Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -III

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ramana
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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby ramana » 31 Jan 2015 04:34

When Congress accepted Partition they settled for a truncated country.
They were weak.
It was SCB who dissuaded the British from staying.
Fear of BIA revolt following RIN was a strong factor.

Its not the same now.

Its the greater India that is needed for the betterment of the world.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby abhischekcc » 31 Jan 2015 08:52

Partition of India removed the most disturbing elements in India's body politic - muslim separatists. If those people had been pat of post-independent India, then e would have been a fragile country.

So partition truncated the nation physically, but strengthened its identity.

Inclusion of parts from a disintegrating pakistan must be only for those parts that have rejected the idea of pakistan - which is the political name of muslim separatism. Baloch and Sindhis may be ready for it. But that does not mean India is ready for re-unification. The Hindu identity is going to become far more crystalised in the coming years, and inclusion of such a large muslim population will not be acceptable to the body politic.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby abhischekcc » 31 Jan 2015 08:53

Ramana ji,

Reading your earlier posts in this thread, a question popped in my mind - is it possible for India to rise without the destruction of the west?

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby ramana » 31 Jan 2015 09:08

No. The West will play balance of power in Asia and lead to a repeat of mess. For this I don't mind rise of China that finishes West dominance in Asia. Read some where PVNR also felt but I don't know his reasons.
Congress Mukth Bharat will also help.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby johneeG » 31 Jan 2015 10:12

abhischekcc wrote:Partition of India removed the most disturbing elements in India's body politic - muslim separatists. If those people had been pat of post-independent India, then e would have been a fragile country.

So partition truncated the nation physically, but strengthened its identity.

Inclusion of parts from a disintegrating pakistan must be only for those parts that have rejected the idea of pakistan - which is the political name of muslim separatism. Baloch and Sindhis may be ready for it. But that does not mean India is ready for re-unification. The Hindu identity is going to become far more crystalised in the coming years, and inclusion of such a large muslim population will not be acceptable to the body politic.


I think people need to know some things:
a) All Muslims who stayed back in Bhaarath were not necessarily against muslim separatism.
b) All people who stayed in Pakistan were not necessarily in favour of creation of Pakistan or muslim separatism.
c) Muslim separatism can be both in favour and against creation of Pakistan.
d) People against creation of pakistan were not necessarily in favour of muslim assimilation into Bhaarath.

Pakistan was created for British interests. Nehru accepted it and even helped it. As long as Nehru was alive, there was no direct war between Pakistan and Bhaarath. In 1948 also, Nehru ji ended the conflict by going to UN.

However, it is true that Pakistan itself is a symbol and creature of muslim separatism. It is an attempt to negate its own ethnicity and imitate the Turks/Arabs/Persians due to islamic identity. But, despite its best attempts(even creating a separate nation), Pakistanis are learning that they can never become a Arab/Turk/Persian. They will remain Bhaarathiyas in ethnicity.

Link to post on that topic

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby devesh » 31 Jan 2015 10:46

abhischekcc wrote:Partition of India removed the most disturbing elements in India's body politic - muslim separatists. If those people had been pat of post-independent India, then e would have been a fragile country.

So partition truncated the nation physically, but strengthened its identity.

Inclusion of parts from a disintegrating pakistan must be only for those parts that have rejected the idea of pakistan - which is the political name of muslim separatism. Baloch and Sindhis may be ready for it. But that does not mean India is ready for re-unification. The Hindu identity is going to become far more crystalised in the coming years, and inclusion of such a large muslim population will not be acceptable to the body politic.



actually NO.

a nation with active enemies inside would only motivate the Hindus to further consolidate their identity and strengthen the Hindu basis of Indian/Bharatiya nationhood. instead, we chose escapism. consequently, our identity has been submerged under the secular rubric, while the enemies have preserved and further strengthened the "unity" of their identity.

I would even further argue that history is rarely what we think it will be. conventional views on projected history are almost always "underwhelming" in hindsight. Pakistan's sole reason for existence is destruction of Hindus from Indian subcontinent. whether we like it or not, Pak and BD will both continue to move in the direction of overt Jihad in all forms. Simply imposing tactical defeats like '71 is ultimately futile....as neither Pak nor BD have been deterred from Jihad by such an action. so, eventually both these states will have to be dealt with. because they will continue on the path to Jihadi consolidation. we will have to destroy the roots of Islamic power and remerge those parts back into the country. eliminate the theocracy. ruthlessly criticize and also criticism of the theology. guarantee "modern" rights to Muslim women (all women, but especially the M women to undermine and purge the Jihadi/Islamic "mard"). all this will have to be done under a State which sees its interest as served by the rollback of Islam from Bharat.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby johneeG » 31 Jan 2015 11:12

I think the first step is to support Indic Islam i.e. Islam without Arabic/Turkic/Persian cultural hegemony. Right now, Islam has become as euphemism for Arabic/Turkic/Persian culture. Its as if you can't be a muslim without imitating the Arabs/Turks/Persians.


----
Kaplan's theory seems to be that there are 3 separate entities in sub-continent:
a) Indus(i.e Sindh) river civilization
b) Ganga river civilization
c) south of Vindhya civilization

He seems to be saying that Bhaarath is as artificial as Pakistan. He seems to say that Bhaarath was also artificially united by the british. Otherwise, it would have been these 3 entities. Basically, he seems to be saying that entire sub-continent might be re-organizing.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby V_Raman » 31 Jan 2015 12:30

I think Kaplan is inspired by Shiva Trilogy ...

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby RoyG » 02 Feb 2015 00:57

ramana wrote:No. The West will play balance of power in Asia and lead to a repeat of mess. For this I don't mind rise of China that finishes West dominance in Asia. Read some where PVNR also felt but I don't know his reasons.
Congress Mukth Bharat will also help.


This is where our strategic thinkers like Chanakya really shine. We set boundaries for ourselves and tried not to provoke others. Waste of energy and resources. The Russians have started thinking the same way. We have to let others do the dirty work for us and salvage the pieces and grow stronger. Our long term objective will be to destroy the Judeo-Christian idea of the West.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby RamaY » 02 Feb 2015 04:12

^ Chanakya clearly said that one should empowering oneself over and above one's enemies/competitors and try to weaken the enemies/competitors.

The self declared red lines won't stop the competitors to acquire power and one fine day the red lines become useless.

