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Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 02 Mar 2017 08:21

In video, IS militants vow to attack, ‘bleed’ China - AFP
Islamic State (IS) militants from China’s Uighur ethnic minority have vowed to return home and “shed blood like rivers”, according to a jihadist-tracking firm, in what experts said marked the first IS threat against Chinese targets. The threat came in a half-hour video released on Monday by a division of the Islamic State (IS) in western Iraq and featuring militants from China’s Uighur ethnic group, said the U.S.-based SITE Intelligence Group, which analysed the footage.

China has for years blamed exiled Uighur “separatists” for a series of violent attacks in its western Xinjiang region — the Uighur homeland — and warned of the potential for militants to link up with global jihadist groups.

In the video, a Uighur fighter issued the threat against China just before executing an alleged informant.

“Oh, you Chinese who do not understand what people say! We are the soldiers of the Caliphate, and we will come to you to clarify to you with the tongues of our weapons, to shed blood like rivers and avenging the oppressed,” according to SITE’s translation.

A traditionally Muslim group, many Uighurs complain of cultural and religious repression and discrimination by China.

It appears to be the Islamic State’s “first direct threat” against China, Michael Clarke, an expert on Xinjiang at the National Security College of Australian National University, told AFP.

“It is the first time that Uighur-speaking militants have claimed allegiance to IS,” he added.

Mr. Clarke said it also could indicate a possible split among Uighur fighters, as it includes a warning to those fighting with the al Qaeda-aligned Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said Wednesday that he had not seen the video but noted that “East Turkistan terrorist forces have been posing a severe threat to China's security”, referring to Xinjiang militants.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 03 Mar 2017 01:55

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/201 ... Lh8TVXyupo

Japan’s Senkaku challenge

NEW DELHI – . Japan has barely one-tenth the population of China’s. Moreover, its population is not just aging but also shrinking significantly; it declined by nearly a million just between 2010 and 2015.About a decade ago, Japan’s defense budget was larger than China’s. But now China’s military spending surpasses the combined defense budgets of Japan, Britain and France.To make matters worse, China’s increasing territorial assertiveness and muscular foreign policy are contributing to a sense of insecurity in Japan.Chinese President Xi Jinping declared much of the East China Sea, including the Senkakus, to be a Chinese air defense zone in 2013, and since then China has stepped up its challenge to Japan’s control over those islands, including through repeated intrusions by its military aircraft and warships. Beijing has hardened its stance by elevating its claim to the Senkakus to a “core interest,” while some in China have gone to the extent of questioning Japan’s sovereignty over even Okinawa.

Against this background, many Japanese have wondered whether the United States would come to Japan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack on the Senkakus. The 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty states that an armed attack on either party in the territories under Japan’s administration would prompt joint action “to meet the common danger.”Then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s contradictory rhetoric instilled a sense of skepticism in Japan. Obama said the U.S. security treaty with Japan covered the Senkaku Islands because they “are under Japanese jurisdiction,” yet “we also stress that we don’t take a position on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.” At his April 2014 joint news conference with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo, Obama, while unveiling his position on the Senkakus, urged Japan to refrain from “provocative actions” and emphasized that his administration was committed to encouraging China’s “peaceful rise.” Add to the picture Obama’s conspicuous inaction and silence on China’s 2012 seizure of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, despite America’s long-standing mutual defense treaty with Manila. That development served as a wake-up call for Japan and other U.S. allies in Asia.
By contrast, the new U.S. administration led by President Donald Trump has taken a more clear-cut stance in reassuring Japan that the U.S. would defend it in any confrontation with China over the Senkakus. It has done so without the Obama-style caveat — that Washington does not take sides in the sovereignty dispute and calls on China and Japan to resolve their dispute peacefully through dialogue. In fact, the recent Trump-Abe summit marked the first time that the U.S. commitment to defend Japan’s control over the Senkakus was recorded in a joint statement.The Feb. 12 Trump-Abe joint statement came out strongly for the Senkakus’ defense: “The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. … The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force.”This unambiguous commitment should be seen as an important success of Abe’s proactive diplomacy in seeking to build a personal connection with the new U.S. president. Abe was the first foreign leader Trump hosted at Mar-a-Lago, which he calls “the southern White House.” Earlier, just after Trump’s unexpected election victory, Abe met face to face with him by making a special stop in New York en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru.
Let’s be clear: The Senkaku issue is not just about a 7-sq.-km piece of real estate or the potential oil and gas reserves that lie around it. The strategically located Senkakus, despite their small size, are critical to maritime security and the larger contest for influence in the East China Sea and beyond.China is seeking to wage a campaign of attrition against Japan over the Senkakus by gradually increasing the frequency and duration of its intrusions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters. In doing so, it has made the rest of the world recognize the existence of a dispute and the risks of armed conflict.To be sure, changing the territorial status quo is nothing new for Beijing. China has been doing that ever since it was founded in 1949. The early forcible absorption of the sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan Plateau more than doubled China’s landmass.In the 21st century, Chinese expansionism has increasingly relied upon “salami tactics” — a steady progression of small, furtive actions, none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which help to incrementally change facts on the ground in China’s favor.Unlike China’s success in expanding its frontiers in the South China Sea, it has found the going tough in the East China Sea. Indeed, Beijing’s actions have shaken Tokyo out of its complacency and diffidence and set in motion the strengthening of Japan’s defense capabilities, including arming its far-flung island chain in the East China Sea with a string of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries.At his joint news conference with Trump at the White House, Abe pledged that Japan will play a “greater role” in East Asian security. It was as if he was responding to Trump’s campaign rhetoric that Japan, which hosts about 50,000 American troops, should do more to defend itself.One effective way the Trump administration can encourage Japan to do more for its own defense is by lending full support to the Abe-initiated national security and constitutional reform process. Such reforms could help forestall the emergence of a destabilizing power imbalance in East Asia. Japan is already working to constrain China with its own version of Beijing’s “anti-access, area denial” doctrine against the U.S.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby IndraD » 03 Mar 2017 01:59


doesn;t fit in the picture: why picking up China? Cos they helped Russia veto Sy sanctions many times. IS fighters for that matter have not released such video even against Ru!

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 03 Mar 2017 10:17

http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=250774

China prepared to make concessions in Aksai Chin if India gives up Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh

China's long-time negotiator on the border talks, who retired in 2003, has said that Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh is an "alienable" part of Tibet and that a boundary settlement would not be possible unless India agreed to make concessions in the eastern sector.But if India did so, China would also make concessions in Aksai Chin, suggested Dai Bingguo, spelling out in detail for the first time his thoughts on a solution.Dai, who was the Special Representative on the boundary issue for 15 rounds of talks until his retirement in 2013, said that India "held the key" to the settlement and that if it took into account China's concerns in the eastern sector, Beijing would similarly do so in other areas.India sees China as occupying 38,000 sq km of its territory in Aksai Chin, while China claims 90,000 sq km in Arunachal Pradesh.Dai, who recently penned his memoirs, told the Beijing-based China-India Dialogue magazine, published by the official China International Publishing Group, in an interview: "The disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is alienable from China's Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction."
He said it was not until February 1951 that "the local government of Tibet [was] forced to stop its actual administration of Tawang". "Even the British colonialists who drew the illegal 'McMahon Line' respected China's jurisdiction over Tawang," he said.Dai added: "The major reason the boundary question persists is that China's reasonable requests [in the east] have not been met"."If the Indian side takes care of China's concerns in the eastern sector of their border," he said, "the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India's concerns elsewhere."Despite his emphasis on Tawang, Dai suggested that the 15 rounds of talks he participated in had moved both sides close to "a political settlement". His comments suggest this would involve mutual adjustments or concessions, most likely in Tawang and Aksai Chin."China and India are now standing in front of the gate towards a final settlement," he said. "The gate is a framework solution based on meaningful and mutually accepted adjustments. Now, the Indian side holds the key to the gate."The 19th round of talks was held between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and State Councillor Yang Jiechi, Dai's successor as SR, in Beijing last April.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby TKiran » 03 Mar 2017 18:27

Dai Bingguo's laughable idea that India cede Tawang to China indicates that for the border dispute to be resolved, Tibet must be free again.

mobile.twitter.com/Chellaney/status/837570830796226560

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 03 Mar 2017 18:47

India and China on the cusp of a final border settlement: ex-Chinese negotiator - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
Indian and Chinese negotiators have moved close to the final settlement of their disputed boundary, which can now be triggered by an agreement along the eastern sector that includes Tawang, says a veteran Chinese diplomat.

Dai Bingguo, a former State Councilor and China’s Special Representative for the boundary talks with India that began in 2003, has asserted in an interview with a Beijing-based publication that a final settlement of the boundary question between China and India is within grasp.
"It is safe to say that after more than 30 years of negotiations, China and India are now standing in front of the gate towards a final settlement of their boundary question. The gate is a framework solution based on meaningful and mutually accepted adjustments. Now, the Indian side holds the key to the gate," Mr. Dai told the China-India Dialogue magazine.

