Here's a counter-strategy for India and the IN,to deply IN assets in the Indo-China SEa and needle China the same way it has been doing wiht us in the nountains.The author,a former naval officer,says that we "can't keep China out of the IOR and ":sea-denial" may be difficult,facing local objections.However,just "showing the flag"in the Indo-China Sea does NOT resolve the issue of Chinese subs and warships operating offensively in the IOR,using its bases at Gwadar,etc.and interfering with India's maritime trade,etc. It is very strenuously wooing Burma and Suu Kyi,who has excellent relations with India.Are we allowing another friend to slip out of our influence here too?
India must pursue a strategy of "tous azimuts",as enunciated by the French Gen.Charles Ailleret in 1967 and later espoused by Gen,De Gaulle.
In the French context,it envisioned a large number of megaton ICBMs with a world-wide range and increased dev./numbers of SSBNs, as one had to be "prepared for attack not from anyone in particular,but aimed at all points of the compass" We have to therefore proceed on the assumption that in the event of a conflict with China-Pak,domination of the IOR is absolutely vital and leveraging the landmass of India (and island territories) as an unsinkable carrier,from where LRMPs can operate equipped with ASW and anti-ship LR missiles to detect and destroy any surface and UW PLAN/PN assets. Furthermore,the A&N islands must also serve as a springboard for the IN to operate in the Indo-China Sea,also using base/support naval and air facilities in the littoral countries of the ICS also threatened by China. This latter part is what the author of the article below espouses.
Therefore within the IOR we have to exercise both sea control AND sea denial,and without,in the waters of the Asia-Pacific,disrupt and destroy the enemy wherever he is found,using large numbers of nuclear and AIP subs in particular,along with LR missiles launched from LRMP/strike aircraft and warships."Attack being the best form of defence".
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/YLTJRie ... egion.html
Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region
Maritime power projection, and not sea denial, is the answer to China’s creeping assertiveness in South Asia
Abhijit Singh
The Malabar naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal last week is seen by many as a maritime response to China’s aggression in Dokalam. Photo: PTI
The “Malabar” naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal came to an end earlier this week with a close formation drill involving Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the US flat-top Nimitz, and Japan’s new helicopter carrier, the JS Izumo. The expansive scope and complexity of the engagement led many to portray Malabar 2017 as a maritime response to China’s aggression in Dokalam where the Indian Army and People’s Liberation Army troops remain locked in a tense stalemate.
Indeed, with over 20 ships, including two submarines and over 100 aircraft and helicopters involved in complex manoeuvres, the strategic messaging to China seemed more than clear. Notably, Indian commentators cast Malabar as a strategic precursor to a more proactive sea-denial strategy aimed at challenging People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean.
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In the run-up to Malabar, the media had reported a “surge” in Chinese naval presence in the subcontinental littorals. PLAN units prowling India’s near-seas reportedly included the Luyang III class destroyers, hydrographic research vessels, and an intelligence-gathering ship, Haiwingxing, presumably to keep track of naval ships taking part in the trilateral exercises. But Indian analysts seemed more distressed by the reported presence of a Chinese conventional submarine in the Indian seas, confirmed by the docking of the Chongmingdao, a submarine support vessel, in Karachi last month.
For many Indian observers, the emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises in Malabar is a sign of India’s growing willingness to leverage its maritime partnerships in Asia to counter PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean. Not surprisingly, much of the commentary in the Indian media highlighted exercises involving P-8I and P-8A reconnaissance aircraft, MiG-29K fighters and Japanese ASW helicopters, lending credence to accounts that an Indian “sea-denial” strategy was at work in the Bay of Bengal.
Yet, there is something essentially flawed about the idea that Indian naval power can prevent Chinese warships and submarines from accessing India’s near-seas. Modern-day trading nations regard the oceans as a shared global common, with equal opportunity rights for all user states. Consequently, unless a sea-space is a site of overlapping claims (as in the case of the South China Sea) or a contested enclave in a geopolitically troubled spot (as the Persian Gulf), no coastal state ever actively denies another the use of the high seas.
