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Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 18 Jul 2017 00:26

DavidD wrote:For example, what if China decides to drag the war out, into one of attrition?


A naval war will not last for a long time, the reason being that there is a high risk of collateral damage to third countries and assets e.g. if India forces a blockade of the Malacca straits from the western end and China tries to force the blockade from the eastern end, any resulting hostilities could see damage to the coast/ports in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Other countries will intervene and stop it.

On the land frontier, it will be a stalemate, a few kilometers at most for either side depending on the front. Given the terrain, each side will need a 6>1 or maybe a 10>1 superiority to break out. So India is never going to reach Lhasa and China is unlikely to reach the Indian plains.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Suraj » 18 Jul 2017 00:34

DavidD wrote:You're right that there are many paths to winning a war, but history indicates that conventional bombs on civilian targets is pretty low on the list of ways to winning a war. There are many other ways, however, as war isn't just army A vs. army B at location C. For one, in a war each side would attempt to leverage its strengths to its advantage, and China's strength is its industrial and economic capacity.

For example, what if China decides to drag the war out, into one of attrition?

Because China doesn't have the political capacity to fight such a war. Not since the 1950s. To the point that it doesn't even have the political will to wrest back Kinmen and Matsu Islands from Taiwan because that would trigger an attritionary war with other powers. Us Indians have no idea why you can't grab that back. All those carriers, cruisers and destroyers and instead of grabbing back an island right in front of Xiamen, you instead carry mud across South China Sea and build an island in the middle of nowhere.

"War" for China is 2-3 weeks, tops. The longest it has ever fought was 6 months in the Ussuri Conflict with USSR, a traumatic episode that changed your political landscape. What it does instead is manufacture other trigger points, like the illegal islands its built in SCS. It's a great tactic - seed an idea of potency "yay we built an island - look at our industrial might" without actually facing off anybody.

An attritionary war will hurt China more. It's true that Dalian produces a lot more. It also means China has a lot more concentrated points of production that will hurt it relatively more. And that means India fires a set of (conventional or tactical nuke) missiles that take out Bohai and Dalian. Shanghai Yangshan Deepwater Port handles more container traffic than all of India. A bunch of missiles taking it out and its connecting bridge means China loses more from every hit than us - probably an order of magnitude more. In the event of war, India need not target civilian or even military areas. Just target every major eastern seaboard port complex, shipyard and all major rail junctions. Maybe in the middle of night so we're considerate and no one gets hurt. Minimal casualties, but you'll lose ~$500B-1 trillion in economic activity over a year or two as the world's best manufacturing supply chain has a bunch of swiss cheese holes in it.

That's the problem with the lobbing missiles plan. We just need enough ability to knock out enough of your economic supply chain such that the damage is an order of magnitude larger than the total damage you can cause us, because (shrug) there just isn't enough sh1t to blow up on our side...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 18 Jul 2017 00:51

Karthik S wrote:What we need most is Nirbhay over Tibet. Few waves of Nirbhays during the first hour battle will cut their supply lines across the wide border.


A Cruise missile generally has 300KG warhead, which lets says is sort of close to 250KG dumb bombs, the smallest of the dumb bombs.

1000 CM, which sounds massive even for Uncle style shock & awe equal to 1k 250 dumb. if simplified carried by 50 SU30 at 20/jet,

A fight between between two large armies and 50 jets managing to drop "only" 20 bombs each would be laughed at. Actually even 50 jets reaching their target will be laughed at.

So 1000 CM will do equivalent damage of 50 jets.

Cruise Missiles are glorified 250KG bomb dropped along with jet on one way trip. Not saying CM are useless, but any effective attack requires 100s if not thousand.

Nothing comes close to jets offloading their flowers.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 18 Jul 2017 01:08

DavidD wrote:For example, what if China decides to drag the war out, into one of attrition?


One thing people keep forgetting is India has been in constant combat for decades. We had daily artillery duels with Pak from 88 to 2003. i.e 15 years!
Double the timeline of WW2.

We have been in COIN for 60 years.

So we will not have shortage of fighting men.

We would need weapons. Despite the OFB being a crappy organisation, it has more 100k people on it's rolls who know how to make weapons. GoI can throw people like peanuts at arm production if need be.

Then their is the private companies. just a company like Tatas with 100 billion turnover and manufacturing history would sure be happy to rise up to the challenge.

And ofcourse there will be lot of countries like US Russia who would love to see China get in to attrition war with a nation of 1.3 billion people. They would gladly supply what we want.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DavidD » 18 Jul 2017 01:43

Suraj wrote:
DavidD wrote:You're right that there are many paths to winning a war, but history indicates that conventional bombs on civilian targets is pretty low on the list of ways to winning a war. There are many other ways, however, as war isn't just army A vs. army B at location C. For one, in a war each side would attempt to leverage its strengths to its advantage, and China's strength is its industrial and economic capacity.

For example, what if China decides to drag the war out, into one of attrition?

Because China doesn't have the political capacity to fight such a war. Not since the 1950s. To the point that it doesn't even have the political will to wrest back Kinmen and Matsu Islands from Taiwan because that would trigger an attritionary war with other powers. Us Indians have no idea why you can't grab that back. All those carriers, cruisers and destroyers and instead of grabbing back an island right in front of Xiamen, you instead carry mud across South China Sea and build an island in the middle of nowhere.

"War" for China is 2-3 weeks, tops. The longest it has ever fought was 6 months in the Ussuri Conflict with USSR, a traumatic episode that changed your political landscape. What it does instead is manufacture other trigger points, like the illegal islands its built in SCS. It's a great tactic - seed an idea of potency "yay we built an island - look at our industrial might" without actually facing off anybody.

An attritionary war will hurt China more. It's true that Dalian produces a lot more. It also means China has a lot more concentrated points of production that will hurt it relatively more. And that means India fires a set of (conventional or tactical nuke) missiles that take out Bohai and Dalian. Shanghai Yangshan Deepwater Port handles more container traffic than all of India. A bunch of missiles taking it out and its connecting bridge means China loses more from every hit than us - probably an order of magnitude more. In the event of war, India need not target civilian or even military areas. Just target every major eastern seaboard port complex, shipyard and all major rail junctions. Maybe in the middle of night so we're considerate and no one gets hurt. Minimal casualties, but you'll lose ~$500B-1 trillion in economic activity over a year or two as the world's best manufacturing supply chain has a bunch of swiss cheese holes in it.

