Remembering the 1971 war

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KrishnaK
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by KrishnaK »

There's an interesting bit from Soviet Capabilities to Counter US Aircraft Carriers - CIA Intelligence Report, May 1972 that's relevant to how the US perceived the infamous naval standoff between the USS Enterprise CBG and the Soviet naval contingent in the Bay of Bengal 1971.

From page 32
The Soviet capability to counter US carrier forces in other areas is less impressive. When a US carrier task force deployed to the Indian Ocean in December 1971, for example, the USSR moved in additional naval forces. The US carrier force was in the area about 10 days, however, before the major elements of the Soviet reinforcements arrived. The augmented Soviet force included two missile cruisers, a missile destroyer, and two cruise missile submarines. It had a substantial anticarrier capability, including a total of 24 SS-N-3 launchers, but it was without air support for reconnaissance or strike missions.

The combat capability of a deployed Soviet force, however, might be less important than its presence. Third parties might not recognize the disparity in the forces, or might view the Soviet force as a fore-runner of a greater Soviet involvement.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Philip »

Chatham House had an excellent analysis of how we swept into Dacca in such a short time.The three major thrusts put the Pakis in a real fix as they did not know which one was heading for Dacca.Bypassing strongpoints and local MB assistance saw E.Pak fall like France in WW2.The Tangail airdrop was a masterstroke and the rocketing of the Governor's house on Dec.14th at 11am by 4 MIG-21 FLs strafing and rocketing the dome forced the zGovernor to immediately resign! This speeded up the final surrender.Sam's famous words to Niazi...." My dear Abdullah, I am here...the game's up!"
ramana
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by ramana »

That was another general Kalra.
The East Pakistan operations followed Operational art. West Pakistan operations were half hearted thrusts led by not do great. Individual unit actions were exemplary.

Do you have link to the Chatham House appraisal?
Akshay Kapoor
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Akshay Kapoor »

The architect of victory on ground was Gen Sagat Singh. Against orders he thrust into East Pak with the objective of Dacca. To him goes the main credit of the victory. The govt honoured him with a Padma Vibushan and the army shafted him. Sam's concept was a half baked partial thrust that was designed to bring Pak to negotiating table.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by arun »

X Posted from the Bangladesh News and Discussion thread.

Bangladeshi Liberation War Affairs Minister AKM Mozammel Haque thanks and acknowledges our Nations support for engineering Bangladesh’s liberation’s from the clutches of the Punjabi Military Dominated Deep State of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Mozammel: 1971 war was never a war between India and Pakistan : The minister thanked India for its tremendous support that was extended by its people and government in 1971
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by arun »

X Posted from the Terroristan thread.

Fittingly on Vijay Divas commemorating the surrender of 90,000 tall fair tight assed (TFTA) military personnel of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan self proclaimed to have descended from martial Arab and Central Asian horsemen to Short Dark Rice Eating (SDRE) Indian Hindu’s comes news of India again bursting Pakistan’s cherished notions of martial superiority based on the specious theory that 1 TFTA Pakistani Mohammadden equals 10 SDRE Hindu’s.

At the Commonwealth Championship for the “Martial” sport of wrestling the Islamic Republic wins 6 bronze medals as against 10 Gold and 10 Silver by India.


Pakistani wrestlers bag six bronze medals in Commonwealth Championship


India clinch 10 gold, 10 silver medals at Commonwealth Wrestling Championship
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Philip »

AK which army did he command? I remember that there were 3 formations that put the screws on E.Pak.If I'm not mistaken was his thrust from the N-East?
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Manish_P »

Philip wrote:Sam's famous words to Niazi...." My dear Abdullah, I am here...the game's up!"
Some source attribute those to Major-General Gandharv Nagra
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by anupmisra »

Manish_P wrote:
Philip wrote:Sam's famous words to Niazi...." My dear Abdullah, I am here...the game's up!"
Some source attribute those to Major-General Gandharv Nagra
Most sources do. He (Nagra) had once been the Indian military attaché in Karachi and knew Niazi personally.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/1998/98dec2 ... /head7.htm
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 766660.ece

Here's a follow up from Genrail "Nazi" to the famous offer:
"MY DEAR Abdullah," wrote Major-General Gandharv Nagra in a simple message delivered to the Pakistan's Eastern Command chief in Dhaka on the morning of December 16, 1971, "I am here. The game is up." When Lieutenant-General Abdullah Niazi saw General Nagra walk through his office door three hours later, he delivered an equally succinct analysis of the causes of Pakistan's defeat: "Pindi mein baithe hue ... [expletive deleted] ne marwa diya [the ... sitting in Rawalpindi got us into this mess]."
Did that <bleeped> expletive include yahya khan's mom and sis?
Added later, the exact phrase was: “Pindi main bethe hue haramzadon ne marwadiya”. No "maa - behen".

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... nemy-camp/
Last edited by anupmisra on 19 Dec 2017 22:50, edited 2 times in total.
anupmisra
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by anupmisra »

In a recent television interview, General Jacob asserted that the capture of Dhaka did not figure in the Field Marshal's offensive plans. Building on arguments he had earlier made in his 1999 book, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation, General Jacob argued that Field Marshal Manekshaw had wanted advancing troops to capture towns bypassed in the course of their lightning advance. Without dispute, such a decision would have cost India a decisive victory. India's triumph, General Jacob claimed, was in fact the result of the initiative of mid-ranking officers notably himself.
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 766660.ece
anupmisra
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by anupmisra »

By the way, is it true that the surrender at Dacca is/was the only surrender in public by a defeated army?
Rudradev
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Rudradev »

Anupmisra ji, I believe they thought it was going to be a private surrender but it turned out to be public. Something like this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUFa-i85k88
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by anupmisra »

Rudradev wrote:Anupmisra ji, I believe they thought it was going to be a private surrender but it turned out to be public. Something like this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUFa-i85k88
Yes, that's the same effect. I wonder if the current generation of pakis realize that their army has the dubious honor of being the only surrendering army to have unconditionally surrendered in full public in recent times. That must humiliate and hurt. Gen Jacob insisted on a public ceremony. Even the Nazis signed the surrender document in a closed room in Reims. The Japs signed their document on a ship. No public humiliation.
ramana
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by ramana »

The 1971 war ended the three front war nightmare of Pakistan on two fronts and China in the north.

