Bharat Rakshak Forum Announcement

Hello Everyone,

A warm welcome back to the Bharat Rakshak Forum.

Important Notice: Due to a corruption in the BR forum database we regret to announce that data records relating to some of our registered users have been lost. We estimate approx. 500 user details are deleted.

To ease the process of recreating the user IDs we request members that have previously posted on the BR forums to recognise and identify their posts, once the posts are identified please contact the BRF moderator team by emailing BRF Mod Team with your post details.

The mod team will be able to update your username, email etc. so that the user history can be maintained.

Unfortunately for members that have never posted or have had all their posts deleted i.e. users that have 0 posts, we will be unable to recreate your account hence we request that you re-register again.

We apologise for any inconvenience caused and thank you for your understanding.

Regards,
Seetal

Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

The Strategic Issues & International Relations Forum is a venue to discuss issues pertaining to India's security environment, her strategic outlook on global affairs and as well as the effect of international relations in the Indian Subcontinent. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 19 Jan 2017 09:38

India, Sri Lanka in talks on port - Kallol Bhattacherjee, The Hindu
Sri Lanka is in talks to offer the port of Trincomalee to India. Speaking to The Hindu on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue here, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, Colombo’s Minister of Regional Development, said that the decision on offering the port to India will be taken soon.

“Talks are at present going on between India and Sri Lanka and we hope to offer the Trincomalee port, which is one of the best deep sea ports in the world, to India,” said Mr. Fonseka speaking to The Hindu on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue. Trincomalee has been on the table for sometime as Sri Lanka wants to maintain a neutral stand and provide equal access to its ports to both China and India.

Hambantota hurdles

Sri Lanka’s experience with the Chinese, who carried out major infrastructural work at the Hambantota port in southern coast of the island nation, has put a heavy burden on the country, said Mr Fonseka.

Our experience [with the Chinese] on Hambantota has not been very beneficial as we are facing a heavy debt burden due to the work done in that port. The problems and corruption in the project prompted us to review our policy on infrastructural development. We have currently given the port to a private entity so that some of the more immediate issues are resolved. This arrangement will also address India’s security concerns,” said Mr. Fonseka, indicating that Sri Lanka is willing to address India’s concerns on the visit of Chinese nuclear submarines to Sri Lanka.


Debt burden

The port of Hambantota was conceived as a major Sri Lanka-China project during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapakse, but the controversy around the debt burden has slowed down the project.

Speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, Mr. Fonseka, who led the Sri Lankan defence forces during the 2009 Eelam war against Tamil rebels, said that Colombo is aware of its responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region, and is committed to freedom of navigation.

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 19 Jan 2017 09:52

‘Clash with China can be dangerous: Obama Administration’ - Varghese K George, The Hindu
The Obama administration warned the incoming Donald Trump administration that a conflict with China could be dangerous and there is nothing that the U.S could achieve by trying to reopen settled issues with Beijing.

“..it’s dangerous,” Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications for President Obama, told a group of international journalists on Tuesday, on Mr. Trump’s remarks that he might review the ‘one-China’ policy of the U.S. “China’s not going to negotiate anything. So I’m not sure what is accomplished by saying that — by pursuing an approach where you seek to reopen,” Mr. Rhodes said, two days ahead of the transition of power. “..the risk of escalation in the Taiwan Strait is just a flashpoint that the world does not need right now, and the United States certainly doesn’t,” he said, describing the U.S.-China as “the most important bilateral relationship in the world”.

The key adviser to Mr. Obama said the outgoing administration has pursued a constructive relationship with China. “Most of our signature foreign policy initiatives and achievements were built in part on U.S.-Chinese cooperation,” he said, naming the Paris climate agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the management of the global economic crisis in 2009 as examples. He said the U.S. must push back against China on issues such as its aggressive moves in the South China Sea, but “there’s just much more to be gained from pursuing cooperation when we can with China rather than seeing it as an adversary.” “I think that’d be very dangerous for every — for the whole world, frankly,” the official said.

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 19 Jan 2017 10:23

Modi has strongly raised the Gilgit-Baltistan issue at the Second Raisina Dialogue even though he neither mentioned POK or China or CPEC by name. The Foreign Secretary S.Jaishankar was very candid both on Indian sovereignty and the terrorism issue. China responded swiftly and as usual, it did not address the sovereignty issue except to repeat its usual inane words and blatant lies namely that China's stance on Kashmir had not changed, that CPEC was a development project for the whole region, that it abides by Panchsheel, that there was no unanimity on the Masood Azhar issue etc.

But, China is Janus faced. It has used threats too like China would not keep quiet if Agni-V is operationalized, if CPEC is harmed then India would have to face the combined wrath of China and Pakistan etc.

Many Indian authors & analysts who write in Indian newspapers generally opine that India has been cornered by Pakistan & China, that India must join CPEC, that there was no point in standing up to both of them etc. These writers are either from King's College, London or JNU or some think-tanks supported by leftist media outlets.

China is fighting fire on multiple fronts: economy, Xinjiang, Indo-China Sea, CPEC, OBOR, emerging informal alliance against it in Asia, Taiwan etc. Xi is threatening to unleash nationalism which he might feel is the underlying common thread to solving all these problems. The rosy days of China have to come to an end and they seem to be. Therefore, India must persist relentlessly with its national interests, whether it is NSG or UNSC 1267 or UNSC Seat, or missiles etc., always speaking glibly about China at the same time like it does to us, while increasing our military efforts aimed specifically at China without wasting our resources for any other prestige.

chola
BRFite
Posts: 950
Joined: 16 Dec 2002 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 19 Jan 2017 11:05

Better still is to plan for war, offensive war during the coming years when Cheen is dealing with its economy and Trump. We need to take back lands stolen in 1962 at some point. The time could be within the next four years. We need a plan to strike when the first volley is fired in the South China Sea.
Last edited by SSridhar on 19 Jan 2017 11:50, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Call it Indo-China Sea

Austin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 18768
Joined: 23 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Austin » 19 Jan 2017 11:23

Jack Ma: The US Wasted $14 Trillion on Wars


SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 19 Jan 2017 14:08

X-posting from the 'China Watch' thread to expose the liars that the Chinese are. The Chinese lying has been known for a long time and doesn't necessarily come as a surprise. However, all these go to prove the dire situation that China is beginning to see. What will happen to this governor now? The Politburo cannot allow truth to emerge especially with a suspect PLA breathing down their necks.

