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Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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Iyersan
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 17 Jul 2017 11:13

China holds military drill near Arunachal border, ‘enemy’ aircraft the target
http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-new ... mlkIK.html
Posturing???

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudraksh » 17 Jul 2017 11:30

shiv wrote:
ldev wrote:New Delhi is ~350 kms from the nearest Chinese border. Beijing & Shanghai are ~2500 kms from the nearest Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh.

This is a Delhi centric view - which would be pleasing to central government types.

For folks in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam the threat is very close and I don't think Beijing has to be hit to reduce the threat. All we have to do is comprehensively defeat the Chinese armed forces at the border and make inroads into China held Tibet.

I don't think the world has yet turned a full circle where major powers will go back to decimating each other's cities. The logical way to do that is with nuclear weapons and in my view all talk of long range bombers dropping puny conventional loads which did not work in WW2 or Vietnam should be set aside. Attacks on Arunachal and Assam cities should invite retaliation of mainland Chinese cities starting with Chengdu and Yunnan. We should be willing to let Delhi, Bangalore and other cities be hit by hitting China hard if the start destroying Itanagar, Guwahati or Shillong. Lay waste to cities in mainland China. There can be no two ways about it.

Itanagar to Chengdu is 1000 km.
Imphal to Yunnan is 750 km


Newbie question - do we have enough missiles in our arsenal that have the range to do this? Iirc, we had only a few squadrons armed with Agni-2/3?

Do the Chinese have a BMD in place?

Thanks
Rudraksh

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 17 Jul 2017 12:13

http://www.firstpost.com/india/malabar- ... 16205.html
Malabar naval exercise: Cautious China 'listens' as India, US and Japan bond on sea
IndiaSujan DuttaJul, 15 2017
New Delhi: Through the winds and waves in the North Bay of Bengal on Saturday and Friday night, a formidable battle group surrounded the USS Nimitz supercarrier of the US Navy, seeking to protect it from a possible submarine attack.

Protecting an aircraft carrier from possible surface, undersea or aerial attack is the primary responsibility of a navy battle group.
In simulating the protection of the carrier, the Indian Navy and a flotilla from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) were practising drills that they have carried out earlier.

The first time it happened in waters close to India in the Bay of Bengal was exactly a decade ago this month. From Port Blair, the capital of the Indian archipelago of the Andamans, a C2 Greyhound COD (Carrier Onboard Delivery) took off and landed on the USS Nimitz. In 2007, the Nimitz and the then outgoing US aircraft carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk, and the Indian carrier the INS Viraat, made up three aircraft carriers in that year’s Exercise Malabar.

It wasn’t the first of the series of such exercises held every year. But 2007 marked a difference of magnitude. Flotillas from five navies hosted by India converged in the Bay of Bengal for the wargames. They included, apart from the Indian and the US’, Australia, Singapore and New Zealand.

Even as the exercises were underway, China issued a demarche to the Indian government. Beijing wanted to know from New Delhi why it was hosting such drills. The question that was unstated: is this the beginning of an Asian NATO? *(Now 'oos asking?) :rotfl:
Following that, the then UPA government with AK Antony as defence minister decided, all international maritime exercises involving the Indian Navy would be kept bilateral, meaning if the Indian Navy was in drills with the US, no other country would be allowed to participate.

Cut to 2017.
This is the second time on Indian shores — the third time in a series — that the Indian, US and Japanese navies are in the Malabar wargames. A request from Australia to participate in the drills has been kept pending by New Delhi for nearly three years now. As the warships left Chennai and maritime surveillance aircraft of the Indian and US navies — all US-origin Poseidon 8s — took off from INS Rajali in Arakonnam — China also began deploying personnel of its PLA-Navy to Djibouti, a naval base on the Horn of Africa. Even as the Indian-US-and Japanese warships turn around to return to port from the latest edition of the Malabar series of wargames or set sail for onward destinations, a Chinese fleet is due to transit through the Straits of Malacca and waters close to the Bay of Bengal.

In the Indian Navy, there is strong suspicion that the Chinese flotilla is accompanied by — or it has already deployed — submarines and surveillance warships to "listen into" the Malabar wargames.

But that is not deterring either of the participants in going through what they are claiming is among the largest and most complex of naval wargames to ensure “interoperability” – an euphemism to prepare for acting together as a coalition in the event of hostilities.

New Delhi and Washington DC, in particular, are well on the way to reinforcing an already going military relationship. Earlier this morning, in Washington DC, the US House of Representatives passed an enabling act that could allocate upto $621.5 billion to promote defence cooperation with India. The US Department of Defense and the US State Department have been given six months within which to propose a roadmap to intensify the cooperation.

But that roadmap is most likely to depend on India agreeing to sign a new military pact, called the COMCASA – Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement. The COMCASA is the most recent nomenclature for a pact the US proposed more than a decade-and-a-half back. It was then known as the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). India has been hesitant because of fears that such a pact could compromise its military-grade communications equipment.

Year after year, however, and especially in the current edition of the Malabar exercises, the US has sought to demonstrate that a CISMOA or a COMCASA would allow Indian and US military platforms to "talk" to one another seamlessly.

This correspondent has been aboard US and Indian warships during exercises at least thrice — and once last year in the Persian Gulf on the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier — where the US was operating with its 5th fleet partners — and has personally seen the communication that was made possible simply among coalition partners.

India, on the other hand, insisted in 2015 that it would like to use its own communication nodes. But they were incompatible with the US’ and the Indian Navy finally accepted within its warships and submarines "talk boxes" of the US navy for the purpose of the Malabar exercise.

The current and latest edition of the exercise in the Bay of Bengal coincides with an unusually long stand-off between the Indian and Chinese armies. Also, in the South China Sea, where China is locked in maritime disputes with five countries, Indonesia renamed part of its maritime boundaries on Thursday irritating Beijing further.

Like a decade back, this edition of the Malabar series also has three carriers. The Japanese flat-deck carries only helicopters. The USS Nimitz can carry about 90 aircraft of different types. India’s Russian-origin INS Vikramaditya – the only carrier in service in the Indian Navy today – operates the MiG29Ks, also of Russian-origin.

