Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

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johneeG
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby johneeG » 21 Oct 2015 09:05

g.sarkar wrote:
Gagan wrote:What can GoI do?
It can't officially ban Pakistanis participating in events that the government has no oversight of.
Yet it is common knowledge that these sneering scumbags hate the kafirs, pass snide remarks against the kafirs, but like kafir money.
I for one support the Shiv Sena on this wholesomely! Their methods are crude, but once the fear is created, they won't have to resort to actually doing things. One hopes that in the future, just a kindly worded letter from the Shiv Sena politely requesting people not to employ pakistanis in India will suffice.

I agree completely that there should be no politics with Cricket and so on. But, beheading Indian soldiers is not politics by any ones standard! There is one thing GoI can easily do. When I was living in Germany many Moons ago, their government had one way of completely shutting out non-European foreigners. They would make the employers explain why the job could not be given to German or an European. It was very difficult for any one to argue that any one particular job could be done by no German. This law kept out all but the very best. GoI can easily implement something similar.
Gautam


Indeed. Terrorism is not politics. I can even understand the concept of playing with your arch-enemies. Not to my liking, but understandable. But, playing games with barbaric terrorists is beyond understanding. Its just undefendable by any logic.

A proper method of protest is a side issue. The bigger issue is, "can Pakistan be treated like a civilized country when it behaves like a barbarian?"

----
Gagan saar,
I think the ones who know most intimately about artificiality of Pakistan is Pakjabis themselves. They know that Pakistan is not meant to thrive or even survive. So, from their perspective, survival for any short period is seen as a great victory. Let me give an analogy: lets say some naxals occupy a group of villages in dhesh and declare it as an 'independent redistan'. Do they expect that 'country' to survive? No. Its just chance pe dance thing. They expect Dhesh to retake those villages. The same is the case with Pakjabis and Pakistan. When Pakijabis say that they are sitting on strategic location, they mean to say that they are occupying a part of Bhaarath.

Now, interestingly, Bhaarath has not shown any inclination to take back Pakistan. This is a boon and curse for Pakistan. Boon for Pakistan because it survives. Curse for Pakistan because its cut off from Bhaarath. They feel as if they are cut off and alone. So, they try to comfort themselves by running in to the lap of some massa or ummah. And massa and ummah treat pakjabis like slaves.

Pakistan sees itself as part of Bhaarath. It behaves as part of Bhaarath. Pakjabis take their cues from sec-lib narrative. Most of the points are given to Pakjabais by dheshi sec-libs only. I wonder how the rest of the world sees indo-pak thing. How does a westerner differentiate between Pakistani and Indian? For example, how do we view Taiwan vs China thing?

What is most interesting is that:
The sec-libs support playing games with Pakistan.
The sec-libs support making movies with Pakistan.
The sec-libs support all kinds of cultural contacts with Pakistan and other friendly relations with them, even when there is proxy-war. Even when soldiers and citizens are dying in droves. Yet, they want to continue with their games and dances.

The same sec-libs absolutely oppose the idea of Akhand Bhaarath. Isn't that strange. If we can be so friendly friendly with Pakistan, then why have Pakistan as separate entity? Shouldn't Akhand Bhaarath be the highest form of lovey dovey with Pakistan? I can understand communal Hindhus opposing Akhand Bhaarath. But, what logic can sec-libs have for opposing the idea of Akhand Bhaarath? Sec-lib narrative is that the muslims are a wonderful community who have given a lot to the country and civilization. So, what logic can they have for opposing the idea of Akhand Bhaarath? Surely, inclusion of Pakistan into Bhaarath is going to be wonderful because muslim community has given so much in past according to them.

If Pakistanis want to come to Bhaarath to make movies, sell books, play games, ...etc, then why even have a separate country?

I think Pakistan has been allowed to survive by kongis deliberately. (This is clearly seen during shimla. Its a clear lifeline.) Pakjabis seem to know this very well. Just listen to the narrative of kongis and Pakjabis. Its one and the same. They both say the same thing in a different way. Kongi sec-lib depends on Paki jihad and vice versa. Both of them are afraid of saffron because it will end their fake nonsense. These are same set of elites planted during colonial rule. One set were given one part of the country and another set given another part to rule as puppets.

Now, one puppet has been dethroned. So, the other puppet is counting its days. The sec-libs know that Pakistan is an artificial country. They know that it will break at the slightest action of Dhesh. Thats why they run to its rescue.

There was a point raised in 'evolution of Indian strategic thought' thread: What is the actual goal of Bhaarath? What is the goal of accumulation of power and wealth?

I think the first simple and straight-forward answer to that question is: Akhand Bhaarath.
To restore Bhaarath's territory which was lost due to invasions and colonialism. And then to ghar-wapas the people of those locations and to connect them back to the Bhaarath's civilization. Akhand Bhaarath is not just about Pakistan. But, Pakistan is definitely the biggest stumbling block to realizing Bhaarath's full potential. Akhand Bhaarath is equivalent to One China Policy. We should learn from China on this point.

As for Kashmir, Pakistan has no locus standi on Kashmir. They have no case whatsoever. They are the ones who are illegally occupying Kashmir. The whole noise about Kashmir is just a distraction. The fact is Pakistan is sitting on Lahore which was Bhaarath's territory. Sindhu-saraswathi civilization thrived in those areas. And they belong to Bhaarath civilization.

This post seems better for strategic evolution thread, so I'll cross-post it there.

member_29172
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby member_29172 » 21 Oct 2015 09:22

An interesting article that articulates in some 400 words, what members here have known for long. These elite cabals of intellectuals are detrimental to India and it's interests.

Boutique Liberal Activism: Has our freedom of expression really been suppressed?
http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/standp ... ed-2136625

Is our Freedom of Expression really suppressed? If yes, how come people are freely expressing it? I remember the times when plain clothed CID officers followed anyone who was anti-Indira. Are we really intolerant? How come we have so many political parties ruling so many different states? This means there is political tolerance. In industry we have equal opportunities for all kinds of enterprise. Malls exist in the midst of local bazaars and street vendors. Sikhs have shops in the heart of Srinagar. Biharis have farms in Punjab. Which means there is no financial intolerance. In administration, education and health we never question the religion or political alignment of the practitioner. If people can openly criticise the Prime Minister, ridicule religious leaders, question social taboos, debate issues ranging from FTII to bar dancers, return Akademi awards, make fun of regional leaders, it proves that there is no media or FoE intolerance. Close your eyes and visualise Indian map. Try to visualise each and every town, village and hamlet, focusing on how people live there? Are they at conflict? Are they killing each other? Are people eating what they wish? Are they wearing what they wish to wear? Do Hindus, Muslims, Christians and other minorities live, work, socialise together? We enjoy kavi sammelans and mushairas with same enthusiasm. We hum our geet and our ghazals with same joy. All young lovers fall back on Urdu shayari to express their love. Bollywood music will lose its sheen without Urdu lyrics. In movies, don’t we cry and laugh together? Generally speaking, people live in harmony and in a certain social order. Supreme Court opening at midnight to reconsider Yakub Memon’s death penalty on one side and some people celebrating Godse’s anniversary on the other side. It indicates that there is extreme tolerance for polarised cultural and religious sensibilities. Writers are free to write on any subject, take, and then return their awards as a protest. In art, in literature, in films and in almost all creative fields there is tremendous tolerance for different ideas and creations. We don’t buy a pot on the basis of the colour of its potter. Is this fear of intolerance built on real threat or perceived threat? Does this exist in flesh or is it just a ghost?

Who is dividing our society? Who is communalising issues? When a Dadri happens why do TV channels invite Owaisi and Sadhvi Prachi? What has Owaisi’s relevance to this theme when he has no locus standi in the politics of UP? How is Sadhvi Prachi relevant to cow-slaughter? Is Sakshi Maharaj a spokesperson for Hindu aspirations? Is he the sole BJP MP to comment on every social issue? Why aren’t sane, rational voices heard anymore? Why haven’t I heard a ‘cow slaughter laws’ expert enlightening us on ‘Cowism’? I’ll tell you why. If you invite sane voices of reason, the game of boutique activism stands exposed. Boutique Liberal Activism feeds on misery of others. Schadenfreude is the oxygen of their business. That’s why they show only the miserable side of our society. Have you noticed that the evolved, enlightened and reasonable voice of India is absolutely absent from national discourse? Now, you decide, who divides.

Our society is divided into ‘overclass’ (as described by Michale Find) and ‘underclass’. Overclass has systematically siphoned off the national wealth leaving underclass to fight for two square meals. They either inherited or, in collusion with the corrupt regimes, appointed themselves to the positions of power and influence. With strong control over information, they kept underclass in the dark. Their word was the final word. The biggest trick the overclass played on underclass is keeping the hope alive that only they can get them out of this abject poverty. That we have problems and they have the solution. This is the same trick godmen and Satan play on us. The same trick Indian overclass played on us. This disproportionate overclass with social, economic and political clout has constantly shown disdain and contempt for the traditional social values and the underclass is now questioning their motives. If different ideologies, traditions and cultures co-exist and democracy finds popular favour, it’s not due to this narrow but influential elite. It’s due to the tolerance level of the underclass. With level playing field in social media, their game is exposed.

Two phenomenon disturbed this status quo. One, the advent of social media, and second, the rise of Narendra Modi. With the easy access to social and digital media, underclass started questioning the authenticity of information provided by the overclass. Suddenly, their statements are scrutinised, their credibility is questioned, their sinister campaigns and lies are exposed. Their dilemma is that they if they quit social media, they lose their relevance and if they stay, they lose their credibility. This war of intolerance isn’t between HDL (Hindu Defence League) and MDL (Muslim Defence league). This isn’t between the left and the right. This is between the overclass and the underclass. The intellectual hierarchy has been demolished. It’s a sad commentary that in the world’s largest democracy, the writers’ protest has become a subject of jokes. The power hungry artists, writers, academia and media in India waste so much time making political statements to hide behind their lack of intellectual stands. Michel Houellebecq wrote 'Submission', a strong political statement, he didn’t get press coverage for returning some award. The lustre is gone from our intellectual discourse. Secularism has lost its ideological currency. Artists, writers, activists are all suspects. Media czars have lost their access to corridors of power and to people’s hearts. It’s the overclass’ space that has been taken over by the underclass. Their discomfort is with the new order where the others are also heard. Hence, the feeling of shrinking space, by the overclass. They are intolerant to this new phenomenon— the emergence of underclass. They try to devalue this new, empowered underclass by associating it with Modi and, therefore, Hindutva, and that’s a grave mistake. The universe that was full of their voice has shrunk to accommodate this new voice. This is what they call an attack on FoE and growing intolerance.

They work exactly like religion. Most of the religious books are based on fear. If you do this, that will happen. Nobody knows what ‘this’ or ‘that’ is. Social justice, if it has to come, will come only from a free and fair market. Why didn’t our liberals tell us this simple truth? When agendas, vote banks and self-delusion take over, reasoning and sympathy are needed to keep up a common conversation. Without it, there is aggression, deafness, and an obsession with purification; hence the divisive politics of Boutique Liberalism. Boutique Liberalism is an Indian tragedy and a very damaging detour into the quicksand of communalism. Indian Liberalism has come to mean the colour opposite of saffron. That’s their failure. In a desperate attempt, their new mantra is -“We don’t care if you are a gay, we want to know whether you are a liberal or a Sanghi gay?”

