People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

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pankajs
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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 13 Mar 2013 20:58

The Growing Disdain for China's Super-Rich
For a China still undergoing rapid economic development, a new and divisive character has emerged: the wealthy young scion. Children who come from money in China, colloquially called fu'erdai, are often associated with many negative stereotypes.

Fu'erdai literally translates to "rich second generation" and are generally either guan'erdai, meaning "government official second generation;" xing'erdai, meaning "super-star second generation;" or hong'erdai, children whose families have strong roots in the Communist Party and can "eat from both plates."

Perhaps the most representative incident of backlash against fu'erdai occurred in 2010, when the 22 year old Li Qimin, intoxicated and speeding in his luxury car, hit a college girl and killed her. When apprehended, he shouted "My father is Li Gang!" referring to a well-known local official. The phrase quickly went viral, and to this day represents fu'erdai arrogance.

A recent case that angered millions of Chinese microbloggers was that of Li Tianyi, who was both fu'erdai and hong'erdai. Li Tianyi, the 17-year-old son of famous Chinese general and singer Li Shuangjiang, was prosecuted for his involvement in a gang rape.
Even the People's Daily, a state-run media outlet, recognized the significance of the issue: "Multiple incidents involving 'keng die' [children whose misdeeds have tarnished their fathers' reputations] have become hot-button issues in society, because of who they are and because of the violence or arrogance involved. Moreover, the era they live in is characterized by a public trust gap that stems from China's current class divisions, and we must build a bridge to re-build that trust."

Anger among the public is directed not just at these individuals, but at an unaccountable justice system. As user @ 破破的桥 wrote on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, "We already have a society that lacks trust. Do you trust the police? No, they are corrupt. Witnesses? No, also corrupt. Judges? No, they listen to the people in power. Do you trust government agencies? No, they only follow orders."
Xu Danei, a columnist for the Chinese-language version of the Financial Times, cautioned:

In this society which has lost its accountability, [fu'erdai] must be deeply aware that they should not give the other side a chance. Enjoying their high lives, they must stay cautious and never slip, because if they do, there will be millions of hands to take people like Li Tianyi to hell. For grass-roots Chinese who feel deeply abused, this perhaps is their only opportunity to address the unjust gap they feel exists between themselves and the rich and powerful, even it's only by oral 'revenge.'

member_19686
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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby member_19686 » 16 Mar 2013 07:13

An American Conservative perspective on China:
How Social Darwinism Made Modern China
A thousand years of meritocracy shaped the Middle Kingdom.

By RON UNZ • March 11, 2013

During the three decades following Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, China achieved the fastest sustained rate of economic growth in human history, with the resulting 40-fold rise in the size of China’s economy leaving it poised to surpass America’s as the largest in the world. A billion ordinary Han Chinese have lifted themselves economically from oxen and bicycles to the verge of automobiles within a single generation.

China’s academic performance has been just as stunning. The 2009 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests placed gigantic Shanghai—a megalopolis of 15 million—at the absolute top of world student achievement.1 PISA results from the rest of the country have been nearly as impressive, with the average scores of hundreds of millions of provincial Chinese—mostly from rural families with annual incomes below $2,000—matching or exceeding those of Europe’s most advanced and successful countries, such as Germany, France, and Switzerland, and ranking well above America’s results.2

Image

These successes follow closely on the heels of a previous generation of similar economic and technological gains for several much smaller Chinese-ancestry countries in that same part of the world, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and the great academic and socioeconomic success of small Chinese-descended minority populations in predominantly white nations, including America, Canada, and Australia. The children of the Yellow Emperor seem destined to play an enormous role in Mankind’s future.

Although these developments might have shocked Westerners of the mid-20th Century—when China was best known for its terrible poverty and Maoist revolutionary fanaticism—they would have seemed far less unexpected to our leading thinkers of 100 years ago, many of whom prophesied that the Middle Kingdom would eventually regain its ranking among the foremost nations of the world. This was certainly the expectation of A.E. Ross, one of America’s greatest early sociologists, whose book The Changing Chinese looked past the destitution, misery, and corruption of the China of his day to a future modernized China perhaps on a technological par with America and the leading European nations. Ross’s views were widely echoed by public intellectuals such as Lothrop Stoddard, who foresaw China’s probable awakening from centuries of inward-looking slumber as a looming challenge to the worldwide hegemony long enjoyed by the various European-descended nations.

The likely roots of such widespread Chinese success have received little detailed exploration in today’s major Western media, which tends to shy away from considering the particular characteristics of ethnic groups or nationalities, as opposed to their institutional systems and forms of government. Yet although the latter obviously play a crucial role—Maoist China was far less economically successful than Dengist China—it is useful to note that the examples of Chinese success cited above range across a wide diversity of socioeconomic/political systems.

For decades, Hong Kong enjoyed one of the most free-market, nearly anarcho-libertarian economic systems; during that same period, Singapore was governed by the tight hand of Lee Kuan Yew and his socialistic People’s Action Party, which built a one-party state with a large degree of government guidance and control. Yet both these populations were overwhelmingly Chinese, and both experienced almost equally rapid economic development, moving in 50 years from total postwar destitution and teeming refugee slums to ranking among the wealthiest places on earth. And Taiwan, whose much larger Chinese-ancestry population pursued an intermediate development model, enjoyed similar economic success.


Despite a long legacy of racial discrimination and mistreatment, small Chinese communities in America also prospered and advanced, even as their numbers grew rapidly following passage of the 1965 Immigration Act. In recent years a remarkable fraction of America’s top students—whether judged by the objective winners’ circle of the Mathematics Olympiad and Intel Science competition or by the somewhat more subjective rates of admission to Ivy League colleges—have been of Chinese ancestry. The results are particularly striking when cast in quantitative terms: although just 1 percent of American high-school graduates each year have ethnic Chinese origins, surname analysis indicates that they currently include nearly 15 percent of the highest-achieving students, a performance ratio more than four times better than that of American Jews, the top-scoring white ancestry group.3

Chinese people seem to be doing extremely well all over the world, across a wide range of economic and cultural landscapes.

Almost none of these global developments were predicted by America’s leading intellectuals of the 1960s or 1970s, and many of their successors have had just as much difficulty recognizing the dramatic sweep of events through which they are living. A perfect example of this strange myopia may be found in the writings of leading development economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, whose brief discussions of China’s rapid rise to world economic dominance seem to portray the phenomenon as a temporary illusion almost certain soon to collapse because the institutional approach followed differs from the ultra-free-market neoliberalism that they recommend.4 The large role that the government plays in guiding Chinese economic decisions dooms it to failure, despite all evidence to the contrary, while America’s heavily financialized economy must be successful, regardless of our high unemployment and low growth. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, nearly all international success or failure is determined by governmental institutions, and since China possesses the wrong ones, failure is certain, though there seems no sign of it.

Perhaps such academics will be proven correct, and China’s economic miracle will collapse into the debacle they predict. But if this does not occur, and the international trend lines of the past 35 years continue for another five or ten, we should consider turning for explanations to those long-forgotten thinkers who actually foretold these world developments that we are now experiencing, individuals such as Ross and Stoddard. The widespread devastation produced by the Japanese invasion, World War II, and the Chinese Civil War, followed by the economic calamity of Maoism, did delay the predicted rise of China by a generation or two, but except for such unforeseen events, their analysis of Chinese potential seems remarkably prescient. For example, Stoddard approvingly quotes the late Victorian predictions of Professor Charles E. Pearson:

Does any one doubt that the day is at hand when China will have cheap fuel from her coal-mines, cheap transport by railways and steamers, and will have founded technical schools to develop her industries? Whenever that day comes, she may wrest the control of the world’s markets, especially throughout Asia, from England and Germany.5


A People Shaped by Their Difficult Environment

Western intellectual life a century ago was quite different from that of today, with contrary doctrines and taboos, and the spirit of that age certainly held sway over its leading figures. Racialism—the notion that different peoples tend to have different innate traits, as largely fashioned by their particular histories—was dominant then, so much so that the notion was almost universally held and applied, sometimes in rather crude fashion, to both European and non-European populations.

With regard to the Chinese, the widespread view was that many of their prominent characteristics had been shaped by thousands of years of history in a generally stable and organized society possessing central political administration, a situation almost unique among the peoples of the world. In effect, despite temporary periods of political fragmentation, East Asia’s own Roman Empire had never fallen, and a thousand-year interregnum of barbarism, economic collapse, and technological backwardness had been avoided.