Chinese province admits to faking economic data - AFP
A Chinese official has admitted his province falsified economic data for years, state media said Wednesday, vindicating long-held suspicions that China has been cooking the books. The announcement by the governor of the industrial province of Liaoning comes as the world’s second-largest economy prepares to release 2016 data that is tipped to show the slowest growth in more than a quarter of a century. Liaoning’s governor Chen Qiufa admitted that from 2011 to 2014, economic data from the province’s cities and counties had been plagued with false statistics, Xinhua news agency reported. — AFP

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 19 Jan 2017 18:24

India's Nuclear Suppliers Group membership bid not a 'gift': Centre - ToI
External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Vikas Swarup today said India's bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is based on its non-proliferation record, days after China told the US that NSG membership can't be US President Barack Obama's "parting gift" to India.


China slighted India by calling it a 'gift' and requires a strong response.

kit
BRFite
Posts: 1945
Joined: 13 Jul 2006 18:16

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby kit » 19 Jan 2017 20:13

China can be dealt with only from a position of strength .. their bravado hides their panic at being cornered by quite a few powerful countries and a economy looking to implode..not to mention the flight of capital .. and that Trump might actually do what he says

panduranghari
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3469
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 20 Jan 2017 14:26

If you read the transcript of eleven jinping's talk in Davos, the overwhelming feeling one gets is- he understands Chinese were taken for a ride and all the things the Chinese bank on to supplant the US as the number 1 nation on the earth are in trouble unless the idea of globalisation is not promoted. The grassroots movement in many western nations from globalisation towards localisation, from externam focus to inward looking approach is exactly what China does not need at the moment. He calls on the world to embrace OBOR and keep the light of globalisation burning. He goes on to encourage the political and economic elite to make people like Trump understand the importance of this.

Its begging more than pleading.

Austin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 18768
Joined: 23 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Austin » 20 Jan 2017 16:13

panduranghari wrote:If you read the transcript of eleven jinping's talk in Davos, the overwhelming feeling one gets is- he understands Chinese were taken for a ride and all the things the Chinese bank on to supplant the US as the number 1 nation on the earth are in trouble unless the idea of globalisation is not promoted. The grassroots movement in many western nations from globalisation towards localisation, from externam focus to inward looking approach is exactly what China does not need at the moment. He calls on the world to embrace OBOR and keep the light of globalisation burning. He goes on to encourage the political and economic elite to make people like Trump understand the importance of this.

Its begging more than pleading.


Other than DT and UK every other western country is promoting globalisation atleast that is the message from Davos and those elites in Davos things China is their new Leader when it comes to globalisation.

Well even DT says he love globalisation but wants a more fair one ......what ever that means :rotfl:

Prem
BRF Oldie
Posts: 20057
Joined: 01 Jul 1999 11:31
Location: Weighing and Waiting 8T Yconomy

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 21 Jan 2017 00:26

panduranghari wrote:Ifhe grassroots movement in many western nations from globalisation towards localisation, from externam focus to inward looking approach is exactly what China does not need at the moment. He calls on the world to embrace OBOR and keep the light of globalisation burning. He goes on to encourage the political and economic elite to make people like Trump understand the importance of this.
Its begging more than pleading.


Q is will India ever grant legitimacy to OBOR ? 11 doing 69 with Paki makes it impossible. Indians not stranger to this spectacular display as habitually seen among the street dogs of Desh and know well only bricks and sticks separate the Sookers & Kookers.

panduranghari
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3469
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 21 Jan 2017 00:50

Austin wrote:Other than DT and UK every other western country is promoting globalisation atleast that is the message from Davos and those elites in Davos things China is their new Leader when it comes to globalisation.

Well even DT says he love globalisation but wants a more fair one ......what ever that means :rotfl:


Prem wrote:Q is will India ever grant legitimacy to OBOR ? 11 doing 69 with Paki makes it impossible. Indians not stranger to this spectacular display as habitually seen among the street dogs of Desh and know well only bricks and sticks separate the Sookers & Kookers.


The approach 11 has taken as I understand is - In your nation states, you are loosing your hold on your politicians. So embrace me and my vision and I will ensure you do not loose your wealth. You will remain rich and you can still lord over the proletariat. For this you will need to subvert your own political systems and accept a new overlord- who is benevolent. I am the one who has the vision and the ability to make this happen. OBOR is my vision and control over the largest land army is my ability.

While all this is shadow boxing, if Chinese behaviour post 2008 was a belief that they should emulate the west, the current behaviour suggests the west can be managed (possibly due to subservient US policy towards China).

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 21 Jan 2017 08:01

Chinese entry into power sector raises security fears - Sanjay Dutta, ToI
Indian power equipment manufacturers have raised alarm over vulnerability of the country's transmission networks to hacking as Chinese companies make steady inroads into SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems being added to smarten up city grids.

SCADA is a computer-based industrial automation control system that practically makes factories and utilities run on their own. In an electrical system, SCADA maintains balance between demand and supply in the grid.

"In the connected systems, intelligent equipment talk to each other and exchange data and information, making the system more efficient but at the same time increasing the vulnerability if exposed to suspect individuals, companies and nations which may use such access to their advantage," Indian Electrical Equipment Manufacturers Association director-general Sunil Misra said in a letter to power minister Piyush Goyal.

This is not the first time that domestic power gear makers are opposing Chinese equipment. But unlike in the past, when boilers and generators for power stations were in the line of fire, the concerns this time are strategic and not about protecting turf.

SCADA contracts include maintenance of equipment, while transmission lines are given on build, own, operate, transfer basis spanning 35 years. This allows contractors to place their personnel on site in case of SCADA projects and control operations in transmission lines, allowing ample scope of planting computer bugs at a later stage. Chinese companies recently bagged SCADA contracts for 18 cities spanning Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. More such contracts are on anvil.

Paul
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3403
Joined: 25 Jun 1999 11:31
Contact:

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 23 Jan 2017 13:47

Image

Tshering Tobgay ‏@tsheringtobgay 5m5 minutes ago

With HE Luo Zhaohui, China's ambassador to India, and his wife Dr Jiang Yili. Happy to welcome Ambassador Luo who 1st visited Bhutan in 2005

Chinese Ambassador to India visiting Bhutan!

Paul
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3403
Joined: 25 Jun 1999 11:31
Contact:

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 23 Jan 2017 13:50

As Xi arrives in India, China appoints 'firefighter' envoy Luo Zhaohui to ease tensions


China has appointed Luo Zhaohui as its new ambassador to India as both sides look to defuse fresh tensions that have surfaced in ties between them.
Ananth Krishnan


China has appointed its most experienced 'India hand' and a diplomat known for his 'firefighting' skills as its new ambassador to India as both sides look to defuse fresh tensions that have surfaced in ties between the two countries.