Stupid ideas thrive on stupid people. If we let stupid ideas become central to our national debate, we are also proving ourselves to be stupid. Like excellence, stupidity is also habit forming. Who is stupid and dumb? The newsmen who sell rubbish as news or the audience who believe in rubbish as news? They will keep pointing at our problems. They will love us only when we have problems. This illusion needs to be destroyed before it sucks us in. We have that power. The power to ignore the stupid.

johneeG
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby johneeG » 21 Oct 2015 09:25

(Seedhi Baat) We believe in united India: Mohan Bhagwat . Part 1 of 4

Philip
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby Philip » 24 Oct 2015 17:35

The mandarins of the MEA have been mute spectators to the rapidly unfolding events in the ME,Syria,etc.Our pathetic news channels too show us mostly sparring with Pak,verbiosity galore on both sides,verbiage often closer to garbage .Peace with Pak is a pojntless exercise,yet our mandarins keep on regardless as if their attempts will bring them the Nobel gong! One For.Sec. in the past certainly had such ambitions. It would be interesting to list the successes that we've had in recent times.

Mr.Modi has been spot on in his international forays trying to get India back into the global consciousness ,reminding the world of our ancient and hoary history plus the fact that we're the world's largest democracy,a nuclear/mil power to boot. Our past greatness and current capability is however, inversely proportionate to the confidence and vision of our MEA mandarins who pontificate from their ivory towers. Forgetting Pak's perfidy and pathological hatred of India,our other neighbours too like the Maldives and Nepal have often abuse us and sometimes display ingratitude to the extreme. Bharat karnad has just written a book on the siiue,why we will never be a great power.A pity to have missed the function a few days ago. Did anyone attend it? Shiv?

http://bharatkarnad.com/

Belated Invite — Bangalore
Posted on October 8, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Blog-readers in Bangalore are invited to an event at the Lecture Hall, National Institute for Advanced Studies (Indian Institute of Science campus) at 4 PM tomorrow (Friday, Oct 9) hosted jointly by NIAS and the Takshashila Institute. The event will lead off with the JRD Tata Professor at NIAS, Dr. Chandrashekhar and Nitin Pai, heading Takshashila, having a conversation with me on my new book published by Oxford University Press — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’. It will be followed by an interactive session with the audience, which is expected to have many from the DPSUs and serving and retired military community. It should be an interesting session. Those among you in the Bangalore area, do please consider this a personal invite.

Discussion — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’, video
Posted on October 2, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

The panel discussion following the formal launch on Sep 24 of my new book — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ published by Oxford University Press, involving former minister in the Manmohan Singh cabinet and the only genuine intellectual in the Congress Party, Jairam Ramesh, ex-NSA Shivshankar Menon, Rear Admiral KR ‘Raja’Menon (Retd), former head of Net Assessment and Simulation in NSC and ACS (Ops), and Lt Gen SL Narasimhan, Commandant, Army War College, Mhow, is very revealing of where the problems lie. It is an interesting watch! The entire book launch event was videographed, is now uploaded to youtube.com and accessible at:

Great Power: a ‘bridge too far’ for India?
Posted on October 1, 2015 by Bharat Karnad

Think of it. India was there when the Pharaohs ruled Egypt. It interacted with the Ancient Mesopotamian empires on the Tigris and the Euphrates. India was the mystery Alexander of Macedon set out to conquer. Indian spices and precious stones, finely woven cottons and silk, and peacocks, were the luxuries and the exotica craved by Imperial Rome in the age of the Caesers. Much of Southeast and offshore Asia had Hindu kingdoms, and absorbed Indic values and culture, even as Tibet, Central Asia, China, and Japan came under the thrall of Buddhism emanating from the subcontinent. The Ramayana lore so forms the cultural core of countries in this “Farther India” that the 800-year old Thai monarchy still has its historic capital of Ayuthhaya, an ancient form of Hinduism is still practised in Bali, Indonesia, and the adventures of the great Monkey King with mythical powers journeying to the “Western Kingdom” – India – remains the stuff of traditional stories dear to the people of China. So, India is and has always been a civilizational presence and cultural magnet. Alas, that is a far cry from being a great power in the modern age.

Except India, its civilizational imprint aside, has all the attributes of a great power. It has prime strategic location enabling domination of the Indian Ocean, supplanting the Atlantic Ocean as the most strategically important waterway. India’s peninsular landmass jutting out into the sea is, as many have noted, like the prow of an immense aircraft carrier, permitting Indian naval assets and land-based air forces to maintain a grip on the oceanic expanse and choke off adversary forces foraying into “the Indian lake” at the Malacca, Lumbok and Sunda Straits in the east and, in the west, the eastern ends of Hormuz and Suez, and prevent a land power such as China from accessing these proximal seas.

India has a burgeoning economy and the largest, most youthful workforce in the 18-35 age-group, promising the manpower to make India both a manufacturing powerhouse — the “workshop” to the world — and the richest, most extensive, consumer market. Further, the country has been a “brain bank” the world has long drawn on – an endless source of talented scientists, engineers and financial managers from institutions, such as IITs, IIMs, and IISC that are now global brands, helping India to emerge as a knowledge power (in information technology, pharmaceuticals, engineering research and development, and “frugal engineering”). India, moreover, is a stable if raucous democracy, and boasts of one of the largest, most apolitical, professional and “live fire”-blooded militaries anywhere. So, why isn’t India a great power yet?

India is bereft of national vision and self-confidence. It has the will to security but not the will to power. This is manifested in the absence of strategy, policies and plans to make India a great power. An over-bureaucratized and fragmented system of government unable to muster policy coherence and coordination hasn’t helped. The resulting incapacity to think and act big has led New Delhi to take the easy way out and emphasize soft power, when historically nations have become great by acquiring self-sufficiency in armaments and using military forces for strategic impact.

But the Indian Army, that during colonial times won an empire for the British and sustained a system of “distant defence,” with its ramparts extending seawards in the arc Simonstown-Hong Kong, and landwards from the Gulf, the Caspian Sea to the Central Asian khanates, has been reduced to border defence becoming in the process as stick-in-the-mud and passive-defensive minded as a strategically clueless government.

The irony is that an impoverished, resource-scarce, India of the 1950s, strode the international stage like a giant – leading the charge against colonialism, racism, and championing “general and complete disarmament”, assuming leadership of the Third World-qua-Nonaligned Movement, and emerging as the balancer between the super power blocs during Cold War. It was also the time Jawaharlal Nehru articulated an “Asian Monroe Doctrine” backed by Indian arms and, by way of classical realpolitik, seeded a nuclear weapons programme and a cutting edge aerospace industry that eventuated in the Marut HF-24, the first supersonic combat aircraft designed and produced outside of Europe and the US.

Just how far India has fallen off the great power map may be gauged by the fact that some 50 years after the Marut took to the skies the country is a conventional military dependency, relying on imported armaments and with its foreign policy hostage to the interests of the vendor states. And, far from imposing its will in Asia, New Delhi has become a pliant and pliable state, accommodating US interests (on nuclear non-proliferation, Iran, Afghanistan) one moment, adjusting to the demands of a belligerent China the next.

Far from earning great power status the old fashioned way by being disruptively proactive and, in Bismarck’s words, by “blood and steel”, the Indian government sees it as an entitlement, as recognition bestowed on the country by friendly big powers. Never mind that such position gained at the sufferance of other countries is reed-thin, as the recent move by a supposedly friendly US to join another friendly state Russia and China in opposing India’s entry into the UN security Council showed. The fact is India, albeit elephant-sized, remains a marginal power with a small footprint and, in real terms, commands little respect in the world. For such a recessive country, great power will always be “a bridge too far.”
—-


The lack of strategic though in India has been bemoaned many a time.Right now,the MEA seems as confused as ever,with the fond thinking that joining the US's bandwagon will pay dividends has come a cropper after the Sharif visit to the US. The US has reiterated its commitment to Pak,with a token gift of F-16s,just 8 for the moment so as not to annoy India too much and order more Russian eqpt. when Modi visits Moscow. This is the tip of the iceberg that we're seeing,of a lot more arms and aid for Pak...to be used natuarally against India in the future.
The US does not want India to see through its chicanery and turn again to Moscow big time,hence the concealment of further arms supplies.

If Karnad is right in his report,Sushma got a cold reception in Moscow and Mr.Modi may get an even colder welcome when he visits.Russia will want to know exactly where it stands in India's international "alignment" or "re-alignment". in recent times,our increasing military exercising with the US and its military allies is weakening our age-old independence in mil alliances. Without Soviet support both mil and diplomatically,defeating Pak in '71 would've been impossible.Massive shipments of Soviet arms and the insurance that it gave India against any US mil action that Nixon and Kissinger could dream up ,gave us under the leadership of Mrs.G., the resolve to go ahead and defeat Pak decisively.

With a US in retreat on the international stage,and a renaissance in Russian resolve and action to fill the breach left by the US, Indian strat thinkers should immediately review Indian grand strategy and the course of our foreign policy in the light of the rapidly changing world balance of power,where Russia and China lead the pack.

ShauryaT
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ShauryaT » 24 Oct 2015 21:29

Philip: This response is bordering on geo-politics and maybe OT.

The only area where we do need the US is to keep China off balance and focused on its eastern shore. Towards such a goal some alignment with the US is in our interests. Apart from this, we need to work hard, be innovative and bold and form our own policies and MIC. The time to rely on imported arms is past but Indians and GoI have to live to that commitment to turn the equations around. The bania like approaches of the MEA and those in power is not going to cut it. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Watch if defense spending will make a marked difference from its pegged ranges of 1.7-1.9% of GDP.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby panduranghari » 24 Oct 2015 22:30

Shaurya T saar,

I agree with you, more or less. China has sullied the waters with all their neighbours. Russia is using China to show its bluster against the west. The area close to Vladivostok is ripe for taking and I think Russia knows this. According to some American experts, China will move in but before that they will take unilateral action against North Korea. Extreme overtures towards the Americans has most certainly annoyed the Russians. Russia is the only country which can guarantee our oil and gas needs on a transactional basis. Will Russia keep supplying the Chinese with oil and gas while they plan to subjugate them in the near future?

How can we win this 4th generation warfare?

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 31 Oct 2015 21:29

Articles from USI journal on Chanakya

http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Jour ... 0&ano=1379

Kautilya’s Arthsastra : The Wonder it Was & the Wonder It Remains

Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri (Retd)*

An Overview

Kautilya’s work Arthsastra,1 is filled with maxims that have over the millenniums become part of our every day life. For instance, the four strategems of Saam (conciliation or treaty), Daam (reward or money), Dand (retribution) or Bhed (dissension) continue to be amongst the best used political dictums across the world. Essentially a treatise on economy of a state, it is a compendium of precepts, advice and lessons on the art of governance of a nation state (Rashtra). It counsels a monarch on : how to administer his kingdom, how to frame and follow foreign policy with friends, neutrals and potential adversaries. Besides being a unique document of administration, it also encompasses strategic thinking, warfare, espionage and counter-espionage. It serves two primary purposes: ‘one who aspires for peace should prepare for war’ and, ‘without good administration there cannot be good governance.’ The beauty of the Book lies in the fact that the situations visualised some 2,300 years ago remain astonishingly relevant to date. It is so, despite the Industrial Revolution and ever-continuing march of science and technology besides revolutions in military affairs.