The former official stressed that the “major reason the boundary question persists is that China’s reasonable requests have not been met.” He signaled that China was likely to reciprocate in the western sector, which includes the disputed Aksai Chin, if India demonstrated flexibility along the eastern boundary.

“If the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns in the eastern sector of their border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s concerns elsewhere. In this way, both countries can shake off the nagging chains left by colonialists and better work together to promote common development, achieve respective rejuvenation and herald the arrival of the Asian Century,” Mr. Dai observed. He stressed that China has managed to settle boundary questions and develop friendship with 12 neighbouring countries, including Russia and Vietnam.

Referring specifically to Tawang, Mr. Dai underscored that the "disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China's Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction.” He asserted that China "was not a signatory of the Simla Accord of June 3, 1914," which established the McMahon line in the eastern sector. "From the perspective of international law, the Simla Accord, as well as the ‘McMahon Line’ which it created, are not only unfair and illegitimate, but also illegal and invalid,” he observed. {Look who is talking about international law}

Mr. Dai highlighted that an Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, which was signed in 2005 has been “fundamental” in advancing the boundary talks. He said that this agreement pinpointed that the two countries should make “meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question in order to reach a package settlement”. “To this end, the key is to implement ‘meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments’,” he observed.


'Biggest dispute'


The former official pointed out that out of the disputes along the eastern, middle and western sectors of the China-India boundary, the “biggest dispute involves the eastern section."

Mr. Dai praised India for pursuing an “independent foreign policy,” anchored to principle of maintaining its “strategic autonomy.”

“As Indians claim, their country insists on 'strategic autonomy' and is clear about what it considers as acceptable foreign policy. I think this strategy is the result of the common wisdom of generations of forward-thinking Indian politicians and a policy that optimally serves India’s fundamental interests for long-term development.”

Mr. Dai was confident that the era of a multi-polar world had materialised, entailing that interaction among the big powers that included China and India would determine "whether the international landscape can evolve in a peaceful manner.""

'India not our rival'

The former official insisted that China was not opposed to India’s rise, and did not subscribe to the view that Sino-Indian rivalry was unavoidable. "China will neither see India as its rival nor contain India’s development. He added: "Responsible Indian politicians should not treat China as a competitor or target of containment. In the eyes of China, even if there are some competitions between China and India, they are supposed to be healthy competitions that will eventually help both countries develop and progress, instead of political and strategic competitions and zero-sum games."

Mr. Dai highlighted that the Chinese are “delighted” that see the evolution of India’s "sound relationship"" with other countries, including the United States, Russia, Japan and Europe.


Warns against Dalai visit

PTI reports:


Meanwhile, China on Friday warned India against allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh, saying it would cause “serious damage” to the bilateral ties and peace in the disputed border region.

“China is gravely concerned over information that India has granted permission to the Dalai to visit Arunachal Pradesh,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told the media
here.

China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet and routinely objects to any visits by top leaders, officials and diplomats to the area.

China had also aired similar concerns in October last year, when India granted permission to the Tibetan spiritual leader to visit Arunachal Pradesh at the invitation of the State government. The visit is expected to take place this year.

“China is strongly opposed to the Dalai visiting disputed areas,” Mr. Geng said.

“China’s position on the eastern section of China-India border dispute is consistent and clear. The Dalai clique has long been engaging in anti-China separatist activities and its record on the border question is not that good,” he said.

Mr. Geng said China expressed its concern to India through formal channels.

‘Serious issue’


“India is fully aware of the seriousness of the Dalai issue and the sensitivity of China-India border question,” he said.

“Under such a background if India invites the Dalai to visit to the mentioned territory, it will cause serious damage to peace and stability of border region and China-India relations,” he said.


“We have expressed concerns to the Indian side, urged India to stick to its political commitments and abide by important consensus the two sides have reached on the boundary question, refrain from actions that might complicate the issue, not provide a platform to the Dalai clique and protect the sound and stable development of the Sino-India relations,” he said.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sudhan » 03 Mar 2017 19:12

ToI reports that the Dalai Lama will be hosted in Arunachal Pradesh despite Cheeni protests and that the Govt officials will meet him there.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ranjan.rao » 03 Mar 2017 19:38

what they have willfully obfuscated is part -the take care of india's concerns on western sector in J&K; I am quite sure it is a old chinese trap to lure indian diplomats into talking nicely and put dalai lama on hold etc.
Hope we dont fall for such ruse..

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby venug » 03 Mar 2017 20:10

GoI should make an open statement demanding China to NOT go forward with CPEC passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir as it is integral part of India. And there will be dangerous consequences at later time of our choosing if China doesn't take into consideration Indian concerns. Lastly that Tibet is a disputed territory at the very least and as a great friend of India :) China should leave PoK if it desires higher than Everest, deeper than South China sea relations with India.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shashankk » 04 Mar 2017 00:37

https://sputniknews.com/asia/201703031051236942-china-india-dalai-lama/

Language of this article seems to be pro India.

In November, Indian and Chinese military got involved in major standoff at the Line of Actual Control (de facto border) when more than 50 Chinese troops tried to halt ongoing civil works in Indian territory. Chinese forces were claiming that the ongoing work is in disputed areas and there was need to take prior approval from higher authorities on both sides. This incident was considered a precursor to India's decision to allow the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby GShankar » 04 Mar 2017 00:48

venug wrote:GoI should make an open statement demanding China to NOT go forward with CPEC passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir as it is integral part of India. And there will be dangerous consequences at later time of our choosing if China doesn't take into consideration Indian concerns. Lastly that Tibet is a disputed territory at the very least and as a great friend of India :) China should leave PoK if it desires higher than Everest, deeper than South China sea relations with India.


Before one speaks or acts, they need to prepare. If we don't then the bluff is easily called. This is what is now happening with the border skirmishes with pakis and chinese. To make bigger claims, we need to prepare more. Let's give goi some time to make the plans and thoughts actionable.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 04 Mar 2017 06:07

http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-new ... djXTP.html

Dalai Lama’s Arunachal visit will cause serious damage, says China; India dismisses warning

Bilateral ties will be seriously damaged if India allows the Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh in the coming weeks, China warned on Friday while reiterating its contention that the Tibetan spiritual leader is a “separatist”.The warning from China’s foreign ministry came soon after the country’s former chief negotiator on the border issue, Dai Bingguo, said there should be some give and take to settle the dragging boundary dispute.
The foreign ministry said it is “gravely concerned” about reports that the Dalai Lama will visit the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the near future.The Dalai Lama’s visit will cause “serious damage” to China-India ties, foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told a regular news briefing. “China is strongly opposed to Dalai Lama visiting disputed areas,” he said.“China’s position on eastern section of China-India border dispute is consistent and clear. The Dalai-clique has long been engaging in anti-China separatist activities and its record on the border question is not that good,” Geng said.Meanwhile, India on Friday dismissed China’s warning over the Dalai Lama’s proposed visit to Arunachal Pradesh, saying that New Delhi’s position on the matter is well known.“The government’s position is well known and has not changed,” external affairs ministry spokesperson Gopal Baglay said in response to a query.
“China would like to work with India to work relentlessly on negotiation process and find a solution that is equitable, reasonable to all parties,” he added.Geng was more emphatic about China’s displeasure on the Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunchal Pradesh. Indicating that India is deliberately allowing the Dalai Lama to visit the region despite knowing China’s expected reaction, Geng said India is aware of the sensitivity of the matter.“India is fully aware of the seriousness of the Dalai issue and the sensitivity of China-India border question,” he said.“Under such a background if India invites Dalai to visit the mentioned territory it will cause serious damage to peace and stability of the border region and China-India relations.”Geng said China had conveyed its displeasure and concerns to India about the impending visit through formal channels.“We have expressed concerns to the Indian side, urged India to stick to its political commitments and abide by important consensus the two sides have reached on the boundary question, refrain from actions that might complicate the issue, not provide a platform to the Dalai-clique and protect the sound and stable development of China-India relations,” he said.China had strongly protested against the Dalai Lama’s meeting with President Pranab Mukherjee at the Rashtrapati Bhavan in December, saying it opposes any form of contact between the Tibetan leader and officials of other countries.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby srin » 04 Mar 2017 06:20

It is plain stupid to assume that China would withdraw from Aksai chin when their lifeline highway to Xinxiang passes through it.