On the deck of the USS Carl Vinson in the Persian Gulf last March — the carrier from which Osama Bin Laden was given a sea-burial after being killed in Pakistan’s Abbotabad in 2011 — the thump of aircraft landing and the boom of aircraft taking off never ends.

It is the same on the Nimitz. This correspondent landed on the Nimitz in 2007 on a C2 COD — short for carrier onboard delivery — going from a speed of 300kmph to zero in 15 seconds flat. The aircraft was “arrested” by cables strung across the deck. From the Nimitz, he was “shot off” — like a human arrow from a bow — in the same plane that was catapulted to fly in the sky.

Ten years back this month, the USS Nimitz, the US’ largest ship, steamed into Indian waters captained by a man who was called “Nasty”. That was Captain Michael C Manazir’s “call sign”. All pilots from carriers have call signs.

In the Bay of Bengal today, there are signs for calls too: from a trijunction in the Himalayas between India, China and Bhutan. And from the Pentagon in Washington DC.
Published Date: Jul 15, 2017

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 17 Jul 2017 12:20

The yellow-faced sh*tworms now trying to drive a wedge between the GOI and IA,after their attempts as "push and shove" have miserably failed?

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chin ... 93286.html
China escalates border tension, accuses Indian Army of betrayal
China and India have been engaged in a standoff in the Doka La area near the Bhutan tri-junction for almost a month now.

PTI
New Delhi, July 3, 2017 |
The verbal spat between China and India today escalated as Beijing said the Indian Army's action to stop Chinese troops from constructing a road in an area near Sikkim is a "betrayal" of the stance taken by successive Indian governments and India must withdraw from the region.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said that the Sino-India border in the Sikkim sector is well demarcated.
"By entering into the Chinese territory and obstructing Chinese troops normal activities, India violated the existing convention on the boundary and basic principle of the international law and obstructed peace and stability of the boundary area," Geng told reporters in an extensive briefing.
"We require the Indian side to withdraw their troops to the Indian side of the boundary and create conditions for the restoration of peace and stability in the relevant areas."

STANDOFF BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES
China and India have been engaged in a standoff in the Doka La area near the Bhutan tri-junction for almost a month in what has been the longest such impasse between the two armies since 1962, when the two countries fought a brief war.
Sikkim, which became a part of India in May 1976, is the only state with a demarcated border with China. The lines are based on an 1898 treaty signed with China. Doka La is the Indian name for the region which Bhutan recognises as Dokalam, while China claims it as part of its Donglang region.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng said India needs to observe the treaty and pull back its troops immediately.
He dismissed Defence Minister Arun Jaitleys remarks that India of 2017 is different from what it was during the war with the communist nation in 1962, saying China too is different and will take "all necessary measures" to safeguard its territorial sovereignty.
"Former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru endorsed the 1890 Sino-British Treaty on Sikkim in a letter to then Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai in 1959. Successive Indian governments have also endorsed this," he said.
"The India-China boundary in the Sikkim section is well demarcated. The action taken by India is a betrayal of the position taken by (successive) Indian governments," he said.
"What has happened is very clear, the Sikkim section of the boundary has already been defined by the 1890 convention between Great Britain and China. Doklam belongs to China."

Asked if there was a possibility of a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the G20 Summit in Hamburg in Germany this week, Geng said he has "no information at the moment" about the arrangements for bilateral meetings between Xi and leaders of other countries.
He, however, said the line for diplomatic communication between India and China is "open and smooth".
Indias National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who is the Special Representative for the India-China border talks, is to visit Beijing on July 26 to attend the meeting of the NSAs from BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. He is expected to discuss the issue with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi.
The standoff first came to public notice when China denied Indian pilgrims entry for Kailash Mansarovar Yatra through the Nathu La pass in Sikkim. Beijing initially said it stopped the Yatra due to damage to roads in Tibet after rains and landslides. But soon signalled the matter was related to the standoff between the two armies near Sikkim.
The Sikkim route to Mount Kailash and Mansarovar Lake was opened in 2015, enabling pilgrims to travel the 1500-km long route from Nathu La to Kailash by buses.
The other route to Tibet through Lipulekh pass is open as it is located in the middle section where there is no dispute over boundary between India and China, Geng said.

CHANGE OF STATUS QUO
On the Indian Ministry of External Affairs statement on Friday that construction of the road by Chinese troops would represent a significant change of status quo with "serious" security implications for India, the Chinese official said they have "noted" the statement by India.
"(The statement) evaded the 1890 convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet. But it is this convention which has confirmed the alignment of the boundary between the two sides at the Sikkim section. This convention has been recognised by successive Chinese and Indian governments and has been confirmed by the Indian governments in written form," he said.
"Prime Minister Nehru has affirmed in his letters to Premier Zhou Enlai, that the convention must be observed. That is the basic principle of international law. It is an obligation must be fulfilled by the Indian side," he said.
The Chinese official cited two letters Nehru wrote to Zhou - first on March 22, 1959, and on September 26, 1959 - to say that the border between Sikkim and Tibet China is defined by the 1890 Convention and demarcated on the ground in 1895.
"There is no dispute on the border between Sikkim and Tibet," he said, adding that the "trespass" by Indian troops happened at the "defined" Sikkim section.
"This is different from frictions and confrontations between the two sides at undefined boundary," Geng said.
INDIA USING BHUTAN AS COVER
He also accused India of using Bhutan as a cover, but skirted questions on Bhutans protest against the construction of the road, saying the area is Bhutanese territory.
"In order to cover up the illegal entry of the Indian border troops, to distort the fact and even at the expense of Bhutans independence and sovereignty, they try to confuse right from wrong, that is futile," the Chinese official said.
"We have no objection to normal bilateral relations between India and Bhutan but firmly opposed to Indian side infringing up Chinese territory using Bhutan as an excuse. The Bhutan side does not know previously that the Indian troops entered into the Doklam area, which is not in line with what is claimed by the Indian side," he said.
Geng also claimed that Bhutan "did not know that Indian border troops had entered into the Doklam area which is not in line with what has been claimed by the Indian side."
"We will work with Bhutan without interference of any external forces in maintaining peace and tranquillity of border area and resolving the boundary question," he said.