Despite all its Western Universalism nonsense, West is the best student of Chanakya since Mauryas.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby RoyG » 02 Feb 2015 04:52

By boundaries, I meant pushing past South and South East Asia militarily. Red lines will be crossed and we have to give a befitting response.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby A_Gupta » 02 Aug 2015 02:22

Question: Is it even possible to gauge the impact on international investment in India, if India goes beyond low-intensity-combat (e.g., like on the LoC) and does something bigger to bloody Pakistan's nose for its on-going sponsorship of terrorism? It is important to understand this, I think, because PM Modi's economic plans for India over the next decade have a large requirement for foreign investment, in infrastructure and in manufacturing. Are there BRFers who have enough expertise to do this assessment? How would one even begin? Thanks!

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby johneeG » 02 Aug 2015 02:28

^^^ To make it useful one would have to calculate the cost of terrorism on Bhaarath. What is the economic loss to Bhaarath due to Pakistan sponsored terrorism from 1980s onwards? And then adjust it with inflation. Finally, then, compare it to the cost that the one-time war might have on economy.

I think a single war would be actually very beneficial to economy compared to a prolonged low-intensity covert proxy-war. A proxy-war doesn't kill an enemy. But, it drains the enemy.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby Abhay_S » 02 Aug 2015 02:33

johneeG wrote:I think the first step is to support Indic Islam i.e. Islam without Arabic/Turkic/Persian cultural hegemony. Right now, Islam has become as euphemism for Arabic/Turkic/Persian culture. Its as if you can't be a muslim without imitating the Arabs/Turks/Persians.


----
Kaplan's theory seems to be that there are 3 separate entities in sub-continent:
a) Indus(i.e Sindh) river civilization
b) Ganga river civilization
c) south of Vindhya civilization

He seems to be saying that Bhaarath is as artificial as Pakistan. He seems to say that Bhaarath was also artificially united by the british. Otherwise, it would have been these 3 entities. Basically, he seems to be saying that entire sub-continent might be re-organizing.



Kapalans not the first nor the last Westerner to think so.

Fareed Zakaria counters such BS.

http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asia-pacific/the_rediscovery_of_india

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby A_Gupta » 02 Aug 2015 04:28

johneeG wrote:^^^ To make it useful one would have to calculate the cost of terrorism on Bhaarath. What is the economic loss to Bhaarath due to Pakistan sponsored terrorism from 1980s onwards? And then adjust it with inflation. Finally, then, compare it to the cost that the one-time war might have on economy.

I think a single war would be actually very beneficial to economy compared to a prolonged low-intensity covert proxy-war. A proxy-war doesn't kill an enemy. But, it drains the enemy.


What happened in the past can't be changed. We have to calculate the cost of terrorism here on out and the cost to economic growth here on out, if India does nothing or only low-intensity-conflict versus if India takes some major step.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby RamaY » 02 Aug 2015 04:38

A_Gupta wrote:
johneeG wrote:^^^ To make it useful one would have to calculate the cost of terrorism on Bhaarath. What is the economic loss to Bhaarath due to Pakistan sponsored terrorism from 1980s onwards? And then adjust it with inflation. Finally, then, compare it to the cost that the one-time war might have on economy.

I think a single war would be actually very beneficial to economy compared to a prolonged low-intensity covert proxy-war. A proxy-war doesn't kill an enemy. But, it drains the enemy.


What happened in the past can't be changed. We have to calculate the cost of terrorism here on out and the cost to economic growth here on out, if India does nothing or only low-intensity-conflict versus if India takes some major step.


Let's assume another 11/26 like attack affects Indian GDP by 1% (Indian GDP grows at 7% rate instead of 8%). For a $2T economy, it translates to $20B.

Pakistan (with whomever' help) has sustained two long term terror insurgencies: one in Punjab and one in Kashmir. Each insurgency went for a nice 20Yrs.

Now let's assume the next insurgency goes for say 10Yrs. That means it costs India about $250B in cash plus anywhere between 20-30,000 lives.

Now what does it cost to engage Pakistan in a war that will essentially kill Pakistan once and for all?

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby Agnimitra » 29 Aug 2015 11:13

This has become a regular warning/lament -

Red fades to Saffron in Kerala

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby ramana » 31 Oct 2015 04:53

Instead of fretting, USI has war gamed a FSS!!

http://usiblog.in/2014/11/400/

An Overview

1. The brainstorming was premised on the festering geopolitical crises in West Asia and Af-Pak region and its wider ramifications for regional peace and security. Considering the volatility, complexity and level of uncertainty of the geostrategic environment, the setting was restricted to the short term, up to 2016. The setting provided a broad overview of the geopolitical and strategic trends in the Indo-Pacific, West Asia, Eurasia and Af-Pak regions and their impact on the emerging world order and balance of power. The central theme of the narrative devolved around strategic nuances of ethno-regional / sectarian conflicts in West Asia, escalation of jihadi violence in the Af-Pak region and the strained Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian relations.With that as a geo-strategic backdrop, the scenarios dilated on the specifics of threatsposed by ISIS in West Asia, escalation of violence in Syria and Palestine and their wider impact on regional geopolitics and security. The scenario covered the role of regional and extra regional players in the ensuing conflicts. Concurrent with West Asia crisis, the scenario also delved into the vitiated security situation in the Af-Pak region, its internal and external linkages and growing tensions among India – Pakistan – China. The setting sought to highlight the hybrid nature of asymmetric threats, its trans-national character and the role of state and non-state actors (NSAs), including extra regional players in conflict escalation and resolution. The setting provided participants a broad strategic framework to carry out in-depth analyses of the dynamics of conflicts in West Asia and Af-Pak region against a global backdrop. The scenario descriptions were designed to enable participants to do ‘role playing’ as heads of government of major players, prepare comprehensive assessments, discuss dilemmas, examine intention – capability co-relation and formulate comprehensive strategic response to achieve a desired outcome in keeping with respective national interests.

Aim

2. The aim of the brainstorming session was to analyse dynamics of conflicts in West Asia, Af-Pak region and Indo-Pak-Sino imbroglio; their impact on regional and national security and formulation of comprehensive response strategy in keeping with national interests.

Scope



3. The scope of the brainstorming session was:-



(a) Understanding dynamics of the emerging world order and its impact on the balance of power.

(b) Analysis of ethno-regional and sectarian conflicts in West Asia, their causes and effects.

(c) Analysis of the causes and effects of jihadi violence in Af-Pak region and Indian sub-continent.

