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Analyzing CPEC

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Analyzing CPEC

Postby ramana » 08 Sep 2016 03:35

Starting a new thread to gather information on CPEC.
Please post all related posts there.
Would appreciate if you report any CPEC related posts already in the Forum to be transferred here.

Thanks,
ramana

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby ramana » 08 Sep 2016 03:38

Peregrine wrote:India-US military logistics pact is anti-Muslim, Hafiz Saeed says

NEW DELHI: The recent India-US pact to share their military bases for repair and resupply is anti-Pakistan, meant to counter the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor+ (CPEC) and, in fact, against the Muslim world, declared Pakistan-based terrorist Hafiz Saeed+ on Wednesday, ANI reported.

Given these things, it's only logical China and Pakistan get even closer, the terrorist said.

"The US has issues with China, India has issues with Pakistan. The interest of both (China and Pakistan) has become one because of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor+ )," said Saeed, founder of the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Mumbai blasts mastermind.

Just yesterday, Pakistan's army chief Raheel Sharif said the security and timely completion of CPEC - that goes through Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir - is Pakistan's "national duty, and no power will be allowed to disrupt it." China is building the corridor+ that will cost a whopping $46 billion. It is considered to be an extension of China's ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative.

The India-US pact facilitates the provision of logistical support, supplies and services between the US and Indian militaries on a reimbursable basis, and provides a framework to govern them. And the US has agreed to elevate defence trade and technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and partners.

Analysts have said that US would like to use the pact to counter China's growing military might - particularly airbases - in the South China Sea. Countering terrorism, a prime objective of the US and India, will also be facilitated by the pact, analysts added.

Having the pact "makes it much simpler for American naval and air forces to fight there. The US does not have actual bases in India. But, it has the next best thing - a simple way to use India's bases," Forbes magazine said in an editorial.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Cosmo_R » 08 Sep 2016 04:42

Let's look at another scenario.

NaMo says OK we will accept the UN resolution on Kashmir for an eventual plebiscite, This involves the withdrawal of ALL pakistani troops/functionaries along with 'civilian' residents who came after the accession treaty AND an arguably undefined timeline to hold such plebiscite under the sole discretion of GoI as to what constitutes 'equivalent' normalcy which might reasonably equate to the prevailing atmosphere in 1948.

What happens to CPEC? What does the Dragon do? in such circumstance?

There are many ways to defeat Ancalagon.These ways are within our writ and our reach.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby williams » 08 Sep 2016 05:29

CPEC to me is a pretext to build sound military logistic infrastructure between Pakis and Chinese. This will enable them to do joint ops in areas that are very vulnerable to us. Have we even thought about non state actors attacking DBO for example? Those kind of things are possible once this infrastructure is in place. We missed out a lot in building logistics infrastructure around these areas. I just spend the last few days looking at all the roads around this area. Chinese have done amazing job to encircle us around the Korakoram pass - DBO - SSN area. I bet some of the Jingoistic items released in the media - Tanks, landing of C130 in DBO etc., are late (even panic) reaction to catch up.

At this point we need to put massive investment in infrastructure and shore up our defenses first. We need to prepare for a two front war that can escalate into a nuclear exchange. If we are prepared and ready, then that is the only way to deter any aggression in this area. All this talk about economic corridor is plain BS. All this talk about peace with China is also plain BS. We need to do this in the next 5 years or say bye bye to SSN area.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby partha » 08 Sep 2016 07:12

Cosmo_R wrote:Let's look at another scenario.

NaMo says OK we will accept the UN resolution on Kashmir for an eventual plebiscite, This involves the withdrawal of ALL pakistani troops/functionaries along with 'civilian' residents who came after the accession treaty AND an arguably undefined timeline to hold such plebiscite under the sole discretion of GoI as to what constitutes 'equivalent' normalcy which might reasonably equate to the prevailing atmosphere in 1948.

What happens to CPEC? What does the Dragon do? in such circumstance?

There are many ways to defeat Ancalagon.These ways are within our writ and our reach.

I think it would be a big mistake for GoI to accept UN resolution in spite of there being a condition that Pak army should first withdraw. Going the plebiscite route is risky since it's prone to external influence and manipulation. Current stance of GoI is right - it's a bilateral issue and the only issue is about PoK. In the long run, India will prevail and Pakistan will likely be weakened or cease to exist in its current form. Adopt Rahul Dravid's strategy - be patient and tire the opponents out even if it takes few more decades.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby shiv » 08 Sep 2016 07:30

williams wrote: I just spend the last few days looking at all the roads around this area. Chinese have done amazing job to encircle us around the Korakoram pass - DBO - SSN area. I bet some of the Jingoistic items released in the media - Tanks, landing of C130 in DBO etc., are late (even panic) reaction to catch up.
.

I did a study of exactly this 2-3 years ago and my article is online on DFI. Perhaps you have seen it. Please read and comment
http://defenceforumindia.com/chinese-ro ... -chin-1978

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby SSridhar » 08 Sep 2016 07:48

Let's look at the recent developments on the CPEC front as far as India-China relationship goes:

