Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[g.sarkar]

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/the- ... 170821.htm
The Ladakh Scouts, Indian Army's snow warriors
August 21, 2017 09:25 IST
President Ram Nath Kovind presents the President's Colours to the Ladakh Scouts Regimental Centre today, August 21.
These are normally presented to units that distinguish themselves consistently over decades.
The Ladakh Scouts became a regular army regiment only in June 2001 after its stunning performance in the Kargil conflict, notes Ajai Shukla.
The dramatic air landing of two Indian infantry battalions in Srinagar in October 1947, which drove back Pakistani tribal raiders from the outskirts of the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, is the stuff legends are made of.
As the Indian Army built up troops in Kashmir, the raiders were driven back, and Baramula, Uri and Tithwal liberated.
But a similar, less known, crisis occurred in May 1948, when the capture of Kargil by tribal Lashkars left the routes to Leh open.
Defending Ladakh against the tribal hordes were just 33 men of the J-K state forces. Reinforcing the tiny Leh garrison were 20 volunteers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Prithi Singh: The legendary 'X Force' that dragged itself heroically over the wind-swept Zoji La pass. But with the snows melting and passes opening, hundreds of Pakistani tribal fighters converged on Leh, driven by the promise of monasteries groaning with wealth, salacious dreams of unprotected women, and the belief that Ladakh's Buddhist men knew little of fighting. 'Cometh the hour, cometh the man,' it is said.
On May 13, 1948, as Lieutenant Colonel Prithi Singh raised the tricolour in Leh and called for volunteers to fight the invaders, the first hand to go up was that of Chewang Rinchen, a 17-year-old schoolboy from Nubra. For the next two months, until the first Indian Army troops were airlifted to Leh and built up into a viable force, Rinchen and a band of youngsters that he formed into the Nubra Guards confronted and thwarted the battle-hardened tribals. For his heroic defence of Ladakh and the leadership he displayed, Rinchen was appointed a junior commissioned officer in the Indian Army and awarded the Mahavir Chakra, the army's second highest gallantry award. Not content with being the youngest-ever winner of that award, Rinchen went on to win a Sena Medal in the 1962 war with China; and then a second Mahavir Chakra in 1971 for capturing over 800 square kilometres of territory from Pakistan, including the strategically vital village of Turtok. Eventually retiring as colonel, Rinchen is one of the army's greatest legends.
.....
The Ladakh Scouts, in contrast, became a regular army regiment only in June 2001 after its stunning performance in the Kargil conflict. No sooner than the Pakistani intrusions across the Line of Control were detected in May 1999, the Ladakh Scouts swung into action, reconnoitring routes, fixing ropes and enabling the initial successes of regular Indian battalions.
The Ladakh Scouts were also instrumental in exposing the role of regular Pakistani soldiers in the intrusions, which Islamabad was flatly denying. Embroiled in the fighting at Kargil, the Ladakh Scouts lost 31 men and were awarded 55 gallantry awards, more than any other army unit in per capita terms.
Major Sonam Wangchuk, who led his Ladakh Scouts men to the capture of Chorbat La, was awarded a Mahavir Chakra.
In recognition of their valour, the chief of army staff awarded the Ladakh Scouts the COAS Banner -- the only such award ever given. They were also conferred with a Battle Honour for Batalik and Theatre Honour for Kargil.
The army quickly saw the benefit of converting the Ladakh Scouts into a full-fledged infantry group, on the lines of the Gorkhas, Dogras, Sikhs and others.
......

Gautam

[rajpa]

Chinese bordello forces were carrying out "normal" patrols on the Chinese side.

"During this time they were obstructed by Indian forces and the Indian side took fierce actions, colliding with the Chinese personnel and having contact with their bodies." Kuch Kuch Hua told a daily news briefing.

She did seem like the sort that would never be satisfied. She wanted more.

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indi ... 30425.html

[Javee]

dlagon is $hitting its pants now, 2nd exercise in 2 months,

The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Western Theater Command has conducted military exercises amid tensions in Doklam from a standoff with trespassing Indian troops. The Western Theater Command covers Tibet, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, Sichuan and Chongqing.China Central Television reported on Friday that more than 10 PLA units, including aviation units and armored forces, participated in the drills. The five-minute-long video showed tanks firing at targets on hills, followed by helicopters firing missiles at ground targets.
In July, one of PLA's two plateau mountain brigades conducted live-fire drills in Tibet. The drills included the quick arrival of troops and different military units working together on joint attacks.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1062266.shtml

[fanne]

One of the thing that is obvious is (reading all the 1962 battles), the attacking force has the initiative and will win.

No

Winning in one area is not a victory. Conventional (and frequently quoted) military wisdom is that an attacking side needs 2:1 or even 3:1 numerical superiority to actually go in an control territory. Going in and coming out at one or more weak spots means nothing other than for psychological effect.

About a decade ago, when I pointed out the same thing - I was railed by Rahrah StarSpangledBannerites who told me that in Iraq the US never had numerical superiority of that sort. I am unable to find those people in 2017 to ask what happened.

Let me choose my words carefully. A attacking force (with required numerical strength, which is not high if the defending forces are spread thin to cover all areas) will make a breakthrough (if not victory) in spite of overall lesser number (but numerical superiority in the theater they are operating). I agree that in 1962 80% of the IA sat out of the war. 20% participated and only fewer % in certain areas were routed (though as a consequence we lost a very large area in Aksai Hind). Same things can be repeated again, we need some offensive formation to achieve some objective of our own.

[Hari Seldon]

Meanwhile, more quiet on the trade front...