President Xi Jinping will arrive in Goa today for the BRICS Summit and for talks with Prime Minister Mo

di. Both sides are expected to discuss the recently strained relations from the technical hold on the application to sanction Masood Azhar to India's attempt to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and also moves to push Chinese investment into India.

Also read: Ahead of Xi Jinping's visit to India, China says UNSC still divided on Masood Azhar

A week before his arrival, Xi on October 6 formally appointed Luo Zhaohui as the new ambassador in India, which was confirmed by the Chinese Parliament's standing committee last week. Luo had only served a little over two years as Canada ambassador, shorter than the four-year norm, and was sent to Delhi as both sides look to get ties on track.

INDIA HAND

Beijing clearly believes Luo, 54, is the right man to get ties back on track. His experience with India goes back almost three decades. Luo has a master's degree in Indian history from Peking University, and studied under the country's most renowned Indologist, Ji Xianlin. He spent five years in India from 1989 to 1993 as a second secretary in the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi.

Luo developed a reputation for firefighting during his tenure in Pakistan, where he served as ambassador from 2006 to 2010. He played a key role in defusing the "Lal Masjid siege" when Chinese workers of an Islamabad massage parlour were held hostage by Islamist vigilante groups.

Luo was at the time "a young, self-confident ambassador on the rise and a rarity in the Chinese foreign ministry both for his South Asia expertise and his towering height", noted Andrew Small in the 2015 book "China Pakistan Axis". His wife Jiang Yili is a diplomat and scholar who translated Benazir Bhutti's memoir into Chinese.

Luo played "an unusually active" role for usually "cautious" Chinese diplomats in defusing the row and freeing the hostages, notes Small, from directly engaging not only then President Musharraf but also key opposition and religious figures.

LUO FAMILIAR WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS

Luo is more than familiar with Indian officials - and particularly to Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar - as he served as the Director General of the Foreign Ministry's Asia Department and point man on India from 2011, when the foreign secretary was the ambassador to China.


http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/xi-j ... 87437.html

Paul
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3403
Joined: 25 Jun 1999 11:31
Contact:

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 23 Jan 2017 13:52

So when Luo first visited Bhutan in 2005 he was not posted to Indian embassy. Went to Pakistan next year. Most likely an old South Asia desk handler.

Paul
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3403
Joined: 25 Jun 1999 11:31
Contact:

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 23 Jan 2017 13:58

Resume of Ambassador Luo Zhaohui
(2014/05/08)

LUO Zhaohui, male, was born in Hubei Province of China in February, 1962. He has a Master's Degree in History.

1985-1989


Attaché, then Third Secretary, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

1989-1993


Third Secretary, then Second Secretary, Chinese Embassy in the Republic of India

1993-1996


Second Secretary, then Deputy Division Director, Department of North American and Oceania Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1996-2000


Second Secretary, then First Secretary, Chinese Embassy in the United States of America

2000-2003


Counsellor, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2003-2004


Minister Counsellor, Chinese Embassy in the Republic of Singapore

2004-2006


Deputy Director General, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2006-2010


Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

2010-2011


Director General, Department of External Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2011-2014


Director General, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2014-


Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to Canada

Prem
BRF Oldie
Posts: 20057
Joined: 01 Jul 1999 11:31
Location: Weighing and Waiting 8T Yconomy

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 25 Jan 2017 02:46

http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0125/c90000-9171195.html

Global Times: Dongfeng-41 will bring China more respect

Beijing has deployed advanced Dongfeng-41 ICBMs in northernmost China’s Heilongjiang Province, which borders Russia, according to reports based on images.Some Hong Kong and Taiwan media reported that pictures of China's Dongfeng-41 ballistic missile were exposed on Chinese mainland websites. It was revealed that the pictures were taken in Heilongjiang Province. Military analysts believe that this is perhaps the second Dongfeng-41 strategic missile brigade and it should be deployed in northeastern China.According to reports, the Dongfeng-41 is a nuclear solid-fuel road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. With a range of 14,000km and a payload of 10-12 nuclear warheads, it can target anywhere in the world and is widely considered one of the most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles.There has been constant speculation about the Dongfeng-41. Its deployment is classified at the highest military levels. But most military experts believe that China has finished the research and production of the Dongfeng-41 and the conditions for deployment are optimal. But there has been no authoritative information on whether China has a Dongfeng-41 strategic missile brigade, how many such brigades it has and where they are deployed.Some media claimed that the Chinese military intentionally revealed the Dongfeng-41 and connected it with the inauguration of US President Donald Trump. They think this is Beijing's response to Trump's provocative remarks on China.
According to RIA Novosti, the alleged deployment of the DF-41 near Russia’s border should not be read as a threat to Russia, confirmed by military analyst Konstantin Sivkov.“DF-41 missiles placed near Russia’s border are a smaller threat than if they were placed deeper in the Chinese territory. Such missiles usually have a very large ‘dead zone’ [area within minimal range that cannot be attacked by a weapon],” he said, adding that the ICBMs would not be able to target Russia’s Far East and most of Eastern Siberia from the Heilongjiang Province.“Certainly, the actions of the Chinese military, if the reports prove correct, the military build-up in China is not perceived as a threat to our country,” said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov. The Kremlin agreed with the assessment, saying that China is Russia’s “strategic partner in political and economic senses.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 46385
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 25 Jan 2017 04:18

No Ding Dong will scare the world.
Looks like China had to unveil this missile to reassure itself.

Prem
BRF Oldie
Posts: 20057
Joined: 01 Jul 1999 11:31
Location: Weighing and Waiting 8T Yconomy

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 26 Jan 2017 04:36

http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/ ... dd13622147

War With China? Effects Of A U.S. Blockade In The South China Sea

Chinese and Western experts” say a blockade by the U.S. in the South China Sea of China's artificial islands would be an "act of war" according to breathless Wall Street Journal reporters. The New York Times says unnamed “American Navy experts” are calling a blockade “tantamount to war”. Association of a U.S. blockade with war is an incomplete truth at best, and a scare tactic that plays into China's hands.Overblown fears of war illustrate a weakness of democracy when opposing an autocracy that controls state media. While U.S. media is hyping the fear of war, in part because it increases viewers and ad revenues, Chinese media can deliver a sense of resolve and willingness to negotiate, which increases U.S. popular fear and presents China as the reasonable party. Fear of war in democracies leads citizens to prematurely pressure politicians into backing down in international disputes with powerful autocratic adversaries adept at brinkmanship. Citizens in autocracies have no such influence, and their views are nevertheless conditioned to be hawkish by state-controlled media. Democracies are thereby at a disadvantage to autocracies in negotiating and strategic messaging under conditions of brinkmanship.Associating the Trump Team’s mooting of a blockade with war is therefore a self-defeating half-truth at best, and leaves China’s own culpability hidden. From a normative perspective, was it not an "act of war" when China constructed the islands in the Philippines' EEZ in the first place? Was it not an "act of war" when China ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague and refused to vacate its military from those islands that are within the Philippines' EEZ? Is the conclusion of the quoted experts then that China’s acts of war should be answered with silence and continued back-sliding, including in the case of the U.S. defense treaty with the Philippines?
The Philippines has been thunderously silent on Tillerson's comments, and Foreign Minister Perfecto Yasay could even be read to support the idea of a blockade, but without putting the Philippines' thin neck on the line. I don’t blame him.

