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India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby rohitvats » 20 May 2013 10:30

RamaY wrote:^ could you please throw more light on that 4th division story?

My search shows that the Henderson-Brooks report, submitted in mid-1963, is yet to be made public and many hundreds of soldiers died of cold with no bullet wounds and no bullets in pouch.

What was the reason for their punishment post war?

Thanks


You can read about the Division on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_Infantry_Division_(India)

There is a more technical history here: http://orbat.com/site/cimh/divisions/4th%20Infantry%20Division.htm

Excerpt from Wikipedia:

During World War II the Division captured 150,000 prisoners and suffered 25,000 casualties, more than the strength of a whole division. It won over 1,000 Honours and Awards which included four Victoria Crosses and three George Crosses.

Field Marshal Lord Wavell wrote:

"The fame of this Division will surely go down as one of the greatest fighting formations in military history, to be spoken of with such as The Tenth Legion, The Light Division of the Peninsular War and Napoleon's Old Guard"
Even beyond its fighting reputation, it will be remembered for the spirit of mutual trust and fellowship maintained between all ranks coming from so many different races and creeds.


From the Orbat.Com link above:

The division loses its reputation as the Army's best. While it performs well in 1965 and 1971 and removes the tarnish of 1962, it is never to achieve its former reputation from World War II.


Punishment was because the formation did not behave in a manner expected of the formation; there was a rout and senior infantry regiments broke up and fled from battle. An army fighting formation is more than a motley group of various units and sub-units thrown together. The whole is more than the sum of parts. It takes eons to build a cohesive fighting formation and this cohesiveness was lost in 1962. Also, men need to have faith and belief in their formations...be it paltans or divisions. A blot once received is difficult to wash away in Services. During Kargil, Infantry battalions which were held responsible for lapses were not allowed to take part in fighting...they were tasked to support other troops. There cannot be a bigger insult and dishonor for a paltan than being denied permission to take part in combat. These troops were looked down by other formations who took part in the fighting.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby RamaY » 20 May 2013 19:30

Thank you Rohitvats ji. I will read up.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Vayutuvan » 20 May 2013 22:36

ramana wrote:
ramana wrote:Official History of the 1962 war

Read Chapter 10 Review and Reflections

And send copy to the GOI.

matrimc, For you.
ramana

Thanks Ramana garu.

Hope the red-lighted above is not directed at me and you are quoting your own previous post.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby ramana » 20 May 2013 23:28

Thats the problem with math majors. They take everything literally.
Its in the original post.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby RamaY » 20 May 2013 23:48

:D

62nd page should have more gyan than 1st page :P

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Prem Kumar » 21 May 2013 00:59

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang addresses our nation directly through their official, Mount Road based media outlet:

A handshake across the Himalayas

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Vayutuvan » 21 May 2013 02:49

Talking about "literal" :twisted:

"Chapter 10 Review and Reflections" starts on 412th page not 62nd - 4 x more gyan? Bharatiya is still in 40s, Secularism is just barely on 10th, and this is on 16th.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Lalmohan » 22 May 2013 12:31

rohit - as an aside - in one of the reviews of the korean war - there was a comment by an american grandee (i cant remember who) - also talking about the rout of american soldiers in front of chinese attack - something along the lines of 'never seen GI's throw down their weapons and flee in terror...' ityadi

i think that the PLA was very good at psywar and managed to get inside the heads of their opponents, perhaps the human wave tactics also demoralised foes...

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby rohitvats » 22 May 2013 14:30

Lalmohan wrote:rohit - as an aside - in one of the reviews of the korean war - there was a comment by an american grandee (i cant remember who) - also talking about the rout of american soldiers in front of chinese attack - something along the lines of 'never seen GI's throw down their weapons and flee in terror...' ityadi

i think that the PLA was very good at psywar and managed to get inside the heads of their opponents, perhaps the human wave tactics also demoralised foes...


Chief - IMO, the most debilitating tactic was that of Chinese soldiers sneaking between and through Indian positions and then attacking each position in strength. The fact that PLA soldiers could attack at your flanks and from rear is something which can have serious psychological impact on the defender.

In 1962, Chinese had used the knowledge of Tibetans and local population about various trails in the mountains and used these trails to outflank Indian positions, emerge in their rear and simultaneously cut them off from reinforcement and logistical supply line. The fact that Indian positions were sited to serve political and not military objectives simply accentuated this problem by huge degree.

Therefore, when the Chinese overwhelmed Indian positions, there was no organized withdrawal and it became a case of each man to his own. Indian troops were scattered and men in penny packets started to filter back. The lack of communication in the hills added further to the situation and as a result, there was utter confusion. Command and Control was lost and senior commanders had no idea about situation as obtained with lower formations. This is what led to lack of cohesiveness and rout in the end. This is what happened in NEFA.

Another famous example where Indian infantry regiments lost cohesiveness initially was in battle of Assal Uttar in 1965...this happened when advancing 4 Division chanced upon PA 1st Armored Division at Kasur and was pushed back. The Indian 4 Division GoC actually went around in his open jeep with the 2 stars clearly showing in front (were the jeep number is) to give confidence to the troops and also threatened to shoot anyone who retreated.

