Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan (TSP): 06 Dec 2011

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2011 16:50

Suppiah wrote:Not sure what is there for the deep state to gain by going after 10%. If the move is somewhat godfatherish to send the message that you cannot cross the Army and live to tell the story, that message has sunk into the genes of every Pakbaric jehadi animal by now anyway. If it is to replace with a more 'convenient' puppet, then who is that? In any event the President, not to speak of the Parliament and Prime Minister, don't have much powers anyway.

If Zardari has indeed courted the west against the Army, then TSPA chooses to burn all bridges with the western world and that shows the sort of rabid attitude that Saddam and Gadaffi take. We all know where they ended up..it also means TSPA is beyond caring and hence is a much bigger threat to India in the immediate future. MMS & Co better watch out and keep eyes peeled for a Mumbai type attack.

Suppiah, the PA is not targetting just Zardari. They were doing that earlier, but now they want wholesale change. It is preparing for the removal of PPP from power and installing its candidate, Imran Khan. It is unwilling to wait until 2013 for the next elections. Both Kayani & Pasha would be retiring, after their extensions, by then and so they are in a hurry to do something well before that. They need an overtly Taliban-pasand government in power in Pakistan in whom the PA can have 100% confidence well by the 2014 deadline. PA, IMHO, has plans for India after that and needs its clients both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2011 16:54

Rehman Malik meets US Ambassasor Cameron Munter

Atri · Post by **Atri** » 07 Dec 2011 16:59

In 2014, the govt of India is also expected to change (the poll predictions direly against UPA)...

Sri · Post by **Sri** » 07 Dec 2011 17:00

SS Sir. Who will be next President. What is Gilani's future?

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 07 Dec 2011 17:09

Even Ambassadors have been recalled. So the change intended is exactly as SS Ji says: Installation of a Pro-Talibani govt. Things are going to get more confrontational with the West/ NATO. But IMO PA may have gone too far. What happens the next time a drone takes a few to their 72? The down top pressure on the PA is now to get their air assets up and try to knock drones out. Meanwhile rats will continue to leave the sinking ship faster...Beer and Popcorn time yes, but India IMO should be very alert, as a way out for PA would be to do a Mumbai type thing and deflect attention and divert ire from the West to an Indian reaction to the same. Though that won't help much apart from giving a breather from the West..the Paki sure is now living on the edge and bleeding profusely from the war of a 1000 cuts it intended to wage on India.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 07 Dec 2011 17:17

Pakistan president Zardari in Dubai for treatment as coup rumours intensify!

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/de ... dubai-coup

"Cm'on punk,make Kill-any's day!"

The speculation hit a receptive, febrile political atmosphere, rocked by a diplomatic scandal and the recent jolt to relations with the US over the deaths of Pakistani soldiers at a border checkpost.

Pakistan has been ruled for half its existence by the military, and the armed forces have pulled the strings the rest of the time, meaning that the threat of coups are ever present .

Zardari's aides said he would not resign. The president is deeply unpopular with Pakistan's military establishment, which is widely believed to be behind repeated attempts to oust him.

"He had a minor heart attack on Tuesday. He flew to Dubai where he had an angioplasty. He's in good health now. He will come back tomorrow. There's no question of any resignation," Mustafa Khokhar, the government's adviser on human rights told the AFP news agency.

However, Farhatullah Babar, the president's spokesman, dismissed media speculation, saying that "Zardari is in a Dubai hospital for medical tests and checkup as planned".

The president is under pressure from the "memogate" scandal in Pakistan, where he is accused of being behind a written offer delivered to the US military leadership in the days after the raid on Osasma bin Laden in May this year. The anonymous memo offered to rein in the Pakistani military, in return for US support. Pakistan's former US ambassador and close Zardari aide, Husain Haqqani, has already been forced to resign over the issue and faces possible treason charges.

Ali Dayan Hasan, of Human Rights Watch, the international campaigning group, warned against any military intervention. "Constitutional rule of law must be followed and civilian supremacy must be maintained," he said. "Governance must be through genuine periodic elections."

Vikas · Post by **Vikas** » 07 Dec 2011 17:34

Who knows that Good Haqqani may turn out to be the citizen of some western country in the end

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2011 17:49

harbans wrote:But IMO PA may have gone too far. What happens the next time a drone takes a few to their 72? The down top pressure on the PA is now to get their air assets up and try to knock drones out.

The PA is indeed going too far. However, such recklessness is known as tactical brilliance in PA parlance. Of course every mango Abdul including Kayani knows what is in store if PA tries to take on the US/NATO/ISAF, but that may well be the plan. To create a bigger problem, threaten with nukes, involve ummah brother nations & China, laydown conditions and extract concessions. The PA is planning to turn the country completely into a jihadi state, giving up whatever little pretense of a normal state it has now. It will take unreasonable positions and leave no choice but the starkest one for the neighbours and other stakeholders in the region in dealing with it. It feels that the US may not have the stomach to escalate now for various reasons and so it has its best chance. The fact that everytime Pakistan upped the ante, the US came around encourages TSP to play the same game for much higher stakes now. It has received backing from China as otherwise it would have no strength to go this far. A China threatened by the developing presence of the US in Asia-Pacific, the alliances that are developing among US-India-Japan-Oz and other littoral nations is using Pakistan as its paw against the US as well, as it has done against India.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2011 17:56

Sri, When PPP is eventually thrown out, Gilani may not end up in jail like he did before as he has 'cultivated' the PA enough during these three years. He can go back to his groping days. In the interim, he can succeed Zardari leaving the PMship to Bilawal. He has already commented afew days back, like in our desi style, that their yuvraj is fit enough to lead the country. So, perhaps things were brewing for a while.

