China's Global Strategy-I

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ramana
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by ramana »

Long back Mao did think expanding Chinese population should look at sparsely populated Australia.
However idea went kaput when they realized only the coast are green and the center is very arid.
Vips
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Vips »

View: $3 trillion can't buy China out of virus trouble.

Asia’s emerging-market currencies are sliding as the coronavirus outbreak threatens to slow the region’s economy and drives outflows into the dollar. Investors may consider the region’s copious foreign-exchange reserves to be a buffer against severe economic dislocation, capital flight and currency fluctuations. That would be a mistake. Asia’s reserves have expanded vastly since the 1997-98 financial crisis to reach more than $5 trillion, 40% of the global total. Often cited as a strength, they may prove of limited value in any future crisis.

First, reserves aren’t profits. In addition to net export payments, they include foreign investment. The asset (reserve investments) is offset by a liability (the amount owed to foreign investors) . China is the world’s biggest holder of reserves, with $3.1 trillion as of the end of January. While that looks substantial in dollar terms, it considers only one side of the coin. Since 2009, growth in China’s foreign-exchange assets has tracked
accumulated investment liabilities. Based on International Monetary Fund criteria used to calculate the minimum required level of reserves, China needs around $3 trillion — roughly what it has now. The IMF calculations factor in short-term foreign-denominated debt, portfolio liabilities, broad money supply and the cover necessary for trade payments. Similar vulnerabilities exist in Indonesia, India and South Africa, because foreign-currency, especially short-term, borrowing is high.

Some analysts have suggested that China could use its reserves to recapitalize the banking system, which is sure to be hit by the economic shutdown that authorities have imposed in an effort to slow the spread of the virus. Assuming a level of bad debts comparable to that of the late 1990s, the losses and recapitalization requirements would absorb around half or more of China’s total reserves. That would leave the country’s foreign-exchange chest below the IMF minimum.

In addition, reserves can be volatile. Intervention to support a currency can reduce holdings rapidly, as the recent experience of Turkey and Argentina shows. It is difficult to estimate unexpected outflows from disinvestment, unwinding of carry trades, exchange-traded fund redemptions or contingent payments such as collateral calls or derivative settlements. For example, potential claims on Chinese reserves from its Belt and Road Initiative and other international obligations are poorly understood.

Reserve investments are also difficult to realize. Most are in government bonds and other high-quality securities denominated in socalled G3 currencies — the U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese yen. The size of the holdings means that governments couldn’t sell them without a collapse in the price of assets such as U.S. Treasuries and the dollar. That would inflict large losses on Asian investors.

Granted, many central banks have expanded the type of assets they buy. China has redirected its reserves into real investments in advanced economies and strategic projects such as belt and road. However, these aren’t liquid and are risky. China faces challenges in obtaining repayment of loans to developing countries. Such investments are also exposed to potential interference by the host country, especially during geopolitical or trade conflicts.

A further drawback of using reserves is that managing their currency and domestic liquidity effects is cumbersome. Repatriating realized
reserves will force the domestic currency to appreciate, decreasing the nation’s international competitiveness. It will also reduce the value of foreign investments when measured in a country’s home currency. Large-scale accumulation and spending of reserves affects money supply. While central banks can manage this through sterilization operations, conflicts between reserve management and monetary policy objectives will create economic and financial instability.

Finally, the economic model underlying the reserves creates a complex financial interdependence between Asian central banks and advanced economies, termed the “fatal embrace” by the late Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve. Foreign-exchange reserves represent advances allowing the importing country to buy the exporter’s goods and services on credit. Withdrawing support would risk destroying the value of existing investments and damaging the borrowers’ real economy and export demand.

The interdependence runs deeper. Since 2009, the growth of developing-country reserves is highly correlated to the growth of the balance sheets of advanced-economy central banks, which has been driven by quantitative easing. Attracted by higher returns than available at home, investors moved capital into emerging markets, which in turn supported demand and economic activity in developed economies. This is evident in the increased reliance of many North American, European and Japanese businesses on emerging economies for growth and earnings.

Unfortunately, this cheap capital encouraged rapid rises in debt and increased the risk of future financial instability in many emerging countries. The solution lies in international co-operation to create a new international monetary system and for surplus countries to boost domestic demand.

In a world of rising political tensions, trade wars and adherence to debt and export driven economic models, the prospects for that may appear bleak. Still, this is unfinished business the world will have to return to — once it has got past the economic shock of the coronavirus epidemic.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Vips »

At all costs, bar Chinese 5G entry into Indian telecom. Else, live under Beijing’s domination.

India’s strategic digital pushback against Chinese investments and apps has encouraged like-minded countries like the US, and some in Europe, to follow suit. Now it’s time to lasso the biggest Chinese domination tool – 5G, the umbrella under which apps, investments and soon governments could operate.

This new technology from China should not be looked at in isolation, as simply the purchase of telecom technology equipment, and part of India-China trade. It should be viewed in conjunction with China’s four heavens: BRI, the ambitious Digital Silk Route plan, Made in China 2025 and Chinese Standards 2035. Using its formidable AI base, 5G is the mother lode that enables the efficient gathering of global data from around the world, which will give cost efficiency to products listed in China 2025 and help China set global standards.

What’s now perceived by global manufacturers as standards “in China for China” will eventually be “by China for the world”. Visualise a four-tier cake – the bottom tier is BRI, the top tier is Chinese Standards 2035 and in between are the Digital Silk Route and Made in China 2025. 5G is the enabler for all, the infrastructural trunk or cake stand on which the cake sits.

Each global 5G network sale from China is one additional leg added to the cake stand, supporting and strengthening the multi-tier cake. Without strong legs supporting the cake stand, the four-tier cake will fall to the floor. The repercussions will be twofold: Externally for China’s global economic dominance and loss of bargaining power, while internally it could lead to internal strife and discontent, degrading the social contract of “the better life” for ordinary Chinese.

For a strategic, societal and demographic wave of change is under way in China. The country’s robust economic growth has meant rising wages and loss of the title China has held for so long, “the factory of the world”, over which the sun has begun to set. Deglobalisation – Covid-19 is the unexpected eclipse during the sunset – has seen China’s growth sink to an estimated 1% in 2020, the lowest in decades.

In return for continued authoritarian rule, the Chinese public wants better standards of living. This social contract is currently intact, but threatened. Premier Li Keqiang said at a press briefing last month, “There are 600 million impoverished Chinese who live on a monthly income of $161 and they need to be lifted out of poverty.” Higher wages plus an ageing demographic are putting a strain on China’s healthcare systems and budget.

The strongest leg of the cake-stand which holds the four-tier cake has already been weakened with the US and Japan looking at non-Chinese network equipment suppliers for 5G. European countries like the UK have announced they are relooking at the 5G contracts with Chinese equipment vendors given security vulnerabilities. Vietnam has developed its own version of 5G. The General Court, the second highest court in the EU, overturned the EC’s 2016 decision to block the takeover of O2 by a competitor, paving the way for consolidation of industries across the Union.

In the US, the China-US trade war and now a potential Chinese 5G boycott may change the fortune of debt-laden US telecom companies, which may get spectrum reserved for the defence sector to become competitive and avoid Chinese 5G installations.

In this scenario, China will do everything in its capacity to bring India to the table for 5G negotiations – via direct and indirect border skirmishes, drone attacks on oil installations on the west coast of India, cyberattacks, non-tariff barriers, misuse of Chinese social media apps, cutting off supplies of API. China will aggressively sue all Indian telecoms for reneging on contracts for current 4G upgradation and future 5G contracts if any, assuming jurisdiction clauses in these contracts are outside in a neutral country. A bailout package to pay the hefty fines, if imposed on Indian telecoms for reneging on contracts, will have to be funded by the government.

An already beleaguered Indian telecom sector will have to brace for more economic pain as equipment from non-Chinese companies is more expensive. But it can be incentivised by subsidies and tax breaks for patent development in India, enabling it to move from the current hardware-dependent networks to ones that will be software-centric with negligible dependency on the underlying hardware.

Imports from EU 5G equipment manufacturers will be the only option left on the table. The silver lining here is the long pending India-EU FTA will get oxygenated. It’s important for India to play an active role in the formation of the proposed D10 club by the UK administration, which consists of the G7 nations alongside South Korea and Australia. The D10 club is being created for channelling investments into existing telecom companies within the 10 member states, and creating alternative suppliers of 5G equipment and other technologies to avoid relying on China.

Could India eventually contribute to the birth cry of democracy and rule of law in China? What the WTO couldn’t achieve, the potential boycott of Chinese 5G equipment from a majority of G20 countries could well accomplish, if the deprived 600 million of China take to the streets. In that case, it’s Advantage India.
KLNMurthy
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by KLNMurthy »

China will punish Britain for defying its will. We need allies to hold the line

What is the inglistani equivalent of dhoti-shivering?
pankajs
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by pankajs »

KLNMurthy wrote:China will punish Britain for defying its will. We need allies to hold the line

What is the inglistani equivalent of dhoti-shivering?
How then should we understand Liu’s offer of friendship to the UK? We should recognise it for what it is. He has offered friendship as long as the UK embraces terms laid down by Beijing, reminiscent of China’s treatment of the UK’s initiative to establish diplomatic relations in the 1950s. It means that we must allow Huawei to build up to 35% of our 5G infrastructure and we are not allowed to change our mind. However, there will be no level playing field between companies, institutions and individuals operating in each other’s territory. While China insists Huawei be allowed to build our critical infrastructure, no British company will be permitted to do anything comparable in China.

Likewise, we shall continue to host Confucius Institutes on British university campuses, under the supervision of China’s propaganda department, while accepting that British universities with branches in China will not be allowed to teach constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, or even free and independent journalism.

It also means that we must ignore British law, under which the UK has an obligation to the people of Hong Kong under the Sino-British joint declaration – an international treaty registered at the United Nations and valid until 2047 – simply because Beijing has decided it is a historical relic.

It would be wrong for the UK to forsake positive engagement with China. We have never treated the People’s Republic as an enemy and should not do so now. Nor should we abandon our basic values as we engage with China. No amount of trade and investment can justify abandonment of our commitment to the rights and dignity of the individual, the rule of law and democratic principles.