I'd argue that by voluntarily withdrawing (before they got cut off by snow-clogged mountain passes) from Tawang after occupying it in 1962, China relinquished all claims to Tawang or any part south of the McMahon line. And now, they're now indicating that they don't have claim but only occupation over Aksai Chin. :D

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 04 Mar 2017 09:21

What is the basis of their claim on Tawang or even Tibet in the first place and now? We can be sure that it will be nothing logical or reasonable. Did they respect our concerns or positions of Terror or J&K till date? No. Fortunately after that wimp Nehru we stopped being accommodative to China. Babus of MoEA seems to be a bit afraid of them even now. At least they give such impression. That need to change and change fast. Otherwise, they will push and push in everything.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby GShankar » 04 Mar 2017 10:04

IMO, they need something from us(say Tawang). So, they continue to put pressure points on us by taking more and more stuff from us in order to bargain in such a way that they will not have to offer anything that is(was) originally theirs.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 05 Mar 2017 00:50

http://rskalha.blogspot.com/
How Arunachal Pradesh Became a Full Member of the Indian Union-Part I
( 1984-86-99 when India was weakest in economic and military terms)e

. Although in 1914 at the tripartite Simla Convention [India, Tibet and China] the McMahon Line separating Tibet from India had been agreed upon, China insisted that it had never agreed to the McMahon Line. Yet from that point onwards in time till 23 January 1959, the Chinese government, in any official document, never challenged the McMahon Line. Even when Major Khating evicted the last of the Tibetans from Tawang on 12 February 1951, there was no protest from the Chinese government. In his letter to Nehru, PM Zhou Enlai on 23 January 1959 affirmed that “the Chinese government finds it necessary to take a realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line”. But times change and so do policies. Let us fast forward to the early 1980s. In early 1980s PM Indira Gandhi took the decision that Indian security forces were to patrol right up to the McMahon Line so as to eliminate any chance of incursions across the line. A small detachment began patrolling the area from the summer of 1982. There were no Chinese protests when movement by Indian personnel was made in 1983 and on 28 July 1984 a seasonal post was established. However in 1986 when Indian personnel similarly moved up to the post after the winter was over, they found 40 Chinese personnel already encamped there and were soon reinforced by about 200 PLA soldiers. From 26 June 1986 onwards, a bitter exchange of protests took place, but a solution was not forthcoming. India was clearly alarmed at this new found Chinese aggressiveness coming as it did after Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liu Shuqing told us at the 6th Round of Boundary talks in November 1985 that “India would have to give concessions in the eastern sector and China would do so in the western sector”. What these concessions were was not amplified at that time.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby NRao » 05 Mar 2017 01:08



But, it is OK to be insensitive to India and send Chinese troops into PoK.

I think Dhamashala should be moved to Arunachal.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby NRao » 05 Mar 2017 05:15

More of an economic threat.

China asks India again to join corridor project, wants representation in Beijing meet

Like the port in SL, which looks like is dependent on India for 70% of flow, China wants Indian business to fund her strategic project.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 05 Mar 2017 06:53

GShankar wrote:IMO, they need something from us(say Tawang). So, they continue to put pressure points on us by taking more and more stuff from us in order to bargain in such a way that they will not have to offer anything that is(was) originally theirs.

The Chinese want everything to do with, or having any remote connection with, Tibet to be exclusively under their control. This is their obsession because Tibet is declared as 'core interest' and no Chinese can say or do anything that is not in conformity with the 'core interest'. Violators are punishable by death at a minimum. This is very similar to the concept of blasphemy in Islam. Tawang has some connection with Tibetan Buddhism.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby venug » 05 Mar 2017 06:59

"We cannot allow issues that cannot be worked out for the moment to stop us from moving forward," he added.


Meaning: Roll that sovereignty claims,up yours..., we do what we want. Join and fund CPEC and make China a supel powel. In the meanwhile everytime Dalai Lama goes to AP, we go ape shit as if our arse is on fire. India should acknowledge that China is the only supel powel, we not only expand our power, we stomp on sovereignty rights of others, get used to it.

They knew PoK is claimed by us and in illegal occupation by TSP, and yet, they went behind our backs as if didnt even exists and we are no body. Now they say "we cannot allow issues that cannot be worked out...."?

This being done. GoI should pick a time, just get this unfinished work of integrating PoK with rest of India, and ask China to f itself....and I agree this should be done once, China pours all its 70+ billions into CPEC , not untill then.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 05 Mar 2017 13:43

Very good news.

By air or road, Tezu is now a vantage point - Kallol Bhattacherjee, The Hindu
Firming up India’s strategic space, the mountainous regions of Arunachal Pradesh are set to acquire all-weather connectivity. Officials here said the new bridges across the Lohit river and the new commercial airport in Tezu will smoothen transport to several high-altitude districts near the India-China border.

“Necessary approvals and permissions have been issued by the district administration for commercial air services to begin. One calibration flight has been conducted. However, some more calibration flights are required. Recently, the funnel approach has also been cleared [of tall trees],” said the District Magistrate of Tezu, Danish Ashraf, explaining that the Airports Authority of India (AAI) and other government agencies are continuously coordinating for an earliest possible commencement of flights from the airport.

The improvements in connectivity is significant in view of the statements by Beijing’s officials asserting China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh. “The disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction,” said Dai Bingguo, former Special Representative of China to the border talks with India.

However, infrastructure development in the State is noticeable. On a field trip, The Hindu found that the airport, the first in the State, will be equipped with night-landing facility. Apart from the airport, the two mega-bridges over the Lohit river will reduce hurdles in moving men and material to the eastern sector of the India-China border.

Longest bridge in India

The bridges at the Dhola-Sadiya ghat and at Digaru ghat were built by the Navayuga Engineering Company Ltd (NECL).

The bridge at Sadiya, at 9.15 km, will be the longest bridge in India once it is formally inaugurated. However, the people at Tezu say it is the smaller bridge of 2.1 km built at the Digaru ghat that has reduced the distance between Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, bringing the State closer to the rest of India.

In the absence of the bridges, the drive from Guwahati will be interrupted by the Lohit, which could be crossed only by boat. The other bridge near the pilgrimage site of Parashuram Kund is often difficult to reach.

Vehicular traffic across the river required a risky boat ride carrying large and small vehicles to Tezu town. The route to Tezu is critical from a strategic point of view as the Himalayan range, which became famous as ‘the hump’ during World War II, can be accessed only through the mountain roads that begin at Tezu.

Tezu is the nearest town to Walong, where a legendary battle between Indian and Chinese soldiers took place between 16 October to 16 November 1962. “The coming generation will not know the hardship that locals faced to cross the Lohit,” said local trader S. Rahman, who has resided here since 1985, adding, “Locals used elephants to cross the river and so many people drowned in it.”

Strategic preparedness

The new bridges will also provide the necessary support for the strategic preparedness for the forces in the mountains, which will be critical for India where the new Mountain Strike Corps is likely to focus.

The planned high altitude airfields in the Himalayan range would also be helped by the enhanced connectivity of Tezu
.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 05 Mar 2017 18:30

China cuts GDP growth target as it pushes through reforms, de-leveraging - Reuters
China has cut its growth target this year as the world's second-largest economy pushes through painful reforms to address a build-up in debt and strives to keep a lid on risks in its financial sector.

China aims to expand its economy by around 6.5 per cent in 2017, Premier Li Keqiang said at the opening of the annual meeting of parliament on Sunday. China targeted growth of 6.5 to 7 per cent last year and ultimately achieved 6.7 per cent, the slowest pace in 26 years.

A lending binge and increased government spending have fuelled worries among China's top leaders about elevated debt levels and an overheating housing market.

The 2017 target for broad money supply growth was cut to around 12 per cent from about 13 per cent for 2016, while the government's budget deficit target was kept unchanged at 3 per cent of gross domestic product.

China will continue to implement a proactive fiscal policy and maintain a prudent monetary policy, Li said, adding that government would press on with supply-side reforms and take steps to control risks and ensure safety in the financial sector.

"In general, China's policy stance has turned to 'risk control' and 'bubble deflating'. This means that the monetary policy will gradually tighten," said Zhou Hao, emerging markets economist at Commerzbank AG in Singapore.

The target for consumer price inflation this year was kept unchanged at 3 per cent.

Vigilance against risks

China should have higher levels of vigilance against risks from non-performing assets, debt defaults, shadow banking and internet finance, Li said.

It will steadily push forward with de-leveraging, mainly in the non-financial corporate sector, he said.

The finance ministry pledged in its work report released on Sunday to clamp down on local government debt risk.

China's debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 277 per cent at the end of 2016 from 254 per cent the previous year, with an increasing share of new credit being used to pay debt servicing costs, according to a recent UBS note.

Chinese banks doled out a record 12.65 trillion yuan ($1.83 trillion) of loans in 2016, and recent data shows that new yuan loans hit 2.03 trillion yuan in January, the second-highest ever.

The central bank said in a working paper published last month that the debt deleveraging process should be managed prudently to help avoid a liquidity crisis and asset bubbles.

"We will apply a full range of monetary policy instruments, maintain basic stability in liquidity, see that market interest rates remain at an appropriate level, and improve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy," Premier Li said.

China will also press on with asset securitisation and debt-to-equity swaps this year.

China will continue to implement a city-based policy to reduce real estate inventories, mainly in the third and fourth-tier cities, Li said.

Capacity cuts

China will push forward with reform of state-owned firms and assets this year, Li said.