Sri · Post by **Sri** » 07 Dec 2011 18:06

SS Sir, Like in desh, Bilawal will be reluctant to take over specially now. Question is will PML-N now want an election. With Zardari out of way, common wisdom is that Nawaz will win. But ISI may spoil the party by rigging the whole thing for Imran. If Nawaz does participate and then lose because of heavy rigging and then cries about it then he will be easily called a sore loser.

May be an interim government till this parliament's term finishes... may be with a puppet of PA at the helms... oh wait!!! that will be coup...

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 07 Dec 2011 18:16

Sridhar Ji, i see one change in all of this. Before it was the PA and elite that exhorted the Jihadi and expressed outrage whenever to extract concessions from the West. This went on right from Pakistans' inception. The change as i see is now the pressure has inverted. It's become bottom to top echelons pressure in dealings with the West.

Before the elite would be given money and some equipment and the elite would go back and turn the tap off the jihadi's. That's over now. Now even if the West wants to give money, make promises, bribe or cajole, the elite cannot turn off the Jihadi venom that demands and expects on the sword of bull cattle that the elite break off totally from the WOT if not the West itself.

The days off secretly using Paki bases for assault are over. Now i feel even overflights over Baluchistan may be suspended if Drone attacks continue. I doubt now very much the elite can reverse that. Paks wanted Talibanization of Afghanistan, they'll get it all for themselves now. Veena Malik types will be on the run now for sure. We're certainly approaching the end game part. JMT

vijayk · Post by **vijayk** » 07 Dec 2011 18:41

Once the civilian facade goes away, can we expect drones to intentional accidental bombing of army or ISI? Unless they strike terror in the hearts of Paki army and ISI, the pigs will bomb afghans, NATO forces and Indians. Kayani or pasha or both should be accidented. The Paki dogs need to fear.

Sri · Post by **Sri** » 07 Dec 2011 18:41

Harbans Ji, even though Shamsi has been taken back. Jaccobabad airbase is still very much with the Americans. Shamsi was on lease to UAE and apparently UAE paid piddly as rent. Jaccobabad itself produces a bn dollars a year for PA, so no problems there...

ManuT · Post by **ManuT** » 07 Dec 2011 18:43

Sri wrote:May be an interim government till this parliament's term finishes... may be with a puppet of PA at the helms... oh wait!!! that will be coup...

Much like Turkish Army's post modern coups.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2011 18:58

Sri wrote:With Zardari out of way, common wisdom is that Nawaz will win. But ISI may spoil the party by rigging the whole thing for Imran.

As I said in another post, PA may not resort to rigging but may use other means like threats, cajoles etc. to manage a majority for herrow Imran Khan.Already, there is a sizeable dissidence within PML-N and PML-Q is still active. Cahudhry Shujaat would not hesitate to support the PA if his cousin Chaudhry Pervaiz is promised the Punjab gaddi. Like the attempts at tarnishing PPP's image, we can also expect to see the same against the PML-N. These will be waypoints to check for us, Pakistani watchers.

May be an interim government till this parliament's term finishes... may be with a puppet of PA at the helms... oh wait!!! that will be coup...

I am convinced that if things are further stabilized now, an interim government with Imran at the helm with floor-crossing by MNAs to his party, is most likely.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 07 Dec 2011 19:24

harbans wrote:Sridhar Ji, i see one change in all of this. Before it was the PA and elite that exhorted the Jihadi and expressed outrage whenever to extract concessions from the West. This went on right from Pakistans' inception. The change as i see is now the pressure has inverted. It's become bottom to top echelons pressure in dealings with the West.

Before the elite would be given money and some equipment and the elite would go back and turn the tap off the jihadi's. That's over now. Now even if the West wants to give money, make promises, bribe or cajole, the elite cannot turn off the Jihadi venom that demands and expects on the sword of bull cattle that the elite break off totally from the WOT if not the West itself.

harbans ji, you are quite right. The jihadi fervour and hatred is mass-based now. It has been PA's aim to take the country to this stage and they have achieved that. It has never been the attempt of Pakistan to solve a problem; the attempt has always been to create a bigger problem that will then subsume the earlier one.

Satya_anveshi · Post by **Satya_anveshi** » 07 Dec 2011 20:21

and completely seal the possibility of India "taking over" Pakistan and/or making it a case India's satellite? Interestingly this is the exact same objective of white pakis.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 07 Dec 2011 20:28

We always accuse the western press of regarding India as turd world monkeys who do not come up to the standards of the west. But that is true for the way Pakhanaland is regarded too. And Pakhanis are way too sophisticated for the dimwits analysts of the west

All the "coup rumors-shoe rumors" are bullshit. It will be a soft coup' Zardari eased out on "health grounds" - political "support" goes - and "interim consensus government.