  • During his state visit to China in May 2015, Modi raised concerns with Xi Jinping about CPEC
  • During his visit to China in April 2016, the Indian Defence Minister Parikkar once again brought up India’s objections to the CPEC through POK. “We have made our stand very clear and expressed strong reservations in regard to China’s activity in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).” He asserted that the Chinese side, in response, noted India’s concerns, but highlighted the economic aspects of the corridor, which they insisted had nothing to do with defence or military aspects.
  • On August 13, 2016, the Indian Foreign Minister Ms. Sushma Swaraj had a marathon 3-hour meeting with her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Delhi where the issues of CPEC were discussed
  • In July 2016, the Chinese and Pakistani armies mounted joint border patrols in POK regions adjoining Xinjiang-J&K border, ostensibly for preventing Uyghur separatists from crossing the border into Pakistan and further proceeding to join the ISIS. The Chinese press statement which used to refer to POK as ‘Pakistan Administered Kashmir’ for so long gave up that nomenclature this time and simply said, “China-Pakistan border”. The People’s Daily posted a series of pictures of the joint patrol. This is the first such joint patrol in lands belonging to us and is very significant because the stated objective is a camouflage to send a clear message to India that India’s objections to CPEC through POK are ignored by China and it considers POK as an inalienable part of Pakistan.
  • When Modi mentioned Baluchistan in his I-Day message on August 15, 2016, this set the alarm bells ringing in China immediately. One of China’s South Asia expert Hu Shisheng (director of state-run think-tank Institute of South and Southeast Asian and Oceanian Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations affiliated to the Chinese foreign ministry) said, “My personal view is that if India is adamant and if Indian factor is found by China or Pakistan in disrupting the process of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), if that becomes a reality, it will really become a disturbance to China-India relations, India-Pakistan relations. If that happens China and Pakistan could have no other way but take united steps. I want to say that the Pakistan factor could surge again to become the most disturbing factor in China-India relations, even more than the Tibet, border and trade imbalance issues. I think the two countries (China and Pakistan) will do whatsoever to enhance the security and smooth construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But what kind of forms I have no idea. I am just wondering whether military involvement could be one of the choice but in my personal view, it is very unlikely. If Indian concern is too much, China is also one part of the Kashmir issue. If the accession (area by Pakistan to China) is regarded by India as one part of the problem then let the three of us sit down to talk. In the past Chinese scholars are not so much concerned about India-US ties. We strongly believed that India's strategic independence can be trusted and can be maintained. In recent years, Indian strategic independence is facing some challenges because of security issues. The cooperation has been going really far more forward in the past one year”. Since China expresses its foreign policy opinions through such myriad opinion-makers and think-tanks, this must be understood by India as a definite Chinese warning.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby deejay » 08 Sep 2016 08:09

I was trying to compile a complete list of projects under CPEC, their costs and financing etc. I got a fair amount but also missed a fair bit.

Would the gurus here have a look and would it possible to correct or fill the gaps?

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gt08Dq7dZlc5TcU9gQsoHuzPF0Rd_9T7hq3VcYhCWac/edit#gid=1401745602

I have reasons for doing this
a) Reduce the opacity behind the project
b) Understand which areas / parts of project are either being paid by China or at low interest costs
c) What is the gain for Pak Army from this?

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby shiv » 08 Sep 2016 08:15

A China- Pakistan economic corridor makes very little sense unless China is allowed to exploit mineral resources in Baluchistan. Even militarily it does not makes sense to me. It increases logistics lines through mountainous terrain and can be cut off in war, reverting the Indian problem into two separate fronts - the China front and the Pakistan front.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby williams » 08 Sep 2016 08:37

Excellent article Shiv sir. It covers most of the things I was looking for and some more. I want to understand what your thoughts will be on the following:

    Do you think it is possible for the Chinese to link up highway G314 with highway G219 through Shaksgam valley ?
    Does that provide any advantage for a combined Paki-Chini force to threaten DBO area?

My concern is in the name of CPEC China can station considerable acclimatized forces in POK and then use this road infrastructure to pressure us in Northern Ladakh.

It may not be that much of an issue in peace time, but when the Bakis do another Mumbai attack and when we want to conduct some punitive operation inside Pakistan, this link up may deter our policy makers to move in that direction. Is that a genuine concern or I am just being paranoid?

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby shiv » 08 Sep 2016 08:59

williams wrote:Excellent article Shiv sir. It covers most of the things I was looking for and some more. I want to understand what your thoughts will be on the following:

    Do you think it is possible for the Chinese to link up highway G314 with highway G219 through Shaksgam valley ?
    Does that provide any advantage for a combined Paki-Chini force to threaten DBO area?

My concern is in the name of CPEC China can station considerable acclimatized forces in POK and then use this road infrastructure to pressure us in Northern Ladakh.

It may not be that much of an issue in peace time, but when the Bakis do another Mumbai attack and when we want to conduct some punitive operation inside Pakistan, this link up may deter our policy makers to move in that direction. Is that a genuine concern or I am just being paranoid?

Such a link looks unlikely given the terrain and India's presence in Siachen. But in any case that link will at best be a weak one in wartime. Supplies will have to move 5 km up and then down during war and one bridge taken out will stop them. Instead the Chinese could well station large contingents in PoK in peacetime with enough reserves so they don't have to move anything in from China case of war. So it is the peacetime deployments that we need to watch with a view to taking them all out within hours of the start of any hot conflict.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chanakyaa » 08 Sep 2016 16:56

deejay wrote:I was trying to compile a complete list of projects under CPEC, their costs and financing etc. I got a fair amount but also missed a fair bit.

Would the gurus here have a look and would it possible to correct or fill the gaps?

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gt08Dq7dZlc5TcU9gQsoHuzPF0Rd_9T7hq3VcYhCWac/edit#gid=1401745602

I have reasons for doing this
a) Reduce the opacity behind the project
b) Understand which areas / parts of project are either being paid by China or at low interest costs
c) What is the gain for Pak Army from this?

Deejay, great article post on myind.net

On the topic of finances, I believe the most recent loans approved for Bakistan by AIIB which India is big part of, was made to improve a section of the highway, which I believe is part of CPEC network. This means, we are unwillingly/unknowingly making small contributions to CPEC in the form of loans approved by Chinese. In addition, there is some talk (and it may be just talk) about Bakis seeking IMF support for the road construction. There is no official report in the news medium though.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Rahul M » 08 Sep 2016 19:57

as I see it CPEC is simply a ploy to provide china with a working naval base around the gulf while getting stupid pakis to foot the bill. OBOR and any consequent propping up of TSPA are added benefits.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby SSridhar » 08 Sep 2016 20:05

Rahul M wrote:as I see it CPEC is simply a ploy to provide china with a working naval base around the gulf while getting stupid pakis to foot the bill. OBOR and any consequent propping up of TSPA are added benefits.

The beauty is that the Pakistanis have guaranteed a minimum 18% p.a. payment on investments too!