At same time it exposed the US superpower threat which hitherto fore was via Pakistan as a proxy.


This was the reason for the PNE in 1974 as no nuke umbrella was forthcoming and such security guarantee would have meant re-colonization by Soviets.
ramana
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by ramana »

CPEC is making it all one front war if that happens.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Austin »

Vijay Diwas: How India Got Pakistan To Surrender In 1971

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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Austin »

Vande Mataram | Story Of 1971 War

chetak
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by chetak »

anupmisra wrote:
In a recent television interview, General Jacob asserted that the capture of Dhaka did not figure in the Field Marshal's offensive plans. Building on arguments he had earlier made in his 1999 book, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation, General Jacob argued that Field Marshal Manekshaw had wanted advancing troops to capture towns bypassed in the course of their lightning advance. Without dispute, such a decision would have cost India a decisive victory. India's triumph, General Jacob claimed, was in fact the result of the initiative of mid-ranking officers notably himself.
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 766660.ece
Just saying onlee,

Gen Jacob was an iraqi jew by ancestry.

The sheer irony of it all, and the pakis would certainly have not missed this little nugget.
ramana
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by ramana »

Only there was no Iraq when his ancestors arrived in India fleeing Ottoman persecution in Baghdad.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Austin »

Indian Air Force Dogfight - Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Sekhon - Param Vir Chakra [ Good CGI Work ]

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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by g.sarkar »

chetak wrote:
Just saying onlee,
Gen Jacob was an iraqi jew by ancestry.
The sheer irony of it all, and the pakis would certainly have not missed this little nugget.
That Gen Jacob was a Jew was well known to the Pak army and I had read that Gen. Jacob kept it low key. It was Pakistan that publicized it. If I remember it correctly, the original idea of FM Manekshaw and his planners was to quickly liberate a part of East Pakistan and declare it an independent country. He did not have a plan to liberate Dacca. In his defence, it must be said that no one could have anticipated that India could defeat the Pakis so quickly. They did not even put up a semblance of a fight. During the Dacca surrender the number of Indian army present was ridiculously low. The FM was originally in the Frontier Force and knew the Pak army well, but even he did not foresee how they had deteriorated in 1971. Killing civilians and raping women is not good for the morale. In WWII Germans killed many innocent civilians including Jews. But they made an effort to keep the fighting men away from this carnage.
Gautam
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by arshyam »

In WW2, I have read that most of the killings were done by the SS, and the Wehrmacht was not that involved, so I think you have a point there.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by g.sarkar »

If I remember correctly, SS had two parts. The Waffen SS was mostly for fighting. There was also a political wing that managed the concentration camps. Killings were mostly done by the inmates themselves and Ukrainian volunteers. The Ukranians were known for their brutality. The inmates who were used to kill and loot the bodies were themselves killed at regular intervals. Due to the war, there was a shortage of German men in the camps. But the management was always in German hands.
Gautam
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by rsingh »

^^^^
You are correct. here is a Russian film where it clearly depicted.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3VLaSujlXI
Whermacht would occupy a territory and destroy infrastructure. Burn the villages to terrify habitants into submission. SS would follow to pacify the population and control the occupied areas. There were special sections of SS which was given task of fetching blond girls for the services of higher officials. Any way the regime was very brutal.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by rsingh »

arshyam wrote:In WW2, I have read that most of the killings were done by the SS, and the Wehrmacht was not that involved, so I think you have a point there.
well most of the time. But Wehrmacht had no respect for Geneva convention for POW (specially Slavs). There is a clip where rounded POWs are left to starve and Himmler was very happy seeing dying people.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Lalmohan »

the political context is important. the german people were told that the eastern Europeans were sub-human (untermenschen) and could therefore be treated as animals. even before the war Himmler was writing papers about how the wheat fields of the Ukraine had to be turned to feeding the the german people and the displacement and death of millions of slavs was a necessary byproduct
in that context (similar to pakjabis being told that east Pakistani Bengalis were subhuman and religiously suspect) - the wholesale mistreatment and killings of other peoples is easily accomplished - even by ordinary men going around "following orders"
the Wehrmacht also took part in atrocities, but were less ideologically motivated than the SS
the Nazis tapped into a massive wellspring of anti-Semitism in central/eastern Europe - it was easy to find people who would kill jews to please their new masters
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... irs-291298

Brigadier Sawai Bhawani Singh, Brigadier Sukhjit Singh, the Maha Virs

excerpts , do read the complete article

Brigadier Sawai Bhawani Singh, MVC
The citation by the Ministry of Defence reads:

“On the night of December 5 (1971), Lt Colonel Sawai Bhawani Singh, who was commanding a battalion of the Parachute Regiment (commandos), led his men deep into the enemy territory and for four days and nights, with complete disregard for his personal safety, made skillful and relentless raids on the strongly held posts at Chachro and Virawah.”