(d) Dynamics of Pak – China strategic nexus and its implications for India.

(e) Role of extra regional players in the ensuing conflicts in West Asia and the Af-Pak region.

(f) Formulation of comprehensive assessments of emerging scenarios and evaluation of strategic options.

(g) Recommended strategic response for achieving the desired end state.



Highlights of Global Geo-Political Scan



b3



4. Geopolitics of Asia – Pacific Region (APR). It covered strategic and economic importance of Asia – Pacific Region, prevailing contested sovereignty between regional players over island territories, control over energy resources in contested territories and dominance of SLOCs. In brief, Asia Pivot/Rebalancing strategy of US, Counter Intervention strategy of China, East Asia Pivot of Russia, Look East policy of India and Swan Strategy of ASEAN were discussed. Interplay of these strategies portend conflict of strategic objectives of competing nations, leading to emerging alliances, strategic competition/ cooperation and security challenges in the region.



b4



5. Eurasia. It coveredstrategic and geopolitical developments in the region, in back drop of ongoing competition between the West (US & EU) and Russia, for expanding and domination of the region. It highlighted turmoil in the former Soviet Union states, in the backdrop of continued power struggle in the region and expanding influence of the Western world. Events leading to strategic rivalry between the US and its NATO allies on the one side and a resurgent Russia on the other, in the context of prevailing crisis in Ukraine were also discussed.



b5



6. West Asia. It covered geo-strategic and economic importance of the region, prevailing geopolitical shifts and internecine ethno – religious strife that have shaped and reshaped its political and security landscape. It highlightedpopular uprising against autocratic regimes and monarchies, cyclical crises in Palestinian, Libya and Yemen, and prevailing serious ethnic conflict in Iraq & Syria; and reshaping of the socio-political, economic and security landscapes of the region. Regional scan emphasized the prevailing complications and contradictions due to divergent interests of regional and extra regional players, glaring divide between regional players and competition to dominate the region; and deduced its implications on regional security scenarios. In brief, developments in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Israel were discussed, and its impact on regional stability and implications for India were highlighted.

7. South Asia. It highlighted diversity of region in terms of religion, ethnicity, language and political ideology. The South Asian landmass is connected to the IOR and its continental – maritime confluence imparts increased strategic importance, thus making it an important theatre for great power brinkmanship. Due to strategic importance of IOR, there is presence of regional and extra regional powers in the region to serve their strategic objectives in South Asia, Asia – Pacific and Middle East. This has further added to security challenges in the region. The region is also mired in internal security problems, unsettled territorial disputes, terrorism and nuclear arms race which place it under heightened security risks. The China has emerged as a key player in the region and draws political, diplomatic, economic and military concessions from the smaller regional countries, and fueled strategic competition. The present environment in the region is in ferment and suffers from elusive peace and fragile security. Thus, South Asia has emerged as one of the pivotal regions of Asia.

8. Af-Pak Region. It highlighted the prevailing instability in the region as it is the epicenter of global terrorism. This situation is worsened by ethnic divisions and the power play of regional and external players. It emphasized that post-US drawdown; socio-political stability in Afghanistan will remain fragile and prone to exploitation by jihadists and Pakistan. Pakistan also remains politically unstable, and this has further affected its continued fragile economic and internal security situation. In this prevailing uncertain security scenario, jihadists have further strengthened their hold over the Af-Pak region in general; and Waziristan including FATA, NWFP and adjoining eastern Afghanistan and Baluchistan in particular. Internal and external security and environmental dynamics of the region were also discussed.



Outline Scenario – 2016

West Asia

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9. This scenarios were painted in the time frame of 2016, highlighting developments in the region due to the interplay of strategic interests of regional and extra regional players. Following players were discussed:

(a) ISIS: Degraded but not defeated

(b) Iraq: Salvaging National Identity

(c) Syria: A Confused Melee

(d) Iran: The Covert Operator

(e) Saudi Arabia: The Beleaguered Kingdom

(f) Israel, Palestine, Lebanon: A Wider Conflagration

(g) The United States: Re-Entering the Quagmire

(h) Russia: A More Assertive Presence

(j) Turkey: ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ in Tatters

(k) Europe: Reluctance to Intervene

(l) China: A Study in Reticence

(k) Pakistan, Afghanistan: Wary of the ISIS Threat

(l) India: Walking the Tightrope

10. Triggers. Events in the region, which will set off important and sudden changes in regional and global geopolitics, were elucidated as triggers. These were:

(a) Kidnapping of foreign nationals in Iran and Syria by ISIS.

(b) Beheading of kidnapped US diplomatic staff in Syria by ISIS.

(c) In retaliation, US air offensive against ISIS in northern Syria and shooting down of a US fighter jet by the Syrian military.

(d) Russia and Iran joined the ensuing clash between the US and Assad regime and the situation escalated into a major standoff between the world’s big powers in the region.

(e) Suicide attacks on Shia religious places at Karbala and Najaf, killing of a number of Shias including a top Iranian cleric. This sparks off large-scale sectarian violence and killings in Iraq.

(f) Israeli air offensives into Syria in retaliation of rocket attacks on Golan Heights from the Syrian territory.

(g) Assassination of senior Syrian political leader, triggering widespread violence and instability in the country and the region.



Af-Pak Region

11. In the projected time frame of 2016, this scenario highlighted socio-political instability and the worsening security scenario in region. The region continues to be an epicenter of international terrorism and a major source of regional instability. Sectarian violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan against Shia community has strained their respective relations with Iran. Emergence of new alignment between Jihadi networks is posing a united and most formidable threat to the region. Vexed nature of contentious issues between India – Pakistan – China further complicate security dilemmas and these remain a potential source of state-to-state conflict. Following players were discussed:

(a) Afghanistan. It emphasised elusiveness of a viable political reconciliation in Afghanistan, despite formation of National Unity Government with power sharing between the two main political entities. The ANSF remains weak and maintains a semblance of security in Kandhar and other important towns. Ascendant Taliban continue to pose a major threat to state security and continues to enlarge its control. ‘State of Forces Agreement’ was signed and US and other countries are partially fulfilling their obligations of financial aid. US adopted a ‘Hub and Spoke’ deployment pattern, with the Bagram base at Kabul as hub. Jihadi groups have kept militancy on the boil in southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, and declared Nizam-e-Mustafa by imposing Sharia Law in the territory under their control. Interplay of primary objectives of US, Russia, China, Pakistan and India in Afghanistan were highlighted.

