Remembering the 1971 war

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Aditya_V
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

Post by Aditya_V »

If I remember right Wg Cmdr Mangat Su 7B was hit on a raid in Shor Kot Road and not East Pakistan as mentioned above.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... sta-325615

Flying Maha Virs Banerji, D’Costa
Among the first pilots to be trained to fly Sukhoi-7, the two displayed conspicuous gallantry throughout the operations
excerpted
Wing Commander (later Group Captain) D’Costa was the officer designated to induct the Sukhoi-7 aircraft into the Indian Air Force, a new acquisition.

“In the coming months, the letter from Air Headquarters came clearing one squadron in each command to do the night-flying syllabus. The Command gave the task to 26 Squadron, but the squadron did not have their heart in it and did not really utilise the opportunity to its potential, resulting in suboptimal results.

“My CO in 101 Squadron, KC Khanna, got the go-ahead from WAC (Western Air Command), and he gave the task to me. We started the task and had initial difficulties, but slowly we started to make it work. While we could not get the entire squadron operational, but most of the senior pilots had got operational. Simultaneously, TACDE (Tactics and Combat Development Establishment) was formed and moved to Adampur and they were actively testing out night flying too. Sure enough, as soon as the war began, TACDE put in night flying to full use and they were the only force to reach Sargodha and were effective.”


His MVC citation reads:

“Squadron Leader M Banerji, a senior pilot in a fighter bomber squadron, led no fewer than 14 missions within the first week of the conflict with Pakistan against enemy targets, most of them in support of our Army in the Chhamb battles. During these missions, Squadron Leader Banerji destroyed two enemy tanks and two guns. On these occasions, Squadron Leader Banerji was personally responsible for attacking the enemy in the face of heavy ground fire, thus relieving pressure on our own troops. Squadron Leader Banerji displayed conspicuous gallantry and skill in repeatedly attacking enemy forces in the face of extremely heavy ground fire.”
and
For months before the outbreak of the war, D’Costa was priming both the aircraft that were being flown from Russia to India and training the flying and the ground crew. The day after the formal outbreak of hostilities, he flew a low-level photo recce over Pakistan’s Walton airfield and located the radar unit. He conducted repeated strikes over Risalwala and Chander airfields and took out three tanks in Christian Mandi.


Lal wrote in his book: “No.222 (Tigersharks) Squadron led by Wing Commander D’Costa flew against the airfield at Risalwala near Lyallpur on December 4 (from Halwara) in the morning and later gave close support at Sulaimanke and further north along the river at Hussainiwala and Dera Baba Nanak and Narowal in the Shakargarh Bulge.”

His MVC citation reads:

“On December 4, 1971, Wing Commander AA D’Costa, the commanding officer of a fighter bomber squadron, was the first to strike at the enemy’s Risalwala airfield. Next day he led a mission to Christian Mandi and destroyed three tanks. The following day he led an attack on a concentration of tanks at Dera Baba Nanak, notwithstanding intense anti-aircraft fire. On December 7, he carried out a low-level photographic reconnaissance mission in the Sulaimanke area. He followed this up by leading an attack on the same day on the railway station at Narowal, where he personally destroyed and damaged many railway wagons and some installations. Thereafter, he flew a number of reconnaissance missions, bringing back a large volume of intelligence and other missions against railway marshalling yards and Raiwind and the Kasur-Lahore railway track, destroying a large number of wagons and causing devastation at each target in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire, and against Pakistani air opposition. Throughout the operations, Wing Commander D’Costa displayed conspicuous gallantry, determination, leadership and professional skill.”
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... war-328751

Subedar Kali Das of 8 J&K Militia, an unsung ‘Maha Vir’ of 1971 war

extracts
And for sure, there are moments even during the most lethal phases of a battle when a son of the soil chooses to far exceed his solemn oath of “Aagya ka palan karunga”, as was the case of Subedar Kali Das of 8 J&K Militia Battalion, who on December 8, 1971, of his free volition, volunteered to stay back and single-handedly kept enemy hindrance sufficiently subdued, so as to enable the withdrawal of his Company to a depth locality under broad daylight, on the “killing fields” of the Chhamb battlefield.