There were two companies he was leading — Alpha and Charlie. After zooming through the night over sandy desert dunes and vales in Jongas, the companies scared the enemy first with the cacophony they caused. Then, Alpha company partly surrounded a wing of the Pakistani Rangers’ fortified post at Chachro, some 70 km from the border, while Charlie company raided it. They took prisoners.

Then the commandos headed for Virawah. Action repeated itself with the element of hand-to-hand fighting added. In “gingering up the enemy”, Bhawani Singh’s boys killed 17 Pakistani soldiers in the surgical strikes with light machine guns mounted on their jeeps.

Then they raided Nagarparkar, another defended Pakistani position, before returning to base. At the base, they were given yet another task — to blow up an ammo dump in Islamkot that they duly proceeded to do. All of them returned from all the raids. There was no Indian casualty.

In the blitzkrieg that was said to have been modelled after a British SAS raid behind German lines in Libya during World War II, there was a dissonance between a certain ‘A’ and a certain ‘B’, ‘A’ being for the anecdotal and ‘B’ for the battle action report.

In ‘A’, Lt Col Bhawani Singh has also narrated that after crossing into Pakistani territory, somehow the local Khemkhanis (Rajput Muslims) had learnt that their Maharaja was in the vicinity. They wanted to reverentially bow to him, in an account by his friend Brigadier Sukhjit Singh, with cries of ‘Khama Ghani Maharaj’. The villagers, according to Sukhjit Singh, were “demonstrating that borders have never severed generational ties of fealty”.

B: the battle action reports as well as the citations of 10 Para SF during 1971 are non-existent, according to the MoD. The response to a Right to Information query said, “The relevant record of citations has been destroyed as per policy in vogue.” (Reported by The Print in 2019).

At last count, 36 Pakistani soldiers were killed by the Paras and 22 others were taken prisoner.

Brigadier Sudkhjit Singh, MVC
Sukhjit Singh, also of the armoured corps’ Scinde Horse (14 Horse), was its Commanding Officer as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Shakargarh sector, the bulge that threatened the Pathankot-Jammu national highway linking to Srinagar.

His exploits with his men on the then modern T-55 tanks are part of military lore to this day. The Scinde Horse was the first to have got the tanks imported from Soviet Russia in 1966.

He was leading the charge from the south of bulge, in skirmishes leading to the epic Battle of Basantar.

“On December 10, 1971, his regiment was deployed west of Naina Kot when the enemy launched an armoured attack in strength under cover of intense artillery and heavy mortar fire,” his citation noted.

Despite the flak from the Pakistani forces, Sukhjit Singh manoevred his machines, leading his columns from the open cupola of his own tank, sometimes with his dust goggles raised to the forehead to see better through binoculars so that he could direct volleys from his men most effectively.

The next day, on December 11 again, he personally outflanked the enemy to close in on them despite its medium artillery and mortar fire. The Pakistanis lost eight tanks, Shermans and Pattons. The intention was to capture the enemy tanks. One Pakistani officer, two junior commissioned officers and two other ranks were taken prisoner at Malakpur.

He was already a veteran of armoured warfare having been schooled in this regard whilst serving with the Armoured Division in the Sialkot sector during the 1965 operations.

An excerpt from The Tribune (March 19, 2021) quoting him reads: “The 1971 war was raging. I was Lieut Col at that time. My troops managed to round up Pakistani soldiers. Among them was a tall, smart guy with whom I began talking just to cull more information. As our conversation was on, he told me, ‘I have one last wish.’ I replied, ‘What makes you think that we are going to kill you?’ During further inquiry, we got to know that he is the son of Sikandar Hayat Khan, a former premier of Punjab. He was among those who were set free. Much later, I met the family as well.”

After 26 years in the Army and the decoration, the man who led that charge and is said to have influenced the Punjab Chief Minister, Capt Amarinder Singh (of the Patiala royals), to join the Army, has also had long legal tussles, including one when he was posted in the military operations directorate.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... ngh-294742

The visionary warrior Sagat Singh

the author Maj Gen Randhir Sinh (Retd) has penned down a wonderful article

excerpts do not do justice. please read the entire article

excerpts
as the Commander 50 Para Bde , during the liberation of Goa
The advance commenced on December 18. The Para Brigade would move directly south and link up with 17 Infantry Division at Pillem, while 2 Sikh LI, with an armoured squadron, was to move on a parallel axis to Mapuca, which was opposite Panjim and separated by the Mandovi river. It was the intention of the Division Commander to enter the Portuguese capital with his Division. Sagat had this great quality of not breathing down his subordinates’ necks and he allowed the Para battalions to use their heads while he spent time with 2 Sikh LI, encouraging them to accelerate their advance. The Paras crossed three rivers through ad hoc means and kept on advancing till nightfall, when Sagat called a halt as 17 Infantry Division had still not linked up. By then, straining at the leash, 1 Para had captured Ponda, an objective of the Division, and 2 Para was on the road to Panjim.

50 Para Brigade had ringed the capital from three directions. 17 Infantry Division was still out of communication when the Army Commander decided that night to allow 50 Para Brigade to recommence its advance. That was enough. 2 Sikh LI, emboldened as never before, crossed the Mandovi in the morning and entered Panjim, while 1 Para made a dash and captured the seat of government.

as the Division Commander of 17 Mountain Division, deployed on the Sikkim Watershed.
In those days, troops deployed on the Watershed acted as a trip wire against any Chinese ingress and carried out delay and warning up to the main defences which were in depth. Sagat realised that giving up the Watershed would entail a most difficult operation to re-occupy it. It would also enable the enemy to roll down more easily towards Gangtok. He gave orders that the Watershed would not be given up and set about shoring up its defences. He was soon put to the test as the Chinese started pushing the defences in solidarity with Pakistan. Sagat’s orders were firm. Troops will hold on regardless. The neighbouring formation, as per orders, gave up Jelep La and deployed main defences in the depth. Since then the Chinese hold Jelep La and India has not been able to recover it. Despite instructions, Sagat denied the Watershed and that’s why we continue to hold Nathu La and Chola.


