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Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

The Strategic Issues & International Relations Forum is a venue to discuss issues pertaining to India's security environment, her strategic outlook on global affairs and as well as the effect of international relations in the Indian Subcontinent. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
member_29429
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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby member_29429 » 27 Jun 2016 13:33

This is my first post after years of lurking.
When US says india will be admitted before year end, wonder what is there at year end that can't be done now, has it got something to do with with non-Proliferation constituency in domestic politics given US elections or is it that US wants to put some more restrictions on us about what we can export and import before we get into NSG.

As far as china is concerned, I think it is using NSG as a leverage against us to wade us off from SCS and not to go ahead on LSA agreement with US. I think india's best interest also lies in re-balancing our relations between US and china and not to go firmly in US lap. In the whole episode it's the US which is the bigger looser and not china, this NSG snub will only force us to re-balance our relations with china.
Last edited by member_29429 on 27 Jun 2016 14:12, edited 1 time in total.

kit
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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby kit » 27 Jun 2016 13:46

NSG admission was quid pro quo for the climate deal ..no NSG NO DEAL

Hersh
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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby Hersh » 27 Jun 2016 14:06

Will it be better for India to try to change the NPT cutoff date to 1974 and be declared as the original Nuclear Power State? Guessing that NPT draft change wont be consensus based. And then try NSG.

SSridhar
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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jun 2016 14:23

Posting this rather longish article in full as this is the most comprehensive treatise so far on NSG and India's admission. Apparently, this article was written before the Seoul plenary.

Membership Expansion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group - G. Balachandran, Reshmi Kazi and Kapil Patil, IDSA

Part 1: Rules for Admission of New Members

The Indian application for NSG membership, followed by that of Pakistan, has rekindled much interest in both official circles as well as among security analysts in India, Pakistan and elsewhere. Much of the writing on the subject of NSG expansion revolves around the NSG’s Rules of Procedures and membership requirements.

During its initial period of existence, NSG did not have any fixed criteria for membership. Although the group was formed as early as 1974, its first formal plenary meeting was held only in 1992 in Warsaw. At that meeting, the 27 Participating governments took a consensus decision of requiring the application of fullscope IAEA safeguards to all current and future nuclear activities as a necessary condition for all significant and new nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states.

It was only at the 1993 Lucerne Plenary that the NSG adopted its first procedural Arrangement. According to this, the membership criteria were:

  1. Membership of the Nuclear-Suppliers Group initially consists of the countries adhering to the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1, Part 1 and 2) and fully participating in the Plenary Meeting in Lucerne in 1993.
  2. Countries other than those referred to in paragraph 1 (a) may be invited to join the NSG by a consensus decision of its members. Consensus may be achieved intersessionally by the Chair through regular channels.
  3. While it is understood that prospective members would, as a rule, adhere to INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1 in its entirety before being considered for membership, it would also be possible to invite adherents to part 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1 to participate in Plenary Meetings prior to their adherence to Part 2. Until these countries have adhered to Part 2, they will only take part as observers in Plenary Meeting discussions on issues related to Part 2.

Although at this time, the NSG had no NPT requirements, in view of the fact that it had adopted full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports by NSG members, from 1993 onwards the NSG had an unwritten requirement of full scope safeguards as a precondition for NSG membership. Thus Argentina, although it had acceded to NPT only in 1995, was nevertheless admitted as a member at the April 1994 Madrid Plenary as its quadripartite agreement, resulting in full scope safeguards in Argentina, had come into force in early March 1994.

Subsequently, in view of the increasing number of countries desiring to be members of the NSG, the 2000 Paris Plenary mandated the NSG Implementation Working Group (IMP) to elaborate a draft paper presented by them on how a restructured NSG might operate and make proposals to the Aspen Plenary.

At the 2001 Aspen Plenary the IMP presented their document ‘Procedural Arrangement for the NSG’, with a consensus recommendation that the Plenary endorse, adopt and implement it, with the exception of one reserve. Nevertheless, it was clarified that there was no intention behind this reserve to block restructuring or to prevent a final decision on the Procedural Arrangement document at the Plenary. Accordingly, the 2001 Aspen Plenary adopted by consensus the new “Rules of Procedure.”

With respect to participation in the NSG, the Plenary adopted the following:

“5. PARTICIPATION IN THE NSG

Participation in the NSG as of 11 May 2001 consists of those governments adhering to and having exchanged diplomatic notes of acceptance of the Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology (respectively comprising IAEA publications INFCIRC/254/Part 1 as amended and INFCIRC/254/Part 2 as amended, including their Annexes), and referred to in footnote 1 of this document. Governments other than those referred to in footnote 1 may be invited to join the NSG by a consensus decision of the NSG Participating Governments. Consensus may be achieved intersessionally by the Chair through regular channels.

5.1 PARTICIPATION: FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

The following factors, among others, should be considered by Participating Governments when dealing with the possible acceptance of a government as a new Participating Government. A new Participating Government should:

5.1.1. be able to supply items (includes transit items) covered by the Annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the Guidelines;

5.1.2. adhere to and act in accordance with the Guidelines;

5.1.3. have in force a legally-based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;

5.1.4. be a party to the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco or Bangkok or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and in full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s), and, as appropriate, have in force a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA;

5.1.5. be supportive of international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.

5.2 PARTICIPATION: PROCEDURE

Adherence

5.2.1 To be eligible to become a new NSG Participating Government, a government must have adhered to the Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology.

Such adherence is accomplished by sending an official communication to the Director-General of the IAEA stating that the government will act in accordance with the Guidelines. This communication is to be intended for publication in the INFCIRC series.

Participation procedure

5.2.2 If the government concerned has adhered to the Guidelines and is interested in becoming a Participating Government of the NSG, it should indicate its desire to do so to the current NSG Chair directly or through the Point of Contact.

5.2.3 The NSG Chair will then inform the Participating Governments of the interest of the government concerned, of the Chair’s views with regard to its merits and of the procedure to be followed, and will seek the views of Participating Governments on the Chair’s recommendations.

5.2.4 The Chair may recommend either that an intersessional decision be taken on the government’s request for Participating status or that the matter be referred to the next Plenary for consideration and/or decision.

5.2.5 If an intersessional decision is recommended by the Chair, the POC will, upon guidance from the Chair and by a specific date, seek acceptance by the Participating Governments of the specific government’s request for Participating status. As a rule, the Chair’s recommendation would contain as annexes the official communications concerning the request for Participating status, adherence to the Guidelines as well as any other relevant information, particularly concerning the requesting government’s export control legislation and procedures.

5.2.6 If all Participating Governments accept the government’s request for Participating status and so inform the POC in writing, the Chair will then inform the government concerned that it has been invited to become a Participating Government of the NSG.

5.2.7 Participation will become effective on the date set by the Chair for, and upon completion of, an exchange of notes of acceptance of the Part 1 and Part 2 Guidelines, and of the document “Procedural Arrangement for the Nuclear Suppliers Group” and its Annexes, including the Part 2 MOU4. The POC will provide model diplomatic notes: i) for the requesting government to provide a note to each existing Participating Government, and ii) for existing Participating Governments each to provide a note to the government concerned, declaring that as of that date the government concerned is considered a Participating Government of the NSG.

5.2.8 If the decision on a request for Participating status is referred to the Plenary, the Plenary will decide on the matter taking into consideration the factors listed as relevant in this regard and the requirement set out under point 5.2.7 above. The Plenary will set a date for the exchange of notes required by point 5.2.7 above.”

There has been extensive discussion and debate on the phrase “Factors to be Considered” for Participation (See 5.1 above). The United States, in its “Food for Thought” paper submitted to the 2011 Plenary, had argued that the factors “should be considered by the Participating Governments” and are not mandatory criteria that must be met by any proposed candidate for NSG membership. The procedural Arrangement does not require that a candidate meet all of the stated criteria.

According to the IMP, it had considered whether a reference to ratification of an Additional Protocol with the IAEA should be added as a factor to be taken into account when considering future requests for participation in the NSG. As the IMP reported “A significant number strongly supported the idea and saw no difficulty in it, given that it would be just one factor among many for consideration and that non-ratification would not necessarily preclude a government from achieving participation status” [emphasis mine]. Part of the reason for the omission is, of course, the fact that some NSG Participating governments have not signed/ratified the Additional Protocol and are strongly opposed to such a move.

