because Indians are basically "live and let live" people. So unless we claim, that some other party is not letting us live in peace because they are inviting hostile outside powers into our common home, Indian people would not approve, as long as India is not attacked directly. So we need to bring down the boiling point of the Indians, who at the moment would only boil at the violation of India's borders that we de-facto control.

All sorts of invasions are possible with the Doctrine I mentioned earlier, where those countries can be brought under Indian control - both by boots on the ground or through influence.

What would not be possible is that one wakes up one fine day and finds out India has invaded Nepal, the next day Bangladesh, etc for no other reason other than "India wants to be big boss". The Indian Govt. would have to make a credible and strong case for invading other countries.

Should other countries seek Chinese help, it gives India all the more reason to move in.

[Pratyush]

Shiv, to you.

Just one question, is attempting to define the geopolitical interest which can be acheaved through war OT on this thread. Also war is diplomacy by other means.

Teratorial acquisition to deny someone else the ground to be used against you is a viable interest. no.

So by expanding the paramiters of this thread slightely if we can answer the question slightely better then I see no harm in doing so.

Or may be I am playing the demon who disrupts the yagyas of all the rishis in the ashrams. Running away before the mods come my way with devastras. RAMA RAMA

[Pratyush]

Self deleted

[brihaspati]

Two things:

First : seriously need to deconstruct the propaganda that GDP chasing and waging war or preparing militarily for war for geopolitical aims - have to be mutually exclusive. This is a demand not based on historical reality. Most of the war-mongering states that have successfully made wars - as well as economically prospered - have made it through an integrated process of pursuing both GDP as well as expanding territorial dominance. None of them have had a so-called pure GDP chasing, "oh so peaceful" rise - take UK, Russia, USA, China.

As explained by me many times, preparing for war gives a national purpose, sharpens geo-political thinking in the long run, helps identify the best interests, provides long term stability in the neighbourhood, as well as development of indigenous capacities and innovation - because you cannot entirely rely on "others" to provide you with means to defeat them.

Chasing GDP as the only national priority obviously suppresses all military preparations to project coercion beyond borders and therefore encourages hostilities from such regions, since any diversion of resources into such preparations will be seen as taking away from "economic development". This is exactly what our enemies require - as in the past of India - to encourage the cow to graze and fatten oblivious of the cats licking their lips at the edge of the field. If such line of propaganda persists, even after repeated drawing attention to this aspect, I will personally not hesitate to start thinking that the propaganda is not simply delusion but a deliberate propaganda on behalf of our enemies.

Second : We have seen the dangers of leaving the periphery weak and vacillating. We have seen the dangers of allowing "a hundred flowers to bloom" (interestingly such statements always come from the most autocratic regimes or individuals - such as dictators or dynasties) in the neighbourhood - they mostly are soon all overtaken by poisonous weeds. There has to be boundaries set within which a certain flexibility is allowed. Boundaries of behaviour and faiths systems. If ensuring this means we need to absorb periphery militarily, politically - what is this big bad fear and anxiety of the "other"? Are we not supposed to be keenly appreciative and unafraid of "diversity" and supposedly past masters at finding a "niche" for "everyone" within the "grand structure"?

Or behind all that tall propaganda about "celebration of uncountable and infinite and unlimited" diversity (as long as that diversity does not include certain unapproved interpretations of some Indic belief systems) to be absorbed and given a new face and place - is actually a shrewd and devilish political tactic to go for selective upholding of faiths that suit personal tastes of power-seekers? Hence the xenophobia comes out when there is the spectre of having to call common Paki Muslims as Indians, or Tibetans or Nepalese or BD commoners? as Indians of a future India? Is not the hype about our "glorious tolerant" culture about not discriminating and distinguishing between humans!!

This is not just about conquering territories - it is about fundamentally altering the social, economic and political affiliations of the neighbourhood - if necessary by selective military operations. This may or may not lead to actual military conquest, but should lead to "change" of affiliation to India away from other forces. Eventually we would aim for a much larger geo-political entity centred in current India.

[shiv]

Shiv, to you.

Just one question, is attempting to define the geopolitical interest which can be acheaved through war OT on this thread. Also war is diplomacy by other means.

What I am saying is let's talk of "little wars" first before talking big about big wars. If you look at the history of wars - little campaigns doing little things against weak foes in a short time are easier and more doable than big campaigns against powerful foes over long periods of time. No guarantees in any case, but it is generally correct. It is one thing to chase away some ship hijacking coup leaders in the Maldives than saying "Let us take Tibet". Or even POK.

[RajeshA]

As far as "little wars" are concerned, let's see the "opportunities"!