Bent on preventing the continuous Chinese pinpricks at Nathu La, Sagat decided to lay a fence on the Watershed. He took his superiors on board and a single strand of barbed wire was laid on August 18, 1967, despite physical interference and intimidation by the Chinese. The fence was being turned into a formidable obstacle. On September 11, as work commenced, without warning the Chinese opened devastating small arms fire. There were heavy casualties and Sagat asked for permission to open artillery fire. As it was not forthcoming, he gave the orders nevertheless. Our domination of the Watershed enabled the observation posts to look deep into Chinese territory. Heavy casualties were caused, and it took some time for them to recover.

GOC 4 Corps in 1971
Sagat got to know of the role he was to play in July 1971. Operational Instructions were issued in August. He moved to Tripura in September. He was allocated the counter-insurgency formations of 8 and 57 Mountain Division and was also allotted his reserve, 23 Mountain Division. Several ad hoc forces were created, prominent among them being K Force, which was to play a prominent role in the advance to Chittagong. To create administrative maintenance areas in a short time for such a large force under the most hostile circumstances was a major achievement.

The initial task required 4 Corps to advance up to the Meghna river line, capture Chittagong, if possible, and contain Sylhet. Sagat was not satisfied with his tasking. Dhaka was the lynchpin of the Theatre Offensive, but it was not mentioned anywhere as an objective. Sagat had little time to train his units in conventional operations, but carefully monitored their activities. Before the offensive, there were three brigade-level operations. Not satisfied with some of the performances, Sagat was brutal in telling his commanders and troops that he would not accept foot dragging.


The Corps offensive started by the end of November, which required the initial crust of the enemy defences to be pierced. The most savage fighting was opposite Agartala, where 57 Mountain Division was tasked to capture Akhaura. It was a slogging match lasting five days and Sagat set the tone by venturing ahead of the forward troops in a helicopter and then landing amongst them to encourage them on. He allowed no rest as the enemy front started crumbling.

The habit he established initially set the tone of the campaign. His formations were spread over a large geographical area. The Northern Sector was where the offensive was being carried out by 8 Mountain Division towards Sylhet. The North-Central Sector was with 57 Mountain Division as it advanced from Agartala. The South-Central Sector was under 23 Mountain Division as it advanced towards the river port of Chandpur and the Southern Sector was under the ad hoc K Force, which was tasked to head south towards Chittagong.

Every day Sagat would range over his entire frontage in an Allouette helicopter of the Air Force (subsequently, he started using an Air OP flight helicopter piloted by Maj, later Lt Gen, GS Sihota). He would take flight at the crack of dawn, mostly as per an itinerary chalked out late the previous night. He would visit the formations, sometimes flying ahead of the forward troops, and land amongst them, constantly encouraging them while giving them critical information of the enemy. There were times when he would change focus seeing the progress of the offensive. He would land back at the Corps HQ, sometimes after last light, and then after a quick wash, would head for the Operations Room. Thereafter, he and the senior staff would go to the A Mess, where he would issue orders for the next day, setting his staff in a tizzy. At times, the complete plan would change. For Sagat, written instructions were only pieces of paper.

The first major change occurred when he allowed 23 Mountain Division to infiltrate between the enemy defences rather than hit them head-on. The second was when the first heliborne operation of the Indian Army was carried out on a shoestring. After reconnaissance by Group Captain Chandan Singh, on the night of December 7, 4/5 GR with a company of 9 Guards was landed near the Surma bridges at Sylhet. The Mi4 was an old war horse and had seen its best days, but it and the pilots performed marvellously. Instead of contesting the landing, the Pakistani units hemmed themselves in, waiting to be overwhelmed.

December 6 was also the day when Sagat carried out drastic changes to his plan. 57 Mountain Division, which had been tasked to head for the Meghna on an axis north of Maynamati, was ordered to continue its advance ahead of Akhaura towards Brahmanbaria. Taking 61 Brigade under his command, Sagat ordered it to head for Daudkhandi on the Meghna, while shedding two battalions to contain and attack the enemy defences on Lalmai Heights. 8 Mountain Division was asked to get a brigade ready for a heliborne operation on Dhaka. Sagat was a battle opportunist par excellence.

Suspecting what Sagat had in mind, the Army Commander rang him on December 7 and told him firmly not to attempt a crossing of the Meghna. This led to an acrimonious argument, resulting in Aurora visiting him on December 8, where Sagat managed to convince him to go ahead with his plans.

December 9 was an extraordinary day even for Sagat. He flew to Daudkhandi on the Meghna and found it to be vacated. Then he flew south along the river to Chandpur, where he found no enemy, so he flew rear wards, landed in front of the leading battalion and the armoured squadron, picked up their commanding officers, showed them Chandpur from the air, dropped them back and told them to go hell for leather. He flew to Daudkhandi and landed in front of the leading company commander and told him to rush for the river and commandeer all boats. Thereafter, he flew to Agartala, picked up the Air Force squadron commanders to fly along the Meghna to do a recce of likely landing sites. While returning, he saw explosions near the only bridge at Ashuganj and flew over it. A machine gun opened fire, injuring the pilot and grazing the General. He returned to Agartala, had the pilot evacuated, commandeered another helicopter, flew to Brahmanbaria where he saw the preparations for the famous ‘Meghna Air Bridge’ going on. He met Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Himmeth Singh, CO of 4 Guards, and others involved in the heliborne operation being planned over the Meghna and returned to the Corps HQ late in the evening, where he allowed his injury to be treated.