On the less fortunate side, the enormous population growth of recent centuries had gradually caught up with and overtaken China’s exceptionally efficient agricultural system, reducing the lives of most Chinese to the brink of Malthusian starvation; and these pressures and constraints were believed to be reflected in the Chinese people. For example, Stoddard wrote:

Winnowed by ages of grim elimination in a land populated to the uttermost limits of subsistence, the Chinese race is selected as no other for survival under the fiercest conditions of economic stress. At home the average Chinese lives his whole life literally within a hand’s breadth of starvation. Accordingly, when removed to the easier environment of other lands, the Chinaman brings with him a working capacity which simply appalls his competitors.6

Stoddard backed these riveting phrases with a wide selection of detailed and descriptive quotations from prominent observers, both Western and Chinese. Although Ross was more cautiously empirical in his observations and less literary in his style, his analysis was quite similar, with his book on the Chinese containing over 40 pages describing the grim and gripping details of daily survival, provided under the evocative chapter-heading “The Struggle for Existence in China.”
7

During the second half of the 20th century, ideological considerations largely eliminated from American public discourse the notion that many centuries of particular circumstances might leave an indelible imprint upon a people. But with the turn of the new millennium, such analyses have once again begun appearing in respectable intellectual quarters.

The most notable example of this would surely be A Farewell to Alms, Gregory Clark’s fascinating 2007 analysis of the deep origins of Britain’s industrial revolution,
which was widely reviewed and praised throughout elite circles, with New York Times economics columnist Tyler Cowen hailing it as possibly “the next blockbuster in economics” and Berkeley economist Brad DeLong characterizing it as “brilliant.”

Although Clark’s work focused on many different factors, the one that attracted the greatest attention was his demographic analysis of British history based upon a close examination of individual testaments. Clark discovered evidence that for centuries the wealthier British had left significantly more surviving children than their poorer compatriots, thus leading their descendents to constitute an ever larger share of each generation. Presumably, this was because they could afford to marry at a younger age, and their superior nutritional and living arrangements reduced mortality rates for themselves and their families. Indeed, the near-Malthusian poverty of much ordinary English life during this era meant that the impoverished lower classes often failed even to reproduce themselves over time, gradually being replaced by the downwardly mobile children of their financial betters. Since personal economic achievement was probably in part due to traits such as diligence, prudence, and productivity, Clark argued that these characteristics steadily became more widespread in the British population, laying the human basis for later national economic success.

Leaving aside whether or not the historical evidence actually supports Clark’s hypothesis—economist Robert C. Allen has published a strong and fairly persuasive refutation8—the theoretical framework he advances seems a perfectly plausible one. Although the stylistic aspects and quantitative approaches certainly differ, much of Clark’s analysis for England seems to have clear parallels in how Stoddard, Ross, and others of their era characterized China. So perhaps it would be useful to explore whether a Clarkian analysis might be applicable to the people of the Middle Kingdom.

Interestingly enough, Clark himself devotes a few pages to considering this question and concludes that in contrast to the British case, wealthier Chinese were no more fecund than the poorer, eliminating the possibility of any similar generational trend.9 But Clark is not a China specialist, and his brief analysis relies on the birth records of the descendents of the ruling imperial dynasty, a group totally unrepresentative of the broader population. In fact, a more careful examination of the Chinese source material reveals persuasive evidence for a substantial skew in family size, directly related to economic success, with the pattern being perhaps even stronger and more universally apparent than was the case for Britain or any other country.

Moreover, certain unique aspects of traditional Chinese society may have maintained and amplified this long-term effect, in a manner unlike that found in most other societies in Europe or elsewhere. China indeed may constitute the largest and longest-lasting instance of an extreme “Social Darwinist” society anywhere in human history, perhaps with important implications for the shaping of the modern Chinese people.10

The Social Economy of Traditional China

Chinese society is notable for its stability and longevity. From the gradual establishment of the bureaucratic imperial state based on mandarinate rule during the Sui (589–618) and T’ang (618–907) dynasties down to the Communist Revolution of 1948, a single set of social and economic relations appears to have maintained its grip on the country, evolving only slightly while dynastic successions and military conquests periodically transformed the governmental superstructure.

A central feature of this system was the replacement of the local rule of aristocratic elements by a class of official meritocrats, empowered by the central government and selected by competitive examination. In essence, China eliminated the role of hereditary feudal lords and the social structure they represented over 1,000 years before European countries did the same, substituting a system of legal equality for virtually the entire population beneath the reigning emperor and his family.

The social importance of competitive examinations was enormous, playing the same role in determining membership in the ruling elite that the aristocratic bloodlines of Europe’s nobility did until modern times, and this system embedded itself just as deeply in the popular culture. The great noble houses of France or Germany might trace their lineages back to ancestors elevated under Charlemagne or Barbarossa, with their heirs afterward rising and falling in standing and estates, while in China the proud family traditions would boast generations of top-scoring test-takers, along with the important government positions that they had received as a result. Whereas in Europe there existed fanciful stories of a heroic commoner youth doing some great deed for the king and consequently being elevated to a knighthood or higher, such tales were confined to fiction down to the French Revolution. But in China, even the greatest lineages of academic performers almost invariably had roots in the ordinary peasantry.

Not only was China the first national state to utilize competitive written examinations for selection purposes, but it is quite possible that almost all other instances everywhere in the world ultimately derive from the Chinese example. It has long been established that the Chinese system served as the model for the meritocratic civil services that transformed the efficiency of Britain and other European states during the 18th and 19th centuries. But persuasive historical arguments have also been advanced that the same is even true for university entrance tests and honors examinations, with Cambridge’s famed Math Tripos being the earliest example.11 Modern written tests may actually be as Chinese as chopsticks.

With Chinese civilization having spent most of the past 1,500 years allocating its positions of national power and influence by examination, there has sometimes been speculation that test-taking ability has become embedded in the Chinese people at the biological as well as cultural level. Yet although there might be an element of truth to this, it hardly seems likely to be significant. During the eras in question, China’s total population numbered far into the tens of millions, growing in unsteady fashion from perhaps 60 million before AD 900 to well over 400 million by 1850. But the number of Chinese passing the highest imperial exam and attaining the exalted rank of chin-shih during most of the past six centuries was often less than 100 per year, down from a high of over 200 under the Sung dynasty (960-1279), and even if we include the lesser rank of chu-jen, the national total of such degree-holders was probably just in the low tens of thousands,12 a tiny fraction of 1 percent of the overall population—totally dwarfed by the numbers of Chinese making their living as artisans or merchants, let alone the overwhelming mass of the rural peasantry. The cultural impact of rule by a test-selected elite was enormous, but the direct genetic impact would have been negligible.

This same difficulty of relative proportions frustrates any attempt to apply in China an evolutionary model similar to the one that Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending have persuasively suggested for the evolution of high intelligence among the Ashkenazi Jews of Europe.13 The latter group constituted a small, reproductively isolated population overwhelmingly concentrated in the sorts of business and financial activity that would have strongly favored more intelligent individuals, and one with insignificant gene-flow from the external population not undergoing such selective pressure. By contrast, there is no evidence that successful Chinese merchants or scholars were unwilling to take brides from the general population, and any reasonable rate of such intermarriage each generation would have totally swamped the selective impact of mercantile or scholarly success. If we are hoping to find any rough parallel to the process that Clark hypothesizes for Britain, we must concentrate our attention on the life circumstances of China’s broad rural peasantry—well over 90 percent of the population during all these centuries—just as the aforementioned 19th-century observers generally had done.

Absence of Caste and Fluidity of Class

In fact, although Western observers tended to focus on China’s horrific poverty above all else, traditional Chinese society actually possessed certain unusual or even unique characteristics that may help account for the shaping of the Chinese people. Perhaps the most important of these was the near total absence of social caste and the extreme fluidity of economic class.

Feudalism had ended in China a thousand years before the French Revolution, and nearly all Chinese stood equal before the law.14 The “gentry”—those who had passed an official examination and received an academic degree—possessed certain privileges and the “mean people”—prostitutes, entertainers, slaves, and various other degraded social elements—suffered under legal discrimination. But both these strata were minute in size, with each usually amounting to less than 1 percent of the general population, while “the common people”—everyone else, including the peasantry—enjoyed complete legal equality.

