India-US Relations : News and Discussion

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Gus
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Gus » 25 Oct 2014 20:39

ombaba is done. he was done a long time ago..he is just well done now.

JwalaMukhi
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby JwalaMukhi » 25 Oct 2014 20:48

Meanwhile, there will always be efforts to scuttle the relationship, because of various lobbies. The lobbies never take a rest just because one is in lame duck session. There is still lot more capacity left to damage the relationship and foreign policy disaster by the administration.
http://www.indiafacts.co.in/kailash-sat ... EvJHRZ7at4
The choice of Kailash Satyarthi for the Nobel Peace Prize is the result of an old tussle between India and the US. Throughout the 1990s, the US used trade sanctions as well as the World Trade Organization to foist its version of the so-called “free trade” which came complete with patent laws, genetically modified seeds, Enron’s shenanigans, and stringent standards related to environmental and labour laws. The Indian government as well as Indian activists resisted these moves at that time and there was friction between the US and India.


Satyarthi’s NGO, Rugmark, later changed its name to Goodweave International and it is pertinent to note that a majority of its board members have Christian names and at least two of them are from Western churches that use the alleviation of human suffering as a cover for proselytism, a strategy that has been effectively used by Western governments to destabilize several countries. While one board member, Rev. Pharis J. Harvey, is from the United Methodist Church, another board member, Pat Zerega, is from the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

It should be noted that among the five Norwegian politicians who form the panel that decides the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, two of them have a history of actively interfering in Sri Lanka and supporting the Sri Lankan terrorist group LTTE. Of the two, Gunnar Stålsett is a former bishop and served as the state secretary of the Ministry of Church Affairs and Education while Thorbjørn Jagland is a former Prime Minister and a member of the Labour Party in Norway which grew out of the Communist movement. It is time for Indians to realize that the Nobel Peace Prize is just an award given by a group of politicians from Norway who pursue their own agendas, and the process of awarding this prize too has had its share of corruption scandals.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby A_Gupta » 25 Oct 2014 21:24

JwalaMukhi wrote:Meanwhile, the white "pink" guys can never be wrong even if they run a plantation. No Preet Brar or otherwise conducting cavity searches. Pink guys always "find" things, while the "black" guys thugs would always rip off things as during Katrina. Pink guys always "overlook" have "unintentional" way of doing things.


Yes, look at senior leadership of that company:
http://w3.efi.com/about-efi/senior-leadership-team

PS: Not volcanic enough, perhaps, but inspired by JwalaMukhi
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/10/2 ... ce-for-All

RajeshA
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby RajeshA » 25 Oct 2014 22:00

vishvak wrote:USA shenanigans about human rights in other countries - especially the biggest democracy India - and litigations against diplomats, politician most probably won't add positively to Indo-US relationship. In fact, USA won't like it if India doesn't take kindly to meddling within India and actually take hard steps to stem interference completely.


Let's call the case against Modi in USA by the name that best suits it: imperialism! Any US court case which impinges on what happens on Indian soil is indulging in BLATANT IMPERIALISM!

arshyam
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby arshyam » 25 Oct 2014 22:19

anmol wrote:This new diplomatic immunity case makes it clear that Modi Ji told Obama "I will wait two years..."
Where does the US stand with India?

The ball is now in India’s court to make clear where America stands in Modi’s long-term foreign policy calculations. Few priorities are as important for both countries.

Yawn, isn't it always? I don't recall any American commentator saying the US needs to do something w.r.t. relations with another country.

I think Modi should just wait Obama out, after all 2016 elections start early next year, so it's not really that long. But something needs to be done about this so-called case in NY - Obama needs to be told clearly that such behviour is unacceptable and nothing will move on the ground till his govt drops such attempts at coercion. I hope the Spike deal was a signal on that front.

vishvak
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby vishvak » 25 Oct 2014 22:48

Is it too difficult to find out all diplomats from western countries are interfering in Indian matters - from the North East to the Kashmir and South India and so on and so forth? It is not like Indian diplomats interfering within America.

member_22733
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby member_22733 » 25 Oct 2014 23:14

A_Gupta wrote:
JwalaMukhi wrote:Meanwhile, the white "pink" guys can never be wrong even if they run a plantation. No Preet Brar or otherwise conducting cavity searches. Pink guys always "find" things, while the "black" guys thugs would always rip off things as during Katrina. Pink guys always "overlook" have "unintentional" way of doing things.


Yes, look at senior leadership of that company:
http://w3.efi.com/about-efi/senior-leadership-team

PS: Not volcanic enough, perhaps, but inspired by JwalaMukhi
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/10/2 ... ce-for-All


What great positive news! Weren't some people claiming here that there is no wage theft in the US just as there was no slavery?

Minimum wage itself qualifies as a slave wage. These guys were treated worse than that, and yes no "offending" cavity was searched. They would take a plea deal, if there is a criminal investigation, and probably try to settle out of court in a civil case. The benefits of low melanin :)

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby dnivas » 26 Oct 2014 16:05

JwalaMukhi wrote:Meanwhile, the white "pink" guys can never be wrong even if they run a plantation. No Preet Brar or otherwise conducting cavity searches. Pink guys always "find" things, while the "black" guys thugs would always rip off things as during Katrina. Pink guys always "overlook" have "unintentional" way of doing things.
Just as that doctor who unintentionally rode subway and played in the bowling alley even though he was high risk guy with ebola. Meanwhile, if it was black or other colored people, the press and general pinks would gang up to tar and lampoon the entire race of people.
http://www.latimes.com/business/technol ... story.html
Eight workers from India were paid as little as $1.21 an hour by a tech company in Fremont, Calif., over several months in late 2013, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, as reported by the Associated Press.

As a result the company, Electronics for Imaging, which specializes in printing technology, agreed to pay $43,000 in back wages and government penalties. Electronics for Imaging, or EFI, said in a prepared statement that it “unintentionally overlooked” U.S. labor law and has "taken steps to ensure that this type of administrative error does not reoccur."


The fine for this was 3500 and the fine for devyani was a body cavity search and jail. such equal justice!!!

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby rgosain » 26 Oct 2014 16:30

A couple of quick points to the Burns article. When Gary Hart was running for the presidential nomination 30 years ago, he was asked, "where is the beef", that is muscle in his policies as opposed to flab and hot air. Regarding India, someone should point this out to Burns that no amount of private lunches can dress up the hot air from the administration.
It would be good for the ongoing immunity drama with Brahara and the AJC over Modi to be dragged out over the next two years as it will expose the linkages between the DA and and various Islamist groups who fund some of these activities. The outcome of this should be seen as a barometer for future political engagement with the US, and can be used to limit US political interference.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby UlanBatori » 26 Oct 2014 18:06

It would be good for the ongoing immunity drama with Brahara and the AJC over Modi to be dragged out over the next two years as it will expose the linkages between the DA and and various Islamist groups who fund some of these activities. The outcome of this should be seen as a barometer for future political engagement with the US, and can be used to limit US political interference.


This is the sad old Bhavitavyam Bhavedeva, All is Maya, Inaction Is Action policy. As in "we don't care, but SOMEONE should". The GOI should be kicked for this.

