Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[SSridhar]

US President Donald Trump slams Pakistan; China backs Islamabad - Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Economic Times

But hours after US warning Pakistan’s all-weather ally China came to its rescue. “(On) President Trump’s remarks on Pakistan, I should say that Pakistanis at the frontline of fighting terrorism, has made sacrifices in fighting terrorism, making an important contribution to upholding peace and stability,” chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said.

The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson is very active. Seems to have a press meet 24 X 7 !!

[Singha]

this is where tsangpo executes a 180 turn

https://earth.google.com/web/@29.804050 ... XZlchgBIAE

immense forces and fault lines when the himalayas pressed up against the eurasian plate (of which tibet is the edge) must have lifted up the western china region to tilt all rivers to flow to the S and SE instead of east into mainland china.

[ldev]

The thrust of my earlier messages on this topic was that India needs a conventional attack capability that can target the Chinese heartland and coastal areas which is the center of gravity for Chinese economic power. And this has to be in response to an equivalent Chinese capability which can target the Indian heartland. In the absence of that capability, India needs space to maneuver and that's how the concept of a buffer came up. Frankly it is easier to build up that long range stand-off conventional capability rather than try and wrest control of any part of Tibet from China. But that does not mean that India should not make every effort to try and destabilize Chinese control over Tibet.....

[ldev]

I am not opposed to Tibet joining India as it is an Indic civilizational cousin, but it won't be a "buffer" to anything. India's value add will be to let the Tibetans preserve their culture and civilization and be free.

Please, it is such Asian "civilizational" solidarity and brotherhood talk by Banditji which got India the raw deal vs Tibet. There is only one language you need when you speak to China and that is the language of hard power. And if Tibet has to be used as a buffer to protect the rest of India, so be it.

[Singha]

Tibet hardships are overrated. It has plenty of water in the south and does not get much snow unlike our side. I have never heard of quakes there nor floods and landslides.

[shiv]

On the general subject of buffers we can have as borders
1. river buffer
2. mountain range buffer
3. desert buffer
4. ocean buffer
5. buffer state

India has river buffer (Indus) and mountain buffer (himalaya) and ocean buffer over large parts of its borders, but India is too warm and green for people from harsh countries to resist coming in as invaders or refugees

USA and UK have ocean buffer

Baluchistan has been desert buffer. Gobi too is a desert buffer

A buffer state is like a beautiful woman living in a house with a suitor on either side. She can choose to go with one, or one can simply take her over, or one can marry her while the other has an affair with her. India's relationship with Tibet is that China has forced her into marriage but India maintains conjugal relations with her. Historically she did not want either India or China.

But the relationship of both India and China with Tibet are complicated by mountain buffers between both countries and Tibet. That is like marrying or having an affair with a lady who has an electrified fence and gate around her house. That makes the logistics of occupation/cohabitation very difficult for both suitors.

[shiv]

Tibet hardships are overrated. It has plenty of water in the south and does not get much snow unlike our side. I have never heard of quakes there nor floods and landslides.

It's not water. It's about air. After 60 years of occupation the Chinese have barely managed to keep a million Hans there - in an area that is almost equal to eastern China which has 1300 million people. Saying that "hardships are overrated" is like saying hardships of making love to an elephant are overrated. Got to try it first

[UlanBatori]

IMO the focus on Uttar Dharamsala and Aksai Hind is misplaced. Why invade such hostile terrain with impossible logistics when the IA's conventional forces (land armor + amphibious/river-hopping) can easily cut across Myanmar (with permission, I presume) and reach Kunming and link up with Vietnamese comrades? A force of a million can be poured in through that route, while holding actions / small pincer moves are fought in the Himalayas. Once Kunming is kaput, the eastern Tibet Han presence becomes unsustainable, and once Tibet is freed by that route, Xinjiang collapses in short order. Hana will be limited to the territory east of 100 E. Long.
China's population/industry centers are not so buffered as they imagine. Myanmar will allow Indian forces to transit, IMO (already demonstrated with the "surgical strike"). Even BD will, for that matter.

[shiv]

Yak herder - the best thing is to expedite the railway from eastern India via Myanmar to Thailand. The problem is that mountains and rivers run north-south - so the model will have to be "bridge-tunnel-bridge". This is expensive and India will not use the China model of "we put in the money and you stay obliged to us forever." That is the OBOR/CPEC model. Not using the OBOR/CPEC model means that countries like Myanmar have to accept easy terms where they can pay back loans within their capacity - which is much more slow than the OBOR model.