As for human wave tactics, more than this aspect, it was the overwhelming firepower which the PLA brought to bear on Indians which was the main game changer. As I said earlier, Indian positions were in penny packets and not cited in depth with mutual fire-support. This way, PLA could concentrate on each pocket, manage high attacked to defender ratio and queer the pitch further by using heavy firepower. Indians did break human waves in most cases...it is sustained artillery which they were not used to. And because of penny packet deployment, they could not sustain these wave attacks beyond a point. Human wave tactics against a well dug in enemy with fire-support would be suicide...PA artillery in 1965 was single handily responsible for breaking up many an Indian assaults by shelling the forming up locations of our infantry.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Philip » 22 May 2013 15:40

Rohit,thanks for the details.Do yuo have an idea of the aartillery used by both sides in '62 ,and what available info do we have about PLA artillery and missile forces today ranged against us? It would be interesting to have a comparison of the firepower available today to both sides.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby rohitvats » 22 May 2013 17:23

Since a question was raised on PLA tactics in 1962, allow me to post some excerpts from an analysis posted by Ravi Rikhye in history section of his website.

http://www.indianmilitaryhistory.org/india/bomdila1962.html

India 1962: 4th Infantry Division at the Battle of Bomdila


The Bomdila Position

The key to understanding the Battle of Bomdila is that 4th Division was strung out along 100 km of mountain terrain, with its logistics base at Misamari, 200 kilometers away, a journey so arduous it took three days each way by truck. From north to south, first came the Se La, then Dirang Dzong, and then Bomdila. The first two positions appeared to be strong, but could be outflanked by enemy traveling on little-used and long-forgotten tracks. Indian intelligence believed the tracks were impassable; this turned out not to be the case. 4th Division’s natural defense line lay on Bomdila; with the 15 battalions eventually assigned, an impassable defense could have been constructed. Instead, for political reason, it was decided to hold north of Bomdila. Indian troops were in the process of arriving on unfamiliar ground, ill equipped for the altitude and the cold.

They seem to have no aerial reconnaissance, the radio network was sparse and failure-prone, equipment and stocks were very low, and the PLA was constantly inside 4th Division’s decision-making cycle. The PLA kept outflanking Indian defenses, and since 4th Division’s fighting patrols and forward companies had no good information on where the Chinese were, they were defeated in detail. To complicate the issue, GOC 4th Division kept ordering rifle companies out of Bomdila. The actual position could have been held with four or five battalions, it was reduced to six rifle companies. Moreover, division, corps, and army kept ordering the brigade commanders to retreat, even when the latter were confident or determined to hang on.

Later on, the Indians were to say they were outnumbered. Given that an Indian infantry battalion was larger than a Chinese one, and given that the Indians were defending, this is irrelevant. India was feeding in battalions piecemeal, and failing to fight a mobile defense – the only thing that would have stopped the PLA’s mobile offense. The Indians should have gradually retreated to Bomdila, held there, and then counterattacked. They might well have thrown the Chinese back to their start line, because the PLA had outrun its supply lines and could not sustain their presence forward. If, however, the Indian higher commanders had the sense for such a strategy, they would have had the sense to avoid getting trapped at the Namkachu – and also, by the same token, have in the first place avoided getting into a fight with the Chinese when Eastern Command was not ready. A shortage of troops was not the issue.

Western Command proved this in Ladakh. It too had suffered from the Government’s refusal to build up Ladakh’s defenses, and from the policy of dispersing troops in penny-packets to hold ground for political purposes. Indeed, in the first Chinese attack dozens of these posts were wiped out even as the Command lacked resources to mount a proper defense or counterattack. Once the war began, however, it was able to calmly and systematically built up its forces in Ladakh. As China’s second attack opened, Western Command gave up empty ground to absorb the attack. The Chinese say they stopped because they reached their claim line; they could not, in fact, have progressed further because four brigades were waiting for them. The difference between Western and Eastern Commands appears simply to have been this: the generals were quietly competent, and with the political leadership’s attention fixed firmly on the east, were able to fight their war they wanted to, with minimum interference from Army HQ, the Defense Minister, and the Prime Minister.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby manjgu » 22 May 2013 18:51

the indian artillery comprised of 2 para guns with i think 400 rounds.... 4 guns were paradropped and 2 were lost .

JP Dalvis books gives reasonable details of opposing artillery...

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Sachin » 23 May 2013 10:23

chaanakya wrote:You forgot one thing. Tainted Saint from Gods own country just like V.K.Krishna Menon in 1962.

Dont know if any one else posted a link to this blog. Pretty long, but it has a different take on VK Krishna Menon and is critical of many of the other politicians and Military Officers (including K.S Thimmaiah and Cariappah). A Zionist angle is also thrown in.
WHY INDIA LOST THE SINO INDIAN WAR OF 1962- CAPT AJIT VADAKAYIL

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby SSridhar » 25 May 2013 18:49

Daulat Beg Oldie standoff: An assessment - V.Mahalingam, IDSA
Legally speaking China has no business to be in areas beyond its borders. Its border ends at Xinjiang, which was incorporated into the Chinese empire when it was conquered by the Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the 13th century. Known to the Chinese as Xiyu (“Western Regions”) for centuries, the area became Xinjiang (“New Borders”) upon its annexation under the Qing (Manchu) dynasty in the 18th century.1 The then borders did not include areas of present Chinese claims.

