Analyzing CPEC

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arun
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby arun » 19 Feb 2018 18:41

X Posted from the Terroristan thead to the CPEC and OBOR threads.

Financial newspaper from the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan is concerned about the antecedents of the China Overseas Ports Holding Company Pakistan (COPHC-Pakistan), the company that is running the “the centerpiece of the CPEC and a key node of China’s OBOR”, the “Next Dubai or Hong Kong”, the port of Gwadar:

The mysterious China Overseas Ports Holding Company

BR RESEARCH FEB 19TH, 2018 0 VIEWS: 479

China Overseas Ports Holding Company Pakistan (COPHC-Pakistan), the company building Gwadar Port – the centerpiece of the CPEC and a key node of China’s OBOR – is a company of unknown credentials at best, or a fishy one at worst.

On its website (cophcgwadar.com), COPHC-Pakistan says it is “a branch company of COPHC which is an emerging and fast growing company in Hong Kong”. That is the only thing the company has to say about its profile, background and key management.

Documents submitted by COPHC-Pakistan to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) reveal that save for three shares – one each for its three directors – the rest of its total 10 million shares is owned by COPHC Limited based out of Hong Kong.

The COPHC-Pakistan has not submitted its annual documents for FY17; nor has it submitted its annual accounts to the SECP for all the years since its incorporation in Pakistan in October 2014. Under Pakistani law, companies that have a capital of Rs10 million or more are required to submit their annual accounts to the SECP.

BR Research is told that the SECP, which has recently signed MoU with COPHC-Pakistan to set up a facilitation office at Gwadar Port, has sent a show-cause notice to COPHC-Pakistan (on Feb 9, 2017) for not filing the annual accounts and other updated documents. But this is a small matter. The real deal is about the company’s origins and profile.

In its dated annual documents (2016’s Form-A) submitted to the SECP, COPHC-Pakistan mentions the following address of its parent company: Room D, 3/F Thomson Commercial Building, 8-10 Thomson Road, Wanchai, Honk Kong. BR Research has obtained documents from the government of Hong Kong and those documents confirm this address.

That an “emerging and fast growing company” is based out of a single room is a red flag – often indicative of a classic paper company – especially if that room is shared by at least four other companies, one of which featured in the Panama Leaks.

The four companies registered in the same room as COPHC-Pakistan’s parent firm in Hong Kong are as follows: Acota Limited (https:// offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/262770); Chums Asia Limited (https:// www.chums.jp/company/en/); China Dynasty Trading Limited (https:// panjiva.com/China-Dynasty-Trading-Ltd/44033963); and a certain auto parts company (https:// www.auto-bee.com/Contact-us.html). To re-confirm, BR Research randomly selected two companies (Acota and Dynasty) and purchased their documents from the government of Honk Kong – and both have the same addresses as COPHC-Hong Kong.

It may be possible that COHPC-Hong Kong is a vehicle for a consortium of Chinese companies operating in the businesses of port operations, port development, port financing and so forth. But even if that may be the case, then those involved in the port’s handover to COPHC and those overseeing the port ought to know and disclose the details of the consortium. After all, they are building the central pillar of the CPEC, and sharing the details of consortium parties is not uncommon: the strategic stake sale of Pakistan Stock Exchange is one such recent example.

Upon sighting the red flag, BR Research reached out to a host of stakeholders to find the profile and background of COPHC-Pakistan’s parent company and its key management. Most stakeholders, from the Planning Commission to the signatories of the concession agreement signed in 2013, said it was a Chinese state-run company. But when pressed for evidence, they said they didn’t have any, and that theirs was only an “assumption” that COPHC is a state-run company.

BR Research also sent letters/emails and made phone calls to both COPCH-Pakistan and Gwadar Port Authority officials, asking for the profile of COPHC’s Hong Kong based parent company. But nearly a week has passed, and no one has officially responded so far. For a piece of information that is standard and usually readily-available, the silence is disturbing.

China has been shopping for ports around the world. The matter has caught the interest of both international media – the likes of The Financial Times and the Economic Intelligence Unit – as well as of international research firms such as Drewry maritime and shipping consultants. Several detailed reports and studies have been published on the subject in recent months.

In those reports, three Chinese ports and terminal buyers feature the most: Cosco, China Shipping, and China Merchants. The COPHC does not feature in any of those studies, even though, according to Hong Kong government documents, the company is not entirely new; it was incorporated in August 2012. So much for “emerging and fast growing”!

When Pakistan invited bids to develop Gwadar port in 2006, leading seaport operating companies from Dubai, Saudi Arabia, China, and Singapore took part in the bids for the award of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract. The tender committee back then was headed by Farooq Rehmatullah – a seasoned and well-respected energy professional – in consultation with Arthur D. Little, the original consultant for Gwadar Port. The PSA International of Singapore had won that bid.

In 2013, when the COPHC was given port concessions after years of non-performance by the PSA International, there was no such list of contenders. If there was, it wasn’t surely made public. The port was simply handed over to the COPHC with the media reporting silence over the profile and background of the firm. Most observers assumed that it is a Chinese state-run firm. But no one really knows for sure. Will a Chinese state-run company have a shared single-room office?

At the one end, one is inclined to think there is something fishy about COPHC-Pakistan, considering that it is based out of a single room in Hong Kong. Yet at the other end, one would like to give benefit of the doubt that perhaps this is the way how Chinese work, especially considering that the Chinese government is also closely involved in the development of Gwadar.

This column fully supports the CPEC. But not at the cost of transparency. The CPEC is the flagship project of the OBOR. Gwadar is the raison d’être of the CPEC. And while the development of Gwadar as a city is critical, the successful development of Gwadar Port is what will breathe life into CPEC. No amount of urban development will turn Gwadar into an emerald unless its port is successful. Yet Pakistanis, individuals and businesses alike, have no idea about the firm that holds the concession for Gwadar port for 40 years.

The Chinese may not be used to answering the public. But here in Pakistan, the public is becoming sensitive to democratic standards of transparency and accountability. As a private company, the COPHCL may be well within its rights not to disclose its key corporate particulars, but the government of Pakistan cannot afford such secrecy. Ports are strategic assets. And therefore, the public, especially businesses, have the right to know in whose hands rests the fate of CPEC before they go about making grand business plans.

The Chinese government, too, should consider that it is at the risk of making OBOR an international joke with the central pillar of its flagship project (CPEC) being built by a firm that has unknown credentials at best and questionable at worst.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2018


Above from Business Recorder :

The mysterious China Overseas Ports Holding Company

Meanwhile Foreign Minister of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Khawaja Asif, had this to say about Gwadar Port:

Addressing a ceremony at Sialkot on Sunday, Asif said that Gwadar port would emerge as a busiest port and play a dominating role in ensuring drastic economic stability of the country as well as in the region.


From here:

Gwadar port, CPEC projects to open new vista of prosperity: Asif

arun
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby arun » 20 Feb 2018 09:05

chanakyaa wrote:Unfortunately following link is for digital subscribers of FT. Only reason posting the link to highlight that such article exists.

China woos Pakistan militants to secure Belt and Road projects



FWIW, Pakistan Today’s reporting of the content of article by UK’s Financial Times which talks about the Peoples Republic of China playing footsie with Baloch Freedom Fighting Mujahideen who are seeking to liberate themselves from the rapacious clutches of the Uniformed Jihadi’s of the Punjabi Military dominated Deep State of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

China woos Baloch militants to secure Belt and Road projects

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chetak » 20 Feb 2018 11:11

x posted from the OBOR thread

The Backlash to Belt and Road




The Backlash to Belt and Road

A South Asian Battle Over Chinese Economic Power

By Andrew Small

When Beijing announced its One Belt, One Road initiative five years ago, the global reaction was immediate and pronounced. OBOR, as it became known, was hailed as a transformative effort to deploy China’s economic might in service of its strategic goals. By going out of their way to reject analogies to the United States’ Marshall Plan in Europe, Chinese leaders in fact invited the comparison. Chinese ports, pipelines, roads, and railways would expand commercial, investment, and infrastructure linkages from Asia to Europe. They would build new markets, integrate poorly connected regions, and stabilize the Chinese periphery. Ultimately, they would lay the groundwork for a Sinocentric global order.