[Bade]

We have Tibetan colonies in dharmasala as well as whole of Arunachal and they being mountain people can re-populate Tibet. Tibet does not have to be officially part of the Indian Union, but just a protectorate of India like Bhutan. Tibet can be autonomous for internal affairs and depend on India for its defence, with substantial military presence. We are close enough to all southern habitable stretches of occupied Tibet to be able to supply them far more easily than the Chinese could once it is wrested out of Chinese control.

[Karthik S]

Myanmar and Thailand are very much into Chinese camp, ex China will be building $5B HSR in Thailand soon. I don't think they'll assist us.

[shiv]

Myanmar and Thailand are very much into Chinese camp, ex China will be building $5B HSR in Thailand soon. I don't think they'll assist us.

Not really. Myanmar and Thailand are dealing with India as well and not specifically siding with China. The Chinese will build that railway because north to south is easier - going parallel to mountain ranges and river valleys. High speed rail requires relatively straight stretches of track - best on flat terrain. But the Indian railway line is east to west. It will take time, be slower but will open up a new trade and tourism route. Thailand earns a lot from Indian tourists and trade.

One thing I notice across the board in discussions on here is complete ignorance of geography in relation to transport/logistics.

[SSridhar]

Doklam stalemate may continue, say officials - Dinakar Peri, The Hindu

The stalemate at Doklam is likely to continue till the BRICS summit early next month, Defence Ministry officials believe.

“Though there may not be any talks on the standoff, there is likely to be some covert discussion in the backdrop of the summit. After that, we hope there will be some steps from both sides to address the situation,” a senior official said. China is hosting the 9th BRICS Summit at Xiamen in the Fujian Province from August 31 to September 4.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to attend, though India is yet to confirm it.

Officials caution

However, officials cautioned against minor incidents flaring up across the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Last week, the patrol teams of the two armies got into an ugly clash at the Pangong lake in eastern Ladakh when Chinese soldiers tried to enter Indian territory. A video which surfaced later showed the two sides engaging in fisticuffs and stone throwing.

To avoid any inadvertent escalation of local incidents, the Army has instructed its troops on the ground not to respond to provocations. “They [China] could attempt things locally. The alert levels are high and we know the potential areas where such incidents can occur,” the official stated.

Major areas

There are 12 major areas of dispute along the over 4,000-km LAC. The two armies have been engaged in a standoff at Doklam near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction since June 16.

[RKumar]

How about India arresting some isolated island from Japan, Philippines and Vietnam with mutual consent?

Than just dump theses with basic air defence but large quantity of CM/BM missiles. Let these missiles loose as tension arise above certain threshold.

Only this can ensure that Chinese back track from Myanmar, BD, SL, Maldives as well as Terrorist state before we handover the islands back to their respective rightful owners.

[SSridhar]

Myanmar and Thailand are very much into Chinese camp, ex China will be building $5B HSR in Thailand soon. I don't think they'll assist us.

Both these countries do *not* want to be completely under the Chinese thumb, both for historical and current reasons. The delay in the projects stem largely from the inability of India to focus on them.

Most countries in the region do recognize India as somebody not to ignore for economic, historical and cultural reasons.

[Singha]

just because someone builds a rail or port at their own cost does not mean these Govts are going be vassals . both of them are canny enough to take what is coming for free but maintain their independence. even SL has 'balanced' hamabantota by giving us the airport now.

cheen has build or owned port in panama but are they a colony? even botswana has pushed back saying their are not a colony and HH Dalai lama visit is on.

ppl pay too much heed to chequebook. these smaller canny countries are very agile and know how to balance competing interests

[Hari Seldon]

Heck, Indian control of key Himalayan passes is required even from a humanitarian POV.

To aid Tibetian refugees fleeing horrific Cheeni persecution. JMTPs etc.

[manjgu]

also people dont understand that oxygen levels in winters are even lower than in summers when there is more greenery...yes the principal hardships are a) air..oxygen b) cold c) access

[Philip]

In ultra-hostile battle environments such as Siachen,etc.,the future is developing a "bot-army".Robots which can assist/replace humans for some tasks,esp. surveillance,auto-defences against air attacks,perimeter defence,etc.Developing tech that can withstand such extreme cold is going to be hard going,but such bots,including UAVs,unmanned helos for casevac,etc.,will be able to carry larger loads at high alt.Something for our boffins to work on.