Bhutan, however, has no diplomatic ties with China. It is supported militarily and diplomatically by India. And this is not the first time that such a transgression has happened in Doka La. The Chinese forces had in November 2008 destroyed some makeshift Indian army bunkers there.
Defence experts believe China wants to exert its dominance over the Chumbi Valley, which is a part of the southern reaches of Tibet. By claiming the Doka La area, Beijing wants to maximise its geographical advantage so that it can monitor all movements along the India-Bhutan border.
Since the standoff on June 6, when PLA bulldozers destroyed bunkers of the India Army claiming the area belonged to China, Chinese media have carried several pieces warning India for escalating border tension and "reminding" the Indian Army about the 1962 war.
Also read: Doklam standoff: China tells Arun Jaitley it is also different from 1962
Also read: Border standoff with China: Congress says govt napping, part time Defence Minister won't work


If Bhutan has no dpl relations with China,it is free to recognise Taiwan.Any aggression on China's part will be universally condemned and mean fighting the Indian Army,Bhutan's protector. Being the strongest Asian (N) power that can defeat China in a militarily spat,India is the last ASian nation thta it would like to go to war with,esp. as India holds all the cards in the IOR.Instead of a "string of pearls",China would have a "string of blazing hulks" in the IOR should the balloon go up! An acute embarrassment to the PRC and huge loss of face globally.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 17 Jul 2017 12:52

http://www.asianage.com/opinion/columni ... reams.html
Crisis as India stands in way of Chinese dreams
Judging by the invectives and humiliation heaped on India, the state-run Chinese media is signifying that Beijing is displeased with New Delhi. For nearly a month there has been a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction after India stopped China from building a road deep into Bhutanese territory (according to Indian and Bhutanese calculations). While New Delhi has asked Beijing to restore the position as it was prior to June 15, 2017, China wants India to withdraw troops from the Doklam area.
The crucial point to determine is, despite the decibel level of Chinese anger honed by years of Mao Zedong-style indoctrination, the cause of Beijing’s fulmination. There are several strands to it, among them Beijing’s response to its ambitious One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) initiative, snubbed by New Delhi for the good reason that it is built on a route through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. There are wider reasons for Indian scepticism as Beijing is proclaiming it is a superpower that can disregard Indian interests as it takes its place at the high table for two (the other being the United States).
China is also expressing its opposition to India’s closer defence and strategic relationship with the US (inevitable given New Delhi’s troubled relations with two neighbours) — witness the joint maritime exercises with the US and Japan in the Bay of Bengal. Another factor is Beijing’s increasingly close links with Pakistan, a key link in the OBOR concept, becoming in effect a Chinese colony with massive road and port works and injection of thousands of Chinese workers, particularly in the troubled Waziristan area.
The Chinese moves come at a propitious time for it, with US President Donald Trump upholding his “America First” policy, and the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the campaign days giving way to his references to President Xi Jinping in reverential terms. Apart from Japan at one end and Australia at the other, with Vietnam standing out as a sore thumb, Southeast Asia has largely fallen under the sway of China for economic and political reasons. India stands in the way of Chinese dreams.
These factors present a complex problem for India because on one hand it must try to maintain relations on a civil course while on the other safeguard its interests. New Delhi has made it amply clear that China’s forward movement in Doklam would adversely affect safeguarding the “Chicken’s Neck” area that links the Northeast to the rest of the country.
There is also the close Indian historical relationship with Bhutan, which has no diplomatic relations with China, although the wife of the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi reportedly recently made a visit to Thimphu, apart from the super-active ambassador himself recently calling on Rahul Gandhi, to the Congress Party’s acute embarrassment. Given Bhutan’s delicate position, it can only hope and pray that its two major neighbours would ultimately resolve the tri-junction problem primarily affecting its territory amicably.
There are no early prospects of a thaw in Sino-Indian relations. India’s national security adviser Ajit Doval is due to attend a multilateral Brics meeting in China soon, with one Chinese expert (traditionally used as unofficial spokesmen) suggesting that there would be no official-level bilateral talks, with severe weather forcing the two sides to withdraw from their present positions on Doklam. The withdrawal of Indian troops is a Chinese condition for holding talks.
......

Gautam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 17 Jul 2017 14:54

The following link has been sent by a BR lurker, Venkatesh. Thanks, Venkatesh.

Little Bhutan in Tibet - Claude Arpi, The Staesman

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 17 Jul 2017 15:18

shiv wrote:
ldev wrote:New Delhi is ~350 kms from the nearest Chinese border. Beijing & Shanghai are ~2500 kms from the nearest Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh.

This is a Delhi centric view - which would be pleasing to central government types.

For folks in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam the threat is very close and I don't think Beijing has to be hit to reduce the threat. All we have to do is comprehensively defeat the Chinese armed forces at the border and make inroads into China held Tibet.

I don't think the world has yet turned a full circle where major powers will go back to decimating each other's cities. The logical way to do that is with nuclear weapons and in my view all talk of long range bombers dropping puny conventional loads which did not work in WW2 or Vietnam should be set aside. Attacks on Arunachal and Assam cities should invite retaliation of mainland Chinese cities starting with Chengdu and Yunnan. We should be willing to let Delhi, Bangalore and other cities be hit by hitting China hard if the start destroying Itanagar, Guwahati or Shillong. Lay waste to cities in mainland China. There can be no two ways about it.