The facts that the China failed to sign the McCartney-Macdonald line proposed by the British in 1899 or even contest the proposed alignment amounts to accepting the alignment. By and large the Chinese have been claiming areas up to this line which also corresponds to the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Even assuming that there are some disputes in the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which came into being after the 1962 war, the 19 km thick border line is inexplicable and sounds mischievous. China and India have signed two critical agreements on "Maintaining of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas" in 1993 and "Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas" in 1996. These would not have been possible if there were such major perceptional differences.

In this context, Pakistan’s role in enticing China to extend its claim line South of Xinjiang cannot be ignored. It ceded a large chunk of real estate in the Shaksgam Valley, a part of J&K to China illegally. China on its part, has replicated the ‘Delhi illegal colony model’ to regularize her claim by slowly encroaching into the entire area of its interest without firing a bullet and developing infrastructure right from Baltistan in Pakistan in the West to Aksai Chin in the East.

The encroachment in the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) sector was to test India’s response. Having intruded 19 km inside Indian Territory, the Chinese questioned the validity of the LAC and went on to state, "The Chinese side has confined activities to within the Chinese border and never trespassed across the line".2 This is nothing but deliberate assertion of its right over Indian territory.

Coming at a politically sensitive moment, India desperately wanted to end the standoff, restore status quo and prevent any escalation. India’s meekness – studied response for some – provides the Chinese the freedom to consolidate its position in the DBO area. The situation can be compared to the Chinese construction of the road connecting Tibet to Sinkiang across the Aksai Chin in early 1950s. India was ignorant about the development for several years. Having managed to construct the road, the Chinese claimed ownership of the area.

A pattern can be deciphered: Gradually trespass into an area of interest over a period of time and set a routine that evades notice and serious attention thus avoiding any significant protest or challenge. Down play protests or apprehensions if any. Exploit unchallenged border encroachments as an opportunity to consolidate position and stake a claim to the area at an appropriate moment through precipitous military coercion and intimidation. On close evaluation this pattern can be discerned in the construction of dams across Brahmaputra.

Territorial interest and positioning

Indications are that China and Pakistan have reached an agreement to lease the Gilgit-Baltistan area to China for 50 years. China, it appears has already positioned 7000 to 110005 PLA soldiers in the Baltistan area who are working to construct the railway line from Gwadar to Xinjiang which runs parallel to the Karakoram Highway. The highway it is believed is being frantically upgraded. Reports of construction of 22 tunnels6 along the route to establish a gas pipeline from Iran to China are abound. These tunnels can act as a storehouse for missiles. Information relating to construction of huge housing complex in the area and a cemetery at Danyor 10 km across Gilgit river has also surfaced indicating that the Chinese are planning to stay in the area permanently – a clear indication that de facto control of the area has surreptitiously been ceded to China by Pakistan.

With its physical presence in all the four cardinal directions and India being in the South, China’s interest clearly is in closing the gaps in the areas bounded by Gilgit – Baltistan in the west, Xinjiang in the North, Aksai Chin in the East and India to its South. That will facilitate free movement within the area. Securing the Karakoram heights along with this action will thwart any threat from India. There lies the Chinese interest in the Saltoro ridge in Siachen.

Strategic interest

What are the strategic interests of China in securing the areas under discussion?
Besides providing freedom of movement, logistics and security, the area also provides the much needed buffer between India and the Chinese mainland. The Karakoram Highway which passes through this area connects China and Pakistan. The highway that connects Pakistan to Tibet and Xinjiang is also significant in that it opens up the strategic possibility of an alternative shorter route for uninterrupted energy supplies from the Gulf through Gwadar Port avoiding Afghanistan and the Chinese Muslim majority Uyghur dominated Kashgar area. Importantly, it also guarantees access to Afghanistan and Central Asia where China has invested heavily in energy and copper. In nutshell, with Gwadar port under their control, this area has become the key to China’s access to the Arabian sea through Karakoram Highway and their investment opportunities in Afghanistan.

The Indian confusion

The missing strategic culture

The Indian leadership has for long been lulled into complacency over deterrence capability of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence was viewed as the sole savior of the country against external aggression. No one would ever dare a nuclear power was the perception. Two nuclear power nations getting engaged in a military conflict too was inconceivable. Resultantly conventional military capability was overlooked and currently a state of helplessness exists which has taken the country back to 1962. While China continuously upgraded its military and built military infrastructure in Tibet and elsewhere, India continued to put all its eggs in the nuclear deterrence basket.

Border management

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), a Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) mans the LAC. The ITBP does not come under the Indian Army or its operational control. When an incident of this nature occurs, whom does the ITBP report to? What is the Army supposed to do? Who will issue the orders, the MHA or the MOD? Who will coordinate the situation on the ground? Dual control of critical forces deployed right at the border is a great folly. The ambiguity and the consequences of such vague command and control set up are clearly visible. These are areas where turf wars are unacceptable.