(b) Pakistan. It highlighted the Army’s influence in conducting state affairs, particularly in the domains of security and foreign policy, in the wake of the political crisis of 2014. Internal security scenario in the country remains fragile with fissiparous tendencies in Waziristan, Balochistan and the Northern Areas. TTP has not only reclaimed its influence in North Waziristan but commenced targeting civil and military installations within Pakistan. Security scenario in Baluchistan has also worsened and the Baluch Liberation Army has increased attacks against Pakistan military and Chinese workers in the area. Iran-Pakistan relations have worsened due to sporadic attacks by Jundallah on Iranian border towns. Chinese presence in the Northern Areas of POK has created unrest among the local Shia and Ismaili population. Pakistan openly blamed India and US for supporting separatist movements in Baluchistan and Northern areas. China has also enhanced military aid to Pakistan and its clandestine help to maintain Pakistan’s asymmetric edge in nuclear deterrence. China has conducted joint exercises with Pakistan Navy in Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea; and with Army in Northern Areas of POK under FCNA. Indo-Pak relations continue to be in a logjam. Its policy of using jihadis as a strategic weapon against India continues, and with internal situation in Pakistan further deteriorating, cross border attacks increased and ceasefire agreement virtually stands abrogated.

(c) China. It highlighted deteriorating internal situation due to public protests against corruption, media control, environmental degradation and displacement of people, in the wake of government policies directed at construction of new SEZs, townships and industries. Deteriorating internal security situation in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and alienation of the population due to use of force to quell the unrest were discussed in detail. Situation resulted in mobalisation of a military area command to Tibet. Chinese counsellor in the Indian capital was attacked and seriously injured. All these developments were interpreted by China as the handiwork of India and the US to project their country in poor light. China warned India not to permit its territory for anti-China activities. PLA mobilized two Group Armies from Chengdu and Lanzhou Military regions for Trans-Regional Support Operations (TRSO) Exercise, in Tibetan Plateau. The exercise coincided with a joint logistics exercise and airborne drills by PLAA.

(d) India.

(i) Indian government successfully implemented domestic reforms to usher in comprehensive national development, pursue proactive diplomacy and develop credible deterrence. Government is fully focused on modernization of armed forces, infrastructure development in border areas, encouraging domestic defence industry, creation of world class infrastructure and ensuring food, house and education for all. Despite political stability, India continues to face internal security challenges due to continued Proxy War in J&K, simmering insurgency in North East and Maoist-affected states.

(ii) The trajectory of India-China relations is showing an upward trend, albeit amid the shadow of dispute over the shared border. Both are working together to steer regional cooperation and advance their efforts to build the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) economic corridor. Despite Border Defence Agreement and other confidence building measures, Depsang-like incidents continue. China is livid over India deepening its strategic ties with Vietnam and Japan, while it is expanding engagements with India’s neighbours to disrupt the existing balance of power in the region in its favour. Thus, the two sides overtly talk sweet with each, but covertly continue to engage in a game of one-upmanship on the geostrategic chessboard. Indian initiated Project Mausam, aims at restoring India’s ancient maritime routes and cultural links in the region. This initiative has considerably improved India’s overall image in South Asia and IOR Rim States. A revitalized Indo-US relationship is focused on increasing bilateral trade and investment by removing barriers. The US is assisting India to strengthen its strategic capabilities for a potential role in IOR and Asian Region. India is effectively balancing its engagement with US and China, and with Russia further building on the “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”.

12. Triggers. Events in the region, which will set off important and sudden changes in regional and global geopolitics, were elucidated as triggers. These were:

(a) In Afghanistan, rocket attacks on Indian Embassy at Kabul on 15 August 2016, and the killing of five Indians in a sensational suicide attack in Herat. Terrorists also launched rocket attacks on Indian consulate building in Jalalabad, while a flag hoisting ceremony was in progress. All intelligence agencies are indicating the involvement of ISI.

(b) A car bomb attack on the Phiroze Jeejeebhoy Towers in Mumbai on 28 August 2016, which left 87 dead and more than 275 injured many of them serious. This was a direct attack on the economy of the country.

(c) The same day, a suicide attack at Ragunath Temple in Jammu took place. Three terrorists were killed and identified as Pakistani nationals. Five pilgrims including one constable died and 17 were injured. There was immediate condemnation and rage swept across the country, prompting a unanimous demand for strong action against Pakistan.

(d) On 12 Sep 2016, a Chinese counsellor was seriously injured in an attack. Delhi Police intercepted two cars from which militants had fired and in the ensuing firefight all five occupants were killed. Unconfirmed reports say all five were young and had Mongoloid features. The incident has further widened mistrust between the two countries.

(e) On 16 Sep 2016, simultaneous blasts at Dwarka, Rajiv Chowk and Noida metro stations rocked Delhi. Red alert has been sounded in all metropolitan cities and security enhanced at important installations and public places.

13. During first week of Sep 2016, India mobilized limited number of troops (as laid down in Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement) for the annual routine Operation Alert rehearsals on the Chinese border. As departure from the past, the IAF’s Operation Alert too coincides with ground forces. During this period Indian Navy was conducting joint maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal. There was unusual movement of PLA troops opposite Kameng, RALP, Sikkim and Ladakh. Insistence of Chinese patrols’ to use certain routes for patrolling via tracks on the Indian side is leading to tension at the border. They are also objecting to the location of some boundary markers and bunkers and have asked Indian troops to dismantle these structures. Indian troops, however, have resolutely prevented Chinese troops from altering the status quo. During this period, Indian Army’s surveillance and communication detachments reported erratic functioning of the systems. One of the crucial surveillance satellites too was malfunctioning.

14. Meeting of India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is in progress at Prime Minister’s Office, to review the situation and decide further course of action.











Requirement

15. All stakeholders (Iraq, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Russia, United States and India) were asked to give their assessment, options and strategy to deal with these scenarios. Requirements were:

(a) Assessment of the ongoing crises in the internal and external security of the country.

(b) Assessment of crises in the West Asia and Af-Pak regions and how are these likely to impact the county’s strategic interests?

(c) Visualised role of extra regional players in the West Asia and Af-Pak crises.

(d) SWOT analysis of state capacity vis-à-vis perceived threats and challenges.

(e) Strategy to deal with ongoing internal and external security scenarios and uphold the country’s strategic interests in the changing world order.