What stops GOI from getting lawsuits (at least PIL) filed in the Supreme Court of India, against all those involved in these sh1t-throwing exercises? Get arrest warrants for contempt of court (at least all Indian citjens involved), and since they don't recognize Indian sovereignty, the non-Indian-citjens can be presumed hostile to India and banned from entering. Permanent visa bans.

We have to have SOMETHING to point to, hain, as evidence of some signs of intelligence and life in the Indian government and Phoren Sarbhij? Some enduring lessons to point to and chuckle?

Also, facilitate filing damages suits in the US and get depositions. The GOI won't do ANY of these, they just sit with their thumbs up their musharrafs bleating to the WHOTUS to please please don't arrest our PM, please please tell your judge not to beat us up, etc. Begging the slime for favors.

What do you think would happen if a Summons was issued by a US Court for Chinese PM Wie Luv U for the Tien An Men Square massacre?

And then we see that Pakin Harkin has sneaked through a No-Bill Bizz Priej for his flunky.

No, nothing has changed in Indian Babucracy since NaMo took over. Behind the scenes of the Modisan Square hype, were some pretty dismal realities. The Embajy and the Conjulates invited all the Herrows (such as Parthiv Parekh of the Atlanta 'Khabar') who have been propagating the 'Modi == genocide' stuff all these years as the Cream of The Sewers, to the grand gala dinner and photoOps, and dissed all the ppl who have been doing the battles on the frontlines to protect Indian interests.

Figures. What do u expect from a whole tribe of slimeballs?

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Cosmo_R » 26 Oct 2014 22:08

ramana wrote:Looks like raiders on horses from Central Asia infects more people than thought!!!

Did you guys catch the "Turkish or Central Asian" "warrior past" ancestory claimed by Fareed's father? 1.40 timeline. Wow, I thought this was just an inherent Pakistani trait? Do a large number of continental muslims harbor this feeling? How to diabuse this mindset?

http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video ... s.cnn.html

I thought FZ's ancestors were Habshis who settled in Gujarat Maharashtra region.


Take a look at this link:

http://s25.postimg.org/e944x5isf/Page_1_infographic.jpg

This happens to be my 'ancestry map' I am a South Indian and I have certain DNA is common with all those who started in Africa.

It says I am 54% southwest Asian (read modern day Iran/Turkey and the 'stans) and 5% Northern European. That does not mean I have 'roots' in either place/people. All it means is that because all of the current humans came from from Africa, all of us will have certain genes in common.

Also keep in mind that this is on the basis of a pool of 678,000 which may be self selecting because it not cheap.

Perhaps Dr. Shiv could explain this better.

Anyways, I think this is what FZ was trying to convey.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby schinnas » 26 Oct 2014 22:35

UlanBatori wrote:No, nothing has changed in Indian Babucracy since NaMo took over. Behind the scenes of the Modisan Square hype, were some pretty dismal realities. The Embajy and the Conjulates invited all the Herrows (such as Parthiv Parekh of the Atlanta 'Khabar') who have been propagating the 'Modi == genocide' stuff all these years as the Cream of The Sewers, to the grand gala dinner and photoOps, and dissed all the ppl who have been doing the battles on the frontlines to protect Indian interests.

Figures. What do u expect from a whole tribe of slimeballs?


Surprised that you expected it to change! Injection of fresh non-IAS / IFS talent into our top and mid level officialdom is a must to save Bharath from these colonized minds. Indian bureocracy was a class of glorified clerks to help manage British in swindling India through a corrupt enterprise. It would be too much to expect it to change.

For example, the cyber-related divisions of RAW and IB and CBI are primarily good for nothings. If at all they do anything, it is by sending evidence to FBI and select institutes (such as IITs) to get their inputs. Colossal waste of money with nothing really to show for it. Lot of competent IT folks in India have realized enough money and would love to help India if given appropriate opportunity and empowerment in these institutes. But the IAS types wouldn't let them.

To change embassies and consulates, capable political appointees are needed. Knowledge of English and French is not the primary requirement for conducting diplomacy. Clarity of vision and sense of purpose are more important which these IFS types often lack.

While I havent really interacted closely with IFS folks, my interactions with most IAS and other Indian babus have left me unimpressed. I could pick several outstanding managers in private industry who could do a better job than those clowns.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Cosmo_R » 27 Oct 2014 03:37

The Modi MSG show is a template to bring the camels into the tent and ^5$# out instead of in. Co-opting the INC/commie types inherently hostile to India/Hindus is essential to avoiding a split in the diaspora .

The formula is to create an umbrella organization to sponsor the event including the high net worth types like Vivek Ranadivé (by letting his daughter do the US national anthem --really badly) so it is 'non partisan' development stuff they can't argue against , get the non-believers in the same space as the beleivers and the let them feel the energy of the believers."

Classic.

The MSG folk are advising the OZ folk. Look for an excruciatingly bad rendition of 'Advance Australia Fair' by a wannabee.

Crazy like a fox.

UlanBatori
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby UlanBatori » 27 Oct 2014 07:13

Ah, yes, I DO expect it to change, which was the point of my post. The Embajy and conjulate villainy did not go unnoticed, unremarked or unreacted. And their days in office are numbered. I hear that Atlanta conjul is hanging around because his term is over but he's not getting any new posting. Maybe Director Of Cleaning pakistans in South Bloc. Customer complaints amplified by charges of Chicago and Noo Yoik probably not far behind. Inquiry commissions being set up as I hear.

The 1998- 2004 RamaRajya was utterly incompetent - didn't clear the Babucracy jungles and weed out the serpents. All in the name of Bipartisanism etc. This time I think there is a wholesale "shaucha" in progress or in the works. Danger is that too many posts may have to be filled with inexperienced micro-babus. But IFS is long overdue for cleanup.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby shiv » 27 Oct 2014 07:34

Cosmo_R wrote:
ramana wrote:Looks like raiders on horses from Central Asia infects more people than thought!!!

Did you guys catch the "Turkish or Central Asian" "warrior past" ancestory claimed by Fareed's father? 1.40 timeline. Wow, I thought this was just an inherent Pakistani trait? Do a large number of continental muslims harbor this feeling? How to diabuse this mindset?

http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video ... s.cnn.html

I thought FZ's ancestors were Habshis who settled in Gujarat Maharashtra region.


Take a look at this link:

http://s25.postimg.org/e944x5isf/Page_1_infographic.jpg

This happens to be my 'ancestry map' I am a South Indian and I have certain DNA is common with all those who started in Africa.

It says I am 54% southwest Asian (read modern day Iran/Turkey and the 'stans) and 5% Northern European. That does not mean I have 'roots' in either place/people. All it means is that because all of the current humans came from from Africa, all of us will have certain genes in common.

Also keep in mind that this is on the basis of a pool of 678,000 which may be self selecting because it not cheap.

Perhaps Dr. Shiv could explain this better.

Anyways, I think this is what FZ was trying to convey.


Forget genetics. Genetics is an attempt to figure out the truth even if commerical genetic mapping services are only as accurate as the latest genetic guesswork.