However, such legal equality was totally divorced from economic equality, and extreme gradations of wealth and poverty were found in every corner of society, down to the smallest and most homogenous village. During most of the 20th century, the traditional Marxian class analysis of Chinese rural life divided the population according to graduated wealth and degree of “exploitative” income: landlords, who obtained most or all of their income from rent or hired labor; rich, middle, and poor peasants, grouped according to decreasing wealth and rental income and increasing tendency to hire out their own labor; and agricultural laborers, who owned negligible land and obtained nearly all their income from hiring themselves out to others.

In hard times, these variations in wealth might easily mean the difference between life and death, but everyone acknowledged that such distinctions were purely economic and subject to change: a landlord who lost his land would become a poor peasant; a poor peasant who came into wealth would be the equal of any landlord. During its political struggle, the Chinese Communist Party claimed that landlords and rich peasants constituted about 10 percent of the population and possessed 70–80 percent of the land, while poor peasants and hired laborers made up the overwhelming majority of the population and owned just 10–15 percent of the land. Neutral observers found these claims somewhat exaggerated for propagandistic purposes, but not all that far from the harsh reality.15

Complete legal equality and extreme economic inequality together fostered one of the most unrestrained free-market systems known to history, not only in China’s cities but much more importantly in its vast countryside, which contained nearly the entire population. Land, the primary form of wealth, was freely bought, sold, traded, rented out, sub-leased, or mortgaged as loan collateral. Money-lending and food-lending were widely practiced, especially during times of famine, with usurious rates of interest being the norm, often in excess of 10 percent per month compounded. In extreme cases, children or even wives might be sold for cash and food. Unless aided by relatives, peasants without land or money routinely starved to death. Meanwhile, the agricultural activity of more prosperous peasants was highly commercialized and entrepreneurial, with complex business arrangements often the norm.16

For centuries, a central fact of daily life in rural China had been the tremendous human density, as the Middle Kingdom’s population expanded from 65 million to 430 million during the five centuries before 1850,17 eventually forcing nearly all land to be cultivated to maximum efficiency. Although Chinese society was almost entirely rural and agricultural, Shandong province in 1750 had well over twice the population density of the Netherlands, the most urbanized and densely populated part of Europe, while during the early years of the Industrial Revolution, England’s population density was only one-fifth that of Jiangsu province.18

Chinese agricultural methods had always been exceptionally efficient, but by the 19th century, the continuing growth of the Chinese population had finally caught and surpassed the absolute Malthusian carrying-capacity of the farming system under its existing technical and economic structure.19 Population growth was largely held in check by mortality (including high infant mortality), decreased fertility due to malnutrition, disease, and periodic regional famines that killed an average of 5 percent of the population.20 Even the Chinese language came to incorporate the centrality of food, with the traditional words of greeting being “Have you eaten?” and the common phrase denoting a wedding, funeral, or other important social occasion being “to eat good things.”21

The cultural and ideological constraints of Chinese society posed major obstacles to mitigating this never-ending human calamity. Although impoverished Europeans of this era, male and female alike, often married late or not at all, early marriage and family were central pillars of Chinese life, with the sage Mencius stating that to have no children was the worst of unfilial acts; indeed, marriage and anticipated children were the mark of adulthood. Furthermore, only male heirs could continue the family name and ensure that oneself and one’s ancestors would be paid the proper ritual respect, and multiple sons were required to protect against the vagaries of fate. On a more practical level, married daughters became part of their husband’s household, and only sons could ensure provision for one’s old age.

Nearly all peasant societies sanctify filial loyalty, marriage, family, and children, while elevating sons above daughters, but in traditional China these tendencies seem to have been especially strong, representing a central goal and focus of all daily life beyond bare survival. Given the terrible poverty, cruel choices were often made, and female infanticide, including through neglect, was the primary means of birth control among the poor, leading to a typical shortfall of 10–15 percent among women of marriageable age. Reproductive competition for those remaining women was therefore fierce, with virtually every woman marrying, generally by her late teens. The inevitable result was a large and steady natural increase in the total population, except when constrained by various forms of increased mortality.

Remarkable Upward Mobility But Relentless Downward Mobility

The vast majority of Chinese might be impoverished peasants, but for those with ability and luck, the possibilities of upward mobility were quite remarkable in what was an essentially classless society. The richer strata of each village possessed the wealth to give their most able children a classical education in hopes of preparing them for the series of official examinations. If the son of a rich peasant or petty landlord were sufficiently diligent and intellectually able, he might pass such an examination and obtain an official degree, opening enormous opportunities for political power and wealth.

For the Ming (1368–1644) and Ch’ing (1644–1911) dynasties, statistics exist on the social origins of the chin-shih class, the highest official rank, and these demonstrate a rate of upward mobility unmatched by almost any Western society, whether modern or premodern. Over 30 percent of such elite degree-holders came from commoner families that for three previous generations had produced no one of high official rank, and in the data from earlier centuries, this fraction of “new men” reached a high of 84 percent. Such numbers far exceed the equivalent figures for Cambridge University during all the centuries since its foundation, and would probably seem remarkable at America’s elite Ivy League colleges today or in the past. Meanwhile, downward social mobility was also common among even the highest families. As a summary statistic, across the six centuries of these two dynasties less than 6 percent of China’s ruling elites came from the ruling elites of the previous generation.22

The founding philosophical principle of the modern Western world has been the “Equality of Man,” while that of Confucianist China was the polar opposite belief in the inherent inequality of men. Yet in reality, the latter often seemed to fulfill better the ideological goals of the former. Frontier America might have had its mythos of presidents born in log-cabins, but for many centuries a substantial fraction of the Middle Kingdom’s ruling mandarins did indeed come from rural rice-paddies, a state of affairs that would have seemed almost unimaginable in any European country until the Age of Revolution, and even long afterward.

Such potential for elevation into the ruling Chinese elite was remarkable, but a far more important factor in the society was the open possibility of local economic advancement for the sufficiently enterprising and diligent rural peasant. Ironically enough, a perfect description of such upward mobility was provided by Communist revolutionary leader Mao Zedong, who recounted how his father had risen from being a landless poor peasant to rich peasant status:

My father was a poor peasant and while still young was obliged to join the army because of heavy debts. He was a soldier for many years. Later on he returned to the village where I was born, and by saving carefully and gathering together a little money through small trading and other enterprise he managed to buy back his land.

As middle peasants then my family owned fifteen mou [about 2.5 acres] of land. On this they could raise sixty tan of rice a year. The five members of the family consumed a total of thirty-five tan—that is, about seven each—which left an annual surplus of twenty-five tan. Using this surplus, my father accumulated a little capital and in time purchased seven more mou, which gave the family the status of ‘rich’ peasants. We could ten raise eighty-four tan of rice a year.

When I was ten years of age and the family owned only fifteen mou of land, the five members of the family consisted of my father, mother, grandfather, younger brother, and myself. After we had acquired the additional seven mou, my grandfather died, but there came another younger brother. However, we still had a surplus of forty-nine tan of rice each year, and on this my father prospered.

At the time my father was a middle peasant he began to deal in grain transport and selling, by which he made a little money. After he became a ‘rich’ peasant, he devoted most of his time to that business. He hired a full-time farm laborer, and put his children to work on the farm, as well as his wife. I began to work at farming tasks when I was six years old. My father had no shop for his business. He simply purchased grain from the poor farmers and then transported it to the city merchants, where he got a higher price. In the winter, when the rice was being ground, he hired an extra laborer to work on the farm, so that at that time there were seven mouths to feed. My family ate frugally, but had enough always.23

Mao’s account gives no indication that he regarded his family’s rise as extraordinary in any way; his father had obviously done well, but there were probably many other families in Mao’s village that had similarly improved their lot during the course of a single generation. Such opportunities for rapid social mobility would have been almost impossible in any of the feudal or class-ridden societies of the same period, in Europe or most other parts of the world.

However, the flip-side of possible peasant upward mobility was the far greater likelihood of downward mobility, which was enormous and probably represented the single most significant factor shaping the modern Chinese people. Each generation, a few who were lucky or able might rise, but a vast multitude always fell, and those families near the bottom simply disappeared from the world. Traditional rural China was a society faced with the reality of an enormous and inexorable downward mobility: for centuries, nearly all Chinese ended their lives much poorer than had their parents.

The strong case for such downward mobility was demonstrated a quarter century ago by historian Edwin E. Moise,24 whose crucial article on the subject has received far less attention than it deserves, perhaps because the intellectual climate of the late 1970s prevented readers from drawing the obvious evolutionary implications.