[SSridhar]

China struggles to revive its industrial heartland - Michael Schuman, NYT

[tandav]

In ultra-hostile battle environments such as Siachen,etc.,the future is developing a "bot-army".Robots which can assist/replace humans for some tasks,esp. surveillance,auto-defences against air attacks,perimeter defence,etc.Developing tech that can withstand such extreme cold is going to be hard going,but such bots,including UAVs,unmanned helos for casevac,etc.,will be able to carry larger loads at high alt.Something for our boffins to work on.

The battle of the BOTs is likely in these Himalayan frontiers... and it is in these harsh environments where AI and Robots will play a significant role and China does have a large advantage on this front as of now.

[nandakumar]

China struggles to revive its industrial heartland - Michael Schuman, NYT

"The factory, and the more than 200 jobs it has created, is just one small part of a grand plan led by China’s government to rejuvenate the city of eight million, by replacing stumbling state industries with modern manufacturing and start-up companies."
Well they will need 20000 such units in this city alone assuming only half the population as workforce. That will be a lot of BMWs and such other goods.

[shiv]

All Xi’s men: China’s armies get new commanders

China recently confirmed 26 new commanders in the People’s Liberation Army’s 13 group armies that saw not a single leader staying with his old unit, with most receiving postings to far away regions from their theater of command.

Why the shake up in its armed forces, the world’s largest with 2.3 million personnel, when there are conflicts brewing on China’s left and right flanks?

In April, the PLA eliminated five group armies, in keeping with its modernization plan to prune the ground force to make it a more versatile and combat-capable organization.

At present, each of China’s five theaters of command control two to three group armies.


Each has combat and non-combat units divided into the following: infantry, armor, artillery, anti-aircraft warfare, anti-chemical warfare, cyber warfare, army aviation, engineer, communications, transportation, pontoon bridge construction, education and training, military hospitals, and arts troupe.

The size of a group army varies from 30,000 to 80,000 men. We know little about the new commanders besides their brief biographies, but some of the transfers are quite baffling.

For example, Major General Fan Chengcai, the new commander of the 76th group army responsible for Tibet, previously had a long career in the 14th group army of Yunnan Province, a subtropical region very different from the Roof of the World.

His comrade-in-arms, the political commissar Major General Zhang Hongbing served mostly in Henan Province, famous for its open plains. They could be experts in high-altitude, cold-weather warfare, but their background doesn’t indicate that.

There is an alternative explanation to how these decisions were made. While increasing combat effectiveness may be the long-term goal, the immediate concern of the PLA’s commander-in-chief Xi Jinping is about domestic politics.

The personnel reorganization is Xi’s attempt to curb military factionalism, better rendered in Chinese as “mountaintopism” or shantou zhuyi.

Influential Chinese military chiefs tend to build their leadership team based on personal loyalty. Turning the party’s army into their personal army, these commanders become in the words of Mao Zedong “mountaintops” that pose a challenge to the PLA’s cohesion as well as the supreme leader’s authority.

The Qing dynasty fell because a powerful general acquired total control of the New Army. Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek’s defeat on the mainland has been blamed on his failure in containing military factionalism.

The last thing Xi wants to see is collusion between generals and political opponents to derail November’s 19th party congress, when Xi will be crowned China’s paramount leader.

The last thing Xi wants to see is collusion between generals and political opponents in derailing November’s 19th party congress, when Xi will be crowned China’s paramount leader.

Since early this year, Xi has accelerated the promotion of his own generals to the PLA’s highest echelons. In July and August, Xi promoted several dozens of generals, lieutenant generals and major generals to add weight to his control.

Then, to reduce the threat from regional commanders, Xi employed Mao’s old trick of removing them from their familiar environment and away from confidants.

The brand-new unit designations for the 13 group armies, numbering from 71 to 84, also shows Xi’s ambition in tearing down existing loyalty networks and rebuilding the army entirely as his own.

Like all other armed forces, the PLA’s unit designations carry history and esprit de corps. But fresh designations convey new allegiance.

According to the PLA Daily, the number 71 represents July 1st or the Chinese Communist Party’s founding day. The message is clear here — the party leader is the PLA’s nucleus, not the regional commandants.

Although expanding combat effectiveness is the group army reform’s premier goal, the assurance of loyalty is equally important.

The great army personnel overhaul reveals Xi is taking another step towards absolute control over the PLA top brass as he prepares to strengthen his power at the 19th congress.