Yet the Philippines' seeming support of the blockade, from a foreign minister who is usually pro-China, is not being widely reported. Rather, the focus of Western media is on fear of war and the reasonableness of China. The Wall Street Journal article ends with an ominous quote.While it remained to be seen if the Trump administration would back up its words with action, Mr. Spicer’s remarks threatened to seriously upset U.S.-China relations, said Zhu Feng, an expert on the South China Sea at Nanjing University. “It’s a very, very significant concern,” Mr. Zhu said on Tuesday, calling for measured negotiation. “For the Trump administration to unexpectedly and suddenly slam its fist down on the table and say, 'No, no, you can’t go there,' I think it’s tactless,” he said. “China isn’t likely to back off, no matter how high the pressure is.”China Daily couldn't have done a better job of presenting China's strategic messaging. The U.S. has for years warned against China's island building. There is nothing sudden about a new administration mooting the idea of increased military pressure on China. President Obama's good cop routine didn't work, and there is a new sheriff in town.Measured negotiation without backbone is exactly what got us into the South China Sea imbroglio. We should have nipped China’s maritime aggression in the bud by opposing its 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef with a blockade, or better yet economic sanctions, at its inception. When faced with a sophisticated adversary that simultaneously uses incrementalism on the ground while seeking more negotiations, we need to hold the line. Negotiating with China from a position of weakness has killed us in Southeast Asia, and our allies are scattering into disorder.If we are lucky, Trump will put much-needed spine into U.S. diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Many diplomats in the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei want this, but keep quiet publicly for fear of drawing China’s ire. U.S. strength gives us a unique ability to publicly negotiate for what is right. Remember it was Tillerson the diplomat, not “Mad Dog” Mattis the warrior, who so far made the toughest comments on the South China Sea. Don’t panic. Let Tillerson do his job, which is to negotiate from a position of strength.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 46385
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 26 Jan 2017 05:44

Prem, To understand the Philippines there is anew book on foreign policy during the US- Spanish war which shows suddenly US after 30 years after Civil war started having imperial ambitions. Philippines, Guam, in Pacific and Cuba and Puerto Rico in Atlantic became colonies. This legacy is still troubling US.

Will find the title.

Journalist Stephen Kinzer's book, True Flag, explains how the Spanish-American War launched an ongoing debate about America's role in the world.

Prem
BRF Oldie
Posts: 20057
Joined: 01 Jul 1999 11:31
Location: Weighing and Waiting 8T Yconomy

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 26 Jan 2017 05:47

https://bharatkarnad.com/2017/01/25/aba ... -promises/

The Ababeel launch is nothing like the ruse pulled off by the Zia-AQ Khan duo in 1987. But it does show just how strategically Pakistan army thinks and is oriented, the very areas in which the Indian government and military fall flat. Even with the concrete proof of China handing over MIRV tech to Pakistan after previously transferring, nuclear weapons and missile technologies, the Narendra Modi regime cannot get up the guts to strategically discomfit Beijing by nuclear missile arming Vietnam and every other disputant state on the South China Sea littoral bordering China, because of its twin-fear of upsetting Beijing and Washington!!!!!.In fact, Hanoi is so frustrated with New Delhi and Modi’s unfulfilled promises, following on Manmohan Singh’s, regarding the Brahmos cruise missile delivery, it has decided to go with the Russian coastal battery version of the Yakhont — the Bastion, to deter and destroy aggressor Chinese warships out of the Sanya base on Hainan Island. And further, rather than wait for an easy going Indian government to deliver the corvettes it had offered, it has settled on augmenting its fleet of the Russian Gepard-class (near 2,000 ton, full load) frigate, instead. Hanoi, understandably, is not taking very seriously the recent Delhi talk of shipping Akash SAMs to Vietnam.India and Modi are on the point of absolutely losing, if they haven’t already lost, Southeast Asia to China. The wonder is there’s no understanding in the PMO, MEA, and MOD of what will be, or is being, surrendered in terms of the strategic spaces east of Malacca.

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 26 Jan 2017 06:30

So, China has given in very quick time Babur-3 Cruise missile and the Ababeel with MIRV technology to Pakistan. China has confirmed its implacability with us, if ever proof was needed! We cannot simply ignore the new threats. China is showing to us that it muscularly responds to us for not acting in line with Chinese interests. But, we are very slow in responding as Bharat Karnad says. (My new ISP has installed a Chinese WiFi Router which I now have to replace at my own cost! That's how much China has invaded us.) It is also convinced that its MTCR goose is cooked with India's entry and is therefore signalling its intent to be a threat to the rest of the world. China is a threat whether inside or outside. It is hurtling towards a confrontation.

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 26 Jan 2017 07:07

A Chinese chakravyuha in South Asia - G.Parthasarathy, Business Line
Confident of victory in Sri Lanka’s prolonged and bloody ethnic conflict, President Mahinda Rajapaksa decided to develop the port of Hambantota and its neighbourhood, along Sri Lanka’s south-western coast. He was determined to make this region his impregnable political base.

Taking note of Rajapaksa’s aversion to India and the western world, China obliged by offering to undertake a number of projects in and around Hambantota. Given the attention India focused on Colombo port, building and taking control of Hambantota, whose economic viability was questionable, was imperative for China. Beijing decided to acquire naval facilities in Hambantota, in the way as it has taken control of Gwadar in Pakistan.

Questionable projects

Funds for the Hambantota project were made available at near commercial terms by China’s Exim Bank, which extended credit of over $1.2 billion for the construction of the port, and $1.35 billion for a power plant. Assistance was also extended for a southern highway, a tele-cinema park and an airport. Rajapaksa’s ambitions for his constituency also included a sports zone for a proposed international sports meet that was never held and an international cricket stadium. Not a single international cricket match has been played in the cricket stadium. Not a single worthwhile film has been made in the tele-cinema park. All his projects in the constituency have been financial disasters.

