johneeG wrote:a) I don't think Bhaarath was really in Soviet orbit in 1964 totally. There was really no reason to rebuff Bhaarath's requests unless America knew about the impending war plans of Pakistan and wanted Pakistan to win. I think Bhaarath decisively moved into Soviet orbit during Indira's time. That also is interesting point: why did Indira moved the country totally into Soviet orbit? She could have also tried to balance both cold-war sides like Nehru did.
I agree with the bolded part (emphasis mine) above. It was not, but the signs were unmistakable.
We have to look separately at the political and economic relationships. That Nehru was a socialist with communist leanings was known to the entire world even before he became India's PM. In fact, one hope of the British government was that Nehru's socialism which he included in INC's political manifesto of 1936 (before the Provincial Assembly elections under the new GoI 1935 Act) would by itself lead to the defeat of the INC in elections and blunt the INC. One of the fears of the landlords in United Provinces, the Punjab and Bengal was that they would lose their land holdings if INC came to power under Nehru and the Muslim league exploited that fear of the Muslim landlords. Nehru forcefully implemented his socialistic policies after Independence and the US which sought a MFN-type relationship with us was put off by these policies. There is a very blurred line between communism and socialism. On the political front too, India, which had already acquired a fierce reputation for being the voice of freedom from oppression by colonialists, did not condemn the highhanded suppression by the Soviet Union of the Hungarian uprising in 1956. The Indian position in the Korean War (1950-53), or PRC's entry into the UN showed a leaning towards the Communist ideology. Eisenhower opined that Nehru was “falling for the Moscow line — buying their entire bill of goods”. How could Tito, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, be a non-aligned leader? So, it is not true that until Mrs. Gandhi we were neutral. We might not have earlier had the sort of close relationship with the Soviet Union that we endured during Mrs. Gandhi's time, but our position in most matters that were of interest to the western world went against them and certainly appeared to be partial to the Communist bloc.
Nehru's principal foreign policy advisor during this period was the acerbic, but sharp, Communist-sympathizer Krishna Menon, whose far-left views (the INC had considerable leftists within the party with many of them having had education in London which was a den for communism) were well known to everybody. The American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, after a visit to India talked publicly of Communist interference in Nehru's cabinet (Not that Dulles needs to be a touchstone because he was an inveterate India-hater but the impression was accurate).
I am not venturing into Ms. IG's time because the discussion is about whether Bhutto carried out a war against India at the behest of the US and how justified was the US in turning down Indian request for F-104 Sabres.
c) About Bhutto & America: I don't know about the personal relationship of Bhutto with American leadership. But, the reason for my conjecture on Bhutto's role is as follows:
I have seen this particular theme by many Pakistani analysts where they conclude that Ayub Khan was blindly led by Bhutto. And that seems very very strange to me. Ayub Khan was a military man who managed to grab the power. Bhutto was nothing before him. And why would any military man believe a civilian's analysis on war issues? That is only possible if that civilian is actually conveying the views of someone else who the military man respects. Bhutto is ideally placed(as a foreign minister) to be middle-man with foreign countries. America gave all the help that it could to Pakistan to prepare it for 1965 war. So, I conclude that Bhutto must have been the go-between as a foreign minister.
The US-Pak relationship was always very violent in terms of ups & downs. The Americans always distrusted the Pakistanis and the relationship used to swing to the verge of a collapse for one reason or another every now and then. But, certain American assumptions about Pakistan and the need for Pakistani support in its Cold war activities sustained the relationship. Just as other reasons sustained the relationship at other times. This is a recurring theme in the US-Pak equation and
*will not* go away.