Follow the author on Twitter @MrZiYang.

[Chandragupta]

India's approach to Tibet is mountainous and hostile, what about the approach to Tibet from China?Is it as bad? Not considering oxygen/food etc but just looking at the terrain. On Google Earth, it looks like they have access via Hainan/Kunming?

[Singha]

^^ roads are there from yunnan side (kunming), a railway has started.

hainan is a island off the coast.

[kumarn]

This is increasingly lookong like 1962. Except the roles are reversed. Where have we seen this before? Weak deployment on the ground (aka forward policy with just 4 battalions and 25 aircrafts), over the top rhetoric (throw them out type from gobar times), general appointed on political preference (check article posted above) and a military good at ceremonial display (remember reading kaul showing off some artillery exercise to his counterpart in the pla who asked him iif it was possible with such accuracy in the fog of war, now we have thr pla grand displays).

I am now in the chola camp. May be if we race towards lhasa, we might surprise ourselves

[SSridhar]

Sri Lanka justice minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakse fired for criticizing China deal - AP

Sri Lanka's president has fired the justice minister for his criticism of the government, including a decision to sell majority shares of a sea port to China.

President Maithripala Sirisena on Wednesday approved a request made by his United National Party to dismiss Wijeyadasa Rajapakse.

The party accused Rajapakse of breaching the collective responsibility of the Cabinet of ministers by criticizing the port deal as well as other government policies and some of his colleagues.

Sri Lanka's government last month signed a long-delayed agreement to sell a 70 percent stake in a $1.5 billion port to China in a bid to recover from the heavy burden of repaying a Chinese loan obtained to build the facility.

[TKiran]

I am now in the chola camp. May be if we race towards lhasa, we might surprise ourselves

The credit has to be given to TKiran, not chola, I told you first about Lhasa, while chola is dhotishivering about getting to Lhasa (in the dhotishiver dhaaga)

[SSridhar]

China is all set to pay a heavy price for its Doklam blunder - Kanwal Sibal, Economic Times

China has begun to believe that like America, it too has become an “indispensable nation,” at least for the global economy, and that its position as virtually the biggest trade partner of most major economies limits international options in dealing with its imperious foreign policy based on a unilateral definition of its “core interests” and disregard of international law. This explains its willingness to challenge Japan, pursue egregious historical claims in the South China Sea and confront the US in the western Pacific.

This hubris born of such self-evaluation of China’s economic and financial muscle, coupled with its growing military capabilities, lies behind its condescending policies towards India. The Doklam affair is a product of this growing Chinese vanity. A country, supposedly with a sense of history, seems to be forgetting its lessons. Just as it believes that it can resist US hegemony today, others will resist its own tomorrow. China has limited economic leverage over India, although Chinese experts, including its unprofessional, threat-brandishing diplomats in New Delhi, believe India needs Chinese investments, especially in infrastructure, for achieving its growth objectives.

While in normal circumstances flourishing economic ties between the world’s biggest markets can be mutually beneficial, China’s adversarial policies towards India are a barrier. India, less tethered to China’s economy excepting some areas, is less anxious about economic pressure tactics China has used against Japan, South Korea, Philippines or Mongolia over political differences. Conversely, China’s external trade is so huge that it can absorb the loss of the Indian market in the short term, but with the slowdown in its growth rate, mounting US pressure on it on trade, investment, IPR and cyber security issues, murmurs in the EU about its economic ingress into East European countries, the rise of anti-globalisation and protectionist tendencies and so on, China’s export dependent economy might need expanded access to the Indian market in the medium term perspective.

Our skewed trade relationship with China has produced a $ 51 billion trade surplus in its favour out of a total trade of $ 71 billion, which is manifestly unsustainable. China has flooded the Indian market with cheap manufactures, destroying local manufacturing in the process. It has penetrated our power and telecom sectors despite obvious security concerns. It is now entering the e-commerce sector in a big way. Chinese smartphone brands together command more than 51% of the market share in mobile telephones.

Viva and Oppo, who account for 50% of that share, have now captured all the major sponsorships of Indian cricket through their holding company BBK Electronics by committing huge sums of money. PayTM, which has Chinese e-commerce giant Ali Baba as its biggest shareholder, owns title sponsorship of all cricket tournaments in India. The swelling distrust of China’s intentions towards India, aggravated by the Doklam thrust and earlier Chinese blows on NSG, CPEC and Masood Azhar issues, has the government directing mobile manufacturers (predominantly Chinese) to share security procedures and processes they follow to ensure security of mobile phones sold in India to prevent data leakage and online theft.

