Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Philip » 22 Oct 2012 03:49

To better understand '62 we must also look back at '48,where we managed to scuttle Pak's attempt to capture the Valley.Paki looting and raping saw us able to fly in troops to hold Srinagar airport and fight off the invaders.However,the political aftermath was a disaster with Nehru persuaded by the US,UK,etc. to take the Kashmir issue to the UN,when militarily we had the Pakis on the ropes.They deliberately did this (the plebisicite strategy,which never ever happened as promised in that period of time) to save Pak from humiliation which could've splintered the new born nation,which they were building up as a "martial state" ,whose mercenary army would pay obeisance to Uncle Sam,the King and western military alliances like CENTO later on.

Nehru bitterly rued this decision later on in a letter to his sister,so JN Dixit tells us in one of his books,at being double-crossed by the western powers.It is probably one strong reason why he then went on to pursue his disastrous diplomatic campaign of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai to make up for the boot in the backside from his erstwhile western bum chums! It is why he also insisted that China be given the UNSC seat which was offered to India first on moral grounds,another "honourable" gesture to the PRC, which actually held him in contempt for his patronising behaviour towards them.The Chinese seeing how Nehru chose not to complete a military victory with the Pakis in '48,summed him up in their opinion as an international "poseur",who had feet of clay when it came to military matters. Strangely even Mrs. G. did not deliver the final KO blow to Pak over Kashmir in '71 after liberating E.Pak,but we must remember that she was facing a real threat of US military action against us which might've brought in the Soviets in (Indo-Soviet friendship Treaty),something that they probably did not want as the main goal was to split Pak into two by liberating E.Pak and creating Bangladesh.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 22 Oct 2012 06:48

Neither the Indian interviewer nor of course Maxwell go into any issues regarding Tibet. What about the Tibetan refugees? And most importantly, if India were, by Maxwell, more in the wrong than China, surely the Tibetan people would have felt it more than the Han bureaucrats, Chinese red army or CCP politbureau. Is there any record of Tibetan people supporting the Chinese border actions with the argument that the Indians are violating the Tibetan boundary? It's unlikely that a single independent Tibetan came out openly on China's side in that war.

Tibet could have been a pluralist democracy closely tied to India, with which it has cultural and historical ties, instead of an outpost of the CCP empire. This is an approach that is totally missed, in the obsession with boundaries, treaties, territory, power and control.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Karan M » 22 Oct 2012 07:01

We have had 50 years to counter Maxwell & his leftist biased rigmarole. Has GOI done so? No.
Every year at the time of the 62 conflict or multiples of some anniversary, out come the usual articles etc, few of which are archived. It says a lot about our attitude and approach to history, that a hack like Maxwell is still the defacto reference for many on 1962, merely because a) his work is available b) widely disseminated

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 22 Oct 2012 08:04

Does Maxwell himself have any history at all of criticising and condemning the behaviour of imperialists-British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish etc, or only on very specific boundary questions regarding India and China( how convenient), where he refers to old British machinations in the supposed 'great game'. I'm looking for, and not finding, in any of his writings, sincere, heartfelt denunciations of colonialism as first and foremost an ideology of ethno-supremacy, particularly British and European, and secondly as a means to exploit the land, labour and captive markets of the colonial territory by the metropolitan power.

Maxwell has at least to get his fundamentals right with respect to India, for him to be even considered a legitimate and credible analyst. And this he hasn't done, apart from his narrative gaps!

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby kunalverma » 22 Oct 2012 15:52

If there are any errors in the list given in the next post, please let me know. I'll be most grateful. We're putting the list down going over memorials etc. and at places there is a bit of confusion sometimes. Thanks.
Last edited by kunalverma on 22 Oct 2012 16:01, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby kunalverma » 22 Oct 2012 15:53

BATTLE OF BUM LA (13,500')
23 OCTOBER 2012


'Their Names Liveth for Evermore'

The Forward Policy was based on the Intelligence Bureau’s assessment that the Chinese would not go to war with India on the issue of the McMahon Line, so that the International Border would ultimately stabilize along the ‘Line of Actual Control’ established by the presence of troops. By then 24 platoons of Assam Rifles were deployed in NEFA and manning posts all along the watershed – Gemchram (13,779 ft), Taksing (10,500 ft), Domla (17,060 ft), Karbo (11,811 ft), Dembuen (11,800 ft), Malinye (9,842 ft) Mipidon (5,577 ft) and Jachap (9,186 ft). Behind them the Army deployed its troops in greater strength, extending from Tawang to Bomdila, Daporijo and Walong.
-- Brahma's Children (The Northeast Trilogy)


I quote from the Assam Rifles memorial slab which is placed at the top of Bum La.

"In 1962, the Indian Government ordered "OP ONKAR", the occupation of forward posts along the Indo-Tibetan Border. These outposts were on inaccessible heights, isolated and were dependent on air for sustenance. The limited air support available was constantly hindered by the vagaries of weather.
Bum La was one such outpost occupied by a platoon of 5 Assam Rifles. It had sangars without overhead protection, some wire obstacles and a hurriedly laid protective mine field. At dawn on 23 October (3 days after the attack on Namka Chu) the Chinese assaulted with an overwhelming strength of 500-600 troops supported by mortars and anti-tank rockets. The men of 5 Assam Rifles fought with grim determination, supported by mortar fire from 1 SIKH deployed on the ridge to the south. The valiant soldiers of 5 Assam Rifles led by Jemadar AK Roy repulsed a number of Chinese attacks but the odds were too heavy and the platoon was overwhelmed by mid day.
The platoon inspite of daunting odds, fought till the last man in the true traditions of the Indian Army. One JCO and 16 OR of 5 Assam Rifles laid down their lives in the defence of the motherland.
A grim reminder of the valiant battle fought by the gallant soldiers of 5 Assam Rifles are the ruins of their defences now called "ASSAM FORT"."

The names of the 17 Assam Rifles as taken off the memorial in Lokra:

Jem AK Roy; Rfn Ganga Prasad Magar; Rfn Hastabahadur Limbu; Rfn Keshwar Singh Chetri; Rfn Lokeshwar Bose; Rfn Shash Bahadur Gurung; Rfn Lokpa Dandu Lama; Rfn Lal Bahadur Gurung; Nk Pahal Singh Thapa; Rfn Sher Bahadur Thapa; Rfn Prem Singh Thapa; Rfn Sher Bahadur Bhujel; Nk Mehdini Bahadur Chhetri; Rfn Bahadur Singh Bisht; Rfn Bunty Anka; Rfn Deb Prasad Limbu; Rfn Prem Bahadur Chhetri

To the South, 1 SIKH fought the other battle. I don't have the exact names of the men killed at Bum La per se, so am listing the names of all those who laid down their lives from the SIKH Regiment*