This balance only changes during war, when navies seek to block adversaries from entering critical sea spaces in the contested littorals. During peace-time operations, however, maritime forces enjoy assured access to the seas that lie beyond national territorial waters (even if a coastal state insists on prior notification).
Given Beijing’s key role in the politics and geoeconomics of the Indian Ocean region, a peacetime plan to deny its warships entry into India’s surrounding seas is unlikely to succeed. With the PLAN expanding its diplomatic engagements along the Indian Ocean rim, many regional states have been welcoming of Beijing’s maritime initiatives and investments in the Indian Ocean. India’s plans to constrain Chinese naval power in South Asia are bound to meet with regional opposition. *(This is where our diplomacy has often failed us in not anticipating Chinese ventures and ignoring offers amde to us first by littoral countries)
New Delhi, in fact, might do well to take a leaf out of Beijing’s maritime playbook by leveraging naval operations for geopolitical purposes. In recent years, the PLAN has sought to project power in the Indian Ocean region through a constant naval presence in India’s near-seas. By refusing to accept the Indian Ocean as an Indian backwater, it has made successful inroads into India’s geopolitical sphere of influence. India too must now resort to a strategy of counter-power projection by expanding the scope of its naval deployments in the South China Sea, long considered a Chinese preserve.
Raising the tempo of Indian naval operations in South-East Asia does not mean challenging China’s naval might in the Western Pacific. By gradually expanding security presence along the critical sea lanes of the Western Pacific, the Indian Navy must plan to use the South China Sea’s geopolitically sensitive spaces for the strategic power projection.
Such a strategy is bound to have a deterrent effect on China’s naval posture in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing’s constraints in opposing Indian maritime presence in the Western Pacific are similar to New Delhi’s limitations in the Indian Ocean, where the Indian Navy has struggled to offer push-back to China.
What’s different is that Beijing’s political and territorial ambitions in the South China Sea make it far more sensitive to naval forays by unfriendly states. After an arbitral tribunal’s ruling in July last year invalidated many of China’s historical rights within the nine-dash line, Beijing has been extremely cagey about perceived challenges to its authority in the waters of the South China Sea.
China’s vulnerability in its near-seas must be taken advantage of by India. To challenge PLAN incursions into the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy must plan for counter-presence in China’s near-seas, where Beijing cannot prove a territorial infringement, and yet feel the pinch of a perceived violation of its political sphere of influence.
India’s maritime planners know well that a nuanced high-seas presence in the Western Pacific is unlikely to ever cross the threshold of provocation which could lead to full-fledged conflict with China. Nagging Indian naval presence in the South China Sea is better suited to signal Indian resolve than any attempt to deny PLAN assets access into maritime South Asia.
Abhijit Singh is head of the maritime policy initiative at the Observer Research Foundation and a former naval officer.
First Published: Thu, Jul 20 2017.
PS
:Repeated ad nauseum.Send Dr.SS forthwith to Taipei!
Items for discussion:
1.Immediate establishment of a large "Indian Trade and Cultural Centre",which would act as a de-facto embassy. Yaiwan to be allowed the same in Delhi.
2.Indo-Taiwan defence cooperation.Sale of Indian weapon systems to Taiwan,including transfer of Indian developed tactical missiles,warships and sub technology for Taiwan's indigenous sub programme. We could pass on much of the U-209 tech/design as the Germans,without our permission,sold them to the racist S.African regime decades ago!
3.Immediate joint intel cooperation.Chinese speaking Taiwanese intel/cyber experts operating in India ,monitoring Chinese SIGINT/COMINT ,assisting our NTRO,would be invaluable intercepting,monitoring and decoding Chinese commns.,esp in the Tibetan theatre and ICS/IOR. Such assistance would be invaluable as we do not possess enough Chinese speaking human resources both in the MEA and MOD/services/intle agencies.
4.Expanded trade with Taiwan,esp. in IC tech/production,increased Taiwanese investment in India,just as we're offering Israel.
5.Direct flights to Taiwan from India,or via ASEAN nations such as Vietnam. Increased two-way tourism.
Why would Tibetans consider IA as enemy?