Talking about one's ancestry is always about echandee or about grievance. If someones great-great-great grandfather was a king and his line was born off a slave whom the king used and threw away, the descendant is not going to go about saying "I am the descendant of a whore slave". He will say "I am the descendant of a king".

Add to this the fact that India and Indian traits and history were given such as lousy reputation after Macaulay's minute took effect that Hindus lost all self esteem and needed to become westernized to gain self esteem. This is still going on today. Muslims, who shunned western education, retained their self esteem and needed to show how they were different from the degenerate Hindus. Hence Muslims were anything but Hindu origin. Pakistanis, for example, will claim they have nothing to do with India or Indians as long as India has a Hindu connection because it has been made shameful to have a Hindu past.

member_22733
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby member_22733 » 27 Oct 2014 07:51

^^^ Re: self-esteem part.

When I first came to the US, I met up with one of my old friends who moved here before me and he was going on and on bragging about how everyone thought he was Eye-ranian (pronounced exactly like that) and how much he looked non-tamilian even though he was one. I look very SDRE (except for the short part) and I was really confused on what to think of my identity since in my eyes at that time I did not match up with my eye-ranian looking friend or a white person. To look as "anything-but-Indian" had never been that big of an issue for me until I landed in the US. Something about that idea made me slightly sick within.

My friend did do a service to me, it planted in me the seeds of a journey of understanding race, the real history, colonialism and my place in the world. Now I have the satisfaction of being comfortable with being an SDRE, and proud to be one. Over the years my friend has also figured out where he really stands, and he does recall what a jackass he was back in the day much to my satisfaction :)

sanjaykumar
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby sanjaykumar » 27 Oct 2014 08:59

Science and technology is the new shamanism. SDRE are orbiting Mars. Eyeranians are looking what? Persian. It's a bit of a joke.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby anmol » 27 Oct 2014 09:28

nationalinterest.org/feature/the-india-myth-11517

The India Myth

The ubiquitous reports of India’s emergence as a great power are bogus. The road is long, the advance slow and the arrival date uncertain.
Rajan Menon

October 23, 2014
November-December 2014

OVER THE last two decades, numerous books, articles and press commentaries have hailed India as the next global power. This flush of enthusiasm results partly from the marked acceleration in India’s economic growth rate following reforms initiated in 1991. India’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 6 percent per year for most of the 1990s, 5.5 percent from 1998 to 2002, and soared to nearly 9 percent from 2003 to 2007, before settling at an average of 6.5 percent until 2012. The upswing offered a contrast to what the Indian economist Raj Krishna dubbed “the Hindu rate of growth”: an average of 2.5 percent for the first twenty-five years following India’s independence in 1947. The brisker pace pulled millions from poverty, put Indian companies (such as Indian Oil, Tata Motors, Tata Steel, Infosys, Mahindra, Reliance Industries and Wipro) even more prominently on the global map, and spawned giddy headlines about India’s prowess in IT, even though that sector accounts for a tiny proportion of the country’s output and workforce. India also beckoned as a market for exports and a site for foreign investment.

The attention to India has endured even though its economic boom has been stymied, partly by the 2008 global financial crisis, with growth remaining below 5 percent for eight consecutive quarters from early 2012 to early 2014. In the quarter lasting from April to June 2014, growth ticked back up to 5.7 percent, but it is too soon to tell whether or not this represents the beginning of a more sustained expansion. The persistent interest also stems from analyses that portray India’s and China’s resurgence as part of a shift that is ineluctably returning the center of global economic power to Asia, its home for centuries before the West’s economic and military ascent some five hundred years ago. Yet even those who dismiss the proponents of this perspective as “declinists” are drawn to the “India rising” thesis, in part because of the transformation in U.S.-Indian relations during the last two decades and the allure of democratic India as a counterweight to authoritarian China. For much of the Cold War, the relationship between Washington and New Delhi ranged from “correct” to “chilly.” Nowadays, in contrast, predictions that China’s ascendency will produce an Indo-American entente, if not an alliance, are commonplace.

But is India really ready for prime time? India has many of the prerequisites for becoming a center of global power, and, assuming China’s continued and unhindered ascent, it will play a part in transforming a world in which American power is peerless into one marked by multipolarity. India has a vast landmass and coastline and a population of more than one billion, faces East Asia, China and the Persian Gulf, and has a wealth of scientific and technological talent along with a prosperous and well-placed diaspora. But the elemental problems produced by poverty, an inadequate educational system and pervasive corruption remain, and India’s mix of cultural diversity and democracy hampers rapid reform. For now, therefore, the ubiquitous reports of India’s emergence as a great power are premature at best. There’s no denying India’s ambition and potential, but as for its quest to join the club of great powers, the road is long, the advance slow and the arrival date uncertain. Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may seek to be a reformer, and he enjoys a reputation as a charismatic leader and skilled manager. He is also a proponent of improving ties with the United States and Israel. But he will face daunting obstacles in his bid to push India into the front rank of nations.

DESPITE ITS many blemishes, India’s democracy has increased the country’s appeal in Europe and America and prevented quarrels over human rights from complicating the expansion of economic and security transactions with the West. This is in stark contrast to the intermittent skirmishes over human rights that have marred the West’s relationship with China and Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In defending the 2005 U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement, the George W. Bush administration (and American experts who backed the deal) noted that India is a fellow democracy. Barack Obama—who hosted Modi in September 2014—pledges to back India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and invariably invokes the country’s democratic record when he does so.

Yet in East and South Asia, two regions in which India has been most active on the diplomatic and strategic front, its democratic model hasn’t yielded it much influence, or even stature. If anything, the economic achievements of China and Singapore—and the other Asian “tigers” during their undemocratic decades—in delivering rapid growth and modernization and improving living standards have made a bigger impression. India, weighed down by the compromises, delays and half measures necessitated by its democratic structure, comes across as a lumbering, slow-motion behemoth that’s never quite able to sustain whatever momentum it manages to gain on occasion or to bridge the gap between proclaiming reforms and implementing them.

The Indian government, for its part, has crafted sundry soft-power slogans and strategies, among them “India Shining” and the even sappier “Incredible India.” The latter was not simply rhetorical excess—though it was that—or even solely a catchphrase to capture additional tourist revenue. It was also part of a larger effort to increase transactions between India and the West and to recast India’s image. Yet there’s scant evidence that India is seeking to use culture as a means to create a transnational bloc in Asia, or anywhere else. With all due respect to the late Samuel P. Huntington, who listed “Hindu civilization” among the cultural-religious blocs whose rivalry he believed would supplant the competition and conflict among states, there’s no sign that India plans to mobilize that form of soft power, or that it could if it tried. Hyping Hindu discourse in a multiconfessional country, one with more than one hundred million Muslims, would amount to jeopardizing internal security to road test a quixotic theory that emanated from Harvard Yard. Besides, Hinduism is too torn by divisions of class, caste, language and region to make such a strategy feasible; the Hindu diasporas in Asia and Africa, for their part, would have little to gain and much to lose by embracing it. Modi and the BJP will doubtless spice up their rallies with Hindu-nationalist verbiage, but they are likely to find that this tactic, far from mobilizing unity, sows disunity in what is a country of multiple faiths and provokes India’s neighbors, above all Pakistan, while yielding little of tangible value in return. Nor will the project of “Hindutva” help the BJP extend its base beyond northern India’s “Hindu heartland” and into the country’s southern regions, where its message has much less appeal.