China’s Membership

How far has the NSG, as a group, followed its own rules? For instance, it has stated clearly that “If a government concerned has adhered to the Guidelines and is interested in becoming a Participating Government of the NSG, it should indicate its desire to do so to the current NSG Chair directly or through the Point of Contact.” It has also stated clearly that adherence requires that “a government must have adhered to the Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology” [emphasis mine]. And that “Such adherence is accomplished by sending an official communication to the Director-General of the IAEA stating that the government will act in accordance with the Guidelines. This communication is to be intended for publication in the INFCIRC series.”

The Chinese government, when it sent its adherence letter to the DG IAEA, hedged its bets by stating that “the Chinese Government has submitted its application for the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China will, once admitted into NSG, act in accordance with the NSG Guidelines” – a clear departure from the NSG Rules of procedure. Yet, the NSG overlooked this error.

China’s second transgression from the established NSG rules is with reference to its continued nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. After the 2000 Paris Plenary, the IMP in carrying out its mandate had considered an amendment to the NSG Guidelines on “grandfathering” by establishing a policy of requesting applicants for membership to provide information of contracts or agreements, which it feels meets the exemption provisions of paragraph 4(c) of the Guidelines of Part 1. Although this was not formally recommended at that time in 2002, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that it became a practice since then.

According to a November 2008 cable from the US Secretary of State,

“As part of joining the NSG in 2004, China disclosed its ongoing civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Thus, that ongoing cooperation was grandfathered and is limited to construction of Chashma II Nuclear Power Plant for Pakistan; life-time support and fuel supply for the safeguarded Chashma I (construction completed in 1999) and II (construction likely completed by 2011) nuclear power plants; supply of heavy water and operational safety service to the safeguarded Karachi nuclear power plant; and supply of fuel and operational safety service to the two safeguarded research reactors at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). China’s statement did not make any reference to other nuclear cooperation activities that it had committed to undertake in the future. The ongoing work was grandfathered under the exception in Paragraph 4(c) of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 to the NSG Guidelines provision requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply of trigger-list items. For countries, like China, that adhere to the NSG Guidelines after April 3, 1992, the exception in Paragraph 4(c) (for agreements or contracts drawn up prior to April 3, 1992) does not apply to agreements (to be) drawn up after their date of adherence.

Here again, the NSG could not take any action against China and hence overlooked the Chinese violation of its rules.

Thus, all in all, (i) the Guidelines and Rules of procedure were not iron clad requirements and (ii) some countries had wilfully violated these rules with impunity without any adverse consequence. Hence, the recent Chinese assertions that its policy is not anti-India but is only for a rule-based process does not and should not carry much weight. In any case, NSG members will themselves be aware of the Chinese undertakings at the time of its admission and if these had been violated.

Part II: Evaluation of the record of the applicants

Whatever be the final common criteria that is evolved for new membership, in the final analysis, given the objectives of NSG and NPT, new applicants will have to be judged by NSG members on the record of the applicants on the following items:

  1. Non-proliferation record in terms of
    1. Their past history in contributing to the efforts of other states, especially non-nuclear weapon states to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material and missile systems; and
    2. Their history in pursuing domestic nuclear and WMD related missile programmes with clandestinely imported materials, dual-use items and controlled items from other countries through illegal clandestine channels.
  2. Their history of restraint in nuclear weapon and missile programmes;
  3. The benefits the international community will by bringing some, if not all, of their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, materials and technology under international supervision, if not international control. This can be done by way of separation of the nuclear facilities and materials under IAEA safeguards and placing under IAEA safeguards such facilities and materials that would otherwise remain unsafeguarded.

Now that both India and Pakistan have applied for NSG membership, how should NSG proceed in its consideration of these two applications?

NSG is an autonomous private club with its own rules. It arrives at decisions through a consensus process. In the final analysis, its decisions are not subject to any review. While considering the admission of new members, its decisions are taken on purely political grounds. While the NSG’s decisions or the process by which it arrives at decisions cannot be dictated or decided by either India or Pakistan, it is certainly open to discussion. The following are some of the factors that need to be taken into account by NSG members is formulating the requirements for membership and evaluating the two applications:

1) Separation of civil and military nuclear facilities

In 2008, at the time it was granted the NSG exemption, India had undertaken (INFCIRC/731) to: (a) identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner; and, (b) voluntarily place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. At that time, India had 23 power reactors (with a capacity of 24,024 MWth) under operation/construction, of which only six (capacity of 8,099 MWth) were under IAEA safeguards due to treaty obligations. The other 17 reactors (capacity of 15,925 MWth) were all indigenously designed and constructed without any obligation of placing them under IAEA safeguards. As a result of the separation plan, India decided to voluntarily place under IAEA safeguards eight of these unsafeguarded reactors (Capacity 6408 MWth). More such indigenous reactors will be placed under IAEA safeguards as time progresses and India’s civil nuclear programme expands its capacity.

Pakistan today has six power reactors under operation/construction (capacity of 7393 MWth), all of which are under IAEA safeguards due to treaty obligations. It has no civilian reactor facility of its own design/construction. Hence the number of nuclear reactors not under safeguards and not required to be under safeguards that it can voluntarily offer to place under IAEA safeguards is zero (capacity of 0 MWth). Nor is it likely, in fact extremely unlikely, that Pakistan can ever, in the short/medium and possibly long terms, hope to offer any such unsafeguarded reactor facility for IAEA safeguards as a result of any separation plan. Its domestic civil nuclear industry is in its infancy, as is evident from the very high degree of imported systems, components and materials used in the construction of imported power reactors from Chashma I – the contract for which was signed in December 1991 – to the latest power reactor K-2 for which the contract was signed in 2015. In the intervening quarter century, the Pakistani civilian nuclear industry had shown minimal advancement and growth. As a matter of fact, all of Pakistan’s unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, including reactors, are geared towards nuclear weapons production and the number of such facilities as discussed below is increasing progressively.

Therefore, unlike the Indian case which involved bringing under the IAEA safeguards system a large number of unsafeguarded reactors and material with much more to follow in the coming years, Pakistan will not bring to the table any unsafeguarded facility or material either now or in the foreseeable future.

2) Vertical Proliferation: Restraint in the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes as well as nuclear explosive devices

In their statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, the NSG members had affirmed their wish to: (i) “pursue mechanisms to affect positively the nonproliferation commitments and actions of all states”; and, (ii) “seek to promote the fundamental principles of safeguards and export controls for nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes.”

With regard to the first of these goals, at the time of its 1998 nuclear tests, India had two plutonium production reactors (CIRUS and Dhruva). Subsequently, India permanently shut down CIRUS, leaving only one plutonium production reactor operational. Nor has it enlarged or built any new reprocessing plant to separate plutonium.
Sec 104(g)(2)(H)(iii) of the Hyde Act (“Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006”) required that “annually the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including an estimate of the rate of production in India of (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and (II) nuclear explosive devices;” So far, US presidents have submitted seven or more such annual reports. Although these reports are classified, there has been no suggestion so far, from any leaked report of these Presidential annual reports, that India has been increasing the rate of production of either fissile material for nuclear explosive devices or nuclear explosive devices.

Pakistan’s record since 1998, when it also conducted its nuclear tests, has been quite the reverse. At the time of its nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan had one plutonium production reactor at Khushab with a reported capacity of 50-100 MWth. In fact, in April 1998, Pakistan had announced that it had commissioned an unsafeguarded 50 to 70 megawatt (MW) nuclear reactor. Satellite imagery of the Khushab nuclear site has shown construction activities occurring at an accelerated pace. The Khushab nuclear site now has four reactors dedicated to the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. As stated earlier, in the 1990s, the site consisted only of one heavy water reactor with an estimated power of 50 megawatt-thermal (MWth) and an associated heavy water production plant. Pakistan has, however, subsequently expanded its plutonium production capability for weapon purposes by constructing a second heavy water reactor between the year 2000 and 2002, a third one in 2006, and a fourth one in 2011. In addition, it has expanded its reprocessing capabilities as well along with an increase in heavy water production facilities.