About the Book

The Arthsastra contains fifteen Adhikarnas or Books: The first five Books deal with internal administration of the state and the following eight cover its relations with neighbours, while the concluding two are on miscellaneous subjects. Written in Sanskrit, and translated in several international languages, it is read with fervour even today. Almost all aspects of governance, warfare, armed forces, economics, social life, offences and punishments are covered. For example, the first chapter of Book One ‘concerning discipline’ contains detailed table of contents and in one verse (1.1.18), states that it has 150 chapters, 180 prakarnas and six thousand verse in all. (A prakarna is a section devoted to a specific topic)’.2 A brief on the contents of each of the 15 Books below shows clearly that all functions of statecraft and governance are covered comprehensively to facilitate their understanding and compliance, both by the ‘ruler and the ruled’.

Book One (21 Chapters). Outlines the duties of the King, his training and protection; qualitative requirements for selection of ministers – their desired traits like integrity and overall capability of governance as king’s representatives; and highlights the continuous need to watch and control the ‘seducible’ elements of the state.

Book Two (36 Chapters). Includes subjects relating to duties of the government administrators, superintendents, and intelligence agencies; responsibilities of the Commander-in- Chief, superintendents of chariots and infantry – the upkeep, welfare, training and employment of horses, elephants and cattle (as load carriers in the war zone) as essential parts of war machinery.

Book Three (20 Chapters). Elaborates on the ‘code of law’ and ‘duties of judges’. The King as Dharmaraj (as law giver and custodian of faith) was to ensure the ‘rule of law’ and imparting of ‘equitable justice’ throughout the kingdom.

Book Four (12 Chapters). Aptly titled ‘Removal of Thorns’ deals primarily with the Policing System and meting out punishment to law breakers and providing relief to the people affected either by natural calamities or hostile / criminal acts of human beings.

Book Five (Six Chapters). Describes measures taken to suppress treason and seditious elements, to safeguard the King and his kingdom from various threats.

Book Six (Two Chapters). Firstly, amplifies that the king, the minister, the country, the fortifications (defence measures), the treasury and the army with alliances constitute the nation state. Thereafter, the profile and best qualities required in the King and his advisers, for ensuring effective governance, are described. Secondly, it explains the types of neighbours and the circle of states (Mandala Theory) in various forms of alliance and conflict.

Book Seven (18 Chapters). Deals with six measures called Sadgunya of state foreign policy termed as: Sandhi (treaty), Vigraha (war); Asana (neutrality), Yaan (accretion of power), Samarsya (seeking alliance) and Dwaidhibhava (double policy of waging war with one and peace with another). (Book Six and Seven are interconnected and form a common forum for comprehending their applicability). Kautilya pronounced ‘politics as a science well before Aristotle. All others like Machiavelli (1513 AD) and Clausewitz (1832 AD) learnt from him when they said “War is a continuation of politics by other means.”3

Book Eight (Five Chapters). Explains Vyasanas (calamities) that afflict a nation and affect the King and his kingdom; from internal revolt, preparedness of the army to face enemies of the King due to his addiction to vices or bad health and the common man on account of Kama (lust), Krodha (anger), Lobh (greed) and Moha (attachment / desire).

Book Nine (Seven Chapters) and Book Ten (Six Chapters). Related to ‘The Activity of the King about to March’ and ‘Concerning War’, both should be read conjointly. Book Nine deals with strategic planning for (offensive) military operations; intelligence on enemy capabilities and likely courses of action; assessment of relative strengths and selection of campaigning season; economy of effort; troops to tasks; security of rear areas including handling of revolts and rebels; and reliability of allies and cooperation and coordination with them for ensuring decisive victory. Book Ten deals with ‘setting the camp; march from camp; fighting and countering enemy action; suitability of ground for action; functions of various components and forming up forces for various actions.

Book Eleven (One Chapter). Deals with how a would-be-conqueror should subjugate oligarchical principalities hostile to a nation state.

Book Twelve (Five Chapters). Suggests the ways and means a weaker king should adopt to outwit and outmanoeuvre a stronger hostile king to finally triumph.

Book Thirteen (Five Chapters). Deals with the strategy of capturing a fort or laying a siege and then storming it by employment of secret agents.

Book Fourteen (Four Chapters). Contains various secret remedies and means used for the destruction of the enemy. Magical and mystical lures along with occult practices are also mentioned.

Book Fifteen (One Chapter). Provides a scientific tenor to the Arthsastra with the Epilogue: ‘The Method of Science’. It illustrates various devices to elucidate this ‘Scientific Subject’ and contains a long and anecdotal / referral material numbering 72. It highlights the well established stratagems of Saam, Daam(n), Bhed and Dand as essential tools of statecraft.

Significantly, Jawaharlal Nehru has mentioned Kautilya and Arthsastra repeatedly in his book ‘Discovery of India’ and thought it to be of ‘inestimable value’.4

A Peep into History

It may be necessary to understand, as to what led Chandragupta Maurya and his mentor Vishnugupta Kautilya (or, Chanakya) to undertake this prodigious study and write the Arthsastra in such a comprehensive form. It was definitely the misdeeds of the Nanda dynasty and the Battle of Hydaspes, commonly known as the Battle of Jhelum (326 BC) that left India shaken and shattered and virtually enslaved. That slavery, fortunately, lasted for such a brief period that it could be ignored. To recall, Alexander the Great led his army into Asia, with the primary objective of capturing the Persian Empire under King Darius; ostensibly, to seek a revenge caused through an earlier defeat of the Greeks by the Persians. Alexander marched through Asia Minor, Egypt, Syria, the Palestine, Persia subduing the conquered territories, leaving his army to rule the captured territories and ensuring security of his further advance over Afghanistan to the Jhelum, in Punjab. He arrived on the North bank of the Jhelum River in the spring of 326 BC.

The melting snow of the Himalayas and early monsoon had turned this 500 metre wide river into a formidable water obstacle. It was not fordable everywhere, and was being strengthened further by strong coverage of its southern bank by the army of King Porus. The assessment in the Porus army was that Alexander would have to retreat; and even if he tried crossing, he would be destroyed.

Alexander, a skillful military leader, with many major military successes behind him, chose to ‘condition’ Porus to his false design that his army was relaxing in the encampment and were unable to cross the river. He then proceeded to mislead his opponent by a series of small scale manoeuvres leading to feints both by day and night in front and on flanks. That carried on for several weeks. All this time his ‘light troops’, armed parties kept foraging the countryside for supplies, terrorised and bribed the locals to indicate the likely crossing points in the North. That was fixed approx 25 km upstream.

Simultaneously, the boats that he had built surreptitiously, were moved to the vicinity of the crossing place and concealed. Gradually the troops were concentrated over a series of nights and the river front continued to be held by smaller number of troops giving a semblance of the Greeks still encamped there. To add to the element of surprise to this deception, he chose bad weather – a stormy night – when he appreciated that the vigilance by the enemy troops would be low. At the time crossing commenced, some of his troops landed on an un-reconnoitred and undetected island but the others crossed from a shallow site.

Misjudging it as a diversionary small scale operation Porus sent his son with a small force to interdict. Alexander by now firmed in on the southern bank, rolled over this force. Porus, in the meanwhile deployed his full force with a view to block and destroy the invader. A diagramatic representation of the battle is depicted on the Schematic Sketch. The battle is self-explanatory, it was lost by the Indian King and his Army not due to lack in valour but primarily due to three factors: the inflexibility in defender’s plan, lack of adequate reserves to counter Alexander’s outflanking moves and the absence of a strategic culture of having alliances and coalitions to mutually come to the assistance of each other.

The question also arises, why the elephants of Porus failed to tilt the balance? Elephants, like horsed cavalry were the force du frappe of Porus, but here Alexander’s multi-pronged, almost simultaneous attacks exposed the elephants to attack by the Greek infantry, who killed the mahouts and wounded the animals. Though trained to trample the enemy, the injured animals charged madly through their own troops, causing confusion and loss of control and thus became one of the immediate causes of defeat. There were other causes too. For instance, it would appear that not enough resources were employed by Porus to gain intelligence about enemy’s strength and plans. As a result, Alexander managed to achieve surprise and gain initiative.

On his part, Alexander had fought his last battle at the Jhelum and while he won this battle due to his brilliant tactics, fearlessness and boldness, he was equally magnificent in his gesture of returning the kingdom to Porus. An imprisoned Porus, so Greek Historian Plutarch says, when asked by Alexander how he would like to be treated, retorted valiantly: “As a King should be treated by another King.” Alexander restored his kingdom to the vanquished Porus and then left some of his lieutenants to govern India, he himself returning via Taxila where King Ambhi again hosted, feasted and equipped the fatigued but still victorious Greek Army before wheeling back through the desert and sea to Persia. Seleukos Nikator, the ablest of the generals left behind, made further foray into the Indo-Gangetic plains but signed a treaty of friendship with Chandragupta Maurya who had ousted the Nandas by now; it was then, one sees Magasthenes remaining as Nikator’s plenipotentiary at Pataliputra, the Mauryan capital, giving later generations a better perspective of India of those days through Arian’s Indica.


Image

Contribution and Continuing Relevance of the Arthsastra

An analytical study of the Arthsastra suggests that Chandragupta had made an extensive study of the causes and consequences, not only of the fall of the Nanda dynasty, but also of the failure of Porus at Jhelum. Accordingly, he introduced qualitative improvement in the Mauryan Army; in matters of tactics, defence and defence-works, encampment and forts and their defence, the security of the sovereign and all commanders from Senapati down to Padika, considerations for crossing of water obstacles, movement through deserts, forests and mountains, the formations for attack and defence – and even withdrawal. Added to these were the indispensable ‘reserves’. View, for example, the tactical wisdom on reserves: Book 10.5 puts it; “Having gone a distance of 200 bows, the king should take his position together with reserves; without reserves, he should never attack…”

Selection of campaigning season formed a strategic consideration, as significant as the overall plan for operations and even the role of allies. While more thoughts are shared on allies later, the consideration for campaigning season prioritised the ‘Spring’ and the ‘Autumn’. All these considerations must have been the key to the expansion of the Mauryan Empire that extended from Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean – creating for once the fabled Bharat.

The responsibility of a king (or head of state) as outlined in Book 9.2-7 shows the strategic brilliance of thoughts and clarity of concepts on national security. Possibility of insurrection in the kingdom; engineered, as drummed repeatedly, by high functionaries such as ministers, head priest, even by a disaffected prince when the king is on a foreign expedition, is examined in the light of ‘ulterior motives’ that impel them to revolt. There is indirect allusion to the presence of so called ‘quislings’ in the court and even the palace.

Logistics and communications were given due importance. Thorough logistical appreciations culminated in detailed planning for supplies, transportation, treatment and evacuation of casualties, redressal and care of war widows and orphans. Every administrative aspect was attended to. Little wonder then, a king was personally responsible for the planning of an operation and clearly accountable for success and reverse. He couldn’t be passing the euphemistic ‘buck’ to others.