(f) Role of UN in conflict prevention/resolution, humanitarian assistance and peace building in West Asia and Af-Pak region; and options to defuse tensions between India-China-Pakistan.

Response

16. Iraq

(a) Focal point of Iraq’s strategy was based on social re-integration by political, security and economic means. It evaluated three strategic options – No outside troops, deployment of additional (outside) troops and de-facto trifurcation of Iraq.

(b) Iraq opted to choke financial support to ISIS and contain it by strengthening of National Guard and Sunni Tribes, as well as deployment of outside troops. It also planned to win hearts and minds of Sunni population by initiating effective CBMs.

(c) However, the following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Outside Support – Aerial attacks or combination of aerial attacks and foot on ground.

(ii) Trajectory of future US-Iran and Saudi Arabia-Iran relations.

(iii) Support of Iraq’s Sunni population and its integration Into Security Apparatus.

17. Syria

(a) Syria’s strategic choice was based on defeating ISIS and other opposition groups, followed by a political reconciliation process.

(c) However, the following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Support of Anti-Assad Opposition Groups by the West and Gulf countries.

(ii) Aerial attacks on ISIS or combination of aerial attacks with boots on the ground.

(ii) Trajectory of future US-Iran and Saudi Arabia-Iran relations.

18. Iran

(a) In Iraq, it maintains strong influence over new government, provides military aid and limited deployment of troops to degrade ISIS.

(b) In Syria, the survival of the Assad regime at all cost with unflinching and full-fledged support, also supported by Russia and China. It offers resistance to any adventurism by US.

(c) However, the following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Support of Anti-Assad Opposition Groups by the West and Gulf countries.

(ii) Success / failure of US efforts to defeat ISIS.

(ii) Breakthrough in US-Iran and Saudi Arabia-Iran relations.

19. Afghanistan. It has opted to address following issues to stabilise situation:

(a) Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation and reconstruction process.

(b) Economy growth, good governance, education, skill development and employment generation.

(c) Continued engagement of regional and extra-regional players for peace and stability.

(d) However, the following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Political reconciliation and stability of unity government.

(ii) Void created by US troop withdrawal, Taliban resurgence and capability of ANSF.

(ii) The role played by Pakistan.

20. Pakistan It adopted following strategy:

(a) Use Islam as a binding force to attain leadership of the Islamic world and act as a moderator with the West. Continue to exploit geostrategic location for GWOT. Leverage Afghanistan / Taliban for Strategic Depth.

(b) Exploit relations with USA & China to marginalize India.

(c) Exploit religious faultlines within India, keep the Kashmir-issue alive and divert Jehadis towards India. Thwart India’s offensive designs through nuclear deterrence and the support of China.

(d) Ensure internal stability by strengthening Governance/ Federal Structure.

(e) However following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Survival of democracy vis a vis influence of Army.

(ii) Control over Jihadi groups.

(iii) Economic survivability.

21. China It adopted following strategy:

(a) Address income inequalities and urbanisation through reforms. Control internal security situation in Xingjian and Tibet by promoting religious tolerance and integration of Uighurs & Tibetans in mainstream and power sharing arrangements. Check influence of Taliban and ISIS in Xingjian.

(b) Exploit sustained economic growth to ensure dominant role in global economy. Leverage infrastructural investments in South and South East Asian countries for national interests.

(c) Achieve energy security through spread of risks and improved land and maritime connectivity to energy sources.

(d) Continued military modernization to increase conventional and asymmetric reach to deter adversaries.

(e) In West Asia; exploit opportunity to increase influence in region. Support Iran in to dominate the region, Iraq in its re-construction & restoration of normalcy, and Syria in legitimacy of Assad regime. Support regional forces to defeat ISIS & anti Assad forces.

(f) Pakistan needs to be nurtured, as leverage against India. Increase military assistance to Pakistan Military.

(g) Resolve boundary dispute with India on own terms.

(h) However following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Internal security situation in general and control of situation in Xingjian and Tibet in particular.

(ii) Internal security situation and stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

(iii) Sustained economic growth.

(iv) US – China and China – India relations

22. Russia It adopted following strategy:

(a) Support stability in Afghanistan, no military involvement and infrastructural development only if paid for.

(b) Provide military support to Iran, Iraq and Syria, support international efforts to defeat ISIS and ensure Assad regime survivability.

(c) Expansionist design of West to Eastern Ukraine to be defeated.

23. United States It adopted following strategy:

(a) Lead international efforts to defeat ISIS by launching air attacks. Encourage regional forces to employ boots on the ground against ISIS. Support Iraqi and Kurdish forces in terms of intelligence, military aid and logistic; without getting directly involved.

(b) Restrain Iran going nuclear, and continue to have influence over Saudi Arabia and Israel.

(c) Saber retelling to bring down Assad regime, without making any efforts towards it.

(d) Enhance capability of ANSF in Afghanistan, and engage Russia and China in institution building and stability in the region.

(e) De-escalate Indo-China and Indo-Pak standoff, and avoid conflict.

24. India It adopted following strategy:

(a) In West Asia, remain ambivalent on crisis in Iraq and Syria, but support all efforts to defeat ISIS. Ensure safety and security of diaspora in West Asia. Mediate US-Iran talk for early finalization to safe guard national interests. Be prepared to support militarily under UN banner.

(b) In Afghanistan, continue soft power approach for capacity building in field of security, judiciary, education, health and agriculture.

(c) With China, build strong economic leverages and efforts to resolve boundary issue. Continue military modernization to deter any adventurous activities by China and Pakistan.

(d) With Pakistan, strong response to any adventurous activities

(e) However following critical uncertainties remain and may change the outcome:

(i) Deteriorating internal security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and control of TTP and Taliban respectively.

(ii) India-US, India-Japan and India-China relations and its trajectory in economic field.

(iii) India’s economic growth and internal stability.



(FOR FULL DETAILS OF STRATEGIC SCENARIOS CONTACT USI OF INDIA)

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby Samudragupta » 15 Jan 2016 19:02

Germany Needs a Permanent Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

The call for more German engagement in international security is not misguided. There are core interests to protect between Gibraltar and East Asia. As politics by other means, this includes showing the flag East of Suez.