It is funny how we have also been eating the shit dished out to us (with some difficulty) since Musharaf was farted out of Pakhanaland. Every goddam western source has been talking of "civilian""democratically elected" government. We know what those elections were and we know who has been governing the major part of shitland all these years.

Don't expect an exciting coup and come back and make me eat my words if something like that happens.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 07 Dec 2011 20:35

harbans wrote:Even Ambassadors have been recalled. So the change intended is exactly as SS Ji says: Installation of a Pro-Talibani govt. Things are going to get more confrontational with the West/ NATO. But IMO PA may have gone too far. What happens the next time a drone takes a few to their 72? The down top pressure on the PA is now to get their air assets up and try to knock drones out. Meanwhile rats will continue to leave the sinking ship faster...Beer and Popcorn time yes, but India IMO should be very alert, as a way out for PA would be to do a Mumbai type thing and deflect attention and divert ire from the West to an Indian reaction to the same. Though that won't help much apart from giving a breather from the West..the Paki sure is now living on the edge and bleeding profusely from the war of a 1000 cuts it intended to wage on India.

Hmmm...

Could it be the realization of the twin brothers (dont remember who, but someone posted a nice summary on Paki twins, the merchant and the clown jewels a while ago) that the pious brother was able to defeat the super power while his non-pious twin let the merchant snatch away their pious-sheik from under his nose.

The abbortabad and Mehran attack proved that TSPA is not pious enough to get muhammed's blessings. They tried to connect to allah after 1971 defeat but they are not pious enough.

So the pious section of TSPA must be demanding to get complete control over the clown jewels and kabila as its non-pious twin cannot be guaranteed of Muhammed's blessings and victory of kabila.

The pious brother is taking over from their non-pious twin brother to win against the supel-powel merchant. Tathastu!

Overt Talibanization of Pakistan is in Indian Interests.

shaardula · Post by **shaardula** » 07 Dec 2011 20:44

folks heard on radio that fai is likely to get upto 5 years. just caught the last part.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Dec 2011 20:48

SSridhar, Good insights. I bolded the critical ones in my mind.

Harbans, What elite?

Folks we should use consistent descriptors for the TSP actors/stakeholders or we will not understand whats going on.

To my limited knowledge, a civilian coup after Abortabad failed and we are seeing the blowback of that failure.

The civilian coup failed as US did not accept the regime change as it didnt understand the historic opportunity or worse had deeper plans.

Either way its US loss first.

I think Badmash faction is marginalised and wont be a politicial stake holder expcept for nusiance value.

A new regime change will involve PPP onlee as PML-N doesn't have all TSP acceptance. Otherwise it will make the Pakjabification overt. As long as TSPA has Pakjabis they can afford to keep the facade of political power to other groups.

I dont see where Imran Khan's PTI stands.

Roperia · Post by **Roperia** » 07 Dec 2011 22:44

shaardula wrote:folks heard on radio that fai is likely to get upto 5 years. just caught the last part.

Yup, reading something similar on twitter

Ghulam Nabi Fai, head of Washington-based "Kashmiri" American Council pleads guilty of spying for ISI.!

- PTI News

Roperia · Post by **Roperia** » 07 Dec 2011 23:10

Fai pleaded guilty and agreed to the charges of federal prosecutors that he received at least $3.5 million from ISI between 1990 to 2011. This resulted in a revenue loss of between $200,000 to 400,000 to the US government.

Fai agreed before the court that he was in direct contact with the ISI officials including the head of its security directorate.

He conceded receiving talking points from ISI regarding what to say and write. He agreed that he received directions from ISI with regard to which specific individuals to invite for KAC conferences.

"Mr Fai is accused of a decades-long scheme with one purpose to hide Pakistan's involvement behind his efforts to influence the US government's position on Kashmir," US attorney Neil MacBride

His sentencing is scheduled for March 9

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 07 Dec 2011 23:25

Fai has plead guilty. Accepts to receiving illegal payments from Pakistan. But before we celebrate -- he has also said that he didnt lobby for Pakistan, but lobbied out of his own free will and convictions.

Since he has plead guilty (and not innocent) if there was a deal, the prosecutor might have made a deal to leave ISI out and simply press charges for tax and illegal money transfer.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 07 Dec 2011 23:59

Najam Sethi says that health issue is peripheral for Zardari's trip.

He has left so that the memo issue does not blow up requiring him to stay in the country. Claims Zardari will be back after the dust settles. His trip is to get support from Gulf nations and also to not be around temporarily so that the courts and the Army cant squeeze him in Isloo. Sethi says the Memo issue is ultimately aimed at Zardari because the Good Haqqani and Groper will get out just fine. They are small fish that nobody is interested to trap.

Nandu · Post by **Nandu** » 08 Dec 2011 00:08

ramana wrote:
The civilian coup failed as US did not accept the regime change as it didnt understand the historic opportunity or worse had deeper plans.

Yup. This was a major failure by the US to follow through after Abbottabad, caused by the traditional blinkers worn by US analysts when it comes to the Paki military.

Joseph · Post by **Joseph** » 08 Dec 2011 00:29

ramana wrote:
To my limited knowledge, a civilian coup after Abortabad failed and we are seeing the blowback of that failure.

The civilian coup failed as US did not accept the regime change as it didnt understand the historic opportunity or worse had deeper plans.

ramana,

In Summer 2008, the Zardari government was unable to wrest control of the ISI from the PA.