Given its location, Colombo is the natural port for transit of goods to and from India. Apart from a few vehicles that India, Japan and South Korea export to Sri Lanka, Hambantota receives virtually nothing else from international trade. Against annual interest repayment liabilities of around $ 65 million, revenues from trade shipments amount to around $1.3 million. The entire range of projects is financially unviable. Despite offering free landing facilities to foreign airlines, there are virtually no flights to Hambantota airport. The power project is also proving a white elephant.

Strategic interests

Unable to repay the debt incurred to build the coal-fired Norochcholai power plant, the government is now transferring its ownership to the Chinese, in a debt-equity swap. The earnings of the Southern Expressway annually are now less that one-sixth of the debt repayment bill. Between 2009 and 2014, Sri Lanka’s debt tripled. The current total debt stands at around $65 billion. Sri Lanka spends over 90 per cent of all government revenue to service its debts. Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake has announced that his government has decided to sell 80 per cent of the $1.5-billion Hambantota port to a Chinese company. China has also been offered an investment zone in the same region, in another bid to cut the country’s debt burden. {Getting Sri Lanka deeper & deeper into the Chinese abyss. While that is Sri Lanka's problem, it is also ours}

China has now virtually taken over the Hambantota port, its surrounding areas and adjacent industrial park, despite widespread local protests. Reports indicate that this ‘investment zone’ will be used by China to manufacture a wide range of products for export to India. China will thus, in effect, be seeking to export its products from Sri Lanka, making use of the free-trade advantages that Sri Lanka enjoys in trade with India.

What happens in and around Hambantota is of crucial strategic and economic interest to India. We need to make it clear that the use of Hambantota to berth Chinese warships and submarines, and control of the port and surrounding areas in Chinese hands, are unacceptable to India. Gwadar and Hambantota will become staging areas for the Chinese navy to operate across the sea-lanes of the western Indian Ocean, giving the Chinese the ability to interdict vital oil supplies.

While Hambantota could become a crucial part of China’s Maritime Silk Route, Gwadar is fast becoming the nerve centre for a China-Pakistan nexus, to exercise maritime control over the sea-lanes used for oil/gas supplies from Iran and the Arab Gulf states. Gwadar port has been leased to China for 43 years, till 2059. China’s Silk Road Project connects with the Maritime Silk Route in Gwadar. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connects China’s Xinjiang province to Gwadar through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India regards as its territory, as it is a part of Jammu and Kashmir.

Unlike, in the case of Hambantota, the the Gwadar port project is being financed in a number of areas by zero per cent Chinese loans. The total Chinese investment in developing the port and its neighbourhood has been estimated at around $3.5 billion. The total cost of projects along the CPEC is estimated at around $51 billion. There is considerable opacity about the proportion of these investments, which will come in the form of zero interest credits, concessional credits, bank credits with near commercial rates of interest, or as foreign direct investment.

Some misgivings

There are misgivings even within Pakistan about who the main beneficiaries of the Chinese-funded economic vorridor will be. There is strong opposition in Baluchistan, where Gwadar is located, because the people of the province have received no benefits from Chinese-funded projects.

The Saindak copper and gold mining project in Baluchistan’s Chagai district, being developed with Chinese participation, is estimated to contain copper and gold resources valued at around $70 billion. The people of Baluchistan will reportedly receive just 1 per cent of these earnings. There are also fears that outsiders will swamp the province as the CPEC and the development of Gwadar move ahead. New Delhi, like many others who are viewing the strategic dimensions of the growing China-Pakistan relationship with legitimate concern, will no doubt be closely observing these developments.

The last year saw the first-ever visit by a Chinese nuclear submarine to Karachi. In more recent days, Pakistan claims to have successfully tested its first submarine-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of 450 km.

Significantly, this launch came after China, infuriated by the latest launch of India’s Agni V, warned that it could transfer missile capabilities to others, to deal with India. With access to Gwadar and Hambantota, China’s navy partnered by Pakistan will have easy access to the Gulf of Hormuz, through which 30 per cent of all global maritime-traded petroleum is transported from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran and Iraq. Control over these maritime routes by China and Pakistan will have serious implications for energy security across Asia.

tandav
BRFite
Posts: 141
Joined: 26 Aug 2016 08:24

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby tandav » 26 Jan 2017 23:19

SSridhar wrote:So, China has given in very quick time Babur-3 Cruise missile and the Ababeel with MIRV technology to Pakistan. China has confirmed its implacability with us, if ever proof was needed! We cannot simply ignore the new threats. China is showing to us that it muscularly responds to us for not acting in line with Chinese interests. But, we are very slow in responding as Bharat Karnad says. (My new ISP has installed a Chinese WiFi Router which I now have to replace at my own cost! That's how much China has invaded us.) It is also convinced that its MTCR goose is cooked with India's entry and is therefore signalling its intent to be a threat to the rest of the world. China is a threat whether inside or outside. It is hurtling towards a confrontation.


It is my understanding that Indian strategic forces are prepared as follows: Any Pakistani nuclear strike on India will be construed as a Chinese nuclear strike (with Chinese supplied nukes and delivery devices such as Shaheen/Ababeel/Babur etc). Indian dead hand retaliation will include Beijing and Shanghai along with Lahore Islamabad, Rawalpindi.

zoverian
BRFite
Posts: 215
Joined: 16 Aug 2016 10:58

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby zoverian » 27 Jan 2017 00:17

It is my understanding that Indian strategic forces are prepared as follows: Any Pakistani nuclear strike on India will be construed as a Chinese nuclear strike (with Chinese supplied nukes and delivery devices such as Shaheen/Ababeel/Babur etc). Indian dead hand retaliation will include Beijing and Shanghai along with Lahore Islamabad, Rawalpindi.


it would be helpful if you could provide some facts/reasoning for the above mentioned analysis.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 46385
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 27 Jan 2017 05:43

Read V.S. Arunachalam's early statements on this issue. It was on this forum in the early 2000's

Prem
BRF Oldie
Posts: 20057
Joined: 01 Jul 1999 11:31
Location: Weighing and Waiting 8T Yconomy

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 27 Jan 2017 06:54

Not to mention, With Indian TNs in coming like hail stones , PRC will have to lash out at not only India but all possible nuclear and non nuclear adversaries and this will open up possibility of preemptive strike on PRC by these targeted adversaries. Chinese strategic stupidity will eventually haunt them.All India need is enough Maal to Maul the dragon and rest will follow its own course.