The reality remains that upholding our values will result in the UK being punished by China, whose foreign policy aims to make the world safe for authoritarianism – a world in which the Communist party’s hold on power in China cannot be challenged. To face this reality, we must work with our democratic allies to form a united front. Chinese threats to inflict economic pain on an individual democracy become hollow if we all hold the same line and do not allow Beijing to divide and rule.
Chinese model for peace, equality and friendship!
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

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Chinese fixer targets FIVE Prime Ministers: New evidence of Beijing's infiltration of British Establishment as it emerges leading figure 'tasked with grooming foreign elites' met politicians including Boris Johnson, David Cameron and Tony Blair
  • Zhirong Hu has also met former Prime Ministers Theresa May and Gordon Brown
  • He leads the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
  • Academics say its mission is to groom top ‘business, political and media leaders'
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... hment.html
Mr Hu is a director of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which is reportedly controlled by the country’s Communist Party. Academics say its mission is to groom ‘business, political and media leaders in countries around the world’.

The claims are backed by a new book, Hidden Hand. It alleges that China is recruiting ‘useful idiots’ to push the country’s agenda in the West.

Mr Hu, who sits in China’s upper parliamentary house, has also been pictured giving a thumbs-up while posing shoulder to shoulder with Donald Trump in 2018. Eight years earlier he was seen shaking hands in Shanghai with former US president George W Bush.

The revelations about how Beijing has infiltrated the British elite come as the National Security Council is poised to ban China’s Huawei from involvement in the UK’s 5G network tomorrow.

Mr Hu is variously described as a ‘director’ and ‘national director’ of the CPAFFC, which is linked to the Communist Party’s ‘United Front’.

It was described in a dossier compiled with the help of a former MI6 spy as being ‘set up to pursue a United Front strategy ... in order to promote a Party agenda abroad’. The 86-page report, entitled China’s Elite Capture and leaked to this newspaper last week, made a string of incendiary claims that Beijing was trying to manipulate key figures in the UK.

Hidden Hand, written by Australian academic Clive Hamilton, a global authority on China, said of the CPAFFC: ‘Just as in the United Kingdom no community organisation can use the word “royal” in its title without official permission, in China, no community group would include the words “people” or “friendship” in its title without Party approval.

'Friendship has a very distinct meaning, a cynical and opportunistic one. It does not refer to an intimate personal bond, but to a strategic relationship on behalf of the party.’

Such is Mr Hu’s standing in China that shortly after a parade in Tiananmen Square last October to celebrate 70 years of Communist Party rule, he posed for a photograph alongside Chairman Mao’s grandson Mao Xinyu. In 2013, he was pictured with President Xi Jinping.

Political sources in China suggest that Mr Hu’s access to Establishment figures in the West is ‘unprecedented’.

Contacted for comment last night, Mr Johnson, Mrs May and Mr Blair said they did not know Mr Hu and were merely posing for photographs at large events. A source close to Mr Brown indicated the former prime minister had no knowledge of Mr Hu. Mr Cameron declined to comment.

Mr Hu, who also uses the anglicised alias ‘Jacky’, is behind the Kai Xin Rong Group, which invested 500 million euros in broadband in Greece shortly after the country’s prime minister visited Beijing. He claims to donate a third of his personal wealth to charitable causes.

He has also attended functions of the mysterious 48 Group Club in Britain at least twice, accompanied by Lady Xuelin Bates, wife of Conservative peer Lord Bates. Lady Bates was photographed giving a thumbs-up to camera alongside Mr Hu and Mr Johnson at a convention last year.

The 48 Group Club is in the spotlight after Hidden Hand claimed the political networking club was being used to further Beijing’s agenda by making connections with senior politicians.

The revelations came as Labour peer Lord Mandelson, also linked to the 48 Group Club, yesterday appeared to toe the Beijing line and accused the UK government of being at ‘sixes and sevens’ on China.

He said Britain needed to decide whether it was going to ‘jump on the anti-China bandwagon because that’s the current sort of fashion to do’ or to reconsider trade talks.
Vivasvat
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Vivasvat »

Vivasvat wrote:Chinese fixer targets FIVE Prime Ministers: New evidence of Beijing's infiltration of British Establishment as it emerges leading figure 'tasked with grooming foreign elites' met politicians including Boris Johnson, David Cameron and Tony Blair
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... hment.html
Jobs in City firms for children of party leaders. The country's critics banned from Lord Mayor's show. Part two of our devastating expose of China's creeping influence shows just how the 'red aristocracy' has snaked its way into the heart of Britain's financial powerhouses

Top communist party leaders in China are known as the ‘red aristocracy’, and, for all their professed belief in equality, they like to ensure a gold-plated future for their children. Hence the so-called ‘princelings’, who are placed in high-flying financial businesses in the West.

For Western hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds and banks, a prerequisite for doing business in the lucrative Chinese capital markets is a network of connections to the families that dominate the Party hierarchy. Giving jobs to the sons, daughters, nephews and nieces of these families brings immediate guanxi — that peculiarly Chinese word that implies networking and the exchange of favours. It is essential to the way the Chinese do business. The offspring need not be well qualified, or even especially bright. It’s their connections that count.

The American banking house J.P. Morgan operated what it called the Sons And Daughters Program — which provided dozens of jobs in Hong Kong, Shanghai and New York to children of the Party elite. One was Gao Jue, the son of China’s commerce minister, Gao Hucheng. Gao Jue landed a job after a meeting between his father and senior J.P. Morgan executive William Daley. (Daley was a former U.S. commerce secretary under Bill Clinton, and pushed for China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation. He later served as President Obama’s chief of staff.) Gao Jue interviewed poorly but was offered a coveted analyst position with the bank. Prone to falling asleep at work, he was soon judged to be an ‘immature, irresponsible and unreliable’ employee. When, as part of a general downsizing, the bank later wanted to lay him off, his father took the head of the bank’s Hong Kong office, Fang Fang, to dinner and pleaded for his son to be kept on, promising to ‘go extra miles’ for J.P. Morgan in its China deals. Fang was persuaded, and a senior executive in New York agreed to keep Gao Jue on, even though the executive’s own son had been laid off. Business is business. When Gao Jue was eventually let go, he took other finance jobs before winding up at Goldman Sachs.

As one equity executive told the Financial Times: ‘You don’t say no to a princeling.’ Which begs the question of what else the banks do for the Party elite, besides employing their children.

European financial institutions have gone the same way. In Zurich, Credit Suisse kept a spreadsheet that tracked princeling hires against how much money they brought in. It hired more than 100 sons, daughters and friends of senior government officials. One ‘princess’ was employed after the company helped massage her resume. Once on the payroll, she often didn’t show up for work. When she did, she was judged ‘rude and unprofessional’ and sometimes brought her mother with her. Nevertheless, she was paid $1 million during her employment and given a number of promotions because her family awarded deals to the bank.

Deutsche Bank, Germany’s biggest, used bribes and corrupt practices to gain access to China, including showering gifts on leaders, especially the family of then premier Wen Jiabao, and then mayor of Beijing, Wang Qishan. In 2009, Deutsche Bank beat J.P. Morgan to a deal because it had employed the daughter of the client’s chairman.

There was nothing unique about J.P. Morgan’s Sons and Daughters Program; all the big American finance companies had something similar. It was claimed in 2013 that Goldman Sachs had employed 25 sons and daughters, including the grandson of Jiang Zemin, the all-powerful Chinese Communist Party boss until the early 2000s.

Merrill Lynch (and before it, Citigroup) employed the daughter-in-law of former premier Zhao Ziyang, Margaret Ren.
Merrill Lynch also employed the son-in-law of Wu Bangguo, who for a decade until his retirement in 2013 was ranked second in the Party hierarchy, and Janice Hu, granddaughter of former Party head Hu Yaobang.

Of course, some of these princelings may have been employed on their own merits as respected bankers and financiers, but there is no doubt that China’s red aristocracy is placing its children at the heart of Western finance.

For the CCP elite, entanglement with the masters of Wall Street through the placement of scores of princelings serves a more important purpose than employment for their kids. It is a means of gathering intelligence and exerting influence, because it places its informants and agents in the heart of American power. The entire workings of a U.S. firm may be sent back to a father or uncle in China, along with confidential information on the personal and financial affairs of the wealthiest people in America.

While the placement of princelings and promises of access to China’s huge financial market have been the foremost avenue of influence in Wall Street, in the City of London the situation is different. London’s financial district is also the financial hub of Europe, giving big finance an inordinate influence in British politics. Brexit has many wondering whether the City can retain its dominant position or will be displaced by its rivals in Frankfurt or even Paris. The mandarins of the City have been working hard to ensure its pre-eminence, which provides a golden opportunity for Beijing. It would be an exaggeration to say that if Beijing could control the City, it could control Britain, but not a large one.

An ominous, if small, sign of the influence Beijing already wields came in May 2019 when the City of London Corporation, the district’s municipal government, banned the Taiwan office from contributing a float to the annual Lord Mayor’s parade. The City of London Corporation can’t get enough of China. In March 2019, two months before he banned Taiwan’s float in his parade, Lord Mayor Peter Estlin joined a delegation to China to promote ‘fintech and green finance’ links, along with the City’s role in the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s Silk Road strategic plan to invest around the world. He praised the BRI’s ‘win-win culture’, and said he sees the City playing a vital role in helping to finance ‘a fantastic initiative’ and a ‘very exciting’ vision. The delegation was led by John McLean, a board member of the China-Britain Business Council, who declared that ‘London is open for business for Chinese financial and tech companies’. Earlier in 2019, the chair of the City of London’s policy committee, Catherine McGuinness, welcomed the launch of the global edition of the CCP’s China Daily, noting that the paper ‘is based in the Square Mile and is a good friend of the City of London Corporation’.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Vivasvat »

Vivasvat wrote:Chinese fixer targets FIVE Prime Ministers: New evidence of Beijing's infiltration of British Establishment as it emerges leading figure 'tasked with grooming foreign elites' met politicians including Boris Johnson, David Cameron and Tony Blair
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... hment.html
As of 2019, more than 60 countries, accounting for two-thirds of the world’s population, had signed on to China’s BRI programme or intended to do so. There are justifiable fears that it could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development, military expansion and Beijing-controlled institutions.