Lt Col BN Mehta; Maj PM Samvatsar; Capt Mahavir Prasad; Lt Yograj Palta; 2/Lt S Dagur; Sub Joginder Singh (PVC - died later in a Chinese POW camp); Sep Jagraj Singh; Nk Didar Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; L/Nk Rattan Singh; L/Nk Ram Swarup; Sep Bikram Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Hari Singh; Sep Nachhattar Singh; L/Hav Gopal Singh; Sep Sucha Singh; Sep Malkait Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Jit Singh; Sep Nachhattar Singh; Sep Raghbir Singh; Sep Balbir Singh; L/Nk Mohinder Singh; L/Nk Naurang Singh; Sep Saudagar Singh; Sep Sukhdev Singh; Sep Sarwan Singh; Sep Gurdarshan Singh; Sep Ajaib Singh; Sep Balbir Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Sohan Singh; Sep Jangir Singh; Sep Hardip Singh; Sep Sowaran Singh; Sep Gurcharan Singh; Sep Jarnail Singh; Sep Jalaur Singh; Jem Jaspal Singh; L/Nk Sarup Singh; Sep Gurdeep Singh; Sep Jugraj Singh; Sep Amar Singh; Sep Karam Singh; Sep Gurnam Singh; Sep Kashmir Singh; Sep Kartar Singh; Sep Gurbachan Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Piara Singh; Nk Natha Singh; Nk Iqbal Singh; Sep Harbans Singh; L/Nk Surjit Singh; L/Nk Jarnail Singh; Sep Gurdial Singh; Sep Surat Singh; Sep Labh Singh; Sep Sukhchain Singh; L/Nk Arjan Singh; Sep Gurdev Singh; Hav Mohinder Singh; Sep Sukhdev Singh; Sep Santokh Singh; Sep Lakhbir Singh; Sep Puran Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Bikkar Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Kaila Singh; L/Nk Dalip Singh; Sep Bindo Singh; Sep Pritam Singh; Sep Madho Singh; Sep Angrez Singh; L/Nk Labha Ram; Sep Hardial Singh; Sep Basant Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Wasan Singh; Sep Bikar Singh; Sep Ajaib Singh; Sep Baba Singh; Sep Dildar Singh; Sep Swarn Singh; Sep Lashman Singh; Nk Kulbir Singh; Sep Sarju Singh; Sep Gurmail Singh; Sep Mahender Singh; Sep Tehal Singh; Sep Sarwan Singh; Sep Mangal Singh; Sep Nand Singh; Sep Sajjan Singh; Sep Sher Singh; Sep Harbans Singh; Sep Gulzar Singh; Sep Gurdev Singh; Sep Gurdev Singh; Sep Ram Rattan Singh; Sep Harnek Singh; Sep Rup Singh; Sep joginder Singh; Sep Jaswant Singh; Sep Bahadur Singh; Sep Ishar Singh; Sep Jeet Singh; Sep Manjit Singh; Sep Avtar Singh; Sep Ajit Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Surinder Singh; Sep Kewal Singh (was awarded the MVC); Sep Rawel Singh; Sep Nasib Singh; L/Hav Bhajan Singh; Hav Labh Singh; L/Nk Harbhajan Singh; L/Nk Balbir Singh; Sep Gurnam Singh; Sep Darshan Singh; Sep Jagir Singh; Sep Sadhu Singh; Sep Fauja Singh; L/Nk Karam Singh; Sep Pargat Singh; Sep Harjit Singh; Sep Sarwan Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Charanjit Singh; Sep BS Randhawa; Hav Gurmukh Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Nk Maghar Singh; Sep Ujagar Singh; L/Nk Kirpa Ram (was awarded the VrC); L/Hav Shangara Singh; Hav Bhola Singh; L/Nk Karnail Singh; Sep Bhaga Singh; Sep Arjan Singh; Sep Amar Singh; Sep Bhagwan Singh; Sep Gurdial Singh; Sep Tehal Singh; Sep Tarlok Singh; Sep Kundan Singh; Sep Pritam Singh; Sep Resham Singh; Sep Kahan Singh; L/Nk Santokh Singh; Sep Ranjit Singh; Hav Mukhtar Singh; Sep Narinder Singh; Sep Charan Singh; Sep Raj Krishan Singh; Sep Achhar Singh; Sub Bachan Singh; Sub Lachman Singh; Sep Harchand Singh; Sep Santosh Singh; Sub Mukhtiar Singh; Jam Gurnam Singh; Sep Bogh Singh; Jam Sis Ram; Nb sub Rawail Singh

*Flags of Honour

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby peter » 23 Oct 2012 01:22

ramana wrote:Guys I know a medic who fought in battle of Chusul and knew both Dhan Singh Thapa and Shaitan Singh.

Would you like to read his reminiscences?

He retired as a Brigadier in the Armed Forces Medical Corps.

Most definitely. Please post.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby peter » 23 Oct 2012 01:25

ramana wrote:[..]

TS George in his bio of Menon says Menon wanted to repalce the IA heirarchy with officers from common background implying the higher ranks were somehow elities. Yet we see that the whole higher commands were sprinkled with Nehru's relatives like Thapar, Kaul and who else?


Was this a modern version of Iqatadari system which went wrong?

My guess is that Menon wanted pliant people. Usually good generals are not "bendable" and that too in front of a civil servant. The Coorgis and rajputs probably were Menon's targets.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby peter » 23 Oct 2012 01:27

kunalverma wrote:BATTLE OF BUM LA (13,500')
23 OCTOBER 2012


'Their Names Liveth for Evermore'

The Forward Policy was based on the Intelligence Bureau’s assessment that the Chinese would not go to war with India on the issue of the McMahon Line, so that the International Border would ultimately stabilize along the ‘Line of Actual Control’ established by the presence of troops. By then 24 platoons of Assam Rifles were deployed in NEFA and manning posts all along the watershed – Gemchram (13,779 ft), Taksing (10,500 ft), Domla (17,060 ft), Karbo (11,811 ft), Dembuen (11,800 ft), Malinye (9,842 ft) Mipidon (5,577 ft) and Jachap (9,186 ft). Behind them the Army deployed its troops in greater strength, extending from Tawang to Bomdila, Daporijo and Walong.
-- Brahma's Children (The Northeast Trilogy)


I quote from the Assam Rifles memorial slab which is placed at the top of Bum La.

"In 1962, the Indian Government ordered "OP ONKAR", the occupation of forward posts along the Indo-Tibetan Border. These outposts were on inaccessible heights, isolated and were dependent on air for sustenance. The limited air support available was constantly hindered by the vagaries of weather.
Bum La was one such outpost occupied by a platoon of 5 Assam Rifles. It had sangars without overhead protection, some wire obstacles and a hurriedly laid protective mine field. At dawn on 23 October (3 days after the attack on Namka Chu) the Chinese assaulted with an overwhelming strength of 500-600 troops supported by mortars and anti-tank rockets. The men of 5 Assam Rifles fought with grim determination, supported by mortar fire from 1 SIKH deployed on the ridge to the south. The valiant soldiers of 5 Assam Rifles led by Jemadar AK Roy repulsed a number of Chinese attacks but the odds were too heavy and the platoon was overwhelmed by mid day.
The platoon inspite of daunting odds, fought till the last man in the true traditions of the Indian Army. One JCO and 16 OR of 5 Assam Rifles laid down their lives in the defence of the motherland.
A grim reminder of the valiant battle fought by the gallant soldiers of 5 Assam Rifles are the ruins of their defences now called "ASSAM FORT"."