Lack of road communication

The Sub Sector North (SSN) is connected to the rest of Ladakh by two axes. The one along Nubra valley to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) traverses through Saser La Pass at a height of approximately 5200 meters. It is a foot track and would require 3 to 4 days to cover. The second route runs along the Shyok River to Depsang Plains passing through Depsang La Pass at a height of about 5450 meters. It would take anything from 15 to 20 days to negotiate the distance.

Given the strategic criticality, very little has been done to improve the communication in these areas in the last 50 years. The very fact that soldiers were deployed at such locations without proper road communication amounts to abandoning them with scant regard for their safety and well-being. How are these troops expected to survive in the event of an enemy attack? How quickly will they be reinforced or withdrawn? Incidentally, these are not positions with any worthwhile tactical significance to fight a defensive battle from. Ladakh is too far and events in these areas do not directly affect the rest of the country or the vote bank. Loss of territory, deplorable infrastructure or the pitiable quality of life which the people of this area are forced to suffer are invisible to public eye and thus get ignored. The situation along the LAC in other sectors is equally bad.

Operational fitness of the Army

Two mountain divisions were raised for operations in the mountains. The government, however, decided that there was no need for a Corps HQ. The state of weapons and equipment in these two newly raised mountain divisions and their state of operational preparedness is not up to mark.

The terrain configuration in our northern borders adjoining China lacks the space for manoeuver and the lateral communication needed for diversion or redeployment of troops. Considering the fact that penetration by a determined enemy into any defensive position is a possibility, India needs to keep its options open to limit penetration at certain level and take the battle into vulnerable areas of the offender. This alone will provide deterrence and a bargaining advantage in the event of an intrusion.

A cursory assessment of troop requirement indicate a minimum of two divisions with a Corps HQ as contingency reaction force and an additional two divisions with a Corps HQ to handle the counter offensive if and when required. The formations could be switched to take each other’s role if necessary. These formations need to be equipped appropriately and most urgently without any delay.

Terms for withdrawal

What were the terms of withdrawal?

The Government has not come out with the terms of the agreement which culminated in the Chinese agreeing to withdraw from the area of its occupation. Having said that the Chinese were 19 km inside India’s territory it is not clear as to why India had to withdraw from its own territory. Media reports during the crisis indicate that Chinese had made similar probes in three other areas. Further reports point to India demolishing its bunkers in the Chumer area which would ipso facto incapacitate Indian troops patrolling areas up to our claim line . The country needs to know the terms of agreement and the truth. The Chinese message is clear - notwithstanding India’s nuclear power capability, Beijing will take the offensive to secure its interests, as, when and where it chooses.

Did India succumb to Chinese pressure?

Even if a proper agreement had not been reached in the matter yet, knowing the Chinese, such withdrawals would not have been settled without an undertaking or at least an understanding to accept China’s interests in the area. The question is, having invested huge capital in developing infrastructure in and around the area; the Chinese are unlikely to give it away – they are there to stay.

Turning a blind eye to the Chinese encroachment and activities in the area will allow the Chinese to develop infrastructure in this area and keep the option open to rekindle the issue again at a future date. The Chinese are likely to use their ground position as leverage and a bargaining chip.

What would constitute an equitable ceasefire agreement?

The agreement between India and China in this dispute needs very careful study. It is imperative that both sides have access to areas up to their respective claim lines. India cannot afford to give away areas, which are of strategic importance. India also cannot provide an avenue for future intrusion by China or Pakistan. India needs to retain its freedom for developing infrastructure in its chosen areas. If China could develop infrastructure in disputed territory, it is time India did so too.

Siachen – an inconvenience to the Chinese

The domination and the location of the Saltoro ridge is a threat to the security and Strategic interests of China in this area. Apparently, Pakistan’s efforts to negotiate with India to vacate Siachen in the recent past and their effort to influence the track two dialogues in that direction were at the Chinese call. It may also be of interest to know that during the Siachen talks in India between India and Pakistan on 30 and 31 May 2011, the Pakistani delegation had demanded that the Chinese be invited for the talks as the Shaksgam area is with them . The Chinese interest in this area is clear.

Lessons
Diplomacy and Friendship

Diplomacy especially with China does not work without military power, economic robustness and a strong leadership. The effect of DBO like incidents and the lack of firm response will have very adverse effects on India’s influence on its smaller neighbours.

Considering the Chinese military strength, economic prowess and the investments made by them towards the development of infrastructure in the disputed areas, it would not be very easy to recover territory illegally occupied by them. Soft options are therefore unlikely to work.

As a matter of rule, India has adopted a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. However, if the burden of a country’s human rights violations falls at its own doorstep as had happened in 1971 in erstwhile Pakistan, India may have no option but to provide moral, material and financial support besides highlighting and promoting the cause of the affected in various international bodies and institutions.

India has sheltered over 120,000 Tibetan refugees. These refugees are in India because their political aspirations and demands have remained unanswered even after 60 years. It may be recalled that China invaded the de facto independent Tibet in 1950 resulting in the incorporation of Tibet as a part of Republic of China. Since then, human rights violations have been perpetrated against the Tibetans to suppress their claims for independence. The number of Tibetan Buddhist self-immolation cases in the recent past stands testimony to the fact. It is time China learns to respect the sensibilities of people.