In Europe, Chinese companies now own airports, seaports and wind farms across nine countries. They also own the tyre-maker Pirelli, the Swiss agrochemicals company Syngenta, a large slice of Daimler, a slew of office towers in London’s financial hubs, and 13 professional soccer teams.

All, or part, of the ports of Rotterdam (Europe’s largest), Antwerp and Zeebrugge are Chinese-owned. The state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company owns the major Greek port of Piraeus and has a majority share in the Spanish port-management firm Noatum, and so controls the ports of Bilbao and Valencia. Barcelona’s huge new container terminal is owned by a Hong Kong–based company.

Although Beijing insists in public that its port acquisitions are about promoting trade, it has a long-term plan to build strategic pressure, including beneath-the-radar expansion of its military presence. This shift in the strategic landscape is most advanced in the Indo-Pacific, but good progress is being made in the Mediterranean.

‘Meticulously select locations, deploy discreetly, prioritise co-operation, and slowly infiltrate,’ is how one expert on China’s Navy describes this strategy. It’s a neat summary of Communist China’s ambition to rule the world. It may couch its incursions in language of ‘equality’ and ‘co-existence’, but what it is really promoting is Beijing’s own model of authoritarian, state-directed capitalism. The language plays to the dream of global harmony through trade and cultural exchange. But when President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, uses the phrase ‘community of shared future’, the sub-text is that China’s new world order will replace the post-war American hegemony. To the outside world, Xi and other leaders talk about ‘win-win co-operation’, and ‘a big family of harmonious co-existence’, and ‘a bridge for peace and East-West cooperation’, but in discussions at home, the talk is of achieving global dominance.
Vivasvat
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Vivasvat »

Vivasvat wrote:Chinese fixer targets FIVE Prime Ministers: New evidence of Beijing's infiltration of British Establishment as it emerges leading figure 'tasked with grooming foreign elites' met politicians including Boris Johnson, David Cameron and Tony Blair
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... hment.html
Beijing is never slow in using its financial and political muscle to get what it wants, particularly when faced with criticism and dissent and feeling slighted. Many powerful bodies in the West are falling in line instead of resisting the bribery, threats and lies. When under fire, China pulls out all the stops to protect its interests.

When financial risks to the economy became serious in 2015, the CCP exerted subtle influence on international banks not to rock the boat with bad news. UBS, the largest Swiss bank, has a long history in China but it came under pressure to rein in its public commentary about the country. In 2018, one of its employees was detained in China, for no apparent reason, causing UBS management to bar travel by its staff to China.

Expectations can be manipulated downwards too, to punish those who annoy the Party. During Hong Kong pro-democracy protests in 2019, airline Cathay Pacific earned Beijing’s ire when some of its staff members joined in. An analyst at an investment bank, Zhao Dongchen, advised clients that Cathay had done ‘irreversible damage’ to its brand and predicted that its share price would collapse.

Nothing is too small for Beijing not to want to interfere and get its way. When the manager of the Houston Rockets basketball team tweeted support for Hong Kong protesters, America’s leading sports network, ESPN, banned its presenters from any discussion of the politics of it. ESPN also displayed a map of China that included disputed territory that China claims in the South China Sea and has been ruled contrary to international law. It is almost never used outside China.

In other examples, camera-maker Leica, spooked by patriotic netizens, immediately distanced itself from its own advertisement referencing the ‘Tank Man’ of Tiananmen Square fame. Hotel group Marriott International fired a junior employee who ‘liked’ a Twitter post supporting Tibetan autonomy, and it changed the name of Taiwan to ‘Taiwan, China’ when Beijing expressed annoyance. In Stockholm, the Sheraton Hotel, a Marriott subsidiary, banned the local Taiwan office from celebrating Taiwan’s national day at the hotel.

Perhaps the most prominent spot in the corporate hall of shame belongs to Apple. After challenging the U.S. government in court when the FBI wanted access to Apple users’ data, the corporation moved their Chinese iCloud storage operation for Chinese users to a Chinese state-run company. Apple, whose iPhones are assembled in China, also came under fire for deleting an app that allowed Hong Kong people to avoid street clashes with the police. It acted a day after China’s state media accused it of protecting ‘rioters’. Soon after, Apple CEO Tim Cook was appointed to chair a business school advisory board at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

To ingratiate themselves, German car manufacturers self-censor their comments on China. In an interview with the BBC, the chairman of Volkswagen denied any knowledge of the concentration camps in Xinjiang, where a million Uyghurs, China’s Muslim minority, are detained for so-called ‘re-education’. He said he was ‘extremely proud’ of the company’s activities in the region. Mercedes-Benz was quick to apologise after using an innocuous quote from the Dalai Lama in one of its Instagram ads (which was blocked in China anyway). Audi promptly and ‘sincerely’ apologised for using an ‘incorrect’ map of China (one that did not include Taiwan as part of China) during one of its press conferences in Germany.

The German industrial conglomerate Siemens has also tried hard to curry favour with Beijing, signing agreements with ten Chinese partners. Asked to comment on the Hong Kong protests, its CEO Joe Kaeser argued that Germany should ‘balance’ its values and its interest: ‘When jobs in Germany depend on how we deal with sensitive topics, one should not add to the general outrage but carefully consider all positions and measures in all their aspects.’

In other words, the government should stop criticising China’s human rights violations and focus solely on business interests.
Adapted from Hidden Hand: Exposing How The Chinese Communist Party Is Reshaping The World by Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, to be published by Oneworld on July 16 at £20. Copyright © 2020 Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by g.sarkar »

https://zeenews.india.com/world/chinas- ... 98815.html
CHINESE PRODUCTS
China's criminal enterprise of counterfeit products hit Indian, world economy
Surprisingly, 80 percent of these counterfeit goods sold globally are made in China, which sells 60 to 80 percent of these products merely in countries like America, thereby, weakening the economy of those nations from where it actually copies the products.
Zee Media Bureau
Edited By: Arun Kumar Chaubey, Jul 28, 2020.

New Delhi: China has mastered the art of copying and it has now become part of its culture. Contrary to the Indian value system, China rather takes pride in this criminal enterprise of counterfeit products. Forbes magazine has surveyed that counterfeit goods worth over Rs 127 lakh crore are sold annually across the world and it is more than the economy of Canada, Russia, South Korea, and Australia.
Surprisingly, 80 percent of these counterfeit goods sold globally are made in China, which sells 60 to 80 percent of these products merely in countries like America, thereby, weakening the economy of those nations from where it actually copies the products.
The DNA analysis delves deep into China's criminal enterprise of counterfeit products to unearth the facts. China has evolved itself to produce a copy of any product from coffee to cars.
By the year 1985, the total number of cars in China stood at 5200 as the majority of Chinese people did not possess a car. They were not allowed to own a private car, according to the Communist culture of China, but now the number of vehicles in China is more than 270 million. This number is more than the number of cars present in Europe. Now, several top auto companies manufacture their vehicles in China, which allegedly copies the designs of these companies and to produce an exact replica of these vehicles and sold them in the market. You will also be surprised to see some examples of this:
The Maruti 800 used to be India's most famous car until a few decades ago. This was called India's first Family Car. Today, this car is not produced in India but its replica or duplicate model is still very famous in China. In China, the Maruti 800 is known as Jiang-Nan TT, which resembles Maruti 800 with an 800cc engine besides flaunting all other features.
The famous Toyota car Innova, which comes with a starting price tag of Rs 25 lakh in India, a replica of this car, sold in China under the name Linmax, is available for just Rs 7.5 lakh.
Similarly, Jaguar Land Rover's famous car Range Rover Evoque has been replicated in China and is sold as Land Wind X7. The price of the original car is around Rs 55 lakh while Chinese vehicle is available for merely Rs 15 lakh. Notably, Jaguar Land Rover is owned by Tata Motors of India.
Another big car manufacturer Audi's famous model Audi R8 is being produced in China as CH Lithia. The original Audi R8 costs around Rs 1.25 billion, while in China this car is available for a much lower price.
One of the most expensive and luxurious vehicles in the world is Rolls Royce Phantom, which is available at a starting price of Rs 9 crore in India, but the Chinese replica is sold under the name of Geely GE, which costs merely Rs 32 lakh.
.....

Gautam
pankajs
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by pankajs »

Mostly from the US pov but still useful and some portion is insightful.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xpAa0LxrjU
A must-see hangout with General Robert Spalding as he rips the band-aid off the CCP party
The roots for China's desire to dominate the world were laid back in 2007 when iPhone was introduced, says Gen. Robert Spalding in this far-reaching hangout on everything about CCP. If you have time to watch just one video on China's grand plans, it would be this one. Don’t miss!
Mollick.R
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Mollick.R »

'Clean up this mess': The Chinese thinkers behind Xi Jinping’s increasingly hardening line
New York Times Last Updated: Aug 03, 2020, 11:08 AM IST

HONG KONG: When Tian Feilong first arrived in Hong Kong as demands for free elections were on the rise, he said he felt sympathetic toward a society that seemed to reflect the liberal political ideas he had studied as a graduate student in Beijing.
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He became an ardent critic of the demonstrations, and six years later he is a staunch defender of the sweeping national security law that China has imposed on the former British colony.

Tian has joined a tide of Chinese scholars who have turned against Western-inspired ideas that once flowed in China’s universities, instead promoting the proudly authoritarian worldview ascendant under Xi Jinping, the Communist Party leader. This cadre of Chinese intellectuals serve as champions, even official advisers, defending and honing the party’s hardening policies, including the rollout of the security law in Hong Kong.
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“Back when I was weak, I had to totally play by your rules. Now I’m strong and have confidence, so why can’t I lay down my own rules and values and ideas?” Tian, 37, said in an interview, explaining the prevailing outlook in China. Witnessing the tumult as a visiting scholar in Hong Kong in 2014, Tian said, he “rethought the relationship between individual freedom and state authority.”

“Hong Kong is, after all, China’s Hong Kong,” he said. “It’s up to the Communist Party to clean up this mess.”