No region seemed to make a more promising target for such ambitions than South Asia. Sparsely populated Central Asia is a transit route and energy source rather than a serious market. East Asian trade and infrastructure connections are already well developed. EU public procurement rules preclude a privileged role for Chinese companies. Russia is in economic decline.

South Asia, by contrast, appeared to have all the right ingredients for the Chinese economic model: large populations, fast-growing economies, GDP per capita comparable to China’s a decade earlier, weak connectivity, and major infrastructure deficiencies. When Chinese Premier Li Keqiang undertook his first overseas visit in 2013, South Asia was the location he picked to tout two new economic corridors, a version of OBOR avant la lettre.

But five years on, such hopes have proved unfounded. The region has instead become the main battleground for OBOR’s future—with India as its chief opponent, Pakistan as its chief enthusiast, and, in between, countries from Nepal to the Maldives facing economic choices that have become highly politicized. While the hope may have been that Chinese investment schemes would help mitigate competition in the region, the result so far has been precisely the opposite: OBOR has fused with and reinforced existing divisions. If China wants the economics of the initiative to achieve its intended strategic effects, it will need to square the politics first. South Asia illustrates the obstacles Beijing will face when it fails to do so.

CHINA AND INDIA AT A CROSSROADS

At the crux of this contest is the Sino-Indian relationship, which has deteriorated sharply in the last few years. In other regions, Beijing offered careful reassurances to countries that might try to frustrate Chinese investments in their backyards. With Russia, for example, China noted that OBOR would complement and reinforce Moscow’s own connectivity plans. Beijing made no such efforts with India. New Delhi had been willing to join earlier Chinese-led initiatives, such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), when Chinese diplomacy displayed deftness and a multilateral spirit. China’s conduct around OBOR in South Asia took a clumsier and more unilateral form. Its quasi-official maps of the initiative included Indian ports, despite the lack of any consultations between the two sides. The economic corridor linking Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar was likewise folded into the scheme without Indian agreement.

Most controversially, China announced that OBOR would include the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an investment scheme potentially worth tens of billions of dollars, which India has formally objected to on the grounds that the route passes through disputed territory. In practice, the cross-border aspects of CPEC are modest—some fiber optic cable installations and road upgrades had already been under way—and the projects in the contentious region of Gilgit-Baltistan are similarly small in scale. CPEC is essentially an investment package rather than a serious transit route. But the “corridor” terminology and ambitious claims from the Pakistani side about future railways and pipelines implied a more significant change to the status quo. This only deepened New Delhi’s long-standing anxieties over Sino-Pakistani relations, which have for decades been built around the common security goal of counterbalancing India. While China has sought to portray CPEC as a means to stabilize Pakistan, India sees it as emboldening Islamabad.

OBOR’s takeoff in the rest of the region triggered a fresh round of concern about the security risks of China’s growing economic reach. For India, Sri Lanka exemplified its gravest fears. Beginning in 2007, China began supplying arms and diplomatic cover to the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, which played a crucial role during the brutal denouement of the country’s civil war. Beijing also lent an already indebted government funds to pursue several vanity projects, which enabled Rajapaksa to woo his political base. Alarm bells went off in New Delhi when China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) submarines paid port calls in Colombo without advance notice, the last straw that prompted Indian efforts to bolster the opposition to Rajapaksa in the 2015 election. But the new president, Maithripala Sirisena, who wanted to extricate Sri Lanka from some of the Chinese contracts, quickly found that the terms were inflexible and had left the country with virtually unserviceable levels of debt. China was willing to negotiate but sought a debt-for-equity swap that would give Chinese companies a long lease on Hambantota port.

In spite of this, India has maintained the upper hand politically. The 2015 elections proved that there was a price to be paid by Sri Lanka for ignoring New Delhi’s redlines. With the Hambantota lease deal, the Sri Lankan government carefully assured Indian officials that sensitive port operations, including security management, would be controlled by a Sri Lankan company and that the port would not be used for military purposes. It also denied subsequent requests from the PLA Navy to make port calls in Colombo. New Delhi’s message resonated throughout the region, prompting other governments to provide private reassurances that Chinese investments would not be a prelude to militarization. Beijing may find friendly governments to work with temporarily, but with the exception of Pakistan, it will find it very difficult to establish a dual-use port in South Asia that the PLA Navy can count on.

But Sri Lanka’s case also offered a warning to India of the economic realities working against it. Colombo was forced back to the negotiating table with China for lack of any better options. India has since improved its efforts to offer countries appealing economic alternatives. But its various limitations—in its resources, its capacity for direct investment, its significant infrastructure needs at home—have necessitated partnerships with other concerned countries. The most important of these has been with Japan, which created in 2015 the new “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,” an expansion of the infrastructure resources provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and in cooperation with India developed an “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.” Perhaps the most telling Indo-Japanese intervention was in Bangladesh, which in 2015 was in the advanced stages of agreeing to a package of Chinese financing for a new deep-water port. But political pressure and economic incentives (including the largest yen loan that the Japan International Cooperation Agency has ever offered for developmental assistance) pushed Dhaka to opt for a Japanese deal instead.

Almost as important, Sri Lanka handed India a propaganda coup. In Colombo, a convincing story has taken hold, one that paints OBOR as predatory, a debt trap, and a route to military expansionism. In reality, the new Chinese highways have been beneficial; and the expansion of the Colombo port has been an economic success, with the overwhelming majority of the port’s activity consisting of trans-shipment to India. Yet that more nuanced picture is overshadowed by the evocative sight of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, a gleaming, fully staffed building with virtually no passengers, no planes, and an empty departures board, surrounded by sweeping highways on which cars are outnumbered by auto rickshaws, cows, and elephant dung. It is that image that has come to embody OBOR in Sri Lanka, much to India’s delight.

A ZERO-SUM FUTURE?

Beyond South Asia, India has been notably effective in influencing the debate over OBOR by consistently raising its concerns at the highest political levels to countries with plenty of reservations of their own. It was no coincidence that in October 2017, fresh off a trip to New Delhi, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about OBOR “going through disputed territory.” India, alongside Japan, has reinforced the Trump administration’s competitive stance toward China and encouraged the adoption of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy that is partly intended as a counterpoint to OBOR. When the newly resumed security “quad” (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) met in November 2017, these strategic economic issues took up much of the agenda.

Clearly, none of these developments will stop China’s economic advances in South Asia. There are over $20 billion worth of projects moving ahead on the ground in Pakistan. The Southern Expressway in Sri Lanka is progressing ineluctably to connect Hambantota and Colombo. China has just ended India’s Internet monopoly in Nepal. And states elsewhere in the region will continue to take advantage of China’s growing role to gain leverage in their dealings with New Delhi, the traditionally dominant power in their neighborhood. But alongside its partners, India does place certain limits on OBOR in the region by creating an environment in which it is politically costly to pursue various projects without taking Indian interests into account. This puts OBOR at a crossroads in the region.

There are three potential scenarios for what could happen next.

Beijing could make a unilateral course correction, opting to have a greater portion of its efforts in South Asia look more like those of the AIIB: more transparency, less onerous loan terms, a closer partnership with multilateral institutions, and more focus on regional connectivity than bilateral links to China. Beijing is not going to turn the whole of OBOR into the AIIB—it wants to preserve its prerogatives to pursue politically targeted projects with narrower bilateral benefits—but a shift would reduce the levels of criticism and opposition.