That's the problem with the lobbing missiles plan. We just need enough ability to knock out enough of your economic supply chain such that the damage is an order of magnitude larger than the total damage you can cause us, because (shrug) there just isn't enough sh1t to blow up on our side...


You don't have enough ability to knock out enough economic supply chain. The only Indian missiles that can reach China are strategic missiles, they don't have enough accuracy or cost effectiveness to take out bridges. There are rebuttal for the rest, but all of it is beside the point. The point is that war can be fought in many arenas and on many fronts, and all of them will result in BOTH China and India losing.

I know the '62 war arouses various strong emotions on both sides, but if you really take a hard look at it, both India and China lost that war. Two of the greatest civilizations in history who's almost never been in conflict with each other are now at loggerheads. All over what? A few barren rocks? Imagine if the two countries worked together, it'll be 100 times what France and Germany has been able to achieve in Europe. Nationalists from both sides are now stuck in a blame game, "just draw the border the way we draw it, it's all your fault for this dragging on!" The war in '62 made those rocks a matter of national pride, and now there's no good way to move past it.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Suraj » 18 Jul 2017 01:55

DavidD wrote:You don't have enough ability to knock out enough economic supply chain. The only Indian missiles that can reach China are strategic missiles, they don't have enough accuracy or cost effectiveness to take out bridges.

You're very confident about that. Good for you :) It's indeed hard to hit Donghai Bridge from so far away, but Yangshan Port itself is a rather more bigger target.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 18 Jul 2017 02:19

A few points I would like to make:
1. Let us not assume that China will not start a war at this time. This would be repeating the mistakes of 1962, when Pandit Nehru and Krishna Menon had falsely concluded that China was not going to start a war. They did. The timing of 1962 was well planned. Both Mao and Chou were involved. The international situations were a factor and the weather was another. Once again October is the month; I hope we are reinforcing our troops relentlessly in both East and the West. If we are ready, they will not attack.
2. If China cannot sort out India, a relatively soft power, they can forget becoming number one. Along with this, they can forget about coercing smaller nations in Asia and Africa to follow, whose cooperation is inevitable for China to become the top dog . No one will follow a loser, the end of China’s dream.
3. The US and Europe are now so dependent on cheap imports from China, I do not believe they will stop imports from China if India is attacked. The imports will be stopped only China attacks them or their allies directly. They will willingly send arms and ammunition to India at a price and take a wait and watch attitude over the conflict. So if the conflict widens, we should not think that any other power will come to our aid on the short run. Israel being an exception.
4. A great deal of effort is made at BRF to find a motive to China‘s actions. Why are they are doing so and so, they would be better off if they did something else. It is not possible to find out why a group of insulated people with very little outside world experience leading a closed dictatorship, are acting the way they are. Using the same logic, you may say a peaceful resolution of 1962 may have brought China more benefits. Unfortunately, that is not how they think. Their society and system of government allows them to take sudden and apparently irrational actions. For example, during WWII Germany, Japan and the USSR made unexpected moves that the West could not match.
Gautam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 18 Jul 2017 02:52

g.sarkar wrote:A few points I would like to make:
1. Let us not assume that China will not start a war at this time. This would be repeating the mistakes of 1962, when Pandit Nehru and Krishna Menon had falsely concluded that China was not going to start a war. They did. The timing of 1962 was well planned. Both Mao and Chou were involved. The international situations were a factor and the weather was another. Once again October is the month; I hope we are reinforcing our troops relentlessly in both East and the West. If we are ready, they will not attack.
2. If China cannot sort out India, a relatively soft power, they can forget becoming number one. Along with this, they can forget about coercing smaller nations in Asia and Africa to follow, whose cooperation is inevitable for China to become the top dog . No one will follow a loser, the end of China’s dream.
3. The US and Europe are now so dependent on cheap imports from China, I do not believe they will stop imports from China if India is attacked. The imports will be stopped only China attacks them or their allies directly. They will willingly send arms and ammunition to India at a price and take a wait and watch attitude over the conflict. So if the conflict widens, we should not think that any other power will come to our aid on the short run. Israel being an exception.
4. A great deal of effort is made at BRF to find a motive to China‘s actions. Why are they are doing so and so, they would be better off if they did something else. It is not possible to find out why a group of insulated people with very little outside world experience leading a closed dictatorship, are acting the way they are. Using the same logic, you may say a peaceful resolution of 1962 may have brought China more benefits. Unfortunately, that is not how they think. Their society and system of government allows them to take sudden and apparently irrational actions. For example, during WWII Germany, Japan and the USSR made unexpected moves that the West could not match.
Gautam



1) You don't get to be the largest trading nation on the globe by being an irrational psycho nation, global economics punish those without fail,

2) Because they are an economic power and a weak military nation in terms of culture (not hardware), war weakens their intrinsic strength.

Cheen of Mao WAS a psycho state and global economics punished it as such. The Cheen of today, if it wants to continue advancing, cannot be.

The fact they haven't fought in 4 decades even as their military had grown exponentially shows me they are a rational trading state intent on growing power through intimidation, not fighting.

I would be happy if Cheen were psycho and did start a war that I know we can win easily. But I fear they are not and they won't fight.

But is it to our advantage if they don't fight? I don't think it is. Letting them off the hook without bloodying them means we are still waiting for their hammer to drop. Their hammer is their infrastructure (Gwadar, Djibouti), their schemes (CPEC,OBOR) and their military/industrial production (endless mass of ships and aircraft.) The weight of those will only get heavier with time.