Read Full Article Here//
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 326164.cms
arshyam
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by arshyam »

^^What's the point in posting the same article in 3-4 different threads?
RaviB
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by RaviB »

China’s Superpower Dreams Are Running Out of Money
When the coronavirus crisis is over, China will be forced to embrace a less ambitious future.
By Salvatore Babones | July 6, 2020
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/06/ch ... -spending/
Posting in full since paywalled

Seen from afar, China’s current all-fronts offensive gives the impression of a rising power on the march. China is simultaneously starting a border skirmish with India, militarizing the South China Sea, cracking down on Hong Kong, pressuring Taiwan, confronting Japan over disputed islands, and quelling internal unrest—all while fighting a resurgent coronavirus outbreak. At the same time, it is investing billions of dollars in a bid to dominate emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors. And then there’s the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s $1 trillion program to build the transportation infrastructure for a China-centered world.

Running a global superpower is an expensive business. The United States famously spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined, yet the notion persists that its military is still underfunded and underequipped for its global superpower role. And if the pundits are to be believed, the United States will lose its competitive edge without more investment in university research, advanced technologies, foreign aid, diplomacy, the United Nations, clean energy, and, of course, pandemic preparedness. That’s just to name a few of the United States’ superpower funding priorities. The full list is much longer.

But if the United States—with an economy roughly 50 percent larger than China’s and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita more than six times as great—can’t afford to remain a global superpower, how can China possibly afford to become one? Leaving aside the facts that China’s chief diplomatic allies are North Korea, Cambodia, and Ethiopia (and Iron Biradar), that it is surrounded by potentially hostile nuclear-weapon states such as Russia and India, that its state-sponsored technology companies are widely distrusted outside China, and that Beijing has been widely blamed for allowing the coronavirus pandemic to spread to the rest of the world, how is it possible that a self-described developing country like China can finance a superpower rivalry with the United States?

The simple answer is it can’t. Even before the coronavirus hit, China’s economic growth had slowed from double-digit rates in the early 2000s to 6.1 percent in 2019—if you believe the official figures, that is. This figure is highly suspect, not least because the person who sets China’s annual GDP target, National Development and Reform Commission vice chairman Ning Jizhe, is the same person who, as director of the National Bureau of Statistics, is responsible for measuring GDP. Independent modeling published by the Brookings Institution suggests that China has historically overestimated GDP growth by an average of 1.7 percent per year.

China’s officially reported tax revenues confirm this picture, growing at just 3.8 percent in 2019, compared with 6.2 percent in 2018 and 7.4 percent in 2017. Yet as China’s financial means have become more restricted, its spending has continued on its old, profligate trajectory, growing 8.1 percent in 2019. The result has been a widening gap in China’s government budgets, with the officially reported budget deficit reaching 4.9 percent of GDP in 2019. The International Monetary Fund puts the true figure of the government’s shortfall at more than 12 percent of GDP. And this was before the coronavirus, during a period of supposedly healthy economic growth.

Hard figures for China are hard to come by, but it seems that the Chinese government was scaling back spending commitments even before the coronavirus hit. You would hardly know it from the glowing project announcements, but China’s BRI funding commitments have actually been falling since 2017. And even these falling numbers are just promises—the reality of China’s BRI spending is even more meager. Chinese banks have virtually disappeared from BRI financing, leaving the cash-strapped government to shoulder the burden alone. Meanwhile, projects have been shelved, scaled back, or delayed all across Asia.

Western critics of the BRI tend to interpret these problems in terms of the fear of indebtedness that these projects spark in recipient countries. They rarely mention the indebtedness they induce in China itself. So when Western media reported in December that China was pressuring a reluctant Pakistan to resume work on the stalled China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, they failed to mention that China is unwilling to finance the construction itself. Similarly, China wants to build a new port in Myanmar, but it is reluctant to pay for it. China signed a Transit and Transport Agreement with Nepal in 2015 but has yet to build a single mile of road or railway in the landlocked Himalayan country. It’s the same story in Africa and Eastern Europe: China continues to announce grand projects but has been unwilling to offer enough money to actually get them off the ground.

China’s financing problems are nowhere more apparent—and less acknowledged—than in its military budgets. Analyses from the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggest that Chinese defense spending may actually fall in real terms in 2020. Given China’s elevated pace of military operations on several borders, spending constraints must be putting serious pressure on acquisitions budgets. It is impossible for anyone outside China’s defense establishment to know what is really going on, but circumstantial evidence suggests that many of China’s big-ticket weapons programs have been put on go-slow.

For example, China is believed to have built only 50 or so J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighters. The J-20 program now seems to be experiencing serious development problems, limiting production for the foreseeable future. This compares to America’s stock of 195 F-22 and 134 F-35 fifth-generation fighters, with continuing annual production of more than 100 F-35s, even after coronavirus delays.
Similarly, China once planned to deploy six U.S.-style aircraft carrier strike groups by 2035. Aside from the Soviet-surplus training carrier Liaoning, China currently has only one conventionally powered ski-jump carrier, with a second under construction. Plans for four nuclear-powered carriers have been delayed indefinitely due to “technical challenges and high costs.” China says it will eventually develop fifth-generation fighter planes for deployment on aircraft carriers. Meanwhile, the United States’ F-35C carrier-optimized stealth fighters are already in training for deployment this year.

Fighting India with sticks and stones on the high plateau of Ladakh comes cheap, but preparing to confront the United States in the Western Pacific is a very expensive proposition indeed. It is likely to prove a luxury that a slow-growth, post-coronavirus China will not be able to afford. Like a gangster flashing a wad of $100 bills, China makes a great show of its wealth and its willingness to spend it. In reality, Beijing’s bank balance doesn’t match its bling.

Having witnessed decades of double-digit growth in Chinese GDP and government spending, outsiders are conditioned to believe that China’s financial resources are unlimited. Having lived through China’s economic rise themselves, insiders are perhaps conditioned to believe it, too. But no budget is bottomless, and China seems to have hit the buffers just as the coronavirus struck. China’s leaders can at least save face by abandoning their GDP targets and blaming the virus for the inevitable austerity to follow. But when the crisis is over, the United States will still be a global superpower. China may be forced to embrace a less-ambitious future.
Manish_Sharma
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Manish_Sharma »

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has- ... AkyjXm0pF7

China Has Stopped Biding Its Time
A bipartisan U.S. consensus emerges on the scale of the threat from Beijing.
By William A. Galston
June 22, 2021

American attitudes toward China have changed dramatically over the past decade. There is much less confidence that the democratic world can bring China into a rules-based international order—or that the growth of the Chinese middle class will create internal pressure for liberalization and democracy. Elites in both political parties agree that competition with China is now at the center of U.S. economic and foreign policy, a stance that many Americans endorse.

The accession of Xi Jinping to the peak of Chinese leadership marked the end of the era defined by Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim, “Hide our strength, bide our time.” Mr. Xi is asserting China’s strength, not hiding it. And he believes that China’s time has come.

Mr. Xi’s strategy rests on five pillars. First, he has moved aggressively to take back authority over every industry in his country. Economic actors that had been increasingly independent—especially in technology and consumer services—have been reined in, and he is pressing the private sector to hand over all of its data. Dissenting voices in civil society have been shut down. Potential threats to his leadership from within the party have been suppressed. The full power of the state has been unleashed against Hong Kong and the Uyghurs. And he has sparked a campaign to deploy Chinese history in service to the Communist Party, an effort that has been labeled “the largest mass-education drive since the Mao era.”

Second, Mr. Xi has established technological superiority as a core national goal. His “Made in China 2025” plan is designed to propel his country into the lead in the technologies that will dominate the global economy in coming decades, many of which have military applications. And he has strengthened the connections between the civilian and military sectors.

Third, Mr. Xi has upgraded his defense forces and extended their reach. The Chinese army is far better equipped than it was a decade ago. The navy is the largest in the world. And China is moving to establish a global system of ports to give its forces access all over the world.

Fourth, Mr. Xi is using China’s economic clout to extend its diplomatic reach. Although the Belt and Road Initiative has yielded mixed results, developing countries and autocratic governments welcome the absence of the environmental and governance requirements that other funders impose. Most recently, while Western countries have concentrated on inoculating their own populations against Covid-19, China has boosted its international standing by shipping millions of doses of its vaccine to countries throughout Asia.

Finally, and most ominously, Mr. Xi has deployed the full force of Chinese nationalism to support the reassertion of his country’s power and to complete its reunification. Last week, 28 Chinese fighter jets and other aircraft conducted exercises over waters south of Taiwan. A successful effort to end Taiwan’s independence by force, once considered improbable, can no longer be ruled out.

Against this backdrop, President Biden made a stepped-up response to China the centerpiece of his recent European trip. The Group of Seven which was silent on China when it last met three years ago, called on Beijing to restore Hong Kong’s freedom and to respect human rights, especially in Xinjiang. The group called for a transparent probe into the origins of the Covid-19 virus, and established a working group to develop a response to the Belt and Road initiative. And NATO, which barely mentioned China as recently as 2019, now labels it an increasingly serious security challenge. Last week, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary-general, stated that “the balance of power is shifting” and “we need to respond together as an alliance.”

But there is a difference between declarations and concrete policies. Europe would prefer to focus on the threat from Russia, and many European countries fear that a tougher stance toward China would endanger their economic interests. By contrast, it appears that the Biden administration is seeking to stabilize relations with Russia by establishing mutually agreed red lines on cyberattacks, Ukraine and other contested areas so that the administration can focus its military, diplomatic and soft-power strategies on the Chinese challenge, which it believes will determine the course of the 21st century.

A lesson of the past few years is that there is little the U.S. can do to change China’s domestic policy. We cannot persuade or force its leaders to abandon their drive for technological and military superiority, to decrease the state’s role in the economy or to respect human rights. We must focus—as a country and as the leader of democratic alliances—on what we can do to strengthen ourselves.

Recent bipartisan moves in the House and Senate to increase investment in important technologies are a promising start. It remains to be seen whether we can agree on the investments and strategic decisions that an effective military response to the Chinese challenge will require—and whether we can restore a sense of common purpose across partisan lines without which such a response cannot be sustained.

This article is in your queue.Open Queue
American attitudes toward China have changed dramatically over the past decade. There is much less confidence that the democratic world can bring China into a rules-based international order—or that the growth of the Chinese middle class will create internal pressure for liberalization and democracy. Elites in both political parties agree that competition with China is now at the center of U.S. economic and foreign policy, a stance that many Americans endorse.