The names of the 17 Assam Rifles as taken off the memorial in Lokra:

Jem AK Roy; Rfn Ganga Prasad Magar; Rfn Hastabahadur Limbu; Rfn Keshwar Singh Chetri; Rfn Lokeshwar Bose; Rfn Shash Bahadur Gurung; Rfn Lokpa Dandu Lama; Rfn Lal Bahadur Gurung; Nk Pahal Singh Thapa; Rfn Sher Bahadur Thapa; Rfn Prem Singh Thapa; Rfn Sher Bahadur Bhujel; Nk Mehdini Bahadur Chhetri; Rfn Bahadur Singh Bisht; Rfn Bunty Anka; Rfn Deb Prasad Limbu; Rfn Prem Bahadur Chhetri

To the South, 1 SIKH fought the other battle. I don't have the exact names of the men killed at Bum La per se, so am listing the names of all those who laid down their lives from the SIKH Regiment*

Lt Col BN Mehta; Maj PM Samvatsar; Capt Mahavir Prasad; Lt Yograj Palta; 2/Lt S Dagur; Sub Joginder Singh (PVC - died later in a Chinese POW camp); Sep Jagraj Singh; Nk Didar Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; L/Nk Rattan Singh; L/Nk Ram Swarup; Sep Bikram Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Hari Singh; Sep Nachhattar Singh; L/Hav Gopal Singh; Sep Sucha Singh; Sep Malkait Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Jit Singh; Sep Nachhattar Singh; Sep Raghbir Singh; Sep Balbir Singh; L/Nk Mohinder Singh; L/Nk Naurang Singh; Sep Saudagar Singh; Sep Sukhdev Singh; Sep Sarwan Singh; Sep Gurdarshan Singh; Sep Ajaib Singh; Sep Balbir Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Sohan Singh; Sep Jangir Singh; Sep Hardip Singh; Sep Sowaran Singh; Sep Gurcharan Singh; Sep Jarnail Singh; Sep Jalaur Singh; Jem Jaspal Singh; L/Nk Sarup Singh; Sep Gurdeep Singh; Sep Jugraj Singh; Sep Amar Singh; Sep Karam Singh; Sep Gurnam Singh; Sep Kashmir Singh; Sep Kartar Singh; Sep Gurbachan Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Piara Singh; Nk Natha Singh; Nk Iqbal Singh; Sep Harbans Singh; L/Nk Surjit Singh; L/Nk Jarnail Singh; Sep Gurdial Singh; Sep Surat Singh; Sep Labh Singh; Sep Sukhchain Singh; L/Nk Arjan Singh; Sep Gurdev Singh; Hav Mohinder Singh; Sep Sukhdev Singh; Sep Santokh Singh; Sep Lakhbir Singh; Sep Puran Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Bikkar Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Kaila Singh; L/Nk Dalip Singh; Sep Bindo Singh; Sep Pritam Singh; Sep Madho Singh; Sep Angrez Singh; L/Nk Labha Ram; Sep Hardial Singh; Sep Basant Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Wasan Singh; Sep Bikar Singh; Sep Ajaib Singh; Sep Baba Singh; Sep Dildar Singh; Sep Swarn Singh; Sep Lashman Singh; Nk Kulbir Singh; Sep Sarju Singh; Sep Gurmail Singh; Sep Mahender Singh; Sep Tehal Singh; Sep Sarwan Singh; Sep Mangal Singh; Sep Nand Singh; Sep Sajjan Singh; Sep Sher Singh; Sep Harbans Singh; Sep Gulzar Singh; Sep Gurdev Singh; Sep Gurdev Singh; Sep Ram Rattan Singh; Sep Harnek Singh; Sep Rup Singh; Sep joginder Singh; Sep Jaswant Singh; Sep Bahadur Singh; Sep Ishar Singh; Sep Jeet Singh; Sep Manjit Singh; Sep Avtar Singh; Sep Ajit Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Sep Surinder Singh; Sep Kewal Singh (was awarded the MVC); Sep Rawel Singh; Sep Nasib Singh; L/Hav Bhajan Singh; Hav Labh Singh; L/Nk Harbhajan Singh; L/Nk Balbir Singh; Sep Gurnam Singh; Sep Darshan Singh; Sep Jagir Singh; Sep Sadhu Singh; Sep Fauja Singh; L/Nk Karam Singh; Sep Pargat Singh; Sep Harjit Singh; Sep Sarwan Singh; Sep Mohinder Singh; Sep Charanjit Singh; Sep BS Randhawa; Hav Gurmukh Singh; Sep Joginder Singh; Nk Maghar Singh; Sep Ujagar Singh; L/Nk Kirpa Ram (was awarded the VrC); L/Hav Shangara Singh; Hav Bhola Singh; L/Nk Karnail Singh; Sep Bhaga Singh; Sep Arjan Singh; Sep Amar Singh; Sep Bhagwan Singh; Sep Gurdial Singh; Sep Tehal Singh; Sep Tarlok Singh; Sep Kundan Singh; Sep Pritam Singh; Sep Resham Singh; Sep Kahan Singh; L/Nk Santokh Singh; Sep Ranjit Singh; Hav Mukhtar Singh; Sep Narinder Singh; Sep Charan Singh; Sep Raj Krishan Singh; Sep Achhar Singh; Sub Bachan Singh; Sub Lachman Singh; Sep Harchand Singh; Sep Santosh Singh; Sub Mukhtiar Singh; Jam Gurnam Singh; Sep Bogh Singh; Jam Sis Ram; Nb sub Rawail Singh

*Flags of Honour


Do you know how many total men we lost in this battle and how many did the Chinese loose?

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby brihaspati » 23 Oct 2012 02:09

Again CIA report on Menon's [and JLN's] views around 4th Novemebr, 1961.
http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/91/0000782343/KRISHNA-MENON%27S-VIEWS-ON-INDIAN-RELATIONS-WITH-KHRUSHCHEV-AND-UNDERGROUND-ATOMI.html

"The only way to use Khruschev to good purpose in the east-west conflict is to remain on friendly terms and thereby be in a position to exert some influence, however limited, on him. Both Nehrus's and Menon's line is: DON'T UPSET KHRUSHCHEV. "YOU CAN INFLUENce HIM ONLY BY NOT BEING AGAINST HIM EVEN IF YOU ARE NOT ON HIS SIDE".

ON THE MORE LIMITED ISSUE OF INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY KHRUSCHEV IS THE ONLY MEANS OF INFLUENCING PEIPING, AND THUS THE ONLY TANGIBLE DETERRENT TO AN AGGRESSIVE CHICOM POLICY. NEHRU LOOKS UPON THE PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH CHINA AS A LONG PROCESS OF UNDERMINING CHINA'S POSITION IN ASIA, AND THE ONLY WAY HE CAN DO THIS IS THROUGH MOSCOW.


MENON REITERATED HIS POSITION THAT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS ARE AS DANGEROUS AS ATMOSPHERIC TESTS, AND SAID HE HAD MADE THIS STATEMENT ON THE SCIENTIFIC AOVICE OF DR KOTHARI ( NOW CHAIRMAN UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION; FORMERLY SCIENTIFIC ADVISER TO THE MINIST OF DEFENSE WHERE HE WAS LARGELY CONCERNED WITH ORDNANCE PRODUCTION).


This is autumn 1961. Not 1962. In more non-public settings - JLN and Menon did not differ much. JLN changed his public positions more fluently than Menon. As per this report - they do not appear to have a great deal of mist in their eyes about Khruschev/USSR. Neither is Menon shouting out his love for Mao.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby brihaspati » 23 Oct 2012 02:42

When we think that people were pro-communist/ideologically motivated to allow communist causes to flourish, including that of USSR and China in the 50's and early 60's : consider the following possibilities, even if Moynihan is doing psy-ops and there seems to be no great outcry against him for lying:
http://www.esamskriti.com/essay-chapters/Foreign-hand~-How-big-a-threat-is-it-1.aspx
Irritated by these speeches denouncing the ever-present menace of CIA subversion, the US ambassador in New Delhi, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ordered an investigation which uncovered two occasions during her father Jawaharlal Nehru’s premiership when the CIA had secretly provided funds to help the Communists’ opponents in state elections, once in Kerala (where cash was supplied to the Roman Catholic Syrian Christian church to destabilise the democratically elected Communist Party of India) and once in West Bengal.

And just who was the conduit for these funds? According to Moynihan, “Both times the money was given to the Congress Party which had asked for it. Once it was given to Mrs Gandhi herself, who was then a party official. Still, as we were no longer giving any money to her it was understandable she should wonder to whom we were giving it.”