Ganeshotsav body asks Mumbai mandals to stay away from Chinese products (IE)

[Lilo]

Hidden agenda behind China-India Himalayan showdown - Asian Times

It is now clear the military standoff is not really about Beijing building a road in an area disputed between China and Bhutan

By BERTIL LINTNER AUGUST 21, 2017 3:30 PM

As Chinese and Indian security forces square off on a remote plateau in the Himalaya mountains, it is has become clear over two months into the showdown that it’s not really about China building a road in an area disputed between China and Bhutan.

As always when China is involved in a confrontation near or across its frontiers — be it the border war with India in 1962, skirmishes with the Soviets along the Amur river in 1969, or military raids across Vietnam’s northern border in 1979 — there is a hidden political agenda.

In 1962, China wanted to assert its influence in the Third World where until then India had been a leading voice. In 1969, China had to show it would not hesitate to challenge their main enemy at that time, “the Soviet revisionists”, by military means. In 1979, China sought to “punish” Vietnam for intervening in Cambodia and ousting the pro-Beijing Khmer Rouge regime.

This time, China is attempting to drive a wedge between Bhutan and its traditional ally India, China’s main and traditional geopolitical rival. Most recently, China is frustrated with India’s reluctance to join its One Belt One Road infrastructure development initiative. Unresolved border issues are another bilateral problem, as is the long-time presence of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government in exile in India.

In June, Chinese construction workers protected by People’s Liberation Army soldiers moved into the Doklam plateau, an area which the Bhutanese claim as their territory and which the Chinese call Donglang and likewise claim as theirs. India does not claim Doklam, but supports Bhutan on the unresolved border issue.

Less than 50 kilometers from the stand-off area is the Bhutanese town of Haa, the center for the Indian Military Training Team, or IMTRAT, which is responsible for training the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA). Doklam is also located on the western flank of the Chumbi valley, the narrow salient between western Bhutan and the mountainous Indian state of Sikkim.

Any Chinese attempt to widen that corridor, giving its security forces more room to maneuver in a sensitive border area, would be perceived as a threat to India’s security.

India’s reaction to the roadworks may have been exactly what the Chinese wanted. It appears that India was left with no choice but to walk right into a diplomatic trap. The move has made India appear as the belligerent party and at the same time caused concern in Bhutan where India’s military presence is a politically sensitive issue.

There is currently a good all-weather road down the Chumbi valley. Nathula, the mountain pass where China meets the Indian state of Sikkim, is already a major post for cross-border trade with India and many Chinese goods are re-exported to Bhutan. However, direct imports from India account for 75% of Bhutan’s total trade, while 85% of its exports are sent to India.

There is some trade across the Bhutan border with China as well, with Bhutanese carrying medicinal herbs on yak or horseback to China and returning with electronics and other manufactures. But the volume of that trade is small and the road China intends to build does not appear to be for expanding trade — especially since Bhutan and China, despite more than twenty rounds of talks, have not yet demarcated their shared border.

In recent years China had begun courting Bhutan, the only neighboring country with which Beijing does not yet have diplomatic relations. That courtship, some analysts suggest, could reset the prevailing India-dominated balance of power in the Himalayas.

Throughout modern history, Bhutan has depended heavily on India. The tiny Himalayan kingdom is tied to Delhi through treaties signed with the British colonial power in 1910 and independent India in 1949 and 2007.

The first two treaties gave Bhutan a high degree of internal autonomy but its foreign relations were still guided by India, in effect making it an Indian protectorate. The 2007 treaty granted Bhutan more independence over its foreign affairs.

India not only trains the Royal Bhutan Army, but also pays the salaries of its troops. And the Border Road Organization, an outfit affiliated with the Indian Army, has built roads all over Bhutan. For India’s security planners, Bhutan is of utmost strategic importance as it lies south of the crest of the Himalayas, or the northern line of defense against China.

China’s claim to territories south of that defense line was the pretext for a massive Chinese attack in 1962, where Chinese troops invaded large areas in the eastern Himalayas and then withdrew after inflicting a crushing defeat on Indian army units in the area.

Despite its long-time dependence on India, Bhutan has in recent decades gained more independence. It became a member of the United Nations in 1971 and its 2007 treaty with India — a revised version of that signed in 1949 — states only that the two countries “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interests of the other.”

In a bid to counter India’s influence in Bhutan, China has deployed its usual “soft diplomacy.” Chinese circus artists, acrobats and footballers have recently traveled to Bhutan, and a limited number of Bhutanese students have received scholarships to study in China.

Tourism has expanded as well. Nineteen Chinese tourists visited Bhutan a decade ago; now it is more than 9,000 a year, or 19% of its annual total arrivals. Chinese travelers have become a major source of income for the small kingdom of less than a million people.

Last August, Bhutan and China representatives met for yet another round of border talks. According to a statement issued by the Chinese foreign ministry after the talks: “Although Bhutan and China have not established diplomatic relations yet, it will not hold back the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

The Bhutanese side is willing to continue deepening exchanges in such fields as tourism, religion, culture and agriculture and further lift the cooperation level with China.”

The current conflict has thus placed Bhutan on the horns of a complicated dilemma. On June 29, the Bhutanese foreign ministry stated publicly that “[China’s] construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between the two countries.”

A month later, Bhutan’s ambassador to India, Vetsop Namgyel, attended a function at China’s New Delhi embassy to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. His top-level attendance was significant considering China and Bhutan do not yet share diplomatic relations.

On August 2, the Chinese foreign ministry issued a new statement saying that “the China-Bhutan boundary issue is one between China and Bhutan. It has nothing to do with India” and “India has no right to make territorial demands on Bhutan’s behalf.” India, the Chinese foreign ministry went on to say, has not only “violated China’s sovereignty” but also “challenged Bhutan’s sovereignty and independence.”