From all open source accounts, Pakistan’s production, and rate of production, of fissile material for nuclear weapons has far surpassed India’s capabilities and it is now poised to become the fourth largest stockholder of nuclear weapons after America, Russia and China. The rate of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in Pakistan today is currently probably the world’s fastest, with no sign of it slowing down in any substantive degree


3) Export controls and horizontal proliferation

One of the factors to be considered for membership is how far the prospective member state is “supportive of international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.” There are two elements to this question of non-proliferation – horizontal and vertical. Horizontal proliferation relates to the efforts of a state to either acquire or export controlled and restricted technologies through clandestine channels.

On the subject of clandestine exports, there has not been any evidence of any Indian attempt to proliferate to any other state – nuclear weapon state or otherwise – either fissile material or the technology to produce fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. In the case of Pakistan, the history of the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network is well known and documented. In 2009, the United States imposed sanctions under the provisions of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) on A. Q. Khan and a number of colleagues and cohorts for having materially and “with requisite knowledge contributed through export of certain goods or technologies, to the efforts by non-nuclear weapon states to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device.” These sanctions, imposed on January 9, 2009, are still active and in force today.


Sanctions imposed pursuant to the NNPA cease to apply only if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that:

“(1) reliable information indicates that the foreign person or United States person with respect to which the determination was made under subsection (a)(1) of this section has ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, as described in that subsection; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances from the foreign person or United States person, as the case may be, that such person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, as described in subsection (a)(1) of this section.”

The continued application of these NNPA sanctions imply that the US President is unable, even after a gap of more than nine years, to determine and certify in writing that the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network has ceased its proliferation related activities.

On a number of occasions in the recent past, evidence has surfaced that either the A. Q. Khan network or a variant thereof is still operating, engaging in illicit exports of controlled items to Pakistan from USA and other western countries. Much of the relevant material in connection with these activities will be in the classified files of individual countries. But, undoubtedly, NSG members will have sufficient information on the basis of the informal information sharing scheme followed in the NSG plenaries and will, therefore, be in the best position to judge the relative adherence to non-proliferation by India and Pakistan.

Inward horizontal proliferation – imports – when they are illegal under the laws of the country from where they are imported is also a matter of concern especially when it is done through either ghost/shadow firms or nationals of the country of export. Usually, when such transactions are exposed, either the firms are fined/listed in the Entity List of the exporting country or the nationals are tried and sentenced. Whereas the US and Japanese Entity Lists have added scores of such Pakistani firms to their Entity Lists in the last decade, much after the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network, there have been no, or very few, additions of Indian firms. Here again the Entity Lists of the other members of NSG are not in the public domain but, no doubt, the member countries themselves will have full information on which to base their valuations/judgements.
Part III: Gains if admitted and losses if not admitted

There has been a lot of debate and discussion in India on the rationale behind India’s application for membership in the NSG. What are the potential gains, if any, if India gains admission? And conversely, what are the potential losses if it does not become a member? We shall discuss below not only the potential gains/losses to India on admission to NSG but that of others as well, in particular NSG itself, Pakistan, and other third parties.

Gains for India

The 2005 India-US nuclear deal and the 2008 NSG exemption to India had benefited India enormously. One of India’s major aims in securing the 2008 NSG exemption was to further its civilian nuclear energy programme. The rationale was to “create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.” Lack of sufficient uranium fuel had seriously affected the PLF (Power Load factor) of NPCIL’s operating nuclear power plants. It had fallen from a high of nearly 85 per cent in 2001-02 to a low of 50 per cent in 2008-09.

The NSG waiver facilitated the signing of civil nuclear cooperation agreements between India and several other countries like France (2008), United States (2008), Mongolia (2009), Namibia (2009), Russia (2010), Canada (2010), Argentina (2010), the Czech Republic (revalidated in 2010), Kazakhstan (2011), Republic of Korea (2011), Australia (2014), Sri Lanka (2015), and United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (2015). As a result of these agreements, it became possible to freely import nuclear fuel. In the subsequent years, the PLF rose substantially, reaching 82 per cent by 2014-15.

The NSG exemption also resulted in a number of foreign governments/firms negotiating with India on the export, with subsequent domestic production, of nuclear power reactors, in addition to the already existing agreement in respect of Kudankulam. France-based AREVA was allotted a site in Jaitapur, Maharashtra; US firm Westinghouse was allotted a site at Mithiwardi, Gujarat and US-based General Electrics was provided a site at Kovvada, Andhra Pradesh. These imported reactors were intended to increase India’s nuclear power capacity by nearly 30,000 MWe. That few, if any, of the contracts have been actually finalized is due more to some of the provisions of the Indian Civil Nuclear liability Act than any lack of action from the NSG.

Thus, from one perspective of the future growth of civilian nuclear energy programme, there is no immediate Indian need for NSG membership. However, this assurance is conditional upon a caveat. There is no doubt that if India is to realize its goal of increasing civilian nuclear power capacity in hundreds of GWe (Gigawatt of electricity), it will have to rely heavily on the supply of nuclear fuel, systems and components. While there are no difficulties in accessing the international market and especially the NSG countries, there is always the potential danger of NSG Guidelines being modified in future with adverse impact on the Indian nuclear industry.

It is true that the 2008 NSG exemption did state that: “In order to facilitate India’s adherence to INFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2 and to remain current in its implementation of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to consult with India regarding changes to, and implementation of, the Guidelines and inform the Plenary of the outcome of the dialogue with India. Consultations with India regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their effective implementation by India.” But this does not by itself assure in any unequivocal manner that India’s views on the proposed amendments will be fully respected. It is only with membership that India can assure itself that no decision inimical to its interests will be taken collectively by the NSG.

Hence, India’s membership in the NSG is essential to safeguard future Indian interests in nuclear commerce. However, contrary to some reports and analyses, NSG membership is in no manner a requirement or necessary condition for India to engage in nuclear exports. In fact, even without the NSG exemption, India would have been able to export nuclear technology, systems, components and reactors had it chosen to do so.

Apart from these tangible and essential goals, there is always the goal of making India a part of the global nuclear governance regime in all its aspects – civil application of nuclear science, global nuclear nonproliferation governance, nuclear security to safeguard against nuclear accidents/incidents, protection of the global stock of nuclear material falling in the hands of non-state actors, etc. NSG being one of the pillars engaged in such nuclear governance, it is only natural and fitting that India becomes part of such a global governance architecture in the important arena of nuclear science, technology and applications.

Gains for the NSG

What does the NSG gain from Indian membership? For a long time, the NSG has been grappling with the problem of how to associate the three non-NPT, nuclear weapon capable, countries in global nuclear governance issues. As early as 2001, the NSG Plenary at Aspen “agreed there should be consideration of options for intensified dialogue with non-NSG countries, including those that are not parties to the NPT and that possess developed nuclear capability and are potential nuclear suppliers.” Although the 1st NSG Consultative Group (CG) meeting in late 2001 discussed this item threadbare, members could not reach a consensus and many were not keen on deep engagement with these countries, all expressed a keen desire to engage these countries in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The next stage of a serious discussion of this nature was at the time of the India-US nuclear deal resulting in the grant of NSG exemption for India on a one-time, one-country basis. However, since 2011, NSG plenaries have been discussing the relationship with India, apparently with no consensus. However, the need to engage with these countries, under proper conditions, has only increased with the growth of non-state actor entities interested in acquiring WMD capabilities.

It is true that India’s non-proliferation commitments are not dependent on NSG admission, which may not be true of certain other states which have in the past actually engaged in transferring WMD technologies and systems to NNMS and operating a former IAEA Director General termed as a “Nuclear Wal-Mart”!

So, NSG does not gain much in terms of its nonproliferation efforts by admitting India. Nevertheless, it would gain from admitting the last remaining major nuclear industrial capable nation. In short, while both India and NSG do not stand to gain anything substantial in the immediate and near term future, both stand to gain from being able to forestall any future negative developments.

All in all, while neither side may be desperate to be together, both will only gain with such a partnership even though neither may suffer greatly if there is no partnership.