China and India could also reach an informal agreement over the scope of OBOR, given that there is still considerable room for negotiation, even over Indian sensitivities about CPEC. Particularly if China made progress on other thorny issues, such as on India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, New Delhi’s stance on OBOR could end up resembling Japan’s: retaining economically competitive elements while identifying targeted areas for cooperation. As former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon has argued, India’s interest is in seeing more projects like Colombo port and fewer projects like Hambantota. If India more actively engaged China on the rules of the road, its capacity to shape OBOR would arguably be greater.

The most likely scenario is that the competition continues and hardens. Dynamics in South Asia are increasingly taking on a zero-sum quality. And with improving U.S.-Indian and Chinese-Pakistani relations set against a decline in U.S.-Pakistani and Chinese-Indian relations, such dynamics are becoming mutually reinforcing. This is an unhealthy trend, given the pressing need for a better economically integrated region. The connectivity deficit in South Asia remains significant: the World Bank estimates that intraregional trade accounts for only five percent of the total, compared with 25 percent in Southeast Asia, 35 percent in East Asia, and 60 percent in Europe, while intraregional investment stands below one percent overall. Although in East Asia, rivals have been able to sustain mutually beneficial economic relationships, in South Asia, security rifts have stymied trade and investment. Outside parties, including the United States and China, still have an interest in alleviating this problem rather than allowing the economics of the region to turn into an extension of political and military rivalries. The window for doing so is now closing.

So far, OBOR’s rollout in South Asia demonstrates the barriers Beijing will face unless it makes adjustments. Beijing pushed the narrative that growing Chinese trade and investment would spur development, stability, and a more integrated region. But the project’s early promise has been soured by China’s failure to reach a consensus with the region’s major power and to answer serious questions about whether its handling of Sri Lanka is sui generis or symptomatic of its general approach. Even in sympathetic Pakistan, similar concerns are quietly expressed, and the Maldives is shaping up to be the regional test case for 2018. There is still an opportunity for Beijing to push forward a version of OBOR that is likely to command broader support and consent, including from competitors and rivals that can still see benefits in certain Chinese investments. But token efforts, such as recent offers to rename CPEC, are not enough. If Beijing wants a clearer run to advance the economic and strategic goals that underpin OBOR, it needs to do its political homework first.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby SSridhar » 20 Feb 2018 19:08

chanakyaa wrote:Unfortunately following link is for digital subscribers of FT. Only reason posting the link to highlight that such article exists.

China woos Pakistan militants to secure Belt and Road projects

Understandable.

China also had a deal with Jama'at-e-Islami about a decade back.

Failure or even tardy implementation of CPEC would be a serious setback for not only the rest of BRI but also a big blow personally for Xi who has invested so much into CPEC. He will therefore pull out all the stops to smash hurdles on the way and Baloch separatism is top on the list.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 20 Feb 2018 23:34

chanakyaa wrote:Unfortunately following link is for digital subscribers of FT. Only reason posting the link to highlight that such article exists.

China woos Pakistan militants to secure Belt and Road projects
chanakya Ji & arun Ji :

Aap ki Seva mein Prustoot hai :

China woos Pakistan militants to secure Belt and Road projects

Beijing in talks with tribal separatists in Baluchistan to protect $60bn investment

Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad and Kiran Stacey in New Delhi

China has been quietly holding talks with Pakistani tribal separatists for more than five years in an effort to protect the $60bn worth of infrastructure projects it is financing as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Three people with knowledge of the talks told the Financial Times that Beijing had been in direct contact with militants in the south-western state of Baluchistan, where many of the scheme’s most important projects are located.

For more than half a century, Beijing has maintained a policy of non-interference in the domestic politics of other countries. But that has been tested by its desire to protect the billions of dollars it is investing around the world under its Belt and Road Initiative to create a “new Silk Road” of trade routes in Europe, Asia and Africa.

In Pakistan, Beijing appears keen to fill the void left by Washington, which has drifted from its former ally after becoming frustrated at Islamabad’s failure to tackle extremism. Beijing’s willingness to get involved in Pakistani politics has fuelled concerns in New Delhi, which is worried about China’s growing political influence in neighbouring countries, including Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

“The Chinese have quietly made a lot of progress,” said one Pakistani official. “Even though separatists occasionally try to carry out the odd attack, they are not making a forceful push.”

As it seeks to boost the Chinese economy, China’s plans for a new Silk Road has pitched Beijing into some of the world’s most complex conflict zones.

Chinese peacekeepers are already in South Sudan, where Beijing has invested in oilfields and is planning to build a rail line. China has also contributed troops to a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali and even talked about launching attacks against Isis in Iraq, where it has been the largest foreign investor in the country’s oil sector.

Pakistan, which is set to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of the infrastructure initiative, is one of the riskiest parts of the world in which to do business. Last year 10 local workers were killed by unidentified gunmen while working near Gwadar port, the linchpin of the economic corridor.

Some have warned that China’s investment could lead to Pakistan being treated like a client state by Beijing, despite promises that Chinese troops would not be stationed there.

“The Belt and Road Initiative is portrayed as an economic project to boost infrastructure and connectivity but, increasingly, it has significant local political and strategic dimensions,” said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Pakistani officials, however, have welcomed the talks between Baluch rebels and Chinese envoys, even if they do not know the details of what has been discussed. “Ultimately, if there’s peace in Baluchistan, that will benefit both of us,” said one official in Islamabad.

Another said the recent decision by the US to suspend security assistance to Pakistan had convinced many in Islamabad that China was a more genuine partner. “[The Chinese] are here to stay and help Pakistan, unlike the Americans, who cannot be trusted,” the person said.

Pakistan is planning to buy Chinese military helicopters and components for surveillance drones as part of its plan to fortify its border with Afghanistan with a 2,600km-long fence.

Chinese officials did not comment on the talks, though the Chinese ambassador to Islamabad said in a recent interview with the BBC that militants in Baluchistan were no longer a threat to the economic corridor.

One provincial tribal leader said many young men had been persuaded to lay down their weapons by the promise of financial benefits. “Today, young men are not getting attracted to join the insurgents as they did some 10 years ago,” he said. “Many people see prosperity” as a result of the China-Pakistan corridor, he said.

This article has been amended to reflect that the 10 workers killed near Gwadar port last year were Pakistanis

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby mappunni » 21 Feb 2018 06:16

SSridhar wrote:
chanakyaa wrote:Unfortunately following link is for digital subscribers of FT. Only reason posting the link to highlight that such article exists.

China woos Pakistan militants to secure Belt and Road projects

Understandable.

China also had a deal with Jama'at-e-Islami about a decade back.

Failure or even tardy implementation of CPEC would be a serious setback for not only the rest of BRI but also a big blow personally for Xi who has invested so much into CPEC. He will therefore pull out all the stops to smash hurdles on the way and Baloch separatism is top on the list.


The news of China talking with Baloch militants has been rebuked by BLA

https://twitter.com/Faiz_Baluch/status/965643621113483265

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby brvarsh » 21 Feb 2018 06:42

Its a good news that Chinese are talking to Baloch fighters - First, they are afraid of them and see them as a credible disruptive force and Second, they see Pakistani army incapable to deal with them. Third, which is a music to ears that Chinese are engaging groups without Pakistani government's involvement that should be an eye opener for Pakistani government if they have any "sharm" left that their biggest partner is in there for the land not the people.
Critical question is how Baloch freedom seekers would respond to this?