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jan 2017 08:15

tandav wrote:It is my understanding that Indian strategic forces are prepared as follows: Any Pakistani nuclear strike on India will be construed as a Chinese nuclear strike (with Chinese supplied nukes and delivery devices such as Shaheen/Ababeel/Babur etc). Indian dead hand retaliation will include Beijing and Shanghai along with Lahore Islamabad, Rawalpindi.

Yes, that's what the 2003 Indian Nuclear Doctrine seems to say, or at least as interpreted by many including the then NSA Shiv Shankar Menon, namely that aiders and abettors would also be targetted and NFU would break-down at that instance.

But, deterrence & compellance are in the minds of the adversary just as beauty is in the eyes of the beholder.

Let me quote from this report which appeared yesterday, on India signing the remaining two defence agreements with the US, CISMOA & BECA. Let us not debate whether we should sign them or not. The merit or otherwise does not concern us here. But, read the following:
Although India has agreed to sign the pacts, the negotiations have not yet started, as India needs to keep the sensitivities of Russia and China in mind, according to sources.


I am not sure if the above is just an opinion of the author of the article, or he has some inside information etc. But, the mere fact that such a thought exists and is articulated is disturbing, isn't it? A nuclear power that faces a serious threat from another nuclear power, China, and which is surrounding us from all sides and which is proliferating and transferring all sorts of nuclear weapons to our 'enduringly hostile' neighbour, technologies, and delivery platforms that can hit us and us only along with supporting its jihadi terrorism against us, hesitates to sign a defence deal citing 'sensitivity' of that very implacable enemy? Tell me who is deterred by whom here. If such a thought persists, that shows that Indian strategic planners are constrained by India's limitations and China's superiority. The 'massive punitive retaliation', about which several analysts have raised debates, then becomes meaningless with respect to China (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong et al)

Deterrence is more about capability, credibility, intent, and consistent & unambiguous signalling of the intent and capability.

I recall what I wrote here some time back.

On the issue of nuclear doctrine and China’s perception of Indian nuclear-weapons and deterrence, the Chinese thoughts appear to be that India is not a major nuclear threat to it because of factors such as the size and capability of its nuclear warheads, delivery systems, its NFU policy, a usually defensive Indian diplomatic outlook, and non-aggressive nature. It also believes that it was India’s hunger for a Great power status coupled with domestic politics that led to the 1998 tests. In other words, China believes that both in capability and intention, India is not a threat. It also believes that the technological gap between the two countries in this field is too wide to be easily bridged by India.

I do not want to get into deterrence debate here but, nevertheless, want to put a perspective on reality.

TKiran
BRFite
Posts: 469
Joined: 13 Dec 2009 00:22

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby TKiran » 27 Jan 2017 12:38

Chinese don't have any fear of India, as they are certain that Pakistan will not allow India to rise.

They are sure that India cannot attack China proper, as there is a buffer of Tibet.

They were correct in their analysis.

Even if they attack India, they can't hold on to land, as Tibet is such a buffer that it provides natural boundaries for both China and India equally, even if Tibet is under the control of China.

There is a natural balance militarily.

What is changing this dynamic is CPEC.

If India can take back PoK, that will unravel China. China will simply collapse.

CPEC started by China, India has to end it visibly, without giving any face-saving formula for China. That can be done only by subjugating Pakistan.

That's the only way to eliminate China threat. Any other ad-hoc steps would be futile.

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jan 2017 13:08

TKiran, I agree that Pakistan has to be made 'useless' both for China & the US. Pakistan is the trump card that both have used against us at various times. Right now, Pakistan is 'far more useful' to China than it is to the US. There is an element of truth in what Jinnah said, "You need us more than we need you".

g.sarkar
BRFite
Posts: 1102
Joined: 09 Jul 2005 12:22
Location: MERCED, California

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 27 Jan 2017 13:32

http://zeenews.india.com/india/when-cia ... 70997.html
When CIA feared China could attack India again after bloody 1962 war
By Zee Media Bureau | Last Updated: Friday, January 27, 2017 - 10:12
New Delhi: Though China emerged victorious in the bloody 1962 war with India, it still baffled the Americans for months who were worried that Beijing could again strike New Delhi through Tibet, Myanmar and even Nepal and Bhutan.
According to a Hindustan Times report, the Chinese troops Chinese troops mounted an offensive in October 1962 following a string of skirmishes along the disputed frontier and, later advanced into Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now the state of Arunachal Pradesh).
However, a month later, China announced a unilateral truce and withdrew its troops.
But by January 1963, US intelligence officials began examining the possibility of China “giving the Indians another black eye”, revealed the recently declassified documents posted on the Central Intelligence Agency’s website.
The documents reveal that CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and United States Intelligence Board made several assessments over a period of months, analysing possible attacks by China on India through neighbouring countries.
The US intelligence officials estimated that the Chinese could mobilise a little more than 120,000 troops for such attacks and also assessed the air threat to India.
A DIA document, titled “The Chinese Communist ground threat to India”, which was prepared up less than six months after the 1962 war, also concluded that China had the capability to carry out attacks in Ladakh, through border passes between Ladakh and Nepal, across eastern Bhutan and NEFA into Assam.
The DIA report concluded that such an attack would extend the Chinese control to the town of Leh, seizing the territorial claim north of Joshimath, the “eventual occupation” of Nepal to forestall Indian intervention and the “effective occupation” of NEFA and the part of Assam north of the Brahmaputra river.
The DIA report, however, estimated that the occupation of Assam would require a “strong and permanent lodgement” in the Guwahati area.
A May 1963 top secret memorandum from the CIA and USIB also concluded the “government of Burma (now Myanmar) would not resist the movement of Chinese troops” for a possible attack on India and would even “acquiesce” in the use of Burmese transportation facilities and airfields.
.....

Gautam

TKiran
BRFite
Posts: 469
Joined: 13 Dec 2009 00:22

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby TKiran » 27 Jan 2017 16:43

SSridhar wrote:TKiran, I agree that Pakistan has to be made 'useless' both for China & the US. Pakistan is the trump card that both have used against us at various times. Right now, Pakistan is 'far more useful' to China than it is to the US. There is an element of truth in what Jinnah said, "You need us more than we need you".


SS sir, the surgical strike gave a opening, but we didn't follow it up, doubtful if there would be another one. We should have gone on offence and hold to land, inch by inch, till we reach Karakorum highway. Time for covert operations has passed, everyday we are loosing time, the perception right now is that CPEC is a success, it may as well turn out to be truth, àla Coral reefs of Indo-China Sea

Varoon Shekhar
BRFite
Posts: 1547
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 23:26

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 27 Jan 2017 18:24

Why is India giving these contracts to Chinese companies? Purely because of cost competitiveness? There must be other countries with SCADA capabilities. India has its own SCADA know how from at least 1999. Are Indians crazy or something, to allow China to penetrate like this into the economy?