8 J&K had been tasked to hold with one Company each the dominating hillocks, Point 707 and Laleali, which provided an excellent vision of Pakistani army dispositions across the LoC, and another Company on Nathua Tibba, a hillock echeloned to the rear, while the Battalion Headquarters with the fourth Company were deployed on the relatively open terrain at Dewa, the start point of a motorable track leading to Akhnoor. As the battle unfolded on the eve of December 3, 8 J&K emerged among the chosen favourites of Pakistan’s artillery shelling reprisals, followed by the opening infantry assaults, simultaneously on 707 and Laleali from 2020 hours to 2140 hours. But for the two bunkers dislodged at 707, the enemy paid a very heavy price in dead and wounded. And in any case, by 0300 hours of December 4, even those two bunkers were back with 8 J&K after a spirited local counter-attack.

Irked by the 8 J&K’s stubborn defiance right up to December 6, Laleali was next attacked by a battalion, with both sides exchanging blow for blow till the two opposing Company Commanders (Maj Virender Kumar and Major Farook Ali) came face to face such that “of the two, one had to die; fortunately, Viroo lives to fight again”. Viroo was awarded the Vir Chakra and so also Farook its equivalent, posthumously.

Piqued by the stalemate, on December 7, Pakistan shifted focus on to Dewa with tanks supporting infantry assaults, preceded by intense artillery fire assaults, again and yet again. Eventually, by 1445 hours on December 8, Dewa defences had become untenable and 8 J&K were ordered to withdraw to a locality in depth. However, as the Pakistanis were at last riding the crest of the winning wave, it was essential to keep them engaged with automatic fire in order to facilitate self-extrication from Dewa right under the enemy’s nose and in broad daylight visibility conditions.


This is when Subedar Kali Das volunteered to put up a lone “Last Stand” at Dewa. He exchanged his stengun for an LMG, commandeered six to eight magazines of ammunition, crawled into a bunker best suited for LMG trajectory and kept the enemy at bay till he was shot dead and his comrades by then, well out of harm’s way!

After the ceasefire, his body in a coffin was handed over to 8 J&K by the Pakistanis with a citation which read,


“This is the body of Subedar Kali Das of 8 J&K Militia. He died while fighting very bravely in Area Tank ahead of Dewa Post. He did not leave his trench till the last breath. After inflicting heavy casualties, he became a target of a Ghazi’s bullet. His badges of rank are available. A piece of paper was found in his pocket, revealing his name.”

Despite such high praise from the enemy, Subedar Kali Das’ act of valour went unrecognised.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... ndh-335117

Daring exploits of 9 Sikh and 10 Sikh in Lipa valley (PoK) and Purbut Ali (Sindh)
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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THE FALL OF DHAKA: “The Mega Surrender and Birth of Bangladesh''
Oct 26, 2021
Rashtriya Raksha University, India
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgx4O2hJwMA&t=29s
10th Monthly 1971 War Webinar Series on Battle of Fazilka- Amidst Danger, They Persevered by SISDSS
1,526 viewsStreamed live on Sep 29, 2021
wig
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cit ... urce=email

How commandos, fate helped overcome a missed chance

the article above written by Major General O P Sabharwal ( Retd). It covers the defensive battle fought during the 1971 war protecting the approach to Akhnoor by the gallant officers and men of The 9 th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, ably assisted by three tanks of The Deccan Horse and six guns of 216 Medium Regiment under Major Ranbir Singh

extracted
In1971, Lt Gen Sartaj Singh, general officer commanding (GOC) of 15 Corps, had planned a limited offensive into Pakistan from Chamb-Jaurian. The 10 Infantry Division with additional troops was to carry out the offensive. Alfa group of 9 Para Commando battalion, under Maj M M Ashok Cariappa, was allotted to10 Infantry Division. I was a lieutenant colonel and commanding officer of the battalion, which was with the infantry division to coordinate offensive tasks.