Ownership reforms at more than 100 central government-run enterprises will be completed by the end of the year as part of efforts to use private capital to revive its lumbering state sector, state media reported last month.

China is also looking to shutter more 'zombie' enterprises, or firms with inefficient surplus capacity and saddled with debt.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) said in a work report released at the opening of the National People's Congress that it would shut or stop construction of coal-fired power plants with capacity of more than 50 million kilowatts.

China will also cut steel capacity by 50 million tonnes and coal output by more than 150 million tonnes this year, the economic planner said.

Fixed-asset investment is expected to rise about 9 per cent in 2017, down from last year's target of 10.5 per cent.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby GShankar » 06 Mar 2017 02:32

SSridhar wrote:
GShankar wrote:IMO, they need something from us(say Tawang). So, they continue to put pressure points on us by taking more and more stuff from us in order to bargain in such a way that they will not have to offer anything that is(was) originally theirs.

The Chinese want everything to do with, or having any remote connection with, Tibet to be exclusively under their control. This is their obsession because Tibet is declared as 'core interest' and no Chinese can say or do anything that is not in conformity with the 'core interest'. Violators are punishable by death at a minimum. This is very similar to the concept of blasphemy in Islam. Tawang has some connection with Tibetan Buddhism.


Agreed that China (probably) covets Tawang more than any other Indian territory they call "disputed". However with GoI members boldly visiting Arunachal Pradesh and inviting Dalai Lama there means either we are sending a (sterner?) message to China or we are preparing for something more concrete. Time will tell..

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 06 Mar 2017 14:05

Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunachal will “inevitably trigger confrontation”, warns Global Times - Atul Aneja, The Hindu

Indian MEA spokesperson must say, "We cannot allow issues that cannot be worked out for the moment to stop us from moving forward. The two countries have a great potential which should not be disturbed. As the two biggest emerging economies, they have vast common interests on establishing a new global financial order, tackling climate change and other major issues. Now China and India have come to a critical period to further upgrade bilateral ties. If the Chinese side takes care of India’s concerns, the Indian side will respond accordingly and address China’s concerns elsewhere. In this way, both countries can shake off the nagging chains left by colonialists and better work together to promote common development, achieve respective rejuvenation and herald the arrival of the Asian Century. India supports China and other countries over separatism. These issues are important, but bilateral cooperation are more important. The discussions about Tibet are going on. It takes time."

The Chinese might realize that these words were said earlier by China and India is simply parroting them now.

An op-ed in a leading Chinese daily, affiliated with the flagship People’s Daily, has warned India not to leverage the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan leader in exile in Dharamsala, as a bargaining chip to shape ties with China.

The daily cited India’s decision to host the Dalai Lama in Arunachal Pradesh, despite China’s objections to the visit expressed last week, as a step that “will inevitably trigger confrontation, undermine the stability of the region and sour Sino-Indian relations.”

Last week, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang had asserted that “The Indian side knows very well the seriousness of the Dalai issue and the sensitiveness of the boundary question.” He added that, “Under such circumstances, India’s invitation to the Dalai Lama to the disputed areas between China and India will bring severe damage to peace and stability of the border areas and China-India relations.”

The Global Times, quoting Indian media reports cited unnamed officials in India as saying that Dalai Lama was visiting Arunachal Pradesh - the state over which India and China have a border dispute - in his capacity as “Tibetan spiritual leader, ” and were surprised by Beijing's new-found "sensitivities" as the Dalai Lama has undertaken numerous such visits earlier.

In its response the daily said, “These Indian officials apparently didn't realise, or deliberately ignored, the severe consequences the Dalai Lama's trip would bring. The 14th Dalai Lama is by no means a spiritual leader but a Tibetan separatist.”

The write-up stressed that Indian policy towards the Dalai Lama was misguided. “For a long time, some Indians have considered the Dalai Lama as a strategic asset. They believe that India could gain many benefits by using the Dalai issue as leverage. For instance, making an issue of the Dalai Lama could serve as a diplomatic tool to deal with China's growing economic and political influence in South Asia.

However, they overestimate the political value of the Dalai Lama and his group while miscalculating China's determination to safeguard its core interests,” it observed.

The op-ed highlighted that an “increasing number of Western leaders have shut the door on the Dalai Lama in recent years after realising the Dalai card is ineffective.”

“In the wake of a string of countermeasures by China, Mongolia's government pledged to extend no more invitations to the Dalai Lama in late December. Against such a backdrop and at a time when a China-India strategic dialogue was just held to improve bilateral relations, the decision to receive the Dalai Lama in the disputed region is unwise. Leveraging the Dalai Lama issue to undermine Beijing's core interests risks dragging the two countries into a state of hostility.” it said.

The daily added that the two countries had a “great potential” for cooperation which should not be disrupted. “As the two biggest emerging economies, they have vast common interests on establishing a new global financial order, tackling climate change and other major issues. Now China and India have come to a critical period to further upgrade bilateral ties.”

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 07 Mar 2017 00:58

I welcome such a confrontation for we can set at rest all the MND issues once and for all.
Also PAD and AAD should be speeded up to nullify Dong Feng missiles from China.

Has added advantage of nullifying Pak M-9/11 and NoDong missiles.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 07 Mar 2017 03:49

US Sends Japan Advanced Military Planes Citing Threats From China, North Korea
http://www.ibtimes.com/worlds-next-war- ... th-2502848

The Air Force sent 14 Super Hercules military planes to western Tokyo Monday in a sign of loyalty to Japan amid growing tensions and threats of war in the Pacific with China and North Korea. Air Force officials called the C-130J planes its “meanest, toughest, most tactical machine,” Stars and Stripes reported.The planes were delivered in a ceremony at Yokota Air Base complete with a crowd of airmen, family members and Japanese guests. U.S. Forces Japan and 5th Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Jerry P. Martinez said during the event that the plane’s signaled Washington’s “ever, ever, ever strong commitment” to Japan.Today the United States of America delivered its premier, meanest, toughest, most tactical machine in the world, the J model,” he said. “When you look around the world at the threats that exist in this region, our friends in Japan, they need to know that the United States sends its best … we have the premier tactical airlifter now on Japanese soil.”Defense and global security leaders have closely been watching simmering conflicts in Asia, where North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons capabilities, and China has warily eyed the new administration of President Donald Trump, who has threatened to start a trade war with Beijing. China has been at the center of other conflicts, as well, such as building military bases in the disputed South China Sea claimed by various nations and sending warships to the East China Sea claimed by Japan. China has also questioned South Korea over its new anti-ballistic missile system. Seoul and Tokyo are both close allies of the U.S. Newer C-130J Super Hercules feature enhanced GPS capabilities and improved communication systems from contractor Lockheed Martin. The four-turboprop military airlifter is designed for special operations, such as defense and humanitarian applications, aerial refueling and close air support, UPI reported. The planes' new Rolls Royce engines is said to bring more power, fuel efficiency and range. The C-130Js can carry 128 passengers. Older models only were equipped for 92 passengers. The military aircraft are also considered a model of safety. Fewer than eight C-130Js have crashed to date.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 07 Mar 2017 09:51

Cross post from India-US thread.

Coming back to OROB and India not willing to be in it, it was expected that Indians would be out of it. China saw to that with they tried to put the string of pearls around us and further pushed into J&K. China does not want to be friends with any nation on equal footing. Be it Japan and Indian in Asia or the US. This idea of Han Supremacy and Middle Kingdom complex is not going to go anywhere. The Communist party is, in fact, going to play more and more on those ideas.

Rapid economic growth, Hardline nationalism, racial supremacy, Despotic rule and the need to egg the population on and on coupled with large armed forces and comparatively weak neighbours all there now. Can we think with all this where China may be going and what we need to do to stop then hurting us badly?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby GShankar » 07 Mar 2017 10:22

Yagnasri wrote:Cross post from India-US thread.

Coming back to OROB and India not willing to be in it, it was expected that Indians would be out of it. China saw to that with they tried to put the string of pearls around us and further pushed into J&K. China does not want to be friends with any nation on equal footing. Be it Japan and Indian in Asia or the US. This idea of Han Supremacy and Middle Kingdom complex is not going to go anywhere. The Communist party is, in fact, going to play more and more on those ideas.

Rapid economic growth, Hardline nationalism, racial supremacy, Despotic rule and the need to egg the population on and on coupled with large armed forces and comparatively weak neighbours all there now. Can we think with all this where China may be going and what we need to do to stop then hurting us badly?


Not so easy. If it were UPA3 (as widely expected at that time,) it is possible India may be part of obor, officially recognizing LAC, leaving siachen, etc. could have happened. May be I am going overboard but may be one has to fear the worst would have happened if UPA3 had occurred.

Somehow I believe India is preparing to step up to the plate. We are taking slow but steady steps to signal china that we mean business.