Two more significant aspects of war were given due importance. The care and morale of the civilians in the occupied territories was the first. There was to be no ‘scorched earth policy’ or wholesale destruction, murders and killings or ill-treatment. People were treated humanely and won over; the troops were to go in as ‘liberators and not conquerors’. The Arthsastra warns: “A country without people makes no sense as there can be no kingdom without people”. No genocide, was the ordinance. In fact, the then civil affairs organisations that formed part of the invading force raised not only supplies for the troops but recreated local levies for its own army. Rarely was action, to disarm and disband the defeated army resorted to, unlike what the USA did in Iraq, with worse consequences.

Another important point was psychological motivation of own combatants for the operations. There was, besides material and spiritual aspects, the inalienable faith of the Indians in the teachings of the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Bhagwad Gita, all of whom, in their immutable wisdom, continuously preached the ‘immortality of the soul’, the ‘Karmanya’ or duty of soldiers, their probable death and disability while in combat or combat like duties. And a soldier, should he die, (it was a forlorn hope that he wouldn’t) would make his way to Heaven; on the Earth with victory behind him, he would enjoy the fruits of an honourable life. With these, the families of the dead were to be cared for by the king and honours were to be piled on the victorious soldiers. This ‘battle for the hearts and minds’ would continue through the campaign.

The Security of a State is irretrievably linked with foreign or external affairs. That’s where the Arthsastra does an equally enviable work for guidance to the king in foreign affairs and expounds the much associated dictum of: Saam, Daam, Dand and Bhed. It suggests Six Measures or Sadgunya constituting measures of Sandhi, Vigraha, Asaana, Yaana, Samarsya and Dwaidhibhava for conducting foreign affairs with the enemy, the potential adversary, the friendly powers, the neutrals (indifferent) and all those who would ally with the king against an inimical power. Out of this came the popular theory of Mandal and Rajmandal – conglomeration of states – with varying degrees of influence and inter-state relations.

The concept of Mandala was ipso-facto related to increasing growth of the power of the state and any number of permutations and combinations were expected to have been achieved according to the strategic needs, the raison d’etre of which was always to compete with and grow stronger than an acknowledged adversary. The alliance thus obtained, it was emphasised, must not run into calamitous situation (calamities elucidated in Book 8.5.21) which otherwise adversely affect the contribution of an ally. Alliance to succeed had to act with adequate perseverance and full understanding of each other’s aims, objectives, strength and limitations. Such a doctrine then – and also relevant in modern diplomacy – speaks well of the tenets of diplomacy advocated and practised during Kautilya’s time.

The impermanence of Sandhi is also discussed in the Arthsastra with equal realism. A treaty with or without stipulation, as alluded in Book 7.6.112, was to be guided in accordance with the principle enunciated thus: “The observance on both sides entering into a treaty made by means of what is agreeable and beneficial and carrying out of conditions as agreed upon and their safeguarding is clinging to a treaty…” Earlier, it emphasises that the treaties made for ‘open war’, ‘concealed war’, ‘silent war’ could be ‘spoiled’ or ‘repaired’. Apparently, treaties could never be ‘permanent by binding’; they must have been a sort of ‘marriage of convenience’ – to be broken at mutual convenience. History has been witness to innumerable treaties being ‘pieces of papers’, to be dumped into dustbins or consigned to flame. But the principle of Sadgunya has served as a beacon of light throughout the history of diplomacy and diplomatic interface – if not all over the world, but certainly in India.

In summation one would gratefully quote Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister from page 96 of his book ‘Discovery of India’ : “Bold and scheming, proud and resourceful, never forgetting a slight, never forgetting his purpose, availing himself of every device to delude and defeat his enemy, he sat with the reins of empire in his hands and looked upon the emperor more as beloved pupil than as a master…There was hardly anything that Chanakya (Kautilya) would have refrained from doing to achieve his purpose; he was unscrupulous enough, yet he was wise enough to know that this very purpose might be defeated by means unsuited to the end.”

Endnotes

1. The Arthsastra, like much of the old Indian literature was lost until Shamasastri, the Librarian of the Mysore Oriental Library located one copy and translated it in 1905. It led to greater evolutionary search. The first three editions of the ‘translations’ of the Book by R Shamasastry were published in 1915, 1923 and 1929. The fourth edition was reprinted in 1944 and the fifth in 1956.

2. ‘Kautilya: The Arthshastra’ by LN Rangarajan (Penguin books, India (P) Ltd, New Delhi, 1987), p. 21.

3. To the Western world, Nicolo Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz introduced the concepts of strategy and statecraft. In the East, readers may realise, adequate thought had been given to these subjects by Sun Tzu in China (BC 500) and Kautilya in India.

4. The ‘Discovery of India’ by Jawaharlal Nehru (Published by The Signet Press, Calcutta, 1946), refer to pages 73, 85, 90, 96-97, 99, 111 and 128.





*Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri (Retd) was commissioned in 3/1 GR in 1960. He is a well known biographer and military historian. He has authored eight books.




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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 31 Oct 2015 21:33

Comparing Sun Tzu and Kautilya

http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Jour ... 7&ano=2722



Sun Tzu and Kautilya on War and Statecraft : Their Relevance Today
Lieutenant Colonel BS Varma (Retd)@

Historical Perspective

Written in 500 BC, Sun Tzu’s essays on ‘The Art of War’ are still relevant today because they are ‘the concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war’. Among all the military thinkers of the past, only Clausewitz is comparable and he is even more ‘dated’ than Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight and eternal freshness.1

In the past, successive generations of Chinese and Japanese soldiers and scholars evolved their military thinking based on Sun Tzu’s ‘Seven Military Classics’. Much later in the eighteenth century, the European colonial powers and Russia evinced interest in Sun Tzu leading to many translations of his works. In 1772, ‘The Art of War’ was published in Paris and was possibly read by Napoleon, as a young officer. In 1803, he said “China is a sleeping giant, when she awakes the whole world will tremble”. Later, in 20th Century, Mao Zedong keeping the “sleeping giant” in mind, promised his Communist comrades “All that the West has, China will have”. Today China, aided by their cumulative civilisational military wisdom, has awakened and shaken the world to emerge as a leading world power. Mao Zedong in his two celebrated essays, “On Protracted War’ (1936) and “The Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (1936) acknowledged his indebtedness to Sun Tzu.2

Recently on 25 Jul 2014, speaking at a book release function at the Rashtrapati Bhawan, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “India very often is not a history conscious nation……only a society which is conscious of history has the potential to create.”3 In this context, India with its rich civilisational and martial heritage must learn from what military strategists like Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Clausewitz,Liddell Hart and Samuel Griffith said on the ‘conduct of war’. It is equally important to study Military History to learn the lessons from other’s experiences because human life span is too short to gain experience in every field. In the Indian context, it will be relevant to quote Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd) from his article in USI Journal Oct-Dec 2011.4

“If the military and civilian leaders of those times had studied the Korean War (1950-53) and imbibed its lessons, the outcome might have been different. It will be generations before we come to terms with what happened in October-November 1962.”

In Kautilya’s ‘Arthashastra’ situations visualised some 2300 years ago remain astonishingly relevant to date. It is so, despite the European industrial revolution and ever continuing march of science and technology besides the present day revolutions in military affairs.5

A few selected quotes on what Sun Tzu and Kautilya said on ‘war and statecraft’ and responsibilities of the heads of the State (Kings), military leaders (Generals) and the polity are put together in the succeeding paragraphs to provide a glimpse of oriental military wisdom to ‘kindle interest’ in statecraft and matters military. Certainly, being strong intellectually and militarily have been the two essential civilisational characteristics.

Sun Tzu’s Precepts on War

Study of War

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the promise of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be studied thoroughly. Moral strength and intellectual faculty were decisive in war whose proper application could lead to certain success.6

Seeking Supreme Excellence in War

To fight and win in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s will and resistance without fighting.7

Planning and Readiness

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our plans unassailable.8

Surprise and Deception

All warfare is based on deception. Deception means deceiving or being deceived, tricking or shamming by doing the unexpected to achieve surprise. It involves use of military devices leading to victory which must not be divulged beforehand.9

Waging War

The art of war is governed by five constant factors : The Moral Law; Heaven (signifying night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons); Earth (comprising distances, danger and security, open ground and narrow passes, the chances of life and death; The Commander (should stand for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness); Method and Discipline. Every general should be familiar with these five heads to be victorious.10

On Long Wars

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. In war, let your object be victory and not lengthy campaigns.11

Five Essentials for Victory

He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight; he will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces; he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks; he will win, who prepared himself , waits to take the enemy unprepared; he will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. Hence, if you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer losses (e.g. heavy casualties in the Kargil War). If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle (e.g. 1962 War).12

Methods of Attack

In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack; the direct and indirect; yet these two in combination, the direct and the indirect, lead on to each other. It is like moving in a circle – you never come to an end.13

On Generalship

In war, the General receives his command from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. He, whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious. (To make appointments is the province of the sovereign; to decide on battle, that of the general. A sovereign of high character and intelligence must be able to know the right man, should place the responsibility on him and expect results).14

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and so service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.15

On Gaining Victory

If you know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.”16

Kautilya on Statecraft

Relevance for India

Kautilya, also called Chanakya, is as big a military thinker as Sun Tzu; as also, an outstanding military thinker who inspired Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel amongst others to follow his teachings at the time of our Independence. Field Marshal KM Cariappa, as Commander-in Chief of the Indian Army, had the privilege of observing how closely the Sardar followed Kautilya in precept and practice. Kautilya always had much to offer to the Nation and its strategists.17 Free India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru studied Kautilya and highlighted the achievements of Chandragupta and Chanakya in establishing Mauryan Empire within two years of Alexander’s death in his book, ‘Discovery of India’ – crediting Chanakya with playing a dominating part in further growth and preservation of the empire.