The same thing happened in the 60s. Ayub Khan seized power with the blessings of the Americans and imposed the Martial Law. The Pakistanis loved it. But, soon, the political & religious problems overtook him. He was forced to lift the Martial Law and accede to introduction of democracy. A man who once said that "democracy was suitable only for cold countries" had to introduce a new Constitution and allow political activities. So long as Martial law was in force and he had absolute powers, Gen. Ayub Khan was a confident man, especially with the support from the Americans in spite of the occasional hiccups. However, the lifting of the Martial Law made him feel insecure. He had to contest elections, for which purpose he resurrected the then defunct Muslim League and called it the Pakistani Muslim League (PML). The fast-rising and fiery orator ZA Bhutto caught Ayub's eyes and he was inducted into PML as a deputy leader. This deputy leader advised Gen. Ayub Khan to bestow upon himself the Field Marshal title so that he would forever remain atop the Generals even after democracy was introduced in Pakistan so that military coups to depose him could be averted. Ayub Khan liked that clever-by-half idea and elevated him as his Foreign Minister. As military relationship with the US deteriorated over various issues, the fiery Foreign Minister suggested a closer relationship with China to threaten and bring a semblance of balance. All these things enamoured ZAB to Bhutto and he began to trust him blindly.
In fact, the 1962 supply of arms to India by the US, the 1963 border agreement between Pak & China without taking the US into confidence in spite of being in CENTO, SEATO and having a Mutual Defence Agreement, ZAB's statement in their National Assembly in c. 1963 that if India attacked Pakistan, the "largest state in Asia" would come to its rescue, the aviation accord between China & Pakistan (SEATO & CENTO had barred such accords); Ayub Khan's refusal to attend Kennedy's funeral because he thought that the latter was India-friendly, LBJ's nasty response to ZAB just after the JFK funeral showed a level of unravelling of the US-Pak relationship. In May 1964, LBJ authorized USD 100M worth of arms sales annually to India. This was the time that India asked for F-104 and out of concern for a deteriorating US-Pak relationship, the US refused.
If Bhutto was really responsible for misguiding Ayub Khan and rest of the Pakistan Army in 1965, then he would have been halaled in 1965 itself
In late 1964, in the light of worsening US-Pak situation and his own political survival, FM Ayub Khan had formed a secretive Kashmir Cell to create trouble. The Cell was headed by the Foreign Secretary who of course reported to the hawkish Foreign Minister ZAB. In February 1965, this Cell put the (in)famous plan to FM Ayub Khan. However, Ayub Khan rejected that. In April that year the Rann of Kutch incident happened and the Indian Army decided to withdraw and the matter went to international arbitration. The Kashmir Cell pressed the issue further at this point of time. In May 1965, ZAB, as the foreign minister, wrote to Ayub, "the current relative superiority of the military forces of Pakistan in terms of quality and equipment was in danger of being overtaken". His assessment was based on the Soviet assistance and LBJ's announcement of USD 100M for the Indian armed forces. Ayub Khan eventually gave in and gave the green light on May 13, 1965. Op Gibraltar started on August 5-6. On Sep. 11, Ayub Khan realized that the war was over for Pakistan (according to Altaf Gauhar). Ayub & ZAB secretly flew to meet the "largest Asian friend who was expected to come to Pakistan's help" but that friend advised that Pakistan should continue to fight even if they have to "withdraw to the hills" in the true spirit of Long March and communist revolutions. Ayub had to send ZAB to the UN where he gave a fiery speech and indulged in theatrics that endeared him to the masses back home. The people's anger moved towards Ayub Khan.
ZAB was a clever man, way too clever for FM Ayub Khan. As a foreign minister, he attended the Tashkent Peace talks. When Ayub signed it, he denounced Ayub Khan for having surrendered to the Indians. Later, he criticized his boss saying that if only Ayub had heeded his advice and not surrendered to the US pressure for a ceasefire, the war would have been different !! Haven't we seen this behaviour in Kargil too? That was how ZAB transformed himself and became even more popular than before. [/quote]
, with anxiety creeping in when the find they cannot keep up because 1 citizen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan now amounts to less than 1 citizen of India 
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, to give our national ego a boost. It almost sounds like a joke. Increasingly, Pakistan has nothing to offer to the west, including personality and charisma.Pakistan must watch Modi’s gait and gestures. Modi is an astute politician, who has the ability to outsmart rivals with an amazing sense of timing. We on the other hand, are stuck with archaic, redundant policies of following the same deadbeat formula of ‘successes’. There has to be a drastic improvement of the Pakistani image in the west. The US is helping India get armed to the hilt and soon we will lose our only advantage- our military strength. And that is Modi’s aim - the political and military dominance of India. He has a plan? Do we?
(See the picture is much smaller and no one is serious)