In many respects, Moise’s demographic analysis of China eerily anticipated that of Clark for England, as he pointed out that only the wealthier families of a Chinese village could afford the costs associated with obtaining wives for their sons, with female infanticide and other factors regularly ensuring up to a 15 percent shortfall in the number of available women. Thus, the poorest village strata usually failed to reproduce at all, while poverty and malnourishment also tended to lower fertility and raise infant mortality as one moved downward along the economic gradient. At the same time, the wealthiest villagers sometimes could afford multiple wives or concubines and regularly produced much larger numbers of surviving offspring. Each generation, the poorest disappeared, the less affluent failed to replenish their numbers, and all those lower rungs on the economic ladder were filled by the downwardly mobile children of the fecund wealthy.

This fundamental reality of Chinese rural existence was certainly obvious to the peasants themselves and to outside observers, and there exists an enormous quantity of anecdotal evidence describing the situation, whether gathered by Moise or found elsewhere, as illustrated by a few examples:

‘How could any man in our village claim that his family had been poor for three generations? If a man is poor, then his son can’t afford to marry; and if his son can’t marry, there can’t be a third generation.’25

… Because of the marked shortage of women, there was always a great number of men without wives at all. This included the overwhelming majority of long-term hired laborers… The poorest families died out, being unable to arrange marriages for their sons. The future generations of poor were the descendants of bankrupted middle and rich peasants and landlords.26

… Further down the economic scale there were many families with unmarried sons who had already passed the customary marriage age, thus limiting the size of the family. Wong Mi was a case in point. He was already twenty-three, with both of his parents in their mid-sixties; but since the family was able to rent only an acre of poor land and could not finance his marriage, he lived with the old parents, and the family consisted of three members. Wong Chun, a landless peasant in his forties, had been in the same position when he lived with his aged parents ten years before, and now, both parents having died, he lived alone. There were ten or fifteen families in the village with single unmarried sons.27

… As previously mentioned, there were about twenty families in Nanching that had no land at all and constituted the bottom group in the village’s pyramid of land ownership. A few of these families were tenant farmers, but the majority, since they could not finance even the buying of tools, fertilizer, and seeds, worked as “long-term” agricultural laborers on an annual basis. As such, they normally were paid about 1,000 catties of unhusked rice per year and board and room if they owned no home. This income might equal or even exceed what they might have wrested from a small rented farm, but it was not enough to support a family of average size without supplementary employment undertaken by other members of the family. For this reason, many of them never married, and the largest number of bachelors was to be found among landless peasants. Wong Tu-en, a landless peasant working for a rich peasant for nearly ten years, was still a “bare stick” (unmarried man) in his fifties; and there were others in the village like him. They were objects of ridicule and pity in the eyes of the villagers, whose life [sic] centered upon the family.28

Furthermore, the forces of downward mobility in rural Chinese society were greatly accentuated by fenjia, the traditional system of inheritance, which required equal division of property among all sons, in sharp contrast to the practice of primogeniture commonly found in European countries.

If most or all of a father’s property went to the eldest son, then the long-term survival of a reasonably affluent peasant family was assured unless the primary heir were a complete wastrel or encountered unusually bad fortune. But in China, cultural pressures forced a wealthy man to do his best to maximize the number of his surviving sons, and within the richer strata of a village it was not uncommon for a man to leave two, three, or even more male heirs, compelling each to begin his economic independence with merely a fraction of his father’s wealth. Unless they succeeded in substantially augmenting their inheritance, the sons of a particularly fecund rich landlord might be middle peasants—and his grandchildren, starving poor peasants.29 Families whose elevated status derived from a single fortuitous circumstance or a transient trait not deeply rooted in their behavioral characteristics therefore enjoyed only fleeting economic success, and poverty eventually culled their descendents from the village.

The members of a successful family could maintain their economic position over time only if in each generation large amounts of additional wealth were extracted from their land and their neighbors through high intelligence, sharp business sense, hard work, and great diligence. The penalty for major business miscalculations or lack of sufficient effort was either personal or reproductive extinction. As American observer William Hinton graphically described:

Security, relative comfort, influence, position, and leisure [were] maintained amidst a sea of the most dismal and frightening poverty and hunger—a poverty and hunger which at all times threatened to engulf any family which relaxed its vigilance, took pity on its poor neighbors, failed to extract the last copper of rent and interest, or ceased for an instant the incessant accumulation of grain and money. Those who did not go up went down, and those who went down often went to their deaths or at least to the dissolution and dispersal of their families.30

However, under favorable circumstances, a family successful in business might expand its numbers from generation to generation until it gradually squeezed out all its less competitive neighbors, with its progeny eventually constituting nearly the entire population of a village. For example, a century after a couple of poor Yang brothers arrived in a region as farm laborers, their descendents had formed a clan of 80–90 families in one village and the entire population of a neighboring one.31 In a Guangdong village, a merchant family named Huang arrived and bought land, growing in numbers and land ownership over the centuries until their descendants replaced most of the other families, which became poor and ultimately disappeared, while the Huangs eventually constituted 74 percent of the total local population, including a complete mix of the rich, middle, and poor.32

The Implications for the Chinese People and for American Ideology

In many respects, the Chinese society portrayed by our historical and sociological sources seems an almost perfect example of the sort of local environment that would be expected to produce a deep imprint upon the characteristics of its inhabitants. Even prior to the start of this harsh development process, China had spent thousands of years as one of the world’s most advanced economic and technological civilizations. The socioeconomic system established from the end of the sixth century A.D. onward then remained largely stable and unchanged for well over a millennium, with the sort of orderly and law-based society that benefited those who followed its rules and ruthlessly weeded out the troublemaker. During many of those centuries, the burden of overpopulation placed enormous economic pressure on each family to survive, while a powerful cultural tradition emphasized the production of surviving offspring, especially sons, as the greatest goal in life, even if that result might lead to the impoverishment of the next generation.Agricultural efficiency was remarkably high but required great effort and diligence, while the complexities of economic decision-making—how to manage land, crop selection, and investment decisions—were far greater than those faced by the simple peasant serf found in most other parts of the world, with the rewards for success and the penalties for failure being extreme. The sheer size and cultural unity of the Chinese population would have facilitated the rapid appearance and spread of useful innovations, including those at the purely biological level.33

It is important to recognize that although good business ability was critical for the long-term success of a line of Chinese peasants, the overall shaping constraints differed considerably from those that might have affected a mercantile caste such as the Ashkenazi Jews of Eastern Europe or the Parsis of India. These latter groups occupied highly specialized economic niches in which a keen head for figures or a ruthless business sense might have been all that was required for personal success and prosperity. But in the world of rural Chinese villages, even the wealthier elements usually spent the majority of the lives in backbreaking labor, working alongside their families and their hired men in the fields and rice paddies. Successful peasants might benefit from a good intellect, but they also required the propensity for hard manual toil, determination, diligence, and even such purely physical traits as resistance to injury and efficiency in food digestion. Given such multiple selective pressures and constraints, we would expect the shift in the prevalence of any single one of these traits to be far slower than if it alone determined success, and the many centuries of steady Chinese selection across the world’s largest population would have been required to produce any substantial result.34

The impact of such strong selective forces obviously manifests at multiple levels, with cultural software being far more flexible and responsive than any gradual shifts in innate tendencies, and distinguishing between evidence of these two mechanisms is hardly a trivial task. But it seems quite unlikely that the second, deeper sort of biological human change would not have occurred during a thousand years or more of these relentlessly shaping pressures, and simply to ignore or dismiss such an important possibility is unreasonable. Yet that seems to have been the dominant strain of Western intellectual belief for the last two or three generations.

Sometimes the best means of recognizing one’s ideological blinders is to consider seriously the ideas and perspectives of alien minds that lack them, and in the case of Western society these happen to include most of our greatest intellectual figures from 80 or 90 years ago, now suddenly restored to availability by the magic of the Internet. Admittedly, in some respects these individuals were naïve in their thinking or treated various ideas in crude fashion, but in many more cases their analyses were remarkably acute and scientifically insightful, often functioning as an invaluable corrective to the assumed truths of the present. And in certain matters, notably predicting the economic trajectory of the world’s largest country, they seem to have anticipated developments that almost none of their successors of the past 50 years ever imagined. This should certainly give us pause.