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby deejay » 08 Sep 2016 20:12

SSridhar wrote:
Rahul M wrote:as I see it CPEC is simply a ploy to provide china with a working naval base around the gulf while getting stupid pakis to foot the bill. OBOR and any consequent propping up of TSPA are added benefits.

The beauty is that the Pakistanis have guaranteed a minimum 18% p.a. payment on investments too!


No, not on all investments being made. Gwadar area - Port, LNG floating facility, pipeline, hospital, desalination plant and Power plant is at 0% interest rate.

Pakis have extended tax holidays for these.

Power projects also have various return on investments and different rates.

SS ji, request take a look at the spreadsheet and see of there are any gaps you can help fill in there.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby deejay » 08 Sep 2016 20:14

chanakyaa wrote:...
Deejay, great article post on myind.net

On the topic of finances, I believe the most recent loans approved for Bakistan by AIIB which India is big part of, was made to improve a section of the highway, which I believe is part of CPEC network. This means, we are unwillingly/unknowingly making small contributions to CPEC in the form of loans approved by Chinese. In addition, there is some talk (and it may be just talk) about Bakis seeking IMF support for the road construction. There is no official report in the news medium though.


Thank You Chanakyaa ji.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby RoyG » 08 Sep 2016 20:23

What makes the Chinese so strategically inept?

They have squandered a huge opportunity to be the dominant force of Asia.

They could have become the center of Buddhism, expanded full spectrum ties w/ its neighbors, and peacefully settled their territorial disputes.

This would have ensured the United States would have become a greatly reduced player in the region.

Why not simply create a CPEC type of initiative w/ India? The gains for them would be 100 fold larger.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Prem » 08 Sep 2016 22:46

Chabahar port will be made successful. Railway link getting done fast.


Afghanistan-Iran railway construction kicks near Herat province

http://www.khaama.com/afghanistan-iran- ... ince-01855
The construction of a railway line between Afghanistan and Iran officially kicked off near the western Herat province of Afghanistan on Wednesday.According to the local officials, the construction work of the railway line in Afghanistan launched as 90 percent of the railway work inside the Iranian soil has been completed.The railway line will be established from Iran to Ghoryan district and will further go towards Zindjan district and Herat Airport.The latest development for the establishment of the railway line between Afghanistan and Iran comes as Afghanistan has been attempting to expand its regional transit reach.Earlier this year the leaders of Afghanistan, India and Iran signed the Chabahr port agreement in Tehran, the capital city of Iran.Afghanistan is expected to have sea-land access through the strategic Chabahar port in Iran by the end of this year as the work on the port already begun by a joint venture of Kandla Port Trust (KPT) and Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) last year.
Access to Afghanistan’s Garland Highway can be made from Chabahar port using the existing Iranian road network and the Zaranj-Delaram road, constructed by India in 2009.The port will be also used to ship crude oil and urea, saving India transportation costs. It will also cut transport costs and freight time for India to Central Asia and the Gulf by about a third.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby V_Raman » 09 Sep 2016 00:21

Was there a brand bargain between China and US to keep China/India relations on the boil for China to get developed industrially?

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby manjgu » 09 Sep 2016 07:23

speaking on commercial aspect of CEPC..a) was wondering isnt cost of transporting good by road/rail to East China much higher than transporting the same by sea route? b) setting up of industrial complex is allegedly a important part of CEPC..but with cheap chinese imports what will happen to local industry or is it a base for chinese companise to shift manufacturing from china to pakistan?

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby svinayak » 09 Sep 2016 07:41

V_Raman wrote:Was there a brand bargain between China and US to keep China/India relations on the boil for China to get developed industrially?


There was a grand bargain right from Mao itself

China was isolated country 60 years ago and was brought into global integration by the US with a grand bargain

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chanakyaa » 09 Sep 2016 08:24

+1. All the alleged opposition to Chinese power in all shape or form is a serious head fake.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby williams » 09 Sep 2016 08:37

Why not simply create a CPEC type of initiative w/ India? The gains for them would be 100 fold larger.


If you think CPEC is about economy then that will make sense but this is not about the economy. It is about their strategic idea to encircle India and slow down our growth as much as possible. How would trade with a basket case country help them. It will not.

BRF is different, But most people on our side do not understand this very well. Chinese leadership does not like to relate with India at this level. If something like that happens there is going to be more people to people contact and their people are going to see the benefits of democracy. Today their people believe in the propaganda piece that India is a weak, corrupt country and democracy is bad.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby habal » 09 Sep 2016 13:01

RoyG wrote:What makes the Chinese so strategically inept?



read Srimad Bhagvatam Kalki puran, the Chins are just a prop in the scheme of things. Their house of cards will come down tumblings when it is smote by the right sword weilder.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby prahaar » 09 Sep 2016 14:19

There was a Pakistani expert commenting on TV, that CPEC is not and never will even become a major source of supply to China. All this sea-route to Shanghai being a weak point is all hogwash. CPEC will never replace anything of that sort.

Under the guise of CPEC, China is enslaving Pakistan (not unlike what British EIC did to India). In future (post-CPEC), PRC will have good reason to browbeat any resistance to RAPE Viceroys. Increased lawlessness in Pakistan is a great alibi to station security for the convoys and terminals. The reports of Chinese presence/domination in POJK can be rolled out throughout the arteries of Pakistan. The China-Pakistan nexus is now moving from the nuclear-conventional warfare towards a more dangerous and long-lasting relationship.

The only weak link in the above puzzle is the degree of success of the PA to deliver on the diktats of Beijing (to browbeat any local resistance). China is not US.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 09 Sep 2016 16:58

AA : Some of the “Balanced & Intelligent” Articles on CPEC & Gwadar – Four by Pakistanis and One Indian :

Gwadar - Farrukh Saleem : July 31, 2016

Why Gwadar? - Farrukh Saleem : August 07, 2016

The CPEC - Farrukh Saleem : June 19, 2016

OBOR and CPEC - A. RAUF K. KHATTAK : AUG 24, 2016

THE CPEC PIPEDREAM AND WHY GWADAR AS A PORT IS OVERRATED - Sanjay Dixit - June 13, 2016

BB : Kyuakpyu : China's Alternative to the Malacca Straits by getting its Oil - Natural Gas from Persian Gulf, West Africa etc -through Kyuakpyu thus making Gwadar "UNWANTED & UNNECESSARY" and the only use of Gwadar to the Chinese is for the Strategic Purpose of Basing the Chinese Fleet in Gwadar.