Duties and Responsibilities

Kautilya’s Arthashastra dwells on the Mauryan Army and has in many places sought to advise the Rajadhiraj (King) on the duties and responsibilities of the Head of State. It is amazing how clearly he saw the likely faultlines in governance, the intricacies of management of the military by the State functionaries, the nature of the military and the citizenry and the close interplay between them all which are so completely relevant even after 2000 years.18

Importance and Usage

Most of the Arthasastra’s contents were distilled from the four Vedas – Rig Veda, Sama Veda, Yajur Veda, Atharva Veda and Puranas, including Ramayana and Mahabharata.19 Therefore, Arthsastra’s maxims over the millennia have become part of everyday life through folklore. For instance, the four stratagems of Saam (conciliation or treaty), Daam (reward or money) Dand (retribution) and Bhed (secrecy of plans, creating dissensions and gaining intelligence) continue to be amongst the best used dictums. It reinforces two fundamentals : “one who aspires for peace should prepare for war ; and without good administration, there cannot be good governance and rule.”20

Contents

The Arthsastra contains fifteen Adhikarnas (books) in which broadly speaking : The first five deal with internal administration of the State, the following eight cover its relations with neighbours, while the concluding two are on miscellaneous subjects. Importantly, Book Six (two chapters); firstly, amplifies the constituents of the Nation State (king, ministers, treasury, the army, fortifications and alliances) and the qualities require in the king and his advisors for ensuring effective governance; secondly, it explains the types of neighbours and the ‘Circle of States’ (Mandala Theory) in various forms of alliances and conflict. Book Nine (seven chapters) and Book Ten (six chapters) are related to ‘The Activity of the King about to March’ and ‘Concerning War’ respectively.21

Analytical Study

An analytical study of the Arthasastra suggests that Chandragupta and Kautilya had made an extensive study of the causes and consequences of the fall of the Nanda dynasty, and also the failure of Porus at Jhelum. [Refer to Schematic Sketch of Battle of Jhelum (326 BC) in USI Journal, Oct-Dec 2012, p. 56]. Accordingly, he introduced improvements in the Mauryan Army; in matters of tactics, defence, the security of the sovereign and commanders, considerations for crossing of water obstacles, movement through deserts, forests and mountains, the formations for attack and defence – and even withdrawal. The tactical wisdom on indispensability of ‘reserves’ was also highlighted: “Having gone a distance of 200 bows, the King should take his position together with reserves; without reserves, he should never attack”.22 No wonder he established the Maurya Empire which extended to the North along the natural boundaries of the Himalayas, to the East into Assam, to the West beyond modern Pakistan, into Balochistan and the Hindu Kush mountains of what is now Afghanistan.23

(Refer to Map)

Image

Map: Maurya Empire at its maximum extent
Source : http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurya_empire)



Conclusion and Recommendations

In the 20th century, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Kautilya’s Arthashastra have evoked much interest in India and abroad. Sun Tzu was a thinking military general (who knew the multi-faceted compulsions of a State) while Kautilya was an all pervasive strategist of statecraft (who also knew the components and compulsions of war). Sun Tzu and Kautilya’s works are outstanding classics that deal with the issues of war and peace in both strategic and practical terms. In China, generals and military thinkers made strategic studies into an independent discipline and sustained it down the centuries.24

On the other hand, Kautilyan strategic culture lost its vigour with the decline of Hindu India. Subsequent Indian rulers – Muslims and Mughals – developed their own strategic thought. Later, during the British imperial rule, their war strategy in India encouraged treason and forgery, intrigue and forgery, reinforced by bribery and blackmail, leading to complete subjugation of the Indian people and suppression of the strategic thinking process.25 By using Indian resources, wealth, soldiers and manpower they went on to create ‘The British Indian Empire’ whose strategic frontiers lay well beyond the Maurya Empire.26

Lastly, even after the 1962 border conflict with China, a study of China’s strategic culture was not taken up by either the military or the academics. It is only over the last two decades or so that some modest beginnings have been made to examine the issue of military strategy and national security across the Country. It may be worthwhile to expose our future military leaders to these classics on warfare and statecraft right from their impressionable years at the National Defence Academy and carry these right through the military and civil institutions of higher learning. As one grows up in age and service these texts begin to take on different meanings and are intellectually stimulating.

Endnotes

1. Samuel B Griffith, ‘Sun Tzu : The Art of War’ (New York and Oxford University Press, 1963.

2. Dr Srikanth Kondapalli, in his essay ‘Sun Zi and Guerrilla Warfare in China’, in the book ‘Sun Zi and China’s Strategic Culture’, published by IDSA, New Delhi, 26 Jul 2014, pp..17-33.

3. Times of India, 26 Jul 2014, p 17.

4. Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd), ‘Battle of Se-La and Bomdi-La : A View from the Other Side of the Hill’ and a Comparison with the Battle of Chosin Resevoir’, USI Journal Oct-Dec 2011, pp 575-594.

5. Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri (Retd), ‘Kautilya’s Arthashastra : The Wonder It Was and the Wonder It Remains’, USI Journal, Oct-Dec 2012, pp 555-564.

6. Op. Cit. Endnote 1, p 63.

7. Lionel Giles, ‘The Art of War by Sun Tzu’ translation originally published in 1910.

8. In 1944, Lionel Giles translation was included by TR Phillips in ‘Roots of Strategy’ (Harrisburg, PA : The Military Service Publishing Company, 1953.

9. Op. Cit. Endnote 7, p 4-5

10. Op. Cit. Endnote 7, p 3-4.

11 Op. Cit. Endnote 7, p 6-8.

12. Op. Cit. Endnote 7 p11

13. Op. Cit. Endnote 7, p 16

14. Op. Cit. Endnote 1, p 83.

15. Op. Cit. Endnote 7, p 35.

16. Op. Cit. Endnote 7, p. 36

17. Field Marshal KM Cariappa in Foreword to the book ‘Generals and Strategists : From Kautilya to Thimayya’ by Chandra B Khanduri, 09 Mar 1991.

18. Air Marshal SG Inamdar, PVSM, VSM (Retd) ‘Kautilya to Chandragupta on the Mauryan Soldier’, USI Journal, Jan-Mar 2010, pp 105-109.

19. Bharat Karnad, in the Chapter, ‘An Elephant with a Small ‘Footprint’ : The Realist Roots of India’s StrategicThoughts and Policies’ in the Book, ‘India’s Grand Strategy : History, Theory, Cases’, First published in India by Routledge, New Delhi, 2014.

20. Brigadier Chandra B Khanduri, ‘Kautilya on War : The Military Wisdom of the Arthasastra’, Greenfields Publishers, Dehra Dun (India), 2013.

21. Op. Cit. Endnote 5, p. 557-569

22. Op. Cit., 5, p. 561.

23. Downloaded from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia on 31 Jul 2014.

24. KN Ramachandran, in Introduction of the book, ‘Sun Zi and China’s Strategic Culture’, IDSA, New Delhi, Sep 1999.

25. Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Discovery of India’, Signet Press, Calcutta, 1946, pp 73, 85, 90, 96, 97, 99, 111 and 128. Also refer to the pages 122-125, under the heading ‘Chandragupta and Chanakya : The Maurya Empire established’ in the 1981 Edition published by Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund with Foreword by Indira Gandhi, dated 04 November 1980.

26. Rear Admiral K Raja Menon’s National Security Paper 2011, ‘Components of National Security and Synergising them for Envisaged Security Threats’ USI Journal, Jan-Mar 2012, pp 105-143.



@Lieutenant Colonel BS Varma (Retd) was commissioned into 18 Cavalry on 11 Jun 1967 and was later transferred to 43 Armoured Regiment in February 1981, on its raising. He retired from the Army on 30 Jun 2004. Presently, he is working as Assistant Director at USI since Jun 2007.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLIV, No. 597, July-September 2014.



RoyG
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby RoyG » 06 Nov 2015 21:58

Didn't know where else to put this. Urge all BRFites to read it. AGuptaji, you would especially like this one. We need a dharmic critique of Post-Modernism. This is critical today b/c this is the weapon that the West is currently using to try and turn us into a kichdi state. I've been saying for a long time that Judaism is no different than Christianity and Islam in that makes the same assumptions about human beings.

https://www.academia.edu/17537173/An_In ... modernists

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ShauryaT » 07 Nov 2015 00:15

This is another book launch event for BK's new book. The reason I am posting these is, it provides us to listen to some others such as CNS Vishnu Bhagwat.
October 29, 2015 - Asia Society India Centre was delighted to welcome Bharat Karnad, Research Professor, Centre for Policy Research, Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh, Former Flag Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command and Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, Former Chief of Naval Staff, to the platform on Wednesday evening.

Video in page link.

http://asiasociety.org/india/india-soft ... hard-power

ramana
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 07 Jan 2016 03:16

http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php? ... 0674066427


As the rest of the world worries about what a future might look like under Chinese supremacy, Edward N. Luttwak worries about China’s own future prospects. Applying the logic of strategy for which he is well known, Luttwak argues that the most populous nation on Earth—and its second largest economy—may be headed for a fall.


For any country whose rising strength cannot go unnoticed, the universal logic of strategy allows only military or economic growth. But China is pursuing both goals simultaneously. Its military buildup and assertive foreign policy have already stirred up resistance among its neighbors, just three of whom—India, Japan, and Vietnam—together exceed China in population and wealth. Unless China’s leaders check their own ambitions, a host of countries, which are already forming tacit military coalitions, will start to impose economic restrictions as well.

Chinese leaders will find it difficult to choose between pursuing economic prosperity and increasing China’s military strength. Such a change would be hard to explain to public opinion. Moreover, Chinese leaders would have to end their reliance on ancient strategic texts such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While these guides might have helped in diplomatic and military conflicts within China itself, their tactics—such as deliberately provoking crises to force negotiations—turned China’s neighbors into foes. To avoid arousing the world’s enmity further, Luttwak advises, Chinese leaders would be wise to pursue a more sustainable course of economic growth combined with increasing military and diplomatic restraint.



ramana
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 03 Feb 2016 01:11

It seems Shyam Saran has submitted a policy document to NaMo in last week of January on national security policy.

It emphasizes assertive posture with Indian Navy getting primacy.

Please post any details you can find here.

ramana
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 20 Feb 2016 21:56

IDSA has published 3 vols of seminar on Chanakya:

Vol I

Vol II

pdfs are available.

Read and order print version.

RoyG
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby RoyG » 21 Feb 2016 07:04

Ramana,

Have you read Interrogating International Relations: India's Strategic Practice and the Return of History? Apparently provides insight into Mughal grand strategy. May help us better understand C-System. It is mentioned on page 16 of vol 1.

I just ordered a copy.

http://www.amazon.com/Interrogating-Int ... 0415598125

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ShauryaT » 22 Feb 2016 21:15

ramana wrote:It seems Shyam Saran has submitted a policy document to NaMo in last week of January on national security policy.

It emphasizes assertive posture with Indian Navy getting primacy.

Please post any details you can find here.
The report is classified, will have to wait and watch for "droppings" coming out of people with access. Thanks.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 22 Feb 2016 22:35

RoyG wrote:Didn't know where else to put this. Urge all BRFites to read it. AGuptaji, you would especially like this one. We need a dharmic critique of Post-Modernism. This is critical today b/c this is the weapon that the West is currently using to try and turn us into a kichdi state. I've been saying for a long time that Judaism is no different than Christianity and Islam in that makes the same assumptions about human beings.

https://www.academia.edu/17537173/An_In ... modernists



Can you mail the pdf?

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby RoyG » 23 Feb 2016 01:22

sure. just sent you a message over twitter.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 23 Feb 2016 02:43

I replied.

---

Thanks,
ramana

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ShauryaT » 10 May 2016 18:51

CSC. Adm. Arun Prakash critiquing BK's new works, but read the whole thing and tell us what you think.

ADM Arun Prakash reviews ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’

So it would be fair to question the author’s quixotic inquiry into India’s ‘great power’ quest, when we know that a dysfunctional Parliament, lack of vision in the government and the country’s decrepit, bureaucracy-driven security structures preclude any prospect of attaining it in the foreseeable future.

The book’s leitmotif is essentially a lament that India has missed every opportunity to rise to its potential. Karnad sets out manifold reasons for this: a diffident and risk averse polity which has consistently held back its punches, a stove-piped and over-bureaucratized government, absence of an articulated national vision, hollow hard power, over-emphasis on soft power and finally, a military which remains trapped in an industrial age mindset. He is right on every count, and renders a valuable service by dwelling, in great detail, on these national shortcomings....