Maritime Core Interests


Recently, James Rogers argued that European geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific is not European, but rather only British and French. He was right. However, with both countries’ political, social and economical travails, it is doubtful Paris and London will be able to accommodate their ambitions. In the name of European interests, other European states have to get involved; this applies in particular to Europe’s present economic powerhouse: Germany.
The Baltic, North Sea and North Atlantic are NATO/EU-inland-seas. Since 1991, they are not subject to military considerations and are therefore relatively safe. Germany’s maritime core interests are located in a corridor from Gibraltar through Suez and Malacca to the Ports of East Asia. Stability in the maritime arena is almost entirely provided by the US. However, a bankrupt America is unlikely to provide additional free-rides to the Europeans.


It’s For the Interests


The German Navy needs to contribute to stability and security in the Indian Ocean, because the world’s fourth largest economy is heavily dependent on exports and global trade. In 2012, the total value of all goods shipped from Europe to Asia was 816 billion Euros (Holslag 2013: 157). No doubt, Germany’s industry has done its share of this total value. Andrew Erickson, in addition, has outlined why the Indian Ocean is so important for Europe:




“The Indian Ocean is not just a source of raw materials; it is also a vital conduit for bringing those materials to market. Most notably, it is a key transit route for oil making its way from the Persian Gulf to consumers in Europe and Asia. Seventeen million barrels of oil a day (20 percent of the world’s oil supply and 93 percent of oil exported from the Gulf) transits by tanker through the Strait of Hormuz and into the western reaches of the Indian Ocean. (…) In terms of global trade, the Indian Ocean is a major waterway linking manufacturers in East Asia with markets in Europe, Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Asia–Europe shipping route, via the Indian Ocean, has recently displaced the transpacific route as the world’s largest containerized trading lane.” (A. Erickson: Diego Garcia, p. 23)

German vital interests, shared by its European and global partners, are therefore safe and secure sea-lanes. Needed are stability ashore and the absence of state and non-state sea-control, which could become hostile to German interests. Combating piracy and terrorism as well as contributing to disaster relief and mutual trust building are therefore security challenges Germany must tackle in the Indian Ocean to pursue its interest of geopolitical stability.

In addition, Germany has also resource interests in the Indian Ocean. Its deep sea is blessed with metal resources and Berlin is already working on gaining exploration rights. German research ships pay regular visits to the Indian Ocean. In the coming run for deep sea resources, Germany will not stay absent. When the deep sea mining starts (probably after 2020), the expensive ships are easy to target and very vulnerable. Due to Rare Earths, Manganese and Cobalt, mining in the Indian Ocean could become of extreme economic importance. Blue-water operating ships need blue-water protection, otherwise pirates, terrorists, criminals or even other states may conclude that the German ships are easy to capture.

Of course, the Indian Ocean’s resources will be subject to international diplomacy. However, diplomacy needs a backbone; often that is an economic, but sometimes it has to be a military one. If all you get from Berlin is words, nobody will pay attention to its interests. Showing the flag is therefore a way to make oneself heard.

Finally, Germany has an interest to sell its arms to the world’s most emerging defense market – Asia. Thus, an Indian Ocean presence is also a means to advertise the products of German shipyards to potential Asian customers.


Berlin’s New Stance


It seems that minds are slowly shifting in Berlin towards more German responsibility in international security. Thomas de Maizière, defense minister and potential 2014 NATO SecGen, is arguing for an end of Germany’s “Sonderrolle” and is promoting NATO reform. Moreover, a recent SWP/GMF-report, written by a numerous think tankers and policy-makers from all parties, says that Germany must lead more and show more organic initiative to contribute to a stable international order.During the summer, there were many op-eds in the German press which criticized the government’s passivity in global affairs, with special regard to Syria, and called for a more active foreign policy. One example is a comment published by the Berlin-based newspaper Der Tagesspiegel saying that Germany’s geopolitical reluctance has become grotesque. Slowly, public debate in Germany has started to change.


However, written words do not mean that things get done. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that Emily Haber, State Secretary in the Federal Foreign Office, gave a speech about Germany’s interests in the Indian Ocean. With a strong geopolitical and geo-economic emphasis, Mrs. Haber outlined that “the Indian Ocean will be the new center of the international limelight”. Due to the contrast to what you normally get from many German voices, Mrs. Haber’s speech is definitely worth quoting to show why the Indian Ocean is an area of German interests:


“What is Germany’s interest in that region? Just as China is connected to the Indian Ocean on its Eastern side by the Strait of Malacca, Germany and Europe are connected to it by the Suez Canal on its Western side. Neither China nor Germany is a rim country, but as the world’s strongest export nations we both have an eminent interest in open sea lanes of communication and free trade. (…) If we look at the economic data, Germany is – just like China – a strong trading partner for the Indian Ocean rim countries. Trade and economy hinge on security and stability. We realize that. (…) But when we state our interest in secure and stable conditions for trade and cooperation with Indian Ocean rim countries, and beyond, we believe it goes both ways. After all, we are the world’s largest and arguably most innovative free trade area, and the Indian Ocean is your pathway to it.”



We see Germany has significant interests in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, these are not in solely national interests, but rather shared with Berlin’s European and American allies and also with Indo-Pacific countries. (Sadly, different from other global capitals, the term Indo-Pacific is not used frequently in Berlin, yet. Even in the academic landscape, watching Asian geopolitics with an Indo-Pacific focus is rare.) It is time that Europe’s present economic powerhouse does its share to contribute active- and globally to a stable international order and to a peaceful use of the global commons. To be taken serious, German foreign policy must deliver more than calls (without consequences) for disarmament and arms control.

Djibouti or Diego Garcia?


Many Germans will scream out loud at the idea of a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, widely unrecognized, such a presence already started in 2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom 2002-10, Operation Atalanta 2009-present).In addition, German ships took part in NATO-SNMG port visits in the Indian Ocean. Bi-annually, the German and South African Navies hold joint exercises. After the 2004 Tsunami, a German supply ship went to Indonesia for disaster relief. Most notable, two times German frigates, Hessen in 2010 and Hamburg in 2013, operated in the Arabian Sea over several months in real(!) deployments of US carrier strike groups.

Worth mentioning is also the Hansa Stavanger incident. In April 2009, Somali pirates captured the German cargo ship and took the crew as hostages. From the US Navy LHD USS Boxer, German special forces (GSG 9) planned an assault to free the hostages. The mission was cancelled by Washington, because the Americans were fed up from political troubles in Berlin about the mission. However, Hansa Stavanger provides two maritime lessons to learn for the Germans. Number one, they need their own LHD/LPD or at least permanent access to one. Number two, a naval presence in the Indian Ocean is necessary not only to protect their interests, but also their fellow citizens (and those of allies and partners). Next time maybe the US Navy will not provide one of their expensive LHDs. The overstretched French and British could be incapable to help out.