If Moynihan's allegations are true - then the time clues are very very specific : nothing moved in congrez at those two time periods, without the top bosse's nod, and IG was not the top boss during those two times.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 23 Oct 2012 18:01

The casualties in 1962 on the Indian side were admitted several years later to be about 4500, half of them from non-combat( weather) causes. Not sure of the Chinese losses.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby devesh » 23 Oct 2012 21:31

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/b ... 013766.ece

Behind the war, a genesis in Tibet


Fifty years on, how the events leading up to 1962 were perceived by China remains almost entirely absent in Indian narratives of the war. Unlike the wars with Japan and in Korea that have a central role in Chinese propaganda about a national revival led by the Communist Party ending “a century of humiliation,” the conflicts with India and Vietnam, where China was the aggressor, are largely airbrushed from today’s Chinese history textbooks. Few Chinese students are even aware of 1962.

In marked contrast to the current re-examination of the events of 1962 under way in India on the 50th anniversary, the Chinese State-controlled media is still largely reluctant to discuss a sensitive chapter in bilateral relations, resulting in very limited insights into the war from Chinese perspectives.

However, declassified Chinese documents, which include internal memos sent from Chinese officials in New Delhi to Beijing and notes detailing negotiations from 1950 until 1962, provide fresh insights into Chinese perspectives and decision-making in the decade leading up to 1962.

The Chinese documents provide a far from conclusive history of the war, and are only a reflection of Chinese perspectives — some merited and others unfounded — and the costly misperceptions that led to 1962. This series of articles will, drawing from the documents, look to simply present, rather than evaluate, the perspectives in Beijing that led to China’s decision to launch an offensive on October 20, 1962.

As many as 12 years before Chinese forces began their offensive against India on October 20, 1962, Chinese officials, in an internal diplomatic note, expressed concern over the Indian government’s long-term designs on the status of Tibet. The note, dated November 24, 1950, reported on talks between India and China that had discussed the continuation of Indian privileges in Tibet, which had been enshrined in earlier treaties with Britain. “In general,” the note said, “it was exposed that India has interfered in China’s internal affairs and has hindered China from liberating Tibet.” “India pretends not to have any ambition on Tibetan politics or land,” the note concluded, “but desires to maintain the privileges that were written in the treaties signed since 1906.”

The November 1950 note marked the beginning of growing Chinese suspicions — which were, on occasion, based on slight evidence and driven by China’s own internal insecurities — on India’s intentions towards Tibet, resulting in a turbulent decade during which the Tibetan problem emerged as the central issue in ties between the neighbours.

The occupation of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) in 1950 marked a fundamental shift in how the Chinese viewed relations with India. Months after the PLA’s occupation of Tibet, as China began strengthening its grip over the region, Chinese officials began to object more vociferously to Indian activities. Even as India voiced support to China on the Tibetan issue in 1950 by not backing appeals at the United Nations, the Chinese, internally, continued to suspect Indian designs to destabilise Tibet.

On July 28, 1952, an internal note from the Communist Party’s Central Committee instructed authorities in Tibet to crackdown on Indian business delegations, accusing India of “spreading reactionary publications in the Tibetan language.” In a meeting with the then Indian representative in Beijing, R.K. Nehru, on September 6, 1953, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made clear its displeasure with India’s continued case for privileges, even describing the “Indian incumbent government” as holding an “irresponsible” position on Tibet.

Turning point in 1954

In 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru softened India’s stand by recognising the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as a part of the People’s Republic of China and giving up privileges, in the likely hope that ties would improve. However, that same year, India, for the first time, printed new maps delineating its northern and northeastern frontiers, which Nehru declared was “not open to discussion with anybody” — a development that ultimately sowed the seeds of the boundary dispute. The documents make clear that Tibet, more than the unsettled boundaries, was by far the fundamental issue that concerned China in the 1950s. They do not, however, shed any conclusive light on whether Beijing might have been open to a compromise on the former issue in return for India’s major concession on Tibet — a question ultimately rendered irrelevant by Nehru deciding not to link the two issues.

The centrality of the Tibetan issue for the Chinese was evident in 1956, when armed revolts broke out across Tibetan areas. With rising tensions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama travelled to India that same year, ostensibly to attend a Buddhist conference but also considering seeking asylum. While Nehru persuaded the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, he also arranged for two key meetings between the young Tibetan spiritual leader and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who happened to be on a visit to India at the same time.

The meetings appeared to cement in the Chinese perception the status of India as a major actor in any eventual resolution of the Tibetan problem. In the first meeting, on November 1, 1956, the Dalai Lama told Zhou that there was “no democracy” in the way the Standing Committee of the TAR was operating. “Yesterday, we visited their Parliament and saw many representatives were debating,” the Dalai Lama said. “I think they are doing better than us on this point…Our Standing Committee of the TAR rarely debates and the content of the discussion is only the letter and word problems.”

The situation in Tibet continued to worsen ahead of their second meeting on December 30, 1956. Zhou conveyed that Mao Zedong wanted the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet as soon as possible “because now some people in Lhasa want to rebel there while the Dalai Lama is not in Tibet.” Accepting the root of the problem was in the Chinese-led reforms in Tibet, Zhou said Mao had decided that reforms would be shelved and reconsidered six years later — and only if the Dalai Lama granted his consent.

Zhou also hit out at Tibetan “separatists” who were active across the border in Kalimpong in India, and warned the Dalai Lama that the People’s Liberation Army would suppress any dissident activity: “They want to be independent and separate Tibet from China; it is betrayal of China. We must not allow it to go on and the PLA will always protect its people’s interests and take self-defense measures… ” Zhou added he would “rouse Nehru’s attention” about such activities in India.

On October 8, 1962, 12 days before the Chinese offensive, Zhou Enlai reflected on his 1956 talks with the Dalai Lama in a candid meeting with the Soviet Union’s Ambassador in Beijing, suggesting that it was a turning point in how he viewed India’s role in the Tibetan question and intentions regarding the boundary dispute. According to the minutes of the meeting, he said India had, in 1956, “exposed their desire to collude with the Dalai Lama and attempt to maintain Tibetan serfdom.”

“At that time, I found Nehru inherited British Imperialist thoughts and deeds on the border issue and the Tibet issue,” Zhou said. “However, considering the friendship of China and India, we took a tolerant attitude and did not convey this to Nehru. In 1958, serfs in Tibet, Xikang [Sichuan] and Qinghai rebelled. Nehru could not wait and took advantage of the border issue to interfere with China’s internal affairs. The Dalai Lama rebelled in 1959 and fled to India, and this was caused by Nehru’s inducement.” Zhou’s views largely characterised the thinking in Beijing three years later, when the Tibetan uprising began to unfold in 1959. China’s leaders, internal documents show, became increasingly convinced — on the basis of questionable evidence — India was to blame for their own failings in Tibet and that the resolution of their Tibetan problem was inextricably linked to the boundary dispute — a conviction that would have fateful consequences.


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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 23 Oct 2012 22:10

The odd thing is from 1949 onwards Nehru appeased the PRC giving them legitimacy:Recognition, Tibet, ending Korean war, refusing the UNSC seat and so on. Then he gets smacked by the PRC after gettnig all these. Looks very interesting behavior by Mao.

All the analcysts paint Nehru in bad light while quoting PRC "statesman"!

The real genesis is Mao was playing for leadership of Asia and Nehru didnt even know that. Nehru brought a knife to a gunfight hoping that the other guy wont use it.

If not Tibet, Mao would have found some other excuse.