The unrest in the Uyghur dominated Xinjiang Autonomous region and in the Gilgit-Baltistan areas too open up a number of options for India. Chinese calculations of economic prosperity through Gwadar Port in Baluchistan can be nullified by providing moral, material and financial support to Baluchistan independence movement.

China is India’s second-largest trading partner and their combined trade was $50.9 billion in the April-December period, according to Indian government figures, India may have to provide incentives to countries like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, and other western countries to promote their trade interests in India while restricting entry of Chinese goods and services through various measures.

DBO like incidents will prompt the Indian people to demand that India align with countries which are subjected to similar provocation. India may also have to weigh its options of supporting the US and other countries to limit Chinese influence and hegemony in the region. The US Asia pivot too may need a relook.

While accusing the US of trying to forge anti-China alliances, China should take a close look at its own aggressive show of strength which are forcing countries to go in for countervailing alliances. If indeed such alliances are formed, China cannot blame anyone but itself.

Exchange of maps indicating the perception of LAC on both sides should be expedited. India needs to work out its strategy to force Chinese to accept an equitable and a reasonable solution to the border dispute at an early date, failing which India should not hesitate to work on hard options suggested.

White Paper on illegal occupation of Indian Territory

It is time the entire issue of illegal occupation of Indian territory by Pakistan and India is investigated by a Committee consisting of a panel of judges, military professionals and a White Paper prepared for placing the facts before the Parliament.

Border Management

Effective border management entails unified command with integrated surveillance, intelligence, and communication network. Rules of engagement should be spelt out while the border management agency needs to lay down its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for dealing with border violations and skirmishes.

Operational preparedness

There is an urgent need to go into the state of operational readiness of the Defence Services. The Government needs to spell out its National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy to enable the services to lay down their respective strategies. The aspect of collusion between China and Pakistan and the assessment of force structure requirements to face up to such challenges will emerge out the exercise.

Restructuring MOD

Ministry of Defence (MOD) in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is meant to handle situations of the kind as witnessed in DBO recently. In contrast, based on some media reports, the China Study Group (CSG) consisting of the NSA, and bureaucrats from other ministries including heads of Central Security Agencies took control of the situation. 30-odd Chinese soldiers are too insignificant a number to derail the normal processes of Government functioning. The need for restructuring the Integrated Headquarters of the MOD with a professional bureaucracy consisting of experts from strategic, military and diplomatic community rather than the present generalist should be given traction.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby member_23692 » 26 May 2013 17:23

Dont mean to whine, but I am surprised nobody on this forum has posted this already.

On second thoughts, I am not surprised, because the Indian media has buried this story. Only one newspaper published this (Hindustan Times) and even it hid it somewhere away from the Top Stories section.

Face-offs continue; China builds 5km road inside LAC
PTI Leh, May 26, 2013
First Published: 15:41 IST(26/5/2013) | Last Updated: 15:55 IST(26/5/2013)



http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/JAndK/Face-offs-continue-China-builds-5km-road-inside-LAC/Article1-1066213.aspx

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby eklavya » 26 May 2013 17:44

India needs to build-up infrastructure on the China border on a war footing. The leaders in Delhi are asleep and snoring.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby RKumar » 27 May 2013 00:15

I guess, sh*t is about to hit the fan. Congress is sleeping since long time. In stead of the trying to consolidate our positions on border, regrouping and reforming the army, ITBP, BSF structure, GoI is pretending and projecting everything is normal on the boarder. I guess statement from George Fernandes was based on the facts, that China is number one threat.

With current gov in charge God save India.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby shyamd » 27 May 2013 18:31

4 years ago India took the decision to develop offensive options as a deterrence against India. So it is part of this that India approved raising the MSC, roads, opening more naval bases in IOR such as INS Baaz etc. They are also raising more to be permanently based on the border like Ladakh scouts, Sikkim scouts.

Until all our program's are completed they expect the PRC to continue nibbling on the borders.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby member_23692 » 27 May 2013 19:21

Another gem, this time from the "hawkish" AK Antony, as reported by Times of India today.

Note how Antony says, "the army is 'handling it'", in response to the question of what India is doing about the Chinese having built a road 5 Kms inside Indian territory. He did not say that the Army has taken retaliatory action there or elsewhere along the border or even that this was being taken up diplomatically at the highest level. He just said that the "army is handling it"? What exactly is meant by "Army handling it" ? And note the word, "local", which keeps being used by this government. It is a recurrent theme for the ruling dispensation- "local problem"; "local areas". Can anyone explain, when exactly is an incursion NOT in "local areas" ?


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-handling-Chinese-incursion-issue-in-Ladakh-defence-minister-Antony/articleshow/20294279.cms
THANJAVUR: Army was "handling" the situation arising out of the latest incursion in Ladakh, defence minister A K Antony said on Monday after Chinese troops prevented Indians from patrolling up to LAC in Finger-VIII area where they have built a road inside Indian territory.

"Army is updated about latest position there. Whenever these kind of incidents happen in the local areas, they are handling it," he told reporters here asserted that India can protect its national interests.

The defence minister was asked about the recent Chinese incursion in Ladakh where its troops have built a road five km inside the Indian territory.