Gains for Pakistan

The case of Pakistan is entirely different. Since it is a non-nuclear weapon state according to the NPT, and has neither IAEA fullscope safeguards on all of its nuclear activities or a NSG exemption from fullscope safeguards requirements as is the case with India, NSG members, with the exception of China, have refused to engage in any nuclear related commerce with Pakistan. Even China-Pakistan nuclear commerce has been held to be against NSG Guidelines by many NSG member countries. In addition, Pakistan’s domestic nuclear industry, with the exception of nuclear weapons related matters, is underdeveloped as seen from its inability to construct on its own any civilian nuclear power reactors even after operational experience of running power reactors for more than 40 years. Nor has it invested in and developed its uranium resources. Therefore, it in entirely dependent on China for its entire civilian nuclear programme – from systems, components, reactors to nuclear fuel. Even a NSG exemption, like that granted to India, would be of enormous benefit to Pakistan in diversifying its suppliers.

Will NSG gain anything from Pakistan’s admission? It is extremely doubtful. Certainly not in furthering the global nonproliferation norms when Pakistan is still under a number of sanctions for its proliferation related activities. Can Pakistan assist the global nonproliferation regime by bringing under international scrutiny fissile material currently not under any such scrutiny or supervision? No. If Pakistan does become a member and continues with its proliferation activities in contravention of NSG Guidelines, can NSG do anything about it? No, the inability of NSG to do anything about the continuing China-Pakistan nuclear trade, contrary to NSG Guidelines and China’s assurances at the time of its admission, is an indication of its inability, as group, to deter members from carrying out activities barred under its Guidelines. Further, Pakistan apparently sees NSG membership as a means to assist its nuclear weapons programme. In fact, very recently, the US State Department Deputy Spokesperson felt the need to clarify on this by stressing that “this (NSG membership) is not about an arms race and it’s not about nuclear weapons. This is about the peaceful civil use of nuclear energy, and so we would certainly hope that Pakistan understands that.”

Therefore, as far as NSG is concerned, Pakistan’s membership in the grouping will not have any impact on its proliferation related activities and hence on the non-proliferation objectives of the NSG.

Gains for Other Countries

Apart from Pakistan, one state that stands to gain from Pakistan’s admission into the NSG is China. In his address to the 59th IAEA General Conference in September 2015, the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) stated that “Pakistan envisages a nuclear power generation capacity of 40,000 MWe under its Nuclear energy Vision-2050.” Without NSG exemption/membership, Pakistan will have to rely solely and wholly on Chinese financial and supply assistance to achieve anywhere near this target since both its domestic financial resources and nuclear industry capacity and capability are nowhere near the levels necessary for it to carry out this task relying on only its domestic capabilities. While China may not face any problem in financing such a huge programme, it will definitely face immense challenges in being able to assure Pakistan of lifetime supply of fuel on its own. A 1 GWe plant operating at 85 per cent load factor will require about 200 to 250 MT of natural Uranium (NU). The annual requirements for 40 GWe will be anywhere between 8,000 and 10,000 MT of NU, and it is very unlikely that China will be able to undertake such a long term commitment on its own. If, however, Pakistan were able to get an NSG exemption/membership, then while China can easily finance the construction of new power plants, Pakistan will be able to source nuclear fuel from countries other than China. It is, therefore, very much in China’s long term interest to have Pakistan gain NSG exemption and membership.

Part IV: South Korean Plenary


Formally adhering to NSG guidelines, India and Pakistan have applied to the current NSG Chair for membership in the group. Normally, under the Rules of Procedure, the NSG Chair would have informed the Participating Governments (PG) of the interest in membership of the government(s) concerned, of the Chair’s views with regard to its merits and of the procedure to be followed, and would have sought the views of Participating Governments on the Chair’s recommendations. The Chair would have then recommended either that an intersessional decision be taken on the government’s request for Participating status or that the matter be referred to the next Plenary for consideration and/or decision.

However, given the special nature of the application – the first by non-NPT states and that too by states possessing nuclear weapons – and the imminent regular Plenary session in the immediate future, the Chair had recommended an extraordinary plenary session to discuss the special characteristics of the applications prior to the regular plenary session.

In line with NSG practice, there was no public release of the outcome of the extraordinary plenary. It is quite likely that the NSG Participating Governments had decided to refer the final decision to the Regular plenary to be held later.

The regular plenary will now be held on June 23-24. Will there be any final decision on the two applications by India and Pakistan? What are the possible outcomes of the Plenary with respect to admission of new PGs?

Although this is the first time that the NSG plenary would be formally discussing the admission of non-NPT countries, as early as 2001 the NSG Consultative Group (CG) had intense discussions on how NSG should approach its relations with these countries, without coming to any consensus on the subject.

Although there was no formal Indian application for the past more than five years since the US circulated a “Food for Thought” in May 2011, the past five NSG plenaries had regularly “discussed the NSG relationship with India.” The outcome of these discussions is not known officially although reports had suggested that the NSG Participating Governments had not been able to reach a consensus either on the NSG’s relationship with India or the criteria that should be the basis for such a relationship. However, in his briefing on June 13, the Chinese Foreign ministry Spokesman stated “The just concluded NSG meeting had no discussion on the accession of any country. The NSG Chair also announced that there was no such agenda. Everyone just talked about one common concern, which is how to deal with the accession of non-NPT countries to the group. Extensive discussions on this issue are still going on within the group, and such discussions are quite necessary.”

Of the 48 Participating Governments in the NSG, many – USA, UK, France, Russia, Mexico, Switzerland and others – have openly declared their support for India’s admission as a PG. Press reports have suggested that a few NSG PGs – China, New Zealand, Ireland, Turkey, South Africa and Austria – have expressed their opposition to India’s accession to NSG. Of these, only China has openly expressed its opposition and stated its reservation/objection for considering India’s application at this stage. Although China has been vocal in asserting that a number of other countries share its views, the others have not publicly stated either their positions or reservations.

NSG decisions are made by consensus. As explained earlier, while the NSG does have a formal Rules of Procedures and “Factors to be considered” for membership, the group has been flexible both in the interpretation and enforcement of its rules and Guidelines. In the ultimate analysis, the decisions by the individual countries are political in nature and the outcome depends on a number of factors, not all under any one country’s control. So it would be rash to predict what they will do. However, one can assess the various options open to NSG members and make a cautious estimate as to which of the options are more likely.

What are the possible outcomes of the South Korea Plenary? The NSG can either come to a decision or postpone its decision.

What are its possible decisions?

  1. Admit both India and Pakistan: The admission of both India and Pakistan is very unlikely at this stage. India’s association with the NSG has been discussed by the group in an intense fashion since 2008. Also, since then, for the past six years, NSG Participating Governments have been maintaining contact and consultations with India through regular channels, including the Consultative Group and Plenary, for the purpose of considering matters connected with the implementation of all aspects of the NSG Exemption Notification taking into account relevant international commitments or bilateral agreements with India and have been satisfied with the results. In addition, as per the plenary request, the NSG Chairman has been regularly conferring and consulting with India with a view to intensifying dialogue and cooperation with India. So while NSG members are conversant with the various elements of the Indian application, the same is not true as far as their knowledge of the Pakistani application is concerned. Therefore, within the short period of time between the submission of Pakistan’s application and the plenary, the NSG Participating Governments would not have had sufficient exchange of information with Pakistan and, therefore, would not be in a position to make the “admit” decision with respect to that country. Therefore, the admission of both India and Pakistan at this plenary is very unlikely.

  2. Deny admission to both India and Pakistan: The NSG denying admission to both India and Pakistan is very unlikely. Whatever be the views of individual NSG members on NPT membership etc., all would, or should, realize that a blanket ban on their admission to NSG will not serve the global nuclear community’s interests and will undermine their relevance. Therefore, a decision of blanket exclusion of both India and Pakistan from NSG at this time is not on the cards.
  3. Admit India and deny/postpone the decision on Pakistan: While this is possible, the other NSG Participating Governments will have to carry China along with them. Therefore, much will depend on the attitude that China adopts. China has no doubt realized by now that at this juncture it will be very difficult for the NSG to admit Pakistan. It will, however, require strong assurances that the NSG will consider Pakistan’s application on its own merits in the coming days with a further assurance that it will be done as soon as possible. Given the fact that it is in the NSG’s interest to have Pakistan also as a member, it should not be difficult for them to assure China about their best intentions. This scenario is possible although the chances of it are not very high.
  4. Admit India and deny/postpone the decision on Pakistan, but defer both announcements to a later date. This is the most likely scenario. The plenary may decide to postpone the announcement till a later date so as to address a few outstanding issues. Such a step may be taken to assure that Pakistan’s case will be considered on its own merit, that a decision will be taken as expeditiously as possible, and to assure that India will not stand in the way of Pakistan’s admission. It is quite possible that the sudden secret visit of the Indian Foreign secretary to China last week was to convey such an assurance to China. This would seem to be the most probable outcome of the plenary.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 27 Jun 2016 14:35

RajeshA wrote:If one goes back and checks the posts over the Indo-US nuclear deal and the NSG waiver, one finds the same countries who were objecting - Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, followed by Switzerland, Norway and Netherlands.