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jan 2017 18:37

Varoon Shekhar wrote:India has its own SCADA know how from at least 1999.

A decade before that.

Varoon Shekhar
BRFite
Posts: 1547
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 23:26

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 27 Jan 2017 20:09

^
Nice, well then it's yet another example of a technology which India possessed before China, but where China tried to, and succeeded in, catching up with India, and even exporting the technology. Whereas i don't think india has exported any SCADA system(?). China will cite this as an example of how mighty they are. The least India can do is not allow China to make inroads in this sector. Just common sense!

g.sarkar
BRFite
Posts: 1102
Joined: 09 Jul 2005 12:22
Location: MERCED, California

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 28 Jan 2017 11:52

http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-ch ... us-2296865
China steps up preparedness for military conflict with US
China is stepping up preparedness for a possible military conflict with the US as President Donald Trump has signalled that he will follow a more hardline policy to counter Beijing's claims on the disputed South China Sea and on other issues, official media reports said.
A commentary in the official website of People's Liberation Army's (PLA) said on January 20, the day Trump assumed Presidency, that the chances of war have become "more real" amid a more complex security situation in the Asia Pacific.
The commentary written by an official at the national defence mobilisation department in the Central Military Commission, China's overall military high command, said the US call for rebalancing of its strategy in Asia, military deployments in the East and South China Seas and the setting up of a missile defence system in South Korea were hot spots getting closer to ignition.
"'A war within the President's term' or 'war breaking out tonight' are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality," Hong Kong based South China Morning Post quoted the commentary as saying.
The official People's Daily said in another commentary on Sunday that China's military would conduct exercises on the high seas regardless of foreign provocations. China's sole aircraft carrier Liaoning had passed through the narrow Taiwan Strait last month.
The commentary referred to remarks by the US secretary of state nominee Rex Tillerson that the US should stop China's access to artificial islands it has built in disputed areas of the South China Sea. New White House spokesman Sean Spicer said that the US would prevent China from taking over territory in international waters in the South China Sea. With their threats to China, Trump and Tillerson are making "rookie blunders" that will only hurt US credibility, the commentary said. "Tillerson's statement was too arrogant. If the new US administration follows this route and adopts this attitude, then it will lead to a war between China and the US and that would mean the end of US history or even all of humanity," Jin Canrong, associate dean of the Department of International Studies at Renmin University of China, told state-run Global Times.
....

Gautam

g.sarkar
BRFite
Posts: 1102
Joined: 09 Jul 2005 12:22
Location: MERCED, California

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 28 Jan 2017 12:00

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ ... viser-says
Donald Trump’s plan for China relations is to be unpredictable, adviser says
Since his election, Trump has confused Beijing with comments on South China Sea, Taiwan and the yuan
Donald Trump’s game plan for relations with China is to use unpredictability as a means of wrong-footing the country’s Communist party leaders and extracting economic concessions, a prominent adviser has said.
Since his election, Trump and his team have repeatedly discombobulated the Chinese government with a series of interventions on sensitive issues such as the South China Sea, US relations with Taiwan and China’s alleged manipulation of its currency, the yuan.
Those moves have unsettled and angered Beijing, which had expected Trump to tone down his anti-China rhetoric after his victory.
In an interview with China’s state-run broadcaster, Michael Pillsbury, a former Pentagon official and longtime China scholar, suggested Trump’s decision to repeatedly tweak Beijing’s nose was part of a calculated strategy.
Analysis Beijing grits teeth in face of Trump's tweets
China shows restraint as it tries to work out if US president-elect is being deliberately confrontational or just out of his depth
The US president believed the Chinese were “the best negotiators in the whole world, so to get an advantage he wants to be unpredictable in the eyes of the Chinese government,” Pillsbury told CGTN, an international mouthpiece for the Chinese government that was formerly called CCTV. “I think he has succeeded in this, don’t you?”
Pillsbury, a fluent Mandarin speaker who is known for his contacts within China’s People’s Liberation Army and has been advising Trump’s team, said the president had outlined this strategy in his most recent book, Great Again: How To Fix Our Crippled America.
"Although the US is planning to send three aircraft- carriers to the West Pacific region, if they invade the South China Sea, we have the ability to destroy them all even if they send 10, let alone three," Jin said.
"The islands with airports that we have built in the area are 'unsinkable aircraft carriers' and compared to US aircraft carriers, they have more advantage to some extent," he said.
......

Gautam

SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20836
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jan 2017 17:33

Varoon Shekhar wrote:^
Nice, well then it's yet another example of a technology which India possessed before China, but where China tried to, and succeeded in, catching up with India, and even exporting the technology. Whereas i don't think india has exported any SCADA system(?). China will cite this as an example of how mighty they are. The least India can do is not allow China to make inroads in this sector. Just common sense!

Varoon, many years ago, a South Korean was sitting next to me in a flight and we started talking. He was in India for installing thermal power generating sets for a power station supplied by South Korea. Without any prodding from me, he wondered why India was importing from this South Korean company while it had a giant like BHEL. He said clearly to me that they were nowhere compared to BHEL.

VinodTK
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2053
Joined: 18 Jun 2000 11:31

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby VinodTK » 29 Jan 2017 20:11

From HindustanTimes: What the next India-China war might look like
India’s military might was on view during its Republic Day parade on January 26. Much of the focus of its armed forces is on China even though they are more regularly engaged in dealing with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. China looms large in the minds of India’s planners – owing to its large military budget, its modernisation plans and the aggressive posturing in the South China Sea – but there is not enough public discussion as to what a future India-China war might look like.

This gap has been impressively addressed in a paper by Iskander Rehman for the Naval War College Review titled ‘A Himalayan Challenge: India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border’. Rehman, senior fellow at Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University, draws on extensive source material and interviews with figures in Indian intelligence, military and special forces to capture how Indian and Chinese strategists think about a border war, the way they are organising their resources and the constraints they face. The paper essentially tries to assess if “India’s operational concepts are sufficiently tailored to…the evolving Chinese challenge”.