BTW in 7th century Tibet was the overlord of the Central Asia.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby nakul » 23 Oct 2012 22:20

The Chinese saw a part of India that was snatched by British. According to them, India as the inheriting country was equally at wrong. He wanted to undo the injustice meted out to him. When Nehru stuck to British agreements, Mao saw him as an extension of the British imperialists and attacked him.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 24 Oct 2012 01:21

Again you are following into the path that the Lefties started. Blame Nehru and make Mao appear innocent.
The guy was preparing for years as can be seen by the number of forces and places the attacks were launched. Yet Nehru is the one being blamed.Nehru might be wrong on hazar things but he wasnt the guilty party here.
Its MAO and his insecurity with misperception.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby nakul » 24 Oct 2012 01:32

It is a fact that China sees a part of India as its own. Even if you replace Nehru or Mao, there will be a tussle between where the borders lie. Each side will look out for its own interests. I am not interested in blaming or forgiving anyone. His mistake was not to deal with a bully as such. Mao was a bully. The reason for the war was not Nehru's provocation but his defining of India's boundaries which Mao sought as his territory.

IMHO even Tibet doesn't belong to China. But that won't stop them from claiming it. Nehru did the right thing by defining Indian borders on paper. His mistake was not to enforce it on the ground.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 24 Oct 2012 06:07

More of the same


Op-Ed in Pioneer

To be ready for future, accept past blunders
Ashok Mehta

India has many lessons to learn from the debacle of the 1962 war with China. One of them is that an unprepared Army must never be pushed by a confused leadership into a war

Today, 50 years ago, the Chinese PLA had pressed the ‘pause’ button in the offensive they started on October 20, when in less than four days they had routed 7 Infantry Brigade at Namkachu and captured Tawang. The drubbing the Chinese delivered to India’s hastily assembled 4 Corps in the Kameng Division of the North-East Frontier Agency (Arunachal Pradesh) was to end after another four-day blitzkrieg from November 17 to 20 after they had bundled off both Sela and Bomdila, the two impregnable fortresses. Between October 24 and November 10, they built a road from Bumla to Tawang for guns and logistics to support their operations further south to the plains of Assam. Declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, the PLA withdrew to positions 20 km north of the McMahon Line. None of the territory China captured including Tawang — which it claims to this day — were retained. In two quick bursts of fighting the Indians were routed.

What is strange is that after 7 Infantry Brigade’s capitulation at Namkachu, the PLA launched its offensive against Tawang at Bumla only on October 23. Further, when 1 Sikh sought to engage the PLA between October 20 and 23, permission was denied. Eastern Army Commander, Lt Gen LP Sen arrived at Tawang on October 23 and ordered its evacuation. On November 10, 4 Corps Commander, Lt Gen BM Kaul addressed officers at Sela and told them they would remain there that winter and Tawang would be recaptured next spring. What is breathtakingly inexplicable is the complete inaction on our part between October 24 and November 17, when the PLA was preparing for ‘phase II’ of its offensive. The Indian Air Force could have in that period seriously dislocated road-building in Tawang and subsequent operations.

India’s Himalayan Pearl Harbour became inevitable through the ill-considered actions of self-serving political and military leaders. Political bungling was compounded with tactical blunders in the field caused by frequent breaches in the chain of command, panic reaction of commanders and most of all, Army Headquarters and the Corps Commander, Lt Gen BM Kaul, ordering around companies and platoons. The tragic break-up of command and detachment of units to plug perceived holes and gaps in defences and contradictory orders led to the uncovering of defences and collapse of organised resistance. The confusion over which was more important— Sela or Bomdila, was pivotal to defeat. And all this while, commanders and soldiers were fed on the belief that the Chinese would never attack.

What provided moral justification for China to launch the October 20 pre-emptive were three immediate provocations: Capt Mahavir Prasad establishing a post at Chedong as part of the forward policy which was five kilometre across the McMahon Line in Chinese territory instead of at Dhola and refusal to withdraw despite the PLA’s warning; a failed probing attack against Chinese bunkers ordered and witnessed by Lt Gen BM Kaul; and Jawaharlal Nehru’s pompous declaration that he had ordered the Army to evict the Chinese from Thagla. The agony of dealing with the Chinese had just begun.

The power of the electronic and the print media forced the Government for the first time in 50 years to honour the martyrs of 1962 war last week. Union Minister for Defence AK Antony acknowledged the lapses of the 1962 war and the existing gaps in defence preparedness and infrastructure, but repeated the determination to “defend every inch of our land”, a statement which has become a political cliché. Mr Antony requires contemporary deterrence vocabulary. Fifty years on these last two weeks, the country has relived the 1962 trauma. A real sense of anger lingers over the national humiliation and defeat for which the political and to a lesser extent the military leadership must share the blame. The emotional parliamentary resolution of 1963 ‘to recapture every inch of territory lost to the Chinese’ is only of academic value.

Some lessons are worth recalling: First, the disconnect between diplomacy and defence; second, politicisation of military; third, planning on assumptions of adversary’s goodwill; fourth, assertion of border claims not being backed by military and diplomatic strength; fifth, lack of understanding of the Chinese psyche on the border issue as well as Tibet; sixth, failure to read Chinese capabilities and intentions; seventh, throwing the gauntlet to the Chinese on Thagla Ridge. This last cardinal sin led to the escalation of conflict following the probing attacks at Namkachu, and it was clearly the turning point where a challenge was converted into teaching a lesson. Strategic signaling and communications between the two sides had broken down.

Writing in The New York Times on October 15, this year, Michael Dobbs, recounting the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, (and other US experiences in Vietnam and Iraq) which coincided with the Himalayan Blunder says, “The most important lesson to be learnt is that mistakes and misunderstandings can unleash an unpredictable chain of events causing governments to go to war with little understanding of consequences.” This fits eminently to the unintended India-China war. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, while a US naval blockade was able to deter Soviet ships from carrying nuclear missiles to Cuba, a back-channel dialogue was also taking place. Coercion and diplomacy were not allowed to decouple. But there was conspicuous absence of conversation between India and China during the build-up to the war.

1962 will of course not be repeated. The Indian Army gave it back to the Chinese at Nathula and Jalepla in 1976 and stood its ground at Sumdorong Chu in 1986. Border talks resumed nearly three decades ago were upgraded to Special Representatives level, accompanied by several Confidence-Building Measures. It was the belief and hope that trade, which will touch $100 billion by 2014 between the two sides, will facilitate a border settlement. This is the theory also being advanced to resolve political disputes with Pakistan. Unfortunately, better trade relations have not in any way made the border issue less contentious. By lowering its guard, India has once again played into China’s hands. It is now desperately trying to catch up with a more assertive China.

The self-flagellation over 1962 must stop. To close the episode of the Himalayan Blunder, two steps are necessary: The Government must formally acknowledge it launched an unprepared Army into an unintended war; and the three Chiefs of Staff should demand the release of the Henderson Brooks report. Not only will this set the record straight but it will also clean the stables.

(The accompanying visual is of people paying homage to martyrs of the 1962 India-China war, on the war’s 50th anniversary, at the war memorial in Tawang, in Arunachal Pradesh, on October 20. AP photo by Anupam Nath)


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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Philip » 24 Oct 2012 07:44

Nehru ,who had become the most important leader in India's freedom struggle after the Mahatma,failed to realise-or never gave it enough thought ,that while India had achieved Independence through non-violence,Chairman Mao had freed China using exactly the opposite mean-the barrel of the gun! It was mainly because of Netaji and the IMA,that the colonial rulers of India realised that they could not depend upon millions of Indians in uniform any longer and that they would be unceremoniously turfed out if they overstayed their un-welcome. His flawed belief was that India's moral force of non-violence was the equivalent of military force,forgetting that Gandhi ,who well understood the minds of the British,evolved his non-violent methods as the perfect tool with which to get them start packing their bags.Between Netaji and Gandhi,the Brits had no option,but to leave asap.Had Mao been our colonial master,he would've shot Gandhi,Nehru et al at the first sign of mental rebellion,as he so exemplary demonstrated during the "Cultural Revolution",where he allowed the "snakes to emerge from their holes" and then chopped off their heads!