The accession of Xi Jinping to the peak of Chinese leadership marked the end of the era defined by Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim, “Hide our strength, bide our time.” Mr. Xi is asserting China’s strength, not hiding it. And he believes that China’s time has come.

Mr. Xi’s strategy rests on five pillars. First, he has moved aggressively to take back authority over every industry in his country. Economic actors that had been increasingly independent—especially in technology and consumer services—have been reined in, and he is pressing the private sector to hand over all of its data. Dissenting voices in civil society have been shut down. Potential threats to his leadership from within the party have been suppressed. The full power of the state has been unleashed against Hong Kong and the Uyghurs. And he has sparked a campaign to deploy Chinese history in service to the Communist Party, an effort that has been labeled “the largest mass-education drive since the Mao era.”

Second, Mr. Xi has established technological superiority as a core national goal. His “Made in China 2025” plan is designed to propel his country into the lead in the technologies that will dominate the global economy in coming decades, many of which have military applications. And he has strengthened the connections between the civilian and military sectors.

Third, Mr. Xi has upgraded his defense forces and extended their reach. The Chinese army is far better equipped than it was a decade ago. The navy is the largest in the world. And China is moving to establish a global system of ports to give its forces access all over the world.

Fourth, Mr. Xi is using China’s economic clout to extend its diplomatic reach. Although the Belt and Road Initiative has yielded mixed results, developing countries and autocratic governments welcome the absence of the environmental and governance requirements that other funders impose. Most recently, while Western countries have concentrated on inoculating their own populations against Covid-19, China has boosted its international standing by shipping millions of doses of its vaccine to countries throughout Asia.

Finally, and most ominously, Mr. Xi has deployed the full force of Chinese nationalism to support the reassertion of his country’s power and to complete its reunification. Last week, 28 Chinese fighter jets and other aircraft conducted exercises over waters south of Taiwan. A successful effort to end Taiwan’s independence by force, once considered improbable, can no longer be ruled out.

Against this backdrop, President Biden made a stepped-up response to China the centerpiece of his recent European trip. The Group of Seven which was silent on China when it last met three years ago, called on Beijing to restore Hong Kong’s freedom and to respect human rights, especially in Xinjiang. The group called for a transparent probe into the origins of the Covid-19 virus, and established a working group to develop a response to the Belt and Road initiative. And NATO, which barely mentioned China as recently as 2019, now labels it an increasingly serious security challenge. Last week, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary-general, stated that “the balance of power is shifting” and “we need to respond together as an alliance.”

But there is a difference between declarations and concrete policies. Europe would prefer to focus on the threat from Russia, and many European countries fear that a tougher stance toward China would endanger their economic interests. By contrast, it appears that the Biden administration is seeking to stabilize relations with Russia by establishing mutually agreed red lines on cyberattacks, Ukraine and other contested areas so that the administration can focus its military, diplomatic and soft-power strategies on the Chinese challenge, which it believes will determine the course of the 21st century.

A lesson of the past few years is that there is little the U.S. can do to change China’s domestic policy. We cannot persuade or force its leaders to abandon their drive for technological and military superiority, to decrease the state’s role in the economy or to respect human rights. We must focus—as a country and as the leader of democratic alliances—on what we can do to strengthen ourselves.

Recent bipartisan moves in the House and Senate to increase investment in important technologies are a promising start. It remains to be seen whether we can agree on the investments and strategic decisions that an effective military response to the Chinese challenge will require—and whether we can restore a sense of common purpose across partisan lines without which such a response cannot be sustained.

While the Biden administration plays for time, some lawmakers believe sanctions would be the faster route to establishing whether the origin of covid-19 was a lab-leak in Wuhan, China.
_______________________

Done!
Sorry Ramana ji, was posting from mobile, will be more careful in future.
Last edited by Manish_Sharma on 24 Jun 2021 14:49, edited 2 times in total.
ramana
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by ramana »

Manish, Please clean up the above post.
Thanks, ramana
VinodTK
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by VinodTK »



Gravitas | Caught on-cam: China's forced labour in Zimbabwe

In my view the above clip is good watch for all who keep saying India cannot spend money on defense. 21st century Nazi techniques, will be applied on Indian population with few Indian sepoys obediantely implementing the CCP polocies and practices.
Rudradev
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Rudradev »

One thing confuses me about the Quad.

China's political and cultural heartland is the 40% of PRC territory that lies between the Pacific shelf & the Heihe-Tengchong line. 94% of the population and virtually all economic & technological centres are in this area. It is where the historical dynasties of China have ruled.

The importance of strategic depth in the western & southern near-abroad i.e. Xinjiang & Tibet was a lesson imbibed by CPC because having access to a hinterland in west-central China was vitally important to the Red Army's own success against the KMT. Republican China was squeezed between Japanese domination of its coastal centres and communist guerillas fighting asymmetrically from inland bases.

Today PRC faces its primary foes, once again, on the shores of that core Chinese territory east of the Heihe-Tengchong line. It is on the defensive here. However its conflict with India is based on its sheer impetus to expand. You would think that controlling all of Xinjiang & Tibet is enough strategic depth for China. What it wants in Ladakh, Kashmir, and from Gilgit-Baltistan to Gwadar is an opening to the Persian Gulf.

Now why does China want access to the Gulf? Again the motivation is purely expansionist. Simply put, there is no way in hell that-- if USN, Japanese & Australian navies blockade the Malacca straits-- China could hope to secure its energy needs through the Gwadar-KKH corridor. It would have to rely on Russia and perhaps CAS to supply it. The Gwadar corridor is never going to be adequate for this. It exists chiefly to extend Chinese influence *outwards*, not to secure Chinese interests inward from the Arabian Sea.

So to view the motivation for Chinese aggressiveness towards India as anything but a product of Beijing's global imperialist designs, is folly. In contrast one could argue that China's concerns with regard to the Pacific Quad members is primarily about defending its eastern heartland.

India's opposition to China is provoked by a very different set of Chinese policies than the US/Australian/Japanese opposition to it... that's the bottom line. This means that it's very possible for China to reach an accommodation with the other three Quad members while leaving India high & dry. Washington, Tokyo & Canberra can put their fingers on the windpipe of China's eastern heartland, with or without India's intervention.

With even a slight upper hand, these three can impose their will on China with regard to far-eastern or southeast Asia. India's help is not critical to this. So one can well imagine a Molotov-Ribbentrop type compact by which China agrees (temporarily) to mute its ambitions in the Japan/Korea and ASEAN theatres, while the US/Australia/Japan are content to let Beijing extend its influence in other theatres... including the Russian far east, south-central Asia, and the Middle East, which the US is rapidly disengaging from in any case.

Even if India formalized her relationship to the Quad with an official treaty, I don't see any possibility of other Quad members honouring their obligations of coming to India's defence when China imposes a land/air war against India in the Himalayas. They are focused on the Chinese heartland east of the Heihe-Tengchong line; they would not risk blood and treasure to curb Beijing's adventurism directed outward from the Chinese hinterland west of that line.

In this as in all other matters, India stands alone.
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Najunamar »

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/wor ... 008728.cms

Looks like XJP is thumbing the nose at Biden and Quad. Inexorably moving toward a showdown?
Pratyush
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Pratyush »

Najunamar wrote:https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/wor ... 008728.cms

Looks like XJP is thumbing the nose at Biden and Quad. Inexorably moving toward a showdown?

This is the outcome of the new PRC assertiveness.

Will not really be an issue with the US, if they decide to exit START treaty regime.

Just as the exited the INF treaty in Trump presidency.

Bring the supply chain within the United States as much as it is possible to do so. Finances become available to rebuild build the nuke forces.
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Yagnasri »

Chinese aim to control and expand in the western direction is also to have a land link to Central Asia and to larger access Mongolian and Russian areas. It is very creatival to have land access to the largest land mass on earth. Period. That is why Pakis were created in the first place. To stop us from getting accress to central Asia and Russia getting access to IOR.

Further a large buffer of desert like land in the west also makes the any invasion from the west very difficult. It also makes any air attack on the critical population, industrial and other areas very difficult. Take our own case, a fighter/bomber from the Chinese airbase in Tibet theoretically (of if the have a suicide wish) can attack most of the North Indian cities. But we can not do to the chinse cities from Bharat due to vast distances involved.
Cyrano
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Cyrano »

Interesting view points Rudradev & Yagnasri gaarlu.
Yagnasri
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Yagnasri »

Till 2nd world war Japanese invasion, the main threat came to Chinese from the land side i.e. West and North. It is very difficult for them ( or anyone else with such history) to disregard this historical fact. Not all people are idiots like us.
Rudradev
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Rudradev »

Najunamar wrote:https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/wor ... 008728.cms

Looks like XJP is thumbing the nose at Biden and Quad. Inexorably moving toward a showdown?
Actually this is interesting for many reasons.

Traditionally, the display of officially developing and inducting nuclear weapons & delivery systems is a type of direct deterrence messaging used by the conventionally weaker party vis-a-vis the conventionally stronger party.

So for example: Pakistan has used this type of messaging vis-a-vis India; and India has used it vis-a-vis China.

However, China has for the most part stayed away from using this type of messaging, *directly*, vis-a-vis the United States. Their game has been rather to proliferate nuke and missile technology to rogue actors like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran etc. The purpose is not direct deterrence but undermining (and defying) the global non-proliferation regime-- which of course is established and maintained by the US. In contrast China has kept its own weapon stockpiles very limited (at least officially) in comparison to US or Russian stockpiles.

If this is changing, what could it mean? Some points to ponder.

1) Is it a message to the hardcore non-proliferation lobbies known to exist in Japan and Australia? China might be trying to disrupt the quad by giving ammunition to these lobbies to use against the US. The argument is "look, we always restrained our manufacture and deployment of nukes but the USA's aggressiveness is forcing us to rethink that policy".

2) It could also be a sign that China has given up on the Non-Proliferation Ayatollah regime in the US (the Perkovitches, Krepons etc. who used to ignore Chinese-Paki proliferation while browbeating India in the late '90s)-- those guys are old and toothless, and their successors have come on board with the new US attitude of confronting China. So Beijing is trying to replace them with new ayatollahs in Japan and Australia (and probably also in EU). This is similar to how the Soviets used anti-nuclear groups in the UK, Germany etc. against Reagan during the Cold War.