What strains the reader’s credulity is Karnad’s radical prescription for putting India on track to achieve its ‘destined glory’. His grandiose plan is rooted in an ‘Indian Monroe Doctrine’ and involves India defining a vast security perimeter, extending from the Caspian Sea to Antarctica and from East Africa to SE Asia. Having bound this area together with security, trade and economic ties, he wants India to act as a maritime ‘security provider’.

However, it is when dealing with China that Karnad takes one’s breath away. Choosing to ignore the very handicaps he had pointed out earlier, and the incongruity of a poor and struggling India donning a hegemon’s
mantle, Karnad recommends that Pakistan be downgraded as a security threat and eventually won over economically. At the same time, he recommends that
China be confronted head-on, in Tibet as well as at sea.

Some of the unorthodox measures he suggests to contain China are guaranteed to rattle the diplomatic and military communities alike. Apart from an unrealistic and ambitious scheme to establish Indian bases in
the Pacific and Indian Ocean as well as in Central Asia, he recommends that India should resume thermonuclear testing and arm Vietnam with nuclear weapons. Resurrecting a discarded Cold War concept, he suggests
the planting of nuclear demolition charges on Himalayan ingress routes to deter the Chinese. His most utopian suggestion involves the basing of an Indian ballistic missile submarine in Australia to deter China!...

One wishes that some of the educated few in India’s political establishment spare time from electoral politics to read this book. They would realize the truth of Karnad’s words, that ‘the lack of a comprehensive vision, strategy, game plan and primarily, political will, and a scatter-shot approach to marshalling national resources… give the impression of a country clueless about what it wants and how to get it…’.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 21 Sep 2016 22:16

X-Post from the URi attack thread....
pankajs wrote:http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.co ... ak-policy/

Uri terrorist attack brings into focus correctness of India’s Pak policy

S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser.

India needs to change its basic approach towards Pakistan. It is a rogue state and is unlikely to mend its approach towards India as along as the Pak Army controls the levers of power in that country. In fact, it is not a country with an army but an army with a nation. Its assurances should not be taken seriously. With this basic understanding, India should deal with Pakistan. In diplomatic talks, India needs to be careful and it would be appropriate to downgrade the diplomatic level. Currently, the option is not between the vacillating weak kneed policy and a war, which is possible between two nuclear weapon states as was demonstrated by Kargil conflict and Sino-Russian war over the border. The need is to raise the cost for Pak Army for its policies and that cannot be achieved through one off response for the losses. Even the best tactical operation without a well thought out strategy is just a noise before a defeat. India needs a well-calculated, proactive and long term strategy towards Pakistan to achieve the strategic objective. India’s response should be a combination of available conventional and unconventional options for strategic advantage and should be pursued without wavering. While conventional methods can provide visible results and satisfaction to people, it is unconventional options spread across a wide spectrum that can give the desired results in the long run.


Even though he was Dy. NSA and Chariman JIC, he fumbles when he doesn't state the Strategic Objective. Strategy cant move forward until the objective is defined.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby RoyG » 22 Sep 2016 00:19

Ramana,

You also have to ensure that the strategic objective survives the next party that comes to power.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 23 Sep 2016 01:52

I would be remiss for not posting these articles which track India's policy towards Baluchistan and PoK our member Deejay:

1) India's New Approach to wards Balochistan and PoK: A New Paradigm


2) Offensive Defence: India's Pak Approach

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby Philip » 23 Sep 2016 18:45

"Offensive defence" is what the Pakis are practising,not India! They are unleashing incessant terror attacks to keep India off balance.There is a limit for India's "rope-a-dope" tactics as best used by the late "greatest" Md.Ali. At some point in time we have to come off the ropes and deliver a KO blow to the Pakis.
Right now it is costing them precious little in the way of money,manpower,weapons,etc.,by using the suicidal terror proxies ,available a rupee a dozen in the TSP.The madrasas keep churning them out ,cannon fodder for the Paki military.

The stark truth is that we've yet for two decades,since Kargil,bloodied Pak.The timing of the Paki attack was cleverly planned,when the UNGA meet was on and joint Paki-Russian mil exercises.

Let me add that this time round if we do not use our military muscle,friendly nations that look upto us will desert us as being nothing more than a bunch of loudmouths incapable of fighting back.They will compare India and China and then decide on which side of the fence they should stand in future.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby panduranghari » 27 Sep 2016 23:20

http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-br ... ic-thought

“…the highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.


“Grand strategy remains a standardless, incoherent concept, whose popularity surge after the end of the Cold War multiplied the lack of rigour with which it was employed…as has been the case for the entirety of the history of grand strategic thought, [scholars’] independent efforts are leading them in divergent directions.”


What accounts for the paucity of grand strategic thought? Milevski’s explanation is that writers on grand strategy have engaged their subject with (almost) the singular objective of solving the most pressing immediate problem. Little attention is ever given to previous treatments of grand strategy. “The result is that grand strategic thought has been predominantly ahistorical.”[5] It is true that Clausewitz was motivated to understand Napoleonic warfare, but “…On War remains relevant because the nature of continually recurring war remains recognizably the same; definitions of grand strategy are transient because they reflect only their own particular geopolitical conditions.”[6] Without a grounding in strategic theory, grand strategy will remain rudderless. But the situation is even worse, Milevski insists, because strategic theory itself has moved away from its anchor—war—and has become merely an internal logic devoid of a subject. Without war, strategic theory is vacuous; without strategic theory, grand strategy is nomadic.


The peace of 1919 cost Great Britain dearly, however, and the question of how the nation could survive total war became a live one. J.F.C. Fuller saw this as a matter of preserving civilization. With the stakes in war now so high, grand strategy could no longer be confined to the military realm, nor could it be considered strictly a wartime phenomenon. With the goal of preserving a state’s economic and moral base in the event of major war, Fuller advocated for national policies that put Britain in a powerful position in peacetime (i.e., replacing mass infantry with tanks) and for wartime strategies aimed at counter-command and control that would limit the cost and duration of war.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 27 Sep 2016 23:35

To me grand strategy purpose is to achieve national objectives.
Its a four part process.
First comes What is the objective? Most time is lost in arguing about this as there are multiple streams of thoughts. The mark of a leader is to identify what is to be done.
Second comes who? Who will achieve the objective. It should be a single person leading and entity. This ensures responsibility and accountability.
Third comes How? This is a sequence of steps that all lead to achieving the objective (What?)
Fourth comes When? This is mainly a question of resources which depend on how important it is to achieve the objective (What?)

This four step process applies from small programs to large national objectives.
Its the essence of program planning in business situations, elections, anything.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 27 Sep 2016 23:36

Its never written down but by studying the actions and writings one can discern a national grand strategy whether its enunciated or not.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby panduranghari » 27 Sep 2016 23:38

So Ramana Saar, what is Indian Grand Strategy?

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby GShankar » 27 Sep 2016 23:45

Who are the makers of this strategy in India? For Ex: so called "Deep State" in western countries. For china and Russia, may be it is the party

In India, if there is a "deep state", then any clarification on who are they? And seems like there is too much govt. control over deep state even if it exists - ex: 10 years of congress time.

And whatever current govt. does, if they don't stay in power for a long time, then these acts could be quickly undone. So, what are our options?

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby Rudradev » 28 Sep 2016 00:32

Indian Deep State = Babus. IAS, IFS, IPS (and intelligence services) mainly. Some of these are ideologically compromised (came up through decades of being exposed to Nehruvian policymaking as the gold standard, and survived through years of corrupt Darwinian selection by Die-Nasty favouritism). Some are ideologically sound nationalists who repressed themselves perforce during the Die-Nasty years, and are now finally getting the opportunity to act in what they perceive... cf Ajit Doval. Many are solid professionals who do not take it upon themselves to lead but to follow (implement existing policy directives faithfully)... so there is a lot of *inertia* in our deep state, as babus simply continue doing what their seniors were doing even if the elected government articulates new policies. That is actually true even of the US deep state, and probably many others... the machine is huge and the gears keep cranking on even after some button is pressed in a faraway control room.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 28 Sep 2016 00:47

panduranghari wrote:So Ramana Saar, what is Indian Grand Strategy?

I wrote about the past till Independence

ramana wrote:He wrote what he thought he heard. Don't worry. You will be surprised how much the babus know about the epics and all that.

I kind of gave short para on what the strategy was in my tribute to KS garu.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1031338

There is no direct evidence of a grand strategy of the modern Indian Independence movement. There is no single document that describes the endeavor. However one can infer from the speeches, writings and actions of a pantheon of national leaders like Tilak, Gokhale, Mahatma Gandhi, and Jawaharlal Nehru that there were three goals of the movement. The primary goal was to end colonial rule and get rid of the British. The secondary goal was to create a modern Indian state and reclaim its status prior to the beginning of the colonial era. The tertiary goal was to prevent further fragmentation of the sub-continent.


Part three is still work in progress.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 28 Sep 2016 01:04

panduranghari wrote:http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-bridge/2016/9/21/reviewing-the-evolution-of-modern-grand-strategic-thought

“…the highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.


“Grand strategy remains a standardless, incoherent concept, whose popularity surge after the end of the Cold War multiplied the lack of rigour with which it was employed…as has been the case for the entirety of the history of grand strategic thought, [scholars’] independent efforts are leading them in divergent directions.”


What accounts for the paucity of grand strategic thought? Milevski’s explanation is that writers on grand strategy have engaged their subject with (almost) the singular objective of solving the most pressing immediate problem. Little attention is ever given to previous treatments of grand strategy. “The result is that grand strategic thought has been predominantly ahistorical.”[5] It is true that Clausewitz was motivated to understand Napoleonic warfare, but “…On War remains relevant because the nature of continually recurring war remains recognizably the same; definitions of grand strategy are transient because they reflect only their own particular geopolitical conditions.”[6] Without a grounding in strategic theory, grand strategy will remain rudderless. But the situation is even worse, Milevski insists, because strategic theory itself has moved away from its anchor—war—and has become merely an internal logic devoid of a subject. Without war, strategic theory is vacuous; without strategic theory, grand strategy is nomadic.


.......



Very good reference to think about.

BTW the refs mentioned are even more thought provoking.

E.g. Refs 8. 10 and 11,15
[8] On the differences between force and power, see Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third, revised ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 223-228.

[9] Jean-Marie Guehenno, “The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy,” Survival, 40 (Winter 1998-99), 5-19.

[10] Graham Allison and Philip Zellikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson, 1999), ch. 3.

[11] Alan G. Stolberg, How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 2-3.

[12] Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 282-295.

[13] Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare, Roger T. Ames trans. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 113.

[14] On Moltke the Elder’s system of expedients, see Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 77-78.

[15] Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).




There is a Carlisle paper on how nation-states craft Grand Strategy.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... pubID=1128


Good to get hold of.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby panduranghari » 28 Sep 2016 13:00

Thanks Ramana saar. Much to chew on and digest.