The U.S. has been unable to get the PA to take action against the Haqqani network.

How were the Zardari government and the U.S. going to be able to force the PA (and the ISI) to be subordinate to the civilian government when previous attempts in prodding for change were successfully resisted by the PA?

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 08 Dec 2011 00:32

Nandu-ji

I dont think so. Pakistan is a multiplayer game. It is not just a question of removing a few people from the army to shore up "civilian supremacy". Pakistan is a mixture of Army, Courts and Political parties who wont hesitate to ride the Army's coat-tails into power. All of who have shady relationships with the media, jihadis and mullahs of varying influence.

Imagine this scenario. Us supports Zardari in removing the top leadership of Army and ISI. Since Kayani and Pasha got extensions (blocking promotions of people under them) they probably stuffed the top of the Army with their minions. Who will replace Kayani and Pasha? Does Zardari know anyone in the Army he can trust? Even if he does that, will the rest of the Army play along or will they label the top generals as stooges of US and PPP and do a coup against them? Recall that Mushy himself had assassination bids against him! Next comes the courts. Will they play along? Or will they declare things like NRO being illegal and reactivate cases against Zardari? What about other opportunistic political parties like PML-N and Imran Khan? Will they whip up nationalistic sentiments and conduct riots on the street backed by a jingo-istic media, army and Judges? If so will PPP survive?

Point is, US probably desires stability for now rather than stirring the pot with the end result of half of PPP on lamposts strung up along with reasonable top-level Khakhis. The country run by a weak jingoistic Paki with no support base, sharing power with a mullah conglomerate and an army headed by mid-level karnails and jernails with long beards.

Army can be removed from the equation in Pakistan *only* if civvies (who matter) come together and realize that Army is ultimately bad for them (even though using them as a shortcut for power is very seductive) and decide to undermine it. But that level of complex thought is too complicated for low-IQ inbreds.

Sanju · Post by **Sanju** » 08 Dec 2011 00:39

The following link on the first page is not working:

Inside Jihad - How Pakistan sponsors terrorists in India
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/ ... r_sb1.html

Rahul Shukla · Post by **Rahul Shukla** » 08 Dec 2011 01:27

Pakistan all set to repay $1.2b to IMF: Secretary Finance (Online News)

Federal Secretary Finance Dr.Waqar Masood Khan confirmed to Online on Wednesday that government will pay back total amount of $1.2 billion to International Monetary Fund during 3rd and 4th quarters of the current fiscal year 2011-12; however, he did not make clear the amount of each quarter and the name of months in which IMF will be paid back.

Sahaafi-e-akhbaar must have snorted Afghan's finest, given what is stated in the very next paragraph:

“In the month of February government will repay first installment of $500 million to International Monetary Fund and $700 million will be paid back in the month of June from foreign currency reserves held by the State Bank of Pakistan( SBP).”, official told Online on the condition of anonymity.

Sarkar-e-Papistan's fiscal year lasts July-June. Anyway, here is how Papistan will pay back the money:

The foreign currency reserves stand over $17 billion on December 07, 2011 out of which $7.6 billion is loans obtained from the Fund under the existing SBA program.

Approximately 45% of Papistan's reserves are money loaned by kafirs. AoA!

Dipanker · Post by **Dipanker** » 08 Dec 2011 03:51

On Yawn newspaper there is a poll (left column towards bottom 1/3rd) with this question: "Is Afghanistan right in blaming Pakistan for the attacks in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif without any proof?"

Right now No is 51%, Yes is only 47%, please cast your votes!

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 08 Dec 2011 04:11

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2 ... f-Pakistan
Doomsday war games: Pentagon's 3 nightmare scenarios

1. Collapse of Pakistan
Following the assassination of the Pakistani president in a scenario that begins in 2013, Pakistan begins to descend into chaos. It is a time of great uncertainty, in which Pakistan’s “Islamist Army faction and its militant Muslim allies” decide to act.Their plan, according to the war game: “to exploit that country’s growing civil disorder to seize power and create a radical Islamist state.” Compounding this chaos is the confusion over who will gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal, estimated to number 80 to 120. These weapons are believed to be located at a half-dozen or so sites around the country.At least one site is occupied by Islamist units. “Both US and other national intelligence services have concluded that sympathetic elements of the ISI [Pakistan's spy agency] have provided Islamist officers leading the breakaway army units with the activation codes needed to arm the nuclear weapons under their control,” notes the scenario, which is drawn from "7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century" by Andrew Krepinevich, a former staffer in the Office of Net Assessments, the Pentagon’s futuristic and highly influential internal think tank.this were to happen, “there may be little to prevent these weapons from being used.”The principal targets of such weapons would be United States, and US citizens draw little comfort, the scenario adds, from the efforts of US government officials to emphasize the difficulties involved in transporting nuclear weapons halfway around the world, which would be necessary, they add, in order to target an American city.
US forces have considered a preemptive strike on the area where the weapons are thought to be located, but Islamist forces have warned of the “horrific consequences” that would result if any foreign power attempted to do this. While the crisis in Pakistan “comes as a shock to most Americans,” the scenario notes, “to many observers, including senior government officials, it is hardly a surprise at all. To them, the greatest surprise is that Pakistan did not implode sooner.”
2. Rise of militant China
It is the year 2013, and “what experts are calling the greatest aggregation of naval power the world has ever seen is assembling in a long arc several hundred miles off the maritime approaches to China.” The leaders of the United States and Japan are debating what to do next “in what many fear may be the opening gambits in a new world war.”
3. Collapse of North Korea
Authoritarian dictators can repress their populations for decades, but now the regime of Kim Jong-il “is embarking on the most difficult challenge that such regimes face: succession,” according to a scenario by Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind, published in the fall issue of the journal International Security.