Around the middle of November 1971, there was a war game about the offensive plans and loose ends were being tied up for the offensive.

Lt Gen Sartaj Singh had given his outline plan for the offensive when I got up and said: “While we are planning offensive into Pakistan, my commandos who are deployed all along the frontline looking for gaps in Pakistani defences to infiltrate during the war, tell me that Pakistan seems to be building up opposite us with tanks, artillery, and a lot of infantry movement has been seen.”

Brigadier R K Jasbir Singh, commander of the 191 Infantry Brigade, got up and said: “I endorse Lt Col Sabharwal’s views.” General Sartaj roared: “It’s all rubbish. As D-Day is approaching, you chaps are getting ‘yellow’.”

There was pin-drop silence. I got up and volunteered to lead a confirmatory patrol behind the enemy lines to see for myself and report and sought permission to do so. This was agreed to and permission was given by the commander.

At 9 pm on November 20,1971, Capt Keshav Padha, Havildar Waryam Singh, Lance Naik Karam Singh, Paratrooper Pushpinder Singh (radio operator), and I were to cross into Pakistan and spend around eight hours behind enemy lines, to look for any signs of Pakistani buildup. Before we could go ahead, Lt Gen Sartaj Singh rang up: “You will not go across. I repeat, you will not go across.”

This, I feel, was a big mistake.

Vital bridge

On December 3, 1971, Maj Gen Jaswant Singh and I were visiting headquarters of the 191 Infantry Brigade, the forward brigade, to tie up and meet with Brig R K Jasbir Singh to get the latest information. After the discussion, when we were about to leave, Brig Jasbir Singh offered us a drink. Just then, heavy shelling from Pakistan began.

The war had started.

General Jaswant and I headed back for our command posts. As we were crossing the Chamb bridge, we stopped. It was unmanned. Gen Jaswant Singh, seeing this, told me: “Sabu, you will defend this for me no matter at what cost; this bridge is going to be vital for this battle.”

Having rehearsed day in and day out for offensive tasks behind enemy lines, here I was given a task in a purely infantry role.

Nevertheless, we were determined to do our best. On December 4, 1971, around 3 pm, Capt Cariappa with his boys arrived at the bridge and started digging to defend the structure. Around 400 yards behind them were three tanks of Deccan Horse .800. Behind them, there were 6 guns of 39 Medium Regiment, commanded by Major Ranbir Singh.

Azad Kashmir Brigade of Pakistan, having overrun some of the forward Indian positions, was in the area of the western bank of Tawi since December 4 or 5. Their task was to advance along Chamb, Jaurian and Akhnoor. When the advancing elements of the Pakistani brigade reached the western banks of the Munnawar Tawi, they were clueless of the fact that at that given time, there was nothing between them and Akhnoor bridge except the commandos, yet they failed to make it to Akhnoor bridge.

At the same time, commandos were blissfully unaware of the fact that apart from them, there were no other fighting forces behind them on the road between the two bridges.
Saviours of Akhnoor

The commandos, a troop of tanks, and a battery of gunners stood firm and became saviours of Akhnoor and Jammu by giving Lt Gen Sartaj Singh enough time to redeploy his forces.

During December 4-5 night, the Pakistani brigade launched three fierce attacks on the bridge. Each attack was preceded by an intense earth-shattering artillery barrage that seemed to last for eternity. The first attack with the battle cry of ‘Allah Hu Akbar’ came around 2 am. It was on the commando team led by Capt Macarius. Initially, we lost some ground in this attack, but it was soon regained by a local counterattack led by Capt Macarius.