With Oil And Gas Pipelines, China Takes A Shortcut Through Myanmar - Eric Meyer

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby SSridhar » 09 Sep 2016 18:07

V_Raman wrote:Was there a brand bargain between China and US to keep China/India relations on the boil for China to get developed industrially?

Pure conspiracy theory. China-India relationship was non-confrontational after 1962 though China made some rumbling noises now and then especially in 1965 & 1971. OTOH, it had far, far serious problems with USSR (and then Russia) and Japan and then Vietnam. In fact, with Janata Party assuming power, China-India relationship began to normalize though Foreign Minister Vajpayee's trip might have ended in fiasco. There is every reason to believe that the FSU ensured that India-China relationship did not normalize.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby krisna » 09 Sep 2016 19:25

See that there are no cpec diagrams as pictures are worth 100words.
will post some images just for easy understandings for those who browse .


Image


tsp concnetrating on eastern corridor to avoid any violence and baluchis instability . eastern corridor(islamabad lahore multan route ) passes thru sindh punjab densely populated and more industrialised regions on tsp relative to KH and baluchistan.

Image


Image
unbelievable shanghai stats from china-
the roads in karakoram highway speed at 1km/1 hr at times slower than that especially in winter. it is narrow at many places unless roads are widened and made all weather proof which is tough at such heights.
lenth of KH is 1300 km from rawalpinid to kashgar. 490 km in china and 800+ kms in tsp.
width of kkh road is 10 metres. proposal to expand it to 30 metres and make it all weather highway. expand the present the transport capacity to 3 times its current capacity.


Image
Last edited by krisna on 09 Sep 2016 19:55, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby pankajs » 09 Sep 2016 19:33

^^
The Shanghai stats are deliberate i.e to hide the primary strategic orientation of the project (china's pov). The road/rail project will not even cover 1% of the total Chinese imports/exports.

The Bakis will get a few expensive power project in return. One video states that the power will be sold at 18 Bak Rupee per unit. Not sure if that tariff is at the plant gate or the consumers meter.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby krisna » 09 Sep 2016 19:53

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/201 ... hinas.html
lengthy article . good read covers a lot of issues.
Image

It is now known that just 6% of what China had promised Pakistan in terms of aid, assistance, and investment between 2001 and 2011 was delivered ($66 billion was pledged in total). And this is because there is no economic rationale to the Kashgar-Gwadar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For, it is physically impossible to maintain year-long connectivity between China and Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway (KKH), which links Kashghar in Xinjiang with Gilgit and Abbottabad through the Khunjerab Pass. Today, the KKH is functional for five months a year at best because of adverse weather. A landslide and flooding in 2010 blocked the highway for more than one year. China and Pakistan have discussed the possibility of building a parallel highway that will feature extensive tunnels that cut through the Khunjerab Pass, rendering landslides irrelevant, but still making it highly vulnerable to earthquakes. Therefore, this idea of extensive tunnelling seems fanciful-and expensive, estimated by Pakistan to cost more than $11 billion


lenth of KH is 1300 km from rawalpinid to kashgar. 490 km in china and 800+ kms in tsp.
width of kkh road is 10 metres. proposal to expand it to 30 metres and make it all weather highway. expand the present the transport capacity to 3 times its current capacity.

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About Gwadar history
Pakistan had identified Gwadar as a naval base site as far back as 1954 when Gwadar was still under Omani rule. Pakistan's interest in Gwadar started when, in 1954, it engaged the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to conduct a survey of its coastline. The USGS deputed the surveyor, Worth Condrick, who in turn identified Gwadar as a suitable site for a seaport. After four years of negotiations, Pakistan purchased the Gwadar enclave from Oman for $3 million on September 8, 1958 and Gwadar officially became part of Pakistan after 200 years of Omani rule. It was offered to the USA for development in the early 1970s, but the US refused to do so. It was only in 2001 that China agreed to co-develop the Gwadar Port by providing $198 million in financial assistance. Gwadar Port was eventually developed by China Harbour Engineering Company at a cost of $248 million between 2002 and 2006. Phase-I covered the building of three multipurpose berths and related port infrastructure and port handling equipment. This phase was completed in December 2006 and commissioned inaugurated on March 20, 2007. Under this phase, the following were constructed: 3 multipurpose berths each with a length of 602 metres and with a combined capacity of bulk carriers of 30,000 DWT) and container vessels of 25,000 DWT, an approach channel 4.5km-long dredged to 12.5 metres depth; a turning basin 450 metres in diameter; one 100-metre service berth; and related port infrastructure and handling equipment, pilot boats, tugs, survey vessels, etc. At the same time, a $200 million Makran Coastal Highway connecting Gwadar to Karachi was completed. Phase-2 of the project, now being built at a cost of $932 million. Will see the construction of 4 container berths, one bulk cargo terminal with a capacity of 100,000 DWT ships, one grain terminal, one ro-ro terminal, two oil terminals (capacity: 200,000 DWT ships each), and one approach channel to be dredged to 14.5 metres depth. Also to be built was a China-supplied oil refinery, plus roads linking Gwadar to Quertta in Balochistan and Ratodeo in Sindh. None of these, however, were implemented, nor was the promised 584 acres of land in Gwadar handed over by the Pakistan Navy to PSA


china has the rights now to develop gwadar as its deems right for the around next 45 years.

shiv
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby shiv » 09 Sep 2016 20:38

I need information on what the Chinese like to eat normally and what they get in Pakistan

Peregrine
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 09 Sep 2016 22:31

Still a Pipedream : A Pakistan-to-China rail corridor is not a substitute for maritime transport

The recent flurry of trade deals and MOUs (worth US$35 billion) signed during Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit to Pakistan have brought the possibility of a more robust Pakistan-to-China transport corridor back into the spotlight. The trade deals stand to drive increased economic activity by Chinese companies in Pakistan in coming years.