Consider also the ironic case of Bruce Lahn, a brilliant Chinese-born genetics researcher at the University of Chicago. In an interview a few years ago, he casually mentioned his speculation that the socially conformist tendencies of most Chinese people might be due to the fact that for the past 2,000 years the Chinese government had regularly eliminated its more rebellious subjects, a suggestion that would surely be regarded as totally obvious and innocuous everywhere in the world except in the West of the past half century or so. Not long before that interview, Lahn had achieved great scientific acclaim for his breakthrough discoveries on the possible genetic origins of human civilization, but this research eventually provoked such heated controversy that he was dissuaded from continuing it.35

Yet although Chinese researchers living in America willingly conform to American ideological restrictions, this is not the case with Chinese researchers in China itself, and it is hardly surprising that BGI—the Beijing Genomics Institute—has become the recognized world leader in cutting-edge human genetics research. This is despite the billions spent by its American counterparts, which must operate within a much more circumscribed framework of acceptable ideas.

During the Cold War, the enormous governmental investments of the Soviet regime in many fields produced nothing, since they were based on a model of reality that was both unquestionable and also false. The growing divergence between that ideological model and the real world eventually doomed the USSR, whose vast and permanent bulk blew away in a sudden gust of wind two decades ago. American leaders should take care that they do not stubbornly adhere to scientifically false doctrines that will lead our own country to risk a similar fate.

Ron Unz is publisher of The American Conservative.

http://www.theamericanconservative.com/ ... china-248/

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 16 Mar 2013 13:03

From Police Chief To Political Office, Jobs Are For Sale In China
Confronting the issue is a matter of political self-interest and survival for China's new leaders. The problem is how to root out corrupt officials when so many are quite literally invested in the system.

Consider the case of Huang Yubiao, a Chinese real estate millionaire with a charitable streak. He was seen on local television promising poverty-stricken villagers, "I'll give you whatever you need."

But his failed attempt to buy a seat on the Hunan Province People's Congress turned him into a whistle-blower. Online, he went public, admitting that he'd given out approximately $50,000 worth of bribes to about 320 members of the Shaoyang City People's Congress in his bid to become a provincial delegate.

"Everyone was doing it," he told NPR in a telephone interview. "My bribes were the lowest, so I wasn't elected. They asked me to add money, but I didn't. They told me I couldn't be elected as I only paid $160 a head. It needed to be higher, maybe even triple that."

He even accused an official, the Shaoyang Congress standing committee's deputy head, of encouraging him to bribe. He told Xinhua news agency that he'd originally intended to give money to all 470 electors, but stopped handing out the bribes when he realized how "meaningless" the process was. He failed to get elected by 26 votes. Now, a corruption investigation is under way.
Everyone Knows, Even 6-Year-Olds

Netizens have even posted information listing how much it cost to buy certain posts in one city, Chenzhou. In 2006, $300,000 could get you county party secretary; for $250,000, you could be county police chief.

Anti-corruption expert Ren believes the figures to be reliable, but says it would cost more today. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the security of a job with a state-affiliated institution means there's a price for lower-level jobs, too. A doctor's job in a northeastern hospital goes for around $30,000, while even a staff job on the subway can be bought.

"It's not just corruption of the bureaucracy, there's corruption in every field," Ren says. "In medicine, there are kickbacks and packets of money passing from patients to doctors. Even in education, parents know how to cement relationships with teachers by giving gifts. These things pollute kids when they're very young."

Poignant proof of it is in a video shot by the Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper. Six-year-olds are asked what they'd like to be when they grow up. The kids run through the normal gamut of pilots, firefighters and artists.

Then one small boy confidently says, "I want to be an official."

"What sort of official?" he's asked.

"A corrupt official," replies the little boy, "because they have lots of things."

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby Suppiah » 19 Mar 2013 08:52

Nice report on various 'activities' going on in PRC railways...look like Chinese are discovering their inner-pakistaniyat in their railways!

http://www.thecontroversialfiles.net/20 ... s-ten.html

(Posting recommended by a fellow brf mujahid)


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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby kish » 19 Mar 2013 15:59

Dedicated to all chinese dlones here in brf.

Fake bureaucrat takes China authorities for ride

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 19 Mar 2013 21:55

The Photoshop masters do it again!

Image

The Time cover that wasn’t
In their fulsome praise of Wu Renbao today, China’s newspapers all mention that he made the cover of Time magazine in 2005. So I went looking through all the covers of Time magazine in 2005 and came up empty-handed. It was then, however, that I discovered that the newspaper New News (新消息报) from Qinghai province had kindly printed the said Wu Renbao Time cover, inadvertently revealing that it and all the other Chinese newspapers had been embarrassingly duped by a blatantly fake Time cover. It boggles the mind how this newspaper didn’t notice its terrible mistake, with the fake cover being such a nut job of nonsensical grammar. The fake Wu Renbao cover, it emerged, was in fact ripped off of this Time cover from January 2006. This fakery has already been reported on Weibo today (e.g. here or here), and elsewhere on the Chinese Internet.

Yet before we completely dismiss New News as a sorry excuse for a newspaper, it would probably be remiss not to mention that this snafu (as with everything else related to Chinese news reporting) was likely first propagated by Xinhua itself. Looking back at the paper trail of news reports yesterday, it does appear as if Xinhua was first with publishing a story of the news of Wu’s death and the claim that he appeared on the cover of Time magazine in 2005 in a report published at around 20:30 last night. As mentioned above, Xinhua had already reported the false assertion on its Weibo account just after six last evening.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby svinayak » 19 Mar 2013 22:07

pankajs wrote:
Yet before we completely dismiss New News as a sorry excuse for a newspaper, it would probably be remiss not to mention that this snafu (as with everything else related to Chinese news reporting) was likely first propagated by Xinhua itself. Looking back at the paper trail of news reports yesterday, it does appear as if Xinhua was first with publishing a story of the news of Wu’s death and the claim that he appeared on the cover of Time magazine in 2005 in a report published at around 20:30 last night. As mentioned above, Xinhua had already reported the false assertion on its Weibo account just after six last evening.

Fundamentally it is a psy ops manufactured news. The image of the leaders and name recognition itself will take time in the chinese masses since the days of the mass propaganda is over. The early revolutionary leaders are no longer leaders and they have created an image of china among its own people that they may not be able to meet the expectation. Interesting times

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby jamwal » 22 Mar 2013 22:45

New Zealander Describes Ordeals in Chinese Prison

Forced labor, chemical testing, and taser shocks to the mouth are just a few of the horrors one can expect to experience in a Chinese prison, according to New Zealander Danny Cancian.

The last four years of Cancian’s life were spent mostly in Dongguan Prison, which he called a “hellhole on Earth” in a recent YouTube video. He holds up placards detailing his time in jail. One reads: “The Chinese government has no compassion or regard for life.”

“There were people hanging themselves every week” in the prison, he said in an interview with Fairfax New Zealand. “They had to take all the wire clothes lines out of the cells.”


The prisoners had to work six days a week in a neighboring factory. “Every morning at 5 a.m., they’d march us all to the factory, and then at 7 p.m. we’d come back.” Cheap Chinese labourThey were given 10 minutes to drink rice water for breakfast. Lunch was rice and boiled cabbage. Dinner was far from pleasant. “Disgusting, horrible, smelly things,” he said. “The prison used to buy all the old dead pigs


He also witnessed chemical testing on prisoners, and narrowly missed being a guinea pig for a flu vaccine. “[They would] march us off to get tested. I said to them, ‘No way, you just put me in solitary confinement because you are not trying out drugs on me.’”

After his release, Cancian was told that he would not be allowed to return to China for five years. “I said to them you might as well make it 500 years because I am never setting foot back in China again.”


http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/84525 ... four-years


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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby svinayak » 24 Mar 2013 13:46

China as an Island. THis is the real China from the historical times and now it cannot manage the PRC state since it never had the historical legitamacy nor the memory to rule these areas.

Image

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 27 Mar 2013 23:23

cross-post
---------------------
China jails 20 on jihad, separatism charges in restive Xinjiang
Chinese courts have sentenced 20 people to up to life in jail on charges of separatism and plotting to carry out jihad in the restive far western region of Xinjiang, the government said on Wednesday.

The courts in Kashgar and Bayingol said the 20 - all ethnic Uighurs judging by their names - had had their "thoughts poisoned by religious extremism", and used cell phones and DVDs "to spread Muslim religious propaganda", the Xinjiang government said on its official news website (www.ts.cn).

Some of them bought weapons to kill policemen as part of their jihad and spread propaganda related to the banned East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the report said, a group which China says wages a violent campaign for a separate state.
Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the exiled World Uyghur Congress, said the 20 were actually guilty of no more than listening to the US-funded Radio Free Asia and using the internet to discuss the importance of religious and cultural freedom.