We need to go war, regardless of Cheen does because right now, we own all advantages along the border and in the IOR where we can cut off trade to a trading power in a way that can stunt their strategy of grow and intimidate.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 18 Jul 2017 03:38

Cholaji,
I beg to disagree. I do not believe that we will win a war against China easily as you write. We might win but not not easily. Our military has been neglected for a long time now. A war 5 or 10 years down the road would be far better. But all that is theoretical, as a democratic India would not start one, China could. And the Indian army will have to fight with what they have. I do not believe China is an "irrational psycho nation", not today, and not during Mao. I also do not agree that "we need to go to war". It does not make economic sense. The results of any war is uncertain, otherwise any country that was militarily stronger would win every time. Furthermore, the political system in India will not allow a unilateral war just like that. That is how it should be in a democracy. A war with China will only help the other powers, irrespective of the result. Our own development will be postponed by years, as it did in 1971. But fighting a war that was put upon us is different.
Gautam
PS I do not like to start a back and forth argument on why India should start a war with China, so this will be my last comment on this.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 18 Jul 2017 06:47

It is ok to believe one should not go to war, because a decisive win is uncertain always. But I do not understand why people who are not sure of a win now, want to whine about previous governments for not doing the same. They must have also come to the same conclusion during their time, not to escalate further given the constraints then. So what is different now other than the fact that the economy has grown a lot and we are better armed ?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 07:50

pankajs wrote:The last we head .. Indian and Chinese soldiers were in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation. How is it possible to fire upon such a assembly without hitting own soldiers?

Folks please use past information and commonsense AND bakis are known to make all kinds of absurd claims. Since when did baki channels become our primary source.

2 front psyops has begun. Pakistan has entered the war thru LoC . We are at war.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 07:51

India’s provocation will trigger all-out confrontation on LAC
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1056783.shtml

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 07:54

India rejects ‘malicious’ Pakistani media report of soldier deaths in Chinese attack
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-new ... w1GeK.html

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 18 Jul 2017 08:05

Was watching a video of a Chinese tv interview of MD Nalapat and two other Chinese Profs, the Chinese academics were complete hawks when compared to Nalapat. If they want war, then as Chola says we should give them war. The entire Chinese society is so steeped in their own bile, that they believe and become willing mediums of the state's propaganda. Some amount of smacking may be required to bring them to their senses.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 08:19

http://www.financialexpress.com/india-n ... tly/767594
Sikkim standoff at Doklam: China warns India, says PLA troops will not wait patiently
Sikkim standoff at Doklam: In a stern message directed towards India, China has said that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been waiting patiently at Doklam but will not do so for an indefinite period.
By: FE Online | New Delhi | Updated: July 18, 2017 8:00 AM


Sikkim standoff at Doklam: In a stern message directed towards India, China has said that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been waiting patiently at Doklam but will not do so for an indefinite period.
Sikkim standoff at Doklam: In a stern message directed towards India, China has said that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been waiting patiently at Doklam but will not do so for an indefinite period, according to Indian Express report. Beijing has conveyed this message to foreign diplomats. A few diplomats have conveyed this message to Indian counterparts in Chinese capital and Bhutanese counterparts in New Delhi. It has been learned that foreign diplomats were briefed about ongoing standoff during a closed-door briefing last week. China has also informed some of the G-20 countries about the situation, the report says. Last month, Indian Army blocked Chinese road works in Doklam and have since been in a faceoff with PLA troops. Beijing wants Indian troops must pull back. It has categorically said that the dispute was between China and Bhutan but the Indian soldiers have jumped in.
A diplomat from one of the P-5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council) countries, told The Indian Express that their colleagues in Beijing attended the briefing and were given the impression that the Chinese side will not be waiting for an indefinite period. “This is quite worrying, and we have conveyed it to our Indian colleagues in Beijing and Bhutanese colleagues in Delhi,” the diplomat was quoted as saying IE.
On the other hand, India has maintained that both the governments had reached agreement in 2012 that the trijunction boundary points between India, China and a third country will be finalised in consultation with the country concerned. “Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine trijunction points is in violation of this understanding,” the Ministry of External Affairs said in its statement.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SriKumar » 18 Jul 2017 08:24

Iyersan wrote:
pankajs wrote:The last we head .. Indian and Chinese soldiers were in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation. How is it possible to fire upon such a assembly without hitting own soldiers?

Folks please use past information and commonsense AND bakis are known to make all kinds of absurd claims. Since when did baki channels become our primary source.
We are at war.
Iyersan san, please to let the declaration of war be coming from the gorment officials or phrom Modiji saab. :P

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby tandav » 18 Jul 2017 08:34

DavidD wrote:
Suraj wrote:
I know the '62 war arouses various strong emotions on both sides, but if you really take a hard look at it, both India and China lost that war. Two of the greatest civilizations in history who's almost never been in conflict with each other are now at loggerheads. All over what? A few barren rocks? Imagine if the two countries worked together, it'll be 100 times what France and Germany has been able to achieve in Europe. Nationalists from both sides are now stuck in a blame game, "just draw the border the way we draw it, it's all your fault for this dragging on!" The war in '62 made those rocks a matter of national pride, and now there's no good way to move past it.


Reason has been obvious... India and China have never shared a border for 1000s of years. Tibet at times was either an Indian protectorate or a Chinese protectorate where sages from both civilizations met and contemplated spirituality, citizens had free access to its vast emptiness. That historic fact has to be restored and things will go back to normal. As I have suggested... There should be a joint India China peace park in Tibet. Hopefully Xi will come to his senses and start the process of pulling back Chinese military from Tibet. Ideally No Chinese or Indian Military force should be deployed at greater than 2000m ASL.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ArjunPandit » 18 Jul 2017 09:29

Going by history the best opportunity of an operation for Chinese is in October. Wouldn't it be foolish of Chinese to warn us well in advance or am I missing something.. Of course one can argue, we may repeat the mistakes of 62 on the lines same as xi has eleven balls

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 18 Jul 2017 09:54

We need to be very careful about the internal sabotage this time. Unlike earlier wars, significant sections of the peacefuls and all the Naxals will be siding with Pakis and Chinese this time. Any planning needs to take that into account. Fortunately, we already have "two and half" front war idea in the open which shows we have seized of the matter.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DrRatnadip » 18 Jul 2017 10:01

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinio ... 5269/lite/

Danger at Dolam

The longer the standoff lasts, the more easily these positions will harden.
For example, given the unprecedented Indian presence in territory disputed by China and Bhutan, China may conclude that it needs to strengthen its physical position on the Dolam Plateau. Beijing could build more permanent structures a kilometre or two behind the “turning point” at Doka La. That is, China may use the Indian challenge to justify further steps to consolidate its presence on Dolam. India would then be faced with accepting a larger, more permanent Chinese presence or escalating further to stop it. The most realistic outcome would be restoration of the situation before June. This would mean the return of Indian troops to Indian territory and the withdrawal of Chinese construction crews from the area. India may demand or hope that China will vacate the Dolam Plateau, but China is unlikely to leave an area where it believes it had already maintained a presence for decades. The danger inherent in the current stand-off demands a quick resolution.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pratyush » 18 Jul 2017 10:25

Yagnasri wrote:We need to be very careful about the internal sabotage this time. Unlike earlier wars, significant sections of the peacefuls and all the Naxals will be siding with Pakis and Chinese this time. Any planning needs to take that into account. Fortunately, we already have "two and half" front war idea in the open which shows we have seized of the matter.



