Here is an extract of an article which says the latest U.N. Security Council resolution merely caps the crude oil imports at current level.
The Resolution does restrict the supply of refined oil and gas products to North Korea. However it seems that these are not being supplied to North Korea in any great quantity anyway since in accordance with its Juche policy North Korea does not import gas condensates in any significant quantity and itself refines most of the oil it imports. Moreover the complex wording of paragraph 14 makes it clear that North Korea can continue to import refined petroleum products for use by its civilian economy and that the export of refined petroleum products to North Korea is not entirely prohibited.
These provisions – of which US ambassador Nikki Haley made a great deal in her speech to the UN Security Council – are not intended to cause North Korea further economic damage. Rather they appear to be primarily intended to prevent North Korea from circumventing the cap imposed on its crude oil imports by increasing its import of refined oil and gas imports in their place. In addition there seems to be a secondary motive of limiting the import by North Korea of certain refined oil products (diesel oil in particular) which are used by its military.
As for the elaborate procedure outlined in Resolution 2375 for inspecting ships trading with North Korea, the reality – as everyone knows – is that the US navy has been stopping and searching North Korean ships and other ships trading with North Korea on the high seas for some time.
This is of course an entirely illegal practice, but the US has never shown any hesitation in acting in this way when it thinks it can.
Resolution 2375 not only implicitly forbids this practice by setting out a procedure which instead should be followed but by setting out such an elaborate procedure for inspecting ships trading with North Korea essentially precludes the US from stopping and searching Chinese ships, which are of course the main carriers of traded goods between North Korea and China.
Resolution 2375 also imposes a ban on North Korean textile exports. This is the major concession in the Resolution to the US, which has seized on North Korea’s textile exports as North Korea’s major foreign currency earner since prohibition of its coal exports earlier this year.
The key point about this provision is however that this is both a relatively minor trade (its annual value is put at around $700 million) whilst enforcement on its prohibition is all but impossible given the difficulty of tracing the origin of textile goods and the ease with which such goods move across the border between North Korea and China.
The underlying truth is that North Korea’s annual trade turnover in 2016 is calculated to have been no more than $3 billion. Even on the most pessimistic assessment of the size of the North Korean economy that figure is remarkably low, and points to the limited importance of foreign trade to North Korea. It is likely that the only product which North Korea needs to import in order to sustain its economy at its existing level is crude oil.
The true meaning of Resolution 2375 is that it shows that China is determined to continue supplying North Korea with crude oil at existing levels, and that it is not prepared to change its stance on this.
Chinese thinking on this issue has been set out clearly in a Global Times editorial published directly following the vote in the UN Security Council on Resolution 2375http://theduran.com/north-korea-crisis- ... uff-again/