3) Is it an honest admission by China that it is genuinely more scared of a hot war with the Quad in the Indo-China Sea than at any previous time? A direct-deterrence message in the classic sense: don't mess with us or you will face armageddon. This would indicate China considers military confrontation to be a more realistic possibility than before.

4) What are the implications for India?
a) Should India take advantage of this to rapidly, massively upgrade its own nuclear arsenal? One could hardly ask for a better opportunity.

b) If China is building huge amounts of missile silos, delivery platforms, etc. then its reputation as a "responsible member nation" in groups like the NSG could also be vulnerable. Is there any way India could take advantage of this, to cement its own position in such groups?

c) Should India take up the matter with Russia? Is there additional room for convergence of interests between us and Moscow here? After all the Russians would not be happy about China increasing its stockpile of weapons that someday could be used against them.

d) Perhaps most interesting of all: how does this affect the eyeball-to-eyeball standoff in the Himalayas? Paradoxically, I would suggest that the very fact China is openly building and deploying more nukes makes it MORE rewarding, in a game-theoretical sense, for India to be MORE aggressive in its conventional forces' posture towards China in the Himalayas.


See it's like this. Deterrence equations vis-a-vis China-India and India-Pakistan have been established since the late 1990s. This is one reason why (for example) India did not cross the border during Kargil, and why we did not proceed with war against Pakistan following Parakram.

The rules of nuclear deterrence equations were initially clear to everybody but Pakistan. India would not initiate an existentially-threatening conventional war with Pakistan because of Pakistan's nuclear redlines. Likewise, China (for about two decades) did not initiate any massively threatening military deployment on the border with India or the LAC, because it did not want to risk crossing India's nuclear redlines.

Pakistanis being Pakistanis decided the rules did not apply to them. They were the first to try and wage subconventional war (i.e. jihadi terrorism) against India in spite of our nuclear redlines. Their gamble was that India would not respond to terrorist provocations by conventional military means because of the "nuclear flashpoint" argument.

Ultimately, in response to this, India expanded the ambit of what it was willing to do in response to terrorist provocations by including near-conventional ripostes into its list of options. This was how the game changed with the Uri surgical strikes and Balakot: India showed that we would respond conventionally (although in a limited sense), disregarding Pakistan's nuclear redlines just as it disregarded ours when carrying out a terrorist jihad. The Pakistani nuclear umbrella for terrorism was gone with the wind.

The next step after this has been that China too is willing to undertake massive, threatening military deployments against India. This indicates a decision to disregard India's nuclear redlines just as India disregarded Pakistan's at Uri and Balakot. However-- unlike India, which was responding to terrorist aggression by Pakistan, the Chinese moves are themselves an act of aggression.

So all in all, it's fair to say the rules of nuclear deterrence equations between India-China and India-Pakistan have frayed considerably (if not completely broken down) since the late 1990s.

Importantly, however-- from the global perspective, the phenomenon of China ignoring India's nuclear redlines (from 2018 until now) came up in the context of a very limited Chinese nuclear arsenal (relative to the US or Russia). The Chinese did not have an arsenal that was existentially threatening to the United States. This meant that, until now, the US world order has not much cared about China disregarding India's nuclear redlines by massing forces across the LAC in Ladakh. After all, what was the worst that could happen? Most likely both sides would beat their chests and steer clear of a serious conventional escalation. The nuclear redlines that China flouted were India's, and only India's... because Chinese nuclear capabilities did not threaten the US or Europe directly. If this meant that the upstart Indians learned a lesson about their nuclear ambitions, so much the better, from the Western point of view.

What has changing now is the answer to that question: "what's the worst that could happen"?

Simply put: if China goes for an all-out war with India now, and fails to secure an easy conventional win (as it will), then both sides will start brandishing their nuclear weapons. But now (as opposed to earlier) Chinese nuclear mobilization is a recessed threat to the West as well as to India. Earlier their nukes were largely specific to India, Japan, and some Pacific nations-- but now (or very soon) they will have enough DF41s to hit all major targets in the continental US and Europe. This changes the game very sharply from the West's point of view. Meanwhile, India's nuclear mobilization will clearly be directed at China alone (with perhaps some warheads earmarked for Pakistan if it should get involved). Our longest-range missiles have been carefully tailored to hit all parts of China, but no further.

But conversely, what if India steps up and kicks the PLA in the family jewels? What if we deliver the short, sharp blow that humiliates China along the LAC? China then has two options. It can escalate, going for an expanded conventional war that will inevitably lead to nuclear posturing. Again, at this point, China's nukes threaten the world while India's nukes only threaten China. Advantage India, from the global point of view-- the international diplomatic pressure will be on China rather than India to pull back. On the other hand, if China does not escalate in response to an Indian kick in the family jewels, that is even more humiliating for Beijing.

In short, the fact of China developing, inducting, and deploying large numbers of long-range nuclear weapons and delivery systems gives India space to play a more aggressive game beneath the Chinese nuclear redlines than we had before. So far China had the advantage in this, but perhaps not any longer. Nobody will want to see China mobilize a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying Western civilization, even if they were OK with the possibility of China brandishing a nuclear arsenal that was only threatening to India.
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Rudradev »

Yagnasri wrote:Chinese aim to control and expand in the western direction is also to have a land link to Central Asia and to larger access Mongolian and Russian areas. It is very creatival to have land access to the largest land mass on earth. Period. That is why Pakis were created in the first place. To stop us from getting accress to central Asia and Russia getting access to IOR.
They already have access to Central Asian Republics, Mongolia, and huge stretches of Russia. My point was, why Gwadar? They do not need Gwadar/CPEC for this purpose-- Xinjiang already gives it to them. They do not need Gwadar/CPEC as a territorial buffer against India-- Tibet already gives them that. And they cannot use Gwadar/CPEC as an option to save themselves from an energy blockade in the Sunda/Malacca straits, because it does not have either the security or the capacity to do that reliably.

Therefore Gwadar/CPEC is nothing but an arm of Chinese expansionism... not a security concern but an imperialist venture. It has two purposes: (1) Extending Chinese influence to the Persian Gulf and (2) Keeping India out of Central Asia by essentially buying up Pakistan (and perhaps Afghanistan).

Therefore, Gwadar/CPEC does not directly threaten the interests any of the other Quad nations. They can very well leave India high and dry, with an agreement that as long as China keeps its focus on Gwadar, Persian Gulf and Indian Subcontinent... while not challenging the US and its allies' writ in the Pacific region or ASEAN... they have no problem with Beijing.

Xi may be too ambitious or overconfident to agree to something like that but the next guy might be fine with it.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by ramana »

Thanks Manish. Not an admonition. It's a important article.
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Rudradev »

Does China have any treaty alliances to balance against the Quad? I know Russia-China ties stop short of a mutual defence pact. Is even Pakistan or North Korea committed by treaty obligations to go to war if China claims foreign aggression against it?
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Rudradev »

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wh ... iwan-23607

Why China Plans to Invade Taiwan

Chinese military writings themselves reveal this is a much more malignant project than the half-sympathetic rationales often repeated in the Western media: that full reunification with Taiwan is key to China's national self-determination, or that China simply wants to protect its transit rights in the Taiwan Straits.

The real target is Japan. By controlling Taiwan PRC can make Japan forever subservient. This is why Chinese moves to invade Taiwan will not only be a major test of US commitment to its smaller transpacific allies, but a critical proof-of-concept for the viability of Quad itself.
The Course Book on the Taiwan Strait's Military Geography is a restricted-access PLA manual, used to teach senior officer seminars in Beijing. It warns readers that an external military might one day use Taiwan to cut-off China’s trade lines, hinting that the island could be used as a military base by the United States to blockade China and undermine its rapid rise to great power status. On this basis, the manual argues that physical control over the island is vital for safeguarding against foreign blockades. China’s seaborne oil imports, which pass through the Strait, are highly vulnerable, “so protecting the security of this strategic maritime passageway is not just a military activity alone, but rather an act of national strategy.”

This source then goes a step further, telling readers that Taiwan is a chokepoint of great utility for blockading Japan. The Taiwan Strait, it notes, is a Japanese maritime lifeline that runs from Europe and the Middle East, and based on PLA studies, Japan receives 90 percent of its oil imports, 99 percent of its mineral resources and 100 percent of its nuclear fuel needs from ships that travel across these sea lanes. In total, 500 million tons of Japanese imports pass by Taiwanese waters each year, with 80 percent of all Japan’s container ships traveling right through the Strait, the equivalent of one Japanese cargo ship every ten minutes. Consequently, these waters will, “directly affect Japan’s life or death, its survival or demise.”

PLA intentions and plans for a conquered Taiwan are made plain in another internal document, The Japanese Air Self Defense Force, a handbook studied by mid-career officers at the PLA Air Force Command College in Beijing. The stated purpose of the text is to help Chinese pilots and staff officers understand the strengths and weaknesses of their Japanese adversaries. Buried amidst hundreds of pages of detailed maps, target coordinates, organizational charts, weapons data and jet fighter images are the following lines:

As soon as Taiwan is reunified with Mainland China, Japan's maritime lines of communication will fall completely within the striking ranges of China's fighters and bombers...Our analysis shows that, by using blockades, if we can reduce Japan's raw imports by 15-20%, it will be a heavy blow to Japan's economy...After imports have been reduced by 50%, even if they use rationing to limit consumption, Japan's national economy and war-making potential will collapse entirely...blockades can cause sea shipments to decrease and can even create a famine within the Japanese islands.

If China attempts to seize Taiwan and US fails to intervene, Quad is dead. At that point Japan will have no option but to discard NPT.
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by Pratyush »

^^^

Interesting view. If Japan is compelled to junk NPT. South Korea will not be that for behind.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by tandav »

There are parallels in Japan's WW2 strategy and Chinese strategy now in Indochina sea



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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by ramana »

What are the parallels please tell us?
What do you want people to take away.
You have seen the videos, what did you learn?
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by tandav »

ramana wrote:What are the parallels please tell us?
What do you want people to take away.
You have seen the videos, what did you learn?
China's navy (official and unofficial) is bigger than all other navies in the Indochina sea (including Japan and USA). The Japanese in WW2 had prepared a military invasion plan to capture most of colonial Indo China. Japan in 1941 succeeded in its Asia strategy.