The second attack came around 3 am, which came on the team commanded by Capt Amar Bisht. This too was repulsed, with heavy losses to Pakistanis. In both these attacks, medium machine gun (MMG) teams of Naik Ram Singh and Lance Naik Hoshiar Singh, and of Havildar Bahal Chand and Commando Ram Singh played a vital role. Between them, they fired 12,000 rounds and inflicted heavy losses on attacking Pakistanis. The third Pakistani attack came around 5 am. By this time, the enemy had been vanquished and chased across the western bank of Tawi.

The commanding officer of 13 Azad Kashmir along with nine of his men had been taken prisoner. During the battle, we lost a few commandos, including Lance Naik Hoshiar Singh, Commando Ram Singh and Lance Naik Om Prakash. Ten commandos, including Capt M A Cariappa, were wounded.


In this battle, fate intervened and there were two lucky breaks for India. One, out of the blue, commandos arrived to defend the Chamb bridge at the most crucial time. Two, the GOC of Pakistan’s 23 Infantry Division, Maj Gen Iftikhar Janjua, died in a helicopter crash on December 9.

If Chamb and surrounding areas are still with India and Pakistanis could not reach Akhnoor, the credit for this must go to Alfa group of 9-Para Commando under Maj Cariappa, three tanks of Deccan Horse, and six guns of 216 Medium Regiment under the leadership of Major Ranbir Singh.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... lla-337891
14 Jat and conquest of Comilla by Maj Gen GG Dwivedi (Retd)

excerpts

Advance to Comilla
At 0830 hours on December 7, Maj Gen RD Hira, MVC, GOC of 23 Mountain Division, tasked Lt Col LN Sabharwal, CO of 14 Jat, to capture Comilla as soon as possible. Comilla, a politically important town, was a vital communication centre. Its early capture was crucial for further progress of the Division operations. The attack was planned in three phases:

The battalion commenced the advance to Comilla at 1000 hours on December 7. En route, the enemy position at Gazaria was cleared by ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies and Lakshmipur by ‘C’ Company, where six enemy soldiers were taken prisoner.

After last light, the ‘A’ Company under Maj KN Rai resumed advance and I was leading the navigation party. We quickly secured the airfield. Hereon, in the absence of an updated map, I had to rely on a captured Razakar (militia soldier) as the guide. Ironically, we completely missed the objective, Tomtom (Thomson) Bridge, envisaging it to be a prominent landmark though it was actually an incognito culvert. Consequently, the Company Headquarters and leading platoons walked right into the enemy’s main defences, with the CO’s party following just on the heels.

Fleeting ambush

It was almost midnight and in close proximity were a few Pakistani soldiers loading weapons in a truck. To maintain surprise, there was complete radio silence. Hence, Maj Rai asked me to check from the CO if we were to continue the advance. I must have gone hardly 40-50 metres down the road when two enemy vehicles, a jeep and a 1-tonne, suddenly appeared, heading towards the town. As I swiftly moved aside, the jeep drawing fire from our troops deployed around came to a screeching halt right where I was.

Instantly, I fired a long burst from my carbine at the jeep, at almost handshake distance. As I was about to fire another burst, someone abruptly jumped out from the jeep in front of me. Spontaneously, I fired at him but after two rounds, the carbine got jammed and the individual managed to flee, pleading; “Have mercy in Allah’s name!”

As I was in the process of removing stoppage from the carbine, a volley of bullets from the jeep went whistling over my head. Someone pulled me down. It was Sepoy Chote Lal from ‘A’ Company Headquarters. Soon, the jeep was aflame and exploded with a bang. The 1-tonne was engaged by Capt SJ Bhatia, Battalion Adjutant, and was destroyed too. In this lightning action, 12 enemy soldiers were killed.

Making my way back to ‘A’ Company amidst the melee with Chote Lal in tow, I bumped into men of ‘B’ Company, who momentarily took me to be a Pakistani officer. Timely intervention by Maj Bachan Singh, ‘B’ Company Commander, saved the situation. As I passed by our 81 Mortar detachment, which was in the process of deployment, an enemy artillery shell landed in its vicinity, killing three of our men.