However, our assessment is that while the trade and investment agreements may help cement an “all weather” alliance between Beijing and Islamabad, they do not mean that an all weather transport corridor becomes viable. An expanded road and rail network linking Pakistan to China faces three key challenges. The bottom line is that maritime shipping routes will remain a cheaper, simpler, and more secure option for moving crude oil and other goods into China.

1) Security. The proposed transport corridor would go through areas that are subject to flooding and insurgent activity, as well as avalanches, landslides, and seismic activity in the Karakoram Range. If any of these disruptive events materializes, rail and road traffic cannot re-route around the trouble point the way that ships at sea can.

2) Capacity. A modern one-track rail line in the United States can currently handle around 16 trains per day, according to Cambridge Systematics. A Pakistan-to China rail corridor would likely be built with one track each way, but with reduced throughput of around 12 trains per day. U.S. freight trains carried an average of 2,800 tonnes of cargo in 2004, according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Trains transiting the Khunjerab Pass would likely carry smaller loads, perhaps 2,000 tonnes, due to the large vertical gradient. With these train frequency and load parameters, the corridor would be able to handle 8.75 million tonnes of cargo per year, or approximately 175,000 barrels of oil per day if all the trains carried oil.

To move the volumes that would be necessary to make this route able to handle enough cargo to reduce sea transport reliance measurably, there would need to be a rail setup with 3 or 4 lines. Furthermore, bringing that much cargo into Western China’s rail network and then having to move it into industrial areas in the central and eastern regions would likely necessitate additional capacity expansions of the national rail system. These investments would likely be cost-prohibitive.

3) High construction and transport costs. The tariffs needed to pay off the finance costs of the route and move freight over a 15,000 foot vertical relief would likely make the cost highly uncompetitive with sea routes. The roughly 2,000 km-long Qingzang railway to Lhasa, Tibet cost roughly US$4 billion to build (US$1.85 million per km). The cost per km to build a rail line connecting Islamabad and Kashgar could be several times more expensive to build given the tough geologic and political circumstances along the route.

In terms of transport costs, we estimate that moving a barrel of oil by sea to Shanghai at a ship rate of US$75,000 per day at 23 km per hour with a 2 million barrel cargo costs around US$0.90 per barrel, while moving it by barge upriver to the rapidly-growing inland demand center of Chongqing would cost an additional US$1.23 per barrel, for a total transport cost of US$2.22 per barrel (Exhibit 1). In contrast, moving oil from Ras al-Tanura to Gwadar and then by rail into the heartland of China would likely cost closer to US$8.00 to US$12.40 per barrel, making that route economically uncompetitive, as well as limited in capacity.[1]The disparity would be slightly greater for major cities on China’s east coast.

Exhibit 1: Estimated costs of moving oil to Chongqing, China from the Persian Gulf by sea and via Pakistan

U.S. Dollars per barrel


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Source: BNSF Railway, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, NBS, ND Petroleum Council, China SignPost™

In short, there are compelling reasons why sea transport has been dominant for so long. To even build a Pakistan-to-China rail corridor would require massive upfront investments, would be economically uncompetitive relative to sea routes, and due to the many physical and political risks along the route, commercial shippers would likely be highly reluctant to use it.

Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins,“Oversea Trumps Overland: The Strategic Trajectory of China’s Oil Imports,
China SignPost™, No. 1 (May 26, 2010).

China’s Oil Security Pipe Dream: The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports,
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 88-111

Cheers Image

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Amoghvarsha » 10 Sep 2016 00:19

CPEC or not Pakistan will be a Chinese colony.Expect Chinese boots on the ground in the name of protection.Also expect Pakistan to default on the loans and there by China dictating terms to them.There is a reason why Bakis havent revealed the details of this project.

ramana
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby ramana » 10 Sep 2016 05:00

Its possible that
I get this feeling that G2 is tag teaming to lead India down a garden path where we will be forced to concede territory - Kashmir.

I am not able to explain this yet.


from anonymous member.

ramana
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby ramana » 10 Sep 2016 07:25

USI on OBOR

http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Jour ... 0&ano=2793



One Belt One Road: A Strategic Challenge

Lieutenant Colonel K Nishant Nair, SC@

Introduction

The origin of the “One Belt and One road” initiative dates back to September 2013, when Chinese President Mr Xi Jingping during his visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, invited the countries to join the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)1and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) respectively.2 Together, they form the “One Belt and One road” (OBOR) initiative, which has been touted as an economic initiative presenting a win-win situation for all the countries participating in it. Undoubtedly, a land and maritime silk route stretching across the heartland of Eurasia and the rimland of the Indian and Pacific ocean will facilitate trade and provide impetus to economy but it will also provide China with an unprecedented foothold in these areas, making it a big stakeholder in the affairs of management of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), provide it with a springboard to exert influence across the Asian, African and Eurasian continents. Hence, the OBOR presents both an economic opportunity and a strategic challenge of unprecedented proportions to countries like India. This article explores the geostrategic dimensions of the OBOR initiative, highlights the Indian concerns and provides policy recommendations on the same.