As Ramanna put it in plain English,Nehru "took a knife to a gunfight",not expecting the other party to shoot first!
Sadly,the cliches of "not allowing a sq. inch of territory to be lost" is being rehashed by pygmies like AKA,unfit to step into the shoes of Krishna Menon for that matter! The dear Lord forbid that in the future it will be yet again left to the men and women in uniform who will have to come to the defence of the nation and clean up the turds left by their political masters.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby svinayak » 24 Oct 2012 11:33

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r53XCVsV ... re=related

October 20 marks 50 years since the 1962 conflict with China. The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict claimed the lives of 5,000 Indian soldiers.

For the first time, an Indian Defence Minister along with the top military brass of the country paid homage to the martyrs.

Defence Minister AK Antony and the three service Chiefs laid wreaths at the Amar Jawan Jyoti at India Gate.



Check the Old radio broadcast by Nehru in 1962

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Aditya_V » 24 Oct 2012 12:59

nakul wrote:The Chinese saw a part of India that was snatched by British. According to them, India as the inheriting country was equally at wrong. He wanted to undo the injustice meted out to him. When Nehru stuck to British agreements, Mao saw him as an extension of the British imperialists and attacked him.


You forget the most critical element, that the India was also miltary extremely weak since the leadership belived DIplomacy without power can solve issues. That was the biggest incentive for the Chinese to attack, notice how they unilaterly ran from Arunachal once they knew we are getting arms from other powers and anther 2 months of war would have meant thier that the PLA would meet the same fate of operation Babrorosa in Tibet.

The Chinese deliberetly quit while they were ahead, IA was in the state of Soviet forces before WWII which caused the debacle.

Moral of the story, a strong Miltary India is good for peace. A strong Paki or chinees mean war. World leaders should work towards a Miltary Strong India and Miltary Weak China and India to ensure peace and stabiulity.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby member_23629 » 24 Oct 2012 14:42

Check the Old radio broadcast by Nehru in 1962


For some strange reason, he always used to broadcast his messages to Indians in English, when less than one percent of them understood the langauge at that time. Had he deigned to speak in Hindi, at least half the country would have directly undrstood what he was talking about.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 24 Oct 2012 18:16

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-bi ... ily/251537

Pretty nice discussion on NDTV about the 1962 war, and India's state of preparedness now. The host Vikram Chandra, who is usually part of the p-sec crowd, comes across as patriotic, balanced and realistic, definitely not a Praful Bidwai or Achin Vanaik. A soldier who actually fought in the war is one of the speakers, and gets a round of applause. Col Anil Athale also weighs in. Good one!

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby nvishal » 24 Oct 2012 19:02

Nehru might be the father of the non-alignment policy but that doesn't absolve him from the deaths of a well over 5000 indian soldiers. He is directly responsible for their deaths and should have been put on trail for it.

That idiot should have acknowledged the drumbeats. He should have equipped the guys with better or at least fair firepower.

But now that this war has transpired into a long term dual, it presents an opportunity for india to involve itself in the battle of Tibet and Xinjiang.

If I understand the west any better, I imagine them cutting PRC by splitting it which won't be hard considering that both the uyghurs and the tibetans intensively dislike the han.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby srin » 24 Oct 2012 20:48

The folly was to focus only on intent and not on capabilities, and as Americans would say - "drinking your own kool aid".

Intents can change overnight. Nor was there a quid pro quo deal with China about the border issues for recognizing Tibet occupation, supporting UN membership etc.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 24 Oct 2012 20:56

Philip, Veteran journalist late Nikhil Chakravarthy once wrote a ANI op-ed in whihc he said that JLN realised the folly and expected a new attack for TSP as follow on. He claims it wca JLN who already approved crossing the IB in case of TSP meddling in Kashmir and taking Lahore.
However the INC seeking to milk the 'injured/betrayed' Nehru image for its own dubious purposes does not allow a full picture to emerge. And to make matter worse his acolytes are blind followers who dont understand Nehru's thinking process.
They have become the worst ritualists.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby brihaspati » 24 Oct 2012 21:10

As many leaked comments, and moves showed - JLN was not unaware of the military preparations from Mao's side. He had time from as early on as 1954 to prepare for the eventual showdown. He was also aware of the limitations on reliability of the Soviets or west to come to his military rescue - and it is complete BS given to public imagery that he+others believed that China would dare not invade.

His own actions from 1950 to 1958 continuously strengthened China's hand internationally, while from 1954 he began to give out his doubts about China in private. What forced him to publicly and militarily still go on helping China - is a mystery, but hopefully will somewhat be cleared if the British gov decides to go ahead with release of certain classified docs by 2020. On the other hand, it might not - since there is a clause hanging there - "if the GOI has no objections".

The forward posts is a very curious idea and move - and militarily someone would only do that if they were expecting light, unarmed, or lightly armed inflitration - even more appropriately, a dragnet to apprehend a very small but important group, would be a most likely cause. This was not about preparing to withstand invasion or staking a claim on the land. After all if we are to believe in the public statements as being honest and sincere - that territory was not important at all since not even grass grows there.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby SSridhar » 25 Oct 2012 05:49

Lessons from the 1962 debacle - G.Parthasarathy in Businessline
India’s younger generation can barely comprehend the humiliation, trauma, shame and anger that prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the diplomatic, military and strategic debacle in the 1962 border conflict with China. Responding to former President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan’s admonition of his “credulity” and “negligence”, former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had acknowledged, “We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and living in an artificial atmosphere of our own making”.

Nehru had, in 1959, proclaimed that the Chinese were “unlikely” to invade India because they knew it would lead to a “world war”. He believed that China, faced with a growing rift with the Soviet Union and at odds with the US, would just not go to war with India.

Disastrous policy

What followed was a disastrous policy of deploying poorly-equipped troops in forward positions to contest Chinese claims, despite logistical and operational reservations expressed by former Army Chief Gen K. S. Thimmayya and other senior operational commanders. This policy sought to give credibility to a claim in Parliament that “not an inch of Indian territory” would be left undefended. Having raised expectations, the Prime Minister was unable to negotiate on suggestions by China’s former Prime Minister Chou en Lai. Taking suggestions on border claims at face value could, however, have been hazardous, as China’s claims continued to change repeatedly, as they do to this day.

Compounding the diplomatic bungling and the incredible naiveté in believing that China would never attack India was the behaviour of former Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon. He arbitrarily appointed Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul, with no combat experience, as the Corps Commander of the newly-established IV Corps in Tezpur, tasked to “throw the Chinese out” in the eastern sector. India’s defence collapsed on November 19, with its elite 4th Infantry Division beating an ignominious retreat.

BORDER TENSIONS

As the eastern sector collapsed, a panic stricken Nehru wrote to former US President John Kennedy seeking American air support. India’s claims to non-alignment lay in tatters. A few months before the conflict commenced, the Chinese Ambassador had learnt in secret negotiations with the Americans that the US would not get involved in the event of border tensions escalating with India. {First time I am hearing this}

With the Sino-Indian conflict coinciding with the Cuban Missile crisis, China compelled the Soviet Union to initially remain neutral. Rather than assisting India, the Americans and the British demanded that India resolve differences with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. It was the Soviet Union that moved meaningfully to help India bolster its Defences.