China has suggested in principle that it would give up its other territorial claims in northern Bhutan if Thimphu agrees to give up its claim to the Doklam plateau — a proposal that India would see as detrimental to its national interests and a violation of the 2007 treaty it holds with Bhutan.

At the same time, Bhutan is eager to lessen its dependence on India and show the world that it is a truly independent nation. The Doklam dispute has therefore led to mixed reactions in Bhutan. The Bhutanese don’t want the Chinese so close to home, but India’s overt intervention could be viewed as reverting to the status of an Indian protectorate.

That view could influence local electoral politics. P. Stobdan, a well-known Indian security analyst, argued in a July 11 article for the Indian website The Wire that, “the next election in Bhutan in October 2018 will be fought on pro- versus anti-Indian slogans.”

That would no doubt be music to China’s ears — and if so Beijing would have achieved exactly what it envisaged when it started constructing an obscure road to nowhere in Doklam

Yesterday I posted a screenshot of Chinese 50center commentators precisely acting on this aim to drive a wedge b/w Bhutan-India .

viewtopic.php?p=2201281#p2201281

[anupmisra]

Hidden agenda behind China-India Himalayan showdown - Asian Times

It is now clear the military standoff is not really about Beijing building a road in an area disputed between China and Bhutan

By BERTIL LINTNER AUGUST 21, 2017 3:30 PM

Ignore this sell out. This is a paid for article by the author who also works for the South China Morning Post.

[UlanBatori]

and having contact with their bodies."

Such a cute way of referring to it.

BTW, Checking every possible ingress point is not a sign that India is only "thinking defensive". You make the cost of intrusion very high - so that the Strike Corps has plenty of freedom to drive along the 100deg. E. Longitude and connect with Mongolia. Any conflict should end with liberation of Uttar Dharmasala and E. Turkestan. I seriously believe that if they move a ton of conscripts into the Himalayas, they leave themselves wide open in UD and ET. Once a few roads/railroads/airfields are rendered kaput, that region is indefensible.

But... all that really requires a good solid exchange of goodies in the ICS and I-P ocean theater that sucks in most of the PLAF and several Corps. Ultimately the price that the stupid Commies will pay for not making friends with India is that the liberation of occupied UD and ET will remain on India's agenda until the opportunity presents itself.

[Gyan]

We are talking big while handing over whole of our manufactering sector to China. China uses its industry while we screw ours.

[shiv]

Let me choose my words carefully. A attacking force (with required numerical strength, which is not high if the defending forces are spread thin to cover all areas) will make a breakthrough (if not victory) in spite of overall lesser number (but numerical superiority in the theater they are operating). I agree that in 1962 80% of the IA sat out of the war. 20% participated and only fewer % in certain areas were routed (though as a consequence we lost a very large area in Aksai Hind). Same things can be repeated again, we need some offensive formation to achieve some objective of our own.

Two separate things here. Assuming 1.2 million man army and 4500 km border we can make the absurd calculation of 3.5 men per kilometer standing in a thin single man line all along the border. Each man will be separated from the next man by 300 meters. Obviously this is not how things will work

There will be some border places that are impassable, others that are passable with difficulty and still others allow easy ingress. The latter two will need watching with small forces while the majority sit in the rear. Depending on where an enemy force build up occurs (or where an attack occurs if Intel inputs do not detect the force build up) the forces in the rear will rush in reinforcements. In some areas the attacking force will manage to push in, so there must be a "plan B" in every area to fall back and hold good defensive positions in the rear areas. This, for example, could have been done in Tawang in 1962 if idiot leadership had not allowed the slaughter of all the men opposite Thagla ridge across Namka Chu river when everyone knew that they should have pulled back and made stronger defence positions in the rear

The objective of taking enemy territory in exchange for our losses in some areas must always be on the cards. That is what happened in 1965. That is what Pakis wanted to do in the west in 1971.

Aksai Chin in 1962 was, sorry to say, not "territory lost by India". Although the territory was ours as a line on map we never controlled it because - as Bandit Nehru insisted - "not a blade of grass grows there" which is bullshit. The Chinese started building the S 219 by 1951 and it was complete by 1958. Intel inputs about this were known but nothing was done. Yes we did lose some territory - we were pushed back to where we are now - controlling only the western 1/3rd of Pangong. But we were not doing anything and the Chinese knew damn well that we were not doing anything.

[shiv]

We are talking big while handing over whole of our manufactering sector to China. China uses its industry while we screw ours.

Indian Express is merrily pushing Gionee phones on twitter.

[sanjaykumar]

This is tiresome. The Chinaman needs to either sh!t or get off the potty.

[nam]

Let me choose my words carefully. A attacking force (with required numerical strength, which is not high if the defending forces are spread thin to cover all areas) will make a breakthrough (if not victory) in spite of overall lesser number (but numerical superiority in the theater they are operating). I agree that in 1962 80% of the IA sat out of the war. 20% participated and only fewer % in certain areas were routed (though as a consequence we lost a very large area in Aksai Hind). Same things can be repeated again, we need some offensive formation to achieve some objective of our own.

In 1962 there was no preparation to fight. Nor we had the capability to monitor Chinese mobilisation. Even then Chinese actually failed. No wining army captured it's claimed areas and runs back with a excuse of "just wanted to teach a lesson".

If the had continued the war, their forces would have been decimated in the Himalayan foothill. Their LoC had collapsed and they would been short of ammo, facing off bulk of Indian forces.

With no one to protect Tibet, what would have happened if India had decided to chase PLA in to Tibet?

[anupmisra]

Stop me if you have heard this narrative before.