OBOR Initiative

Please refer to Map 1. The initiative as mentioned earlier comprises of the land based SREB and the MSR. According to the available data the SREB will begin in Xi’an in central China pass through Lanzhou (Gansu province), Urumqi (Xinjiang), and Khorgas (Xinjiang) to the West near Kazakhstan. Thereafter, run southwest from Central Asia to Northern Iran before swinging to West through Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. From Istanbul, the Silk Road crosses the Bosporus Strait and heads northwest through Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and Germany. Reaching Duisburg in Germany, it swings North to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. From Rotterdam, the path runs to the South to Venice, Italy — where it meets up with the MSR.3

A recently published vision document by Chinese Government identifies specific gateways that will connect China with other Silk Road economies, like Xinjiang province for connecting Central, South and West Asian countries including Pakistan. Similarly, China’s Heilongjiang will become the gateway for Mongolia and Russia’s Far East. Eurasian high-speed transport corridor linking Beijing with Moscow will also be developed through the area. China also plans to leverage Tibet’s geographic location for extending a Silk Road node to Nepal. Two areas in southwest China : Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and the Yunnan province will be used to establish links with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yunnan, which borders Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar will connect with the Greater Mekong sub-region, and serve as a pivot to link China with South and South East Asia. Yunnan’s provincial capital, Kunming, is the end-point of the proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor, which starts in Kolkata.4 Thus, the SREB will comprise the main artery and a number of hubs and spoke networks connecting the hubs or gateways to other areas of economic interest. The document also mentions developing of China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors.5 However, the details of the same have not been elaborated upon.

The MSR will stretch from the western Pacific to the Baltic Sea beginning in Quanzhou in Fujian province then connecting Guangzhou (Guangdong province), Beihai (Guangxi), and Haikou (Hainan) before heading south to the Malacca Strait. From Kuala Lumpur, the MSR heads to Kolkata in India then crosses the rest of the Indian Ocean to Nairobi, Kenya. From Nairobi, the MSR goes North around the Horn of Africa and moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens before meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice (Italy).6 The vision document published by the Chinese Government also visualises a route from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific.7

Geostrategic Dimensions of OBOR

Overt Objectives

The OBOR has been overtly touted as an economic initiative with potential to bring unprecedented economic growth to the participating nations. It will also provide means to achieve the security of SLOCs and help mitigate security concerns. The integration of all existing cooperation in the neighbourhood and the region will create trade networks, boost economic activity and productivity through infrastructural linkages like port facilities and development of continental arteries.8 This will provide accessibility to the China’s hinterland and allow it to capitalise on vast manufacturing infrastructure that it has created. China has also created a 10 billion Yuan fund ($ 1.6 billion) for neighbouring countries which are part of MSR and has plans to create a $16.3 billion fund to build and expand railways, roads and pipelines in Chinese provinces that are part of SREB.9 It also plans to promote policies that encourage Chinese banks to lend money to other countries along the planned route. This is in addition to the funds which it has already committed (Sri Lanka - $1.4 billion for developing port infrastructure; Central Asia - $50 billion for infrastructure and energy deals; Afghanistan -$327 million). With the establishment of China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) more money is likely to flow into the region to shore up infrastructure capabilities. Thus, the idea is not just to create an economic trade route but also increase its political influence by creating a community with “common interests, dependencies and responsibilities.”10

Covert Intentions

An analysis of OBOR reveals a deeper strategy, a strategy which has the ingredients to turn the 21st century as the Chinese century. The strategy once implemented has the potential to establish China as the predominant maritime power in Asia-Pacific, apart from a continental power with political and economic influence across Eurasia. It would provide China an uninterrupted access to the various ports which are part of the project along the SLOCs through which its energy and other resources flow and at the same time reduce the concerns of the ‘Malacca dilemma’.11 Thus the project has the potential to bind the participating nations in a collective security framework. The economic potential of the project will attract many countries which are not part of the framework to join it, while China will take the centre stage with its economic might and investments. The initiative has the potential to further tilt the skewed balance of power in Asia in favour of China and establish her as the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific. To that extent, it is indeed a response to the US strategic rebalance to Asia.12

In India the echoes of Booz Hamilton’s ‘String of Pearls’ theory are becoming louder.13 As the scope of the project is yet to be defined, the gamut of security concerns it will bring about are still being debated. The fact that it was initially proposed specifically in relation to ASEAN and later extended to Sri Lanka (February 2014)14 and Maldives ( Signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China to join the MSR in December 2014)15 while the initial maps did not include Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka), all point to a plan which is still unfolding. Hence, it can be argued that MSR is a manifestation of the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy albeit with a different name serving the same purpose. In the same vein the ‘String of Pearls’ may manifest in terms of access to ports and bases for People’s Liberation of Army Navy (PLAN) for logistic support like refuelling etc. rather than having permanent bases as envisaged by Hamilton.

Militarily, the MSR initiative is part of its attempt to breakout of its maritime isolation, constrained by the US led alliance domination of the first and second island chains, which have effectively restricted Chinese maritime space.16 The implementation of the initiative would be in sync with the PLAN programme of ex­pansion which might make it one-third larg­er than the US Navy by 2020. The development of the carrier groups which is likely to be increased to four by 2020 with their likely area of operations in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will also facilitate PLAN to play larger role in security of MSR operations, thereby facilitating the PLAN to secure a foothold in the IOR.17

As China uses its economic strength to secure foreign policy goals, the OBOR initiative has also been compared to the ‘Marshall Plan’ enacted by the US after World War II. The US implemented the plan to establish itself as a bona fide super power; Beijing is also betting its twin Silk Roads can do the same.18

India’s Concerns

The sheer magnitude of the project itself is overwhelming. As the project unfolds the participating countries would be intertwined with each other in more complex ways than can be imagined at present in terms of trade agreements, visa regimes, logistics agreements, customs regulations etc. to facilitate trade and business. The OBOR initiative has the potential to drive affected nations to enter into agreements with each other to derive economic benefits, thereby pushing countries more closely into the Chinese fold. Needless to say, China with its investments in the OBOR will hold the centre stage in the geo-economics. The integration of all the existing cooperation with neighbouring and regional countries will result in a group of polarised nations which are economically interdependent, share the common trade and security concerns, look up to China to be the common arbiter thereby; creating a regional and international geo-economic, geopolitical and collective security framework. This may result in reduced Indian influence in the subcontinent and effectively restrict Indian importance to its periphery.19

Though Chinese analysts have been insisting that OBOR is a geo-economical initiative and not a geopolitical one, India has all the reasons to be sceptical. The impact of infrastructure development of the magnitude as envisaged in the OBOR initiative has increased the fear of being encircled by China, physically and geo-politically.20 The possible manifestation of the ‘String of Pearls’ has already been delved upon earlier in the article. Even if the China does not have a ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, the project will undoubtedly facilitate the Chinese to establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean thereby contesting India’s position as the security provider to countries in the region.21

The project also has military implications for India; the unresolved border dispute with China and the trust deficit which exists after the 1962 War between the two countries further complicate the issue in India’s neighbourhood. India is also wary of growing Sino-Pak nexus. Pakistan and China are already in the process of developing the Karakoram Highway which forms part of the Xinjiang Gateway. India also has unresolved border issues with Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh. thus the initiative has the potential to further complicate the resolution of outstanding border issues between India and its neighbours, if part of the project is implemented through the disputed areas. The possibility of the infrastructure created under the initiative to be used in case of a military conflict by Indian adversaries is also a matter of concern.