The difficulty with “soft power,” a concept now embedded in the lexicon thanks to another Harvard professor, Joseph Nye, is that it’s hard to determine its effectiveness, or even to figure out quite how it works. Few would deny that a country’s political system, cultural achievements and image can, in theory, add to its allure. What’s much less clear, though, is how this amorphous advantage goes beyond evoking warm feelings and yields actual influence, defined as the capacity to shape the policies of other countries.

Did Americans (or Europeans or Japanese) gain a greater understanding and appreciation of India and begin to take it seriously because of India’s soft power? Unlikely, given how little the outside world interests the citizens of the United States, never mind that their country is engaged in every corner of the globe on a host of issues and in ways that affect the lives of millions. Did the greater coverage of India, in part perhaps because of New Delhi’s endeavors on the soft-power front, increase the attention it received from America’s well educated, well heeled and politically powerful? Possibly, based on the data on tourism, the increased number of courses on India-related topics at universities, and the growing popularity of Indian prose-fiction writers and attire bearing traces of Indian culture. But one can yearn to see the Ajanta Caves, read R. K. Narayan or Arundhati Roy, sport a kurta, or be able to tell one genre of Indian classical music or dance from another without giving so much as a thought to the pros and cons of developing military ties with India, championing its quest for a spot on the UN Security Council, or expanding trade and investment ties with it. Soft power, apart from being a slippery principle, can only do so much in practice. It simply cannot compensate for the deficit India has in other, tangible forms of power, which remains the greatest impediment to India’s becoming a global power.



THE HEYDAY of central planning and import-substitution-based economic policy, which had extraordinary influence in India, is over. The BJP’s thumping victory over the Congress Party, which itself initiated economic reforms in the 1990s, betokens an even stronger push toward privatization and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the principal aims of India’s economic strategy will naturally be growth and prosperity, the country’s leaders understand the strategic benefits that are to be gained from having the business community of important democratic countries (the United States, Britain, Japan, Germany, France, South Korea and Brazil, for example) acquire a strong stake in India’s market.

Still, to gain substantial economic influence, India’s leaders will have to implement many politically unpopular reforms that are required to restore and maintain high rates of growth, boost trade and attract greater sums of FDI. These include cutting subsidies for basic commodities, revamping entrenched and rigid labor laws, opening protected sectors—such as retail, agriculture and services—to foreign competition, and stamping out tax evasion, which in India is both ubiquitous and an art form. These aren’t the only steps needed to make the economy grow faster and more sustainably so that the increased resources required to bolster India’s bid for great-power status become available.

Take education. While India’s progress in educating what fifty years ago was a largely illiterate society has been impressive, there’s much more that needs doing on this front to boost Indian economic power. The countries that are already front-rank economic powers achieved near-universal literacy long ago, while in China, Indonesia and Malaysia more than 90 percent of the population is literate. In India, the figure is 74 percent. While that’s a massive increase compared to the proportion in 1947, the quality of Indian schools is uneven because problems such as moribund curricula, substandard classrooms and widespread absenteeism among teachers abound. The success of states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh contrasts starkly with the failures of the educational system in others, such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. What might be called the “effective literacy rate” is thus lower than suggested by the national average, especially in rural areas (where about 70 percent of the population still lives) and among females. Moreover, India’s schools are not producing the skilled labor needed by local and foreign firms at anywhere near the required rate, and too many of those with degrees in science and engineering are not readily employable on account of the poor quality of their training. Indian higher education has a proud history that spans centuries and boasts some venerable institutions, but according to economists Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, even its elite engineering and management schools don’t make the “top 200” list in global surveys; by contrast, the best universities of other major Asian economic powers have cracked the top 100.

Likewise, vast sums will have to be mobilized (from tax revenues or government-backed, dollar-denominated bonds) to modernize and expand India’s antediluvian infrastructure. The list of pressing needs is long. It includes building or revamping water-management and sanitation systems; bridges, railways and roads; harbors and airports; and power plants (to end chronic electricity shortages and even blackouts). Fixing India’s infrastructure by building more rail and air networks, bridges and ports won’t be cheap: the price tag is estimated to be $1 trillion. But absent a colossal effort, the drag on India’s growth could amount to 2 percent a year. Access to computers and the Internet must also be scaled up dramatically if India is to compete successfully in the global marketplace. Despite the publicity India’s prowess in IT receives, society-wide access to information technologies remains unimpressive. In 2008, according to the World Bank, India had 7.9 Internet users per 100 people. That number had grown to 15.1 by 2013. But by then Guatemala had 19.7, Haiti 10.6, Kyrgyzstan 23.4 and the Dominican Republic 45.9. The figure for China was 45.8, in Germany and France and the United States it was over 80, and in Denmark it was 94.6. Even allowing for India’s mammoth size and population, this dismal comparison speaks for itself.

India faces an even more fundamental problem—one that makes prognostications about its impending ascent to great-power status sound surreal. Simply put, the country still lacks the human capital required for acquiring the power and influence commensurate with its leaders’ aspirations. Consider some pertinent numbers. India’s per capita income in 2013 was $5,350. By comparison, China’s was $11,850, Japan’s was $37,630 and—tellingly—South Korea’s, which was comparable to India’s in the early 1950s, was $33,440. Nearly one-third of Indians still subsist on $1.25 a day or less. India places 135th out of 187 on the UNDP’s Human Development Index, a composite measure of access to basic necessities. Similarly, it ranks 102nd out of 132 on the Social Progress Index, which assesses countries’ records in meeting people’s essential social and economic needs. In UNICEF’s rankings, India (with 48 percent) places fourth in the proportion of children who are stunted and second (43 percent) in the percentage of those who are underweight (“severe” or “moderate”). The handful of Asian countries with worse records includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea—not good company for a country that yearns to be global power. As Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen demonstrate in a recent book, despite its robust economic growth during much of the last two decades, India lags far behind the other “BRICS” in such measures as citizens’ access to potable water and basic health and sanitation services, the immunization of children and nutrition. Worse, its performance is poor even relative to some of the world’s poorest countries. In India’s own neighborhood, Bangladesh and Nepal, despite having smaller per capita incomes and slower growth rates, have done better on several key quality-of-life measures.