I am more concerned about the over ground workers and the Scamgress.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 18 Jul 2017 11:19

1. Chinese are so convinced of their overwhelming military superiority that they just don't care.
2. Chinese want to bully India into submission rather than fight. War is uncertain so they might not chance a war.

I mean how many warnings does one give. For the past more than a month it has been at least a warning per day.

India has to confront the Chinese some day on their expansionist definition of border. Forgetting the strategic significance of the trijunction for a moment, If we back down now it will only embolden the Chinese to grab something else somewhere else.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 11:38

Iyersan wrote:India rejects ‘malicious’ Pakistani media report of soldier deaths in Chinese attack
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-new ... w1GeK.html



India refutes ‘baseless’ Chinese media report of killing 158 Indian soldiers
http://www.newsx.com/national/69370-ind ... n-soldiers

Most important how come the narrative changed from the Indian side to implicate the Chinese media. When the morning mail stated that Baki media Duniya news produced the above fake news

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby A Deshmukh » 18 Jul 2017 11:41

as part of psych warfare,
we can distribute flyers to the chinese border soldiers saying: (in chinese) "dont give up your lives for the remote tibet territory. your parents are waiting for you" or something to that effect. can also put in a reminder of how many chinese killed in 1967 border skirmish and 1979 Vietnamese border war to give an idea that they are not invincible.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chetak » 18 Jul 2017 11:47

Yagnasri wrote:We need to be very careful about the internal sabotage this time. Unlike earlier wars, significant sections of the peacefuls and all the Naxals will be siding with Pakis and Chinese this time. Any planning needs to take that into account. Fortunately, we already have "two and half" front war idea in the open which shows we have seized of the matter.


That's why the commies are asking for detailed discussions and briefings on the chinese standoff so that information can be leaked.

I would not put it past these buggers to record such proceedings and pass it on


Quick notes: Indian Marxists, Border fence...

Yechury blames govt for Amarnath killings: “Usually terror groups in the state claim attacks immediately, we expressed puzzlement at why that was not the case this time. There were no answers from the government,” Yechury said. "Since that all sections in the Valley, including the separatist Hurriyat, had condemned the Amarnath terror attack, the govt should utilize this positive atmosphere to break the ice and talk to all stakeholders to bring an end to the unrest there".


Yechury blames India for Doklam standoff: "On behalf of the CPM, I told the government that there is a need for them to get to the depth of the reasons for the provocation, the changes in the govt's policy with China, India's growing strategic ties with US, and the joint military naval exercise along with the US and Japan in the South China sea," Yechury said. He also said India's "new permissions" to the Dalai Lama and hoisting of the Tibetan flag in India were other issues that irked the Chinese.


CPM sides with China: "Doka La is Bhutan's standoff with China, India should not interfere"

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Dumal » 18 Jul 2017 12:22

pankajs wrote:1. Chinese are so convinced of their overwhelming military superiority that they just don't care.
2. Chinese want to bully India into submission rather than fight. War is uncertain so they might not chance a war.

I mean how many warnings does one give. For the past more than a month it has been at least a warning per day.

India has to confront the Chinese some day on their expansionist definition of border. Forgetting the strategic significance of the trijunction for a moment, If we back down now it will only embolden the Chinese to grab something else somewhere else.


I agree. This has been one crisis or near-crisis (depending on how this transpires) that I would say all of India is calm and composed. Everyone from the common man and the trading community to the Government and the military have gone on with their primary jobs with not a peep of concern nor any gratuitous sermoning. The usual barking of dogs like Yechury notwithstanding, the caravan just keeps on moving. I am sure in the background the military has been working like crazy to get up to snuff and ready.

The Chinese as we all have sensed have put themselves into a corner and continue to do so. Their warnings to diplomats of other countries who relay those to our diplomats seem to be the latest escalation but how is it worse than the daily direct threats. I can only see one of two outcomes - one party blinks and back off or there is a war. I only hope it is not us who blinks.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 18 Jul 2017 12:40

Varoon Shekhar wrote:
If a war does break out soon, probably not more than 5 countries will take China's side.


Varoon ji,

I do not believe that very few countries will support China. The obvious candidates like Bakistan and NoKo will, so would Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. Russia and US will sit on the fence and so would most of the west. They will mouth the usual platitudes but they want India-China war as it ruins the future for these 2. At the moment, the fissiparous tendencies in these 2 nations are under control due to strong governments. It wont be the case post war and that will permit the European exploitation of the world ( that started post formation of the banking guild of Genoa in the 15th century).

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 18 Jul 2017 12:57

chola wrote:
We need to go war, regardless of Cheen does because right now, we own all advantages along the border and in the IOR where we can cut off trade to a trading power in a way that can stunt their strategy of grow and intimidate.



Chola ji,

What are the political objectives that India wishes to achieve for going to war? I am sure you also agree that we should be prepared but to go to war without any clear objectives, what is the point?