Itanagar to Chengdu is 1000 km.
Imphal to Yunnan is 750 km


Shiv, you just made my point. That point being, that Siliguri itself or Itanagar or any point along that Chicken Neck Siliguri corridor is as critical to India as New Delhi itself which by the way is "only" 350 kms from from the Chinese border well within range of over 1500 short range Chinese ballistic missiles and over 300 cruise missiles should the Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) choose to deploy them in Tibet. India has no equivalent threat to the Chinese heartland short of it's long range Agni nuclear missiles. If China launches a 1000 conventional ballistic missile and 300 cruise missile barrage at northern/eastern India which is well within range of it's conventional missiles, will India retaliate with nuclear missiles? Ot will it be better if India has a similar ability via sea launched cruise missiles numbering in the hundreds to precision attack power plants, communication nodes, bridges and other vital infrastructure in coastal China? That would be the equivalent of India attacking China's Bangalore, Mumbai and the Mumbai to Ahmedabad corridor. Or alternatively India should possess a force of 1000 + conventional missiles with the range to strike that Chinese heartland i.e. a mix of Agni 4s and 5s, but armed with conventional warheads. Short of either of these 2 options, posturing at the border even with 200,000-300,000 Indian troops or doing a one off IAF suicidal strike mission via SU-30s to Chengdu at most is not going to threaten China, the way that China can lay waste to critical Indian infrastructure at least in north India or threaten an attack on the Siliguri corridor. The map below is dated to 2006 and shows the PLARF short range missile threat in 2006. I am sure that their threat radius/range has only grown since then. For the overlords in Beijing, the confrontation with India is at a distant "colonial" frontier i.e. Tibet, 2500 kms away. For India the threat is directly at it's heartland. For India to be credible, it's threat has to directly threaten the overlords in Beijing and the Chinese elite in Shanghai and the Guandong province.

Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 17 Jul 2017 15:38

ldev wrote: If China launches a 1000 conventional ballistic missile and 300 cruise missile barrage at northern/eastern India which is well within range of it's conventional missiles, will India retaliate with nuclear missiles?

The Chinese conventional missile threat is always posed rhetorically and ends with the question "What will we do?"

The fact is so what if we have 1000 conventional missiles targeting Beijing and Shanghai? How much damage would that do? They would shrug off the damage or nuke us. 1000 missiles would each have (say) 500 kg warheads each . OK a few cities get hit with 200 or 100 or 250 x 500 kg warheads? How much damage is that going to do? They are certainly not going to capitulate there. Nor are we.

Hitting cities and maybe 'strategic targets' with conventional weapons would be tragic and hurtful but not a war winner. It would show that the Chinese are serious about doing damage to us. But if we are fighting a land war and they are hitting our cities - we have the choice of
1. Nuclear retaliation
or
2. Grabbing territory and making them "lose" the land war

I put it to you that hitting cities is useless for them. They are sure to lose the war. They are better off peppering air bases and major military bases and railheads with 100 missiles each - to put them out of action so they can win the land war. Similarly we stand to gain by putting their logistics and supply lines out of action to win the land war

1000 conventional missiles on faraway cities is not a war winning strategy and even we would not be able to hurt them much with 10,000 conventional missiles. Countries like Vietnam and Iraq have seen a far greater tonnage of bombs fall on them and have still carried on fighting. As did Germany, Britain and Japan

Pulverize their logistics, C&C centers and start grabbing territory. Let them hit cities with their conventional missiles. We have to be ready for that. Bengaluru is as much in the war as Guwahati. We need to win the war and not worry about 200 bombs on Bengaluru. Or Delhi. No point wasting conventional missiles on cities. Absorb the damage. Win the land war. If it comes to nukes - its a different story

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 17 Jul 2017 15:49

>>They are better off peppering air bases and major military bases and railheads with 100 missiles each - to put them out of action so they can win the land war. Similarly we stand to gain by putting their logistics and supply lines out of action to win the land war

1000 conventional missiles on faraway cities is not a war winning strategy

True, but fighting a conventional war is as much psychology as actual destruction of physical targets. The CPC hold on China is brittle, nobody knows how strong it really is, I doubt that the Chinese will stick to doing only conventional things in the event of a large scale war with India, one that falls short of a nuclear exchange. If as you posture China launches a 1000 missile barrage at Indian airbases and AAM sites, then in theory Indian skies could be vulnerable maybe for an hour or a few hours. If you remember there was that other thread about China sending paratroopers over Delhi which was made much fun off. That paratroop drop over Delhi is not about capturing Delhi, but all about psychology, that India cannot even defend it's capital. Forget about the fact that those paratroops are on a 1 way suicide mission. India needs something similar, that the CPC cannot even defend the Chinese elite in their heartland. India has to get out of this mentality that war is only about slogging away at the border and capturing a few sq kms of territory constitutes victory. There are many paths to fighting a war and many paths to what constitutes victory. One has to be open to that.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 17 Jul 2017 16:03

ldev wrote:True, but fighting a conventional war is as much psychology as actual destruction of physical targets. The CPC hold on China is brittle, nobody knows how strong it really is, I doubt that the Chinese will stick to doing only conventional things in the event of a large scale war with India, one that falls short of a nuclear exchange. If as you posture China launches a 1000 missile barrage at Indian airbases and AAM sites, then in theory Indian skies could be vulnerable maybe for an hour or a few hours. If you remember there was that other thread about China sending paratroopers over Delhi which was made much fun off. That paratroop drop over Delhi is not about capturing Delhi, but all about psychology, that India cannot even defend it's capital. Forget about the fact that those paratroops are on a 1 way suicide mission. India needs something similar, that the CPC cannot even defend the Chinese elite in their heartland. India has to get out of this mentality that war is only about slogging away at the border and capturing a few sq kms of territory constitutes victory. There are many paths to fighting a war and many paths to what constitutes victory. One has to be open to that.

Ultimately psychology will not win the war. The armed forces will.

Don't know if you were around in 1965 and 71 when cities were blacked out. But media are also blacked out and there are open orders that people who spread rumours will be arrested. So if 100 bombs fall on Bengaluru the chances of stories going very far will be minimized. In fact it would be better to put out news that Blr has been nuked "Nuke failed to explode- only light damage" and that would raise a demand to nuke the Chinese back and people in Bangalore will think they have survived a nuke attack. Rest of India will be really angry.The media will be on a tight leash. There will be stories put out about great victories at the border and Chinese retreating and any paratroopers will be mopped up and shown on television. No news will be completely reliable or true. But news will be positive, or negative depending on the effect desired on the people. Nothing will be clear. People will be pouring funds for national defence. women donating jewellery. Young men wanting to volunteer and blood banks overflowing with donated blood. People will be working free if it helps the cause.