4 Guards with other troops was flown over the Meghna at night. Other units took river crafts across. The squadron of 63 Cavalry, under Maj Shamsher Mehta, which was right in the forefront of the advance, swam across. By the time Dhaka surrendered, it had been encircled from three sides. From the East, across Daudkhandi and from the NE and north. Brigades had successfully crossed the Meghna and carried on advancing, while the Pakistan brigade in opposition, with the GOC of their 14 Division, was successfully contained at Bhairab Bazaar.

Dhaka had been surrounded in one of the swiftest and greatest feats of arms in less than 16 days. Sagat’s vision, which he kept close to his chest, saw him use all resources innovatively, not giving up on his aim and relentlessly pursuing, bypassing and defeating the enemy. He was ruthless in the pursuit of this vision but ensured his troops and commanders were imbued with it. His personal courage, stamina and far-sightedness have never been matched in the annals of the Indian Army, which covered itself in glory.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... ara-297878

Lt Col Kulwant Singh Pannu, Maha Vir of 2 Para

excerpts
In the time it took to jump out of IAF’s C-119 and park the jeep in Dhaka Cantt, the CO of 2 Para & his men had passed into legion, their exploits forever in texts studied by professional soldiers


“I was returning to Tangail from one of our headquarters at Mohanandapur village when the Indian Army paratroopers started landing near Poongli,” wrote Anwarul Ham, a former ambassador and then second-in-command of the Mukti Bahini in Tangail.


“It was quite a sight. I was 1.5 miles away and I ran to greet them. I introduced myself to Lt Col Pannu. He made two requests: to disperse the crowd of villagers (who were gawking) and to arrange for local volunteers to help carry the load and push the artillery guns and jeeps to the road.”

Three of the four guns had fallen into ponds. One landed on the roof of a village house. The battalion group that had landed comprised elements of a field battery and medics. The drop was spread over a wide area, by one estimate over 20 km.


It was tasked to secure the Poongli bridge and the adjacent ferry on the Louhajang river that branched from the wide Jamuna. Securing the bridge would cut off battalions of Pakistan’s 93 Brigade that were falling back to Tangail and Dhaka from Mymensingh and Jamalpur. The operation was deep behind enemy lines, the battalion group having flown from Kalaikunda and Dum Dum in West Bengal. They had linked up with 1 Maratha Light Infantry, who were already in the thick of operations battling their way through East Pakistan from Tura in Meghalaya.

To fulfil his brief, Pannu had to rally round his men and equipment, moving in a wide arc as night fell. Having rounded up a bulk of his men, he prepared to take the bridge. Four artillery guns could be made operational for the charge. Most of the Pakistanis fled but that same night there were three counter-attacks on Poongli bridge.


“I came face to face with bone-chilling scenes of last night’s battle. Corpses of hundreds of enemy soldiers littered the road, bodies from one side of the bridge to another. We walked with care so as to not step on the dead,” wrote Dr Nuran Nabi, a lieutenant of Tiger Siddiqui’s force in Dhaka’s ‘The Daily Star,’ some 30 years after the event.

The 2 Para group, having linked up with 1 Maratha Light Infantry, then rolled cautiously towards Dhaka on the Mirzapur-Jaydebpur Road, reaching Milestone 26, its destination, by the evening of December 15. They were then tasked to turn west and reach Dhaka through the Mirpur bridge. The bridge was staunchly defended even though, by December 15, the war was collapsing for Pakistan.


“We lost three — killed in action. There were 41 enemy casualties but we were at the gates of Dhaka by midnight,” Nirbhay Sharma, who was adjutant to Pannu and who retired as a Lieutenant General (and then became Governor of Arunachal and Mizoram), has written and said in multiple interviews.

The next day, Pannu, Sharma and Tiger Siddiqui were to take the message to Niazi. Pannu, who had tied up with Tiger Siddiqui after the airdrop in Tangail, had taken him along on the battles through to Dhaka. He wanted him along not only for the camaraderie they had struck, but also because of the clear idea drilled into Indian officers that this was not a country they were to occupy but help the Mukti Bahini.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... war-307036

Western front exploits and 4 MVCs
The bravehearts Maj Vijay Kumar Berry, Maj Vijay Rattan Chowdhary, Capt Pradip Kumar Gour and Capt SRS Walkar

extracts. do the read the full article
Even if India had a decisive surrender from the Pakistan Eastern Command in Dhaka on December 16 and an acceptance of a ceasefire on the western front on December 17, there were bloody fights that took a heavy toll in lives beyond those dates.

Just as armed conflicts between India and Pakistan had broken out before the formal declaration of hostilities on December 3 that year, they continued after the formal cessation of the war.


One of the bitterest in that order was in Rajasthan’s Ganganagar sector. Nearly 10 days after the ceasefire was accepted, Pakistan’s army made an intrusion to set up a defended position atop two sand dunes over what was basically wasteland of little or no strategic value. The firefights that followed came to be known as the “Battle of the Sadiqia Sand Dunes” or the “Battle of Naggi”.



Later chroniclers have pointed out that Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan had described the fall of Dhaka and the signing of the instrument of surrender by his Eastern Command chief Lt Gen AAK Niazi as merely a loss of a battle, while the war would go on (reference: Major KC Praval’s excerpt in the Indian Defence Review, ‘Indian Army after Independence’). It was surmised that Pakistan wanted to claim victory or stalemate in the west while its forces had collapsed in the east. Within 24 hours of that statement, better sense prevailed and he accepted the ceasefire.