"Giving heavy sentences to Uighurs (on the excuse) of terrorism is China's special way of carrying out suppression," he said in an emailed statement.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby Prem » 28 Mar 2013 02:09

Yatha raja Tatha Praja, China orr Chorrina

Quit Photoshopping Officials Into *****, Begs Giant Billboard
china’s Hunan Province has a problem: renegades are using their skills for black hat trickery, Photoshopping pictures of Chinese government officials and company bosses into *****. They’ll then use the Photoshopped pictures to attempt to blackmail the officials, who have no way of proving it’s not actually them getting freaky in the pics (have they not heard of the pixel test?).The whole thing has gotten so bad–127 cases reported just last year, with over $7 million extorted–that law enforcement in Hunan are desperate to stop it. So desperate, in fact, that they erected gigantic billboards in the city of Shuangfeng warning against the phenomenon.“Decisively crack down on the crime of exploiting Photoshop technology to blackmail people with compound pictures, in order to establish a good image of Shuangfeng,” reads one of the billboards, according to France 24.Chinese officials are no strangers to sex controversies, so it’s unsurprising that they’d want to get out in front of this scandal: if you’re gonna blackmail someone, at least have the decency to do so with a real picture.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 22:00

Indonesia Protested to China Over Passports Last Year: Foreign Minister
Indonesia's foreign minister has said that the Southeast Asian nation protested to China about a controversial map printed in Chinese passports last year which claimed almost all of the South China Sea, the Financial Times reported Friday on its website.

Beijing has become increasingly assertive in its claims over large swathes of the South China Sea, including islands and shoals which are also claimed by several Asean members and Taiwan. The controversial "nine-dash line" printed in its passports represents the extent of China's claim over South China Sea in a map it submitted to the U.N.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 22:06

China's Lonely Seeking a Spouse- at Discount Rates
Are you a "budget wife"?

Despite the name, being a budget wife -- or jingji shiyong nv in Chinese -- is harder than it seems. According a list published by an anonymous Web user on Sina Weibo, China's most popular micro-blogging platform, to qualify as one, you must:

Be between 5'2" and 5'8"
Weigh between 100 and 120 pounds
Have long hair that trails over shoulders
Be warm and mild in personality
Have B- to C-cup size breasts
Not be a "gold digger" (baijinnv)
Not be a flirt
Not be horny
Earn between roughly $500-$1000 per month
Have a BA or above
Know how to cook and wash clothes
Be responsible and sympathetic
Speak appropriately
Be educated and reasonable

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 22:13

Lonely and Far From Home, China’s Migrant Workers Turn to ‘Temporary Marriages’ to Survive
Liu Li, a member of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) from Anhui province, gave an answer during a recent press conference: “Due to long separations, many of those in the current wave of migrant workers have started ‘temporary marriages.’ It may surprise many to hear it, but it is very common among the group I belong to.” Rep. Liu made news in early 2012 after being the first migrant worker from Anhui selected for the NPC; she previously worked as a foot-washer.
Liu Li’s statement also triggered national media response. Beijing Youth Daily commented that “when faced with lust, it’s reasonable that migrant workers would form temporary marriages to solve the problem. Despite the moral condemnation and the risk of destroying families, this after all is safer and healthier than illegal behavior like seeing prostitutes. Moreover, by sharing the cost of renting and cooking, ‘temporary marriages’ can be more economic.”
In Xiamen, Fujian Province, the Strait News interviewed the migrant worker community. The News described a man called Mr. Zhou (alias), who in many neighbors’ eyes had a typical temporary marriage life. Last summer, he had visitors staying over, a women and a girl, who he told others were his wife and daughter from his home village. He behaved as a “model husband” to his family, helping to cook and coming home on time after work. But one week after the visitors left, another woman appeared in the apartment and stayed with him. It turned out that Zhou had carried on his relationship with the first woman for a long time, but she would “disappear” whenever his family visited, traveling back her own family during holidays.

The phenomenon is not limited to urban factory areas. While many men find themselves alone in cities, their wives are left behind with children and farm work. In a book by Wu Zhiping called A Survey of the Lives of Chinese Rural Women, Wu relates the story of Mei, who while in her 40s lived with another man in her village. Mei’s husband had worked in the city for many years and only came home for spring festivals. “Our marriage life over 24 years has been less than some other couples [experience] in one year. At home, farm work that requires strong labor is difficult for women. I’d be crazy already if there was no helper. I really have no other way,” Mei said.

The story from Wu’s book says that Mei has no friends in her village, and her actions are seen as shameful.

Yet if blame is to be assigned, it is unclear who should accept it. Beijing Times’ report emphasizes factories and companies: “Providing basic living supports for migrant worker-couples [to avoid separation] should not rely on government and society’s ‘kind reminders’ but rather companies’ conscience and social responsibility.” An article in People’s Daily listed more fundamental reasons: “The temporary marriage phenomenon is caused by half-cooked urbanization, hampered population mobility … and an [unequal] urban-rural structure. In the long term, the ultimate solution is to improve migrant workers’ distressed living conditions via institutional reform and systemic improvement.”

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 22:24

Tibetan Monk Dies in Self-Immolation in China
BEIJING — A Tibetan monk killed himself this week by self-immolation near his monastery in western China, according to a report on Thursday by Radio Free Asia, which is financed by the United States government.

The act by the monk, Kunchok Tenzin, 28, took place at a major intersection near Mori monastery, in Gansu Province, which has a significant Tibetan population.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 22:37

Battle within China's ruling elite
A brutal feud between Chinese ruling families has spilled into the public arena, with the son of a revered Communist Party leader accusing rivals of sending armed thugs to take over his luxury villa complex in suburban Beijing.

Hu Dehua, the 63-year-old ''princeling'' son of a popular 1980s reformist leader, told Fairfax Media his security guards fled in terror as 200 armed men invaded the site, stole all the documentation of his company, Jingda Real Estate Development, and took over compound management.
Collusion between officials, developers and mafia-style ''black society'' thugs has become common in China, where the law is explicitly subordinate to politics and politics is shaped by money.

Foreign and local business operators say China's legal environment has deteriorated. Some lawyers and scholars have diagnosed a ''mafia-isation'' of government and business, and several Australian businessmen are in Chinese jails after what they allege were mafia-style ''shakedowns'' of successful businesses.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 23:03

28,000 rivers wiped off the map of China
More than half of the rivers previously thought to exist in China appear to be missing, according to the 800,000 surveyors who compiled the first national water census, leaving Beijing fumbling to explain the cause.

Only 22,909 rivers covering an area of 100sq km were located by surveyors, compared with the more than 50,000 in the 1990s, a three-year study by the Ministry of Water Resources and the National Bureau of Statistics found.

Officials blame the apparent loss on climate change, arguing that it has caused waterways to vanish, and on mistakes by earlier cartographers. But environmental experts say the disappearance of the rivers is a real and direct manifestation of headlong, ill-conceived development, where projects are often imposed without public consultation.

The UN considers China one of the 13 countries most affected by water scarcity, as industrial toxins have poisoned historic water sources and were blamed last year for turning the Yangtze an alarming shade of red.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 29 Mar 2013 23:08

‘China’s Kate Middleton’ trips over Beijing’s tank tracks
Beijing’s eagerness to spruce up its image is understandable, but implementation might need some work. Other photos of Peng Liyuan are now turning up, showing her in an army uniform serenading the troops after they’d crushed pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Chinese censors are hot on the trail of the embarrassing images, but it’s too late: they’re out there in cyberspace now, reminding everyone that Beijing’s tolerance only runs so deep before the tanks are called out.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 30 Mar 2013 19:30

China trade a risky business for Australians
The jailing of another Australian in murky circumstances has raised new questions about the risks of doing business in China, just as Prime Minister Julia Gillard prepares to lead a high-powered delegation to a Chinese business forum.

Carl Mather was quietly convicted of assault in January after attempting to resist four people who barged into his Chinese apartment, while he carried his three-year-old daughter in his arms.
He was convicted for assault after being found guilty of inflicting a knife injury on one of the intruders and injuring the finger of another when it was jammed in the door.

Evidence in Mr Mather's favour never made it to court, Ms Xie said, while evidence against him was accepted but not available for scrutiny. She said her husband's case was analogous to those of Mr Hu, Ms Chou, Mr Ng and Dr Zu except that her husband is not ethnically Chinese.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 30 Mar 2013 19:34

Landslide buries 83 in Tibet gold mine area
BEIJING: No signs of life have been detected at a gold mining site in a mountainous area of Tibet more than 24 hours after a massive landslide buried 83 workers, Chinese state media said on Saturday.