So the chances of the entire country getting demoralized is in my view unlikely. Psy ops reporting is NORMAL in wartime and we will not be getting Kargil like feeds from Darkha Butt. Ultimately even if we really bomb Beijing with conventional missiles and celebrate - we will still have a border war to win. And similarly the Chinese are not going to get demoralized. If we claim great losses inflicted on Beijing people will soon ask why the war is still going on. So psychology can only be taken so far and no further

Post war the government can be brought down saying Blr was nuked and the government did not nuke back as per nuke doctrine :lol:

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 17 Jul 2017 16:49

SSridhar wrote:The following link has been sent by a BR lurker, Venkatesh. Thanks, Venkatesh.

Little Bhutan in Tibet - Claude Arpi, The Staesman


Goddamned Nehru. Pox on him and his 100 generations.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 17 Jul 2017 16:55

The other thing is that China uses its Xining-Lhasa railway for tourism during normal days. In case of war that line will be taken over for military logistics. The question is whether China would like to hide the fact that it is fighting a border war or make it public.

1. Why would they want to hide a border war from their people? Hiding a border conflict with India might be desirable if the Chinese want to appear benign and accuse India of making a mountain out of a molehill. But hiding conflict won't be easy given that the railway to Lhasa will be off limits and the army mobilized. Signs will be visible and expatriates will know . But too much activity will be noticed - so I think the Chinese will not be able to fight a serious war with India and still hide the conflict

2. Assuming conflict with India is declared openly to the Chinese people, then India will be blamed and the war will have to be to punish India and evict India from Chinese territory. That would be a war for the Chinese to lose. India will fight viciously and the Commie Party will have to either explain how they got a massive punishment, or pretend that they won.

As things stand I don't see any of this happening. China simply has to tone down the rhetoric and stop trying to build a road in Bhutan or ready itself for eventual conflict with a nation that has a huge chip on its shoulder and want to badly give China the thrashing of its life. Neither choice will be pleasant or easy for China.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby rsingh » 17 Jul 2017 17:41

Lets assume that war has started. Chinese firing on our posts in Arunachal Pardesh and near Ladakh. IA has started firing in response. Few of bridges are destroyed by China's agents. GOI has ordered IA to respond with "measured " firing.
Question 1: What is reaction of International community? how it will unfold at UNO? What is reaction of communist parties of India?
Question 2: What will be impact on Rs, Stock Exchange , our imports and exports?
Question 3: What will be impact on Chinese economy (currency,export and import)?
Question 4: What will be reaction of other countries who has border dispute or conflict of interest with China?
Question 5: What are the implications for China (internally)?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karthik S » 17 Jul 2017 17:49

They are more dependent on exports than us. IIRC, everything they make, 65% goes to international customer, whereas 65% of what me make is for domestic consumption. Also, more importantly, we still "eyes" on their shipping and energy lines. Just as we didn't use IAF in 65, it will be unwise if we don't use our navy now. Am not suggesting we have to go blasting all their ships, just if we harass few ships, stop them for "check", will send the message.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 17 Jul 2017 18:01

Yes, Nehru badly blundered by not taking a stronger stand on Tibet, when China invaded it. But something was in place in the aftermath, because there was a Tibetan rebellion in the late 50's, and the Dalai Lama and hundreds of thousands of Tibetan refugees came to India. There is speculation that some covert support for the rebellion( which itself was entirely internal) came from India. Just imagine, an independent, democratic, progressive Tibet closely tied to India, and sharing a spiritual connection through Buddhism. And that was the neighbor India had for the last 60 odd years. Oh well, perhaps some day..

If a war does break out soon, probably not more than 5 countries will take China's side. The rest of the world will be supportive of India, or neutral with sympathy toward India. Only their economic interests in China will make them a little circumspect about opposing Beijing too much. Otherwise....

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby IndraD » 17 Jul 2017 18:49

Image
NoKo launches Anti US postal stamps

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sudhan » 17 Jul 2017 19:28

IndraD Ji, Why NoKo stuff is being posted here? We deal with their patron here..

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 17 Jul 2017 20:09

shiv wrote:
Don't know if you were around in 1965 and 71 when cities were blacked out. But media are also blacked out and there are open orders that people who spread rumours will be arrested.


The question is whether China would like to hide the fact that it is fighting a border war or make it public.


With the internet and social media today, no country can hide a war; that is hugely different from 1965 & 1971. Also those wars were border wars. Nobody in the rest of India was directly affected by the war other than a solitary raid attempted by the PAF over Mumbai in 1971, no damage AFAIK. Unless you shut down Whatsapp, Twitter, Facebook etc. there will be rumors galore. And even if you shut it down there will be rumors galore. Also the past is no indication of future wars. Just because past wars were border wars with the rest of India unaffected, one cannot assume that the Chinese will not lob hundreds of conventional missiles on Indian cities deep inside India. They have the numbers in missiles available for such a delivery. India has never seen war destruction in it's cities. How will the population react to that? People will photograph any such damage and upload it to social media no question about it. Similarly any damage that India can cause to China's premier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai will be uploaded onto social media, notwithstanding draconian control over social media in China. I still remember when the IA plane was hijacked to Kandahar the relatives implored GOI to give the terrorists what they wanted. The Chinese in comparison have been hardened to upheavals, famines, dictatorial orders such as the one child policy and dislocation of life, mostly brought about by their own rulers. I don't want to be alarmist, but rather than let confidence lapse into complacency it is better IMO to live by the title of that famous book by Andrew Grove (pivotal ex-boss of Intel Corp.), "Only the Paranoid Survive".

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 17 Jul 2017 20:43

rsingh wrote:Lets assume that war has started. Chinese firing on our posts in Arunachal Pardesh and near Ladakh. IA has started firing in response. Few of bridges are destroyed by China's agents. GOI has ordered IA to respond with "measured " firing.
Question 1: What is reaction of International community? how it will unfold at UNO? What is reaction of communist parties of India?
Question 2: What will be impact on Rs, Stock Exchange , our imports and exports?
Question 3: What will be impact on Chinese economy (currency,export and import)?
Question 4: What will be reaction of other countries who has border dispute or conflict of interest with China?
Question 5: What are the implications for China (internally)?