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 08 Dec 2011 04:53

== Taking big hits to the fence and over now. Echandee completely beng soiled even by the Ozzies..

Why Australia Should not Sell Uranium to Pakistan

Predictably, Pakistan is seeking equal treatment with India on uranium sales from Australia.

For decades Pakistan has sought to assert parity with India in the international arena. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to get others to accept that there is a necessary linkage between the two nations created from the partition of British India in 1947.

Nowhere is the “breaking of parity” going to be more evident that in the supply of uranium.

India has consistently refused to sign the NPT on the grounds of principle, namely that the treaty creates a privileged club of legitimate nuclear weapons powers

India has never dissented from the NPT, per se, just its discriminatory clauses. It has also been a consistent critic of the failures of those in the nuclear club to seriously engage in nuclear disarmament, another key aspect of the treaty. Pakistan also refused to sign the NPT. (On the sole principle that India didn't sign it, not that the NPT was flawed)

What makes it acceptable, in my view, is that India appears to have an impeccable record on non-proliferation.

There is no evidence I am aware of where Indian nuclear technology has been sold or given to another country. The control of India’s nuclear weapons is very clearly under civilian control.

The same cannot be said for Pakistan.

Nice to see some Aussie Journo's doing some homework before spouting off.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 08 Dec 2011 04:53

Dipanker wrote:On Yawn newspaper there is a poll (left column towards bottom 1/3rd) with this question: "Is Afghanistan right in blaming Pakistan for the attacks in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif without any proof?"

Right now No is 51%, Yes is only 47%, please cast your votes!

Why should there be such a poll ? Didn't Lashkar-e-Jhangvi accept that it has indeed carried out the twin bombings ?

Dipanker · Post by **Dipanker** » 08 Dec 2011 05:17

^ You are right, Paki are just being Paki!

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 08 Dec 2011 05:32

Bilawal, Gilani jointly chair PPP leaders meeting
Billa, Gilla and Killa ni

ISLAMABAD: Chairman Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and PPP’s Vice Chairman Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani jointly presided over a meeting of the senior party leadership present in Islamabad at the Prime Minister House on Wednesday evening.Spokesperson Farhatullah Babar said that the meeting discussed issues relating to the Nato air strikes, the forthcoming Senate elections and the steps for the implementation of the pledge made by the party to meet the longstanding demand of the people for Saraiki province.The meeting decided that the Joint Session of the Parliament would be called as soon as the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security are finalized.It was also decided that soon after the return of the PPP Co- Chairman, President Asif Ali Zardari, applications would be invited from the party workers for the Senate elections.The meeting asked the manifesto committee to expedite finalization of its report on the Saraiki province.Chairman PPP Bilawal Bhutto Zardari lauded the courageous stand promptly taken by the Government on the Nato air strikes.He also appreciated the measures taken by the Government and the party to meet the genuine aspirations of the people of Pakistan.The meeting was attended by Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Hina Rabbani Khar, Qamar Zaman Kaira, Syed Khursheed Shah, Dr Babar Awan, Syed Naveed Qamar, Nazar Muhammad Gondal, Sherry Rehman, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, Jahangir Badar, Farhatullah Babar, Rukhsana Bangash and Hashaam Sheikh

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 08 Dec 2011 05:36

TFTA looking Paki from Urannus!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gt9jwo2 ... r_embedded#!

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 08 Dec 2011 06:35

Trying (but not succeeding so far) to get the full text of this article in the Foreign Affairs magazine which is behind a subscription:

Talking Tough To Pakistan
By Stephen D. Krasner
November 29, 2011

Prof. Kranser (of Stanford and Hoover Institute) says stuff in the above article that has this Paki in a big snit:
Of NATO attacks and conspiracy theories —Dr Moeed Pirzada

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 08 Dec 2011 06:35

anupmisra · Post by **anupmisra** » 08 Dec 2011 06:40

jrjrao wrote:Trying (but not succeeding so far) to get the full text of this article in the Foreign Affairs magazine which is behind a subscription:
Talking Tough To Pakistan

Here you go (full article):

Talking Tough to Pakistan

How to End Islamabad's Defiance
By Stephen D. Krasner

November 29, 2011

Cuts or increases in U.S. civilian and military aid will not alter Islamabad's political
calculus -- and Washington should stop expecting them to. Nevertheless, it should stay
engaged with the country if only to protect its major regional strategic interests.