At the Sadiqia dunes, however, Indian troops discovered on December 25 the incursion by a company of Pakistan’s 36 Frontier Force and Rangers. It was supported by heavy artillery. They had also laid minefields to stop an Indian advance.

Major Vijay Kumar Berry, then leading Charlie Company of the 4 Paras, was asked to secure the area. He was backed up by the 9 Para Field Regiment of Artillery and the 410 Field Company of Engineers. Clearing the minefields while being subjected to shelling was done by the Engineers.


Just a week earlier at Basantar, further north of Berry’s position, Major Vijay Rattan Chowdhary of the 405 Field Company of the 9 Engineers Regiment had demonstrated what it takes.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... vir-309946

Maj Chandpuri, the Longewala Maha Vir

excerpted from the above
In May 1971, Capt Chandpuri was posted to 23 Punjab, then located at Bikaner, with an operational role in Jaisalmer sector. Maj Chandpuri, after his promotion, was assigned the command of Alfa (Sikh) Company. Punjab battalions have a mix of two Sikh and two Dogra companies. Soon, Maj Chandpuri was detailed for a month-long familiarisation with the operational area, which was to pay great dividends in the war that was to follow.

Anticipating the war, 23 Punjab had occupied its battle positions. Major Chandpuri’s Alfa Company was defending Longewala, the sweet water position, while the remaining battalion was occupying a defended area at Sadewala. The remaining brigade was at Tanot. The Longewala position was reasonably well fortified with anti-tank mines laid by the Pioneer section, largely towards the south-west. The only wire fence that circumvented the position was basically laid to keep out the wild camels that came sniffing for water. This wire was to prove the undoing of the attackers.

A section each of 81 mm mortars, 7.62 MMG and 106 mm RCLs were in location. Having patrolled the areas around and fortified the trenches, the Punjabis were confident of themselves. Intelligence inputs pointed to a Pakistani attack, and sure enough on December 3, air strikes on all Indian airfields announced the start of the war on the western front. On the night of December 4/5, Lt Dharamvir, the Company Officer with Maj Chandpuri, reported large columns of tanks and infantry moving towards Longewala. Maj Chandpuri collected his men, spoke to them about their rich martial traditions and urged them to hold fast at all costs. He, however, said that anyone who feared death was free to leave, but he would fight to the very last. “Loon de mull chakaon da wela aa gaya sathiyo (time has come to repay a national debt),” he said.

A series of ‘jaikaras’ of “Jo Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal” reverberated as Maj Chandpuri realised that his motivational tirade had hit home. His request for reinforcements and tanks was still pending with his CO when the enemy tanks closed in on the wire and gradually spread out to surround the post. Exchange of small arms fire had commenced, with which all avenues of reinforcement were now blocked. Maj Chandpuri expected a tank assault on his weak defence anytime. Fortunately, that did not happen. The enemy tanks taking the cattle fence to be a minefield halted. The infantry started shooting at the Punjabi defences. The wire had successfully separated the infantry from its tank support. The ttle was now between an infantry battalion and the resolute Alfa Company of 23 Punjab.
The 106 RCL gun of Maj Chandpuri got into action, the first round scoring a hit against a T-59 tank that had closed in, which soon burst into flames. The second RCL gun knocked out an enemy jeep. Seeing the result, the MMG and 81 mm mortars opened fire, imposing further caution on the enemy infantry accompanying the tanks. At this juncture, Sepoy Bishan Das of Pioneer Platoon on orders began to place anti-tank mines on the likely routes of the tanks.

Maj Chandpuri, in order to motivate his men, moved from trench to trench under enemy fire. Tank-tracer rounds were guiding every fire and making it more accurate, men were getting injured but seeing their Company Commander move under fire kept the company motivated.
IAF action
As day broke, the IAF Hunter aircraft took to air targeting every tank in the open. Initially, the aircraft avoided engaging tanks very close to the Company locality thinking them to be our own. But once the ground reality was communicated, every tank was shot.

Early on December 5, Lt Dharamvir’s patrol had reinforced the company, along with three AMX-13 tanks of the Independent Squadron.

Longewala Company had held the better part of the enemy brigade and a tank regiment with sheer will power. The Indian Air Force then went into a happy shooting mode, making Longewala area the graveyard of the enemy tanks; 37 were destroyed, breaking the back of the Pakistani offensive to capture Jaisalmer.

For his conspicuous gallantry and inspiring leadership, Maj KS Chandpuri was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cit ... s&from=mdr

1971 War: Take 2 Kg extra for luck

extracts- do the read the full article
A team of 120 Para Commandos of Indian Army was given the task to raid and destroy enemy’s artillery guns positioned inside Pakistan territory during the 1971 war.
The military engineers told them that 3 kg of plastic explosive would be enough to damage the guns, the commanding officer of the unit, however, asked the raiding team to “add 2 kg extra for luck”. The raid, popularly recognised as “Operation Mandhol” is considered to be the first surgical strike by Indian Army’s Special Forces inside enemy territory.
from the above
One of the renowned veterans of special forces, Col Pathak, 80, said their company comprising five officers and around 120 men, led by Maj C M Malhotra, started around 5.30pm on December 13, 1971.
“It was a cold night and they had to cross neck-deep water of the Poonch river to reach Mandhol. On reaching the village, they found it completely deserted. After tracing the gun positions, the party was split into six groups with each attacking one gun. After a fierce battle with the enemy, all guns were destroyed with the help of pencil-cell connected timer explosives. During the fight, many soldiers of the Pakistan army were killed while several fled,” recalls the veteran.
The raiding party of Indians lost two of its men while 20 were wounded
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by jaysimha »

SCHOOL OF INTERNAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (SISDSS) of
RASHTRIYA RAKSHA UNIVERSITY, PRESENTS BATTLE STUDIES -
Monthly Webinar Series on -
THE BATTLE OF CHHAMB-“An Ultimate Tale of Endurance''





Indian Air Force Operations of the 1971 War "Guardians of the Sky"
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... tri-313298

Remembering the exploits of BSF’s Assistant Commandant Ram Krishna Wadhwa and Lance Naik Nar Bahadur Chhetri
extracts
Nar Bahadur Chhetri of the 12th Battalion of the Brigade of Guards was with its Charlie (‘C’) company at Mandiala in the 10th Division’s area of responsibility in the sector west of Jammu. This was the same area where six years earlier India and Pakistan had fought bitterly in the stalemated war of 1965.