Without naming China, which does not allow foreign investment in power grid projects but is winning distribution network contracts (in 18 cities) to smarten up city grids, India, with cyber security concerns in mind, has also said that it will invoke the principle of reciprocity to keep foreign companies out of power transmission projects. Some political groups are becoming active in advocating a boycott of Chinese goods and this movement can get galvanised proportionately with Chinese misbehaviour with us. China will pay a price for its folly.

[chola]

I am now in the chola camp. May be if we race towards lhasa, we might surprise ourselves

The credit has to be given to TKiran, not chola, I told you first about Lhasa, while chola is dhotishivering about getting to Lhasa (in the dhotishiver dhaaga)

Stop trying to steal my warmongering mantle, Karela-Wielder!

[Hari Seldon]

Interesting that the PLA is officially the party's army and not the country's. Well, sure. The party is the country in its own reckoning...

[anupmisra]

Interesting that the PLA is officially the party's army and not the country's. Well, sure. The party is the country in its own reckoning...

PLA's allegiance and commitment have always been to the CPC. It is in their "constitution". PLA is sworn to protect the party rather than the state, something that is unheard of in a democracy. Eleven Gin Pegs is slowly moving his favorite chess pieces to key positions in the PLA for a showdown this Fall. Interesting times ahead.

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-01/3 ... 702143.htm

[UlanBatori]

The problem is that mountains and rivers run north-south

North is bad, but move a bit south (this is why I said Aiazawl not northern points to start) and it's slow-moving rivers and paddy fields. Not exactly tank country, but more like hovercraft country. That's why the Pakis felt so secure in East Pakistan circa 1970. "Nah! The yindoos can't attack!"
The valleys are great for storing and waiting. Further south is a level ride to Kunming. Need some google maps of the Kunming downtown and surroundings.
Wonder if Kunming has good roads for the 20 million Han to exit towards Beijing with their Smartphones stuck in their ears.

[shiv]

India's approach to Tibet is mountainous and hostile, what about the approach to Tibet from China?Is it as bad? Not considering oxygen/food etc but just looking at the terrain. On Google Earth, it looks like they have access via Hainan/Kunming?

It is bad for the Chinese also. Nothing via Kunming That is why I am veering around to the view that holding Tibet is costly for them. they put a brave face and claim al iz vel

First the mountains east of Chengdu where they built a highway still takes 10 days to cross. In the early years they decided that it would not be feasible to build a railway on that route because of time and cost. So they went way waaaay up north - north of the mountains of eastern Tibet and built a railway line that went east first and then down south via permafrost. And because the railway rests on permafrost, it runs mainly on bridges built on flat ground where the bridge support foundations go deep into the permafrost (frozen soil + water). In some areas these support foundations have to be kept cool using liquid ammonia injected into the foundations.

You can see a brief description of the road and railway if you watch for 45 seconds from the link below
https://youtu.be/q-CKlBQdWTI?t=61

[ldev]

Myanmar and Thailand are very much into Chinese camp, ex China will be building $5B HSR in Thailand soon. I don't think they'll assist us.

Not really. Myanmar and Thailand are dealing with India as well and not specifically siding with China. The Chinese will build that railway because north to south is easier - going parallel to mountain ranges and river valleys. High speed rail requires relatively straight stretches of track - best on flat terrain. But the Indian railway line is east to west. It will take time, be slower but will open up a new trade and tourism route. Thailand earns a lot from Indian tourists and trade.

One thing I notice across the board in discussions on here is complete ignorance of geography in relation to transport/logistics.

In response to your insistence on this issue I did a Google Earth flyby over the north east including from Manipur into Burma. While certainly not as difficult as the India-China border the mountain terrain is still formidable. I should have remembered, many many years ago, I used to travel to the North East from Kolkata. I still remember the road journey from Imphal to Moreh on the Myanmar border. Imphal is in a bowl, but still at an altitude of about 800 meters, and to get to Moreh you climb over the surrounding mountains and get down to Moreh on the other side.