"Indian can protect its national interests. India is not the India of the past," the minister said.

A recent incident has come to light in Ladakh where Chinese troops prevented their Indian counterparts from patrolling up to the Line of Actual Control.

The alleged incident took place near Finger-VIII area, also known as Siri Jap, on May 17, two days before Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang arrived in New Delhi after it was announced that the stand-off resulting from a 19-kilometre deep Chinese intrusion had ended.

Asked about the readiness of armed forces, the minister said, "We are fully prepared. The nation can be fully assured that our armed forces are fully prepared."

He said countries are "showing keen interest in strengthening defence relationship with us. Every body wants more cooperation of our defence forces, that shows gradual enhancement in our capabilities."

The minister said he would be visiting China soon as was decided during the visit of the then Chinese defence minister Gen Liang Guanglie in September last year.

The minister said that he would visit Australia, Singapore and Thailand in the first week of June.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby member_23629 » 27 May 2013 20:10

shyamd wrote:4 years ago India took the decision to develop offensive options as a deterrence against India. So it is part of this that India approved raising the MSC, roads, opening more naval bases in IOR such as INS Baaz etc. They are also raising more to be permanently based on the border like Ladakh scouts, Sikkim scouts.

Until all our program's are completed they expect the PRC to continue nibbling on the borders.


It is amazing that 50 years have passed since the 1962 war, but our programs on the border are not yet complete and China can still nibble territory because we are taking our sweet time to get ready. Any other country not burdened with Gandhians, jholawalas, bleeding heart liberals and woolly headed philosophers would have taken decisive action, trippled its army budget, and closed the window of opportunity for the Chinese in five years flat.
Last edited by member_23629 on 27 May 2013 20:39, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby manjgu » 27 May 2013 20:17

Well even in 1962 Krishan menon and Nehru were telling India that Namak Chu, Dhola, Chushul etc were 'local' problems and will be 'sorted' out. I dont know of any other country except probably the Pakis where the political class makes such a big chu..ya of their own countrymen. truly staggering.

unless someone comes and enter Antonys own house , the problem will be local.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby manjgu » 27 May 2013 20:17

Well even in 1962 Krishan menon and Nehru were telling India that Namak Chu, Dhola, Chushul etc were 'local' problems and will be 'sorted' out. I dont know of any other country except probably the Pakis where the political class makes such a big chu..ya of their own countrymen. truly staggering.

unless someone comes and enter Antonys own house , the problem will be local.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby devesh » 27 May 2013 20:36

shyamd wrote:4 years ago India took the decision to develop offensive options as a deterrence against India. So it is part of this that India approved raising the MSC, roads, opening more naval bases in IOR such as INS Baaz etc. They are also raising more to be permanently based on the border like Ladakh scouts, Sikkim scouts.

Until all our program's are completed they expect the PRC to continue nibbling on the borders.



so when are the "programs" going to be completed? and when are the completed "programs" supposed to stop the "nibbling"?

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby manjgu » 27 May 2013 20:42

they will probably completed in rahul gandhis great grandchildrens time, when the LAC will be across khardungla in northern sector and near tezpur in eastern sector!!

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby shyamd » 27 May 2013 21:08

varunkumar wrote:It is amazing that 50 years have passed since the 1962 war, but our programs on the border are not yet complete and China can still nibble territory because we are taking our sweet time to get ready. Any other country not burdened with Gandhians, jholawalas, bleeding heart liberals and woolly headed philosophers would have taken decisive action, trippled its army budget, and closed the window of opportunity for the Chinese in five years flat.

easy to say sitting on your desk. The territory on our side is extremely tough, mountainous compared to the flat plains the PRC enjoy. Last year we had land slides and roads, infra damaged... its not as easy for us as you make out.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby shyamd » 27 May 2013 21:09

devesh wrote:so when are the "programs" going to be completed? and when are the completed "programs" supposed to stop the "nibbling"?

Follow news on raising on MSC and defence acquisitions and you'll get your answer.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby member_23629 » 27 May 2013 21:16

easy to say sitting on your desk. The territory on our side is extremely tough, mountainous compared to the flat plains the PRC enjoy. Last year we had land slides and roads, infra damaged... its not as easy for us as you make out.


Oh OK. I didn't realise that Indian politicians have been moving heaven and earth for the last half a century to create world-class military infrastructure on the China border, but cruel nature, a vengeful God and vindictive fate have been conspiring against them and unjustly denying them the fruit of their labours. Life is a bitch, I would say.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby shyamd » 27 May 2013 21:46

Reality is terrain, it's not easy on our side and it's not just that. Earlier theory was that if we left it underdeveloped it would be more difficult for the Chinese to move in forested areas with no roads no tanks etc. I.e they won't go far.

Now thinking is offensive capability should act as deterrence and a pure defensive posture alone is insufficient to deal with PRC.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby rohitvats » 27 May 2013 23:30

Some time back, I had postulated that China gets India to sign all these meaningless agreements to forge a false sense of normalcy. Using this false sense of normalcy, it restricts India from achieving its true potential in military terms and maintains a status quo which is beneficial to China.