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Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Peregrine » 07 Mar 2017 17:51

Five reasons why China is so scared of India

NEW DELHI: Though India lags far behind China in several fields, the communist country is getting wary of India's gains in foreign direct investment (FDI), technology and manufacturing. India's closer military ties with the U.S. is another major concern of China. China has realised that India holds great potential and if it is able to tap it effectively, India could emerge as a major threat to China.

Below are a few reasons why China is scared of India:

Foreign direct investment

On Monday, President Xi Jinping vowed to open up China like never before. China faces dwindling foreign exchange reserves when India is aggressively pushing itself as a destination for foreign investment.

Premier Li Keqiang has announced that foreign firms would be treated the same as domestic firms when it comes to licences applications, standard setting, government procurement and would enjoy same preferential policies under Made in China 2025 initiative. China is scared it might lose FDI race to India.

In 2015, India was for the first time the leading country ($63 billion) in the world for FDI, overtaking China (USD 56.6 billion) and the US ($59.6 billion). This has set the alarm bells ringing in the Chinese establishment.

Manufacturing

China is also scared of India overtaking it in manufacturing in the long term as labour costs in China are rising. Global Times, a Chinese establishment newspaper, wrote recently in an article headlined 'China should pay more attention to India’s increasing manufacturing competitiveness': “Although India is still in its initial stage of developing export-oriented manufacturing industries, the country has great potential to emerge as a regional hub for labour-intensive industries. One recent analysis showed China’s manufacturing hourly wage in 2016 was roughly five times that in India.”

The trigger for the article was India’s exports to China increasing 42% in January this year. Though China has a big edge over India in bilateral trade, it wants to see if the rise in Indian exports is a flash in the pan or a trend.

Talent

US-based software firm CA Technologies disbanded its almost 300-person research and development team in China while setting up a team in India with some 2,000 scientific and technical professionals over the past few years.

This is one instance that signals India having a better pool of technological talent. The Chinese state media has agreed that India has better technological talent than China. Recently, Global Times wrote, "Over the past few years, China witnessed an unprecedented boom in tech jobs as the country became an attractive destination for foreign research and development centres. However, now some high-tech firms are turning their attention from China to India due to the latter's relatively low labour costs. Attracting high-tech talent from India could be one of China's options for maintaining its innovation ability." India, with a sufficient young talent pool, is becoming increasingly attractive, the Global Times said.

Technology

When India launched 104 satellites, breaking the Russian record of 37 satellites being placed in orbit at one go, the Chinese media made light of this achievement. But a few days later, it corrected its stand and said China could learn from India in space technology.

What India is doing in the space sector can be the envy of China. It is developing low-cost technology which finds takers in the west. India has already overtaken China in space technology, which is increasingly important due to its various civil and military applications. India’s low-cost and stunningly successful Mangalyaan mission last year had raised an alarm in China because China's own Mars misison had failed in 2009 and it has yet to launch another mission. China's worry goes beyond space sector. India's low-cost innovation in space technology can unlock its vast technological potential in other sectors too.

Indo-US military ties

Last year, India and the U.S. signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), a militray pact that facilitates the provision of logistical support, supplies and services between the US and Indian militaries on a reimbursable basis and provides a framework to govern them.

Though the Chinese media downplayed the deal, it has become a big bother for China. The deal means that the U.S. can now dominate not only the Indian Ocean but also has easy access to South China Sea as the U.S. warships can dock and get repaired at Indian ports. This will dent China's attempt to ring-fence India by dominating Indian Ocean.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 07 Mar 2017 19:51

US military remains dominant in Asia, but China is catching up - AP
China's announcement of a 7 per cent rise in military spending+ for the year came shortly after President Donald Trump called for a 10 per cent increase+ in America's defence budget, prompting renewed scrutiny of how the two countries' capabilities compare.

While the US military remains the dominant force in Asia and the world, China has been moving from quantity to quality+ and is catching up quickly in equipment, organization and capability, and is increasingly able to project power far from its shores. Rapid economic growth, lavish spending and a desire to regain China's historical role as East Asia's leading power are helping drive the moves.

Below is a comparison of the present state of the two militaries, based on figures found in recent US government research on China's capabilities and information from defence think tanks and government websites. Some figures are estimates or approximations.

The big picture

China's People's Liberation Army has a total of 2.3 million personnel under arms, constituting the world's largest standing military. It provides only partial information about its order of battle, the PLA's mission and future plans, although outside analysts have produced detailed estimates. US troop strength varies depending on need, but as of Jan. 31, there were 1.4 million active service members spread throughout the services.
Budgets

China announced this week that defence spending would rise by 7 percent this year to 1.044 trillion yuan ($151 billion). While China has the world's second-largest defence budget, it's just a fraction of what the US spends, even if analysts' estimates of hidden additional spending are taken into account. Trump's request for an additional $54 billion in spending would bring the US defence budget to a record $603 billion, and that's before including tens of billions of dollars for overseas military operations. If approved, the increase would mean the US was spending 3.4 percent of its gross domestic product on defence, up from 3.2 percent of GDP last year. China says its budget this year would equal 1.3 percent of GDP.

Ground forces

Owing to the PLA's origins as a guerrilla army and former tensions along its land border with Russia, the ground forces continue to dominate, with 1.6 million personnel and a weighty emphasis on armored vehicles (9,150) and heavy artillery (6,246). The US army boasts 460,000 personnel with another 182,000 in the Marines. It has a smaller emphasis on artillery (1,299) and armored vehicles (8,848), but places a greater emphasis on air support and special forces operations.

Air power

The US can boast more than 13,000 aircraft of all types to China's nearly 3,000. The gap is especially great in helicopters, where the US has more than 6,000 to China's 802. Despite having fewer aircraft, some of which are under the Chinese navy, China's air force has 398,000 personnel to 308,000 for the USAF. Both air forces are seeking to upgrade their aircraft, although the introduction of the fifth generation F-22 and F-35 jets puts the US several years ahead. China's stealth fighters remain in the prototype stage, although it has managed to replace more than half of its fighter fleet with fourth-generation aircraft.

Navy

China's navy has many more vessels (714 to 415), but the US has more where it counts in terms of power projection. The US has 10 aircraft carriers to China's one (although more are being built), 62 destroyers to China's 32, and 75 submarines to China's 68. The US Navy has 323,000 personnel to China's 235,000, reflecting the breadth and depth of a service that operates worldwide. China's navy has made strides in that direction since it established a permanent overseas presence by joining in multinational anti-piracy patrols off Somalia in 2008, and has begun exercising in the Western Pacific beyond the ``first island chain'' that blocks its access to open seas.

Missile command

The PLA has a completely separate branch, the Rocket Force, to operate its formidable arsenal of short-, medium- and long-range missiles, including those capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Estimates say China has a stockpile of approximately 260 nuclear warheads for delivery by nearly 150 land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic missiles as well as bombers. The US has an estimated 1,740 nuclear warheads deployed for delivery by the same means. China's development of the DF-21D ballistic missile that is thought capable of threatening aircraft carriers has garnered much attention, although it remains untested in a conflict.

Overseas presence

China hasn't fought a conflict outside its borders since it invaded Vietnam in 1979 and officially eschews overseas alliances. Nonetheless, the PLA has been expanding abroad, from garrisons atop man-made islands in the South China Sea, to UN peacekeeping operations, joint naval exercises with Russia in the Mediterranean and the construction of its first overseas base in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti. The US military, in comparison, currently operates in more than 100 countries, maintains a worldwide network of alliances and is engaged in major conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and, increasingly, Syria.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby GShankar » 08 Mar 2017 07:06

Question(s):
Any specific reasons why China is making noise about defense shield for Korea?

And do we have even a rudimentary shield, that could be offered to Vietnam and/or other Asean members?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 08 Mar 2017 17:35

GShankar wrote:Question(s):
Any specific reasons why China is making noise about defense shield for Korea?

Several reasons.

The US has been steadily building up the BMD shield for Japan and now SoKo. Two years back, it deployed X-Band radars in northern Japan’s Aomori Prefecture and later Kyoto. These radars cue into USN's Aegis ship-based missile systems as well as the land-based THAAD which are being setup in Japan & SoKo. The Obama regime also decided to deploy two more Aegis-equipped destroyers in Japan by c. 2017 bringing to seven the total number of such ships. Of course, the US & Japan claim that these shields are necessary against the NoKo threat, which is evidently true; but, they will be effective against any Chinese misadventures too. The Chinese feel hemmed in.

The Chinese are shown ineffective against such systems in spite of ordering their own S-400 shield from Russia.

The PLAN wants to dominate the East & South Indo-China Sea if not the Western Pacific. These systems sap their morale. They don't like the US asserting itself in what they consider as their backwaters as it minimizes their ability to threaten other nations in the region. NoKo is just its cat's paw against Japan, US & SoKo just as Pakistan is against India.

And do we have even a rudimentary shield, that could be offered to Vietnam and/or other Asean members?