'Extremely dissatisfied' China blames India for border scuffle

China laid the blame at India's door on Monday for an altercation along their border in the western Himalayas involving soldiers from both of the Asian giants.

Last week, a source in New Delhi, who had been briefed on the military situation on the border, said soldiers foiled a bid by a group of Chinese troops to enter Indian territory in Ladakh, near Pangong lake.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that last Tuesday, Chinese border forces were carrying out "normal" patrols on the Chinese side of the actual line of control in the Pangong lake are.

"During this time they were obstructed by Indian border forces and the Indian side took fierce actions, colliding with the Chinese personnel and having contact with their bodies , injuring the Chinese border personnel," Hua told a daily news briefing.

"China is extremely dissatisfied with this" and had lodged solemn representations, Hua said.

One thing is clear. Yeh Kya Hua Chun Mun just confirmed that the "untrained" chini conscripts were "injured". Chinis are miffed. Threat number 1021 soon to be issued.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chin ... SKCN1B103J

[shiv]

"Extremely dissatisfied" is a distinct watering down of rhetoric

[NRao]

Forget barking, this is not even a growl.

Time for India to reload.

[atamjeetsingh]

This is from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- ... 543647.htm

BEIJING, Aug. 21 (Xinhua) -- Some Chinese troops suffered injuries from Indian troops' fierce action in the western part of the border area, the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed Monday.
This came after a video showing border troops from the two countries pushing and throwing stones at one another near Pangong Lake.
Last Tuesday, Indian border troops obstructed Chinese border troops, who were carrying out normal patrols on the Chinese side of the actual line of control in the Pangong lake area, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said at a daily briefing.
Hua noted some Chinese were injured after the Indian side "took fierce actions, collided with the Chinese and physically fought with them."
The Indian troops' actions went against the two countries' consensus to keep peace on the border and endangered the situation in the western part of the China-India border, she said.
Hua stressed China is extremely dissatisfied and had lodged solemn representations.
China has urged India to conform to relevant agreements and restrict its border troops' activities to maintain peace and stability in the border area.

Note the word fierce action by Indian troops.

[schinnas]

This word is used to paint India as aggressor. For some reason, China has been consistent in its theme to paint India as aggressor, even at the cost of any loss of face that would mean to its audience who are concerned about China's middle kingdom and supelpowel image. This indicates that China will use this as excuse for any of its actions inimical to India in the future... including and not limited to any armed aggression on the border.

[Y I Patel]

Let me choose my words carefully. A attacking force (with required numerical strength, which is not high if the defending forces are spread thin to cover all areas) will make a breakthrough (if not victory) in spite of overall lesser number (but numerical superiority in the theater they are operating). I agree that in 1962 80% of the IA sat out of the war. 20% participated and only fewer % in certain areas were routed (though as a consequence we lost a very large area in Aksai Hind). Same things can be repeated again, we need some offensive formation to achieve some objective of our own.

Two separate things here. Assuming 1.2 million man army and 4500 km border we can make the absurd calculation of 3.5 men per kilometer standing in a thin single man line all along the border. Each man will be separated from the next man by 300 meters. Obviously this is not how things will work

There will be some border places that are impassable, others that are passable with difficulty and still others allow easy ingress. The latter two will need watching with small forces while the majority sit in the rear. Depending on where an enemy force build up occurs (or where an attack occurs if Intel inputs do not detect the force build up) the forces in the rear will rush in reinforcements. In some areas the attacking force will manage to push in, so there must be a "plan B" in every area to fall back and hold good defensive positions in the rear areas. This, for example, could have been done in Tawang in 1962 if idiot leadership had not allowed the slaughter of all the men opposite Thagla ridge across Namka Chu river when everyone knew that they should have pulled back and made stronger defence positions in the rear

The objective of taking enemy territory in exchange for our losses in some areas must always be on the cards. That is what happened in 1965. That is what Pakis wanted to do in the west in 1971.

Aksai Chin in 1962 was, sorry to say, not "territory lost by India". Although the territory was ours as a line on map we never controlled it because - as Bandit Nehru insisted - "not a blade of grass grows there" which is bullshit. The Chinese started building the S 219 by 1951 and it was complete by 1958. Intel inputs about this were known but nothing was done. Yes we did lose some territory - we were pushed back to where we are now - controlling only the western 1/3rd of Pangong. But we were not doing anything and the Chinese knew damn well that we were not doing anything.

Nehru's malign choices are at the very root of how modern India views China, and the subconscious id that has hijacked interactions between the two civilizations. Shiv mentions how the Chinese started building S219 by about 1951 - keep that in mind, as we review Nehru's decisions on China and Tibet between 1950 and 1955 or so, in the following synopsis of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet.

China invaded Tibet in 1950 through two major prongs: one from the Southeast, from Yunan into Amdo led by Zhang Guohua (who later commanded PLA in 1962 against India), one from the NorthWest from Xijiang and led by Fan Ming. So India knew from then onwards how important the northwest access into Tibet was. At the time of invasion, India had inherited all of British India's treaty obligations and privileges in Tibet including trading posts, embassy, control over communications, even a small military presence. All of them were explicitly up for negotiation, and even if the plan was to give all of it away, Nehru did so without asking for anything in return. In fact, until the Aksai Chin highway was built, Tibet and PLA were fed and provisioned thorough, hold your breath, the port of Calcutta. Add to this were other major levers: recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Chinas replacing Taiwan in UN Security Council, and India's role as an intermediary in the Korean war where JLN played a major role as China's advocate. While indulging in all of this giving, Nehru tried to play too clever by half in settling real border disputes, by assuming China's implied assent to India's claims when all of the agreements and Panchsheel were being signed with so much fanfare. The Chinese were probably incredulous at his naivete, but played along with some vague wording on the time not being ripe to settle border issues. The hell it wasn't - why would they want to negotiate when all they had to do was to wait for India to fritter away all of its leverage on this issue?