Close-quarter combat

Soon I linked back with the ‘A’ Company Headquarters. A bloody skirmish was on. During the ensuing fire-fight, Company Havildar Major Kishen Singh single-handedly destroyed two enemy machine guns in a close-quarter engagement, taking a heavy toll of the enemy. In the process, he was fatally wounded. Major Rai, in another daring action, silenced a BMG. Subedar Raghubir Singh, ‘A’ Company senior JCO, was also killed in this action. It was deeply tormenting. I had developed a close bond with both Raghubir and Kishen in just a few days.

The fighting continued through the night, amidst complete confusion. It being a built-up area, our operations had to progress from house to house in small teams, hand grenades being used extensively. The artillery support was not very effective against well-fortified defences. By early morning, Comilla finally fell. The intensity of fighting was evident from the enemy casualties: 43 killed and 32 were taken prisoner (including Maj Shah Nawaz Khan, 2i/c of 30 Punjab, who had escaped by jumping out of the jeep a few hours earlier; he was found in a wounded condition in hospital). More than 50 weapons were captured. Our casualty list included 17 killed and wounded.

It was a Herculean feat, 40-km distance covered on foot in barely eight hours with full battle loads, and the enemy being taken by complete surprise. Soon, people in large numbers came out on the streets euphorically shouting “Joi Bangla”. They offered us eatables and cigarette packets as a mark of gratitude.

The Army Commander, Lt Gen JS Aurora, and Corps Commander Lt Gen Sagat Singh landed at the Comilla airfield the same day to a rousing welcome by the locals. They personally complimented the CO for our Battalion’s commendable performance in capturing Comilla.

CHM Kishen Singh was awarded Vir Chakra (posthumous) for his raw courage and extraordinary valour. Maj Rai was awarded Sena Medal for his daring, upfront leadership. The Battalion was conferred with “Theatre Honour Comilla”.

On December 15-16, our Battalion was tasked to capture Nabiganj, Bandar-Madanganj-Narayanganj, the well-prepared defensive positions on the outskirts of Dhaka. These were hard-fought fiery actions, with both sides taking heavy casualties: the enemy had 40 killed while we suffered 28 (killed and wounded).

The Battalion Mortar Platoon under Capt SS Tanwar proved very effective, compensating for the paucity of artillery support; its performance was lauded even by the adversary. 14 Jat, raised on October 1, 1963, acquitted itself with distinction in the finest traditions of the Indian Army. In war, there are many defining battles which remain unknown, Comilla being one such classic action.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... war-340986

Engineering the victory march in 1971 war
Such a rapid offensive in a riverine country — East Pakistan, later Bangladesh — with few roads and antiquated bridges could not have made headway but for the traditional skill of the Sappers in improvisation

extracted
The motivation and morale could be gauged from the visit of Maj Gen Lehl, GOC of 20 Mountain Division, to the Military Hospital. He was told by one of our wounded soldiers: “Sir, do check how our men were lying dead at Morapara and Hilli. All would be facing the enemy.” Gen Lehl, in his book “Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan”, writes: “How right he was. No wonder 8 Guards and supporting troops fought so well.”


Such a rapid offensive in a riverine country with few roads and antiquated bridges could not have made headway but for the traditional skill of the Sappers in improvisation. At the surrender ceremony at Bogra on December 18, our 471 Engineer Brigade Commander, Col M Suri, and our CO, Lt Col Malik, happened to meet the Commanding Officer of 13 Engineer Battalion (Pakistan army). His appreciation spoke volumes: “Sir, I simply admire the way your boys brought the Division virtually on their shoulders over the most indifferent and unexpected approach. We could never imagine that such a large force could ever advance over a route we had ruled out as impossible.”
Another incident comes to mind that highlights the bravery and grit of the men. 76 Field Company was moving with their bridging column when they suddenly came under strafing by the Pakistan Air Force. As per the drill, all the men dispersed to take positions. In this process, an ASC driver stepped on a mine and got his leg blown off. Maj OP Batra, who was the Company Commander, wanted to go and recover the jawan but he was stopped by Capt Amrish Sharma: “Sir, he is from my platoon and I will go get him.” Amrish went inside the minefield and lifted this jawan on his shoulders and brought him on the road.
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... war-343683