On September 22, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, made his last official appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In
his speech, he bluntly criticized Pakistan, telling the committee that "extremist
organizations serving as proxies for the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan
troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers." The Haqqani network, he said, "is, in many
ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency [ISI]." In 2011
alone, Mullen continued, the network had been responsible for a June attack on the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, a September truck-bomb attack in Wardak Province that
wounded 77 U.S. soldiers, and a September attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

These observations did not, however, lead Mullen to the obvious conclusion: Pakistan
should be treated as a hostile power. And within days, military officials began walking
back his remarks, claiming that Mullen had meant to say only that Islamabad gives broad
support to the Haqqani network, not that it gives specific direction. Meanwhile, unnamed
U.S. government officials asserted that he had overstated the case. Mullen's testimony,
for all the attention it received, did not signify a new U.S. strategy toward Pakistan.

Yet such a shift is badly needed. For decades, the United States has sought to buy
Pakistani cooperation with aid: $20 billion worth since 9/11 alone. This money has been
matched with plenty of praise. At his first press conference in Islamabad following his
2007 appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mullen called Pakistan "a steadfast and
historic ally." In 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice even said that she
"fully believed" that Pakistan "does not in any way want to be associated with terrorist
elements and is indeed fighting to root them out wherever [Pakistani officials] find
them." Meanwhile, U.S. leaders have spent an outsized amount of face time with their
Pakistani counterparts. As secretary of state, Hillary Clinton has made four trips to
Pakistan, compared with two to India and three to Japan. Mullen made more than 20 visits
to Pakistan.

To be sure, Mullen was not the first U.S. official to publicly point the finger at
Islamabad, nor will he be the last. In 2008, the CIA blamed Pakistan's ISI for aiding the
bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. In July 2011, two months after U.S. Navy SEALS
raided Osama bin Laden's compound near the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy, Admiral
James Winnefeld, vice chair of the Joint Chiefs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee,
"Pakistan is a very, very difficult partner, and we all know that." And in an October
press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Clinton noted that the Obama
administration intended to "push the Pakistanis very hard," adding, "they can either be
helping or hindering."

Washington's tactic -- criticism coupled with continued assistance -- has not been
effectual. Threats and censure go unheeded in Pakistan because Islamabad's leaders do not
fear the United States. This is because the United States has so often demonstrated a fear
of Pakistan, believing that although Pakistan's policies have been unhelpful, they could
get much worse. Washington seems to have concluded that if it actually disengaged and as a
result Islamabad halted all its cooperation in Afghanistan, then U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts there would be doomed. Even more problematic, the thinking goes, without external
support, the already shaky Pakistani state would falter. A total collapse could
precipitate a radical Islamist takeover, worsening Pakistani relations with the
U.S.-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan and escalating tensions, perhaps even
precipitating a nuclear war, between Pakistan and India.

WEIGHING OF DEEDS

The U.S.-Pakistani relationship has produced a few modest successes. Pakistan has
generally allowed NATO to transport supplies through its territory to Afghanistan. It has
helped capture some senior al Qaeda officials, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the 9/11
mastermind. It has permitted the United States to launch drone strikes from bases in
Baluchistan.

Yet these accomplishments pale in comparison to the ways in which Pakistan has proved
uncooperative. The country is the world's worst nuclear proliferator, having sold
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea through the A. Q. Khan network. Although
Islamabad has attacked those terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban,
that target its institutions, it actively supports others, such as the Haqqani network,
the Afghan Taliban, and Hezb-i-Islami, that attack coalition troops and Afghan officials
or conspire against India. Pakistan also hampers U.S. efforts to deal with those groups;
although many Pakistani officials privately support the drone program, for example, they
publicly exaggerate the resulting civilian deaths. Meanwhile, they refuse to give the
United States permission to conduct commando raids in Pakistan, swearing that they will
defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs.

A case in point was the raid that killed bin Laden. Rather than embrace the move,
Pakistani officials reacted with fury. The police arrested a group of Pakistani citizens
who were suspected of having helped the United States collect intelligence prior to the
operation and delayed U.S. interrogations of bin Laden's three wives for more than a week.
Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the ISI, condemned the U.S. raid before a
special session of parliament, and the government passed a resolution pledging to revisit
its relationship with the United States. Of course, the operation was embarrassing for the
Pakistani military, since it showed the armed forces to be either complicit in harboring
bin Laden or so incompetent that they could not find him under their own noses. But
Pakistan could easily have saved face by publicly depicting the operation as a cooperative
venture.

The fact that Pakistan distanced itself from the raid speaks to another major problem in
the relationship: despite the billions of dollars the United States has given Pakistan,
public opinion there remains adamantly anti-American. In a 2010 Pew survey of 21
countries, those Pakistanis polled had among the lowest favorability ratings of the United
States: 17 percent. The next year, another Pew survey found that 63 percent of the
population disapproved of the raid that killed bin Laden, and 55 percent thought it was a
bad thing that he had died.

Washington's current strategy toward Islamabad, in short, is not working. Any gains the
United States has bought with its aid and engagement have come at an extremely high price
and have been more than offset by Pakistan's nuclear proliferation and its support for the
groups that attack Americans, Afghans, Indians, and others.