I must admit that I had not evaluated the PLA positions and options in depth in past. Analysis of PLA spatial distribution shows that PLA has got away by committing bare minimum number of troops to Indian borders - both in the east and west. But more so in west.

Analysis of PLA forces under Lanzhou Military Region (responsible for Ladakh section of LAC) show that PLA troops are spread far and wide. In fact, it is my opinion that if Indian Army+AF were to mount a surprise and rapid offensive onto PLA positions occupying Ladakh, we could overwhelm them. PLA would take minimum of 4-5 days to bring together a cohesive force against India. And this when India and Indian Armed Forces would be fully ready. And waiting.

On reason for this in my opinion is that PLA was stationed across China with the objective of preventing enemy forces from threatening the Chinese heartland in coastal areas and Beijing. And for assaulting Taiwan. The two potential enemy forces could be USSR and US Army.

However, the fact that China has got away with deploying minimum number of troops shows how confident they are of Indian polity not taking aggressive position and exploring such options.

In the recent Discussion Board I had started, I have written a piece on spatial distribution of PLA under Lanzhou and Chengdu MR. Also, there is a short analysis of connectivity in terms of rail and road connectivity. The section will be expanding further.

http://tandemwarhead.blogspot.in/2013/05/distribution-of-pla-and-connectivity-1.html

PLA forces under Lanzhou and Chengdu MR:

http://tandemwarhead.blogspot.in/2013/05/summary-of-pla-strength-in-lanzhou-and.html

There are some other excellent pieces which explore last mile connectivity situation from Chinese perspective.

Please feel free to participate by using the comments section.
Last edited by rohitvats on 28 May 2013 09:10, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Bade » 28 May 2013 02:52

Without India willing to take action to cut-off the Karakoram pass access via POK for PRC permanently, Aksai Chin will remain in Chinese hands. With POK not in our hands all the incursion on Aksai Chin area will remain just of academic interest though an important one to keep track. If POK is taken back then the Chinese will have less interest to hold Aksai Chin. It has been a fatal error on India's part to let the North-west Kashmir remain under Paki hands.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Philip » 28 May 2013 03:12

Rohit,would you then say that the Chinese aggro in recent times is a huge bluff on their part? When in earlier standoffs,the moment the IA got tough,the Chinese backed off.

Tibet despite the massively improved infrastructure,is a long,long,way from Beijing,and from the reports posted earlier-about PLA troops suffering psychological disorders in trying to suppress the Tibetans,China's hold is not all that secure.Some analysts glibly talk of China being able to quickly reinforce Tibet with 3-5 times the size of our forces ranged against it,but they forget the fact that the logistic trail is a very long one,and any huge reinforcement of the Tibetan garrisons will keep China preoccupied in the west when its main goal is the absorption/reconquest of Taiwan and replacing the US as the key Pacific power in the east.

The IA should plan for a strike force that can strike at various places in Tibet using paras, airlift/helo capability,to cut the Chinese LOCs in Tibet at key places of our choosing and opportunity.The destruction of Chinese airbases is a must and domination of the air essential for support of our army.We must also start training and arming a Tibetan version of the Mukti Bahini.Above all,the strength of the IA should be at least three times the size of the planned new strike corps/army.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby ShauryaT » 28 May 2013 04:49

Bade wrote:Without India willing to take action to cut-off the Karakoram pass access via POK for PRC permanently, Aksai Chin will remain in Chinese hands. With POK not in our hands all the incursion on Aksai Chin area will remain just of academic interest though an important one to keep track. If POK is taken back then the Chinese will have less interest to hold Aksai Chin. It has been a fatal error on India's part to let the North-west Kashmir remain under Paki hands.
I think you are referring to the Kunjerab pass, through which the KKH passes through. The Karakoram Pass is north of DBO, through which we access Xinjiang. Aksai Chin is not geographically linked to PoK. Although Aksai Chin, provides easier road access from Tibet to Xinjiang, other routes do exist for PRC. Both these regions of PRC were incorporated under conditionality of autonomy.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby ShauryaT » 28 May 2013 04:49

Bade wrote:Without India willing to take action to cut-off the Karakoram pass access via POK for PRC permanently, Aksai Chin will remain in Chinese hands. With POK not in our hands all the incursion on Aksai Chin area will remain just of academic interest though an important one to keep track. If POK is taken back then the Chinese will have less interest to hold Aksai Chin. It has been a fatal error on India's part to let the North-west Kashmir remain under Paki hands.
I think you are referring to the Kunjerab pass, through which the KKH passes through. The Karakoram Pass is north of DBO, through which we access Xinjiang. Aksai Chin is not geographically linked to PoK. Although Aksai Chin, provides easier road access from Tibet to Xinjiang, other routes do exist for PRC. Both these regions of PRC were incorporated under conditionality of autonomy.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby Bade » 28 May 2013 07:36

Thanks for the correction.

There seems to be an offshoot of G219 where it takes a vertical turn going due west towards G314 which is aligned N-S close to Khunjerab pass. The straight line distance is ~100km. The gravel roads (?) are not visible in google maps, except as legends.