Thus, the case for a permanent German naval presence is less spectacular than it seems. This article argues to extend what is already happening since more than ten years. The German Navy should operate one frigate or corvette based in Djibouti, if possible in cooperation with the French and other on-site navies. Submarines, SIGINT ships, surveillance planes and supply ships could be send whenever necessary. As Germany considers buying one or two LPD and developing amphibious cooperation projections with Poland and the Netherlands, a joint German-Dutch-Polish expeditionary task force might be an idea worth discussing.

Instead of Djibouti, the US naval and air base Diego Garcia is a considerable location. Having already cooperated with the US in the Indian Ocean, Germany could base a frigate there. Such a move would strengthen its relationship with its closest non-European ally. Moreover, the US base is more reliable and safer than Djibouti. There is no terrorist threat on the island or the possibility of a government kicking the Germans out. From a strategic perspective, there is no reason why the United States should not welcome a German presence on Diego Garcia, because Europe is much dependent on the Indian Ocean than America.


“However, as noted previously, many of America’s allies and key trading partners in Europe and East Asia are highly dependent on the Indian Ocean for energy. Similarly, with respect to the goods trade, the Indian Ocean is also a far more important conduit for the nations of East Asia and Europe than it is for the United States. Thus the strategic importance of the IOR to the US is not based on its direct impact on America, but on its importance for key US allies and partners. In so far as developments in the IOR affect key allies and partners in Europe and East Asia, who depend on the region energy and trade flows, they are of importance to the United States.” (A. Erickson: Diego Garcia, p. 24)


Any US reluctance to give access to Diego Garcia should be countered with the argument, that it was Washington which was calling for more European and German global engagement. Now, when Germany wants to do something, America should not close the door.

The location in Djibouti is much closer to the vital sea-lanes, while Diego Garcia offers greater flexibility. Therefore, if the German Navy should seek for access to both bases. Diego Garcia is closer to the deep sea claims. However, there will be no German naval operations to secure claims by force. Nevertheless, Germany should be able to act in areas of its interest, to protect its vessels against pirates, and to conduct search and rescue missions.

Even if minds in Berlin have slowly started to shift, nobody should be afraid of the Germans. There will be no national operations using force to oppose Berlin’s will on other countries, due to the legal situation and political culture. Frankly, Germany will not strike Dubai to stop the money laundry. Moreover, the scope of operations is limited, due the tyranny of distance and capabilities; East of Malacca tours are unlikely. Any German presence is about showing the flag to demonstrate political will and to protect vital interests like safe sea-lanes.

How to Remove Political and Legal Obstacles


Constitutionally, present German laws for expeditionary missions are still based on the supreme court’s 1994 “out-of-area decision”. According to the ruling, Germany can send troops abroad using force only in missions of international organizations (UN, NATO, EU). National missions involving the use of force abroad are forbidden, with the exception of rescuing citizens (so done in Albania 1997). Legally, Germany is not allowed to go alone for strike missions like Britain in Sierra Leone or France in Mali.Present discussions about Pooling+Sharing and German contributions to NATO capabilities (AWACS, SNMG, staff) show the limits of this legal basis. If Germany wants more NATO/EU-cooperation to work, it must change either the laws for parliamentary approval or even the constitution. Berlin is now (rightly) seen as an unreliable partner.However, right now there is a window of opportunity to change. The coming Grand Coalition has a 4/5 majority in the Bundestag. Necessary for constitution changes is a 2/3 majority. Thus, the situation for Merkel’s government is more than comfortable. Getting the Green Party to join the vote in the second house (Bundesrat) may be the tougher, but possible job.The German constitution should be changed in two ways. Firstly, it should remove present obstacles to German contributions in NATO and EU. Moreover, it should allow permanent expeditionary basing of troops, with the use of force restricted to defensive measures and saving citizens, as long as there is no international mandate for other tasks. Bundestag should get the competence to decide about expeditionary basing, either unlimited or limited in years, but with the right to bring the troops home at any time. In addition, the Bundestag has to approve the necessary funds anyway. No money, no navy.Finally, I now expect the worrywarts to challenge my case with legal and political arguments: legally difficult, politically impossible, too US-friendly and so on. However, maybe the worrywarts should start to recognize how, as outlined above, international order and German debate are changing. Time for them and for German policy-makers to adapt to a geopolitical environment, which requires Germany to do more in global and Indian Ocean affairs.



http://cimsec.org/germany-needs-permane ... ocean/8518

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby NRao » 06 Feb 2016 09:57

Very smart. I love this guy. "Silk".

India can strike at Pathankot masterminds at a time of its own choosing: Manohar Parrikar tells Aap Ki Adalat

"You have to plan, Here I have named individual and organisation, and have not named any country, because if it's against a country, then it means war. We want to teach a lesson to the individual. Where and when, that will be our choice,” Parrikar said.


Start. Cold or hot does not matter what anyone thinks. We will get it done. Nothing personal against a people, only one or two persons.

:rotfl:

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has said that India can strike back at those who masterminded the Pathankot air base attack at a time of its own choosing. "Selection of time will depend on creation of capabilities and our choice. That is very important," he said.

Replying to questions from Rajat Sharma in the show Aap Ki Adalat, to be telecast on India TV this weekend, Parrikar, however, was careful to clarify that this planning was not aimed at any neighbouring country.

"You have to plan, Here I have named individual and organisation, and have not named any country, because if it's against a country, then it means war. We want to teach a lesson to the individual. Where and when, that will be our choice,” Parrikar said.

Asked why India has not launched a counter-attack against terror camps in Pakistan after the Pathankot air base incident, Parrikar said: "How do you know where we should strike and where we should not. Such things are not disclosed in public. We must have the capability. And Pakistan...I will not name any country...They take sort of fights with us by sending terrorists. Such people need to be taught a lesson. There is no question mark in it. But when, how and at what time, should be decided based on our convenience.

"I can assure you, on a different level, this has already been achieved. You see the overall scenario of terrorist incidents. Why did they come to Punjab, because in Jammu-Kashmir, there is the army, and the army has neutralized them to a large extent. The ratio of our losses compared to killing of terrorists is widening quite big now. Earlier it was 1:1, now it is 1:4, and even that should not happen. It should come lower than that. So, we have initiated many counter measures there. Pathankot was a high-publicity high-value target, and I think now that we have begun replying, they have learnt to an extent. If some groups have not learnt, I can assure you they will understand that soon, but I will not do that by disclosing it now."