Capt Swaraj Parkash, who played a stellar role as Captain of INS Vikrant during 1971 war


extracted
Parkash was instrumental in getting the ship going, in backing his engineers to resolve its boiler problems and much else through typical Indian innovation, and in working up his air squadrons to perfection. Almost miraculously, within four months, the carrier and its aircrew were raring to go. Parkash meant business in preparing for war. In the words of the late Vice Admiral BR Chowdhury, who served as Parkash’s Chief Engineer at that time, “Vikrant got ready for war because of the unique leadership and interdependence which spontaneously developed under a competent, wise and humane command.”

When the hostilities commenced, Vikrant was the centrepiece of the Navy’s offensive in the east, and the relentless operations of the vessel’s air wing resulted in the destruction of enemy shipping, port infrastructure — particularly in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar — and lines of communication, leading to the strangulation of East Pakistan at sea and contributing to the Pakistani surrender at Dhaka.

For his leadership and for the risks he took in operating in hazardous waters close to the enemy coast and yet ensuring an accident-free outcome, Parkash was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. His comrade during the war and then skipper of INS Kamorta, Capt (later Vice Admiral) MP Awati, described Parkash’s feat as “a masterful display of seamanship and shiphandling”.

One instance of this attribute of Parkash’s came to the fore on the afternoon of December 4, 1971, when Vikrant was ordered to strike Chittagong. At that time, the other fleet units were on a submarine search-and-attack mission and Vikrant had no anti-submarine or anti-air protection. Launching an air attack then would have seemed foolhardy, and many of Parkash’s officers advised him against it. After deliberating on it for some time, Parkash said, “Like bloody hell. I did not come to this point to turn back without attacking. Launch the strike.” Capt CM Vyas, the Fleet Operations Officer at the time, described the order thus: “Those were the sweetest words I ever heard. Here was leadership of very exceptional quality.”

This extraordinary respect that Parkash got from his seniors, peers and subordinates is evident even today. Rear Admiral Santosh Kumar Gupta, Commander of the Sea Hawk squadron during the war and himself a Maha Vir Chakra awardee, describes Parkash:

“Capt Parkash was a thorough professional. Very mature and stable by nature, he was a person who inspired confidence all-round. I was soon to acknowledge that he was an extraordinary Captain who was temperamentally cool and relaxed and ever ready to take prompt action in any emergency. He was a true leader of men. Prior to 1971, there had been seven Captains of repute of Vikrant I had served with, and I can say with confidence that he was the most exceptional, and I was indeed fortunate that I saw him at close quarters.”
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.indianpolitics.co.in/untold ... neck-1971/

Untold Exploits of Indian Special Forces, Capture of Chicken Neck 1971

please do read the full write up. it details the operations by 9 Para in the Jammu Akhnoor sector
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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Image
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Re: Remembering the 1971 war

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https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comme ... rit-357851
Capture of Brachil Pass tribute to Army’s spirit
It had taken more than 36 hours to capture the formidable Brachil Pass. The enemy had defended it valiantly. Over 40 km of Pak-occupied territory and 19 enemy posts were captured by 18 Punjab, earning the battle honour ‘Brachil & Wali, Malik’. The morale of our men remained high because of our camaraderie, regimentation, unit ethos and good training. This operation was the Army’s early tryst with winter warfare in high-altitude terrain.
extracted
we descended stealthily at last light from Kala Pahar at Kargil, astride the Srinagar-Leh road, and moved in a single lane through our own minefield, treading softly, so that no rolling stones alerted the enemy. However, the sudden emergence of a few stone-walled huts in the desolate surroundings while crossing the Line of Control had imposed caution on us, lest some inimical elements may be present there. Suddenly, a captivating picnic spot appeared while we moved through a flattish area, but now tremendous danger lurked in that bone-chilling cold, dark night. We had never imagined earlier that some day we would be destined to set foot in that forbidden valley.