Austria, New Zealand, Ireland are a constant and apparently oppose every nation that has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, unless USA brings its weight to bear upon them. As is what must have happened in 2008.

Switzerland & Brazil are the stand out wannabe PRC munnas. Their positions truly surprised India. Brazil may even be a potential loan applicant from BRICS bank which is headquartered in Beijing or Shanghai. Their economy is in doldrums. Brazil has raised these questions for the first time, shockingly. Brazil under Dilma Roussef had a great rapport with Modi and would never have done this. Basically the new incumbant is too new and has allowed the situation to be managed by someone else, in this case one suspects PRC.

Turkey is obviously ummah birader, but kept quiet after first objection. They know the game, and if USA puts it's weight behind any resolution, it is unlikely for Turkey to oppose.

In short if USA cracks the whip, there is no opposition in NSG. This time USA didn't crack the whip.

As has been seen in informal panel for consultation decision, China can be willy nilly bypassed by USA any time it wants to. No one in this group opposes that because the group is a USA creation.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 27 Jun 2016 14:38

Chairmanship of BRICS has passed on from Russia to India.

& Brazil opposes India.

the new incumbant is a western plant has single-handedly undermined BRICS.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby Singha » 27 Jun 2016 14:48

I think RIC will be fine without B. as a neutered military power, they can never stand up to be counted as a serious player at the table.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby Gus » 27 Jun 2016 14:49

Hersh wrote:Will it be better for India to try to change the NPT cutoff date to 1974 and be declared as the original Nuclear Power State? Guessing that NPT draft change wont be consensus based. And then try NSG.


i thought NPT is a tougher nut to crack than NSG.

we had terms like NPA - NP Ayotullahs used here...

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 27 Jun 2016 15:04

looking back, I think the entire idea from USA this time round was to form the panel for informal consultations on memberships. That they did. They knew that too many players would be opposed and since it is their own raised munnas, it may not seem prudent to rush through everything in one time. Ofcourse if they support it well & good.

the heavy hand will make itself visible in next plenary, because India's representative will be in the room to push it's case. And not respond through hearsay chits passed outside.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby kit » 27 Jun 2016 15:12

I think Modi was given assurances by the US regarding passage through NSG vs the climate deal ..the PM did spend a lot of personal effort into this .. am certain no NSG means Obama can kiss the climate deal which very well could be his legacy good bye !!

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jun 2016 16:02

Why is NSG Membership important for India? - Ashok Sajjanhar, IDSA
The issue of India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been the focus of significant public and media attention over the past few weeks. It appears to have emerged as the single most critical foreign policy priority for the Modi government. The government is according so much importance to the issue that Prime Minster Modi hurriedly decided at the last minute to include visits to Switzerland and Mexico during his tour to USA and some other countries to raise this issue and obtain categorical support for India’s membership at the forthcoming NSG plenary at Seoul on 23-24 June 2016. It is a reflection on Modi that he was able to get unequivocal support from Mexico and Switzerland although they had initially opposed the grant of a unique waiver to India by the NSG in 2008. They had also expressed concerns about India's NSG membership when the issue came up in informal discussions in recent years.

Under normal circumstances, the issue would probably not have assumed such a high profile. What appears to have brought it so completely under the floodlights is the uncharacteristic and open opposition by China to India’s membership in this body. Over the last few weeks, China has issued several statements, officially as well as through its mouthpiece media publications, maintaining that no single country waiver should be granted to India as was done in 2008. It stated that, in any case, India is not eligible to become a member of the NSG as it is not a member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), adherence to which latter is necessary for membership in the former. China has also averred that for non-NPT members some definite criteria should be evolved rather than granting country specific waivers. At other times, it has stated that Pakistan also has similar credentials to join the NSG; and that if India is admitted, Pakistan should also be admitted simultaneously. China has also maintained that there are several countries which have reservations about India’s membership of the NSG. Further, if only India were to be admitted, it would disturb the nuclear-arms balance in South Asia as India will engage in a massive nuclear weaponisation programme. Finally, China has stated that India's membership will ''jeopardise'' China's national interests and touch a ''raw nerve'' in Pakistan.

None of China’s contentions appear to hold much water. However, before considering them more critically, it will be useful to understand what the purpose and mandate of the NSG is. It is doubtless true that NSG was established in the wake of the Pokhran I peaceful nuclear explosion conducted by India in 1974. The intent and purpose of the NSG is, however, different from that of the NPT. NSG is not an international treaty. It is a group of “nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.” After more than 25 years of its establishment, some suggested guidelines were evolved in 2001 at Aspen for admitting new members to the organisation. Amongst these, membership of NPT is only a guideline, a consideration, and not a mandatory requirement while deciding on a country's application.

India is keen to become a member of the NSG and other export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Agreement and Australia Group as it seeks to significantly expand its nuclear power generation and also enter the export market in the coming years. Although the 2008 NSG waiver does provide significant possibilities for India to engage in civilian nuclear trade with other countries (and indeed, India has entered into such agreements with several countries like Russia, France, UK, USA, Kazakhstan, Australia, and others), membership of the NSG will provide greater certainty and a legal foundation for India's nuclear regime and thus greater confidence for those countries investing billions of dollars to set up ambitious nuclear power projects in India. Moreover, as India’s international political, economic, military and strategic profile and clout increases, India would like to move into the category of international rule-creating nations rather than stay in the ranks of rule-adhering nations. For this, it is essential that India gets due recognition and a place on the NSG high table.

India’s track-record in observing the provisions of the NPT and NSG, even though it has not been a member of either body, is impeccable. If the NSG was able to grant a waiver to India in 2008 on the basis of its past performance, it should have no objection to admitting the country as a member this time as well because of its record in adhering to all its commitments over the last eight years. It is, however, obvious that the decision on 23-24 June in Seoul will be taken by some countries on political considerations rather than on merit. Usually China has been seen to stay in the background and put up smaller countries in the forefront to articulate opposition to any issue that it does not concur with. This time, in addition to instigating smaller countries to raise objections, China has itself come out openly in opposition to India’s membership. Since all decisions at NSG are taken by consensus, any country, small or big, can stand in the way of a consensus. India has therefore launched a blitzkrieg of hectic diplomatic activity to explain its position, allay fears and overcome the opposition of a few countries which might still have concerns.

India has also reached out to China directly to explain that its interest in NSG membership is not guided by any political or strategic considerations but only to facilitate the expansion of its clean and green nuclear energy programme. It took the unusual step of dispatching its foreign secretary to Beijing on 16-17 June to hold discussions on this and other important issues with his counterpart. If the issue goes to the wire, Prime Minister Modi is expected to take up the issue with President Xi Jinping in Tashkent where both leaders are likely to be present for the SCO Summit on 23-24 June.

India became a Member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on 7 June 2016. All 34 members of MTCR are members of the NSG. India is hence assured of support of these 34 members in its quest for NSG membership. It may be noted that China is not a member of MTCR, although it put in its application in 2004, because several members have concerns about China’s dubious proliferation record in supplying missile technology to countries like Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.

Most questions raised by China against India’s membership have little validity. For instance, membership of NPT is not a condition for becoming a member of NSG. It is only a guiding principle to which consideration needs to be given. Pakistan’s credentials for NSG membership are highly flawed and inadequate. Over the last eight years India, as per its commitment, has separated its reactors which are under IAEA safeguards and those which are not. Pakistan has a blemished and flawed proliferation record as it has engaged in illicit supply of nuclear technology and materials to Iran, Libya and North Korea. No comparison between the track records of the two countries is hence justified. India maintains that rather than evolving criteria, its performance should be the basis on which the decision on its application should be taken.