For G219 PRC has chosen an alignment passing through Aksai chin as it can serve two purposes, one as a connection from Tibet to Xinjiang as you stated and also if that spur above is developed further a shorter connection to G314 and then N35 (KKH) within POK if the terrain allows that.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby ramana » 28 May 2013 23:20

I was talking to veteran of Battle of Chusul in 1962 last Sunday. He is on his early 80s and very upset at the repeat of the Chinese perfidy.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby member_23692 » 21 Jul 2013 02:55

Chinese troops cross border in Ladakh again with banners asking India to vacate territory
Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times New Delhi, July 20, 2013
First Published: 21:59 IST(20/7/2013) | Last Updated: 23:40 IST(20/7/2013)


http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Chinese-troops-cross-border-in-Ladakh-again-with-banners-asking-India-to-vacate-territory/Article1-1095743.aspx


India is in a bind. It cannot retaliate, as successive governments since 1947 have hollowed out our defense capabilities. Our weapon systems are obsolete, our Air Force is ill equipped, our morale is low and our top brass is corrupt. Indian government feels it cannot go complain to Massa and other powers because that will expose our inner hollowness and weakness, so we still pretend like we can handle this ourselves to keep up the false facade that we are the "next super power".

So, what does India do ? It keeps quiet and allows the Chinese to slowly nibble away at our territory and the Indian government hides this shamelessly from its own people.

At what point, does the fourm think, citizens should rise up and overthrow this corrupt and traitorous dispensation, a la Tahir Square style ?

And at what point should the people start to think that the disgrace that passes for democracy in India is not worth ALL THE TERRIBLE TROUBLES AND MISERIES IT CAUSES ?

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby harbans » 21 Jul 2013 10:48

The solution to the Chinese nitpicking along the border is simple. Very simple. Derecognize Chinese aggression of Tibet. Claim Kailash Mansarover. Start to reverse the damage done by previous leaders. That message needs to be got through to a potential leader like NM. Obviously while doing all that keep the powder dry.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby chaanakya » 21 Jul 2013 11:21

shiv wrote:
Pranav wrote:Saar, it is mostly a matter of the corruption and incompetence of our own rulers. Why blame vultures for doing their job. So the real war should be between the people and the ruling establishment.

:rotfl:
The Chinese blame us. Indians also blame us.

Typical.

Welcome Shiv garu, Happy to see your post again. Missed badly.

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby chaanakya » 21 Jul 2013 11:41

There is an excellent timeline drawn by Rediff
starting with 1947 onwards till 2002.

Entire China Border along Ladakh Sector is manned by ITBP . Like BSF and AR they are under control of MHA and considered as Border Security Patrol deployment during peacetime. Now that it has come in public domain that Chinese had been aggressively intruding into Indian Side of Line of Actual Control , it is high time that sector be handed over to Army .

The government, as always, played down the issue by holding the transgressions took place due to "differing perceptions" about where the LAC actually lies. "Our security forces also continue to patrol all areas that fall within the Indian perception of the LAC," said defence minister A K Antony in Rajya Sabha on Wednesday.

Union minister of state for home Mullappally Ramachandran, however, did admit the number of transgressions by PLA troops stood at 228 in 2010, 213 in 2011 and 64 till April.

Similar figures, if not more, have been recorded in earlier years. The number of Chinese transgressions, as Antony said, have "generally been as per established pattern" during the last five years.

But that does not detract from the fact that the PLA has been flexing its muscles through an aggressive border management policy to stake claim to disputed areas in all the three sectors - western (Ladakh), middle ( Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh).

Chinese troops, for instance, damaged a 200-feet long stonewall in Yangtse area of Tawang in Arunachal last year, which was subsequently re-built by India after lodging a strong protest with Beijing.

Armed motorized as well as boat patrols by PLA in the strategically-located Trig Heights and Pangong Tso lake in eastern Ladakh have also intensified since 2009. Similarly, Chinese has stepped up claims along the 206-km border between Tibet and Sikkim, which India long considered was "a settled matter", with the so-called 2.1 sq km "finger area" in the northernmost tip of the state remaining a specific matter of concern.

New Delhi hopes the new bilateral boundary coordination mechanism, which became operational two months ago after being inked during the 15th round of border talks between national security advisor Shivshankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo in January, will help prevent border flare-ups between the two armies.

India also takes up "specific incidents" of transgressions by PLA through hotlines, flag meetings, border personnel meeting (BPM) and diplomatic channels. During the 4th India-China annual defence dialogue last December, India also told China that military patrols along the LAC should not be undertaken at night, nor should they "surprise each other". Moreover, laid-down stand-operating procedures to cool down tempers should be followed in the event of face-offs between the two armies.

India also suggested the proposed BPM mechanism at Lipulekh in the middle sector should be shifted to the nearby Mana Pass to make it operational, to follow the ones already in place at Nathu La, Bumla, Spanggur and Kibithu-Damai.


http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... angong-tso

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Re: India-China War 2013 - Trigger: Incursion into India

Postby chaanakya » 21 Jul 2013 12:00

harbans wrote:The solution to the Chinese nitpicking along the border is simple. Very simple. Derecognize Chinese aggression of Tibet. Claim Kailash Mansarover. Start to reverse the damage done by previous leaders. That message needs to be got through to a potential leader like NM. Obviously while doing all that keep the powder dry.

fully agree. We need to take offensive into their camp.


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