Our system is still in the making, though we are making good progress. See the BMD thread.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 08 Mar 2017 18:10

China proposes ‘dual suspension’ formula to defuse Korean crisis - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
China on Wednesday proposed a "double suspension" formula to defuse the crisis in the Korean Peninsula as part of its new assertive approach to shoulder greater global responsibilities within the framework of the United Nations.

“As a first step, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) may suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S.-Republic of Korea (South Korea) military exercises,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a media conference the sidelines of the annual session of the National People's Congress.

This will help the parties to break out of the security dilemma and return to the negotiating table, he observed.

Mr. Wang added: “We may follow the dual-track approach of denuclearising the peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism on the other.”

Mr. Wang compared the missile tests of the North and the joint drills across the border in the South to “accelerating trains coming toward each other.”

“Holding nuclear weapons won't bring security, using military force won't be a way out,” Mr. Wang said, in a message to Pyongyang and Seoul. “There remains a chance of resuming talks, there is still hope for peace.”

Mr. Wang stressed that the North Korea and the United States were the main parties to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, but as a next-door neighbour with a lips-and-teeth relationship with the Peninsula, China’s role in the resolution of the issue was indispensable.

‘BRICS will widen the circle of friends’

In response to a question, Mr. Wang highlighted that the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping was set for deepening its engagement with the Global South under a BRICS-plus approach.

He stressed that under the stewardship of China, which will host the BRICS summit this year, the emerging-country bloc will explore establishing a dialogue partnership with other major developing countries. "We will widen the circle of friends of the BRICS and turn it into the most influential platform for south-south cooperation in the world," Mr. Wang observed.


At a time when the United States appeared to be looking inwards, the Chinese Foreign Minister affirmed that his country would champion inclusive globalisation, within the framework of the UN. He said that President President Xi Jinping’s January visit to international organisations had sent out a clear message that China strongly supported multilateralism, along with its abiding commitment to the UN-centered multilateral international system.

"In China's view, the current international system was built by our forefathers from the ashes of the Second World War. It is a result of our common effort and wisdom. It is like a well-designed building with multilateralism as its cornerstone and the UN and other international organisations as important pillars."

In his freewheeling annual press conference that lasted nearly two hours, Mr. Wang signaled Beijing’s support for a trilateral relationship among China, Russia and the United States. "We believe the three countries can develop healthy and positive relations so that jointly we can fulfill our responsibilities for world peace and development," he said.

Contrary to the view that a US-Russian rapprochement under the Trump administration may impact negatively on Beijing, the Chinese foreign minister pointed out that the China-Russia relationship has peaked to a “historical high”. He added that Beijing and Moscow had established a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” as part of a “strategic decision,” based on the fundamental interests of the two countries.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Agnimitra » 09 Mar 2017 11:40

Just like Maoists in India are well organized on university campuses, Chinese students on US university campuses are very well organized and take orders directly from their consulates.

Dalai Lama Causes Protests by Chinese Students Association at UCSD


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 09 Mar 2017 18:00

Asean-China Code of Conduct: Never-ending negotiations - Richard Javad Heydarian, Straits Times
The Philippines' chairmanship of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) comes at a critical moment for the regional body, which marks the 50th anniversary of its founding this year.

A toxic combination of maritime disputes, growing uncertainty over the direction of the new American government, and deep confusion over Manila's own foreign policy, however, has challenged Asean centrality like never before. In particular, the Philippines is currently under tremendous pressure to deliver a multilateral diplomatic breakthrough in the South China Sea disputes.

Eager to prevent a dangerous escalation in maritime disputes, Asean is determined to finalise the framework of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China before the end of the year. The COC is meant to be a binding agreement to ease tensions in the region.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi yesterday announced that a first draft of a COC has been finalised, lauding what he described as "clear (diplomatic)progress", which has left "China and Asean countries feeling satisfied". At stake is no less than Asean's internal coherence and peaceful management of one of the most dangerous flashpoints in Asia.

Despite that promising statement, the fact remains that so far, neither the Chinese Foreign Minister nor officials from Asean countries have given precise details on the elements of the draft COC, its legal basis, and how it will, once ratified by parties, be enforced and by whom. It is also not clear whether this is a draft on the guidelines of or the key elements of the COC per se.

This year, two sets of meetings, one in Bali in February and another one in the Philippines in June, have been scheduled to iron out the framework of a COC. It would take a herculean effort to finalise the negotiations within the year.

The road to a binding COC has been long and arduous.

As early as 1996, during the 29th Asean Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta, regional members called for a legally binding COC in the South China Sea, "which will lay the foundation for long-term stability in the area and foster understanding among claimant countries".

By 1999, Asean forwarded the proposal to China, which promised to take it into full consideration.

By 2002, China and Asean signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea, a declaratory prelude to a legally binding final agreement.

Among other things, the non-binding DOC discourages signatories from aggressive actions and bars construction of new structures in the contested region that could spark armed conflicts.

In 2011, under the chairmanship of Indonesia, there were hopes of a swift negotiation of the guidelines of a COC.

In September 2013, during a technical working group's meeting between Asean and China in Suzhou, hopes were once again raised
that by early 2014 there would be a breakthrough on the implementation of the DOC as a prelude to full negotiation of a COC.

Over the next three years, however, China rapidly expanded its strategic footprint across disputed land features in the Spratlys and Paracels and stepped up its deployment of military, coast guard and paramilitary patrols across disputed waters.

Yet, Asean repeatedly failed to call a spade a spade, even though such provocative unilateral actions directly contradict the spirit and letter of the DOC, which expressly encourages claimant states to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes" and "refrain from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner".

Twenty-one years since the idea of a COC came up and 15 years since the signing of the DOC, Asean is still in the middle of what some see as never-ending negotiations.

As the new chairman of Asean, the Philippines, a claimant country in the South China Sea, has promised to fast-track the negotiations of at least a framework of a COC before the end of the year.

Mr Wang's announcement of the finalisation of at least the first draft of the agreement is clearly welcome news.

Yet, the Philippines is internally divided on how to move forward.

On one hand, President Rodrigo Duterte has signalled his preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral, management of the disputes. He has consistently set aside the Philippines' arbitration award in regional forums, preferring instead to discuss terrorism and proliferation of illegal drugs in his chairman's statement later this year.

So he may welcome even a watered-down version of a COC, which doesn't cite the elements of the Philippines' arbitration case.

On the other hand, many in the Philippines, including within the Foreign Ministry and security establishment, are eager to see the arbitration award and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea serving as the legal basis for the negotiation of the COC framework.

But this will meet vehement opposition from certain China-aligned Asean members, particularly Cambodia.

Amid improved relations between the Philippines under President Duterte and China, the Chinese Foreign Minister noted that tensions in the South China Sea have "distinctly dropped" in recent months. This could create a favourable backdrop for negotiating a mutually acceptable set of binding rules to govern the disputes among China and Asean claimant states.

Given this is the 50th anniversary of Asean's founding, there are high expectations that a diplomatic breakthrough will materialise within the year. Otherwise, Asean risks falling into irrelevance in the evolving Asian security architecture.

•The writer is a political science professor at De La Salle University in the Philippines, and the author of Asia's New Battlefield: US, China, And The Struggle For The Western Pacific.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby TKiran » 09 Mar 2017 18:36

http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/707v3Y9 ... llies.html

Bramha Chellaney: @Chellaney:The growing rift with North Korea means that China is now left with just one ally, quasi-failed Pakistan

My take is that it's a flawed analysis., China is basically Han. It has allies all around its periphery. Tibet is an ally, Xinjiang is also an ally. I would call these two countries allies, as Han China has encapsulated these two peripheral countries and already colonized. Hong Kong is an ally, Macau is also an ally. Taiwan is getting bullied and it's going to be an ally sooner. Mangolia is an ally, whether the Mongols accept it or not. For a Han cored China it has allies all around. Han core is the middle Kingdom and they are ruling that core and it is not less than miracle to lift the Han masses out of poverty in just two decades.

If you don't consider these facts and analyze as if North Korea has been an ally and saying that now relationship is going south is not sound in my opinion. It's like saying, 'One person has died due to heart attack in India, heart attacks can become epidemic in India and all Indians are going to die one day due to heart attacks.'. That's wrong inference.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 09 Mar 2017 20:05

China wants 'BRICS plus' to include 'friendly' countries, plan might hurt India's interests - Saibal Dasgupta, ToI
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has come up with the idea of extending the remit of BRICS by inviting other developing countries under a new banner, BRICS Plus.

Addressing his annual press conference on Wednesday on the sidelines of the National People's Congress, the Chinese parliament, Wang said China would "explore modalities for BRICS-plus, to hold outreach dialogues with other major developing countries".

"We hope to establish extensive partnerships and widen our circle of friends to turn it into the most impactful platform for South-South cooperation," he said. China, which is the rotating president of BRICS this year, will host the next summit in September.

Analysts said China is trying to expand its influence by inviting its allies, and the move might result in the dilution of role played by India and other countries in BRICS. The club has five countries-Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

"India would be the worst affected among BRICS partners. After expansion, the organization would lose its focus and coherence on development issues and become more like a political platform for China," Mohan Malik, professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies at Honolulu in US, told TNN.