What are Chinese political objectives for going to war?
1. To show rest of Asia, they are top dog and everyone should pay a tribute to Beijing.
2. To continue OBOR unabated
3. All conflicts with neighbouring states, just disappear ONLY if India is soundly defeated.
4. G2 becomes a reality and the world acknowledges it as such.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 18 Jul 2017 13:05

http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopoliti ... -realities
CHINA-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE
THIS STANDOFF IS CHINA TELLING INDIA TO ACCEPT CHANGING REALITIES
As technology kills the distance between the two Asian giants, the current Himalayan standoff is Beijing’s way of warning New Delhi not to trample too egregiously on China’s interests, or else...
BY JOHN GARVER
16 JUL 2017
As China and India find themselves in the middle of yet another military standoff in the high Himalayas, their age-old border problem is back on the boil. Or so it would seem. The underlying causes of the current round of hostilities, which broke out last month in the tri-junction of Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan where China was building a road, run much deeper and are rooted in the deeper churning in the region as a result of the simultaneous rise of two great and proud peoples.
....
India’s vulnerability
From Beijing’s perspective, New Delhi is colluding with Japan and the US to stifle China’s natural and rightful rise to a position manifesting “the China Dream” and to which China’s glorious history entitles it. The appropriate response for India would be, Beijing believes, to credit China’s reassurances of non-threat and friendship, partner with China on the BRI and to deal with regional security issues. Instead, New Delhi is linking up with “anti-China forces” in Tokyo and encourages the US to oppose China’s rise.
India is in a vulnerable position. Unlike Japan, it is not protected by an alliance with the US. India has stressed its “strategic autonomy” and the fact that it does not desire alliance with the US. The reasons for this are complex, but one consequence is that a Chinese war with India does not automatically mean a Chinese war with the US, unlike the situation with Japan.
Beijing might conclude that New Delhi is the weakest link in the chain of “anti-China containment” (for such is China’s perception) being built up across the SA-IOR. The US might object to Chinese chastisement of India, but could not fundamentally alter the outcome. Moreover, India’s military modernisation is proceeding slowly. The PLA enjoys considerable superiority over India’s military in most areas. As Indian military modernisation proceeds with US and Japanese assistance, the PLA’s relative advantage may diminish. It might make sense for China to teach India a lesson before China’s advantage is eroded. ■

Gautam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DrRatnadip » 18 Jul 2017 13:20

http://m.indiatoday.in/lite/story/dokla ... 04522.html

Beijing does not fear war: Is China gearing for battle over Doklam standoff?

Keeping up its sabre-rattling over the Doklam standoff, China's media today said Beijing "doesn't fear going to war" and that any escalation would see India "face the consequence of an all-out confrontation".

A commentary in the hawkish Global Times, a tabloid under the People's Daily known for its hardline views, accused India of "repeatedly making provocations" since the 1962 war, the latest of which, according to writer Duo Mu, was the standoff near the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.

"China must be prepared for future conflicts and confrontation," the commentary said. "China can take further countermeasures along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). If India stirs up conflicts in several spots, it must face the consequence of an all-out confrontation with China along the entire LAC."

It also called on China to "continue strengthening border construction and speed up troop deployment and construction in the Doklam area". "These are legitimate actions of a sovereign country," it said.
Last edited by DrRatnadip on 18 Jul 2017 13:22, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 18 Jul 2017 13:22

As the clouds darken across the Himalayas and subcontinent, there is one silver lining,the putrefying smell of Chinese "over-confidence". That the geriatric sh*tworms of Zhongnanhai ,who fondly imagine that India will simply fold up and run away as most Chinese propagandists believe in.
Armed with this over-confidence,like bloated-chest bullfrogs,the PLA storm troopers are clanging away in the Himalayas,breathing fire and thunder at India and its army.Underestimating one's opponent could be lethal for the PRC,provided India makes good use of the time still available to plug whatever gaps may

https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/high- ... t-doka-la/
HIGH NOON IN THE HIMALAYAS: BEHIND THE CHINA-INDIA STANDOFF AT DOKA LA
JEFF M. SMITHJULY 13, 2017

If you’re struggling to make sense of the latest standoff between the Chinese and Indian militaries 10,000 feet in the Himalayas, don’t fret: You’re in good company. The showdown at Doka La is the product of a multi-layered, multi-party dispute steeped in centuries-old treaties and ambiguous territorial claims. Only recently have sufficient details emerged to piece together a coherent picture of the crisis and we’re still left with more questions than answers. However, one thing is clear: While stare-downs at the disputed China-India border are a common affair, the episode now underway is an altogether different, potentially far more dangerous, beast.

This crisis began in mid-June when Chinese forces were spotted constructing a road near the disputed tri-border linking India, China, and Bhutan, prompting an intervention by Indian troops in nearby Sikkim. Nearly a fortnight later, over 100 soldiers from each side are eyeball-to-eyeball, with India moving thousands more into supporting areas. Each passing week has seen a further hardening of each side’s position.

On July 5 China’s ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, described the situation as “grave” and insisted and there was “no scope for compromise.” A vitriolic outburst from China’s Global Times followed, accosting “Cold War-obsessed India” for “humiliating the civilization of the 21st Century.” It mused:

[T]he face-off in the Donglang area will end up with the Indian troops in retreat. The Indian military can choose to return to its territory with dignity, or be kicked out of the area by Chinese soldiers…India will suffer greater losses than in 1962 if it incites military conflicts. We hope India can face up to the hazards of its unruly actions to the country’s fundamental interests and withdraw its troops without delay… The more unified the Chinese people are, the more sufficient conditions the professionals will have to fight against India and safeguard our interest. This time, we must teach New Delhi a bitter lesson.

India’s Ministry of External affairs has been less strident but sent a clear signal about the stakes by claiming China’s activities “would represent a significant change of [the] status quo with serious security implications.”

A History of Non-Violent Standoffs

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the China-India border dispute, traveling to secluded locales dotting the Himalayan frontier like Leh, Tawang, and Pangong Lake. I’ve interviewed dozens of diplomats, experts, and military officials from both countries. And I’ve written at length about the subject. A holistic account of the dispute and its arcane origins are beyond the remit of this article (there is an abundance of literature on the subject, including John Garver’s Protracted Contest and my book, Cold Peace) though some points of context are in order.

First, the de-facto border, the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is a magnet for standoffs between Chinese and Indian border patrols. Unlike the turbulent Line of Control with Pakistan in Kashmir, however, an elaborate series of bilateral mechanisms has kept the LAC free of any fatal exchanges for decades. Only once since 1962 has a standoff turned bloody. That’s the good news. But there is also bad news: That fatal exchange, the Nathu La incident of 1967, unfolded near the site of the current crisis.

Second, the peace that has prevailed at the border masks a disconcertingly ambiguous tactical situation along select portions of the LAC. Not only is the roughly 3,500-kilometer border unsettled and un-demarcated, there are roughly a dozen stretches along the frontier where the two countries cannot even agree on the location of the LAC. These are the source of hundreds of relatively innocent “transgressions” by Chinese border patrols annually. (China doesn’t publicly track Indian transgressions). On occasion, these devolve into more serious “intrusions,” as witnessed in 2013 and 2014 when the People’s Liberation Army spent several weeks camped across the LAC in the Western Sector.