Asked why India was not carrying out cross-border strike against terror camps as it did against the NSCN(K) rebels inside Myanmar, Parrikar said, he would not disclose much in such matters, otherwise "the surprise element will be gone".

"Once it happens, you will come to know about it. In the North-East, those who attacked our 6 Dogra (regiment)... we didn't tell them what we were going to do.

"...In Myanmar, the incident that you are quoting about, when we'll do, how we'll do and where we'll do, I can't tell you the exact spot where we did it. We did not make any advance briefing to the media about it. What you are saying is post-facto. Secondly, your assumption is based on various information that it took place at a particular spot, but we don't divulge that. But we did it because we had proper intelligence, proper capability and the time was right," Parrikar said.

The Defence Minister said: "I am still saying what I said earlier that those who inflict pain on us, we will definitely inflict pain back on them. Because they will not understand, unless pain is inflicted on them. ..but here I am adding a clause, I will not disclose where, when and how..it's our choice."

When Rajat Sharma pointed out that the Pathankot attackers had rehearsed the attack at a Pakistani airbase, Parrikar replied: "I can tell you this much that their pushers were in Pakistan. I can't reveal the details, because as we say, no one tells the world what you do and what happens inside a bedroom. So in such operations, nothing is revealed to the world, but we will do it surely."

Asked why the army was not carrying out cross-border strike as the US did to kill Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan, Parrikar said: "The US took four to five years to locate Osama bin Laden, and to clear their doubts about his location, it took another one and a half years to plan the operation. When the US planned an operation inside Iran, their helicopter crashed in the desert and they faced humiliation.

"I am only saying that the operation that we plan, or whatever we are doing, I am not saying against Pakistan or any camp, there should be perfect planning, and it has to take care of everything. Your information should be perfect. Everybody has general information, and specific information plan a more important role."

The Defence Minister went to the extent of saying that India "was losing much of its patience" and "we would respond to the terror attacks with vigour" (eent ka jawaab patthar se denge).

Parrikar said there has been fresh information that some of the Pathankot attackers were inside the airbase even before the intelligence was received. "Some people have inferred wrongly about the gaps that I had mentioned. The airbase has a 25 kilometre periphery, and they should not have entered, but we got advance information only 10-12 hours earlier. Now more information has come saying probably they (attackers) were in before the intelligence was received by us. Anyway that will be investigated by agencies and things will be clear. That is the gap which I was saying.

"But the success of operation was that we were able to corner them and kill all of them. It was not easy. Six people, who had come with very clear intentions that they will lose their lives can actually do many damaging things which we did not allow, that is the success part of it. But this will not stop here. Why should we be defensive? People who sent them here have to be taught a lesson," he said.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in Rajat Sharma's show Aap Ki Adalat will be telecast on India TV on Saturday, February 6 at 10 pm. The repeat telecasts will be on Sunday, Feb 7 at 10 am and 10 pm.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby devesh » 07 Feb 2016 02:36

abhischekcc wrote:Partition of India removed the most disturbing elements in India's body politic - muslim separatists. If those people had been pat of post-independent India, then e would have been a fragile country.

So partition truncated the nation physically, but strengthened its identity.

Inclusion of parts from a disintegrating pakistan must be only for those parts that have rejected the idea of pakistan - which is the political name of muslim separatism. Baloch and Sindhis may be ready for it. But that does not mean India is ready for re-unification. The Hindu identity is going to become far more crystalised in the coming years, and inclusion of such a large muslim population will not be acceptable to the body politic.


not true. think about why Indians in US send their kids to Chinmaya mission or the countless other Hindu religious orgs to learn the basics?

in India, most kids of this generation in urban middle-class backgrounds lack even the most basic understanding of our rituals and traditions. you're likely to find the opposite in USA. why is this? especially since Hindus in USA are surrounded by the vast American melting pot, mainstream christianity that is very pervasive in politics and social culture, and secularist memes.

when you are forced to confront people who are different and who proudly proclaim their difference, you don't lose your identity. actually, your own sense of identity becomes stronger. you develop more commitment to maintain your identity.

By creating the truncated India, Hindus were lulled into a false sense of security which they actually don't enjoy. and simultaneously we lost sovereignty over parts of our country which have become entrenched with Islam and Jihadi memes through generations of propaganda.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby devesh » 07 Feb 2016 02:43

even now, the rise of Christian belligerence in India is actually resulting in an opposite polarization among Hindus. I have personally seen Hindu religious orgs adopting more direct approaches in how they deal with it. a prominent Swamiji in the South recently told his flock that "we must learn to differentiate between 'internal' and 'secular' issues. we cannot let Christians or Muslims use our 'internal' issues against us. These are to be handled by 'us'". In short, don't air your dirty laundry in public which helps enemies target us. I was astonished. I have known this swamiji for 15 years, and seeing his "path" over last few years is very interesting.

We must deal with the rot instead of pretending it doesn't exist.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby harbans » 09 Feb 2016 10:16

IN that Kaplan map above (rather last page) few points:

Almost all the region above the Ganges and below UKh/Nepal today has demographically slipped out of the hands of Dharmics. Muslims will be about 40-50% in that region. North Bengal is already demographically compromised.
Kashmir should never be shown the way it is being shown. LAdhak/ Jammu must be shown separately. The valley is just about the size of NCR. In any analysis, its better to internalize these facts.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby svinayak » 09 Feb 2016 10:36

abhischekcc wrote:Kaplan is usually a very perceptive commentator, but I am surprised at this article - looks like written by somebody of much lesser calibre. It could be that since Kaplan is not an expert on Indian history, and because he had to read up on the region in a hurry, he has not thought through his points thoroughly.

Islamist is India would rise when Pakistan starts breaking. The UP-Bihar muslims were the forefathers and the will agitate and will come down after some anarchy

External powers will try to take advantage of the anarchy and chaos of Pak breaking.

Kaplan usually relies on social-political analysis done by others. Complex society like India is tough for many western analysts.

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Re: Future Strategic Scenario for the Indian Subcontinent -I

Postby ramana » 11 Feb 2016 06:39

Its 2016. Time to read the above scenario and see how it matches the unfolding events.

viewtopic.php?p=1924552#p1924552


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