Later, post 1954, by which all the unilateral gifting away was done, they started revealing their true stance. Not to recount all the negotiations in their sordid detail, but by this time Nehru was getting hammered in the parliament for his stupidity and so he started taking a hardline stance. An important component of this was settling on the Ardagh-Johnson line which was the maximalist claim, and which, at the time of staking the claim Nehru already knew what Chinese were up to in Aksai Chin. So he set India up to dispute a line with China that was of vital strategic importance to China (and got even more so later when their Amdo line of access got tenuous due to the Khampa rebellion). And this was done with, frankly speaking, no thought to the defensibility of the border. Shiv has done a superlative job of educating us on the geography of that region, so consider: to defend the AJ line, India would have LCs traversing some of the most forbidding and inaccessible virgin territory on earth. A simple and revealing example of this is what happened to the CRPF patrol that was set to Kongka Pass. The patrol was barely equipped to feed itself, had no military backup, was exposed, was unnecessarily provocative. So the inevitable happened - the Chinese sprang an ambush. Some in the Indian Army did raise objections at such a militarily indefensible stance, but the same generals badly undercut their sound professional judgement by being pompous know it alls who prioritized their prestige and privilege over their professional judgement. But let me not digress. The point is, that through a series of amazingly incompetent choices, not unlike what Jinping is indulging in right now and not just with India, Nehru tied India's honor and its good relations with China on an untenable political and military strategy.

The truth is, from a military defensibility point of view, the current chain of positions held by India along China's 1960 claim line are just fine. And we have all of Arunachal Pradesh that the Chinese were willing to cede right past 1962, and practically said so in so many words. The fact that the problem was not solved pragmatically and allowed to fester into such a political dispute is what has so poisoned India-China relations in all these decades. It is also why so many knowledgable and thoughtful Indian still cling emotionally to Aksai Chin as being a part of India. The truth is, it never was except in the fevered colonial imagination of some British empire builder. It should never have become the poison pill for India-China relations, and if there is such deep seated suspicion of the Chinese in Indian minds, this is the root of it all. For sure, the Chinese have done a lot to hurt India since then, but nothing worse that what other friends of India such as US have done. And absent Nehru's malign legacy, none of what followed need have happened.

But that is then, this is now. The reality is that Jinping and the Chinese have now become arrogant pricks who have none of the capability of their genocidal but battle hardened predecessors. In responding to them, India actually stands to benefit by learning from how the Chinese dealt with an incompetent and arrogant Indian leadership (both political and military). The first lesson is, when your enemy is digging himself into such a hole, lend him a shovel. Don't give the Chinese an easy out by rising to their baiting. Second, be prepared to make them pay for their stupidity. The Indians of 1962 operated under some bizarre political assumption that the Chinese would not retaliate militarily. The Chinese are making similar moronic assumptions about India, and the burden is on Indian political leadership to devise the right politico-military strategy to counter the Chinese. And most importantly, do not fixate on territory. This might appear to be a great opportunity to grab some land, but think really long term. India and China have lived with the reality of each other for millennia, and will continue to do so. Grab something now, and be prepared to defend it in perpetuity. Put a friking bulls eye on the poor Indian soldiers who will have to defend that territory when a resurgent China, one that has learned its hard lessons, prepares to avenge its honor.

What will that territory gain India? Bragging rights for maybe a couple of decades? If India seeks to do real harm to the current Chinese regime, without making this a source of future enmity between two abiding civilizations, the best course of retaliation would be to undermine the legitimacy of this regime. What can India do that will serve this set of contradictory short and long term purposes? The soft spot of China right now is it's ageing demographic, the most precious resource their diminishing young people. The occupying Han in Tibet and elsewhere are also their source of political power and legitimacy. So India should do all it can to destroy that weakness, which is also their source of power.

Doing so can also be brilliant military strategy. India should be with China as Shivaji was with Aurangzeb. Indian Army should treat PLA barracks as if they are terrorist camps - hit the ones within, say, 50 km of the LAC with surgical raids when the balloon goes up. Keep doing this for a couple of days, and it will totally disrupt all Chinese plans and investments in modern warfare. Do not make this about technology or firepower. Make this everything about a raider's ruthlessness. Make this about hurting the regime rather than insulting a civilization. Show them to be incompetent pricks, but do not sully the face of Chinese civilization. India and China can be friends. Mao's China, IMHO, tried to do that in dealing with Nehru's India. It's time for Modi's India to return the favor to Jinping's China.

[Singha]

Er umm you missed a minor detail in the soothing fairytale

Cheen invaded and grabbed tibet on false pretexts . We need to rescind any acceptance of that .

Your 100 yr dhoti shiver plan sounds unreal to me. Damage them for next 20 years unless you want a bigger monster on the door

Your civilizational buddy buddy plan is nothing more than a poorly repkged panchsheel

[schinnas]

+1. India never shared border with China but only Tibet. While Nehru was fooling by all means, he wasn't the aggressor despite ordering his ill equipped army to throw out Chinese occupiers.

China has been the aggressor from 1950s and with every passing year their inimical actions against India have only increased. They even went to the extent of nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan and sheltering anti India terrorists, thereby causing irreparable damage to our security concerns. They continue to do everything in their power to block India's growth from counterfeit currency to blocking NSG membership to UNSC membership. Not to forget their support for NE militants and maoists.