Third, there are several reasons the current episode differs materially from these common transgressions and even the more serious intrusions. It’s distinguished by the location of the standoff, the conduct of the two sides, and the public messaging from both capitals.

This Time is Different

Whereas the vast majority of incidents at the LAC occur in the disputed western and eastern sectors at Askai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, the current standoff is not even technically a product of the Sino-Indian border dispute, but is rather related to the Sino-Bhutan border dispute. Nevertheless, India has become intimately embroiled by virtue of its special relationship with Bhutan and the geographic proximity of the standoff to its vulnerable “Chicken’s Neck” – the narrow stretch of territory connecting the majority of India to its more remote northeast. For all practical purposes, the standoff has become an extension of the China-India border dispute.

Beijing’s public messaging was the second indication this standoff differed from its predecessors. Whereas the Indian media covers each border skirmish with hyperactive zeal, China often avoids public commentary altogether. When it does comment, Beijing’s messaging is generally bland and de-escalatory, noting the ambiguous nature of the LAC and appealing for patience and dialogue. Not this time.

China’s Foreign Ministry has called the standoff “essentially different from the previous border frictions…in undefined areas.” Unlike previous stare-downs along the LAC, Beijing says this dispute is unfolding on Chinese territory, on which India has “illegally trespassed.” What’s more, China has refused to negotiate a resolution until its “pre-conditions” are met: namely, a complete withdrawal of Indian forces. On July 11, the popular CGTN talk show “Dialogue with Yang Rui” featured Chinese analysts urging Beijing to escalate the situation. The recommended that China begin using the term “invasion” to describe India’s activities at the tri-border and issue Delhi an ultimatum to either depart the area or be evicted. They stated that China should modify its position on the Kashmir dispute and encourage Bhutan to hold a referendum on whether it wants to be an Indian “puppet state.”

Finally, China has matched its rhetoric with retributive action by canceling an upcoming pilgrimage to Tibet and deactivating a historic border crossing near the site of the standoff. Closed since the 1962 war, the Nathu La crossing was re-opened only in 2015 as a confidence-building measure. Beijing insists its fate “totally depends on whether the Indian side can correct its mistake in time.”

He Said, Xi Said

So, what really happened? Following an uptick in Chinese activity in the region, on June 16 a Chinese military construction team was spotted building a road near Doka La, several miles south of Batang La, where India and Bhutan place the border, but several miles north of Gamochen, where Beijing places the tri-border.

According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, “a Royal Bhutan Army patrol attempted to dissuade them from this unilateral activity.” When that failed, Indian military personnel from neighboring Sikkim intervened some 48 hours later. In “close coordination” with Bhutan, they then “approached the Chinese construction party and urged them to desist from changing the status quo.”

China’s Foreign Ministry corroborates this account but argues the standoff “is located on the Chinese side of the boundary and belongs to China.” Beijing insists the tri-border junction was fixed at Gamochen through an 1890 convention signed by the British Raj and the Qing dynasty. It claims India’s intervention is “a betrayal of [the] consistent position” held by Delhi since Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Delhi has indeed affirmed the validity of the treaty in the past but maintains that in 2012 the two agreed the tri-border was unsettled and would be resolved through consultations with all three parties. Any attempt to “unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.”

Second, as former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon notes, China’s claim is likely based on flawed colonial mapmaking: The watershed principle Beijing uses as justification for the tri-border actually favors Batang La – Bhutan’s and India’s position – over Gamochen. Third, Bhutan was not a party to the 1890 convention and, on June 29, told China its border activities violated two agreements signed in 1988 and 1998 committing both sides to abstain from any unilateral actions that would alter the status quo.

High Peaks, High Stakes, and the Border

Unsurprisingly, there is more at stake in the Doka La standoff than a few dozen square miles of desolate Himalayan frontier. There are grander geopolitical dynamics and ambitions driving the dispute related to the balance of power at the LAC, the broader Sino-Indian rivalry, a struggle for Bhutan’s loyalties, and the strategic vulnerability of India’s “Chicken’s Neck.”

For several years Beijing has been floating a proposal to freeze the operational status quo at the Sino-Indian border — an idea Delhi has flatly rejected. Buttressed by superior infrastructure and more favorable geography, China enjoys a substantial tactical advantage along the LAC — though Iskander Rehman persuasively argues the gap may not be as formidable as is commonly portrayed.

In the decades following the Sino-Indian war India pursed a strategy of deliberate neglect toward its border areas, convinced a scarcity of infrastructure would hamper any invasion force from the north. In the late 2000s, Delhi acknowledged the futility of that strategy and ordered massive border infrastructure upgrades that received additional support from Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the time being, Delhi appears unwilling to enshrine its tactical disadvantage at the LAC and it’s plausible Beijing is using the border tactics to pressure India to the negotiating table on a “freeze-of-forces.”

Some analysts have speculated that China’s border incursions are the product of rogue actors in the PLA, a theory rejected by most seasoned China analysts. One senior Indian diplomat formerly responsible for high-level negotiations with China recently explained to me that the PLA’s border activities were unquestionably orchestrated from Beijing. They are designed to embarrass India’s leadership, he suggested, and to show the Indian public and the world that China can operate at the border with impunity while underscoring Modi’s inability to secure India’s sovereign borders.

China has indeed built a lengthy resume of launching border incursions at politically sensitive junctures. A two-week Chinese incursion into Ladakh in 2014 overlapped with President Xi Jinping’s inaugural visit to Delhi, spoiling bilateral atmospherics at the outset of the Modi-Xi era. Perhaps it’s no coincidence the world learned of the Doka La standoff just as Prime Minister Modi was in Washington meeting with President Donald Trump.

The Rivalry

The Xi-Modi era has witnessed an intensification of the Sino-Indian rivalry, particularly since Modi’s frustration with Beijing seemed to reach critical mass in 2016. After an unsuccessful attempt to forge a strong personal relationship with Xi, Modi balked at China’s efforts to block India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers group and shield Pakistan-based terrorists from U.N. sanctions last year.