The Munawar Tawi near the then ceasefire line flowed down south to meet the Chenab; the land is undulating, often with tall ‘sarkanda’ grass and the waterways fordable. Tank country, in military terms. The town or large village of Chhamb dominated by Hindus was to the west of the Tawi.

Chhetri and his anti-tank platoon from the 12 Guards (then an infantry battalion, now mechanised infantry) were on guard at the Chhamb crossing over the Munawar Tawi when their commanders erred in judgement. The 10 Div top echelons had assumed that they should be in defensive positions till Manekshaw visited the formation just before the hostilities began.

“Don’t lose the Chhamb salient,” he dictated. The Chhamb salient was a launchpad of sorts inside Pakistani territory. The evening of the morning the Pakistan Air Force bombed Pathankot and other airbases on December 3 and formally initiated hostilities, the artillery started bombarding Indian positions.

Shortly after 8 the next morning (December 4), the Indians saw Pakistani Sherman tanks attempting to cross in the Indian 191 Brigade area under Brigadier RK Jasbir Singh.

Neither the Pakistani nor the Indian tanks at the time were equipped with night vision devices. They manouevred mostly early in the morning.

The Indian side had laid minefields but had left a gap from which own forces could go into Pakistani territory. But in the time the minefields were laid and the battle broke out, the division had re-oriented from a defensive deployment in depth to an offensive one. That left the defences in depth areas weak. A post-mortem study suggested that the commander should have taken both exigencies into account in planning his deployments.

The Pakistanis infiltrated through the Dewa-Ghopar axis and as the assault troops began fording the Tawi, the ATGM platoon began firing. According to Nar Bahadur Chhetri’s citation, “On December 4, 1971, the enemy launched a massive attack with a combined force of infantry and armour. Lance Naik Chhetri’s position was subjected to intense artillery mortar and automatic fire by the enemy. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Lance Naik Chhetri engaged the enemy and knocked out five enemy tanks. In this action, Lance Naik NB Chhetri displayed conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in keeping with the highest traditions of the Army.”
and
The Battle of Chhamb, despite the heroism of Lance Naik (later Subedar Major) Nar Bahadur Chhetri, a Gorkha from Boorali village in Nepal, took the heaviest toll on the Indian Army. An estimated 400 soldiers were killed, 723 were wounded, 190 went missing or were taken prisoner, 18 tanks and other vehicles were lost.
In the battles that waged before that, however, the diplomacy of Mr Grenade — whose word no one trusted once the pin was pulled — carried on in the western front, going on to claim the life of Assistant Commandant Ram Krishna Wadhwa of the Border Security Force (BSF) in the Punjab-Rajasthan area.

Wadhwa was in charge of two Border Outposts (BOPs) that were at first overrun by the Pakistan army after heavy artillery fire on the night of December 4-5. His BSF troops had to vacate the posts and while they were retreating, according to an unofficial account, were even fired upon by Indian troops who mistook them for Pakistanis.

He was ordered to re-occupy and retain Raja Mohtam Post, which he did at the cost of his life. Even after the recapture, a superior Army officer was wounded in a mine blast and had to be evacuated.

Wadhwa’s citation reads:

“The Border Security Force picquet at Raja Mohtam near Mamdot on the western front had been occupied by the enemy on December 5, 1971. Shri RK Wadhwa, Assistant Commandant, was assigned the task of recapturing it. He led his troops gallantly through heavily-mined area and under intense and accurate fire. His courage and personal example inspired his men to close in and capture the objective. Later, when he was counter-attacked, he showed exemplary courage and utter disregard for his personal safety in going from trench to trench encouraging his men in repulsing the enemy. However, while moving under heavy fire, he was mortally wounded by enemy shelling and succumbed to his injuries.

In this action, Assistant Commandant Ram Krishna Wadhwa displayed exemplary courage, leadership and indomitable spirit and devotion to duty of a very high order.”
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... war-319544
How submarine operations stood out in 1971 war
author
Admiral VS Shekhawat (Retd)
do go through
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... gat-322697

Tale of IAF Maha Virs Wg Cdr Ramesh Sakharam Benegal & Wg Cdr Harcharan Singh Mangat

extracted
Wing Commander Ramesh Sakaharam Benegal, MVC
The chief of the “Lynxes” squadron was Ramesh Sakharam Benegal, then a Wing Commander, the Commanding Officer of the 106 Squadron flying the English Electric Canberras on bombing and photo-reconnaissance runs.

In an earlier life, Benegal was in jail. He was jailed by the British for being a member of Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army. He was also called “Tokyo Boy”. The Japanese had selected him for training in the Imperial Japan Air Force Flying Academy during World War II.


A natural choice for the Indian Air Force, Benegal deployed his men and flew missions himself over Karachi before the Naval raid that took out the Pakistan port city’s fuel dumps, and to inspect the damage after the Battle of Longewala.