Among the consequences of having shopworn infrastructure, relatively low literacy rates and a substandard educational system, along with an industrial manufacturing sector that’s small relative to that of its competitors—all problems that the Asian “tigers,” and China thereafter, overcame—is that, as wages in China have risen, multinational corporations haven’t relocated to India to the degree one would expect given the size of the Indian market and the low cost of Indian labor. Instead, they have gone elsewhere—not just because of India’s inadequate human capital and infrastructure, but also because of bureaucratic barriers that hinder business and investment and persist despite the reforms of the past two decades. These problems help explain why India places 134th out of 189—just below Yemen—in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business Index.” Not surprisingly, India attracts far less FDI than it needs to boost growth and productivity. From 2010 to 2012, FDI inflows to India averaged $27 billion a year, compared to $119.5 billion for gargantuan China, $55 billion for tiny Singapore and $60 billion for Brazil, a member of the BRICS coalition to which India belongs. Malaysia attracted $10.3 billion and Thailand $8.3 billion—both far more than India in per capita terms. Yet the former has a population of thirty million (2.3 percent of India’s) and the latter sixty-seven million (5 percent of India’s).

It’s often said that India, unlike China, has the advantage of a relatively young population and will therefore not face labor shortages. What often goes unmentioned is that the largest population increases are occurring in some of India’s poorest states (Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), not in those (such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu) that have been the best at meeting basic economic needs and in increasing literacy.

These same deficiencies have prevented India from establishing a significant position in global trade. While it does rank fifteenth on a list of the top twenty economies in the dollar value of merchandise trade, its exports and imports combined in 2012 totaled $784 billion. Several countries with smaller GDPs and much smaller populations outranked it, including Singapore, Belgium and the Netherlands. China’s trade, valued at nearly $4 trillion and about on par with that of the United States, accounted for 10.5 percent of the value of all international trade in 2012. The dollar value of India’s trade amounted to one-fifth of China’s and to 2 percent of the global total, even though India has roughly 17.5 percent of the world’s population, about the same proportion China does. India does fare better in trade in commercial services: in 2012, it ranked seventh in a list of the top exporting countries; but its share was still only 74 percent of China’s (which still lacks a powerful service sector) and 4.4 percent of the world total, comparable to that of Spain and the Netherlands.

Apart from the quantity and complexity of the problems that have to be addressed, India’s democratic system is not conducive to enacting controversial economic changes quickly. Because of their authoritarian political systems, China, as well as Taiwan and South Korea in their nondemocratic phases, could push through sweeping reforms that helped establish the foundation for rapid industrialization and economic growth. India’s raucous, vibrant democracy is rightly admired, but it impedes the implementation of deep economic reform. Creaky coalition governments are common at the center, and headstrong local power brokers (the chief ministers of its twenty-nine states) can be veritable kingmakers. Labor unions are powerful, and militant and caste-based political alliances are impenetrable yet influential. Then there’s an electorate that’s not shy about registering its displeasure at the ballot box when economic reforms bring pain or when the increased competition from abroad threatens traditional sectors, such as small retail shops, agriculture or industries long shielded by various forms of protectionism. In principle, Modi, who faces the challenge of overcoming such obstacles, is well placed to do so given his economic track record, his popularity and the BJP’s massive electoral mandate. Modi may style himself as a no-nonsense, business-friendly, results-oriented manager, but he won’t be able to demolish these deeply rooted impediments to reform without a tough struggle. Running Gujarat was one thing. Acting as India’s CEO will be quite another.



DURING THE past two decades in particular, Indian leaders have looked beyond their immediate neighborhood and adopted a more ambitious strategy. The “Look East” policy, a case in point, seeks to expand and deepen India’s presence in East Asia so that China does not have a free hand in shaping the strategic and institutional landscape there. More to the point, it is designed to strengthen security ties with the Asian countries located around China’s perimeter, particularly those unnerved by the prospect of a Pax Sinica and anxious about America’s staying power and the narrowing gap in power between the United States and China.

India has been active on a variety of fronts in East Asia. It has been training Myanmar’s naval officers and selling the country maritime surveillance aircraft. It has provided Vietnam loans for buying Indian arms and has signed a deal, despite profuse Chinese protests, to tap Vietnamese oil deposits in the South China Sea, adjacent to islands claimed by Beijing. It has been engaged in regular security consultations with Japan, Israel, Australia, Indonesia and the United States, and has participated in naval exercises in the Pacific alongside America, Japan, Singapore and Australia. It also signed a free-trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2009. While specialists on Indian foreign policy tally these and other triumphs with care, what’s sometimes missing from their analyses is a comparative perspective, which would show that China’s presence in East Asia, and the resources it has deployed to gain influence there, far exceed India’s on every dimension that matters, and by a wide margin.

Another part of India’s strategy has been expanding the power and reach of its armed forces. Much has been accomplished, and the balance between India and China is a far cry from what it was in 1962, when a military rout that revealed Indian troops’ lack of basic equipment created a political firestorm at home. The Chinese would find it considerably harder now to prevail swiftly in a war along the border. Still, India trails China in military power, and a quick comparison makes the disparity evident. Though the two countries have populations of comparable size, India’s GDP is a mere 22.5 percent of China’s. This gap gives Beijing a big advantage in mobilizing and applying various power-relevant resources—and one that is likely to widen given that China’s rate of growth, though it has slowed of late, still exceeds India’s. India and China have devoted a comparable proportion of GDP to defense in recent years: about 2.5 percent and 2.0 percent between 2008 and 2013, respectively. Yet because of the GDP disparity China can, with a smaller burden on its economy, spend far more on its military machine than India: $188 billion compared to $47 billion in 2013. The actual gap is likely even larger, as China’s official figures probably understate its true level of defense spending.

Nor is it just a matter of the spending mismatch: whether it’s armor, airpower, cyberwarfare, air-defense systems or power-projection capacity, China retains a significant advantage over India, in qualitative and quantitative terms. Some numerical comparisons of major categories of armament make this evident. In combat aircraft, attack helicopters, submarines and destroyers, China’s lead ranges from 2:1 to 4:1. Some strategists, Indian and Western, aver that the Indian navy now has the wherewithal to establish dominance over its Chinese counterpart and to block the lifeblood of the Chinese economy by controlling maritime passageways that provide China egress from East Asia. Leaving aside the fact that this scenario assumes a full-blown war in which the naval balance would be but one factor, the difficulty New Delhi faces is that China has far more economic resources than India to devote to seapower in the coming years. Besides, in 2013, the Indian navy received only 18 percent of the military budget, compared to 49 percent for the army and 28 percent for the air force, and a reallocation of resources, certain to be contentious, would be required to ensure maritime dominance over China. That’s possible in principle—leaving aside the inevitable interservice budget battles—but not easily accomplished given the threats India faces from the land and air forces of China and Pakistan, who continue to be aligned. Even if one concedes the claim about Indian naval superiority, Beijing can apply counterpressure in various ways, particularly by bolstering Pakistani military capabilities, using its well-developed strengths in cyberwarfare and striking across the Sino-Indian border. Even with India’s recent move to further strengthen its border defenses by creating a “mountain strike corps” of fifty thousand troops, the Chinese are likely to retain the advantage in numbers, mobility and firepower—and thus the wherewithal to mount offensive operations across the three main sections of the border: Ladakh-Xinjiang, Tibet-Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh-Sikkim.