RATIONAL CHOICE

It is tempting to believe that Pakistan's lack of cooperation results from its weakness as
a state. One version of this argument is that much of Pakistan's civilian and military
leadership might actually want to be more aligned with the United States but is prevented
from being so by powerful hard-line Islamist factions. Its advocates point to the fact
that pubic officials shrank from condemning the bodyguard who in January 2011 shot Salman
Taseer, the governor of Punjab, who had spoken out against Pakistan's blasphemy law.
Similar silence followed the March assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti, the minorities
minister and only Christian in the cabinet, who had also urged reforming the law.
Presumably, the politicians held their tongues out of fear of reprisal. Another
explanation of the weakness of the Pakistani state is that the extremists in the
government and the military who support militants offer that support despite their
superiors' objections. For example, the May 2011 terrorist attack on Pakistan's naval air
base Mehran, which the top military brass condemned, was later suspected to have been
conducted with help from someone on the inside.

Still, there is a much more straightforward explanation for Pakistan's behavior. Its
policies are a fully rational response to the conception of the country's national
interest held by its leaders, especially those in the military. Pakistan's fundamental
goal is to defend itself against its rival, India. Islamabad deliberately uses nuclear
proliferation and deterrence, terrorism, and its prickly relationship with the United
States to achieve this objective.

Pakistan's nuclear strategy is to project a credible threat of first use against India.
The country has a growing nuclear arsenal, a stockpile of short-range missiles to carry
warheads, and plans for rapid weapons dispersion should India invade. So far, the strategy
has worked; although Pakistan has supported numerous attacks on Indian soil, India has not
retaliated.

Transnational terrorism, Pakistanis believe, has also served to constrain and humiliate
India. As early as the 1960s, Pakistani strategists concluded that terrorism could help
offset India's superior conventional military strength. They were right. Pakistani
militant activity in Kashmir has led India to send hundreds of thousands of troops into
the province -- as many as 500,000 during a particularly tense moment with Pakistan in
2002. Better that India sends its troops to battle terrorists on its own territory, the
Pakistani thinking goes, than march them across the border. Further, the 2008 Mumbai
attack, which penetrated the heart of India, was a particularly embarrassing episode; the
failure to prevent it, and the feeble response to it, demonstrated the ineffectuality of
India's security forces.

Pakistan's double game with the United States has been effective, too. After 9/11,
Pakistan's leaders could hardly resist pressure from Washington to cooperate. But they
were also loath to lose influence with the insurgents in Afghanistan, which they believed
gave Pakistan strategic depth against India. So Islamabad decided to have things both
ways: cooperating with Washington enough to make itself useful but obstructing the
coalition's plans enough to make it nearly impossible to end the Afghan insurgency. This
has been an impressive accomplishment.

CARING BY NEGLECTING

As Mullen's comments attest, U.S. officials do recognize the flaws in their country's
current approach to Pakistan. Yet instead of making radical changes to that policy,
Washington continues to muddle through, working with Pakistan where possible, attempting
to convince its leaders that they should focus on internal, rather than external, threats,
and hoping for the best. For their part, commentators mostly call for marginal changes,
such as engaging the Pakistani military more closely on the drone program and making the
program more transparent, opening U.S. textile markets to Pakistani trade, helping
Pakistan address its energy deficit, focusing on a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir
dispute, and developing closer ties to civilian officials. Many of these suggestions seem
to be based on the idea that if millions of dollars in U.S. aid has not been enough to buy
Pakistani support, perhaps extra deal sweeteners will be.

The one significant policy change since 2008 has been the retargeting of aid to civilians.
Under the Obama administration, total assistance has increased by 48 percent, and a much
higher percentage of it is economic rather than security related: 45 percent in 2010 as
opposed to 24 percent in 2008. The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009, which
committed $7.5 billion to Pakistan over five years, conditioned disbursements on
Pakistan's behavior, including cooperation on counterterrorism and the holding of
democratic elections.

Despite Pakistan's ongoing problematic behavior, however, aid has continued to flow.
Clinton even certified in March 2011 that Pakistan had made a "sustained commitment" to
combating terrorist groups. Actions such as this have undermined American credibility when
it comes to pressuring Pakistan to live up to its side of the bargain. The United States
has shown that the sticks that come with its carrots are hollow.

The only way the United States can actually get what it wants out of Pakistan is to make
credible threats to retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S. demands and offer
rewards only in return for cooperative actions taken. U.S. officials should tell their
Pakistani counterparts in no uncertain terms that they must start playing ball or face
malign neglect at best and, if necessary, active isolation. Malign neglect would mean
ending all U.S. assistance, military and civilian; severing intelligence cooperation;
continuing and possibly escalating U.S. drone strikes; initiating cross-border special
operations raids; and strengthening U.S. ties with India. Active isolation would include,
in addition, declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, imposing sanctions, and
pressuring China and Saudi Arabia to cut off their support, as well.

Of course, the United States' new "redlines" would be believable only if it is clear to
Pakistan that the United States would be better off acting on them than backing down. (And
the more believable they are, the less likely the United State will have to carry them
out.) So what would make the threats credible?

First, the United States must make clear that if it ended its assistance to Pakistan,
Pakistan would not be able to retaliate. The United States could continue its drone
strikes, perhaps using the stealth versions of them that it is currently developing. It
could suppress Pakistani air defenses, possibly with electronic jammers, so as to limit
military deaths and collateral damage. And even if Pakistan shot down some drones, it
could not destroy them all. The United States might even be able to conduct some Special
Forces raids, which would be of such short duration and against such specific targets that
Pakistan would not be able to retaliate with conventional forces. Pakistan might attempt
to launch strikes against NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, but its military would
risk embarrassing defeat if those campaigns did not go well. Pakistan might threaten to
cut off its intelligence cooperation, but that cooperation has never really extended to
sharing information on the Afghan Taliban, one of the United States' main concerns in
Afghanistan. Moreover, if Pakistan started tolerating or abetting al Qaeda on its own
soil, the country would be even more at risk. Al Qaeda could turn against the state and
attempt to unseat the government. And the United States would surely begin striking
Pakistan even more aggressively if al Qaeda found haven there.