Question 1: What is reaction of International community? how it will unfold at UNO? What is reaction of communist parties of India?


Things are more complex now then in 1962. China is a UNSC P-5 with veto powers. Generally if India is winning expect a SC resolution to maintain peace and calls for ceasefire. Same in General Assembly.
OTH if India is losing there will be no such calls.



Question 2: What will be impact on Rs, Stock Exchange , our imports and exports?

Indian Stock market and Rupee will go down initially. If India is winning it will go up.
Export Imports are long term while war is short term.


Question 3: What will be impact on Chinese economy (currency, export and import)?

Depends on victory.

Question 4: What will be reaction of other countries who has border dispute or conflict of interest with China?

Nothing. China has settled most of the disputes with other countries. If you are talking about Indo-China Sea its another matter. The dispute is with US but via proxies like Philippines etc.
Question 5: What are the implications for China (internally)

Only clear defeat has implications. Most likely it will be kept hidden like in China-Vietnam War by declaring huge victory.


I think no matter what Xi Jinpeng will go now or later.

He has the most power since Mao and yet precipitated a crisis that he could not finish.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 17 Jul 2017 21:26

I think no matter what Xi Jinpeng will go now or later.

He has the most power since Mao and yet precipitated a crisis that he could not finish.


Xi Jinping is taking extraordinary steps to consolidate his hold on power. On Saturday he ousted a potential rival, Sun Zhengcai only 53 years old, as Party Chief of a major city in China. The ousted Sun Zhengcai at the last Party Congress was expected to become a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which consists of only 7 people including Xi.

And as Zhao Suisheng, director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at the University of Denver notes:

All signs are pointing to the direction that Xi is planning for a third term” after his 10 years are up in 2022. “Succession is being planned according to Xi’s plan, not some arrangements made five years ago by his predecessor. That has already become ancient history.”


Xi has certainly accumulated the most power since Mao and is overturing all conventions laid down by his predecessors including Hu Jintao.

Downfall of Chinese Rising Star Points to Xi Power Play

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 17 Jul 2017 21:28

ldev wrote: Just because past wars were border wars with the rest of India unaffected, one cannot assume that the Chinese will not lob hundreds of conventional missiles on Indian cities deep inside India. They have the numbers in missiles available for such a delivery. India has never seen war destruction in it's cities. How will the population react to that? .

I think this is a short view of history. I will explain below

I have repeatedly been saying that Bengaluru is (and should be) as much in the war as Guwahati. If Guwahati gets bombed, why not Bengaluru? That is what war means. Media control in war does not allow rapid lateral spread of news in war so the idea that people will lose morale on hearing news of India being attacked deep inside is something that I dispute. In fact people may get fired up. Heroes arise in war and at times of adversity. After the first 100 bombs people will realise that it is possible to live in wartime under attack. Anyhow where will they go? There will be people who take the attitude that if we are going to die - help take down a cheeni and die.

A temple down the road from where I live has a mark from a cannonball fired by the British. Every village and town in India has seen battles. Forts abound and the memories of war exist among the population. The idea that populations have not known war is not true. Only the last 40-45 years have been free of war, and maybe the time has come for India to feel war. No one will be happy - but Chinese missiles raining on 20 cities deep in India will do some damage but it won't get them anything more than brownie points. The war is not going to end with that. How much damage will be done by expending 1000 conventional missiles on 25 cities? Its like 3-4 air raids on those cities and then the Chinese will run out of missiles. They won't stop the people at the border and people in the cities will get hit and carry on. Funnily enough - a German ship called the Emden put a few shells on Chennai in WW1 . And my grandfather built a bomb shelter in Blr.

This is not an argument that we should not have conventional missiles - but raining 50-100 conventional missiles on Beijing will now cow them down. Heck we have people saying "50 kilotons - the equivalent of 50,000 x 1000 kg bombs is not good enough." So what are a few 100 bombs. Yes people will die, there will be losses, but that is war. Defeating them comprehensively at the border is essential. Not sending psychological signals with ineffective use of munitions.

I must add that unless the scale of destruction is too huge to comprehend - with tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths - such as after a nuclear attack or massive earthquake, a few 100 conventional bombs are not enough to cow anyone down or scare anyone. If we have 200 conventional missiles to hit Beijing - the CCP will sit in shelters and drink wine knowing that our stock will be rapidly exhausted. No nation builds up a huge arsenal and armed forces simply to get scared at the first few explosions.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Suraj » 17 Jul 2017 21:56

ldev: very interesting post on Xi's political moves. I'm surprised the Chinese political firmament isn't browning their collective qipaos. Ever since Deng, the unspoken rule has been smooth transition of power and rule by consensus from the Politburo Standing Committee. Even Jiang Zemin at his zenith didn't try to mess with the rules Deng laid down, not even after the latter died in 1997. In fact, Jiang's Shanghai clique tried to keep the Beijing power center honest. Chongqing seems like an aspiring power center that's being cut to size repeatedly, first Bo Xilai and now Sun Zhengcai being targeted.

Xi's ambitions would be very interesting to keep an eye on. Due to the way they work, starting a war won't help Xi's chances in the 2017 conference; he has no public perception to handle, and his detractors may use it as a case of him starting an unnecessary fight at the border even as he purges opponents inside.

I wonder if there's any corresponding set of political events in 1962 when Mao attacked. We know external events occuring when he attacked - the Cuban Missile Crisis. What about internal events ? The Lin Biao event was years later, and the Great Leap Forward (1959-61) was done by 1962. Cultural Revolution was 4 years away in 1966.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 17 Jul 2017 21:58

That is why we need to focus on land forces, more MSCs, PGMs, SAMs etc to take over and hold Tibet in a deep thrust.

The nukes will suffice for the eastern seaboard of china.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karthik S » 17 Jul 2017 22:00

What we need most is Nirbhay over Tibet. Few waves of Nirbhays during the first hour battle will cut their supply lines across the wide border.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 17 Jul 2017 22:02

At the very least the Tsangpo river should be the new border between India China.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 17 Jul 2017 22:11

Suraj wrote:Xi's ambitions would be very interesting to keep an eye on. Due to the way they work, starting a war won't help Xi's chances in the 2017 conference; he has no public perception to handle, and his detractors may use it as a case of him starting an unnecessary fight at the border even as he purges opponents inside.