Modi has his work cut out for him. He will doubtless seek to reform India’s defense industries but will have to continue relying mainly on external suppliers. Russia, whose armaments dominate India’s army, navy and air force, will retain a natural advantage. But in recent years India has been dissatisfied by cost overruns in Russian armaments, the unreliability in the supply and quality of spare parts, and accidents aboard Russian-built submarines, and so it has sought to reduce its dependence on Moscow. Modi won’t burn bridges with Russia, but he will open the door more widely to American, European and Israeli suppliers. While Israel will remain a niche supplier for India, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, trade between the two countries has grown (it totaled $6 billion in 2012); so have Israel’s military sales, which cover radars, missiles of various sorts and reconnaissance aircraft. India has become Israel’s leading market for its arms exports, the annual worldwide total value of which is $7.5 billion, with India accounting for as much as $1.5 billion. Such transactions, which include intelligence sharing related to counterterrorism, are no longer controversial within India; Modi, who visited Israel while running Gujarat and attracted billions of dollars of Israeli investment in his state, has voiced his admiration of Israel’s economic and technological achievements and his desire to boost cooperation.

New Delhi’s strategy toward China goes beyond strengthening India’s armed forces. Since the bilateral military balance heavily favors Beijing, India has turned to a classic coalition strategy aimed at dispersing China’s military strength across what, given the size of the Chinese landmass, are far-flung fronts. This gambit, already well under way, will gain momentum. For reasons rooted in history and geography, India’s natural partners will be Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam and the United States, countries with which India’s military ties have grown during the last two decades. The increasing security cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo in recent years is particularly significant and will increase because of their shared apprehensions about China. Given Japan’s economic and technological prowess, it could—if the increasing threat from China trumps domestic opposition—boost its military strength in fairly short order. With a GDP approaching $5 trillion, barely 1 percent of which it devotes to defense, this would only require a minimal increase in the defense burden. While East Asian states have been rattled by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to revise Japan’s “peace constitution” and to increase its military capabilities, India has welcomed them and embraces Japan as a strategic partner. In 2014, Japan and India decided to begin regular consultations between the two countries’ national-security leaders. This decision followed the initiation of yearly trilateral meetings among India, Japan and the United States in 2011. There is more involved in this than talk. Japan has participated in three—in 2007, 2009 and 2014—of the annual U.S.-Indian “Malabar” naval exercises, which were initiated in 1992 (they were suspended following India’s nuclear test in 1998). What bears watching is whether Japan’s 2014 decision to lift the ban—which dates back to 1967—on the export of military technology and arms leads to purchases by India as part of its push for military modernization and diversification. Tokyo’s 2013 offer to sell India the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft, and India’s interest in buying fifteen of them, may represent a harbinger. Already, Japan and Australia have been in discussions over the latter’s purchase of ten Soryu-class Japanese submarines (worth $20 billion), a development that points to the potential for larger arms sales by Japan to India, especially given their shared concern about China’s expanding power.



USING DIPLOMATIC and economic means, India is also establishing a presence on China’s western and southwestern flank, in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It has positioned itself to play a major role in post-American Afghanistan by training Afghan security forces, building road networks and acquiring natural-resource deposits. But China has also been purchasing economic assets in Afghanistan, notably in energy and mining, and once the United States and its allies depart, Beijing will have to develop a strategy to defend these gains, which means that its presence in that country will grow, adding a new front to Sino-Indian competition.

China has overshadowed India in Central Asia, despite the emphasis the region receives from Indian strategists and New Delhi’s efforts to strengthen its position. India remains an observer rather than a full member in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among the many sources of Chinese influence in Central Asia. Indian energy companies have been bested by their Chinese counterparts in bids for shares in Kazakh companies and energy fields, most recently in the giant Kashagan offshore field, among the largest in the world. Pipelines recently built by China are drawing increasing volumes of Kazakh and Turkmen energy eastward. Trade and investment trends show that Beijing’s economic presence is fast overshadowing Russia’s, to say nothing of India’s, in what has been a Russian sphere of influence since the nineteenth century. India’s position is even weaker in the military sphere. Unlike China and Russia, it lacks direct access to the region. Its quest for access to the Ayni air base in Tajikistan, its first attempt to gain a military toehold, ran into Russian opposition—no matter that New Delhi had spent some $70 million to renovate it—and so Ayni’s operational value to India as a combat-aircraft platform remains uncertain.

The United States will be the key partner in India’s coalition strategy because it has more power to bring to the grouping than any other country and because Sino-American competition seems likely to intensify. Developments such as the 2005 U.S.-Indian nuclear deal—which effectively marked Washington’s recognition of India as a nuclear-weapons state and an abandonment of its punitive antiproliferation approach to New Delhi—have produced predictions of an alliance in the making. This forecast is faulty. For one thing, it makes light of the political obstacles within India, which are a legacy of Cold War frictions and the abiding suspicion, even animus, toward the United States within India’s left wing and on the nationalist right. It also underestimates India’s apprehensions about the loss of autonomy that could follow an alliance with the United States, a sentiment that persists in a country that has prided itself on hewing to nonalignment. These are among the reasons New Delhi has opted for a flexible, ambiguous position, one that’s unlikely to change under Modi, even as he expands the security cooperation with the United States that’s already in place. India has forged multiple ties with the United States and Europe, but it also has continued high-level political exchanges with China and is seeking to increase Sino-Indian trade. (China has become India’s biggest trade partner.) Moreover, during Chinese president Xi Jinping’s September 2014 visit to India—the first by a Chinese president in eight years—the two leaders signed a deal providing for $20 billion in Chinese investment in India’s infrastructure, especially railways, over five years. This was despite the controversy created by Chinese soldiers’ encroachment across the (still undemarcated) border, which coincided with Xi’s trip.

This multifaceted strategy is New Delhi’s likely course for the future. It gives India greater flexibility than would an alliance with the United States and provides two attendant advantages. First, India can expand ties with the United States on all fronts, calculating that Beijing will be forced to take account of America’s likely reaction should China contemplate coercive action against it. Second, India can improve its bargaining position against China, which will want to forestall the tightening of military bonds between India and the United States. A definitive alliance with America would deprive New Delhi of that strategic flexibility. As his predecessors did, Modi will continue to see China as India’s main security threat, but it’s simplistic to see him as a mere Sinophobe. He has expressed admiration on several occasions for China’s economic achievements and, while governing Gujarat, visited China and succeeded in attracting more Chinese investment than the chief minister of any other Indian state.



IF CHINA presents problems for India, then Pakistan remains an even more acute one. The nature of India’s Pakistan predicament has changed in three fundamental and unprecedented ways. First, India’s conventional military advantage will be harder to use to good effect, because threats of war will be less credible now that the specter of nuclear escalation looms. This risk will be present in any war in which Pakistan suffers heavy losses, and will even constrain what India can do in response to another major terrorist attack that it traces to Pakistan. Stated differently, the greater the conventional military advantage India acquires over Pakistan, the more dangerous it may be to employ it. That’s something that Modi will have to reckon with, even as his tough-guy image will put him under pressure to respond forcefully to Pakistan-based terrorism.