Screw any Hindi chini Bhai Bhai, until they reverse all these inimical actions.

[Mort Walker]

Let me choose my words carefully. A attacking force (with required numerical strength, which is not high if the defending forces are spread thin to cover all areas) will make a breakthrough (if not victory) in spite of overall lesser number (but numerical superiority in the theater they are operating). I agree that in 1962 80% of the IA sat out of the war. 20% participated and only fewer % in certain areas were routed (though as a consequence we lost a very large area in Aksai Hind). Same things can be repeated again, we need some offensive formation to achieve some objective of our own.

In 1962 there was no preparation to fight. Nor we had the capability to monitor Chinese mobilisation. Even then Chinese actually failed. No wining army captured it's claimed areas and runs back with a excuse of "just wanted to teach a lesson".

If the had continued the war, their forces would have been decimated in the Himalayan foothill. Their LoC had collapsed and they would been short of ammo, facing off bulk of Indian forces.

With no one to protect Tibet, what would have happened if India had decided to chase PLA in to Tibet?

Chinese action was coordinated with Soviet movements in Cuba. Look at the dates and you will see a correlation. Mao and Chou En Lai coordinated with Khrushchev. They knew full well China could not sustain a prolonged fight with India.

[Mort Walker]

I would suspect more aggressive Chinese posture once things with North Korea settle down. The US and SK are doing some exercises and once that ends, the Chinese can give full attention in the south.

[Y I Patel]

Er umm you missed a minor detail in the soothing fairytale

Cheen invaded and grabbed tibet on false pretexts . We need to rescind any acceptance of that .

Your 100 yr dhoti shiver plan sounds unreal to me. Damage them for next 20 years unless you want a bigger monster on the door

Your civilizational buddy buddy plan is nothing more than a poorly repkged panchsheel

A statement like this can only come from total ignorance of the actual historical issues. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was formalized in 1951 under a 17-point autonomy plan recognized by none other that the current Dalai Lama, and essentially held till the late 1950s. An armed conflict to recover Tibet in the face of a political position (Chinese sovereignty) that Tibetans had recognized and continue to recognize would be politically and militarily insane. That said, if a conflict with India were to destabilize the current regime and the Tibetans themselves choose a new political reality, then...

The point to understand is that while recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was inevitable, using the recognition along with the other real leverage India had to extract much greater concessions from the Chinese was not. At that point in time, China was busy making concessions to several other neighbors like Myanmaar and Nepal and settling along MacMahon line. It was Nehru's stupidity that prevented a compromise from happening.

[Lisa]

Stop me if you have heard this narrative before.

'Extremely dissatisfied' China blames India for border scuffle

One thing is clear. Yeh Kya Hua Chun Mun just confirmed that the "untrained" chini conscripts were "injured". Chinis are miffed. Threat number 1021 soon to be issued.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chin ... SKCN1B103J

The above article is lies. lies, lies. Nothing actually happened,

http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Ffn9XM ... an-tr.html

See.....

[UlanBatori]

I keep thinking, China's military and economic advance is all tied to building roads. Who built the roads in 1951 in Uttar Dharmasala? Slave labor!!

[anupmisra]

In the BRF thread titled "PRC Political News & Discussions", on 05 Apr 2006, Johann had provided a link to a circa 2000 analysis (Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present & Future) by Rand Organization which predicted this in-your-face-chini behavior in the years 2015-2020.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1121.html

From chapter six of the report, Conclusions, here is a summary of the rport which seems to have predicted the current chini behavior.

At the very least, therefore, growing Chinese power would at some point in the future likely result in a search for “hegemony” understood as a quest for universal acceptance of its increased power, status, and influence as a legitimate right. Toward that end, if history is a reasonably accurate guide, an assertive China could reasonably be expected to augment its military capabilities in a manner commensurate with its increased power; develop a sphere of influence by acquiring new allies and underwriting the protection of others; acquire new or reclaim old territory for their resources or for symbolic reasons by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or bystanders who resist such claims; prepare to redress past wrongs it believes it may have suffered; attempt to rewrite the prevailing international “rules of the game” to reflect its own interests; and, in the most extreme policy choice imaginable, even ready itself to thwart preventive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes. Although it is unlikely that the last choice would be attractive in the nuclear age and might be made less likely if China were to become a democracy, the fact remains that any combination of these policies, though natural from the perspective of a powerful state, would stir the suspicion of its rivals and precipitate an action-reaction spiral that reinforces the temptation to embark on assertive stratagems even more strongly.

[Mort Walker]

Er umm you missed a minor detail in the soothing fairytale

Cheen invaded and grabbed tibet on false pretexts . We need to rescind any acceptance of that .

Your 100 yr dhoti shiver plan sounds unreal to me. Damage them for next 20 years unless you want a bigger monster on the door

Your civilizational buddy buddy plan is nothing more than a poorly repkged panchsheel

A statement like this can only come from total ignorance of the actual historical issues. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was formalized in 1951 under a 17-point autonomy plan recognized by none other that the current Dalai Lama, and essentially held till the late 1950s. An armed conflict to recover Tibet in the face of a political position (Chinese sovereignty) that Tibetans had recognized and continue to recognize would be politically and militarily insane. That said, if a conflict with India were to destabilize the current regime and the Tibetans themselves choose a new political reality, then...

The point to understand is that while recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was inevitable, using the recognition along with the other real leverage India had to extract much greater concessions from the Chinese was not. At that point in time, China was busy making concessions to several other neighbors like Myanmaar and Nepal and settling along MacMahon line. It was Nehru's stupidity that prevented a compromise from happening.

JLN's failings are not the issue here. The Chinese operated under the Soviet model of bait and switch. Where Tibet was offered sovreignity under the Chinese umbrella, but then the Hans came in and took over.