Since then, Indian policy toward Beijing has assumed sharper, more confident edges. It is possible Beijing is signaling its displeasure with any number recent Indian initiatives, including Delhi’s decision to boycott Beijing’s highly-touted “Belt and Road” summit in May, allow the Dalai Lama and the U.S. ambassador to visit Chinese-claimed Arunachal Pradesh, and vocally support an arbitration that ruled decisively against Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. Since the standoff began, Indian firms have renewed an oil exploration contract with Vietnam in waters disputed by China and the Indian press has highlighted a trip to the LAC in Ladakh by the prime minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama and these Tibetan leaders in Dharamsala has been a major source of contention with Beijing for decades.

Yet perhaps no issue has generated more friction in recent years than China’s creeping inroads into both the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent. Since 2005 smaller neighbors like Nepal and Sri Lanka have substantially expanded their relationships with China, heralding the appearance of Chinese submarines in Colombo and crackdown on Tibetan refugees in Nepal. In capitals across the region China and India have been waging a shadowy but intensifying struggle for the loyalties of local political and economic elites. It is possible China sees an opportunity for a breakthrough in India’s last subcontinental stronghold, Bhutan.

The Neighbor

The tiny Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan served as a virtual Indian protectorate after Delhi assumed control of the country’s foreign and security policies in a 1949 treaty. The “Friendship Treaty” was revised in 2007 to accord the Bhutanese nominally more control over their foreign affairs but maintained the two sides would “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.” India still accounts for all of Bhutan’s defense trade as well as 75 percent of its imports and 85 percent of its exports. Remarkably, Bhutan receives over two-thirds of all Indian foreign aid.

By contrast, Bhutan remains the only Chinese neighbor yet to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Together with India, it’s also one of the only countries to host an outstanding land border dispute with China. Beijing claims several hundred square kilometers in Jarkarlung and Pasamlung in north-central Bhutan, and several hundred more at the Doklam plateau along Bhutan’s western border with Tibet, the site of the current crisis.

Sino-Bhutan border negotiations began in 1984, with India initially negotiating on Bhutan’s behalf before withdrawing to a supervisory role. In the mid-1990s, China offered Bhutan a “package deal” whereby it would renounce its claims in the north in exchange for control of the Doklam plateau. Bhutan demurred, not least due to India’s fierce opposition.

Like many Indian analysts, Abhijnan Rej believes “one of the key Chinese objectives in initiating the Doklam standoff seems to be testing India’s resolve to stand by Bhutan.” Beijing’s public diplomacy lends some credence to the view that it’s trying to drive a wedge between the two countries. China’s first public comment on the Doka La standoff claimed Bhutan was unaware Indian troops had entered the Doklam plateau and accused India of wanting “to infringe on Bhutan’s sovereignty.”

On July 9, The People’s Daily doubled-down, insisting India had “affected Bhutan’s independence by intruding into Chinese territory and using Bhutan as an excuse.” Bhutan’s media, it said, “have long been criticizing India’s interference in its domestic affairs. Their infuriation should be understood.”

While a border incursion would appear an unusual negotiating tactic, it tracks with the peculiar mix of carrots and sticks China has employed in an attempt to simultaneously wean Bhutan away from India while pressuring it to cede the Doklam plateau and establish formal diplomatic relations. “When stakes are high, Beijing has shown no hesitation in mounting military pressure along the border,” says Bhutanese analyst Talik Jha, who describes China’s strategy as one of “military intimidation followed by diplomatic seduction.”

Meanwhile, the tug-of-war for Bhutan’s loyalties has been intensifying in recent years, albeit gradually. An international conference in Rio in 2012 witnessed an impromptu, first-ever meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries, raising hackles in Delhi. Shortly thereafter Bhutan imported 15 buses from China. Ahead of a national election in Bhutan the following year, India suspended fuel subsidies to its eastern neighbor. The vote produced a more emphatically Indophile government and an apology from Delhi over the “unfortunate technical lapse” in the provision of subsidies.

While Bhutan’s outreach to China has cooled since, border talks and surveys have continued. The People’s Daily claims India’s involvement in the Doka La standoff is a product of its concern over advancing China-Bhutan negotiations.

The Chicken’s Neck

Delhi has kept a close watch and tight grip on the Sino-Bhutan border negotiations for the same reason it joined the fray at Doka La: Chinese control over the Doklam plateau would represent a grave strategic threat. The Chinese-controlled Chumbi valley bisecting Sikkim and Bhutan cuts toward the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow, strategically-vulnerable strip of territory connecting the main mass of the Indian subcontinent to its more remote northeastern provinces.

A Chinese offensive into this “Chicken’s Neck” could sever India’s connection to the northeast, where China still claims up to 90,000 square kilometers in Arunachal Pradesh. China’s Global Times seemed to acknowledge as much, and further stoke Indian anxieties by arguing “northeast India might take the opportunity to become independent” if Delhi’s fears were realized and China launched an operation to “quickly separate mainland India from the northeast.”

The topography of the region further elevates the strategic value of the Doklam plateau, and helps to explain how India bloodied China’s nose during the nearby skirmish at Nathu La in 1967. Whereas China holds a tactical advantage along the vast majority of the LAC, the Chumbi Valley is arguably the only position along the de facto border where China’s position is deeply compromised. As Indian analyst Nitin Gokhale observes:

Chinese forces in the narrow Chumbi Valley are currently in the line of sight and fire of Indian forces poised on the ridges along the Sikkim-Tibet border. Aware of this vulnerability, the Chinese have been eyeing the Doklam plateau since any troops stationed there will be away from visible observation and beyond artillery range of Indian forces either based in North or north-east Sikkim.

In other words, control over the Doklam plateau constitutes a “win-win” for the PLA; both a knife to India’s jugular and shield to blunt its sharpest spear. With existential stakes for Delhi, and Beijing posturing growing more uncompromising by the day, there’s no end in sight to the longest standoff at the China-India border in over three decades.

Jeff M. Smith is the Director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century.


Yes,we must accept changing realities,India is not the India of ...'62 and China must accept that fact that we will never accept its hegemony of Asia.

We must also NEVER show the area occup[ied by China ,that is TIBET as CHINA in any maps of the region.Tibet is COT,Chinese occupied TIbet.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 13:32

Doklam Impasse: Chinese diplomats tell foreign envoys troops running low on patience
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/world/ ... 28349.html
It has been a month since troubles began in Doklam. Even as India has been contesting China's claim to the Bhutanese territory, Chinese diplomats are known to have told foreign officials stationed in China that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will wait patiently only for so long. These foreign diplomats, it is learnt, have conveyed this message to their Indian counterparts in Beijing and to their Bhutanese colleagues in Delhi.