I googled and read up about the rail line being built from Jirbam to Imphal. Construction started in 2008 and they are looking for completion in 2019. And that is for 111 kms and this route will involve construction of the highest bridge in the world and the longest tunnel (~11 kms) in India. The road from Imphal to Moreh is about ~100 kms. And that rail link from Imphal to Moreh has still not been sanctioned. That construction will certainly involve at least one major tunnel to get out of the Imphal valley. The good news is that once you get over the mountains surrounding Imphal the terrain if I remember slopes steadily downwards to the Myanmar border. But at this rate if Jirbam to Imphal is going to take 11-12 years, with the current level of project implementation, will Imphal to Moreh take any less time? We are looking at the 2030s maybe? Well before that I suspect the Chinese will have built a high speed rail line linking Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to Kunming via Thailand and Laos

All of this is to say that expertise in implementing such large scale projects is as much of a critical strategic necessity as domestic weapons manufacturing e.g. the MMRDA (Mumbai Metropolitcan Regional Development Authority) has issued tenders to build a trans harbour link from South Mumbai across the harbour to Nhava Sheva which will link the city to the new international airport being built there. The tender document insisted that domestic Indian companies MUST have a tie up with a foreign construction company with the required expertise. I presume the required expertise was to be able to build a bridge with supports in the sea-bed. It is disconcerting to realize that even such large Indian construction companies as Gammon India and Shapoorji Pallonji do not have such expertise and have to tie-up with foreign contractors.

Mumbai planning authority MMRDA has received 17 bids for the construction of the much-delayed 22-km-long Mumbai Trans Harbour Link (MTHL) project. The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) has received these bids from out of the 29 that were shortlisted for the three packages of the project.

The authority has received the bids from a consortium of leading domestic and international players including AFCONS-FLUOR-SPCPL, Daewoo-TATA, HCC-SKECL, IL&FS TNLSPSCPL ITD-SIMPLEX-ITDPCLSMCCL L&T-IHI for first two packages of the project.

While for the third package, it received bids from J Kumar Infraprojects, L&T, NCC, TD-Thakur-JM Mhatre apart from the consortium of AFCONS-FLUOR-SPCPL.

[Marten]

India's approach to Tibet is mountainous and hostile, what about the approach to Tibet from China?Is it as bad? Not considering oxygen/food etc but just looking at the terrain. On Google Earth, it looks like they have access via Hainan/Kunming?

It is bad for the Chinese also. Nothing via Kunming That is why I am veering around to the view that holding Tibet is costly for them. they put a brave face and claim al iz vel

First the mountains east of Chengdu where they built a highway still takes 10 days to cross. In the early years they decided that it would not be feasible to build a railway on that route because of time and cost. So they went way waaaay up north - north of the mountains of eastern Tibet and built a railway line that went east first and then down south via permafrost. And because the railway rests on permafrost, it runs mainly on bridges built on flat ground where the bridge support foundations go deep into the permafrost (frozen soil + water). In some areas these support foundations have to be kept cool using liquid ammonia injected into the foundations.

You can see a brief description of the road and railway if you watch for 45 seconds from the link below
https://youtu.be/q-CKlBQdWTI?t=61

So if we decide to mass troops in a threatening posture across Ladakh and Uttarkhand borders, we should be able to raise the human cost of countering us. Let's have more of these until a point perhaps ten years from now, where we can roll across Aksai Chin/Hind and hold it.

[RKumar]

^With this statement we are behaving like Paki ... oO (On banvas for a month)

[shiv]

So if we decide to mass troops in a threatening posture across Ladakh and Uttarkhand borders, we should be able to raise the human cost of countering us. Let's have more of these until a point perhaps ten years from now, where we can roll across Aksai Chin/Hind and hold it.

Logistically - it is not easy for China or India but given planning we can certainly push them back and grab and badly embarrass them. They know that. I think their advantage is in NOT making war. They will become like Pakis - needling and gnawing. IMO

[pankajs]

Brahma Chellaney‏ @Chellaney

China passes the buck, asks India to make "positive moves" and withdraw first. Will Modi do that to save his upcoming China visit for BRICS?

Strange! Is Xi going to dis-invite Modi or is he going to ban Modi from BRICS or from visiting China? What is there for Modi to worry? It is the Chinese who should be eager to make this installment of BRICS summit a success.

Some time it is very difficult to understand this expert-speak! Possibly I am not thinking clearly. Can someone help decode this nugget?

[Marten]

Shiv Sir, I meant we can still maintain several more mountain divisions in relatively comfortable environs while they try to match us in far more hostile environments. Attrition for them will be far more real than present where they have to use oxygen enriched barracks and avoid foot patrols. Should we not use this advantage more often?