China has significantly bolstered its defences on Tibet’s borders with India since 1962. Apart from developing an impressive road and rail communication network, it has deployed 2.2 lakh troops in the Lanzhou military region bordering Ladakh, including airborne and motorised divisions. Another 1.8 lakh troops are deployed in the Chengdu military region facing India’s north-eastern States. Beijing has also been augmenting capabilities and training for high altitude warfare. The main lesson of 1962 is the need for Indian conventional capabilities along our borders with China to convince it that future conflicts will not remain confined to the Indian side.

Strategic containment

China today is the second largest economy in the world. It has made remarkable strides in areas ranging from space to cyber warfare. But it faces serious internal tensions arising from contradictions inherent in having a relatively open economy, on the one hand, and a closed and increasingly corrupt one-party political system on the other. China is continuing nuclear weapons, missile and defence collaboration with Pakistan. It is expanding its role in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. It has consistently sought to undermine India’s “Look East” Policies by trying to block India’s entry into the East Asia Summit, prevent the Nuclear Suppliers Group from giving India a waiver on nuclear cooperation, and being ambivalent on India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

There is little awareness on the security implications of China’s growing role in key sectors of our economy such as power and communications, or of the dangers posed by the domination of these sectors by Chinese companies.

India has to, therefore, combine pro-active diplomacy and build up its offensive military capabilities along its borders with China, by formulating and implementing measures to achieve indigenisation in key sectors such as power and communications. Moreover, if present policies continue, our imports of electronic and communication equipment will exceed imports of oil and natural gas by 2020.

A serious effort has to be made to enable our public and private sectors to develop capabilities comparable to those developed by the Chinese in these strategic sectors.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 25 Oct 2012 06:05

Yes SSridhar. In secret negotiations the Chinese got assurance in mid 1962 that US(Kennedy years) wont intervene. It is this fact that makes me think Nehru being cut down a peg that was offered to PRC to break the FSU alliance. Who knows what else was offered especially since the Pakis scrounge for US made parts for Chinese designed bum.

Also if you look at the time that it took a nuke power to move from fission to fusion the PRC beats everyone!
And those are the years before the Kissinger rapprochment. So though Nixon took the credit for opening to PRC the foundations were laid by Kennedy.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby brihaspati » 25 Oct 2012 06:32

But that non-intervention assurance was given in the context of Taiwan - if PRC invaded Taiwan. It is usually not clarfied that this assurance was not about any intended move to the west - but to the east. In 1962, USA would not give such assurances - this could come earliest only after 1969 [maybe to an extent even from 1965-65 after the brief frontier spat between PRC and USSR].

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby SSridhar » 25 Oct 2012 07:20

There is more to this 'assurance' by the US to PRC about non-intervention in case of a war. If indeed the Americans had given such an assurance to the Chinese, it is obvious the Americans were playing a high-stake game. Somehow, I feel that the whole exercise was for the Americans to force Nehru into settling the J&K issue with Ayub. I will post later about important happenings around this time frame.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby svinayak » 25 Oct 2012 09:15

SSridhar wrote:There is more to this 'assurance' by the US to PRC about non-intervention in case of a war. If indeed the Americans had given such an assurance to the Chinese, it is obvious the Americans were playing a high-stake game. Somehow, I feel that the whole exercise was for the Americans to force Nehru into settling the J&K issue with Ayub. I will post later about important happenings around this time frame.


You are in the right direction.

The entire Gang of US, UK and Pakistan have paid money and support to Chicom PRC to force India into a corner for concession. Really a high stakes game

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby svinayak » 25 Oct 2012 09:22

PRC is being used as the Street thug to take care of all the other players needs in the region.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby SSridhar » 25 Oct 2012 09:25

Crossing the Point of No-Return - Ananth Krishnan in The Hindu
Three weeks ahead of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s landmark 1960 visit to India, Chinese officials prepared an internal note discussing how they viewed the political and economic situation in India and its bearing on the boundary issue. The April 1, 1960 note, among documents from 1949-65 that were declassified recently by the Chinese government, was prepared to brief the Chinese leadership ahead of Zhou’s April 20 visit.

The note is revealing of how Beijing perceived — rightly or wrongly — the influence of the political climate in India on driving the tensions on the border. “Since the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan in April 1956, India’s economy has been deteriorating and its economic policy has moved increasingly towards the right,” the note observed. “The gap between the rich and the poor is growing. The road of Indian bourgeois reformism has become narrower and narrower.”

“The U.S.-led Imperialist countries,” the note continued, “are taking advantage of India’s economic difficulties and tightening control over India through ‘aid’ and private investment. In early 1958, the United States provided for the first time a large number of loans to India to buy equipment. The U.S. also colluded with Britain, West Germany, Japan, Canada and other countries to ‘aid’ India.” The note concluded, “The strength of the Indian big bourgeoisie has increased and intensified collusion with foreign monopolies… and attempted to intervene in the arms industry to reap higher profits by taking advantage of the Sino-Indian border issue.”

“We came in vain”


Chinese officials saw the 1960 visit as a real opportunity to negotiate and reach a settlement. “In 1960, we first came to Delhi to negotiate, but it was in vain,” Zhou Enlai told the Soviet Union Ambassador on October 8, 1962, 12 days before the Chinese offensive. While Zhou never openly or formally declared that China would accept an “east west swap” deal where India would recognise Chinese claims on Aksai Chin and China would give up its claims on the eastern sector, he made it clear that Beijing was willing to negotiate. In a meeting with R.K. Nehru in New Delhi on April 21, 1960, Zhou said “in the east, a settlement can be found”. “Our aim,” he said, “is still to explore ways of a settlement”.

“The McMahon Line on the eastern section of the Sino-Indian border is illegal and has never been admitted by China’s governments. Nevertheless, in order to keep peace of the border and help peaceful negotiations, we suggested before negotiations that armed troops do not cross the line,” Zhou told the Soviet Ambassador. “India never surveyed the line and only after Indian border defence troops arrived did they know what it was. The topography is favourable for them and thus they drew it on the map.”

Zhou’s meetings with Jawaharlal Nehru on April 25, 1960, however, ended in bitter deadlock. Zhou recounted, according to the October 8 note, that Nehru had rejected out of hand all his proposals. “We suggested that bilateral armed forces respectively retreat for 20 kilometres on the borders and stop the patrols to escape conflicts. They did not accept the suggestion. Later, we unilaterally withdrew for 20 kilometres and did not appoint troops to patrol in the area in order to evade conflicts and help negotiations develop smoothly. However, India perhaps had a wrong sense that we were showing our weakness and feared conflicts… India is taking advantage that we withdrew for 20 kilometres and did not assign patrols, and has invaded as well as set up posts.”

Chinese thinking

Two revealing internal notes prepared shortly after Zhou’s trip shed light on Chinese thinking following the visit. One note prepared on May 31, 1960 alleged that the Indian government had “distorted the exact words of Premier Zhou” in the translations of the press conference held in New Delhi and in the official press releases subsequently circulated. The note listed 11 different ways in which Zhou’s words had been misconstrued. For instance, it said that Zhou had stated that the dispute in the middle sector was “relatively small”; the Indian government’s version read “very small”.

Zhou said “the eastern section of the disputed area has been China’s administrative jurisdiction area for long”. The Indian version, the note claimed, said China had administered the area “for once”. The Indian version, it further alleged, deleted Zhou’s statement that “the Chinese government has never accepted the McMahon line”. The note said Zhou had also wrongly been quoted as saying that “in the eastern section, we are willing to maintain the present status”, adding that the words “before the settlement of the border” had been deleted from the end of the sentence.