China may invite pro-Beijing countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Mexico to join, Malik said. China may be trying to turn BRICS into a China centric organization along the lines of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, he said.

"At the 2016 BRICS summit in Goa, Beijing was successful in thwarting India's attempts to isolate and condemn its ally Pakistan over cross-border terrorism," Malik pointed out. "The BRICS Plus concept would nip in the bud any future attempts at isolating China and its friends," he said.

The Chinese foreign minister said China's goal is to strengthen the BRICS partnership. It planned to introduce a system of stand-alone meeting of foreign ministers, hold sports and cultural events among BRICS countries.

"As President Xi put it, BRICS are like five fingers each with their own strength but when we come together we are a fist that can punch. When we stay united we won't lose lustre but will shine more brightly," he said.

The premier said that, "BRICS countries represent emerging economies," he said. "Over the years, their fortunes may have risen or fallen, and each faces challenges."

Analysts said China might find it difficult to obtain India's approval to the idea of BRICS Plus.

"India surely will not be interested in expansion at this time," Swaran Singh, professor at at the School of International Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University told TNN. "BRICS will be focussed on consolidating at this time," he said pointing to political instability in Brazil, economic slowdown in South Africa, and difficult relationship between India and China. Singh said India would avoid taking any decisive political positions because it is still analyzing the Donald Trump presidency in the U.S.

One of China's goals is to extend the One Belt One Road to countries like India which has been reluctant to participate enthusiastically. Beijing is holding a forum on the Silk Road program in May.

"With protectionism and unilateralism on the rise, the Belt and Road will find common cause where all countries roll up their sleeves and pitch in together. We will help rebalance globalisation," Wang said.


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 11 Mar 2017 08:06

This is surely not the way to 'Manage the Chinese Threat'.

Slow progress in roads along China border: CAG - Dinakar Peri, The Hindu
Image

For the Indian military, the disaster of 1962 did not end with the humiliation by China in the war. In a strategic blunder thereafter, the government decided not to develop its infrastructure along the China border. It took more than four decades for the decision to be reversed.

In 2007, the government decided to aggressively develop infrastructure along the border with China, in a late and desperate measure to catch up. A CAG report tabled in Parliament on Friday, however, has burst the myth about the ambitious catch up, painting a picture of targets not met and huge cost escalations.

Of the 61 India-China Border Roads scheduled to be completed by 2012, only 22 had been completed as late as March 2016 with massive cost overruns.

“All 61 India China Border Roads (ICBR) included in Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) programme were planned to be completed by 2012. However, only 15 roads had been completed by 2012. Out of the balance 46 roads, only 7 roads were completed by March 2016, extending the Planned Date of Completion (PDC) of balance roads up to the year 2021,” the CAG report said.


This means 22 roads or 36% had only been completed up to March 2016 despite incurring an expenditure of Rs. 4536 crore or 98% against the estimated cost of Rs. 4644 crore for 61 ICBRs, the report observed.

Shoddy job

Further, the CAG selected 24 roads for the audit of which only four roads had been completed by March 2012 and two roads between March 2012 and March 2016. The report also noted “numerous instances” of defective construction of roads.

In the aftermath of the brief but bloody border war with China in 1962, India had maintained a policy to not build border roads reasoning that they could be used by the Chinese forces to make quick inroads. However the policy was reversed by a high level China Study Group and the Government had identified the construction of 73 strategically important roads to improve connectivity.

Of these, the 61 roads having a length of 3409.27 km were entrusted to the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to be completed by 2012 and the balance 12 roads were entrusted to other agencies like Central Public Works Department, NBCC and State Public Works Departments among others.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 12 Mar 2017 09:03

When the Taiwanese Came Calling: Chinese Reaction and the Indian Response - Prashant Kumar Singh, IDSA
A Taiwanese delegation which included three parliamentarians among others visited India in February 2017. The visit elicited a sharp reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreign ministry. Its spokesperson Geng Shuang commented, ‘We hope that India would understand and respect China’s core concerns and stick to the “One-China” principle and prudently deal with Taiwan-related issues and maintain sound and steady development of India-China relations’.1 A Global Times commentary warned that ‘By challenging China over the Taiwan question, India is playing with fire’.2 It is hard to recall a previous occasion when the PRC reacted to an event related to India-Taiwan relations with reference to its One China policy. The visit was not in variation with the long-standing normal pattern of India-Taiwan relations. Moreover, Taiwanese legislative delegations visited the US and Malaysia around the same time. As the leader of the delegation Legislator Kuan Bi-ling suggested, Beijing’s criticism was directed only at the delegation which was visiting India.3 The strong Chinese reactions though can be attributed to the growing strategic uncertainty in Sino-US, Cross-Strait as well as the India-China relations.

Tibet and Taiwan: Different Attitudes towards India over ‘One-China’

Chinese exhortation or ‘warnings’ to India so far with respect to the One-China policy has been in the context of Tibet — latest examples being US Ambassador Richard Verma’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in October 2016, the Indian government’s approval in October 2016 for the Dalai Lama’s forthcoming visit to Arunachal Pradesh in March 2017 or his meeting with President Pranab Mukherjee in December 2016.4 In comparison, China has shown a relaxed attitude towards India-Taiwan ties since they established unofficial relations in 1995. The difference in response can be attributed to history and the manner in which China implements its One China policy.

The Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), popularly known as Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE), are based in Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh. India houses more than 100,000 Tibetan refugees. The Tibet issue also makes an interface with the India-China boundary dispute, with the Chinese claim over Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh being the case in point. The 14th Dalai Lama escaped to India after an unsuccessful rebellion against the Chinese in 1959. The situation in Tibet further deepened Chinese mistrust of India around the border dispute, over which the two countries fought a war in 1962.

In case of Taiwan, India has met the Chinese expectations of upholding the One China policy. China expects that the countries which recognize the PRC must not recognize the existence of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and must not have diplomatic relations with the government in Taipei. However, it does not object to their cultural and economic relations with Taiwan.

India has been steadfast in its support for the One-China policy since 1949 when it switched the diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, followed by India’s championing of the cause of the PRC’s international socialization in the 1950s.5 In 1950, India moved the resolution in the UN General Assembly for the PRC’s entry into the UN. {India sponsored 40 resolutions in UNGA for PRC’s admission in the period 1950-’58} India’s support to the One China policy has been oblivious to the setbacks the bilateral relations have suffered. Even India’s defeat at the hand of the Chinese in 1962 did not impact the support. Except for some private thinking, the opposition’s exhortations, and some furtive contacts leading nowhere, there is hardly any material available to suggest that India ever seriously contemplated looking at Taiwan from a balance of power perspective to counter-balance China in the wake of the 1962 War.

It is worth recalling that between 1949 and 1995 when the so-called unofficial ties were established, India and Taiwan did not have any institutional contacts. After 1995, India has conducted its relations with Taiwan with utmost caution and within the domain of the people-to-people relations, without ceding any signs of sovereignty or diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. India did not indulge in any maneuvers in the troubled waters of the Taiwan Strait for instance, a flashpoint between the US and China.

Strategic Uncertainty

President Donald Trump reiterated the US support for the One-China policy in his telephonic conversation with President Xi Jinping on February 8, 2017. This put to rest concerns that arose in the aftermath of Trump accepting greetings from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen over telephone and his questioning of the One China policy in an interview to Fox News in December 2016.6 While a clear picture of Sino-US relations under Trump will take some time to emerge, the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — which was a critical pillar of US rebalancing strategy, has caused uncertainty about the US commitment for Asia-Pacific security.7

This strategic uncertainty, combined with the disarray in US foreign and security policies being felt under Trump, cannot be reassuring for Taiwan. China has already unilaterally suspended the Cross-Strait talks in June 2016 and has taken steps to hurt Taiwan economically in order to make the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — a perceived ‘pro-independence’ party that rejects the PRC’s One-China framework for the talks, feel the heat of Beijing’s displeasure.8 The prevailing strategic situation should force the ruling DPP, which stands for diversification of Taiwan’s international relations and forging friendships with leading democracies of the world, to act with even a greater sense of urgency.

It should be noted that India has found a prominent place along with the US, Japan and Australia in the DPP’s vision for friendship among democracies.9 Tsai in her elections speeches during her two Presidential contests, first unsuccessfully in 2012 and then successfully in January 2016, has stressed India as the democracy with which Taiwan should have a robust friendship. In 2012, as a senior DPP leader, she visited India. India received a special mention along with the ASEAN region in the New Southbound Policy unveiled at her swearing-in speech in May 2016, though in later versions, it has been replaced by the word ‘South Asia’.10

India-China relations have also been witnessing similar strategic uncertainty in the recent past. Events which have fed this uncertainty include two military standoffs in India’s Ladakh region in April 2013 and then in September 2014; Chinese vetoes blocking India’s resolutions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to get Pakistan-based terrorists Masood Azhar, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Syed Salahuddin sanctioned; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir valley disregarding Indian sentiments and the Chinese objection to India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG).