Benegal’s life was at once among the most dramatic, as it was a hyphen traversing tumultuous times. What runs through it is a yearning for adventure and Independence through World War II, India’s freedom movements, incarceration by the British and finally his career in the Indian Air Force. He wrote a book “Burma to Japan with the Azad Hind”, on his time with Bose’s Indian National Army that gives glimpses of what he cherished and the values that he brought to the service. (He also inspired the biopic on Bose by his nephew Shyam Benegal).

Subhas Chandra Bose, aka Netaji, visited the academy in Japan where Benegal had been seconded to be trained by the Imperial Air Force, he writes. In 1944, Bose was scheduled to visit the academy. The Indian cadets were all agog. Each had a portrait of Bose in his room.

“We were made to stand in front of our rooms as Netaji had expressed his wish to meet each of us individually. We all had photographs of Netaji in the INA uniform in our rooms and took the golden opportunity of having them autographed by him. Signing forty-five photographs on a visit like this was time-consuming, but he did it patiently and with a smile.


“Netaji spent at least two minutes with each cadet and asked about each one’s welfare. When he came to my room, he astounded me by telling me that my brother Sumitra was in the Rangoon Headquarters and was quite well. He then asked me if I had received any letters from him and when I replied that no one had written me any letters, he said that he would remind Sumitra to write to me. He then signed my photograph and moved on to the next room. I have since held responsible posts as a commanding officer and I know what it means to an individual when a superior officer remembers his name and anything about his family…”

In a sense, Benegal was used to danger and hardship since he was in his teens. Born in Rangoon (Burma, now Myanmar), he and his mother tried to flee the country when he was just 15, and failed. Months later, he was acquainted with Bose and the INA. He sailed to Singapore to sign up with Azad Hind Fauj. He was seconded to train with the Japanese and undertook a voyage in two vessels that were torpedoed and landed up in the Phillippines. After Japan’s surrender, he fetched up in Madras. He was imprisoned by the British and was one of those accused of treason in the INA trials at the Red Fort, but was released by the authorities, who were increasingly fearing the consequences as the freedom struggle in India gathered momentum.


Unlike most of his contemporaries, Ramesh Benegal brought into the Indian military a flavour that did not have its origins in the Royal Indian Air Force, but a tradition of an Independence movement that was largely eclipsed by the imposition of an idea of the “mainstream”. But the values he brought saw him lead a squadron that operated both in the eastern and western theatres of the 1971 war.

His MVC citation reads:

“As the officer commanding of an operational reconnaissance squadron, Wing Commander RS Benegal carried out a large number of missions over enemy territory and obtained vital information about enemy air force and other installations. The missions entailed flying deep into enemy territory and to heavily defended targets. The information brought back from these missions facilitated the planning of Army, Air Force and Naval operations and thus directly contributed to the attrition of the Pakistan war machine. It is further to the credit of Wing Commander Benegal that he never returned from any of these innumerable missions without having achieved his objective in full measure. While flying repeatedly deep into enemy territory, Wing Commander Benegal displayed conscientious devotion to duty and professional skill of a very high order.”

then Wing Commander Harcharan Singh Mangat, MVC
The Su-7 hero

The aircraft with tail number B858 sits in the museum of the Indian Air Force at Palam, Delhi, today. It was repainted in its original camouflage colours. Harcharan Singh Mangat, the Commanding Officer of the number 32 Squadron, flew the plane.

He is still known as the man who flew a jet with a missile that rocketed into it, but did not explode.


Wing Commander (later Air Cmde) Mangat was flying the Sukhoi-7 on December 4, 1971 — a day after the Pakistan Air Force attacked Indian airbases and formal hostilities were declared. There were 118 counter-air sorties on Pakistan airfields by the IAF that included, apart from the Sukhoi-7, MiGs, HF 24s and Hunters.

Wing Commander Mangat of the Thunderbirds (32) squadron was flying the Sukhoi-7, newly imported from the then Soviet Russia, when a Sidewinder missile from a Pakistan Air Force J6 jet rammed into his aircraft. Before that, ground anti-aircraft fire in East Pakistan had chewed away at his plane’s rudder and ailerons. Mangat limped back to base in Kalaikunda, southern West Bengal.

His experience led to new survivability studies on the aircraft.

His MVC citation reads:

“As the Commanding Officer of the fighter bomber squadron, Wing Commander Harcharan Singh Mangat undertook a number of interdiction and close support missions, as also many reconnaissance sorties, deep into enemy territory, bringing information of great value to the Army and the Air Force in their operational planning. While on a strike mission, his aircraft was hit thrice by intense anti-aircraft fire but he pressed forward until he found that the other aircraft in his formation had also suffered serious damage. At this point, enemy interceptors came on the scene. Despite this, he extricated his formation from the hazardous situation and led it safely back to base. On landing, it was found that his aircraft was extensively damaged. Only superb flying skill enabled him to bring a badly damaged aircraft back to safe landing. Wing Commander Mangat displayed conspicuous gallantry, determination, professional skill and leadership of a very high order.”
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Aditya_V »

Were there F6 aircraft in East Pakistan Bangladesh during the 1971war? I thought there was only a squadron of F86 Sabers
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Haresh »

A question for those of you more knowledgeable.

I watched the film "Border"
There was a small storyline, where some Peaceful's on India's side in Rajasthan were providing info to the Pak's.

Did this sort of thing happen ??
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by nachiket »

Aditya_V wrote:Were there F6 aircraft in East Pakistan Bangladesh during the 1971war? I thought there was only a squadron of F86 Sabers
There were no F-6 aircraft available in the east. Only 1 squadron of Sabres.
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