Read | After 1962 war, CIA feared China could attack India through Nepal, Myanmar

To begin with, Rehman outlines four factors that will shape India-China conflict. First, the territorial defence postures of both countries. India maintains its large body of troops relatively close to the border while China stations a limited number in its interior in Tibet. Second is the climate and the difficult terrain. “Areas along the Indian side are not amenable to mechanised warfare, except certain parts of Ladakh and Sikkim.” The high elevation of Tibet gives China some “commanding advantages” for surveillance, artillery operations and acclimatisation of troops to high altitudes. High altitude and extreme cold affect “almost every element of military equipment”; they complicate air campaigns and battle plans. Third, is the infrastructure disparity between the two sides. The People’s Liberation Army has rapid access to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) thanks to the terrain and highways and high-speed railway networks it has built whereas Indian troops “often have to trek several hours, if not days, to attain certain areas.” Fourth, there are very different command structures on both sides – India has several regional army and air force commands, China has one unified western theatre command.

Planners on both sides believe that the next India-China conflict will be “limited in scope and short in duration, rather than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force campaign”, because of the nuclear overhang and the prospect of a third party intervention if it prolongs. This has a bearing on the kind of war they prepare for. Chinese writings since the 1990s have emphasised “transtheater mobility”, rapid massing of strength, “gaining initiative from striking first” and “fighting a quick battle to force a quick solution”.

Read | India trying to convince China that our rise won’t harm its ascent: Jaishankar

In the event of a conflict with India, conventional forces will be rushed in from the interior and these will be accompanied by air, electronic and cyber operations. The PLA’s air force (PLAAF) and artillery will conduct “standoff strikes” to disrupt and delay the arrival of Indian forces coming from the lowlands.” PLA’s Special Operations Forces (SOFs) will be deployed to attack vital targets “to create favourable conditions for main force units.” Rehman writes that India has been following “with a certain degree of trepidation”, the rapid development of China’s airborne assault capabilities via the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Corps, numbering over 35,000 troops and headquartered at Xiaogan, from where it is expected “to reach any part of China within ten hours.”

Responding to this, India is building on its advantage in conventional troops numbers augmenting its force structure with new battalions of scouts, adding air, missile and surveillance assets, raising a new Mountain Strike Corps and improving its road and rail infrastructure in the border regions. Beyond these material indicators Rehman argues that the most significant change “has occurred in the intellectual domain as Indian defence planners have adopted much more vigorous, tactically offensive approach to territorial defence.” Raising a Strike Corps was a way of moving away from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment; to a form of “offensive defence”, a “cross-border riposte strategy”. As an army colonel told Rehman “once the Chinese seize a position, it may be very difficult to dislodge them. Rather than expend much blood and treasure attempting to storm impregnable positions, we should pursue a strategy of horizontal escalation and capture territory elsewhere.” In line with this, Ladakh and northern Sikkim are good locations for a mechanised riposte where India’s forces would “sweep down from…mountain plains to conduct pincer movements behind Chinese formations, with the hope of breaking troop concentration.” India’s air and missile power would aid these mechanised incursions into Tibet, as part of a wider theatre strategy.

Rehman argues, however, that notwithstanding this India’s approach to conventional deterrence has certain limitations. “While Indian planners have moved toward adopting a more-offensive form of area denial, they continue to rely, for the most part, on conventional forces that could be overcome or circumvented in the event of a fast-moving, localised, and limited border confrontation launched from higher elevations.” This leads to several problems. India is reliant on dispersed, poorly equipped paramilitary forces like the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) as “its first line of defence in many of the forward areas most vulnerable to Chinese aggression.” The nature of the topography is such that conventional troops, which are substantially stationed in lower altitudes, are “relatively static” – moving them from lowlands is challenging, and while they wind up mountain roads and valleys during conflict they are vulnerable to artillery, missile or air strikes.

Read | India’s tanks at LAC could affect investments: Chinese media

These weaknesses can be addressed, in Rehman’s view, by a greater complementarity between conventional forces and Special Operations Forces that can “play a critical role behind enemy lines, conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and direct-action operations.” SOF’s can be used to strike airbases, reconnaissance assets and disrupt build-up of PLA forces. SOFs are also useful to counter “gray zone aggression” described by Michael Mazarr as “sequences of gradual steps to secure strategic leverage”, which would include Pakistan’s covert action and China’s use of infrastructural development to cement territorial claims. In view of their utility, Rehman’s surveys in some detail India’s SOFs, their composition, mandates, operational challenges and deficiencies, which will no doubt be pored over by planners (and adversaries).

Some aspects of Rehman’s diagnosis need immediate attention though. Road and rail projects in border areas continue to be delayed. “As of May 2016, only twenty-one of sixty-one border road projects designated strategic had been completed.” Twenty eight strategic railway lines were sanctioned in 2010, “six years later none have been finalized.” Chronic shortfalls in essential equipment continue, including parachutes, night vision devices, high-altitude clothing and even aluminium, belt-attachable water bottles. SOFs have expanded too rapidly “in size and in ad hoc manner, without the benefit of careful, deliberate planning” – and in numerous cases battalions have had to operate with inferior equipment sourced from infantry. There is not enough training capacity to cope with expanded forces. Attrition levels are high; most special forces units have an officer shortfall of 25-30%.

“Perhaps the greatest set of challenges lies in the organizational domain”, writes Rehman. Like other analysts, he calls for restructuring around a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to harmonise the large number of SOFs, address inter-service rivalry and bring about greater strategic and doctrinal clarity.

Rehman’s paper is a remarkable piece of scholarship that serves India’s defence establishment well. One cannot help but wonder reading it why such an important work on India-China conflict happens to be the product of a western institution rather than an Indian one. There are certainly some outstanding international relations scholars in India, who happen to be productive in spite of the prohibitive climate they operate in. It is worth considering the conditions needed for producing valuable academic work. A paper like Rehman’s has a gestation period (requiring institutional support for scholars to pursue time-taking endeavours), it needs financial support, to create congenial conditions for research and to travel for fieldwork and interviews, and it needs access to establishment figures. Indian scholars based in India can rarely count on these; they are more likely to be underpaid and undervalued by the establishment.

Most importantly, a paper like this needs a strategic and intellectual ecosystem that values critical voices and contrarian thinking. Politicians must know that such rigorous scrutiny serves the public good – and that fine academic work is a product of the habits of thought that are nurtured in institutions, principally universities. If universities are instead turned into receptacles of conformity then India will not have the expertise that great powers need. It will also not establish institutions that will have the credibility and influence to define the debate abroad. Right now a paper originating in a western institution is initiating a conversation on India-China conflict. There is, by contrast, no piece of Indian work on American democracy that shapes the debate in the US on the age of Trump.


Return to “Strategic Issues & International Relations Forum”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Falijee, Shwetank, vmalik, Vyas and 38 guests