The sense of acrimony was clearly evident in Zhou’s meetings in New Delhi, particularly during his interaction with Morarji Desai, the then Finance Minister, on April 25, 1960. The bitterness of the visit is reflected in K. Natwar Singh’s detailed account of the meeting in My China Diary . “Discordance started at the very beginning,” Mr. Singh recounts. After trading barbs on Tibet, Desai accused Zhou “of being unjust”. Zhou told Desai he “had said enough”. “The Chinese Prime Minister said more than enough,” the Finance Minister retorted.

The bitterness of the exchange was further evident in a second internal Chinese government note, prepared on July 31, 1960, that reviewed Zhou’s visit and came to the conclusion that India was not interested in a settlement. The note concluded that “the Indian Establishment wanted to provoke the border event so as to oppose China”. The Chinese government ultimately linked the failure of the 1960 visit — perhaps based on questionable evidence — to Indian designs on Tibet. “After the Tibetan rebellion was put down, a series of progressive reforms would be carried out which would have great influence on India,” the note said.

“The Indian government,” it concluded, “was afraid of this because Indian people under such influence would complain more about their own government’s inability. In addition, the Indian government is facing up difficulties and resembles a mother who lacks milk:eek: The Indian people hope to get on with China; troubles are made by the Establishment.” K. Natwar Singh, in his book, writes that by the time Zhou landed in India, the point of no return had almost been reached. By the time Zhou arrived back in Beijing, the two notes suggested, the Chinese came to believe that point had already been crossed.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 26 Oct 2012 19:28

X-posting....

SSridhar wrote:China will not accept LAC as solution to border dispute: says commentary
China will not accept the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — the effective current boundary with India — as an eventual settlement to the long-running border dispute, according to a commentary published in a newspaper with ties to the Communist Party.

The commentary said a solution to the boundary dispute was unlikely in the foreseeable future as China, as well as India, would not accept the LAC.

As the LAC would not be an acceptable boundary to China, the article ruled out the likelihood of a status quo settlement to the long-running dispute.

With boundary talks failing to achieve a breakthrough after 15 rounds, the commentary suggested both sides instead look to jointly develop disputed regions rather than focus on a solution to the dispute.

Commentaries in Chinese State-run media rarely discuss the specifics of the on-going negotiations over the border, over which 15 rounds of talks have been held. The article was published on Thursday by the Jiefang Daily , or Liberation Daily , a newspaper with close ties to the Communist Party in Shanghai.

The timing of the commentary, on the anniversary of the 1962 war, made it unlikely that it could have been published without the party’s approval. According to two journalists at prominent State media organs, media outlets have been told to follow an unofficial directive “to not play up” the anniversary, and only use Xinhua dispatches in coverage. However, a few outlets, such as the nationalistic Global Times , which is published by the People’s Daily but seen as less authoritative, and the Liberation Daily , have been given some leeway to publish pieces.

Status quo settlement

China had, in the past, suggested it might accept the LAC as a status quo settlement to the boundary dispute. In 1980, the former leader, Deng Xiaoping, hinted that China might be open to a swap deal that saw India give up its claims to Aksai Chin, which is currently administered by China. China would, in return, give up claims to the eastern sector and Arunachal Pradesh.

But since the mid-1980s, China has begun to increasingly voice claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and particularly on Tawang, referring to the State as “south Tibet” in official commentaries.

The Jiefang Daily article was authored by Wu Yongnian, a researcher of the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Wu said as China and India would not accept the LAC, a settlement to the boundary dispute would remain unlikely.

‘Problem is too complex’

The border problem, he said, was too complex. With more than a dozen round of negotiations failing to achieve a breakthrough, he suggested there was a perception in some quarters that talks were at a dead end.

Economic development zone suggested

He said one way to deal with the dilemma would be to create an economic development zone that would link Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet, and shelve the boundary dispute temporarily. He suggested it could serve as a new model to resolve boundary disputes, and might pave the way to an eventual settlement. {Are we fools ?}

He said the timing for such an unconventional move was right, with both India and China focused on economic development. With the border dispute remaining an obstacle to overall ties, he suggested the move would be a breakthrough for the relationship.

While it is unlikely that Mr. Wu’s article could have been published without the approval of party censors, it is unclear whether his proposal has received backing from any sections of the Chinese government.


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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 26 Oct 2012 19:29

Chian is still unsure about itself as the nature of this above article shows. None of them dare to openly say anything and have to drop hints and write unattributed articles. A mark of unsure leadership. They need more time to get settled or die off.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 26 Oct 2012 19:30

Awesome repository at IDSA on the 1962 India_China war.

http://idsa.in/IndiaChina1962war
It has reviews of Maxwells' book and many others.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 26 Oct 2012 20:24

KS garu's review of Maxwells' India's China War


And a consequence of the 1962 war

An Ocean at the Intersection of two maritime prespectives

Despite everything its called Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

India needs no military face to its maritime prespective.

Indian Ocean is the waters from the East Coast of Africa to the Phillipines where it merges into the Pacific.

In the Greek tales it was called Erythraen sea.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erythraean_Sea

Look at the map.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby rohitvats » 27 Oct 2012 01:41

SSridhar wrote:There is more to this 'assurance' by the US to PRC about non-intervention in case of a war. If indeed the Americans had given such an assurance to the Chinese, it is obvious the Americans were playing a high-stake game. Somehow, I feel that the whole exercise was for the Americans to force Nehru into settling the J&K issue with Ayub. I will post later about important happenings around this time frame.


It has been mentioned in the one of the articles linked in this thread that USA gave assurance to China that Taiwan was not contemplating assaulting Chinese mainland in an amphibious operation.

This allowed the Chinese to shift 4 Korean War hardened elite brigades to border opposite NEFA.

IMO, the Sino-Indian border dispute is not the cause of the issues between the two countries. It is simply a symptom of some more deep and more complex. Even if China and India can settle the border issue, the rivalry will not go away - it is not about the borders.

My limited understanding of the issue tells me that the situation today is same as the one obtained in the period leading up to 1962 - an ascendant India looking for its rightful place under the Sun. On the other hand we have an expansionist China asserting its dominance over the immediate region and trying to emerge an independent pole in a world dominated by single super power. In addition, it is witnessing the internal turmoils - Tibet is a burning issue that simply refuses to die away. The economic opium which kept the masses engaged is facing trouble and inspite of their best efforts, people are starting to question the diktats of the Party.

I am of the opinion that China may well try to repeat 1962 with similar objectives - cut India to size and channel internal pressure outwards.

In terms of military capability, we know Chinese think long terms. They have put infra in place and slowly they will put formations in place to use this infra to create a short and intense 'LOCAL' war. Meanwhile, we debate about the long term threat from China.

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Re: Inder Malhotra's series on 1962 war

Postby ramana » 28 Oct 2012 23:34

After reading a plethora of post mortem articles on the leadup to China's aggression in 1962, what I find is there were ample signals and indicators of Chinese intentions an Western reluctance to jump in.
The big gap was a failure on part of the governing elite in India:politicians, intel agency and courtiers inside Indian armed forces to envision what the Chinese are capable of doing. It was this failure which lead to the surprise which only magnified the defeat.
In front of this, the role of lesser folks (Nehru, Menon, Mullick, Thapar, Kaul, Palit) who contributed to the disaster pales in comparison.
Add the perfidy of UK and US t force India to settle the Kashmir question with TSP as if India is a defeated state and something akin the Versailles can be forced down Indian throats.

Fifty years later we hear words that IAF could have saved the day.

I would like folks to come up with an appreciation/understanding of what the IAF could do given its resources at that time.

Later I will give my thoughts on that.


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