Second, the United States must show that it can neutralize one of Pakistan's trump cards:
its role in the war in Afghanistan. Washington must therefore develop a strategy for
Afghanistan that works without Pakistan's help. That means a plan that does not require
transporting personnel or materiel through Pakistan. Nearly 60 percent of the NATO
supplies sent into Afghanistan are already routed through the north, through Russia and
Central Asia. The U.S. military is hoping to increase that number to 75 percent. Without
Pakistan, therefore, the coalition could still support a substantial force in Afghanistan,
but not one as big as the current one of 131,000 troops. The basic objective of that force
would necessarily be counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency. Counterterrorism is less
personnel- and resource-intensive because it aims only to prevent the country from
becoming a haven for Islamist extremists, not to transform it into a well-functioning
democracy. Given the Obama administration's current plans to withdraw 24,000 U.S. troops
by the summer of 2012, with many more to follow, such a strategy is already inescapable.

Finally, Washington must shed its fear that its withdrawal of aid or open antagonism could
lead to the Pakistani state's collapse, a radical Islamist takeover, or nuclear war.
Pakistanis, not Americans, have always determined their political future. Even substantial
U.S. investments in the civilian state and the economy, for example, have not led to their
improvement or to gains in stability. With or without U.S. aid to Pakistan, the Pakistani
military will remain the most respected institution in the country. In a 2011 Pew poll of
Pakistanis, 79 percent of respondents said that the military was having a good influence
on the country's direction, compared with 20 percent who said that the national government
was.

As for the possibility of an Islamist takeover, the country's current power centers have a
strong interest in maintaining control and so will do whatever they can to keep it --
whatever Washington's policy is. It is worth remembering that Pakistan has already proved
itself able to take out the terrorist networks that threaten its own institutions, as it
did in the Swat Valley and the district of Buner in 2009. Moreover, government by radical
Islamists has not proved to be a popular choice among Pakistanis. In the last general
election, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of Islamist parties, won only seven out
of 340 seats in the National Assembly.

The possibility that nuclear weapons could wind up in the hands of terrorists is a serious
risk, of course, but not one that the United States could easily mitigate whatever its
policy in the region. Pakistan's nuclear posture, which involves rapid dispersion, a
first-strike capability, and the use of tactical weapons, increases the chances of the
central government's losing control. Even so, Pakistan will not alter that posture because
it is so effective in deterring India. Meanwhile, previous U.S. efforts to help tighten
Pakistan's command-and-control systems have been hampered by mutual distrust. Any new such
efforts would be, too. Finally, since India has both a first- and a second-strike
capability, Pakistan would not likely strike India first in the event of a crisis. In any
case, even if things did escalate, there is not much that the United States, or anyone
else, could do -- good relations or not.

From a U.S. perspective, then, there is no reason to think that malign neglect or active
isolation would make Pakistan's behavior or problems any worse.

HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE

Even as the United States threatens disengagement, it should emphasize that it would still
prefer a productive relationship. But it should also make clear that the choice is
Pakistan's: if the country ends its support for terrorism; works in earnest with the
United States to degrade al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Haqqani network; and stops its
subversion in Afghanistan, the United States will offer generous rewards. It could provide
larger assistance programs, both civilian and military; open U.S. markets to Pakistani
exports; and support political arrangements in Kabul that would reduce Islamabad's fear of
India's influence. In other words, it is only after Pakistan complies with its demands
that the United States should offer many of the policy proposals now on the table. And
even then, these rewards should not necessarily be targeted toward changing Pakistan's
regional calculus; they should be offered purely as payment for Pakistan's cooperation on
the United States' most important policies in the region.

A combination of credible threats and future promises offers the best hope of convincing
Islamabad that it would be better off cooperating with the United States. In essence,
Pakistan would be offered a choice between the situation of Iran and that of Indonesia,
two large Islamic states that have chosen very different paths. It could be either a
pariah state surrounded by hostile neighbors and with dim economic prospects or a country
with access to international markets, support from the United States and Europe, and some
possibility of détente with its neighbors. The Indonesian path would lead to increased
economic growth, an empowered middle class, strengthened civil-society groups, and a
stronger economic and social foundation for a more robust democracy at some point in the
future. Since it would not directly threaten the military's position, the Indonesian model
should appeal to both pillars of the Pakistani state. And even if Islamabad's cooperation
is not forthcoming, the United States is better off treating Pakistan as a hostile power
than continuing to spend and get nothing in return.

Implicit in the remarks Mullen made to the Senate was the argument that Washington must
get tough with Pakistan. He was right. A whole variety of gentle forms of persuasion have
been tried and failed. The only option left is a drastic one. The irony is that this
approach won't benefit just the United States: the whole region, including Pakistan, could
quickly find itself better off.