Second, Pakistan’s weakness is also starting to worry Indian strategists. Should Pakistan, which is beset by internal violence, fragment, India will face serious problems. Refugees will flow east. Jihadist groups will be able to operate with greater leeway in Kashmir, and even the rest of India, in the absence of a robust Pakistani state that can be pressured to hold them in harness. It’s not clear how such threats can be managed by utilizing India’s economic and military superiority.

Third, nuclear weapons, by raising the risks involved in waging conventional war, provide Pakistan more opportunities to support extremist Islamist groups whose targets now extend beyond Indian-controlled Kashmir and include, as the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament and the 2008 attack on Mumbai showed, the Indian heartland. India has about as many Muslims as Pakistan does, and the repression of Indian Muslims, or a popular backlash against them following terrorist attacks inside India, could generate domestic violence and upheaval that alienate an important and substantial segment of Indian society while empowering India’s radical nationalist forces. The result would be a vicious circle of violence that begets more violence and proves disastrous for India’s future.

It’s unclear whether Modi will be able to overcome these problems. Despite his smashing electoral victory, his success in office is anything but assured. The BJP, while generally seen as more favorable to private enterprise than the Congress Party (notwithstanding that it was on the latter’s watch that many of India’s market-friendly economic reforms were adopted), still contains constituencies committed to economic nationalism. They view globalization as a recipe for deindustrialization, foreign domination over key economic sectors, and impoverishment for small businesses and farmers. Their views, though sidelined in the 2014 campaign, could regain influence if Modi’s economic policies falter or cause pain without producing visible gains for ordinary Indians. India the superpower? Don’t bet on it.

Rajan Menon is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the Colin Powell School of the City College of New York/City University of New York, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a senior research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University.


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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby anmol » 27 Oct 2014 09:55

US Economists Warn on China, India Growth Slowdown
by Anthony Fensom, thediplomat.com
October 24th 2014

China’s slowdown may have rattled markets, but optimism over the region’s longer-term prospects could be blinded by “Asiaphoria” similar to Japan’s earlier rise, according to U.S. economists.

The warning in a research paper by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and fellow Harvard economist Lant Pritchett has added to concerns over Asia’s ability to remain the powerhouse of the global economy, amid a sluggish world recovery.

According to the two U.S. economists, growth in Asia’s billion-plus population “giants” of China and India is more likely to slow to a developed world pace of 2 percent a year than maintain current rates, a “full regression to the mean” that challenges optimistic forecasts over the region’s eventual global economic dominance.

“India and even more so China are into essentially historically unprecedented episodes of growth. China’s super-rapid growth has already lasted three times longer than a typical episode and is the longest ever. The ends of episodes tend to see full regression to the mean, abruptly,” the paper said.

“It is impossible to argue that either China or India have the kinds of ‘quality institutions’ that have been associated with the steady dynamic of growth in the currently high productivity countries. The risks of ‘sudden stops’ are much higher with weak institutions and organizations for policy implementation. China and India have very different modalities of this risk, but both have tricky paths to continued prosperity.”

Despite the warnings, the global economy’s future has been premised on the continuation of the super-rapid growth of these two giants. Those days could soon be over, the economists suggest.

“Extrapolation of current growth rates into the future is at odds with all empirical evidence about the strength of regression to the mean in growth rates…Developing country growth rates are strongly episodic and large (and apparently discrete) shifts in medium-term growth rates of 4 [percent per annum] or more [are] common — and particularly prominent are large slowdowns. Episodes of super-rapid growth tend to be of short duration and end in decelerations back to the world average growth rate,” the paper said.

They added, “We are not arguing that one can predict with any degree of accuracy or confidence a slowdown but certainly policymakers need to be prepared for a wider range of extended slow-growth outcomes in these Asian giants that those that currently dominate the discourse.”

According to the economists, while Asia has seen the rise of Japan followed by the “Asian Tigers” of East Asia and then Southeast Asia, its fourth stage, the rise of China and India, is less than certain of meeting expectations. This could make a $42 trillion difference to future economic gains, should the two “giants” see their next 20 years’ growth rates revert to the mean. Under such a scenario, China’s forecast gross domestic product (GDP) in 2033 would reach around $14 trillion instead of $60 trillion at the 2000-10 pace of 9.7 percent. India would slip to $3 trillion, less than half the near $7 trillion GDP predicted at a 6 percent annual growth rate.

For the rest of the world, the impact of China and India falling back to the field would see global growth slow to around 2.5 percent a year, erasing billions of dollars of economic gains.

According to the economists, episodes of “super-rapid” growth last nine years on average, yet China has sustained such a rate for a record 32 years. Once this period ends, however, growth typically slows to just 1.85 percent a year.

History Repeats

The authors point to previous episodes of “Asiaphoria” in highlighting the danger of blind optimism in the region’s economic potential.

“Japan’s rapid growth from the 1960s (though decelerated already by the 1970s) led to a popular and academic literature explaining why Japan succeeded and would continue to succeed. While there were some concerns raised about a bubble in Japanese real estate, we remember almost no one predicting in 1991 that Japan’s real GDP per capita would be only 12 percent higher in 2011 than 20 years earlier (a growth rate of only 0.6 per annum),” the paper said.

The second recent period of “Asiaphoria” was during the 1990s, when Southeast Asia’s larger economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand “appeared to be booming” but were hit by the Asian financial crisis. While most recovered quickly, none have managed to resume above-average growth since the 1997/98 bust.

The U.S. economists contend that the predicted slowdown for China and India will be the result of a lack of “rule of law” and corruption disrupting business confidence, particularly in communist-ruled China.

“There is a strong cross-national relationship between the extent to which a country is (or is rated as) a ‘democracy’ and GDP per capita,” the authors argue.

“For China to continue to have rapid economic growth while maintaining its current level of democracy….would make it more and more anomalous.”

Should China’s communist rulers be unseated, the nation could expect a sharp deceleration in growth in the subsequent decade post-democratic transition, similar to Indonesia following the end of the Suharto regime, the authors suggest.

The warning for China follows calls by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for structural reforms “to support innovation and technological upgrading in its pursuit of high-income status.” ADB President Takehiko Nakao has urged Beijing to foster “inclusive growth and environmental sustainability,” reform state-owned enterprises and allow the market to pick winners instead of the state.

With the International Monetary Fund cutting its global forecasts and even seasoned business executives such as General Electric’s chief executive Jeff Immelt warning of geopolitical risks, policymakers have plenty to worry about. For Asia though, avoiding hubris similar to the “Japan as number one” predictions of the 1980s may be key to preventing disaster.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby JE Menon » 27 Oct 2014 10:32

Cosmo_R wrote:
Take a look at this link:

http://s25.postimg.org/e944x5isf/Page_1_infographic.jpg

This happens to be my 'ancestry map' I am a South Indian and I have certain DNA is common with all those who started in Africa.

It says I am 54% southwest Asian (read modern day Iran/Turkey and the 'stans) and 5% Northern European. That does not mean I have 'roots' in either place/people. All it means is that because all of the current humans came from from Africa, all of us will have certain genes in common.

Also keep in mind that this is on the basis of a pool of 678,000 which may be self selecting because it not cheap.