China has replicated a similar naval build out in 2021. Just like the Japanese captured Malaya speedily, China is preparing to do so on Taiwan.

The state of the British navy in 1941 against the Japanese could be repeated. The preeminent naval power of the day was wiped off the map within 1 week of deployment. It was only the entry of USA and Indian troops that managed to save the Allies from defeat. There seem to be similar attitudes of technological superiority.

Similarly Today however it appears that ideological states following Islam, Russian oligarchy and Chinese communism see common foes in the democratic block and have already informally banded together.

India and other nations best be prepared for total war in near future. It could also turn nuclear.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by kit »

With China its not a question whether there might be a war, only when. Like it or not, nuclear armed or not., unless and until Chinese population throws out the communist party., there will be a war, it's a given.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by S_Madhukar »

While some of our folks believe (pipe dream) in Akhand Bharat it is pretty clear and understandable Chinese will practically want to make the Far East their vassals once again as was the case in history and with a sizeable nuke arsenal they can keep Unkil at bay at least in a game theorist way. When they do brandish their fire power by aggressive manoeuvres or worst case even with a few nuke tests in the Strait of Taiwan or Sea of Japan, East Asia will fall in line and accept their hegemony at least symbolically to maintain their status quo … may be US will lose their bases as a condition of peace. How many Biden babies are willing to fight for a piece of land in the Far East today … no MacArthur today. It will be a walkover for China, unlike WW2 where the Japanese could not resist US manufacturing power or nuke power. The Chinese of course will prefer that just a normal Beijing parade or a fleet review is enough to scare their enemies instead of fighting an actual war. In fact I see when push comes to shove Taiwan will accept some kind of deal with mainland may be HK style as Cheeni Cheeni bhai bhai and Eleven will have his wish.

Problem I see is we are still looking for allies and alliances. I mean we have had an existential threat the moment Bakis Got the bum but 40 years later we are tardy in our own deterrence just happy matching the Bakis with minimal deterrence. By the time we act we will have silos on the Tawang or Tibet border. Unkil or Quad or UN or anyone don’t care about us .. we can be a nice martyr for them, openly they will praise our resilience Gandhi and all and at home tell their kids to not be idiots like us. Either we do to the Cheeni what the Bakis do to us or we act like Unkil and invest and safeguard our future. A nuke power like us running around looking for imported weapons at the 11th hour only makes us marginally better than Bakis.

There are recent reports of Chinese nuke silos increasing… I wonder if we have invested in our own or a valiant One man army Arihant is all we have. A little dhoti shiver and action in this will be our best hope not QUAD
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Jarita »

This is a useful thread. One of the things I am seeing in China is a deep desire to claim cultural roots. The amount of cultural appropriation from India is massive. Their Wuxia stuff has Indian outfits, jewelry and themes. The same with appropriating Buddhism and Ayurvedic remedies (as part of TCM).
They are a copy cat nation but like an invasive species completely destroy everything they occupy.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by S_Madhukar »

Jaritaji a commie atheist mindset aids cultural misappropriation… of course they did so in the past too but somehow it seems that mindset allows you to use and throw culture as one wishes as the times come and go. Is it adaptability or flexibility or emptiness , who knows :)
It may well be what makes them good capitalists as well, after all there is money to be made either way :wink:
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Cyrano »

European view on China:

Europe’s Response to China’s Military Strategies and Challenges
(Emphasis author's)
China’s mix of rising capacities, assertive and even aggressive behavior, and ambiguous or defensive pronouncements present special difficulties for Europeans'': our Senior Advisor for Asia, François Godement takes stock of China’s military strategies and lists seven principles or possible modalities for a European response. This paper derives in part from François Godement’s participation in a session titled "China's military build-up", organized on June 16 2021, by the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, in association with the European Parliament Delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China.

Europe faces a dilemma in confronting China’s challenges, from human rights to China’s military aggressivity and its mobilizational state economy. The challenge is greater in the long term than Russia’s immediate actions in our region.

Were the Europeans to agree on numerous declarative pushbacks against China’s breaches of international law - whether it is South China Sea, border issues with India, a breach of the 1984 Sino-British treaty on Hong Kong’s or actions against ethnic and religious minorities - those pushbacks are likely to remain mostly declarative. The sanction route is more difficult to follow against a first-class economic power with which we have many entangled interests. By contrast, Russia’s present and future economic clout is doubtful, to say the least. And China’s present path has largely discarded ambiguity.

The post-2009 arrival of a stronger brand of nationalism in China, and the accumulation of power at the apex of the CCP by Xi Jinping after 2012 already implied a growing sense of systemic conflict with democracy. His immediate predecessors had been more restrained in this direction.

But even so, no one predicted the return to totalitarianism, the ideological mass campaigns, the reversal of policies towards minorities up to the persecution of ethnic groups and the halt to the market reform process that is an unavoidable consequence of these new political realities - of the "new normal", as many call it. Some see this as a perhaps temporary return to Cultural Revolution politics. But China’s party-state has gigantic technological and financial means at its disposal, and that means its leverage has expanded, including abroad.

By comparison, the rise of China’s military capacities and the outward spreading of the PLA wings are no surprise. They stand in continuity with the policies enacted under Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, when China’s navy was the first PLA arm to be boosted. The aim was to recover what China viewed as its territory, and to begin balancing other military powers in its maritime neighborhood. Moreover, there is also a continuum of yearly rising defense expenditures. Today, it is futile to debate whether these yearly increases proceed faster than the GDP growth rate, since in any case, the rise of both in absolute terms dwarfs that of every other nation. While one country’s economic progress does not necessarily come at the expense of another, such a strong rise in military expenditures necessarily reflects a changing balance of power. China’s defense budget is higher than that of all Asian countries combined. It comes second only to the US - with a very different spending structure that favors equipment over salary costs.

Military hardware and developments are one thing. Displayed intentions and actions are another. Whereas the increase in capacities has been continuous for at least 32 years, strategic intentions have varied - or they have exited Deng Xiaoping’s era of calculated ambiguity, well expressed by the formula translated as "hide your capacities and bide your time". Yet, some characteristics have endured. They can be described as follows: challenge and intimidate, but do not cross the red line of an escalating conflict; stay in control of the tension, describe your own position as merely reactive and operate within a grey zone, using in part paramilitary forces. This is an incremental strategy rather than a great leap one - for the time being.

Over time, China pushes the envelope further, therefore unveiling strategic intentions. Some observers long wanted to believe that China did not claim the entire South China Sea within the so-called Nine-Dash Line (critics called this the "doughnut hole theory"). In practice, it is very difficult to identify what China does not claim there. Yet, in a South and East China Seas context, where some other countries have occasionally had skirmishes leading to some casualties, the only lethal incidents that China has been engaged in are with Vietnam - a socialist brother which has the misfortune of being a neighbor and is not covered by an alliance. It is only last year, in Ladakh, that we have seen a lethal initiative by the PLA against Indian forces, and even that has been conducted without firing guns, but with knives and other assorted means. It is perhaps no accident either that India is not a member of any formal alliance.

The apparent gap between the increased PLA potential and deployment and its avoidance of armed conflict is often highlighted by China as a virtue, and in contrast with an interventionist America: "we will not fire the first shot"; "we do not interfere in other people’s affairs".

Over decades, there was little linkage between China’s strategic claims and challenges, and its economic ties to the outside world. Only on "core interests" (Taiwan, Tibet and interference over human rights at the time) did China openly link politics and economics. And over the case of Taiwan, effective economic links had been established with the party that used to be the CCP’s challenger to legitimacy.

All of the above have given rise to some complacency among China’s main partners, and a prevalent view that the Indo-Pacific was perhaps the field of competition between China and the United States. Business could go on as usual, especially for other countries or regions that felt they had no stake in a struggle for power.

That perception is outdated today. And it is not Donald Trump, or a sudden rise of hawks in other countries, or a belated attempt by the United States to stop China’s economic rise that have made it obsolete. It is China’s own choice.

Intentions and their manifestations have changed under Xi Jinping. In 2013, admiral Zhang Zhaozhong said China was using a "cabbage strategy" to reclaim Flipino islets, surrounding these with layers of hybrid military and auxiliary forces. Recently, the French Navy chief of staff expanded the notion, terming it "an asphyxiating strategy" across the Indo-Pacific. He described in very concrete terms how that applies to the French navy in the same region.

The PLAN’s (People Liberation’s Army Navy) posture is also contradictory: while China’s doctrine is that innocent passage requires previous declaration, China’s PLAN engages in non-declared passage in other zones.

China’s long arm now extends to the Strait of Hormuz, and to a frequent and significant presence in the Mediterranean. Although part of the motivation for port acquisition or management is economic, there is no doubt that, in some cases, this will also facilitate port calls by the PLAN or even the intention of basing rights in the future.

In Europe, what was a studied ambiguity regarding some of Russia’s actions (from Abkhazia and Ossetia to Crimea and Donbass) is turning into opportunistic collusion on Belarus - where indeed China has established a logistical and economic foothold, and which is now its main rail connection to the EU.

True, China’s behavior in the Indo-Pacific as of now does not apply to other regions of the globe. Elsewhere, the PLA flies its flag or occasionally maneuvers with de facto political allies. China also displays another face, via contributions to multinational peace-keeping, and formal visits and exchange of niceties with countries that occasionally choose to turn a blind eye on China’s behavior in its own region.

We should not be fooled by these two tactics: the slow motion asphyxiation of others in order to impose new "rules" against international law, and the multilateral veneer of China’s international strategy.

But China’s mix of rising capacities, assertive and even aggressive behavior and ambiguous or defensive pronouncements present special difficulties for Europeans.

Whatever the meaning and end goal of a "strategic autonomy" for Europe, whatever the level of deployment and preventive presence of individual member states in the Indo-Pacific, the European Union and/or its Member States do not possess the military capacities that could challenge China’s actions - save at the nuclear level for one Member State and for another European nation, and that is the least desirable option of all. Nor do all member states have a direct and tangible stake in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. But China is our first commercial partner. That leads to an economic interdependence which, in spite of China’s huge trade surplus, works to its advantage.