India is also becoming expressive in raising its concerns with China. India identified China by name as a roadblock to its entry to the NSG, has pushed China on the issue of Chinese support for Pakistan on terrorism and the CPEC. It has further allowed the Dalai Lama to meet with President Mukherjee at the Rashtrapathi Bhavan. Although the Modi government’s ‘One-India’11 is not yet a fully developed and actionable policy, it can be gauged that the government is not inclined to go soft and turn a blind eye to Chinese actions which can potentially impinge upon India’s sovereignty. New Delhi appears to be sending a message to Beijing that its support for the One-China policy might no longer be unconditional.

Except for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s and a few political leaders’ public airing of views on the Formosa problem in the 1950s and 60s, India has been self-censored on Taiwan. This is in line with the international community, which has similarly become progressively self-censored on the Cross-Strait issue in deference to PRC’s One-China policy. It seems that the US and its Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 1979 has relieved the international community from any obligation towards the Cross-Strait issue. However, in a hypothetical scenario of the US withdrawal from the region, there may be stakeholder countries which might not like to over-look the existence of Taiwan and reinvent it as a rallying point to assert their positions in regional politics vis-à-vis China.

One major country that can play an important role in this context is Japan, which has got its share of serious political and security problems with China. These have aggravated since September 2012 when Japan nationalized the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (1997), the phrase ‘in situations in areas surrounding Japan’ was considered as a reference to Taiwan.12 Although the latest 2015 guidelines do not contain this phrase, Japan has subtly upgraded its representative office in Taiwan from January 2017 with a change in nomenclature — from the Interchange Association, Japan to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association.13

It is against this backdrop that India’s ‘Act East’ policy may have to confront the reality of the Taiwan-related developments. It would be relevant to recall that the DPP’s first government (2000-08) coincided with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (1998-2004). During that period, many strategic overtures from Taiwan to India were noticed. The idea of India-Taiwan-Japan strategic triangle, premised on shared security concerns vis-à-vis China, was floated by the DPP affiliated scholars and activists.

George Fernandes, Defence Minister in the NDA government who became famous for his ‘China is India’s Enemy No. 1’ statement after India’s nuclear tests in 1998 — visited Taipei in 2004 and 2006. He did not hold a ministerial portfolio then. However, that was also the time of rising hope in India-China relations, particularly after Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003. These hopes clashed with tensions and the dangerous dip in Cross-Strait normalcy when the Chen Shui-bian led DPP government (2000-08) was in power. The BJP, which is a trenchant critique of Nehruvian legacy including his China policy, and the DPP are again in power almost simultaneously. The hope and enthusiasm of the 2000s in India-China relations has currently given way to uncertainties, unintentionally placing India and Taiwan on the same page vis-à-vis China. The aforementioned fluid strategic situation and its potential implications for India-Taiwan ties therefore cannot go unnoticed in Beijing.
Reading the Visit

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson stated the following in response to the Chinese reaction:

‘We understand that a group of Taiwanese academics and business persons, including a couple of legislators, is visiting India. Such informal groups have visited India in the past as well for business, religious and tourist purposes. I understand that they do so to China as well. There is nothing new or unusual about such visits and political meanings should not be read into them’.
14

While the statement has essentially underlined the continuity and the people-to-people nature of the relations, India has reminded China that it cannot determine the scope of India-Taiwan people-to-people ties, which is not very different from China-Taiwan people-to-people exchanges. And the statement has been issued without reiteration of pledging support for the One-China policy which is in keeping with India not mentioning this routine pledge since 2010. The statement therefore is yet another sign of increasing firmness in India’s approach towards China.

Such delegation-level and individual visits have indeed taken place in the past. Although this delegation was publicized as one composed of parliamentarians, the fact is that it had a mixed composition. Ms. Kuan, in remarks to the media stated ‘Taiwan has been a de facto and fully independent country from the very beginning. Some countries may not recognise Taiwan’s independence, but that has no impact on our sovereignty and freedom’.15 Taiwanese dignitaries haven’t been generally reported making such straightforward remarks on their India visits. Also, China’s reaction has enhanced the delegation’s significance and made Taiwan a talking point in India, thus contributing to Taiwan’s foreign policy objectives.

It would be premature to argue with certainty whether the visit was planned to convey any larger message. Earlier too, the relations have seen some major events, which were speculated as some shift or a departure but eventually were proved as isolated events. India sending serving Indian Foreign Service officials as Director-General to its de facto embassy, the India-Taipei Association (ITA), beginning from 2003, the announcement of a joint study on India-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in 2011, President Ma Ying-jeou’s stop-over in Mumbai in 2012 and Vice President Den-yih’s layover in New Delhi in 2014 are pertinent examples.16 These events however had no strategic impact on ties.

In spite of aforementioned assertiveness of the MEA vis-à-vis China, the Modi government has sent mixed signals on Taiwan. It has embraced Taiwan in its Make-in-India programmes and has signed two important MOUs — Air Services Agreement (June 2016) and MoU for Agriculture and Allied Sector Cooperation (June 2016). India extended the e-visa facility to Taiwan in August 2015.17 An India-Taiwan Parliamentarian Friendship Forum was set up in December 2016.18 The setting up of the forum and the latest visit of the Taiwanese delegation contribute to keep the Indian political class alert about Taiwan, an important requirement for the growth of the relations that have been handled at the official levels.

However, at the same time, Indian parliamentarians have reportedly been stopped from going to attend Tsai Ing-wen’s swearing-in ceremony.19 In another instance, Taiwanese interlocutors maintain that India gave a green signal to Vice President Chen Chien-jen’s stopover in New Delhi on route to the Holy See quite late in time due to which the Taiwan government had to change his route. Incidentally, New Delhi is a natural stop-over for China Airlines flight from Taipei to Rome via New Delhi and there is a past precedent of Vice-President Den-yih’s layover in New Delhi in 2014.20

Charting an Independent Course Away from the Chinese Shadow

Indian approach towards Taiwan has always been shaped by the China factor; and India-Taiwan ties have all along sailed through under Chinese shadow. If Taiwan is a reality that India’s Act East policy might have to confront, China is a bigger reality that India has been facing for decades. India-China relations operate on a much larger strategic canvas which would be difficult to match for any shared strategic canvass that can be visualized for India-Taiwan relations.

China is a much bigger trade partner and investment opportunity. India has to resolve the 4,500 km long boundary dispute with it. China remains suspicious about Indian involvement in any unrest in Tibet. India has to deal with China in international forums ranging from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the NSG and the UNSC. In forums like the NSG or the UNSC, China is in the leading position and India is struggling to get membership. The disruptive value of China is huge for India either directly or, as many would argue, through Pakistan. It is not in India’s national interest therefore to offend China on the One-China policy.

Taiwan’s role in helping India achieve its strategic objectives needs to be dispassionately assessed. While it is to India’s credit that it has never played to the gallery on the Cross-Strait problem, its capability and acceptability constrains would not have allowed it to do so either. Good relations with China, and rightly so, will always be a priority for Taiwan regardless of the party in power There is little room for India to maneuver in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, there are points of view in Taiwan beyond the DPP too. Taiwan may like to ingratiate itself with India, but on its own terms and for the objectives defined by it. Any plans to offset the China factor with each other’s help would be unmerited. Therefore, misplaced enthusiasm needs to be shunned.

Finally, the best course for India-Taiwan relations is the course independent of China. The two sides do enjoy reciprocal importance for mutual development, growth, innovation and joint broadening of cultural and educational horizons. Taiwan is an island of innovation and opportunity and an alternative window to the Chinese society, whereas India remains an untapped market and the country where Taiwan can promote its international personality with relative ease. The best strategic message to China and the region India can give in the context of Taiwan is that it will conduct its people-to-people economic, cultural and scientific ties with Taiwan with confidence and dignity, which will hold true for India’s relations with others in the region too, in their own specific contexts. Thus, in the short- and the medium-term, injecting a dose of greater confidence in the bilateral relations should be India’s strategic objective towards Taiwan. India should not succumb to any undue Chinese pressure and must allow the high-level contacts to grow and develop further, which is logical between two trading partners whose annual trade is around $5 billion, with a potential for further growth. Clarity, firmness and sticking to the positive territory of the relations are what are required in India’s approach towards Taiwan.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 12 Mar 2017 15:45

Tibetan National Uprising Day - The Hindu
The Nilgiris Tibetan Welfare Association organised a march on Friday here to mark the 58th anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising Day.

The day commemorates the uprising of the Tibetan people against the hegemony of the People’s Republic of China in Tibet.
It is observed every year on March 10.

Before the commencement of the march, prayers were held for the 146 persons, who have immolated themselves in Chinese-occupied Tibet since February 27, 2009, in protest against the Chinese regime calling for the freedom of the Tibetan people.


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