That is why this move from the Chinese makes no sense. The only explanation is that they did not feel that India would confront them by deploying troops in a disputed territory in a third country i.e. Bhutan. Although not exactly similar, what India has done is tantamount to US marines landing on the reefs in the South China Sea to physically stop the Chinese from converting the reefs disputed by China, Phillipines etc. into fortified artificial island military bases.

I wonder if there's any corresponding set of political events in 1962 when Mao attacked. We know external events occuring when he attacked - the Cuban Missile Crisis. What about internal events ? The Lin Biao event was years later, and the Great Leap Forward (1959-61) was done by 1962. Cultural Revolution was 4 years away in 1966.


Offhand I cannot think of any internal political event then. I think then as now, there was no internal stimulus for the confrontation with India. But given the extent of Xi's power play unfolding now, chances are remote of any settlement to this dispute till the Party Congress is over.

Also, China's outreach to Indian opposition parties should be seen in the light of Xi's ambitions for staying on in power for an unprecedented 3rd, five year term from 2022 onwards i.e. he is hoping to outlast Modi.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Suraj » 17 Jul 2017 22:28

Any attempt by Xi to stay on for a third term will be IMMENSELY destabilizing for China's political existence. This isn't really a 'fine fine, you want another term, ok, we'll make an exception for you. Everyone, adjust onlee'. There's no such thing as 'adjust' in their system. He'll have to break large parts of the system to make his case work, because there's a career line of people being elevated and moved into Politburo and then PSC, and then out of it, either after serving term or post 1-2 terms as Premier/President. Anyone occupying the top too long causes sewage to build up below him. It will not be pretty.

For all the talk of great Chinese long term thinking ability, it is also a repeatedly demonstrated fact that they're incredibly good at ignoring the lessons of their own history. Deng (second generation leadership) tried to ensure stability for the next several generations. 3rd gen (Jiang) and 4th gen (Hu) largely followed the rules. But by 5th generation (Xi) they're already demonstrating that they're stupid enough not to remember their own history, and what the first gen (Mao) did. Kind of funny because Xi's father suffered immensely in Cultural Revolution and Xi was old enough to experience the suffering himself too.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 17 Jul 2017 22:49

Paul wrote:That is why we need to focus on land forces, more MSCs, PGMs, SAMs etc to take over and hold Tibet in a deep thrust.

The nukes will suffice for the eastern seaboard of china.



I agree. India has a land based threat just as it was in the pre Christian era. And needs more land troops. Another Mountain Strike Corps would do more wonders than all those naval ships and patrol aircraft which are to reduce uncle Sam burden.

An MSC costs about 100K crores and is easily doable.

Just shakedown the corrupt politicians.


Rohitvats can tell ideal location for this.
for dual use.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby rsingh » 17 Jul 2017 23:04

Right. My bad. Guy who WPd me was supposed to be descent guy.
Last edited by rsingh on 17 Jul 2017 23:15, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Marten » 17 Jul 2017 23:07

Will a victory over India help his chances of a third term?
*(assuming that his goal is to ensure that OBOR will continue unharmed with a more pliable govt in place in India). Is that the reason to meet INC representatives?

How important is energy security for China at this point? What affects the current relationship with Putin? Are they expecting a higher price over the next few years, once the middle east *US takes a break from the decades old war? Is this only about getting rm inputs to feed the global manufacturing engine?

Posturing to grab land without getting into armed conflict is not their end game. It is the means to establishing rights over some specific resource. What is the resource targeted in B'Desh? They understand the advantages they hold over us at the moment will probably be wiped out within a few years. Perhaps that accelerates the urgency.
PS: rsingh, is this from a reliable channel?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 17 Jul 2017 23:07

rsingh wrote:Getting news that Chinese fired rocket at indian position and there are many casualties.
Bakistani media: 158 Indian Jawan died.
Apparently CCTV has aired 2min clip. Do not trust harami media but they were quite on Indo -china for long time.


Please post link ... the ones posted previously were all baki sites are not trustworthy.
Last edited by pankajs on 17 Jul 2017 23:10, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Arjun » 17 Jul 2017 23:08

rsingh wrote:Getting news that Chinese fired rocket at indian position and there are many casualties.
Bakistani media: 158 Indian Jawan died.

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/paki ... 04444.html

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Suraj » 17 Jul 2017 23:09

rsingh wrote:Getting news that Chinese fired rocket at indian position and there are many casualties.
Bakistani media: 158 Indian Jawan died.

Please don't propagate rumors here. It's not others' business to verify it for you. It's your responsibility to check before posting.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudradev » 17 Jul 2017 23:11

Yes. Very reliable. Exercise (all of 9 hours long) just ended, but already Pakis were able to verify the precise count of Indian jawans killed. Not 160. Not 159. 157.644382, which after much thoughtful debate they rounded up to 158.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 17 Jul 2017 23:12

The last we head .. Indian and Chinese soldiers were in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation. How is it possible to fire upon such a assembly without hitting own soldiers?

Folks please use past information and commonsense AND bakis are known to make all kinds of absurd claims. Since when did baki channels become our primary source.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 17 Jul 2017 23:16

Related to my previous post.

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/at-dokla ... ff-1725900
At Doklam, Human Chains Face-Off, Soldiers Replaced Every 2 Hours [Updated: July 17, 2017 22:13 IST]

Kolkata: For the last 30 days at least, 350-odd Indian soldiers have been standing in a human chain, eyeball to eyeball with Chinese troops at Dhoka La in Bhutan. Armed, but guns pointed down, the two lines of soldiers stand just metres apart. The lines stretch across 500-odd meters, in an area located roughly 15 km from the Nathu La pass.