[Manish_Sharma]

1.
It should never have become the poison pill for India-China relations, and if there is such deep seated suspicion of the Chinese in Indian minds, this is the root of it all.

For sure, the Chinese have done a lot to hurt India since then, but nothing worse that what other friends of India such as US have done. And absent Nehru's malign legacy, none of what followed need have happened.

2.
This might appear to be a great opportunity to grab some land, but think really long term. India and China have lived with the reality of each other for millennia, and will continue to do so. Grab something now, and be prepared to defend it in perpetuity. Put a friking bulls eye on the poor Indian soldiers who will have to defend that territory when a resurgent China, one that has learned its hard lessons, prepares to avenge its honor.

What will that territory gain India? Bragging rights for maybe a couple of decades?

You are wrong on both these points:

1.
You need to read Shri SSridhar's post on how CCP is following Tian Xia in continuing with their 2000 year old thought that they're born to rule the world.

While Taiwan isn't ruled by CCP, they also have official line that Arunachal Pradesh belongs to china.

2.
No it isn't just bragging rights, but ruling the lands which will secure fresh water for our nation in many millenniums.Imagine we control the udgam sthal of Bramhaputra River.

When you sneeringly use terms like"bragging rights" you show yourself to be do aligned with Nehru's"not a blade of grass grows there.

Nope you are wrong, so wrong.

[nam]

Chinese action was coordinated with Soviet movements in Cuba. Look at the dates and you will see a correlation. Mao and Chou En Lai coordinated with Khrushchev. They knew full well China could not sustain a prolonged fight with India.

Sure that is from Chinese point of view. Why where they sure that India will not continue the fight?

What was stopping Nehru from continuing the fight and taking East Ladakh? If India soldiers did not have winter clothing, China was in much worse position.

Soviet China relation had already deteriorated by 62. Kurshev directly blamed Mao for the 62 conflict.

If Chinese had the will to come to a godforsaken place "where no blade of grass grows", so far their Han homeland, we could not take a place which is so near to us.

[nam]

A statement like this can only come from total ignorance of the actual historical issues. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was formalized in 1951 under a 17-point autonomy plan recognized by none other that the current Dalai Lama, and essentially held till the late 1950s. An armed conflict to recover Tibet in the face of a political position (Chinese sovereignty) that Tibetans had recognized and continue to recognize would be politically and militarily insane. That said, if a conflict with India were to destabilize the current regime and the Tibetans themselves choose a new political reality, then...

This is a genuine question. Did Tibet ever consider Indian sovereignty? Why would Buddisht ever agree to a godless Communist takeover?

[Y I Patel]

Sure, the Chinese have acted dishonestly in their dealings with Tibet. Sure, they use tried and tested strategems that go by fancy names but basically amount to getting the most for the home team while expending the least effort. And Nehru enabled them to do all that to perfection without gaining anything in return. It is not about his feelings - it is about him wasting all of India's strong points in a negotiation without demanding anything in return. And, eventually, leaving a poisoned legacy that India still struggles to overcome.

Regarding Aksai Chin, please consult Shiv's excellent analyses and the recorded opinion of India's generals in the 50s regarding the advisability of defending the line claimed by Nehru on India's behalf. If Nehru had not made it such a point of honor, a pragmatic deal could have been struck - even after 1962. Now it is far enough in the past for us to get over it, and regaining control over that claimed land will not amount to recognition either by China or the international community at large. All it will do is create another point for future conflict, and it will burden India's military with the responsibility to defend terrain that offers no additional military or economic advantage. It is easy to sound patriotic and defend points of honor, but terribly unfair to ask the Indian military to expend precious lives and resources over this.

In any case, I have made my points. This is a very emotional issue, especially at a time like this when the Chinese are working really hard to remove any vestige of sympathy, goodwill or respect for them. So I will rest my case, but please feel free to continue if any of you so desire.

Nam - no Tibet never ever considered Indian sovereignty. Dalai Lama issued statements DURING the tensions leading up to the 1962 conflict questioning India's claims on Tawang.

[UlanBatori]

It would have made no difference if Nehru had said that Aksai Hind was Paradise. He did not have the armed forces or economy, and most of all, he did not have the LEADERSHIP of the armed forces to do diddly about it. I know that on BRF it is heresy to suggest that India's military leaders are anything but Shivajis etc, but the truth is dismal. I think the leadership in 1971 was brilliant; from all I have read the PM gave the generals and Marshals and Admirals full freedom to plan in 1971, while she exhausted all diplomatic options, going all over the world and delivering speeches wherever she was allowed to do so. In 1965 it was also excellent, with whatever resources were available, but again, the nation was saved by the Havildars with the anti-tank weapons, and the tank drivers.

But in 1962 it was dismal. Using the Air Force was a no-brainer, and a good military leadership would have threatened mutiny if the political leadership did not show spine. Nothing that I have read suggests that ANY of the generals was worth the price of the uniform they were given.

In 1999 leadership was very so-so; it was the Majors and lower ranks that won that war by utterly superhuman and often at the cost of their lives. This is why that war has been so quickly suppressed from the national psyche: there was no General or Field Marshal to idolize. They had allowed the himalayan border to be unguarded, not even good boots or winter clothing available, let alone shells for the mountain guns. Any good leadership in 1999 would have said to the "nuclear threat", sent General Vij to have tea in RYK,taken over POK and pulverized Karachi (and Gwadar while we were about it). Broken the framework of the PA and liberated Balochistan. Instead they sat with their thumbs up their musharrafs until the rank-and-file soldiers took back the peaks one by one in bitter hand-to-hand battle.