Perhaps Dr. Shiv could explain this better.

Anyways, I think this is what FZ was trying to convey.


A curious chart... No African component? What the hell is "Oceanian" component? I wonder what the original markers are (as opposed to the geographic one shown here) and on what basis they arrived at those... I mean, if one switched to racial component as an original marker (or whatever the hell it is called), what would the results be? And without dating, it is very convenient for the AIT proponents...

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby pankajs » 28 Oct 2014 00:06

Folks this is epic! Watch the lady in blue make her presentation. She is from the national assoc. of manufacturers. The demands and the threats OMG!
The 1st lady, the ambassador, talks about why Indian market cannot be ignored in-spite of all the issues faced by American companies.

U.S.-India Economic Relations: A Reality Check (From last year; good presentations overall)


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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby pankajs » 28 Oct 2014 01:10

StratPost ‏@StratPost 3h3 hours ago

India, US to hold defense panel meet http://goo.gl/fb/myhLZa

The meeting happens to come shortly after the Indian Defense Acqusitions Council, chaired by Defense Minister Arun Jaitley, decided to proceed with a proposal to purchase the Spike Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) systems from the Israeli defense company, Rafael, on Saturday.

...
While there has been no official reaction from the US on the selection of the Israeli ATGM, observers indicate that the US would be sore at the decision, coming soon after the high-profile visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US and just before the DPG meeting.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Philip » 28 Oct 2014 04:02

Sore (sphincters) indeed! Shafted a second time after the MMRCA fiasco.The US cannot stomach a decision going against them as they place greater value on the "relationship",aka the "master-slave" mentality,than a rejection based upon on technical/end-user preferences. The huge big tkt. wins that were gifted to it (C-17s,P-8s,C-130s) and decisions in favour for Chinooks and Apaches by the MMS regime are not small beer by any yardstick.C-17 production was extended by a few years and extra P-8s,C-130s and possibly C-17s too if available ,may be on the cards. Unfortunately,the memory of the sanctions regime after P-2 is like a stone in the sandal which though it might be getting smaller with time hasn't disappeared entirely.Why items that are game changers must be acquired without any risk of disruption in a crisis or future testing of our N-weapons.With the Israelis,there is far greater understanding and willingness to transfer tech.

pankajs
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby pankajs » 28 Oct 2014 11:53

pankajs wrote:[**quote]StratPost ‏@StratPost 3h3 hours ago

India, US to hold defense panel meet http://goo.gl/fb/myhLZa

The meeting happens to come shortly after the Indian Defense Acqusitions Council, chaired by Defense Minister Arun Jaitley, decided to proceed with a proposal to purchase the Spike Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) systems from the Israeli defense company, Rafael, on Saturday.[**/quote]

Why did the DAC have to announce the selection of Spike on the eve of US India defense panel meet? They could have waited a couple of weeks to make it official.

--I was going to add this comment to my previous post but forgot.

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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Neela » 28 Oct 2014 13:16



vishvak
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby vishvak » 28 Oct 2014 13:55

Indra-shakti saarji? Attack on heatheins and pageins has begun?

sanjaykumar
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby sanjaykumar » 28 Oct 2014 15:20

Glad that US courts have solved domestic problems and are lending their expertise to the rest of the world.

Yagnasri
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Yagnasri » 28 Oct 2014 15:34

I can not wait to see how Big B fare under Khanland.

saip
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby saip » 28 Oct 2014 19:15

How many fans does Amithabh have? Let us see how many of them will start filing cases in India against some US entities. I think two can play this game.

chaanakya
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby chaanakya » 28 Oct 2014 19:41

pankajs wrote:
StratPost ‏@StratPost 3h3 hours ago

India, US to hold defense panel meet http://goo.gl/fb/myhLZa

The meeting happens to come shortly after the Indian Defense Acqusitions Council, chaired by Defense Minister Arun Jaitley, decided to proceed with a proposal to purchase the Spike Anti Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) systems from the Israeli defense company, Rafael, on Saturday.

...
While there has been no official reaction from the US on the selection of the Israeli ATGM, observers indicate that the US would be sore at the decision, coming soon after the high-profile visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US and just before the DPG meeting.

That shows that NaMo achieved his objective of connecting with indian Diaspora in US, thanking them, telling them to work for India , that too without worrying abt Visa or immunity. Connecting with US admin or doing what they desired was least of his priorities.

KJo
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby KJo » 28 Oct 2014 19:46



Now who the F is this US court to summon an Indian citizen??

saip
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby saip » 28 Oct 2014 20:04

^I think the court only issued summons. They have to be served on Bachan, but who will serve them in India?

Yagnasri
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Yagnasri » 28 Oct 2014 21:22

Frankly we need to file some genocide type cases on oObomber. May be a 9.11 case on Bush and get summons to Bush etc and seethe fun.

Prem
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby Prem » 28 Oct 2014 22:17



There are about 50 Million people who participated in that violence. They should all be summoned and brought here in USA on Charted flights. Then they all can apply asylum etc.

vivek.rao
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby vivek.rao » 28 Oct 2014 23:06

The petition against Bachchan was filed by Sikhs for Justice legal advisor Gurpatwant Singh Pannun


So this moron who calls himself a HR activist has some severe constipation by grabbing too much of ISI money. So he goes not filing these laughable cases which dumbo crackpot courts run by very low IQ people send summons.

Even if AB said "Khoon ka badle, Khoon se karenge" twice, what's is problem with that? Isn't this dumb moron and dumb moronic courts in US are aware of something called Freedom of Speech? I have seen most courts not allowing prohibition of KKK marches and ACLU actually fighting on behalf of hate mongers since speech is fundamental.

Looks like some mental case is going around with all these buffoonery and dumbo courts in US instead of rejecting as non-jurisdictional are dumb enough to make a joke of themselves all over the world

member_28797
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby member_28797 » 28 Oct 2014 23:09

Other than writing shitty anti-India articles and doing secular bhangra in amreeka, I don't think anyone can do anything to Indian citizens living in India

sanjaykumar
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby sanjaykumar » 28 Oct 2014 23:26

Image


Perhaps he left his locks and turban in the gurdwara.I hope some true Sikh organisation does not call for his..... ahem...... re-education.

RajeshA
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby RajeshA » 29 Oct 2014 01:22

vivek.rao wrote:Even if AB said "Khoon ka badle, Khoon se karenge" twice, what's is problem with that? Isn't this dumb moron and dumb moronic courts in US are aware of something called Freedom of Speech? I have seen most courts not allowing prohibition of KKK marches and ACLU actually fighting on behalf of hate mongers since speech is fundamental.


"Khoon ke badle Khoon" simply means that for all those hurt in 1984 pogrom, any blood donation from one side would be met by a blood donation from the other side as well!

I don't understand, what's wrong with blood donations?

sanjaykumar
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Re: India-US Relations : News and Discussion

Postby sanjaykumar » 29 Oct 2014 02:33

I am given to understand this human rights activist is preparing indictments against several thousand Western Sikhs who funded the killings of Hindus in Panjab in the 1980s.

He is truly a lion among men.


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