Both substantively and commensurate with its expanding international prestige and profile, India's membership of NSG is of vital significance. A decision at the NSG plenary session in Seoul will depend on China's stance. All other countries are expected to fall in line. President Putin has also assured India that Russia will intercede with China on India’s behalf. India can be reasonably hopeful that China will see reason and logic in India's arguments and will gracefully withdraw its strident opposition. Responsibility devolves upon China, more than it does upon India, to bridge the trust deficit between the two countries. This is a sterling opportunity that China should welcome and grasp with both hands.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jun 2016 16:29

Many countries aired views on non-NPT states' NSG bid: China - PTI
Days after India blamed "one country" for blocking its entry into NSG, China today said "many countries" had expressed their views on the accession of non-NPT countries into the nuclear trading club as it harped on the need for forging consensus over the issue.

"As we have learnt, the plenary meeting issued a news release that the meeting held discussions on technical legal and political issues regarding the accession of non-NPT members and agreed to continue with such discussions," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a media briefing.

Asked about India blaming "one country" of blocking the entry of new members into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) by raising procedural objections, Hong said at the plenary meeting in Seoul "many countries had expressed their views on the accession of non-NPT countries into the group."

"We believe that they should forge a consensus and then make a decision based on consultations and thorough discussions regarding the entry of the specific country," he said, without directly referring to India.

Responding to reports about the appointment of Argentine Ambassador Rafael Grossi as the "facilitator" for informal consultations on India's admission into NSG, Hong said, "We have never heard of any follow up steps."

Hong also did not respond to a question on reports that NSG is expected to meet again later this year after Mexico's initiative to discuss the entry of non-NPT members into the grouping.

"This is what we know about this plenary meeting. I also want to point out that for quite a long time, including in plenary in Seoul, China has been prompting the NSG to have thorough discussions on accession of non-NPT countries," Hong said.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 27 Jun 2016 16:43

Responding to reports about the appointment of Argentine Ambassador Rafael Grossi as the "facilitator" for informal consultations on India's admission into NSG, Hong said, "We have never heard of any follow up steps."


that means they don't matter.

US has allowed China to puff up quite a bit in this matter, later they will prick the balloon. China must be careful not to raise expectations of it's importance to such a level in a forum basically managed by US, and then not be able to sustain the loss of face when things go against them.

Don't come crying to India, saying USA slighted Asian power.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby NRao » 27 Jun 2016 17:16

China is finding skirts to hide behind, where there are none.

As I said before China has been painted into a corner using her own materials.

I think this is the very best chance for India to lead the south-east Asian nations. No need to step on China. Just do the right thing and lead. India started the process at Shangri-la gathering. Continued it post NSG meet. Now need to get to the next gear.

Let China lead and speak for Pakistan and the like. It is fine. Time will close that route too.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jun 2016 17:21

India and the NSG - What game was China really playing? - Shailaja Neelakantan, ToI
Fact 1: India isn't a member of the elite 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), but arch-rival China is. Fact 2: India is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR ), but arch-rival China isn't. Fact 3: Both countries want what they don't have.

And therein lies a tale.

China desperately wants into the MTCR and it very likely opposed India's NSG bid for that reason - a quid pro quo. "Allow us into the MTCR and we will not oppose India's entry into the NSG", might well have been what China was whispering into ears that mattered.

China's proliferation record

Consider that in 2004, China applied for MTCR membership but was denied it because members considered its non-proliferation record dodgy.

"They're not there yet", a US government official told Arms Control Today (ACT) in October, 2004, about China's eligibility. (Arms Control Today is a publication of the US-based non-partisan organization Arms Control Association.)

MTCR members were concerned that Chinese entities continued to provide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as North Korea, the publication said. And since the MTCR aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems - that could be used for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks - selling to North Korea is a definite no-no.

Weeks before the October 2004 meeting, the US imposed proliferation sanctions on eight Chinese companies, ACT reported. "One of those, Xinshidai, was specifically accused of missile proliferation. The others, two of which the Bush administration previously penalized for missile proliferation, were punished for unspecified deals with Iran..." ACT reported.

China in the NSG

Interestingly, that very year, in May 2004, China gained membership to the NSG, despite the opposition by several US lawmakers - both Republicans and Democrats - who were overruled by US President George W Bush. One Republican lawmaker called China one of the world's "principal sinners" when it comes to proliferation, and a Democrat said he had a "deep distrust" of China.

In retrospect, it appears that the refusal to give China MTCR membership was an attempt to set the nuclear balance right, what with China having gained NSG membership earlier that year.

India's MTCR gains

MTCR membership will enable India to buy high-end missile technology and also enhance its joint ventures with Russia, specifically the BrahMos. A few countries, including Vietnam, have already shown interest in buying Brahmos. India will also be able to buy surveillance drones from other countries like the American Predator drones.

In addition, the US, too, might consider exporting to India Unmanned Aerial Vehicles like the Reaper and the Global Hawk.

A senior US administration official said about India: Membership to MTCR "permits India to continue to advance its non-proliferation leadership in the world and contribute to that regime, to limit missile proliferation in the world".

No MTCR membership for China, and, worse, US and European missile technology sanctions against China get it none of the benefits India stands to gain. All it gets is a reiteration of its proliferation record vis a vis Pakistan and North Korea.

So, China opposing India's membership to the NSG to press for its own membership to the MTCR doesn't seem so farfetched.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby Viv S » 28 Jun 2016 05:23

After failed NSG bid, India joins Missile Technology Control Regime

The MTCR membership will help India buy sophisticated missile tech and boost its JVs with Russia and source drones from the US


Image
(From left) India foreign secretary S. Jaishankar receives MTCR membership papers from France ambassador-designate Alexandre Ziegler, Netherlands ambassador Alphonsus Stoelinga and Luxembourg's Charge d’Affaires Laure Huberty, in New Delhi on Monday. Photo: PTI

New Delhi: India on Monday joined the multilateral export control group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as a full member, days after its attempt to be part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) failed thanks to stiff opposition from China and a few other countries.

On Monday, foreign secretary S. Jaishankar signed the document of accession into MTCR in the presence of the ambassadors of France, Netherlands and Luxembourg, in New Delhi, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Vikas Swarup said.

“India has joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) this (Monday) morning. The MTCR Point of Contact in Paris has conveyed the decision regarding India’s accession to the regime through the Embassy of France in New Delhi as well as the Embassies of The Netherlands and Luxembourg,” a foreign ministry statement said.

“India would like to thank each of the thirty-four MTCR Partners for their support for India’s membership. We would also like to thank Ambassador Pieter de Klerk of The Netherlands and Robert Steinmetz of Luxembourg, co-chairs of the MTCR, for facilitating India’s accession to the regime. India’s entry into the regime as its thirty-fifth member would be mutually beneficial in the furtherance of international non-proliferation objectives,” the statement said.

India had applied for membership last year and the grouping earlier this month agreed on India’s entry into the bloc with none of the 34 members voicing any objection.

Last year, Italy had objected to India’s application, unhappy as it was with New Delhi’s stance over the dispute over the detention of two Italian Marines.

The two marines, accused of murdering two fishermen off the Kerala coast in 2012, were allowed to return home and Italy has since dropped its objections.

China, which thwarted India’s entry into the 48-nation NSG at the just-concluded Seoul plenary, is not a member of MTCR.

Since it concluded its civil nuclear deal with the US in 2008, India has been trying to get admission into export control regimes such as the NSG, MTCR, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement that regulate the conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and technologies.

India’s efforts to get into the MTCR also got a boost after it agreed to join the Hague Code of Conduct, dealing with the ballistic missile non-proliferation arrangement earlier this month.

The MTCR membership will enable India to buy sophisticated missile technology and also enhance its joint ventures with Russia. India is also looking to source drones from the US.

The aim of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, complete rocket systems, unmanned air vehicles and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500kg payload for at least 300km, as well as systems intended for the delivery of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD).


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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2016 06:31

The MTCR formalities seem to have been completed rather quickly after the decision to accept India as a full member was taken by that group !

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby member_23692 » 28 Jun 2016 06:35

So, someone correct me where I am going wrong on this.

If India becomes a full member of NSG, it will be able to attract investments, make purchases etc of nuclear material and equipment, but not be able to use ANY of it for military purposes. So, the upside of full membership is that India will be able to establish civil nuclear power plants and that will free up all the domestically available uranium or other fissile material for its military nuclear program.