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Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 27 Feb 2018 00:05

X Posted on the Terroristan Thread

CPEC's Gwadar: A bane or boon for Pakistan?

BALOCHISTAN [PAKISTAN]: China's decision to invest in the Gwadar Port in particular, and the USD 60 billion China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor in the larger context, should not been seen only in economic terms, as a certain section of people harbour fears of Pakistan being colonised by the Chinese.

Officials like, Captain Gul Mohammed, the head of Marine Operations at Gwadar Port, however, project a brighter picture, believing that the port will be South Asia's 'Dubai’

Sindh Province Governor, Muhammed Zubair, who has been one of the key architects behind the port's development, suggests that China's motives behind making the CPEC, has a larger meaning and purpose.

"When you become a superpower and you are sitting on tons and tons of cash, what do you do with that? You have to go global," Zubair , was quoted by The Telegraph, as saying.

"So, I would not question that they have far more objectives than a win-win for China and Pakistan in economic terms. They want to compete with the United States. This gives them the security leverage that they desperately need," he adds.

The Telegraph report further quotes Pakistani officials, as saying that the deal with China is Pakistan's way of actually insurance against a hostile India, and a way of finally breaking free of an increasingly acrimonious relationship with the United States.

"And, it (Gwadar) is widely seen as the jewel in China's "string of pearls" - a chain of strategic maritime bases in countries, including Myanmar and Sri Lanka, that are meant to guard strategic shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean," the report said.

China has big plans for Gwadar Port as Chinese contractors will also build a rail link, Pakistan's largest airport, and a new road to Afghanistan. Desalination plants are planned to support a new desert city expected to grow to 1.7 million people by 2050.

The passage won't be easy as it seems, the harsh climate is not the only thing builders here must contend with. Pakistan's military has fought an on-off struggle with insurgents leading a separatist movement in Balochistan for decades.

"The dusty towns that dot the desert are patrolled by heavily-armed Pakistani troops in pickup trucks mounted with machine guns and anti-IED jamming devices," the report mentions.

"Beijing's presence here and across much of Pakistan, is palpable," the report further mentions.

The friendship of China and Pakistan, two long-standing allies, is concerning ordinary Pakistanis.

"It's obvious that when you are the borrower you're in a weaker position than the lender," said one student at a Karachi University. "We were colonised by the British for centuries. Now, people are wondering if we are about to be colonised by the Chinese too."

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Rudradev » 27 Feb 2018 02:42

http://www.ejinsight.com/20180226-why-a ... -pakistan/

Simon Shen Feb 26, 2018 9:51am
Why are Chinese becoming increasingly unwelcome in Pakistan?


Pakistan has remained one of China’s most steadfast allies for decades, and it is also a key partner as Beijing now implements its “One Belt One Road” blueprint.

In the past few years the Chinese government invested tens of billions of dollars in major projects in Pakistan such as the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” and the Gwadar Port, in an apparent effort to set Pakistan as an example so as to attract more countries to join the Belt and Road program.

However, recently the Chinese embassy in Islamabad issued a rare warning of possible terrorist attacks against Chinese official organizations, enterprises and travellers on Pakistani soil, and urged Chinese citizens over there to stay vigilant and reduce outdoor activities.

In the meantime, the local tourism sector in Pakistan has also issued an internal guideline calling on Chinese travellers to be on full alert for any possible danger and to avoid going to rural or suburban areas.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese embassy wasn’t being paranoid in warning its citizens against terrorist attacks, given that the number of kidnapping, extortion and assault cases against Chinese nationals in Pakistan has been continually on the rise in recent years.

For example, earlier this month, two Chinese business executives of a transportation company were shot by gunmen in the southern city of Karachi, with one of them dead and the other injured. The Pakistani police later said the two of them were the specific targets of a terrorist attack.

And back in October last year, 26 Chinese workers were wounded as a result of a grenade attack on a workers’ dormitory at the Gwadar Port.


Nevertheless, it was a recent tip-off about a possible attempt to assassinate the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan that turned out to be the last straw and prompted the Chinese embassy to issue travel warning for the country. Luckily, the ambassador himself still remains unharmed as of now. :mrgreen:

As to the reason why Chinese nationals have suddenly become the target for terrorists in Pakistan, officialdom in Beijing has insisted that the attacks were perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist and separatist groups such as the East Turkestan Independence Movement, the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS).

Yet the western media have suggested otherwise. According to them, the main reason why Chinese people are becoming increasingly hated in Pakistan is because there is a prevailing view among the local population that China is aggressively milking their country for huge economic profits by imposing “unequal treaties” on their government.

They cited the Gwadar Port as an example, pointing out that under the existing 40-year lease concluded between Beijing and Islamabad, the Pakistani port authority would only get 10 percent of the total profits.

At first glance, both the Chinese officialdom and western media seem to have a point.

However, I believe unequal distribution of economic benefits alone isn’t enough to provoke anti-China sentiment in Pakistan. After all, China has remained the country’s powerful ally for decades, not to mention that pro-China propaganda still commands a huge audience there.

In my opinion, the single biggest contributing factor to the rising tide of hate crimes against Chinese people in Pakistan is Beijing’s escalating interference in the country’s domestic affairs in an attempt to protect its huge infrastructure projects and investment initiatives over there.

China’s policy change has not only violated its own long-standing diplomatic principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, but has also led to Beijing’s entanglement in the ethnic and religious conflicts in Pakistan.

For instance, according to a recent article published by the Financial Times, Beijing has bypassed Islamabad and directly reached out to the separatists in the province of Balochistan in order to seek guarantee of the safety of its huge investment initiatives along the “One Belt One Road”, an act that could have upset quite a lot of Pakistanis. Oh please please let this be true. Imagine if Cheens end up paying hafta to RAA via Baloch Freedom Fighters to keep their khatara CPEC running! Not to mention, if Cheens start cutting deals with Baloch Freedom Fighters, the expected reactions of TSPA/ISI/Sarkari Tanzeems will be fun to watch :D

Even though it appears the terrorists in Pakistan have already shown some degree of restraint in their attacks against Chinese, probably because of Beijing’s behind-the-scenes influence, Chinese people are likely to become more and more susceptible to terror threats as China is getting increasingly involved in the country’s domestic conflict.


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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Kashi » 27 Feb 2018 09:36

So if Cheen is directly negotiating with the Baloch liberation movement activists, can it be assumed that they being in very good touch with ground realities in occupied Balochistan, probably believe that TSPA is failing in containing the movement and they have little faith in the TSPAs ability to keep things under a lid in the long term.

This must be one of the biggest indicators of the state of events in Balochistan.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chola » 27 Feb 2018 10:23

Rudradev wrote:http://www.ejinsight.com/20180226-why-are-chinese-becoming-increasingly-unwelcome-in-pakistan/

Simon Shen Feb 26, 2018 9:51am
Why are Chinese becoming increasingly unwelcome in Pakistan?




LOL. Seriously, just what are the chances of pork-eating, alcohol drinking, prostitute-visiting chini atheists cohabiting successfully with religiously nutcase Paki beardos?

What would happen if those chini engineers leave their east asian girly magazines lying around and one of the local jihadi sees one and is blinded by all that lecherous defamatory skin? Or a piece of cantonese roast pork was dropped on the floor and one of the burka babes steps on it and takes a spill?

The set up is just fraught with all kinds of iffy situations that can lead to a Paki religious explosion.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby arun » 27 Feb 2018 14:21

Bloomberg via South China Morning Post on the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s much bragged about “Next Dubai” :wink: , “Next Singapore” :lol: , “Next Hong Kong” :rotfl: (Clicky), Gwadar Port in Punjabi Occupied Balochistan:

Heavy security and a ‘climate of fear’ surround China’s flagship port in Pakistan : ‘It doesn’t feel like a normal investment location or an enabling business environment if that level of protection needs to be provided’

PUBLISHED : Tuesday, 27 February, 2018, 8:24am
UPDATED : Tuesday, 27 February, 2018, 8:24am

For the thousands of attendees it was meant to be a conference to showcase China’s flagship Belt and Road project in Pakistan – the port in southwestern Gwadar that gives Beijing access to the Arabian Sea.