At Conical, a feature that took its fancy name from its appearance, like many other features in the mountains, the Brachil Pass, the main objective assigned to 18 Punjab became discernible. Brachil is an awesome mountain pass that stands at a height of 4,260 metres (13,990 feet) with sharp, protruding features amidst the mountain tops of the Kargil region and opens the gateway beyond to Skardu. The short halt taken at Conical to dump our heavy baggage, bivouacs, and back-packs was enough to chill the feet and the frozen sweat could cause chilblains or frostbite.


Evidently, the terrain favoured the defenders at Kargil, because they were well entrenched to face the onslaught of an attack and also to brave the freezing temperature of minus 25°C.

After having plodded the entire night, and as the wee hours approached, silhouettes of the enemy post Bahar, the outer crust of Brachil Pass defences, loomed out of the hazy darkness. Suddenly, a Pakistani sentry challenged us, screaming in a shaky voice, “Kaun hai”, and an illumination round fired by the Pakistanis lit up the area around. Our arrival had stunned the Pakistanis. The ordeal had just begun. Even before the illumination round had extinguished, enemy machine guns opened up and the valley reverberated with the echo of the machine gun fire.


The capture of Bahar had been tasked to Charlie Company, commanded by Major Sarjit Singh Sahota. As daylight was approaching fast, Major Sahota decided to lead the assault himself. Raising his walking stick skywards, he stood up to make his men realise that the enemy fire was going overhead. He then rushed forward, urging the men to move forward for the assault. Full-throated ‘jaikaras’, ‘Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal’, ‘Durga Mata Ki Jai’ and our battalion war cry, ‘Har Maidan Fateh’, rent the air, resounding all over and reaching a crescendo.

Major Sahota was wounded by grenade splinters, blood oozed from his neck, but he resolutely carried on wishing that he would collapse only after the Brachil Pass was captured. Major Sahota was evacuated later, but he returned after a couple of days with thick bandages around his neck. He was awarded the Sena Medal.


The battle for the enemy’s post Bahar had begun. The enemy’s sustained machine gun fire impeded our uphill assault. Havildar Gurmukh Singh was hit by a bullet. Incessant lobbing of grenades by the enemy raked us. Splinters of a grenade burnt a hole in my coat parkha, and the smell of burnt rubber oozed from my right-foot snow boot.

Then we heard the Commanding Officer, Lt Col Bhim Sen Joshi, exclaiming, “tagre ho, tagre ho”. Creditably, Lt Col Joshi had imparted us extensive training, turning the battalion into a hardened, battle-fighting machine.


Undeterred, Sepoy Sampuran Singh threw a grenade in the machine gun bunker, neutralising its occupants. The machine gun and its ammunition were captured intact. Sepoy Sampuran Singh was awarded the Vir Chakra. As Lieutenant Ramesh (Gulshi) Bhola, a gallant officer of Charlie Company, came nearer, we chanced upon one of our medium machine guns being hauled up. The men carrying it appeared exhausted and were lagging behind. We pulled and shoved these men uphill. They got emboldened on reaching the top. Later, I was to gift my ‘kara’ (iron bangle), to Gulshi Bhola; he still wears it and proudly displays it as a token of our lifelong bond.

Gulshi and Subedar Mohinder Singh’s platoon were rushed forward for the assault. The perplexed enemy ran rearwards, but opened fire, killing three of our men. Weapons, mortars, huge quantities of ammunition, rations and clothing were captured. Bodies lay scattered. Subedar Mohinder Singh was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
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