The state-run China Central Television said more than 2,000 rescuers have been dispatched to Lhasa's Maizhokunggar county to search for the buried.

About 2 million cubic meters (2.6 million cubic yards) of mud, rock and debris swept through the area as the workers were resting and covered an area measuring around 4 square kilometers (1.5 square miles), CCTV said.
The disaster is likely to inflame critics of Chinese rule in Tibet who say Beijing's interests are driven by the region's mineral wealth and strategic position and come at the expense of the region's delicate ecosystem and Tibetans' Buddhist culture and traditional way of life.

The reports said at least two of the buried workers were Tibetan while most of the workers were believed to be ethnic Han Chinese, a reflection of how such large projects often create an influx of the majority ethnic group into the region.
The Chinese government has been encouraging development of mining and other industries in long-isolated Tibet as a way to promote its economic growth and raise living standards. The region has abundant deposits of copper, chromium, bauxite and other precious minerals and metals and is one of fast-growing China's last frontiers.

Tibet remains among China's poorest regions despite producing a large share of its minerals. A key source of anti-Chinese anger is complaints by local residents that they get little of the wealth extracted by government companies, most of which flows to distant Beijing.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby pankajs » 31 Mar 2013 12:19

Gas blast at mine in Baishan, Jilin, kills 28

A gas blast in a state-owned coal mine killed 28 and left 13 injured in the latest incident to damage the industry's notoriously poor safety record.

The accident occurred on Friday at the Babao Mine in Baishan city, Jilin province, said Xinhua, citing a spokesman with the provincial work safety and supervision bureau.

The injuries of the 13 were not life-threatening.

Rescue work has finished and the cause of the explosion is being investigated, the spokesman added.

The mine is controlled by the Tonghua Mining (Group), the Xinhua report said.

China is the world's biggest consumer of coal, relying on the fossil fuel for 70 per cent of its growing energy needs.

But its mines are among the deadliest in the world because of lax regulation, corruption and inefficiency.

Accidents are common because safety is often neglected by bosses seeking quick profits. An accident at a mine in Guizhou province killed 21 miners earlier this month.

Xinhua reported that 58 workers managed to get to the surface safely after the explosion at the Machang mine.

An explosion at the Shangchang Coal Mine in Yunnan province left 17 dead last December.

A month earlier, 23 were killed in a gas explosion at a mine in Guizhou province.

And last August, seven died in a coal mine accident in Jilin city.

Efforts to improve safety in China's coal mines have seen the numbers of accidents decrease in recent years.

Official figures show 1,384 died in coal mine accidents on the mainland last year, sharply down from 1,973 in 2011.

But labour rights groups say the actual death toll is likely to be much higher.

This is partly due to the fact that some accidents are not reported as mine bosses seek to limit their economic losses and avoid punishment.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby jamwal » 04 Apr 2013 10:49

China stealing fish from overseas at 12 times the claimed figure
China is under-reporting its overseas fishing catch by more than an order of magnitude, according to a study1 published on 23 March. The problem is particularly acute in the rich fisheries of West Africa, where a lack of transparency in reporting is threatening efforts to evaluate the ecological health of the waters.

Fisheries experts have long suspected that the catches reported by China to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome are too low. From 2000 to 2011, the country reported an average overseas catch of 368,000 tonnes a year. Yet China claims to have the world’s biggest distant-water fishing fleet, implying a much larger haul, says the study, which was funded by the European Union (EU). Pauly and his colleagues estimate that the average catch for 2000–11 was in fact 4.6 million tonnes a year, more than 12 times the reported figure (see ‘A colossal catch’). Of that total, 2.9 million tonnes a year came from West Africa, one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds.


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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby Omar » 05 Apr 2013 18:51

Look how China handled this compared to the way India has handled say Dawood Ibrahim in Mumbai train bombings.

The capture of Naw Kham sends a message that no group or state is going to be allowed to mess around with China on the Mekong River

Some gems from the article:

China’s search for Mr. Naw Kham, overseen by its powerful Ministry of Public Security, was a hard-nosed display of the government’s political and economic clout across Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, the three countries of Southeast Asia that form the Golden Triangle. The capture shows how China’s law enforcement tentacles reach far beyond its borders into a region now drawn by investment and trade into China’s orbit, and where the United States’ influence is being challenged.

It took six months for China to catch Mr. Naw Kham, a citizen of Myanmar in his 40s, a man of many aliases who was at the center of the booming synthetic drug business in the Golden Triangle, once known for its opium.

What came next was quick: the authorities flew the drug lord from Laos to China, tried him in a provincial court and executed him last month in a highly publicized live television broadcast that captured the proceedings until just moments before he received a lethal injection.


“The capture of Naw Kham sends a message that no group or state is going to be allowed to mess around with China on the Mekong River,” Mr. Chambers said. “Everyone now knows the top dog on the Mekong is China.”

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby Neela » 08 Apr 2013 00:52

jamwal wrote:China stealing fish from overseas at 12 times the claimed figure
China is under-reporting its overseas fishing catch by more than an order of magnitude, according to a study1 published on 23 March. The problem is particularly acute in the rich fisheries of West Africa, where a lack of transparency in reporting is threatening efforts to evaluate the ecological health of the waters.

Fisheries experts have long suspected that the catches reported by China to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome are too low. From 2000 to 2011, the country reported an average overseas catch of 368,000 tonnes a year. Yet China claims to have the world’s biggest distant-water fishing fleet, implying a much larger haul, says the study, which was funded by the European Union (EU). Pauly and his colleagues estimate that the average catch for 2000–11 was in fact 4.6 million tonnes a year, more than 12 times the reported figure (see ‘A colossal catch’). Of that total, 2.9 million tonnes a year came from West Africa, one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds.





The Chinese are doing exactly what the EU is doing.
And under-reporting is a serious issue in the entire industry. Especially those involved in Tuna. What incentive do they have to be honest? In Japan, a single Blue-fin would fetch upwards of $4000.
And the EU has always turned a blind eye to violations much closer to home.

Both are bunch of slashAndGrab-ers!

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby kish » 10 Apr 2013 10:43

Chinese mother dies after government-forced sterilization

A Chinese mother of two died following a sterilization procedure that government family planners forced her to undergo, over the objections of her doctor.

Shen Hongxia, 42, leaves behind a husband and two children, Life News reported.

Her doctor had warned Family Planning Officers against the procedure, saying she was not healthy enough and it could place her at risk. But planners said they wanted to avoid an “illegal pregnancy,” Life News said.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby Gerard » 11 Apr 2013 06:20

China’s baby formula fears spark global restrictions
China's so-called "4-2-1 families", made up of four grandparents and two parents doting on a single child, pool their money and scour the globe for safe sources of food.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby kish » 12 Apr 2013 00:05

Choking on China

Image

China is the world’s worst polluter -- home to 16 of the 20 dirtiest cities and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Recent headlines have been shocking: 16,000 decaying pig carcasses in Shanghai’s Whampoa River, dire air quality reports in Beijing, and hundreds of thousands of people dying prematurely because of environmental degradation. Most recently, the country has been shaken by a mysterious virus, H7N9, which has already killed six people and has spurred health authorities to order the slaughter of thousands of pigeons, chickens, and ducks thought to carry it. In the United States, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention has begun work on an H7N9 vaccine


According to the World Bank, only one percent of China’s 560 million urban residents breathe air considered safe by EU standards. Beijing’s levels of PM2.5s -- particles that are smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter and can penetrate the gas exchange regions of the lungs -- are the worst in the world. Beijing’s 2012 March average reading was 469 micrograms of such particles per cubic meter, which compares abysmally with Los Angeles’ highest 2012 reading of 43 micrograms per cubic meter.


Acid rain, caused by these emissions, has damaged a third of China’s limited cropland, in addition to forests and watersheds on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan. This pollution reaches the United States as well, sometimes at levels prohibited by the U.S. Clean Water Act

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby ramana » 16 Apr 2013 03:25

Just as Pakis can justify any sick act under the rubric of Islam, the Chinese can eat any animal under the rubric of traditional medicine!!!!

Chinese ship detained with endagered species meat in the freezer
And along the way it hits a protected coral reef and damages it.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby hnair » 16 Apr 2013 03:46

Disgraceful behavior against a rare species. I remember watching a documentary where they show small sharks being thrown alive, after their fins are "harvested" for han-birathers to indulge in. The painful thrashing of these magnificent creatures are still vivid.