In the evenings the almost 8,000 delegates were wowed with cultural shows and a firework display at the newly opened five-story Gwadar Exhibition Centre which was host to about 100 companies last month.

Yet what really caught the attention of some investors were the hundreds of Pakistani troops patrolling the roads and guarding high-end hotel lobbies.

“Nobody will come and invest in this climate of fear,” said Muhammad Zafar Paracha, director at the Pakistani partner of MoneyGram International Inc.

With national elections due in July, Pakistan’s government is keen to trumpet the commercial viability of the deep seaport in the once sleepy sea town of about 200,000 people in a province long racked by separatist insurgency. To secure Beijing’s funding of more than US$50 billion in infrastructure projects, Pakistan has raised a special 15,000 strong security force.

The port is scheduled to start transshipment on March 7. Yet for all the fanfare, some question Gwadar’s prospects amid heavy security. Balochistan is mostly off limits to outsiders and there’s no visible foreign presence beyond the Chinese. Journalists and visitors are closely monitored by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies.

“It doesn’t feel like a normal investment location or an enabling business environment if that level of protection needs to be provided,” said Andrew Small, who has written a book on Pakistan-China relations and is one of a handful of westerns to have travelled to Gwadar.

Beijing has become increasingly vocal over the risks in Pakistan. In December, its embassy in Islamabad warned of imminent terror attacks on Chinese targets. This month a Chinese manager at Cosco Shipping Lines Co, was gunned down in an upmarket area of Karachi. Following the murder, China called on Islamabad to take more measures to ensure security.

“It’s our commitment to the Chinese companies or other investors coming there to provide security,” Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi said in an interview. “The security situation has significantly improved” in Balochistan.

Security challenges come from long-standing grievances of the local Baloch people. Many claim they have been discriminated against by Islamabad, which they say plunders their natural resources and gives little back to Pakistan’s least populated and developed province. More than 2,600 people have been killed or wounded in suicide attacks in the Balochistan since 2003, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

Despite the Chinese influx “locals get no jobs, nothing,” said Hameed Rasheed, a dealer of Honda Motor Company Ltd in Gwadar. Rasheed was also concerned about security in the province after two of his trucks were set ablaze by unknown assailants on the coastal highway in October.

“The main challenges, as I see them, are posed by the security risks of sustaining a large Chinese presence in Balochistan,” said Joshua White, a former director for South Asian affairs at the US National Security Council. “China has demonstrated that it is highly sensitive to threats against Chinese citizens abroad, and even a small number of attacks or kidnappings could constrain the ambitions of China’s state owned enterprises operating in the area.”

Nonetheless some Pakistani companies are investing. Conglomerate Engro Corp. plans to build more than US$700 million of wind and solar power plants in Balochistan. Present at the expo’s stands were major Pakistani lenders Habib Bank Ltd and United Bank Ltd, along with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd.

With more than half a dozen cranes mostly idle, port authorities at Gwadar are also hoping to siphon millions of tons of cargo currently shipped through Dubai. Pakistan’s Maritime Affairs Minister Mir Hasil Khan Bizinjo said the government is looking to shift Nato cargo bound for Afghanistan from Karachi to Gwadar. China is expected to start work in June on a US$1.2 billion port expansion, said Gwadar Port Authority Chairman Dostain Khan Jamaldini.

Some locals see the benefit. Muhammad Wasim Baloch has seen sales of his traditional shoes soar in the past year thanks to Chinese buyers. “Our business has increased about 60 per cent,” he said.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby adityadange » 27 Feb 2018 16:59

Peregrine wrote:X Posted on the Terroristan Thread
CPEC's Gwadar: A bane or boon for Pakistan?

"When you become a superpower and you are sitting on tons and tons of cash, what do you do with that? You have to go global," Zubair , was quoted by The Telegraph, as saying.

So china is already a superpower as per pakistan. So if china wants to go global, it opens doors in pak and not in china itself?? Lahori logic I say. Why cant china invest to develop in new port in china itself?

"So, I would not question that they have far more objectives than a win-win for China and Pakistan in economic terms. They want to compete with the United States. This gives them the security leverage that they desperately need," he adds.

This guy is suggesting two things here. One, china does not have security leverage vis-a-vis usa if it develops port in chinese mainland. Second, china is despatate for security leverage. why so desparate??

The Telegraph report further quotes Pakistani officials, as saying that the deal with China is Pakistan's way of actually insurance against a hostile India, and a way of finally breaking free of an increasingly acrimonious relationship with the United States.

so they fear that one day India and USA will attach pak?

"Beijing's presence here and across much of Pakistan, is palpable," the report further mentions.

What does that mean?

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby A Deshmukh » 27 Feb 2018 18:22

TSP is repeating the mistakes in history. Mughals allowed EIC entry. TSP repeating the same with Cheen.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Kashi » 28 Feb 2018 12:03

A Deshmukh wrote:TSP is repeating the mistakes in history. Mughals allowed EIC entry. TSP repeating the same with Cheen.


A Baki reading your message will be exhilarated beyond measure that he/she's being compared with Mughals, the rest doesn't matter anyway.

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Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 28 Feb 2018 17:57

X Posted on the OBOR Chinese Strategy & Implications Thread

CPEC’s transparency: NHA admits irregularities in award of $2.9b contract to Chinese firm

ISLAMABAD: The National Highway Authority (NHA) chairman confessed on Tuesday that there were irregularities in the award of a $2.9-billion contract to a Chinese firm for construction of a motorway under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The admission raises transparency concerns in the multi-billion dollar deals.

NHA Chairman Jawwad Rafique Malik admitted that concessions worth roughly $200 million given to the China State Construction Engineering Company (CSCEC) were not part of the original bidding documents Pakistan had floated for the construction of the 392-kilometre long Multan-Sukkur section.

The chairman also confessed that the Rs294.4-billion or $2.9-billion contract had been awarded to the Chinese company on an “alternate bid”, which the company had submitted after quoting its original bid.

The chairman made these admissions before the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Revenue that met on Tuesday under the chairmanship of PPP Senator Saleem Mandviwalla. These admissions carry huge implications for the multi-billion dollar CPEC projects and may land the government in trouble.

These confessions also revealed that controlled competition among three Chinese companies was not at all fair play, as the NHA engaged with the so-called lowest bidder in violation of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Rules of 2004.

Several senators have moved a calling-attention notice in the Senate, asking for rationale behind the huge tax exemptions. The Senate standing committee would give a report to the upper house of parliament on its findings.

The Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (Ecnec) had approved the Multan-Sukkur project at a cost of Rs259 billion but the lowest bid CSCEC gave amounted to Rs406 billion, said Malik. He further told the committee that CSCEC also submitted an “alternate bid” valued at Rs339 billion.

Upon this, Senator Nauman Wazir Khattak of the PTI questioned whether the PPRA Rules of 2004 allowed submission of alternate bids.

The chairman claimed that the rules allowed it but he could not cite the relevant PPRA Rule in his defence.

The NHA chairman further said that after negotiations the bidder agreed to lower the alternate bid price to Rs294 billion after the government assured that it would not charge taxes to the tune of Rs19.1 billion or roughly $200 million.

The senators inquired whether tax exemptions were part of the original bid documents and whether the other two Chinese bidders were aware of these exemptions. “Neither the other two bidders nor the lowest bidder knew about these tax exemptions,” confessed Malik.