1. Pakistan - nuclear cover, jihadi mess
2. Bangladesh - quasi-friendly government at the time, India should let Bangladesh know, that India would not take lightly if Bangladesh were to let China build a railway to Chittagong and develop the port. China should not be allowed into the Indian Subcontinent. Should there even be rumors about Bangladesh willing to give Chittagong over to China for use, India might intervene to stop it.
3. Sri Lanka - tell the same thing to Sri Lanka. We should start preparing an Eelam Regiment in the Indian Military from former LTTE soldiers, or organize them at least, under a more India-friendly leadership.
4. Maldives - Lots possible here. India should make clear, that no Chinese would be tolerated on Maldives, either as tourists or otherwise. But also give incentives to Maldivians.
5. Bhutan - offer the king a union with India. The position of His Majesty can be perpetuated.
6. Nepal - Nepal is the most appropriate state to attack and bring under Indian yoke. India has friends there. If we do not do it in the next few years, Nepal would certainly go to the Chinese. If India finishes off the Maoists, then that would be a clear signal to the Chinese, that India means business. Nepal is also far easier to get under control than say Pakistan. With Nepal, India has a clear issue - support to Indian Naxalites. Also US is on board with this one, meaning the West would support Indian intervention. Let our Army stretch their legs there a bit. An invasion of Nepal would send a firm signal to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives to not test India's patience.

[Nihat]

initiators of such conflicts are almost always certain of a military victory over which they negotiate for geopolitical gains.

Can india be as sure of a military victory and does it have the diplomatic clout to corner the adversery on the negotiating table.

[shiv]

Can india be as sure of a military victory and does it have the diplomatic clout to corner the adversery on the negotiating table.

That is what I am asking that we look at. Wars that we are guaranteed to win - even if we have to wait for some opportune time. What would such an opportune time be? What would be the object of such a war?

[shiv]

Nepal Trade:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publication ... os/np.html
Exports - partners: India 59.95%, US 7.87%, Bangladesh 6.04%, Germany 4.89% (2009)
Imports - partners: India 52.85%, China 13.35% (2009)


Aid to Nepal:
India
http://www.asiantribune.com/node/22229

Kathmandu, 21 August, (Asiantribune.com): India has assured to provide all kinds of financial assistance including a massive Rs 32 billion aid package (USD 710 million) for the development of Nepal.

China
http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... 50/448796/

Kathmandu Ahead of Prime Minister Prachanda's second visit to Beijing, China has jacked up its annual aid package to Nepal by a whopping 50 per cent to develop infrastructure of the land-locked Himalayan nation.

Chinese government has announced an additional package of USD 7.31 million to Nepal, increasing its annual financial assistance to the Himalayan nation to USD 21.94 million.

Is war necessary?

[RajeshA]

shiv saar,

we have spoken about the general mind-set the Indian Leadership needs to adopt regarding the use of aggression against other states. We have also spoken of bullying and intimidation by nations and how to counteract it.

Perhaps you would like to suggest some examples where such tactics may be put to use, and what would be the concrete geopolitical gains.

[shiv]

Perhaps you would like to suggest some examples where such tactics may be put to use, and what would be the concrete geopolitical gains.

This is what I am trying to figure out. Will post as soon as I think something is doable and desirable.

[shiv]

Sri Lanka may be the one that needs some therapy of some sort.

Exports - partners:
US 20.59%, UK 12.87%, Italy 5.51%, Germany 5.29%, India 4.54%, Belgium 4.43% (2009)

Imports - partners:
India 20.73%, China 13.45%, Singapore 7.26%, Iran 6.7%, South Korea 5.23% (2009)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LJ20Df02.html

Since the defeat of the LTTE, India has contributed significantly to rehabilitation of displaced Tamils and to reconstruction of the war-ravaged north. But beyond a bit of nudging, it has done little to pressure the Rajapaksa government to find a political solution to the conflict. It has been careful not to tread on Rajapaksa's toes.

Growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, especially since Rajapaksa became president in December 2005, appears to be behind Delhi's reluctance to do anything that could push him into a closer embrace of the Chinese.

There is reason for India to be wary. China's aid to Sri Lanka was a few million dollars in 2005 but jumped to US$1.2 billion in 2009, making it the island's largest aid donor. Beijing has provided Sri Lanka with $3.06 billion in financial assistance for various projects. It has built and funded a major port development project at Hambantota (Rajapaksa's home town) in the south of the island.

Colombo has been skillfully playing India and China against each other. And India has gone out of its way to keep it happy. The invitation to Rajapaksa to the Games' closing ceremony is part of its assiduous wooing of the powerful Sri Lankan president.

There are parallels between India's courting of Rajapaksa and its wooing of Myanmar's generals. As in Sri Lanka, in Myanmar India's main competitor is China.

It was in a bid to counter China's influence in Myanmar that India decided to move away from its criticism and isolation of the generals to engaging them. Over the past 15 years it has repeatedly rolled out the red carpet for the junta top brass and rarely has it condemned them for their human-rights violations. Even after the military's ruthless crushing of the monks' protest in 2007, which evoked sharp Western condemnation, Delhi remained silent for several months, breaking that silence eventually to issue a bland statement of "concern".

Similarly, Delhi's feting of Rajapaksa comes at a time when some Western countries and international organizations are calling for his trial for war crimes. In contrast to Myanmar's military rulers, however, who were roundly rejected by voters in elections.