An Indian Express report quoting a diplomat from one of the P-5 permanent members of the UN Security Council countries, said: “Our colleagues in Beijing attended the briefing and were given the impression that the Chinese side will not be waiting for an indefinite period. This is quite worrying, and we have conveyed it to our Indian colleagues in Beijing and Bhutanese colleagues in Delhi.”
“They [Chinese diplomats] have told our colleagues in Beijing that the Indian side has trespassed into Chinese territory and changed the status quo,” the UN diplomat has told the newspaper.
Speaking to The Indian Express, sources further add that a few G-20 countries, whose diplomats are in Beijing, have also been fed the Chinese version of the events.

Doklam, which is located in the trijunction area between Bhutan, China and India, became a flash point after China began constructing a road there last month. Subsequently, India intervened and has been engaged in a standoff with the PLA ever since.

The Chinese claim Doklam belong to them, and has asked India to back down. However, according to a 2012 understanding between China and India, both the countries had agreed to bilaterally determine rights over Doklam in consultation with another country. Meanwhile, the Chinese have begun calling Doklam as Donglong.

“Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine trijunction points is in violation of this understanding,” said the Ministry of External Affairs in a statement.

New Delhi is believed to be involved in efforts in de-escalating the tension, tell government sources to the Indian Express.

The Chinese, however, say they aren't willing to sit down for a dialogue unless Indian troops pull back from the contested area.
The Chinese media have reported that India repeatedly violated border agreements in a way which infringed on China's sovereignty. An op-ed in the Chinese-state-run Global Times even spoke of “all-out confrontation” given the current circumstances.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Atulya P » 18 Jul 2017 13:42

Noob thoughts - How important is chicken's neck corridor in case the war does break out? Would we not use north BD (for NE) or Nepal (for Sikkim) as transit if, and this is a big IF (given the force balance is in our favor), Siliguri does comes under arty range? War means political boundaries remain only on map. I am not saying that it is not important, the rail and road infra developed is a vital link to NE but it should not be considered as the only link. So what could be the tactical objective from their perspective? They surely cannot hold this area even if they come down the hills. It would at best be a pain in the neck for us.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 13:44

Chinese media rejects fake news report of Indian soldiers’ death in Chinese attack
http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0718/c90000-9243058.html
Chinese mainstream media outlets on Tuesday denounced Pakistani media’s “groundless” report, which claims that over 150 Indian soldiers were killed in Sikkim due to a Chinese rocket attack.

According to Dunya News, a 24-hours Urdu language news service in Pakistan, at least 158 Indian soldiers died and several others injured on Monday due to a Chinese rocket attack across the border.

The news was rejected by India. The Hindustan Times on Monday quoted Gopal Baglay, spokesperson for India’s Ministry of External Affairs, as saying that the reports are “utterly baseless, malicious, and mischievous.”

Meanwhile, Chinese media outlets have carried out a series of investigations, claiming that the fake news should not be taken seriously.

According to an investigative report released by the People’s Daily on Tuesday, the Chinese embassy in India had noticed the report and has denounced its authenticity. Some Pakistani media outlets claim that the fake news is based on unverified information from social media and the Internet.

The Global Times also published a report on Tuesday, calling the Pakistani media report "groundless and fake."

Chinese authorities have yet to responded to the incident, while the fake news article is still posted on Dunya News’ website.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 18 Jul 2017 13:54

The Chinese are trying to create "fear of war" within India by their daily utterances. Why else would they use words like "All out war"? They are trying to build public pressure from within India to get India to back off. The recent drill in Tibet was to aid that effort. BTW, Mamta Banoji, it seems commented yesterday/recently that Modi is the cause of our deteriorating relationship in our neighborhood or something to that effect. The extensive coverage given to the Chinese uttering too helps in this cause.

Contrary to my earlier thinking the Chinese are becoming more strident by the day instead of letting things cool off. With the looming <<whatever>> congress the standoff will reflect negatively on dada Xi and he might as well make a military play say a month or so before though it is fraught with high risk for dada Xi.

Making a play around Chumbi, given the balance of forces, would be an uphill task for the Chinese. Expect an attempt at land grab some place else. Perhaps China might grab more Bhutenese territory to the North just to punish them for the situation.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 14:02

To all ,
Have anybody given thought to the reports that China has briefed envoys from some G-20 nations that the Chinese patience is running out. This was told to the indian express by the G-20 envoys not Chinese.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Marten » 18 Jul 2017 14:03

Iyersan wrote:To all ,
Have anybody given thought to the reports that China has briefed envoys from some G-20 nations that the Chinese patience is running out. This was told to the indian express by the G-20 envoys not Chinese.

Please share your insights. What do you think it means?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 18 Jul 2017 14:10

Marten wrote:
Iyersan wrote:To all ,
Have anybody given thought to the reports that China has briefed envoys from some G-20 nations that the Chinese patience is running out. This was told to the indian express by the G-20 envoys not Chinese.

Please share your insights. What do you think it means?

Trying to move international opinion in their favor. To their viewpoint on Doklam
To gain consensus on any eventuality ... Whatever may be the endgame
To show to the world that they have been very patient with the obdurate Indians

.... Further points can be added by the rest of the members in the forum

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 18 Jul 2017 14:17

Pratyush wrote:
Yagnasri wrote:We need to be very careful about the internal sabotage this time. Unlike earlier wars, significant sections of the peacefuls and all the Naxals will be siding with Pakis and Chinese this time. Any planning needs to take that into account. Fortunately, we already have "two and half" front war idea in the open which shows we have seized of the matter.



I am more concerned about the over ground workers and the Scamgress.


Overground workers are normally cowards who attend UndiTv type media outlets and give lectures on PC BS and anti-Hindu and India lectures. Once the firing starts no one is the media is going to call them for any programme for the fear of public anger. So they will hid and bid for timing. They may, of course, go to Khanland and lecture there on how fasisi fellows are not taken over GoI etc.

Karthik S
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karthik S » 18 Jul 2017 14:35



At 9:00, they talk about immediate necessity to augment naval shipyards and ship building capacity by bringing onboard SoKo and Taiwan.


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