In 2002 the Hamlets in Dilli very nearly destroyed India's credibility. At the very least there should have been a serious jhapad in POK.

I HOPE that in 2017-18 it is again brilliant.

[khan]

Now that the Chinese have escalated to this level, beating the living tar out of Chinese patrols that cross over the LoC might be a good SoP going forward.

[nam]

All it will do is create another point for future conflict, and it will burden India's military with the responsibility to defend terrain that offers no additional military or economic advantage. It is easy to sound patriotic and defend points of honor, but terribly unfair to ask the Indian military to expend precious lives and resources over this.

That sounds logical, however we have to consider that the largest losses face by Indian forces was in WW2 NOT fighting for India. There might be arguments how we did not have a choice yada yada. However the question would apply can we expect IA to shed lives for an Indian objective the way they did in WW2?

The answer is yes. Will IA do it. The answer is yes as well. Ofcourse we don't want to unnecessary make enemies, however defending our line is about deterrent.

The Chinese have 4 brigades in Tibet. We have 12 divisions. Chinese get away with 4 brigades because it had created a long term "dhoti shivering" as a result of 62. They have managed to create a conventional deterrent. The Pakis get away with killing Indian civilians because thee is a failure in conventional deterrent.

It is important to have a public facade of conventional deterrent. And this requires loss of men and material.

[nam]

But in 1962 it was dismal. Using the Air Force was a no-brainer, and a good military leadership would have threatened mutiny if the political leadership did not show spine. Nothing that I have read suggests that ANY of the generals was worth the price of the uniform they were given.

There might have been issues within Leadership in 62, however we need to consider this was a army with WW2 & 47 war experience. 47-48 was mountain warfare. The guys who fought on the ground would have come to second/third rung of leadership by 62.

These were the ones who fought 65. They created the army of 71.

[samirdiw]

Whats preventing us from striking first and grabbing land up to Brahmaputra(Yarlung Tsangpo) and the Indus origin rivers? Is it political decision only or current capability limitations also?

Isn't far easier to defend across the river and flatter land than the steep slopes on our side?

We can always say that China's recent decision to not provide water flow in Brahmaptura that caused the recent floods/landslides even after agreement a few years ago meant we had no option etc.

[UlanBatori]

The guys who fought on the ground (in 48) would have come to second/third rung of leadership by 62.

One might have expected that, but the accounts suggest that the big posts (above B-G) were held by political appointee lotus-eaters. There was no time then to bring up field-proven junior officers through whatever training generals are supposed to get (serious War School/strategy school).
One hint: read the accounts carefully. I have never been able to get the sense that the writers had the slightest appreciation of the ground realities of fighting in the Himalayas.

And NONE of these guys had the slightest clue about the nature of the Chinese PLA. The great Generals (Rommel, Patton, Yamamoto, Sharon, and probably the Iranian/Syrians of today, plus our Arjun Singh, Maneckshaw, Jacob, Singh and their gang) were brilliant, ardent students, who read volumes and did serious thinking about getting inside the minds of the enemy. NO evidence of anything like that in the Indian accounts of 1962 - it was like they were attacked by Martians.

I have a feeling that in many cases if India had offered a hot meal and asylum, half the PLA of that time might have defected.

The accounts from the actual warfighters are written in precise report prose, that's understandable (even those on PeeArr, not the "Eff") They were not hired to be great writers. But until I watched the YouTube interviews (stinker dupatta interviewing survivors of Rezang La for instance) I had never seen people really talk about the conditions. I had HEARD about them from actual veterans in Malloostan (the Kerala Police bravely heading up their with their 0.303s and bare feet....)
The generals (such as Kaul, whose infamous book I remember my Dad reading back in the 1970s and gritting his teeth saying "What an incompetent and pompous bumbling fool - he's blaming everyone else!" ) come across as Dilliwala lotus-eaters.
You saw the difference after Hurricanne Katrina - the Chief of FEMA the political appointee horse thief - went in with his retinue and spent all their resources BOOKING A RESTAURANT in Baton Rouge for The Chief!! THAT is exactly the type of "leaders" that India has had, unfortunately, and sorry to say.
When things got really bad they brought in the bad-ass commander of the 101st Airborne to run things. What a difference! I imagine that would have been what it was to be led by, say, our General Ray (RIP) who actually FOUGHT in the Himalayas.

I think there were some B-Gs who did fight - at least one was taken prisoner in 1962 with his men. Brave men, I have nothing but reverence for them.

[ldev]

del

[Mort Walker]

Chinese action was coordinated with Soviet movements in Cuba. Look at the dates and you will see a correlation. Mao and Chou En Lai coordinated with Khrushchev. They knew full well China could not sustain a prolonged fight with India.

Sure that is from Chinese point of view. Why where they sure that India will not continue the fight?

What was stopping Nehru from continuing the fight and taking East Ladakh? If India soldiers did not have winter clothing, China was in much worse position.

Soviet China relation had already deteriorated by 62. Kurshev directly blamed Mao for the 62 conflict.

If Chinese had the will to come to a godforsaken place "where no blade of grass grows", so far their Han homeland, we could not take a place which is so near to us.

JLN was not a strategic thinker. Remember this is the same fellow that advocated China get UN Security Council seat first and did not allow Nepal raja to merge with the Indian union against Patel's advice.

Soviet-China relations deteriorated from 1964 onwards when China went nuclear. The USSR wanted China as a vassal state and the Chinese wanted the USSR to provide full H-bomb technology.

Khrushchev blamed Mao AFTER the conflict and not during the conflict. The PLA and Soviet Red Army collaboration all the way to the respective politburos was intact through the end of 1962.