Johann wrote:
There's a reason that Afghanistan was so hopeful 2001-03, and saw saw much progress. Pakistan wasn't playing the spoiler role that it had for so long. The 'bad Taliban' is very much the product of Musharraf's almost unstinting support to the US in Afghanistan 2001-03.
The 'bad Taliban's' multiple attempts to kill Musharraf in 2003, and their ability to recruit enlisted military personnel, along with the US focus on Iraq convinced Musharraf and the PA from 2004 onwards that a change in their Afghan policy policy was both good and necessary.
.
From 2001-2003, it wasn't just Musharraf who was "playing nice"... the US was keeping its part of the bargain as well, and actively working to save as many Pakistani "assets" in Afghanistan as possible. The Kunduz Airlift, when thousands of jihadis and ISI operatives were given safe conduct back to Pakistan is one case in point. The disappearance of OBL from under the very noses of coalition troops at Tora Bora is another.
The Americans' goal at the time was only to rid Afghanistan of Al Qaeda (Islamist groups who targeted the *West* specifically.) Washington repatriated the ISI jihadi cadres from Kunduz, fully expecting that Pakistan would again use those cadres to dominate Afghanistan, once the US had finished its job of eliminating Al Qaeda from the region. The US never had a problem with Pakistan-Proxy Taliban rule in Afghanistan; they had been actively engaged with the Taliban since 1996, and to them, the Al-Qaeda business was merely a hiccup in what could once more become a productive relationship.
Unfortunately for America, and very fortunately for India, things did not go as planned by Musharraf and the Bush regime. Musharraf underestimated the degree to which various Deobandi Tanzeems, formerly beholden to the ISI, had become Islamized by transfusions with Taliban Afghans and Arab/Central Asian Al-Qaeda militants. Indeed, he did not see the extent to which the Pakistan Army itself had become Islamized and acquired loyalty to a "higher authority" than himself. He may have continued to believe for a time that his breed of General still had the Jihadis "by the scruffs of their necks."
I don't believe that the stage-managed "assassination attempts" against Musharraf had anything to do with the change in policy, circa 2004, when Pakistan began to assist the rearming and regrouping of the Taliban in NWFP/FATA. The Iraq war diversion certainly did; Musharraf thought that he could take advantage of Washington's distraction in Iraq, and with characteristic tactical brilliance, decided to turn the heat up on the Americans at the Afghan border. In so doing, Musharraf was obviously hoping to blackmail Washington for more aid.
It was also in 2004 that the CIA first began using drones to strike at regrouping Taliban targets within Pakistani territory. This was when resentment against the Pakistan Army among the regrouping Taliban first began to brew, sowing the seeds for a "Bad Taliban"'s emergence later on. After all, until 2003 Musharraf (with American compliance) had protected the ISI's chosen Taliban cadre quite well... seeing them safely into FATA, facilitating their efforts to rebuild their strength for a counterattack, etc.
By 2005 things had become slightly inconvenient for Musharraf, with the Taliban growing restive in FATA. Baitullah Mehsud had to be bribed at Sara Rogha to accept a ceasefire; but even at this point Baitullah was content to let the Frontier Corps maintain a presence in the territories under his control.
However, it was not until after the Lal Masjid siege of July 2007 that a "Bad Taliban" emerged in earnest to oppose the TSPA establishment under Musharraf. Only in December 2007 did Baitullah Mehsud convene the TTP; soon after, the merry rampage of Mullah Radio into SWAT kicked off many years of fireworks in Pakistan proper.
The Haqqanis are a last-ditch effort by the TSPA to regain control of the movement they once spawned and nursed from its infancy. Of all the Taliban groups, the Haqqanis have neither opposed Islamabad directly (as the TTP has) nor tried to go behind Islamabad's back to conclude peace agreements with the US and Karzai (as the Quetta Shura has.) The Pakis tried to re-establish their sponsorship of Hekmatyar for a while, but found him lacking in popular support among the present generation of Pashtun jihadis, and probably didn't trust him that much anyway. So finally, the Haqqanis were by far Islamabad's best and safest bet for a proxy in Afghanistan.
Unfortunately the Haqqanis in North Waziristan (along with Maulvi Nazir's group in South Waziristan) have been *the* primary targets of US drone strikes since the Obama administration took office and the new Af-Pak policy came into effect. This is because the Haqqanis, for all their loyalty to the ISI, have stubbornly refused to stop sheltering a large number of foreign Al-Qaeda cadres. That has been the fly in the ointment. The Haqqanis are the best bet for Islamabad because of their consistent loyalty to the ISI, and completely unacceptable to the Americans because they continue to shelter a number of "most dangerous terrorists" from the US point of view.