Recommendations

As China engages regional powers and India’s neighbours proactively to prepare the groundwork for implementation of OBOR, India finds itself in a dilemma to cooperate or compete. Cooperation as mentioned earlier will entail a long term geopolitical price and India by itself may not be in a position to compete. Hence, India must engage multilaterally to safeguard its interests in the IOR and Asia-Pacific. The broad Indian strategy must aim at safeguarding Indian interests in immediate areas of interest in the short term to mid-term. India must deepen its relations through economic, diplomatic and military cooperation with important countries along the IOR to include Sri Lanka, Maldives, Iran, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and countries in the African continent and, South Asian countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

The Project ‘Mausam’ and India’s ‘Spice Route’ projects are steps in the right direction.22 However, the scope of both should be restricted to immediate area of interest to ensure a focussed and sustained effort. India must strengthen the multilateral framework by drawing on its Strategic Partnership with the USA and, its deepening ties with Japan and Vietnam to ensure freedom of navigation and prevent domination of the IOR and Asia-Pacific by a single country. This will help India to safeguard its national interests while maintaining its strategic autonomy. India must also strengthen the existing mechanisms of Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to implement ‘Project Mausam’ and the ‘Spice Route’ initiative.

India should be more proactive to resolve all its outstanding border and maritime issues in an earlier timeframe with its neighbouring countries, as without their resolution it will be difficult for India to win their complete trust in the implementation of the aforementioned projects. This will go a long way in bringing down the geopolitical concerns of its neighbours who look up to India for support. In South Asia, where most countries have suffered from colonialism, countries are more likely to be influenced by geopolitical considerations than geo-economical ones in their major policy decisions. Hence, resolution of border disputes and unresolved border issues will play an important role in the success of such initiatives in the region.

Conclusion

Since 2002, China’s leaders have described the initial two decades of the 21st century as a ‘period of strategic opportunity’, a period during which the international conditions are conducive for growth of Comprehensive National Power. China’s leaders have also routinely emphasised the goal of reaching critical economic and military benchmarks by 2020. These include successfully restructuring the economy, promoting internal stability, military modernisation in order to attain the capability to fight and win potential regional conflicts, protection of SLOCs, defence of territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and defence of western borders.23 Undoubtedly, China’s OBOR initiative will go a long way towards meeting many of these objectives. However, the geopolitical concerns of the countries are likely to be the biggest impediment towards achieving the full potential of the initiative. The unprecedented scale of the project gives rise to associated geopolitical insecurities which may prevent wholehearted participation from at least some of the countries. Thus, geo-economics may initially prompt the countries to join the OBOR initiative; however, geopolitics may prevent it from achieving its full potential. Add to it, China’s recent aggressiveness in dealing with disputes in South China Sea24 and coercive economic practices25 the challenge presented is indeed a grand one, not just for India but for other regional powers too. Timely implementation of ‘Project Mausam’ and the ‘Ancient Spice Route’ along with multilateral cooperation with other regional powers offers a way out for India to safeguard its national interests in the IOR and Asia-Pacific.

Endnotes

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries”, September 7, 2013 at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ ... 6334.shtml (Accessed March 30, 2015)

2 Jiao Wu and Yunbi Zhang , “Xi in call for building of new ‘maritime silk road” , China Daily, October 4, 2013 at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013 ... 008913.htm (Accessed March 30, 2015)

3 Tiezzi Shanon, “China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Vision Revealed”, May 9, 2014, The Diplomat at http:// the diplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-road-vision-revealed/ (Accessed March 30, 2015)

4 Aneja Atul, “China unveils details of ambitious Silk Road plans”, March 30, 2015, The Hindu at http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... e(Accessed March 30, 2015)

5 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China ,”Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, March 28, 2015,at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_66 ... 9618.shtml (Accessed 07 April 2015 )

6 Op cit. 3.

7 Op cit. 4.

8 Tiezzi Shanon, “The Maritime Silk Road vs. The String of pearls”, 13 February 2014, The Diplomat at http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-mari ... of-pearls/ (accessed on 30 March 2015).

9 Ray Ranjan Dhriti, “Experts see big benefits from Silk Road Economic Belt”, Economy Lead, 06 July 2014 at http://www.economylead.com/internationa ... belt-20684 (accessed on 30 March 2015).

10 Brig (Retd) Sahgal Arun, “China’s Proposed Maritime Silk Road (MSR): Impact on Indian Foreign and Security Policies”, July 2014, at http://ccasindia.org/issue_policy.php?ipid=21 (accessed on 31 March 2015).

11 Ji You, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect its Energy’ Supply”, May 2007, Volume 31, Issue 3 athttp://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ ... _0507.html (Accessed March 30, 2015).

12 Mingjinag Li, “China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: New Round of Opening Up?”, March 11, 2015,RSIS Commentary No 050at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploa ... f(Accessed March 30, 2015).

13 Bo Zhou, “The String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road Keywords : Asia-Pacific, China-ASEAN Relations, One Belt One Road, Silk Road”, February 11 2014 at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-pol ... /(Accessed March 30, 2015).

14 Zorawar Daulet Singh, “Indian Perceptions of China’s Maritime Silk Road Idea”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 ,October-December 2014, pp. 133-148 at .http://idsa.in/jds/8_4_2014_IndianPerceptions ofChinasMaritime SilkRoad.html(Accessed March 30, 2015).