China is a centralized and politicized actor, whereas the EU takes more time to reach consensus and allows more diverse interests to express themselves.

In the face of these difficulties, it has been tempting to compartmentalize the strategic competition and systemic conflict with China, in order to keep economic exchanges and cooperation going. It is also easy to stand back from other Asian partners and the United States, leaving the "heavy lifting" to others and sticking to declaratory stances or symbolic actions. The sanctions adopted so far against some mid-level PRC individuals belong to that category. So far, that catalogue of sanctions has kept a division between political and economic issues at the public level. Opinion campaigns - for instance, on sourcing from Xinjiang - are different, but they are not a Member State or EU stance so far.

The defects in this posture are at least three-fold:

It is China which now links economics with politics, threatening many of its partners over trade, taking economic sanctions in Hong Kong over pretexts of national security, instigating from the top boycotts of certain European firms

Given Europe’s limited military leverage and reluctance towards economic sanctions, China has been able to discount statements regarding its breaches of international law. Tellingly, the only international arbitration which it respects is the WTO’s, even if China is largely reluctant to a significant reform of the organization

Emphasizing "strategic autonomy" in a region where our tools so far are limited, and insisting on specific European interests vs. transatlantic partnership, weakens both the EU and the United States. China is well aware of these divisions and tirelessly works to enlarge them. But China does not reward those who stand apart from a strategic consensus, instead probing their weaknesses to enlarge its own influence. The ongoing story of a huge Chinese university campus in Budapest, after Hungary’s various breaks from a European consensus, is a good example of that proactive push. Various disappointments in other Member States - and in the United Kingdom - are also telling. The reason for this is simple: as a Leninist state, China believes that democracy is fickle and under influence. It trusts no partner and no one individual. Keeping promises is not part of the equation.

In fact, sitting still now ensures that, barring unforeseen events, China’s influence and practices will only grow and will increasingly concern our own regional environment, if this is not already the case.

This is of course not a prediction for the indefinite future: China’s history moves in cycles, its society and political culture will bounce back. A totalitarian system largely led by one man is vulnerable over time. But predicting that moment is impossible.

In the face of these difficulties, some principles and possible modalities for Europe’s response can be described as follows:

* The unanimity requirement in EU Foreign Policy and Security is dangerous, given China’s leverage on Member States. If the rule cannot be changed at the EU level, a transitional and informal practice of unanimity - 1, or -2, should be enacted for statements and decisions. This does weaken overall institutional cohesion but is still preferable to an ASEAN-like paralysis.

* In the Indo-Pacific, where there are by far not enough EU or European military assets, symbolic support and concrete coordination with the United States remain essential. Because this does not imply automatic alignment, these actions should be met by increased communication and dialogue, including on military issues, from the United States.

* In third areas (neither EU nor Indo-Pacific), Europeans should increase their role as a military and security provider. This is not only about weapons - training the military is an aspect that the PLA has also doubled down on. Africa today, Latin America tomorrow, are regions where a struggle for influence is underway.

* Our unconditional support for principles of international law and values should be matched with a strong dialogue, in particular in the Indo-Pacific, to strengthen common interpretations of these values and principles. On freedom of navigation, including EEZs, not all regional states align with the prevailing interpretation. Narrowing those differences would be useful. Another difficult subject is that of human rights and their scope. We should avoid the situation where differences of interpretation help China to garner allies of circumstance in key international votes. This is also important for the European Parliament.

* The EU - if it reaches something approaching a consensus - is stronger in non-military responses: technology, economy and aid policies. This is where the unity of action with other like-minded partners is essential. Investment screening is not sufficiently operational without an international exchange of information and joint decisions. Given China’s hybrid civil-military economy, technology denial in critical areas has become an important issue. The competition over digital platforms will be waged largely in third markets: EU norm-making and negotiation should proceed from that reality. China is so aware of this that, in spite of its Great Firewall, it is preparing data protection laws that in some respects mimic the EU’s GDPR. However, the loopholes in China’s draft are huge, and ultimately will be defined by the state alone. The EU’s aid policies are commendable in size, and are being reoriented through an Indo-Pacific strategy. But they must be further strategized, with as much coordination as possible with the United States and Japan.

* Tackling economic issues in this context means taking on the question of economic decoupling. Let’s face it: China sought foreign investors and companies for the capital, but even more and increasingly for the innovation and technology that they bring. Denying technology means diminishing the attractiveness of foreign capital for China. Even apart from the risks of sanctions and counter sanctions, this is not an attractive proposition for foreign firms that have a short term profit horizon and depend on the China market. But the writing is on the wall. China has constantly accelerated its drive for indigenous innovation and self-sufficiency over the last decade, while seeking gains in foreign market share. The last year and a half further testifies to this trend. Overall, encouraging China’s mercantilism feeds the military-industrial complex of the country. Since we cannot directly counter it alone, we must both seek allies and cap our attraction to China’s sellers. Reinforcing our tech export controls is essential for national security reasons, but we need not deny that it is also another tool that can be used against China’s many strategies for technology acquisition.

* Weaknesses in the international supply chain, whether they have a geopolitical or industrial reason, or even stem from a natural event, have come to the fore. The issue of trust has become paramount - and as we have witnessed over vaccines, it is not easily ensured. The answer to these weaknesses is not a simple yes or no. But several reports have described the key vulnerabilities of the European economies to external suppliers - and China is prominent among these. Reducing those weaknesses is a long-term objective.

Relations with China have become a struggle of will, which the Chinese leader feels he will win over democracies: this is the reason why China has escalated over sanctions and is promulgating open-ended legislation to this effect. China also has ideological and tactical allies - a coalition where no one possesses the economic clout of China. Europeans are often divided on whether Russia or China are the principal challengers and threats to our values and interests. Russia appears more proximate and immediate, while China is more long term and over the horizon. We find the same short-term/long-term divide between the China interests of many companies and public interest (which in fact includes the longer term interest of these companies). Overcoming these divides is crucial.

On the strictly military response, clearly not the EU’s forte, strengthening EU and Member State contributions is important, including for the signal it gives our partners in the Indo-Pacific, and to China itself. Reducing the problems to a power contest between China and the United States is an encouragement to China’s aggressivity. That the European Union has less geopolitical weight than it should does not mean that it should stay on the sidelines - or let itself be sidelined.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Shwetank »

Wasn't sure where to post this as couldn't find a general China thread. Still useful in understanding various methods Chinese state employs, especially the non-physical dimensions, which are also often employed by other groups, especially in India. This is something India is very susceptible to and hard to deal with as there is often nothing concrete to point to as with physical repression, but can often be far more damaging long term.

Cold Genocide: Falun Gong in China
The article explores patterns of a cold genocide in the eradication campaign against Falun Gong. Falun Gong is a spiritual practice that has been targeted for eradication by the Chinese regime since 1999. In comparison to the documented cases of genocide, the genocide of Falun Gong stands out as anomalous because it is virtually ignored. The article seeks to elucidate the multi-faceted nature of this concealed genocide from an interdisciplinary perspective encompassing social work, medicine and law, In particular, the article demonstrates that the eradication campaign against Falun Gong is distinguishable as a cold genocide as it is: (1) multi-dimensional - the destruction of Falun Gong practitioners is not only physical but psychological, social and spiritual; (2) subtle in terms of visibility; and it is (3) normalized in the society in which it takes place. The interplay of these invisible, non-physical elements of eradication renders the cold genocide of Falun Gong insidious, potent and deadly. It is also the interplay of these factors that led this genocide to be underrepresented in genocide studies today.
Interestingly, the appendix also lists the 1971 massacres committed by Pakis as one of the genocides of last century, rare mention in western human rights discourse.
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Re: Quad News and Discussion- June 2021

Post by KL Dubey »

Rudradev wrote:One thing confuses me about the Quad.
Abandon "two-front" thinking and see the light. The only real adversary that India has, literally all the way to Mars, is communist China. The objective is to create a single "front" from the rann of Kachh to Arunachal, supplied almost entirely with Chinese weapons and other resources. In future that may also be envisioned to include the Nepal, Bhutan, and the Burmese borders.

I do agree with you that ultimately India will have to stand alone. That is the only real test of any global power. Can't get by just with alliances like the Quad. That said, Quad is good if we step up and start to drive the agenda and the other players, especially Japan and Australia, get co-opted. The same goes for the India-France-Aus trilateral which presumably will be focused on the southern IOR.
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Re: China's Global Strategy-I

Post by Rudradev »

What exactly do you mean by "two-front" thinking?

Do you mean the idea that India has to fight on a Pakistan front as well as a China front? In that case, you obviously haven't read my post. viewtopic.php?p=2504741#p2504741 "Pakistan" isn't mentioned even once. Only assets like KKH and CPEC are referred to, and they are clearly 100% Chinese-controlled assets even though they nominally lie in Pakistan.

On the other hand China has a much more pronounced two-front situation on its hands than India does. To ignore this is daft. 94% of its population, economy, and technology centers lie to the east, as well as the threat from its most powerful adversaries. Despite whatever economic and infrastructural advantages it might have, it faces huge challenges in balancing adequate military resources between its Pacific seaboard and an Indian frontier that is at minimum 2000 km away from any PLA Eastern or Southern Theatre Command HQ. This is a reality China has to contend with, and it is the primary strategic reason for India to cooperate with the Quad.

If all had been quiet and a true "G2" accommodation had been reached by China and the US on its eastern front-- then everything you describe would have been possible. Beijing could have concentrated all its resources (which it would very well need to) in order to cut off India from the rest of Asia from Kutch to Myanmar. But its resources are nowhere near infinite, and their division across two fronts greatly hampers its ability to achieve that under present circumstances.

The problem arises if the other three members of the Quad manage to arrive at an accommodation with China on its eastern front. If some understanding is reached, for example China agreeing not to alter the overt status quo in Taiwan straits while US, Australia, and Japan recognize its primacy over navigation rights in the South China Sea-- then there is the capacity for a lot of pressure to be relieved, and for many more PLA military and intelligence assets to be redeployed to focus on India.
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