If this was a baki report about bakis killing Indian soldiers at LOC all would have laughed it off. But a baki fart on the Chinese killing Indian soldier suddenly becomes kosher?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Ravi Karumanchiri » 17 Jul 2017 23:42

ldev wrote:<SNIP>

Offhand I cannot think of any internal political event then. I think then as now, there was no internal stimulus for the confrontation with India. But given the extent of Xi's power play unfolding now, chances are remote of any settlement to this dispute till the Party Congress is over.

Also, China's outreach to Indian opposition parties should be seen in the light of Xi's ambitions for staying on in power for an unprecedented 3rd, five year term from 2022 onwards i.e. he is hoping to outlast Modi.


^^^^^^^^
I had thought it was orthodoxy that the entire reason for the 1962 war was for Zhou Enlai's domestic opponents to embarrass him while he was on a state visit to India to proclaim "Chini-Hindi Bhai, Bhai". Other factors are detailed in Wiki... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_War

Nobody reading this thread should presume that the Communist Party of China is a solidly unified block. They are not. Neither is "The Center" in total control of "The Provinces". Rather, there is a veneer of unity that confounds outsiders, especially when we wonder how stuff works in China, or how or why certain things happen.

In China, it is the Provinces that have a unified military command (with separate military academies and all); and sometimes a province will do something to embarrass "The Center" on the international stage, as part of some kind of internal squabble.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DavidD » 17 Jul 2017 23:57

ldev wrote:>>They are better off peppering air bases and major military bases and railheads with 100 missiles each - to put them out of action so they can win the land war. Similarly we stand to gain by putting their logistics and supply lines out of action to win the land war

1000 conventional missiles on faraway cities is not a war winning strategy

True, but fighting a conventional war is as much psychology as actual destruction of physical targets. The CPC hold on China is brittle, nobody knows how strong it really is, I doubt that the Chinese will stick to doing only conventional things in the event of a large scale war with India, one that falls short of a nuclear exchange. If as you posture China launches a 1000 missile barrage at Indian airbases and AAM sites, then in theory Indian skies could be vulnerable maybe for an hour or a few hours. If you remember there was that other thread about China sending paratroopers over Delhi which was made much fun off. That paratroop drop over Delhi is not about capturing Delhi, but all about psychology, that India cannot even defend it's capital. Forget about the fact that those paratroops are on a 1 way suicide mission. India needs something similar, that the CPC cannot even defend the Chinese elite in their heartland. India has to get out of this mentality that war is only about slogging away at the border and capturing a few sq kms of territory constitutes victory. There are many paths to fighting a war and many paths to what constitutes victory. One has to be open to that.


You're right that there are many paths to winning a war, but history indicates that conventional bombs on civilian targets is pretty low on the list of ways to winning a war. There are many other ways, however, as war isn't just army A vs. army B at location C. For one, in a war each side would attempt to leverage its strengths to its advantage, and China's strength is its industrial and economic capacity.

For example, what if China decides to drag the war out, into one of attrition? Constant missile and air based attacks on Indian hangars, runways, ammo depots, etc. What's India's capacity to replace the losses? China could also open up the auto market to Ford and GM, which Trump will probably care more about than SEA politics, give Airbus a few hundred A320 orders, and purchase a couple hundred Su-35s at double market rate, all with strings attached of course. How would Indian logistics be affected? Expand the war into the sea, Dalian shipyard alone is constructing 1x 65k carrier, 2x 12k cruisers, and 2x 7k destroyers at the same time. Trade as %GDP has been higher for India than for China for almost a decade now, and while most Chinese seaborne trade goes through the SCS which India can threaten, almost all of India's trade of material goods seaborne or otherwise goes through the IOR or the chicken's neck. Pay the Germans and the Israeli off along with the aforementioned Russians, what will be the Indian capacity to replace lost assets? How would a protracted naval war affect the Indian economy? How long before the PLAN catch up in experience under actual war conditions?

Of course, the winner of such a war would be the US, France, Russia, and basically anyone but India or China, which is why I believe this dispute will not come to an unacceptable conclusion to either side.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 18 Jul 2017 00:00

Ravi< The real message is whenever the Chinese leadership has a succession struggle they go try to beat up neighbors.
Even the China Vietnam war was during a succession struggle.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War


...
Following the death of Mao in September 1976, the overthrow of the Gang of Four and the ascent of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leadership would revise its own positions to become compatible with market aspects, denounce the Cultural Revolution, and collaborate with the US against the Soviet Union.

...

China, now under Deng Xiaoping, was starting the Chinese economic reform and opening trade with the West, in turn, growing increasingly defiant of the Soviet Union. On November 3, 1978, the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a 25-year mutual defense treaty, which made Vietnam the "linchpin" in the Soviet Union's "drive to contain China."[54]

On January 1, 1979, Chinese Vice-premier Deng Xiaoping visited the United States for the first time and told American president Jimmy Carter: "The little child is getting naughty, it's time he get spanked." (original Chinese words: 小朋友不听话,该打打屁股了。).[55] On February 15, the first day that China could have officially announced the termination of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Deng Xiaoping declared that China planned to conduct a limited attack on Vietnam.



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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 18 Jul 2017 00:13

Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:I had thought it was orthodoxy that the entire reason for the 1962 war was for Zhou Enlai's domestic opponents to embarrass him while he was on a state visit to India to proclaim "Chini-Hindi Bhai, Bhai".


Maybe applicable for 1962.

But right now, Xi is approaching only the end of his first 5 year term. His re-appointment for his second 5 year term is also well within norms laid down from Deng's time, and so is not in doubt. So there is really no need for him to seek a confrontation with India at this stage. Plus via internal purges he has steadily got rid of rivals who could pose a threat to him. The more one thinks about it, the more it looks like a mis-calculation on China's part that India would intervene. And now they cannot back off given the approaching Party Congress.

The level of diatribe against India by the CPC's mouthpieces is also unprecedented and shrill with everybody from the People's Daily to Global Times to the Foreign Ministry threatening India with interference in Kashmir, supporting unrest in the North East, advising India not to forget the 1962 debacle, stating there will be no dialogue until India withdraws etc. etc. This kind of venom was normally reserved for Taiwan or Japan. And I think it stem's from India's completely un-expected move into Bhutan.


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