So, if India does not become a full NSG member, it can still use all its domestically available uranium for its military nuclear program, but not be able to setup any civilian nuclear facilities.

So, the hit to India in not being a full NSG member is in its civilian program, not its military program. Right ? or where am I going wrong here ? And if it is the only hit, then India can live with that, as it can use imported natural gas and oil to generate electricity, in lieu of nuclear power plants or "eat grass", by living with less electricity, in the worst case. Although, in today's scenario and forseeable future, I think there will be plenty of countries other than Muslim countries, including the US, who would be willing, I would imagine, to supply oil and natural gas to India and even assure safe transit of that oil in the event of a war or such happenings. Only the cost of oil and gas to India could be 10% or 20% higher, from these non middle eastern sources, with additional transportation costs and the like. Again, is my assumption on oil and gas true here, that Indian dependence on middle eastern oil is minimal now and in the future ?

Unless, there is some dual use nuke technology that we can buy as full members of NSG, which will assist our military nuke program too or if we have ways of diverting the uranium purchased under full NSG membership to our military nuke program. Is that the case ?

Someone with expertise in this matter can elucidate, please.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby Viv S » 28 Jun 2016 06:46

India already has a waiver from the NSG allowing member states to trade with India in both nuclear material as well as nuclear technology (including enrichment and reprocessing rights). The military program has already been delinked from the civilian sector that operates under IAEA safeguards.

Membership in the NSG makes little material difference to India. Its impact is political. NSG membership would have formalized India's position as a de facto nuclear weapons state. And it would have allowed India a voice in the NSG governance and decision-making as well as a veto over the inclusion of 'other' candidates for membership.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 28 Jun 2016 06:58

my thinking is there may be some issues with supplies and spares or some part or process requiring further verification.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby member_29296 » 28 Jun 2016 09:16

When U.S. says that India will be a member of NSG by the end of the year. What does this implies?
Please let me know if I thinking in a right direction.
It’s just a consoling statement and they are not serious about this however they wants India not to take this personally and should not stop his cooperation for climate deal.
Second they are serious about this and they knew from the beginning that what will be the outcome, (china will oppose and India will not be able to make this time) and everything happened as per their plan. It’s like taking one step back, and preparing to jump and pounce over your enemy. They are very clear what they have to do next to bring India into NSG.

Please do share your thoughts on the same.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby rajithn » 28 Jun 2016 10:04

rsangram wrote:So, someone correct me where I am going wrong on this.

If India becomes a full member of NSG, it will be able to attract investments, make purchases etc of nuclear material and equipment, but not be able to use ANY of it for military purposes. So, the upside of full membership is that India will be able to establish civil nuclear power plants and that will free up all the domestically available uranium or other fissile material for its military nuclear program.

So, if India does not become a full NSG member, it can still use all its domestically available uranium for its military nuclear program, but not be able to setup any civilian nuclear facilities.

So, the hit to India in not being a full NSG member is in its civilian program, not its military program. Right ? or where am I going wrong here ? And if it is the only hit, then India can live with that, as it can use imported natural gas and oil to generate electricity, in lieu of nuclear power plants or "eat grass", by living with less electricity, in the worst case. Although, in today's scenario and forseeable future, I think there will be plenty of countries other than Muslim countries, including the US, who would be willing, I would imagine, to supply oil and natural gas to India and even assure safe transit of that oil in the event of a war or such happenings. Only the cost of oil and gas to India could be 10% or 20% higher, from these non middle eastern sources, with additional transportation costs and the like. Again, is my assumption on oil and gas true here, that Indian dependence on middle eastern oil is minimal now and in the future ?

Unless, there is some dual use nuke technology that we can buy as full members of NSG, which will assist our military nuke program too or if we have ways of diverting the uranium purchased under full NSG membership to our military nuke program. Is that the case ?

Someone with expertise in this matter can elucidate, please.


The current waiver allows us to trade. But the risk is that amendments can be made to this waiver, in the future, without India's consent as India being outside the NSG cannot veto those amendments. India being inside the NSG is a way to provide a kavach to India's ability to trade in the nuclear domain in the future.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby kmkraoind » 28 Jun 2016 10:10

Strictly speaking this article is not related to this thread, but this article came because of India's attempts to get NSG membership, and it throws insights on how Chinese establishment thinks of Indians and India. It seems China is not at all comfortable at India's rise. They are missing Moun Mohan Singh and compromised (Blackmoney-offshore accounts-Hawala-Dawoood-ISI-Pak) Scamia Govt. The quoted part reflects that.

Delhi’s NSG bid upset by rules, not Beijing - Globaltimes.cn

On Monday, the Missile Technology Control Regime absorbed India as a new member, and denied China's access. The news didn't even make a ripple among the Chinese public. The Chinese have become more mature in dealing with these setbacks caused by international relations.

Some Indians are too self-centered and self-righteous. On the contrary, the Indian government behaves decently and is willing to communicate. Throwing a tantrum won't be an option for New Delhi.

India's nationalists should learn how to behave themselves. Now that they wish their country could be a major power, they should know how major powers play their games.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby Anujan » 28 Jun 2016 10:30

nvishal wrote:Whereas, india:
1) does not have a working nuclear warhead. because it refuses to test its design. There is even a doubt whether we have a real enrichment capability. Pohkran II may have fizzled because the enrichment of the warhead uranium was lower or not enough.


:shock: That is not how enrichment or nukes work.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby partha » 28 Jun 2016 10:49

India has been running an enrichment plant in Mysore for many many years now. Recently we announced a huge nuclear facility in Chitradurga, Karnataka which will include a Uranium enrichment plant among others -

http://www.deccanherald.com/content/418391/chitradurga-set-host-uranium-enrichment.html
Chitradurga will soon become a nuclear hub once the special Uranium enrichment facility (SMEF) facility comes up in the district. The unit will be the second nuclear fuel source in Karnataka after the Mysore Rare Materials Plant (RMP).

No one had envisioned Chitradurga would go the nuclear way. But, once Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro), Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) and Indian Institute of Science (IISc) set up their establishments across 10,000 acres in the district, Chitradurga will acquire national status in science and nuclear energy.

Not sure where this idea of India not having any enrichment capability came from.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby partha » 28 Jun 2016 10:52

SSridhar wrote:The MTCR formalities seem to have been completed rather quickly after the decision to accept India as a full member was taken by that group !

It does seem rather quick. China blocking India at NSG could be the reason why MTCR admission was expedited.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2016 11:23

rsangram wrote:So, someone correct me where I am going wrong on this.

If India becomes a full member of NSG, it will be able to attract investments, make purchases etc of nuclear material and equipment, but not be able to use ANY of it for military purposes. So, the upside of full membership is that India will be able to establish civil nuclear power plants and that will free up all the domestically available uranium or other fissile material for its military nuclear program.

So, if India does not become a full NSG member, it can still use all its domestically available uranium for its military nuclear program, but not be able to setup any civilian nuclear facilities.

rsangram, no organization including the UN can stop any country from its 100% indigenous effort, neither can NSG. That is the first thing to note.

As others have also said, India has a full waiver from NSG in 2008 and nuclear commerce and trade with India by member countries of NSG are therefore allowed suject only to each country's specific rules & policies on such a trade. However, a subsequent change in c. 2011 denied India Enrichment & Reprocessing facilities (called ENR) from NSG members. We do not nee to become a NSG member to do nuclear trade. It is almost impossible to get ENR trade granted for India because that is tied up with NPT and possible weapons programme.

Since the current waiver removes the bar on trade, we have already signed deals with several countries to get Uranium and we have been receiving the fuel. That is what Pakistan accuses the US of facilitating India's weapons programme indirectly by freeing up its local Uranium for wepons purposes. But, that is not true because unlike Pakistan, our weapons have been from the beginning Pu-based. We need very little HEU for our weapons. We have already signed deals with France & the US to setup nuclear reactors. We do not need NSG membership for this.

So, the hit to India in not being a full NSG member is in its civilian program, not its military program. Right ? or where am I going wrong here ?


Non-membership of NSG does not hit us in our civilian programme because of the 'clean waiver of 2008' we have. We may have a hit on ENR.

Unless, there is some dual use nuke technology that we can buy as full members of NSG, which will assist our military nuke program too or if we have ways of diverting the uranium purchased under full NSG membership to our military nuke program. Is that the case ?