But the NHA chief insisted that there was no loss to the state, as the government lowered the bid price to the extent of tax exemptions.

The admissions suggest that the deal was not awarded in a fair manner, said Senator Mohsin Aziz of the PTI.

Senator Nauman Wazir claimed that the NHA had initially received a Rs240-billion bid against the total project price of Rs259 billion. It later on asked the bidder to increase the price, which put the amount at Rs406 billion, said the senator. He added that both the bidder and the NHA then changed the project specifications to quote the Rs294 billion price.

But the NHA chief denied that the project scope was changed. Work on the project is expected to be completed in August 2019.

On the issue of tax exemption, Malik claimed that the policy allowed giving tax exemptions on imports. However, when the relevant policy and the rules were read it was disclosed that the exemption was only for temporary machinery imports while the government has given all types of exemptions to the company.

Although the chairman admitted giving exemptions worth Rs19.1 billion, the quantum of tax relief appeared higher. In its written response, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) informed the committee that in fact, three separate SROs have been issued. The tax authorities issued SRO 44, SRO 79 for income tax exemption, and SRO 51 for exemptions on construction materials and goods imported by the company for the project.

The company has been exempted from paying federal excise duty, sales tax and withholding tax on imported construction materials and goods used in the construction of CPEC’s Sukkur-Multan section.

The FBR said that it has the powers to give exemptions after the ECC decision with the approval of the Minister-in-Charge. However, the Sindh High Court (SHC) has already struck down these powers, terming them illegal and unconstitutional.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Falijee » 02 Mar 2018 23:05


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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby anupmisra » 03 Mar 2018 02:33



Suckers!! It was never about the "development" of jihadi nation. No refining of oil or sale within bakistan. Maybe the awaara awaam should resort to pilfering petroleum from the trucks as they wind their way to Xinjiang. After all, that's the only choice they have.

This mega oil city will be used for transportation of imported oil through the Gwadar Port to China. The oil will be imported from Gulf and will be stored at this proposed mega Gwadar oil city. The distance to China will be reduced, and it will take just seven days to cover the distance from Gwadar to Chinese border as import through western China took almost 40 days by covering double distance.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chetak » 03 Mar 2018 13:35

brvarsh wrote:Its a good news that Chinese are talking to Baloch fighters - First, they are afraid of them and see them as a credible disruptive force and Second, they see Pakistani army incapable to deal with them. Third, which is a music to ears that Chinese are engaging groups without Pakistani government's involvement that should be an eye opener for Pakistani government if they have any "sharm" left that their biggest partner is in there for the land not the people.
Critical question is how Baloch freedom seekers would respond to this?



the hans cannot just exterminate them which is their usual methodology of dealing with such pest control issues. They don't want any more adverse publicity to be drawn towards their pet one belt, one pant project as this would go global and would undoubtedly be labelled as a "normal business practice" for the hans.

Especially since they have more fish to fry in the maldives and some other nearby locations.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Bart S » 03 Mar 2018 13:41

anupmisra wrote:


Suckers!! It was never about the "development" of jihadi nation. No refining of oil or sale within bakistan. Maybe the awaara awaam should resort to pilfering petroleum from the trucks as they wind their way to Xinjiang. After all, that's the only choice they have.

This mega oil city will be used for transportation of imported oil through the Gwadar Port to China. The oil will be imported from Gulf and will be stored at this proposed mega Gwadar oil city. The distance to China will be reduced, and it will take just seven days to cover the distance from Gwadar to Chinese border as import through western China took almost 40 days by covering double distance.



Well, that is BS of the higher order to start with. There is no way that trucking oil up to Xinjiang is going to be more economical to supply the whole of China, than a VLCC fleet, that China already has in ample amounts.

There might be some potential to supply Xinjiang etc through Pakistan but it's in no way going to be in 'mega oil city' category.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chetak » 03 Mar 2018 15:06

Bart S wrote:
anupmisra wrote:
Suckers!! It was never about the "development" of jihadi nation. No refining of oil or sale within bakistan. Maybe the awaara awaam should resort to pilfering petroleum from the trucks as they wind their way to Xinjiang. After all, that's the only choice they have.




Well, that is BS of the higher order to start with. There is no way that trucking oil up to Xinjiang is going to be more economical to supply the whole of China, than a VLCC fleet, that China already has in ample amounts.

There might be some potential to supply Xinjiang etc through Pakistan but it's in no way going to be in 'mega oil city' category.



I thought that the hans were going to pipe the oil up to Xinjiang because all the coal fired power stations and other power stations as well were being set up to primarily the heat the pipeline to keep it at a temp that would allow it to flow easily.

This is supposed to be a risk avoidance second route, an alternative to the main route via the malacca straits for oil from the gulf.

The hans seem to have landed themselves in a bit of paki schitt, here too.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 03 Mar 2018 16:52

anupmisra wrote:Suckers!! It was never about the "development" of jihadi nation. No refining of oil or sale within bakistan. Maybe the awaara awaam should resort to pilfering petroleum from the trucks as they wind their way to Xinjiang. After all, that's the only choice they have.
Bart S wrote:Well, that is BS of the higher order to start with. There is no way that trucking oil up to Xinjiang is going to be more economical to supply the whole of China, than a VLCC fleet, that China already has in ample amounts.

There might be some potential to supply Xinjiang etc through Pakistan but it's in no way going to be in 'mega oil city' category.
Bart S Ji :

1. I believe Xinjiang contains about Half of China's Coal, Natural Gas & Oil Reserves. Xinjiang supplies Mainland China with Billions of Cubic Feet of Natural Gas and Millions & Millions of Tonnes of Oil.

2. I refer you to following Article : THE CPEC PIPEDREAM AND WHY GWADAR AS A PORT IS OVERRATED
If Gwadar to China_Xinjiang Rail Route is used then a 300,000 Tonnes of VLCC will require 6,000 Rail Tanker Wagons which "MUST BE HEATED" or they will arrive in Xinjiang with the Oil in Lumps or Blocks - via the Karakoram Highway. Do you think that such a mode of transport is feasible?

3. The Terroristanis are Championing Gwadar as an alternative to the "Choked Malacca Straits". I refer you to the following Article of the Port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. It is about 75 Miles South East of Sittwe - Old Name Akyab - and the Chinese have built Oil as well as Natural Gas Pipelines to Kunming as per following Article :

With Oil And Gas Pipelines, China Takes A Shortcut Through Myanmar

Thus the Chinese are able to by-pass Malacca Straits. It is to be noted that in the past ULCC Vessels of 500,000 Dead Weight Tonnes carried PG Oil via Lambok Straits during the Loaded Voyage to Japan and Malacca Straits for the Ballast Voyage. China can do the same for its supplies to Mainland China. In addition Oil from West Africa and South America may use the Lambok Straits for Loaded as well as Ballast Passages.

As such the Chinese will use Gwadar for (a) Xinjiang's Exports and Imports. The Xinjiang Textile and other Exports will be Labeled as "Made in Terroristan"! (b) Chinese Army, Naval, Air Force Base.

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Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 08 Mar 2018 22:15

X Posted on the Terroristan Thread

anoopmisra Ji :

Mystery Solved!

Under CPEC: First container vessel anchors at Gwadar

QUETTA: The first ever container vessel MS TIGER under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project arrived at the Gwadar port on Wednesday, this vessel was escorted to the port by the navy ships, PNS DEHSHAT and KARAR where an impressive ceremony was held to welcome the ship onboard.

The new ship container service called the Karachi-Gwadar Gulf Express will connect the Gwadar port to the Middle Eastern hub of Jebel Ali as well as the neighboring Emirati ports.