Not just in their goofy "traditional medicine", but their adoption of foreign barbarity against animals for non-food related reasons is kind of odd. Here is a report on the chinese adopting a discredited fashion accessory of the west, mink fur.
Furs fly as Chinese consumers drive boom in U.S. mink farming

Some one should "discover" ancient Mongolian manuscripts saying stew made of paki mullah's freshly harvested sacs are aphrodisiacs and that is how genghis was so successful. Will solve a lot of problems for all creatures innocent in this world :evil:

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby krishnan » 17 Apr 2013 13:59

They tried to bribe their way out and are being slapped with atempt to bribery charges

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby chaanakya » 20 Apr 2013 11:10

Hundreds feared dead, injured as strong earthquake hits China

BEIJING: Hundreds of people were killed or injured when a strong earthquake struck China's southwestern Sichuan province on Saturday, local officials said, five years after a massive quake devastated the region.

The shallow earthquake struck close to the city of Ya'an on the edge of the Tibetan Plateau just after 8:00 am (0000 GMT), setting off landslides, destroying buildings and triggering a major rescue operation.

Four hours after the quake struck, 72 people had been confirmed dead and 600 injured, CCTV News reported.

The quake sent panicked residents in cities hundreds of kilometres away fleeing into the streets, some of them still in their slippers and pyjamas.


Local seismologists registered the quake at magnitude 7.0 while the US Geological Survey gave it as 6.6 at a depth of 12 kilometres (seven miles). It was followed by several aftershocks.



The tremors were felt as far as the megacity of Chongqing, home to around 30 million people, several hundred kilometres to the east, with Xinhua showing images of residents outside their apartment buildings after feeling the shaking.

Xinhua news agency said 2,000 troops were being dispatched to the area, with two helicopters from the Chengdu Military Area Command sent to assess developments on the ground.

The military set up a quake relief and rescue headquarters and medical relief team for the quake-hit region.

Xinhua quoted a resident in the provincial capital Chengdu, who was on the 13th floor when the quake hit, as saying he felt the shaking for about 20 seconds and saw tiles fall off nearby buildings.

City residents ran onto the street to get away from high rises, making phone calls and crying, a Sichuan government website reported.

A few had even packed bags in case they needed to take shelter elsewhere.

In a photo published online by Xinhua, staff at a restaurant in Shifang city near the provincial capital Chengdu showed cracks that appeared in the wall after the quake struck.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby kish » 20 Apr 2013 11:32

Last few days are horrific, one disaster after another.

1) Boston Bombing
2) Bangalore Bombing
3) Iran Earth quake
4) Texas factory blast
5) China Earth quake

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby member_23692 » 20 Apr 2013 19:24

Chinese troops camping in "Indian territory:" police
By Fayaz and Bukhari | Reuters – 1 hr 54 mins ago


SRINAGAR, India (Reuters) - Several dozen Chinese soldiers have set up a remote camp some 10 km (6 miles) inside territory claimed by India in the high altitude Himalayan desert of Ladakh, Indian police sources said, in a possible return to border tension between the Asian giants.
An Indian foreign ministry spokesman said the two countries were in touch with each other to resolve the row. The ill-defined border has fuelled 50 years of mistrust despite blossoming economic ties.
The Indian army set up its own temporary camp just 500 meters (1600 feet) from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers after the incident on April 15, a senior police official stationed close to the border told Reuters.
"The PLA pitched tents inside Indian territory and established temporary posts there", the official said, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter. He said two helicopters gave support to the Chinese as they set up the camp on the Indian side of the disputed border.
"On April 17, 5th Battalion of Ladakh Scouts was sent to the sector to take on the PLA challenge and they are also camping there now," the official said.
Another police officer in Srinagar, the capital of India's Jammu and Kashmir state, confirmed his colleague's version of the incident.
Responding to the reports of a Chinese incursion in Ladakh, the Indian foreign ministry acknowledged both sides were in touch through diplomatic channels established to diffuse border flare-ups.
"We are confident that the current incident will also be peacefully resolved on this basis," spokesman Syed Akbaruddin said. He didn't give details.
India lost a short but bloody war with China in 1962, fought in Ladakh and the eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. Today India controls Arunachal Pradesh, while China administers a large area adjacent to Ladakh called Aksai Chin. Neither side is comfortable with the arrangement.
Small incursions are common across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border that runs some 4,000 km (2,500 miles) across the Himalayas, but it is rare for either country to set up camp so deep within disputed territory.
The two countries have increased their military presence on each side of the border in recent years as their fast-growing economies permit more spending on defense of remote regions. They hold frequent meetings to diffuse tensions, but high-level talks to resolve the dispute have not produced results.
LANDING STRIP
The latest incident took place at Daulat Beg, where India established a landing strip during the 1962 war. At 5,100 meters (16,700 feet), the strip is one of the world's highest. It was reopened in 2008.
When asked, Rajesh Kalia, the spokesman for the Indian army's Northern Command, did not confirm or deny the incident.
"Due to the difference in perception of the LAC a few face offs take place in the eastern Ladakh sector. These are resolved amicably through existing mechanisms," he said.
China's foreign and defense ministries did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Another senior Indian army officer, who asked not to be identified, confirmed there had been a standoff with the Chinese army in the Daulat Beg sector of Ladakh, but said that it had been resolved.
However, the police official stationed in the area said the two sides were still manning the temporary posts, despite a meeting this week between local Chinese and Indian commanders to seek a solution.
"The Indian army asked for flag meeting with the PLA to sort out the intrusion, and on April 18, it was held in Chushul," the police official said. The official said he was not present at the meeting but came to know about it from the army.
"The Indian army commander raised the issue of the intrusion with their Chinese counterpart. The Chinese Army commander reportedly told his Indian counterpart that it is their own territory where they are camping. The meeting ended in deadlock," the official said.
Kashmir police sent a detailed report on the situation to the Home Ministry in Delhi on Friday, the official in Srinagar told Reuters.
(Writing by Frank Jack Daniel. Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing)


http://news.yahoo.com/chinese-troops-ca ... 50790.html

The Chinese attack again !

And our ruling establishment sweeps it under the rug.......yet again !

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby kish » 21 Apr 2013 11:23

China mine blast kills 18

At least 18 people were killed and 12 others injured in a coal mine gas blast in northeast China's Jilin Province, officials said Sunday.

The blast occurred around 1:26 pm (local time) Saturday at Qingxing coal mine in Helong City. A total of 73 people were working underground when the blast occurred, and 55 of them were rescued, local authorities said.

Rescue work came to an end this morning, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported.
An investigation into the cause of the blast is under way.

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby member_23692 » 23 Apr 2013 06:43

.......And now, after the American surrender to Pak in Afghanistan, here is the American surrender to the Chinese....

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/top-us-ge ... 00116.html

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby wig » 24 Apr 2013 12:03

meanwhile, clashes in China's Xinjiang take place

Clashes in China's restive Xinjiang region have left 21 people dead, including 15 police and community workers, the local government says.

The incident occurred on Tuesday afternoon in Bachu county, Kashgar, a statement on the official Xinjiang government website said.

It began when officials searched homes for weapons, it said. Six "gang members" were among the dead, it said.

A Xinhua report said "violent attacks" had caused deaths, but did not expand.

There have been sporadic clashes in Xinjiang in recent years amid rumbling ethnic tensions between the Muslim Uighur and Han Chinese communities

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22276042

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby kish » 24 Apr 2013 18:05

Since border incursion, There has been 3 major incidents.

1) A major earthquake 100s dead and more than 1000 injured
2) A mining accident (18 dead)
3) Uygur uprising (a.k.a terrorist attack) 25 dead

Still they hold on to the usurped land. "Bravo china" or should i say "Gayle china". ;-))

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Re: People's Republic of China, Dec. 27 2011

Postby prashanth » 25 Apr 2013 17:15

US asks China to safeguard rights of Uighurs in Xinjiang :Times of India

"We are deeply concerned by the reports of violent confrontation in Xinjiang that left 21 people dead. We will continue to monitor the situation carefully," US state department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell told reporters.


When asked about the US assessment of the situation with the Uighurs in China, Ventrell said the state department is "deeply concerned" by ongoing reports of discrimination against and restrictions on Uighurs and other Muslims in China.
"We urge the Chinese government to cease policies that seek to restrict the practice of religious beliefs across China. But we've been particularly concerned about the Uighurs and have stated so publicly in the past," he said.


China frequently voices anger at US criticism of its human rights record, although the world's two largest economies cooperate frequently in other areas, including trade and on the showdown with Beijing's ally North Korea.


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