Graham Allison and Philip Zellikow on Cuban Missle crisis is very pertinent when Pakistan threatens to use nukes. I see a lot of parallels in financial warfare undertaken by the US against the world in that perspective. Grand Strategy is not a bloodless economic model as many people claim it is.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby panduranghari » 28 Sep 2016 17:59

Ramana Saar,

Many many thanks for proving that link to KS Garus obituary thread. Your tribute was very well worded and so were the multiple obits by others including a very moving one by Jyotirmaya Sharma.

Ramana wrote:There is no direct evidence of a grand strategy of the modern Indian Independence movement. There is no single document that describes the endeavor. However one can infer from the speeches, writings and actions of a pantheon of national leaders like Tilak, Gokhale, Mahatma Gandhi, and Jawaharlal Nehru that there were three goals of the movement. The primary goal was to end colonial rule and get rid of the British. The secondary goal was to create a modern Indian state and reclaim its status prior to the beginning of the colonial era. The tertiary goal was to prevent further fragmentation of the sub-continent.


I am reading this Neibur Reinhold-Irony of American history

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 03 Nov 2016 00:59

Lots of good papers in CLAWS Manekshaw Papers published to date:

http://www.claws.in/publications-list.p ... per&page=1

Papers by Col Harjeet Singh reflect this thread topic.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby panduranghari » 04 Nov 2016 11:38

^ http://www.claws.in/images/publication_ ... -08-16.pdf

Earlie governments cared not for our cultural history, why would they care about military history?

Interestingly, IMO our cultural history and military history are interlinked.

why did Islam win when Buddhism was dominant in NW India etc. are just as critical as the 5 wars fought by Indian army. JMO.

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby svinayak » 10 Dec 2016 12:52

The Recent Declassification of India's Secret 'Long Telegram' Shows Why It Went Nuclear

The nuclear specter of China has always been India's overwhelming consideration.
Vivek Prahladan
December 9, 2016
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Printer-friendly version
“The main argument in favor of India going nuclear is the Chinese threat” — L.K. Jha (Secretary to Prime Minister) March 5, 1967
“A nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible” — P.N. Haksar (Secretary to Prime Minister) 1968

The Counsel of History
Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar recently made a controversial “personal” comment that perhaps India must revisit its no first-use nuclear policy. However, the only available document on Indian nuclear policy has been the “Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” which has fostered perpetual speculation on the vector and valences of Indian strategic doctrine. We have had little historical perspective on how Indian doctrine has absorbed Chinese and Pakistan nuclear threats ever since India carried out its first underground nuclear test — “Smiling Buddha” — in May 1974. There is still no consensus on what the historical reasons were for India to cross the no-bomb line or what internal discussions were taking place between the scientists and the prime minister’s office. However, newly declassified documents from the prime minister’s office, which include letters between the prime minister’s office and the Department of Atomic Energy, as well as correspondence between the prime minister and scientists help establish the specific considerations that went into the making of India’s nuclear doctrine. It revises arguments such as those of George Perkovich, that, in the second half of the sixties, “the (Indian) scientists acted without benefit of a national security strategy or requirement.” The documents reveal disquiet among India’s strategists about China’s repeated nuclear tests from 1964 onwards.

India’s “Long Telegram” and Crossing the No-Bomb Line
Perhaps the single most important document for establishing the evolving history of India’s nuclear weapons policy comes from P.N. Haksar, Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that may be dated to 1968. The note is titled “Need for India In a Changing World to Reassess her National Interest and Foreign policy.”
The revealing document tends to defy most assumptions held about India’s nuclear policy regarding the level of “stand-off capability” that was being considered in the Prime Minister Secretariat. P.N Haskar wrote:
i. the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium range (2,000-3,000 miles) capable, from sites within India’s frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centers of population
ii. The development simultaneously of submarines driven by nuclear power fitted out to carry nuclear missiles
iii. This nuclear arms program should be based on adequate stockpiling of those sensitive instruments and machinery…. which will be difficult to import from abroad increasingly

Haksar distinguished between the role of nuclear India as opposed to other nuclear powers. Haksar also reveals his thought that India’s nuclear ambition should be clearly communicated with the United States at a relevant time. The nuclear specter of China remained the overwhelming consideration. Haksar seemed to appreciate nuclear balancing in Europe and wrote of India’s “own security require that she becomes a nuclear power to establish a genuine balance of power with China.”

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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 14 Dec 2016 00:06

X-posted from Deterrence thread....

ramana wrote:


Posting in full as its very important and shreds the Perkovich and the 'liberal' deluded Indian elite bakwas. The declassified letter is from Pran Nath Haksar. He was supposedly a leftist and if this was his advice then the whole Praful Bidawi types are toast.


Image of Jaguar omitted as its only good for show. it was the Mirage 2000 that operationalized it. This Jaguar was only good for kickbacks and killing the HF-24.

The main argument in favor of India going nuclear is the Chinese threat” — L.K. Jha (Secretary to Prime Minister) March 5, 1967

“A nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible” — P.N. Haksar (Secretary to Prime Minister) 1968

The Counsel of History

Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar recently made a controversial “personal” comment that perhaps India must revisit its no first-use nuclear policy. However, the only available document on Indian nuclear policy has been the “Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” which has fostered perpetual speculation on the vector and valences of Indian strategic doctrine. We have had little historical perspective on how Indian doctrine has absorbed Chinese and Pakistan nuclear threats ever since India carried out its first underground nuclear test — “Smiling Buddha” — in May 1974. There is still no consensus on what the historical reasons were for India to cross the no-bomb line or what internal discussions were taking place between the scientists and the prime minister’s office. However, newly declassified documents from the prime minister’s office, which include letters between the prime minister’s office and the Department of Atomic Energy, as well as correspondence between the prime minister and scientists help establish the specific considerations that went into the making of India’s nuclear doctrine. It revises arguments such as those of George Perkovich, that, in the second half of the sixties, “the (Indian) scientists acted without benefit of a national security strategy or requirement.” The documents reveal disquiet among India’s strategists about China’s repeated nuclear tests from 1964 onwards.



{In 1998 tests ABV wrote to Bill Clinton about the China factor in deciding to test again at Pokhran. Again Indi awas consistent in threat perception. It was US based NPA propaganda fed by deluded fools like IPCS head Chari and his coterie. Shows they were out of the loop.}

India’s “Long Telegram” and Crossing the No-Bomb Line

Perhaps the single most important document for establishing the evolving history of India’s nuclear weapons policy comes from P.N. Haksar, Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that may be dated to 1968. The note is titled “Need for India In a Changing World to Reassess her National Interest and Foreign policy.”


{Long verbose title guided by old school British practices. Could have been shortened to "Need for India to reassess Foreign Policy" as national interests don't get reassessed.}

The revealing document tends to defy most assumptions held about India’s nuclear policy regarding the level of “stand-off capability” that was being considered in the Prime Minister Secretariat. P.N Haskar wrote:

i. the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium range (2,000-3,000 miles) capable, from sites within India’s frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centers of population

ii. The development simultaneously of submarines driven by nuclear power fitted out to carry nuclear missiles

iii. This nuclear arms program should be based on adequate stockpiling of those sensitive instruments and machinery…. which will be difficult to import from abroad increasingly
[/I]

Haksar distinguished between the role of nuclear India as opposed to other nuclear powers. [b]Haksar also reveals his thought that India’s nuclear ambition should be clearly communicated with the United States at a relevant time.
The nuclear specter of China remained the overwhelming consideration. Haksar seemed to appreciate nuclear balancing in Europe and wrote of India’s “own security require that she becomes a nuclear power to establish a genuine balance of power with China.”


{So those frenetic world wide visits by L.K. Jha were just that. There was no way India would have come under any umbrella even if it was offered. It so happens such an umbrella was not offered and show the P-5 had India as a scape goat or a target in mind}

Haksar wrote this for the benefit of the Indian prime minister almost fifty years ago. This was India’s equivalent of George Kennan’s “long telegram” to the State Department. The long telegram also carried an unsparing assessment of Pakistan as “an unstable state contrived artificially” whose internal logic compelled the “inevitable and chronic hostility of Pakistan to India.” Haksar was India’s Kennan and much of what he assessed has become part of India’s enduring strategic culture. A study of it is central to any constructions of Indian strategic thought. The Indian long telegram assesses the great power approach to Indian nuclear ambition. Haksar acutely felt a “growing convergence of interest in Washington, Peking and Moscow of keeping India under pressure and using Pakistan for the purpose.” He also wrote of both Moscow and Washington having similar a view on balancing India and Pakistan: “making the development of nuclear arms by her (India) that much more difficult by providing measured quantities of arms to Pakistan.” It also gives a window to understanding the Russia-Pakistan rapprochement that was taking place, which had implications for China’s nuclear strategy towards both India and Soviet Union. Haksar grappled with Soviet attempts to gain leverage with Pakistan with the argument that Russia was weaning away Pakistan from China for its own reasons because “close understanding between Pakistan and China may bring nuclear tipped missiles aimed not only at India but the Southern flank of Soviet Union.” Therefore, the dangers of Pakistan and China colluding were not only for India but also for the Soviet Union, and that too in nuclear terms. Haksar self-reflection shows a strategist forming his thoughts rather than a draft where the thoughts are already complete. Uncertain of Soviet strategic intentions, Haskar’s writing reveals a realist exploration of the limits of Indo-Soviet cooperation even as in this same year (1968) military cooperation between India and Soviet Union had begun in earnest. The larger subcontinental strategy of Soviet Union was still not clear.


{Even after collapse of former Soviet Union its not clear even now.}

The Haskar “long telegram” cites Bhutto being under house arrest at the time but acknowledges the possibility of the “flamboyant” Bhutto taking Pakistan closer to China as indeed turned out to be the case. Ayub was seen by both the United States and Russia as a counterweight to India and neither of them wanted to strengthen the war-making capacity of Ayub, but rather his war-deterring capacity towards India.


Another immediate provocation for this “long telegram”: in 1968 Pakistan was looking to set up a nuclear reactor in East Bengal and was holding discussions with Westinghouse before ultimately withdrew. After Soviet statesman Alexei Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan in the same year, it settled for commissioning a feasibility study by Soviet “Technopromexport.” Soviets considered the cooperation a pure commercial transaction in the manner that France described much of its arms and nuclear sales. One of the reasons why Westinghouse withdrew from the bid was because, according to the Indian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan wanted to retain used fuel rods. If Pakistan had succeeded in creating the impression that it had a nuclear explosive device in East Bengal or even a nuclear facility in East Bengal that would have made any intervention by India in that region out of question. This is not to give the impression that India had designs on breaking off East Bengal much before 1971, but it was a factor that could not have been taken lightly by India.