15 Aruma Fathimath, “MSR deal sealed, Free Trade deal in the making”, December 17 , 2014,Haveeru Online at http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/58038 (Accessed March 30, 2015).

16 Ibid.

17 Mahadevan Prem , “China in the Indian Ocean: Part of a Larger PLAN”, June 2014, CSS Analyses in Security Policy No 156 at http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdf ... f(Accessed April 7, 2015).

18 Tiezzi Shanon,”The New Silk Road: China’s Marshall Plan?”, November 06, 2014, The Diplomat, at http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-new- ... /(Accessed April 7, 2015).

19 Ibid.

20 Sibal Kanwal, “Silk route to tie India in knots”, February25, 2014, Mail Today, at http://indiatoday.intoday.in / story silk-route-to-tie-india-in-indian-ocean-indo-china/1/345394.html (Accessed March 30, 2015).

21 Singh Abhijit, “China’s Maritime Silk Route: Implications for India”, July 16,2014, IDSA Comment at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasM ... l(Accessed March 30, 2015).

22 “Modi’s ‘Mausam’ manoeuvre to check China’s maritime might”, TNN, September 16, 2015 at http://defencenews.in/defence-news-inte ... =(Accessed March 30, 2015).

23 Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014", Department of Defence, USA , 24 April 2014, pp 15-16 , at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_ Report .pdf on 13 April 2015 (Accessed April 13, 2015).

24 Bhattacharya Abanti , “South China Sea: China’s Renewed Confrontation and ASEAN Option”, May 28 2014,IPCS,China - Articles No 4469, at http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/south ... l(Accessed April 13, 2015).

25 Glaser S Bonnie, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy”, July 25 , 2012, The Diplomat , at http://thediplomat. com /2012/07/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy/(Accessed April 13, 2015).



@Lieutenant Colonel K Nishant Nair, SC was commissioned into the 7th Battalion, The Bihar Regiment on 09 Dec 2000. He has served in counter-insurgency operations in Manipur and has been General Staff Officer Grade I (GSO1) of a mountain brigade and GSO1 (Operations) of a corps. Presently, he is posted with the Military Intelligence Directorate (Foreign Division) at the Integrated HQ of the Ministry of Defence (Army).

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXLV, No. 600, April-June 2015.



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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby V_Raman » 10 Sep 2016 07:28

from India - South & North Korea Thread
ramana wrote:I posted the above in morning and evening news came of NoKo test.
Looks like Obama pivot to Asia is dead.
This could be the warhead for the submarine launched missile?
What if it gets transfered back to TSP to arm a new weapon system.
US will wring their hands about UN sanctions and laugh behind our backs as
G2 checkmate while continuing trade links with China.


US is very close to finally achieving what it wanted since end of WWII - the real prize - inherit the jewel in the crown from Britain. I really don't think India will mind. Indians love USA!

Wasn't it some Indian thinker in early 40s who predicted that India will align with christian west to fight against the alliance of China and Islamic middle-east?

Once again, It is Indians (Pak) who is helping west colonize India... sigh...

RoyG
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby RoyG » 10 Sep 2016 08:23

williams wrote:
Why not simply create a CPEC type of initiative w/ India? The gains for them would be 100 fold larger.


If you think CPEC is about economy then that will make sense but this is not about the economy. It is about their strategic idea to encircle India and slow down our growth as much as possible. How would trade with a basket case country help them. It will not.

BRF is different, But most people on our side do not understand this very well. Chinese leadership does not like to relate with India at this level. If something like that happens there is going to be more people to people contact and their people are going to see the benefits of democracy. Today their people believe in the propaganda piece that India is a weak, corrupt country and democracy is bad.


Well yeah. That's obvious. The point I was trying to get at is what do the Chinese really gain by encircling India? We are a huge market and we are right under their soft underbelly. We've never been a threatening entity to their continuous civilization.

I just don't understand why they do such stupid things. If they want to challenge the US they can't do it by being embroiled in conflict with all their neighbors.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby panduranghari » 10 Sep 2016 13:45

What if we put on a conspiracy hat on a say- USA promised G2 to China to take down now FSU but reneged on the promise? With FSU gone, China seemingly occupying the opponent position to American hegemony, does having your own network which is not sea based ( but land based-the control of seas all but in the name is controlled by AngloSaxon axis), permits China to carve out its own hegemonic empire?

Perhaps Chinese have internalised Mackinders Eurasian perspective? Hence CPEC/OBOR has no place for India. Perhaps India is the only country which can screw up OBOR by a short war to reclaim PoJK.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby arun » 10 Sep 2016 14:03

Article titled “State of the Union” in The News by one Babar Sattar with a Harvard.edu e-mail id says that the Punjabi Dominated Military of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan conceives of CPEC as a “National Security Asset”, presumable making the economic dimension take a back seat and further has called for a “CPEC authority managed and run by serving generals”:

………… And then there is the CPEC. Every rational Pakistani will agree that it could open new vistas for us and is a good thing. But should it be conceived as a national security asset? No matter how close our relationship with China, we surely know that interests drive actions of nation-states, and in a changing world interests change too. Why should we consider or rely on something as a security asset the control of which doesn’t lie with us? What were the lessons from our alliances of the 50s and their utility during crunch time?

Granted that the CPEC is a vital communications and economic corridor that is a must-have, how does running power companies and other commercial projects fall within the military’s domain and expertise? Why should the military be interested in establishing a CPEC authority managed and run by serving generals?

Is the idea backed by the thought that even if the civilian government renders the economy bankrupt, the military will have an independent resource base to meet security needs? If so, is that the right way to think about Pakistan’s economy and security? Or is the CPEC too important to be subjected to the risk of civilian incompetence? If that is the logic, what about the police or the judiciary or issues like education and water management etc, all vital for Pakistan’s future? Can the military take over everything important to save Pakistan? …………..


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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Amoghvarsha » 10 Sep 2016 14:56

Iran Interested In Investing In CPEC?

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1179649/cpe ... ts-region/


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