“CPEC is a game changer for Pakistan and its success is just a prelude to the economic prosperity of the country and hence has taken central stage in the economic, political and security calculus of not only Pakistan but the entire region”, said Commander Coast of Pakistan Navy, Rear Admiral Moazzam Ilyas while speaking at the reception ceremony.

He also said that considering the importance of the Gwadar Port as focal point of CPEC, its security is paramount. For this purpose, the Pakistan navy has raised Task Force 88 to provide maximum defence to the port and its surrounding areas.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby nam » 08 Mar 2018 22:50

chetak wrote:
I thought that the hans were going to pipe the oil up to Xinjiang because all the coal fired power stations and other power stations as well were being set up to primarily the heat the pipeline to keep it at a temp that would allow it to flow easily.

This is supposed to be a risk avoidance second route, an alternative to the main route via the malacca straits for oil from the gulf.

The hans seem to have landed themselves in a bit of paki schitt, here too.


There isn't enough consumption of oil in these region ( because of low population), that would need such a step. There is already infrastructure to pipe it up and store it from the Hanland.

The route is even easier to disrupt. You just need to blow up the pipeline in couple of places, instead of targeting every 150K tonne oil ship going to China!

The ships bringing in imports for local Pak consumption, themselves don't dock in Gwadar! Even the US supplies to Afghanistan goes through Karachi.

Truly a game changer.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby nam » 08 Mar 2018 22:54

The Chinese are either planning to use Gwadar as a PLAN base or are bribing Pak to prevent the Xinginag holy warriors from go to Afghanistan & Pakland for graduation. The teachers for either of these countries come from Pakland.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby yensoy » 09 Mar 2018 12:06



Is this an euphemism for an overseas Strategic Petroleum Reserve? Like we have in Trinco?

There appear to be some decent hills which can be drilled and hollowed out for a bank of reserve tanks.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby panduranghari » 10 Mar 2018 14:39




viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7610&p=2242730&hilit=oil+Panduranghari#p2242422

Hey I said this was the game plan. The Chinese will also put their army, navy there to protect this investment.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Bart S » 10 Mar 2018 16:29

And how will they actually make use of this reserve that is 5000+ km away from their population centers?

Despite what military they can put there, if push comes to shove they can easily be overpowered and blocaded by India or the US. To get the oil to China they have to take the same route as the rest of their oil supplies, as sending it over the Himalayan passes is a non-starter except for Xinjiang (which has it's own oil resources and can access Central Asia much easier as well).

It could be instead, a sort of China-specific refinery cum warehousing/distribution center close to the source, which might have some economic value, but no strategic significance. Even there, they could instead easily do that in Saudi or any of the other countries they import oil from.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 10 Mar 2018 16:50

Bart S wrote:And how will they actually make use of this reserve that is 5000+ km away from their population centers?

Despite what military they can put there, if push comes to shove they can easily be overpowered and blocaded by India or the US. To get the oil to China they have to take the same route as the rest of their oil supplies, as sending it over the Himalayan passes is a non-starter except for Xinjiang (which has it's own oil resources and can access Central Asia much easier as well).

It could be instead, a sort of China-specific refinery cum warehousing/distribution center close to the source, which might have some economic value, but no strategic significance. Even there, they could instead easily do that in Saudi or any of the other countries they import oil from.
Bart S Ji :

Agree with you that transferring Crude or any other Petroleum Product from China or any other Part of the World via the Karakorum Pass or other Passes is a Non-Starter. Thus Maritime Route is the only one.

The Chines Refinery could refine Oil for ultimate use by China or rest of the World but IMHO it is a ruse to station Chinese Army, Navy as well as Air Force for a purely huge Defence Base in the vicinity of Gwadar.

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Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 10 Mar 2018 17:11

X Posted in the Terroristan Thread

Senators in shock: CPEC western route doesn’t exist in Chinese record

ISLAMABAD: Many in the Senate learnt to their shock on Friday that the CPEC’s western route that the government claimed giving top priority did not exist even in the Chinese record.
On the last day of the last session of the Senate’s parliamentary year with 52 of its members retiring, the PkMAP parliamentary leader in the House Senator Usman Khan Kakar said during their visit to China they came to know that there is no record of the western route in the Chinese record. He lauded Senator Taj Haider, the convener of the Special Committee on CPEC, for working tremendously on the issue and taking it up with authorities[/b].
He said the committee has presented five reports, whereas the Parliamentary Committee on CPEC, having representation from both houses of the Parliament, could not present a single report. Taj Haider said while their visit was arranged by the Chinese Embassy, the committee members did their utmost to sensitise the hosts to the critical importance of western route.
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby arun » 10 Mar 2018 17:47

^^^ X Posting:

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Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 13 Mar 2018 15:25

X Posted on the Analyzing CPEC Thread

Iran says it has offered Pakistan and China participation in India's Chabahar project

NEW DELHI: In what may come as a shock to India, Iran said yesterday it offered Pakistan and China participation in the Chabahar project, a port that is being built by India for the express purpose of bypassing Pakistan.

Pakistan's Dawn newspaper reported today that Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif yesterday invited Pakistan to participate in Chabahar seaport project and in the development of its link with the Gwadar Port "as he sought to allay concerns here (in Pakistan) over Indian involvement in the Iranian port."

“We offered to participate in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). We have also offered Pakistan and China to participate in Chabahar,” said Zarif, who is on a three-day visit to Pakistan, while delivering a lecture at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, said Dawn.

Chabahar is said to be becoming a success story in the India-Iran relationship. The first phase of the Chabahar port in south-east Iran, which India is developing, was inaugurated in December last year. The port opened a new strategic transit route between India, Iran and Afghanistan that bypassed Pakistan.

My Comment : After (1) supporting Terroristan on Kashmir in General and in the OIC in Particular

(2) Not saying a Dickie Bird of the Reduction of the Ughyurs Population Percentage Xinjiang - Please read the following :

China created a new terrorist threat by repressing secessionist fervor in its western frontier : Lindsey Kennedy & Nathan Paul May 31, 2017
Ethnic tensions soared from the 1950s to the 1970s, when state-orchestrated mass migration (pdf) brought millions of Han Chinese into Xinjiang in an attempt to dilute the Uyghur population. Beijing continues to encourage Han movement into the region; the typically strict rules limiting internal migration in China are relaxed for this specific ethnic group and destination. Han Chinese now make up 58% of the Xinjiang population, up from just 6% in 1949.
Islamic Unity by OIC? Seems to be Mythical - Like the Flying Carpet!

(3) Removing India from the - I think - Firdus Gas Fields and passing it on to Russia.

If the Indian Government is still bent on being kicked around by the Iranians then so be it!

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby pankajs » 13 Mar 2018 15:32

International is never a zero sum game. GOI/Modi has my full support on bending and getting kicked by Iran at least in this instance.

You try making international relations a zero sum game and watch how fast India will become like Bakistan i.e. without friends and the friends that will remain will end up squeezing you far worse than what has happened in this case. Just check what *friend* China has done to Bakis on CPEC or a *friend* Russia / France / America have done with India when they could get away with.

No permanent friends or enemies but only interests in international relation. Tally up the plusses and minusses of relationship/co-operation/project and if the plusses exceed minusses then you engage/proceed. If not then put the relationship/co-operation/project in cold storage and have chai biskut.
Last edited by pankajs on 13 Mar 2018 15:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 13 Mar 2018 15:44

pankajs wrote:International is never a zero sum game. GOI/Modi has my full support on bending and getting kicked by Iran at least in this instance.