{On the contrary Indian resolve to sever East Pakistan and limit the 1971 war to the East makes lots of sense. To deny a future nuclear plant infrastructure for Pakistan would be a strategic objective of the 1971 war.}

By 1967, as revealed by a cable from External Affairs official J.S. Mehta from the Indian embassy in Washington to the Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Prime Minister Secretariat that there were differences between the U.S. administration and Congress on the ICBM capability of the Chinese nuclear program. The administration felt that Chinese ICBM would only be ready by 1971-72 and miniaturization of warhead would have to precede any ICBM capability. Congressional hearings revealed that China was still struggling with submarine missile launch. Sidney Graybeal, an advisor to President Kennedy during Cuban missile crisis and a CIA expert on Chinese rocketry, informed Indian EZ official K.P. Jain that China was going to test an ICBM by placing a satellite in orbit irrespective of the size of the payload. The missile test itself would be into the Indian Ocean off the coast of Tanzania and the CIA was monitoring the presence of Chinese technicians in Tanzania. It was also apparent that the Cultural Revolution had not slowed down Chinese nuclear program. In April 1970, K.R. Narayanan (Policy Planning Division-MEA Ministry of External Affairs) wrote on the launch of the earth satellite by China as a follow up to his 1964 paper when he was Director of the China Division. At about this time Haksar had written that India’s “India’s future status in the world and her own security require that she becomes a nuclear power so as to establish a genuine regional balance of power with China.” In March 1969, the Government of India answered in Lok Sabha that it “did not consider it necessary to seek any nuclear umbrella.” (MEA, 1969) As a former Chairman of Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. M.R Srinivasan told the author, “no one in current memory knows that an Indian thinker as P.N. Haksar was already thinking in terms of a triad and it has till now remained hidden in the archives.”


{MRS truly jests. By that time Sarabhai had setup ISRO. Dr. Nag Chaudhri had started exploring Valiant at DRDL. Submarine feasibility studies were underway. I guess unless they seen in writing they don't want to connect any dots.}

The April 1970 satellite launch established that China had acquired MRBM range. Indian agencies were all basing their nuclear calculation around China. China’s nuclear program established the success of the Communist leadership in navigating through domestic political and economic upheaval while keeping the nuclear program a consistent priority. Subramanian Swamy had written in the October 1970 issue of United Service Institution of India Journal that in a nuclear conflict with a major power, China would have to rely on second strike with fifteen to twenty missiles to undertake assured destruction. (Swamy, 1970) Ten would be decoys and ten pointed at cities to penetrate Nike-X. Calculating for eluding sprint missile detonation height among other things, it would succeed in destroying at least three cities by radioactive fallout, which was a sufficient deterrent for China. This argument was a way of arguing that even a smaller number of missiles with appropriate strategies could give sufficient deterrence for counter value massive retaliation. This was a counterpoint to the United Nations study on the minimum deterrence, which placed the arsenal at one hundred warheads, thirty to fifty aircrafts and fifty missiles.

{Also by then the Ussuri River clashes between FSU and PRC were already over. And PRC had tested the CHIC-4 design which was later passed on to Pakistan.}


There was also an argument at the time that India should go in for a tactical weapon arsenal instead of strategic systems. As the PMO documents reveal, this was considered head on by the Department of Atomic Energy. The Indian atomic establishment argued that if China were to meet determined resistance from our ground forces while crossing the Himalayas, she could make use of tactical nuclear weapons and demoralize our troops. It concluded that the argument that India could impact the military situation by possessing only tactical weapons was a fallacy and that India needed to focus on developing strategic delivery capability rather than settling for a small tactical arsenal.


If China is using a nuclear weapon to bully or to annihilate our forces, we can expect China to escalate the conflict if the limited use is successfully countered by us. China is known to be developing a strategic nuclear weapon system involving long range guided missiles. Therefore, the only way by which we could deter Chinese escalation would be to ourselves have a strategic system capable of inflicting an unacceptable damage on China.


The only way to stop China from escalating was to have second-strike capability inflicting unacceptable damage. According to the Department of Atomic Energy, “paper tigers do not provide security, that is, you cannot bluff in regard to your military strength.” India would require a total defensive system rather than a prototype by a scientist. However, since Indian cities were within range of China’s intermediate missile arsenal, India would require longer ranges missile to bring Chinese cities within their striking capacity. The completion of the reprocessing facility at Tarapur, which had begun in 1968, was a pointer in the direction the prime minister’s office was thinking.


{Now we know why the Agni range and payload weight were given to Dr. Kalam when IGMP was began in 1984. He had proposed a small Re-entry Experiment (REX) and was given the range and payload weight objectives and asked to work it in. BTW in his ISRO days he used to do system architecture studies under Sarabhai guidance. No other supervisors.}

In conclusion, it would be a mistake to ascribe the wisdom of Indian nuclear doctrine and strategy merely to those who came in at the weaponization/operationalization stage. The archival history establishes that doctrinal inquiries went back to the mid-1960s. China was and remains the main nuclear threat for India. Indian nuclear doctrine considers China to be its main nuclear rival. Former National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon told the author that since Pakistani delivery platforms are essentially based on Chinese systems, it made them an extension of the Chinese nuclear threat.

Vivek Prahladan is a visiting researcher at Keio University in Japan.




svinayak thanks for posting this.


I would like to see those declassified material for we can understand better the decisions.

ramana
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 14 Dec 2016 00:15

Essence of Grand Strategy formulation is What?
What is to be done is the main stumbling block in creation of Grand Strategy. This phase leads to numerous tussles among the formulators and well meaning people who hinder rather than aid due to lack of clarity of thought.

Next phase is Who?
Who should implement the What or the objectives defined above. Who among the many national resources should implement the objective defined in What phase.

After that comes How?
This is essentially a milestone plan which has broad milestones to get to What.

Next comes When?
This is a tricky question that is really based on resources allocated. When is fully dependent on how many resources are allocated to achieve the How? Again this depends on the priority placed on the What? Resources get allocated based on the priority to achieve the big What?
Many times national objectives are mysteries wrapped in enigmas. Along the way there are obstacles, key people eliminated but somewhere in the deep dungeons of government there will be people monitoring the grand strategy.

ramana
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ramana » 14 Dec 2016 00:24

Let us examine the Haksar memo from grand strategy formulation.

The What?

Haksar wrote
India’s “own security require that she becomes a nuclear power to establish a genuine balance of power with China.”


Next Who?

Haksar wrote

Department of Atomic Energy

Therefore, the only way by which we could deter Chinese escalation would be to ourselves have a strategic system capable of inflicting an unacceptable damage on China.


Next How?

P.N Haskar wrote:



i. the making of nuclear arms in the shape of medium range (2,000-3,000 miles) capable, from sites within India’s frontiers, of striking with success not only a few chosen targets in Tibet but of ranging as far afield as the industrial heart of China in Manchuria and in the great river valleys south of it which include some of her principal industries and urban centers of population


ii. The development simultaneously of submarines driven by nuclear power fitted out to carry nuclear missiles

iii. This nuclear arms program should be based on adequate stockpiling of those sensitive instruments and machinery…. which will be difficult to import from abroad increasingly



Next When?

This is left to the PM to implement based on resources, ground realities and geo-politics.

Even though the letter was written in 1968 the actual realization was done in 1998.

And note China invaded in October 1962, yet it took about five years and the 1965 War and three Prime Minsters to decide on the Haksar Doctrine.


So here in brief is the Grand Strategy of Indian Nuclearization.

Jai Mata Di!!!

ShauryaT
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Re: Evolution of Indian Strategic Thought-1

Postby ShauryaT » 17 Dec 2016 21:29

Now, the below is a thought!!

Call for the trial of Manmohan Singh and his Foreign Policy team

I have strong reasons to call for the trial of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and key members of his foreign policymaking team such as Shivshankar Menon, Salman Khurshid and M.K. Narayanan for treason against India’s national interests along with crimes against our future generations. In my hand is Bharat Karnad’s book, “Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)”, and each paragraph I read resembles a distressed child telling us that these leaders mauled India’s national interests consistently, disturbingly and deliberately, and subordinated this nation of 1.3 billion souls to the interests of adversarial states like China and Pakistan.


If you are a youth under 25 constituting about 55 percent of Indians, this nation belongs to you and your children more than it belongs to my elders or to my generation nearing 50. So, it’s essential for you to know how these Indian leaders engaged in crimes against India while being in power. Manmohan Singh was the prime minister for ten years from 2004. While our ancients taught us that India should be the Vishwa Guru (world leader), Manmohan Singh, as the prime minister, wrote in 2007 that India “does not desire to be a global superpower.” Shivshankar Menon, who served as the national security adviser to Manmohan Singh for four years till 2014, dismissed “status”, “prestige” or “any other goal” that could appear as “popular or attractive” for India.


In the anarchical society of states, where ambassadors are willing to break each other’s nose to protect their nation’s interests, these five points were worthless words from a prime minister unable to defend India’s interests. This cowardice was termed as “the Singh Doctrine” by Sanjaya Baru, the prime minister’s media adviser. In February 2006, when Manmohan Singh was also the external affairs minister, his ministry prevented the Indian Navy from attacking pirates who seized a ship flying the Indian flag; and his government chose to pay ransom to free the Indian citizens. As detailed in the book, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Arun Prakash was bitter about this surrender of the Indian state before a handful of pirates and cowardice of Manmohan Singh.


Karnad’s book has numerous incidents on how army and navy officers were humiliated by the team led by Manmohan Singh. Shivshankar Menon spoke against Admiral D.K. Joshi, who was asked a question in Beijing how Indian Navy would respond if China seized Indian warships deployed in South China Sea to protect Indian energy assets jointly owned with Vietnam. Admiral Joshi gave a standard response that “rules of engagement” will apply whenever India’s “right of self-defense is impeded” – but Menon issued a statement saying Joshi was “misled” and the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement to the effect, observes Karnad, that “New Delhi is more mindful of Chinese sensibilities [than the Indian military is].” The crimes by Manmohan Singh’s team do not cease here. The author narrates another incident: In its intent, the 2010 Operational Directive issued by defence ministry to the military services designated China as the main threat but it was quickly “diluted” by Salman Khurshid who described as China as “major concern” and Pakistan as “part of the Chinese picture” – as if Khurshid was watching a Bollywood movie.

During the tenure of Manmohan Singh, an attempt was also made to revive Nehru’s now-irrelevant and inconsequential foreign policy through Nonalignment 2.0, a quasi-official document supposed to serve as a vision document authored by Congress party’s parasites. At a function to release the document in 2012, M. K. Narayanan, the national security adviser to Manmohan Singh from 2006 to 2010, stated that India must avoid “too activist a [foreign] policy” and that hard power – i.e. military power – is not “necessary” for India because becoming a great power is “an unaffordable luxury.” In line with this thinking, India’s junior external affairs minister Shashi Tharoor conceived “Pax Indica” – a treatise on soft power meant to serve the interests of foreign powers and sell to them “India’s sense of responsibility to the world.”

In this excellent book, Karnad also investigates the responses of the counterfeit liberal writers like Amartya Sen, Ramachandra Guha, Minister Jairam Ramesh and others. Sen lambasted India for the 1998 nuclear tests and dismissed them as “the thrill of power.” Guha, who sells himself as a historian, is quoted as saying: “India will not become a superpower”; and since it is poor, “India should not even attempt to become a superpower.” Jairam Ramesh is quoted as saying by Karnad that India’s great power aspiration is “dangerous.” The author reminds such writers and thinkers that if poor economic conditions were an acceptable reason, the sixteenth-century England would not have funded the enlargement of the Royal Navy on the path to becoming a great power. While subject-matter experts will read Karnad’s book, it must also be read by India’s youths enrolled in Indian institutes of technology and management. At this point in time, India’s defence will benefit the most from non-experts and new ideas.



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