The 123 Treaty with the US, the IAEA Safeguards, the separation of military & civilian nuclear installations, the Additional Protocol signed with the IAEA, the NSG waiver et al would stop us from diverting such imports for military purposes. That simply won't happen.

IMO, there are only a few reasons for India joining the NSG:
  • The waiver of 2008 can be changed at any time to our detriment. For example, the restrictions on ENR came about in c. 2011. It is true that such decisions are taken on a consensus by the NSG and we will always have a few friends, but one can never predict the future. If we are inside the NSG we can stop the waiver from being derailed, as India is never going to sign NPT unless & until we are recognized as a de-jure nuclear-power because the cut-off date is still 1967. This is purely self-preservation and why not?
  • If NSG rules have to be modified, then, we need to be inside it.
  • As an asspiring world power, and rightly so too, we need to be in all policy making-bodies and influential groups around the world. This is especially true in nuclear technology where we have considerable and widespread expertise for a very long time
  • Last but not the least, IMHO, the fact that the London Club and its evolutionary NSG were created to target us and us only and we would be entering that as a full member without signing the NPT is as close to a de-jure recognition of us being a NWS which has hitherto been only a grudging de-facto recognition by some.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2016 11:37

‘Interdependence’ ensured India’s MTCR membership, says Dutch envoy - Kallol Bhattacherjee, The Hindu
India’s strained ties with Italy over the marines case, which started in February 2012, prevented consensus in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on New Delhi’s entry to the club. However Alphonsus Stoelinga, Ambassador of the Netherlands, said Italy should not be blamed for the delay and the age of “interdependence” ensured that India’s membership could not be delayed anymore.

‘All factors in favour’

“In this age, we have to help each other; India’s membership was anyway due, and the organisation had to extend membership to India as all other diplomatic and political factors worked in its favour,” he said.

Setting the stage for its role in the MTCR, India had joined The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation this summer.

Strategic affairs commentator Gurmeet Kanwal said: “Vietnam needs 300-km range BrahMos missile and under MTCR membership, India can legally provide such missiles to Vietnam.”

However, Mr. Stoelinga said the MTCR was a “control mechanism” which prevented missiles and delivery vehicles from falling into rogue hands. “The MTCR helps in controlling the spread of ballistic missiles and unmanned drones. India, like other 34 members of the regime, will have to abide by the rule book,” he said.

It is not quite diplomatic to talk of Vietnam & BrahMos in the same breath as our MTCR admission. There is no link and we should avoid appearing to be thumbing our nose as soon as joining MTCR.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby asgkhan » 28 Jun 2016 12:53

In a hard hitting editorial, China's state media called some Indians too self-centered and self-righteous, adding, "the Indian government behaves decently and is willing to communicate."

Defending China's opposition to India's entry into the NSG as 'morally legitimate', a state- run daily today hit out at India saying the West has "spoiled" the country making it a "bit smug" in international affairs.

In a hard hitting editorial, Global Times said it was rules not China that prevented India's entry into the 48-nation elite nuclear trading body.

It said at least 10 countries, including China, have opposed the accession of non-signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into the NSG.

"India is not a signatory to the NPT, but is the most active applicant to join the NSG. Before the Seoul meeting, the Indian media played up the prospects of its bid. Some even claim that among the 48 members of the NSG, 47 have given it a green light, except China," said the editorial titled 'Delhi's NSG bid upset by rules, not Beijing'.

"...India wants to be the first exception to join the NSG without signing the NPT. It is morally legitimate for China and other members to upset India's proposal in defence of principles," said the tabloid, part of the ruling Communist Party of China's publications.

The daily known for its nationalistic postures said India is emerging as the "golden boy" of the West.

"Recent years have seen the Western world giving too many thumbs up to India, but thumbs down to China. India is spoiled. Although the South Asian country's GDP accounts for only 20 per cent of that of China, it is still a golden boy in the eyes of the West, having a competitive edge and more potential compared to China. The international 'adulation' of India makes the country a bit smug in international affairs," it said.

Criticising Indian media and public reaction on India's failed NSG bid, it, however, said the Indian government has behaved "decently".

"Some Indians are too self-centered and self-righteous. On the contrary, the Indian government behaves decently and is willing to communicate. Throwing a tantrum won't be an option for New Delhi," it said.

"India's nationalists should learn how to behave themselves. Now that they wish their country could be a major power, they should know how major powers play their games," the daily said.

Taking exception to the US' support to India for NSG entry, the editorial said, "US backing adds the biggest impetus to India's ambition. By cosying up to India, Washington's India policy actually serves the purpose of containing China."

"The US is not the whole world. Its endorsement does not mean India has won the backing of the world. This basic fact, however, has been ignored by India," it said.


http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-in ... ia-2228956

Sheer arrogance of these inbred idiots, whose idea of education was to mentally m@sturbate on a lil red book written by a pedo who never brushed his teeth.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 28 Jun 2016 13:17

>> In a hard hitting editorial, Global Times said it was rules not China that prevented India's entry into the 48-nation elite nuclear trading body.

Interesting.

Chinese history lesson:
sample:

Who Killed Abraham Lincoln

A: a bullet

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby kit » 28 Jun 2016 13:18

china does fear an India speaking as one voice ..or rather a mass public opinion in india :P

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2016 13:35

The Hindu has been running a series of articles, including one editorial, where it completely whitewashes the Chinese villainy. These articles talk of opposition from other countries, how NSG is useless, how we are expending our diplomatic energies wastefully, how we will be a second-class member even if we are accommodated etc. While debate about usefullness of NSG is welcome, the whitewash of Chinese villainy, while to be expected from The Hindu group and its contributing columnists, is rather disturbing because this section of the media has plumbed lower depths. The latest article is by Suhasini Haidar: Picking up the Pieces from Seoul. Even the title of the article, a choice made by the editorial team and not the author, suggests as though India had a massive setback in Seoul. In fact, the boot is on the other leg with China's implacability shining through and China standing in a corner all alone. Not a word about all that. Pathetic.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby kit » 28 Jun 2016 13:46

what else can you expect from chindu..predictable

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2016 13:52

asgkhan wrote:Sheer arrogance of these inbred idiots . . . .

No doubt about that.

Deng Xiaoping sent PLA into Vietnam “to teach them a lesson” when our then Foreign Minister Vajpayee arrived in China in Feb 1979, the first Indian contact since 1962. Was it not to inconveniently remind India of 1962? Didn’t China conduct its megaton nuclear test in May 1992 when our Pres. R.Venkatraman was on a first ever Indian Presidential visit to China? The PLA intruded into Depsang & Chumar and stay put there even as Xi Jinping was visiting India in Dec. 2014. The Chumar incident spun out-of-control and a thousand troops from each side was on an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.A similar thing happened before the Chinese PM, Li Keqiang’s visit to India in c. 2013. A few weeks before the arrival of the Chinese PM, in a deep incursion, forty Chinese troops entered the Indian territory in the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector in eastern Ladakh and erected a tented post, 19 Kms inside Indian territory at Depsang Valley, setting the stage for a face-to-face situation with Indian troops which continued for 21 days. This put the visit of Li in jeopardy. Somehow, this was resolved by the visit of Indian Foreign Minister, Salman Kurshid to Beijing and Li’s visit took place. This was soon followed by the Chumar incident which occurred on June 17, 2013 just two weeks before the first ever visit by an Indian defence minister, A.K. Antony, in seven years.

Only a strong reaction makes the Chinese budge.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2016 13:53

Jits wrote:This is my first post after years of lurking.


Jits, welcome to the Forum.

Please do post more. We need diverse thoughts and opinions.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby schinnas » 28 Jun 2016 13:53

I cancelled my Chindu subscription precisely for such reasons. I subscribed to Swarajya instead.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby member_27581 » 28 Jun 2016 13:55

^^what kind of name is this Suhasini Haider, same as M Saleem Pandit who wrote recently "LeT rebels". May be RoPians are too peaceful to pursue Indian interests.

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby habal » 28 Jun 2016 14:00

ranjan.rao wrote:^^what kind of name is this Suhasini Haider.


you will regret asking that question !

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Re: Tracking India's Admission into International Groups

Postby member_27581 » 28 Jun 2016 14:37

^^certainly not more than reading "LeT rebels" or the fact that she happens to be daughter of SuSwamy


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