You try making international relations a zero sum game and watch how fast India will become like Bakistan i.e. without friends and the friends that will remain will end up squeezing you far worse than what has happened in this case. Just check what *friend* China has done to Bakis for CPEC.
pankajs :
Agree pankajs Ji. In future I will try not to comment on China or Iran - not even Terroristan - including the Islamic Countries - when they kick us around. To be sure one will criticize the USA, Canada, European - Eastern or Western, Australia and Japan as they are Fair Game.

Guidance : “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.” Lord Palmerston, 19th century prime minister and foreign secretary of UK!

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pankajs
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby pankajs » 13 Mar 2018 15:54

Who am I to suggest what your should comment on or not?

I am only commenting on
If the Indian Government is still bent on being kicked around by the Iranians then so be it!

Take another example. Iran and Saudi Arabia are at daggers drawn and both are against Israel at least in public. So even while India co-operates with Iran on some issues of our interest it also co-operate with Saudi Arabia on other interests and Israel on still other interests of ours.

So by the same logic
1. Iran is being kicked around by India.
2. Saudi Arabia is being kicked around by India.
3. Both Iran and SA are being kicked around by India on Israel.

All grown ups in the room can play games no?

chetak
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby chetak » 13 Mar 2018 15:58

Peregrine wrote:
pankajs wrote:International is never a zero sum game. GOI/Modi has my full support on bending and getting kicked by Iran at least in this instance.

You try making international relations a zero sum game and watch how fast India will become like Bakistan i.e. without friends and the friends that will remain will end up squeezing you far worse than what has happened in this case. Just check what *friend* China has done to Bakis for CPEC.
pankajs :
Agree pankajs Ji. In future I will try not to comment on China or Iran - not even Terroristan - including the Islamic Countries - when they kick us around. To be sure one will criticize the USA, Canada, European - Eastern or Western, Australia and Japan as they are Fair Game.

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the iranians have always been contemptuous of India and have voted against us in every possible forum at every opportunity.

They are also very transactional, looking for immediate and disproportionate benefits from India who they think is taking undue advantage of their international "isolation"

they are as third grade as their sour crude oil and their dubious intentions towards us.

Need to treat them as they do us.

They are a just two bit nation with no international standing and we are giving them unnecessary importance.

They currently have russian support because the ruskis have lost iraq and their other satellite states in the mid east.

Peregrine
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 13 Mar 2018 16:25

pankajs wrote:Who am I to suggest what your should comment on or not?

I am only commenting on
If the Indian Government is still bent on being kicked around by the Iranians then so be it!


Take another example. Iran and Saudi Arabia are at daggers drawn and both are against Israel at least in public. So even while India co-operates with Iran on some issues of our interest it also co-operate with Saudi Arabia on other issues and Israel on other issues.

So by your logic
1. Iran being kicked around by India.
2. Saudi Arabia being kicked around by India.
3. Both Iran and SA being kicked around by India.

All grown ups in the room can play games no?
pankajs Ji :

Sorry. I Touched a sore spot. Mistook Took Place!

I forgot to add the Shenanigans with the Iranians by the one who wants Terroristani Ihstiqlal in his Ishtiqbal Uninterrupted and Uninterruptedly as well as Continuous and Continuously made an agreement with the Iranians for Natural Gas at a price about US$ 3.50 per MMBTU. He agree that this Agreement was Subject to Iranian Parliamentary Approval. The Iranian Parliament "Dragged it Along" for ever and more. The the Price of Natural Gas went up. They Iranian Parliament did NOT APPROVE THE RATE AT WHICH THE CONTRACT WAS FIXED. I believe the MMS Govt. agreed with the Qataris for Natural Gas at around US$ 8 per MMBTU. I read recently that the present Government of India has reduced the Balance of the Contract Price not only by Qatar but also by Russia and Australia as follows :

After Qatar and Australia, Russia lowers LNG price for India

However Iran is another Story!

In ending let us see how long will the Iranians allow India in the "Cha Bahar" Concession!

chetak Ji : - Your Post Dated 13 Mar 2018 @ 15:58 Hours

Man Oh Man, you must be "My Mind" Reader! Need I say More? :rotfl:

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anupmisra
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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby anupmisra » 14 Mar 2018 17:33

For a moment I thought I was scrolling through a thread on SeePack.

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Re: Analyzing CPEC

Postby anupmisra » 14 Mar 2018 17:40

Anyway, here's more "Uh-Oh!" news from bhikaristan.

Chinese company operating Gwadar lacks NoC, NA body told

The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Finance on Tuesday was informed that the Ministry of Interior had not yet issued security clearance to M/S China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHL), which is building and operating the Gwadar Port, causing the parliamentary panel to ask the authorities to probe this matter.
The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has been directed to launch an investigation against COPHL
they had written to the Ministry of Interior in November 2014 but so far got no response
Under the requirements of the Ministry of Interior, companies involving foreign directorships and subscribers have to secure mandatory clearance –the No Objection Certificate, from the Ministry of Interior.
COPHLC-Pakistan was a company of unknown credentials at best and attributed to an article in which it was claimed that the parent company of the COPHC-Pakistan, the China Overseas Ports Holding Limited, was a one-room company, registered in Hong Kong.
NA panel asked the SECP to probe these allegations in order to determine the origin of the parent company of the COPHLC-Pakistan *(why, its the PLA!...as most "privately held companies" in chinistan are)


Ssshhh!! It is SeePack. There should be no questions asked, especially when it comes to chini involvement. After all, iron blothel does not need security clearance.

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/292040 ... -body-told

Peregrine
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Analyzing CPEC

Postby Peregrine » 14 Mar 2018 17:43

X Posted on the Terroristan Thread

Chinese company operating Gwadar lacks NoC, NA body told

ISLAMABAD: The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Finance on Tuesday Was informed that the Ministry of Interior had not yet issued security clearance to M/S China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHL), which is building and operating the Gwadar Port, causing the parliamentary panel to ask the authorities to probe this matter.

“The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has been directed to launch an investigation against COPHL,” the NA committee said in a meeting held here at the Parliament House on Tuesday under chairmanship of Qaiser Ahmed Sheikh.

SECP Executive Director Shaukat Hussain informed the NA panel that the Ministry of Interior had not yet issued a security clearance certificate to M/s (COPHLC-Pakistan) that is building and operating Gwadar deep-sea port. He said that they had written to the Ministry of Interior in November 2014 but so far got no response.

Under the requirements of the Ministry of Interior, companies involving foreign directorships and subscribers have to secure mandatory clearance –the No Objection Certificate, from the Ministry of Interior.

PTI leader Asad Umar revealed that COPHLC-Pakistan was a company of unknown credentials at best and attributed to an article in which it was claimed that the parent company of the COPHC-Pakistan, the China Overseas Ports Holding Limited, was a one-room company, registered in Hong Kong.

The chairman of the NA panel asked the SECP to probe these allegations in order to determine the origin of the parent company of the COPHLC-Pakistan. The committee also directed the SECP to submit complete profiles of the parent company and its subsidiary. The committee asked the SECP to review the security clearance issue of the COPHC-Pakistan. The SECP also submitted documents in the standing committee. Its papers showed that the three directors of the company hold only three shares – one each for its three directors – and the rest of its total 10 million shares is owned by COPHC Limited based out of Hong Kong.

The COPHLC requested the SECP Registrar for approval for COPHCL-Pakistan name in August 2014. The SECP said that as the Interior Ministry didnot give a security clearance certificate, the regulator proceeded with the incorporation of the company after taking standard undertaking from COPHLC-Pakistan.

For two years, the company did not file its annual audited accounts and the SECP then served a show-cause notice to the COPHC-Pakistan on February 9, 2017 for not filing the annual accounts and other updated documents. Consequently, the company filed the annual audited accounts for the years ended June 30, 2015 and June 30, 2017. Ah! Well!! Account for the Year June 30, 2016 are STILL AWAITED!

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