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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

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Deans
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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Deans » 08 Oct 2017 22:34

pankajs wrote:Exactly. There is no *economic* rational for a China and/or Bangladesh transit trade to bakistan through India. Sea route is cheaper by an order of magnitude.

As far as CPEC is concerned, Sea route is cheaper not just for oil but also for goods from eastern seaboard of China. It makes sense only as an outlet for Xinjiang's trade but how much trade and how much toll will it generate for bakistan?


As I posted earlier, the only commodity which can viably be transported through CPEC, is cotton from Xinjiang. Over half of Pakistan's export is
cotton textiles. Chinese cotton can be transported at a lower cost, to Chinese owned processing units operating in the Gwadar export zone, tax
free (Concessions china will extract after Pak fails to repay Chinese loans) and then exported. This will destroy Pakistan's exports. Pakistan pays to screw itself.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 09 Oct 2017 01:49

yensoy wrote:We have zero obligation to allow trucks from 3rd countries to cross over via India into Pakistan.

Remember, Pakistan doesn't allow our trucks to transit them to reach Afghanistan. Same favour will be returned, CPEC, OBOR, BRI or whatever else emerges.
yensoy Ji :

Thank you for addressing my apprehensions.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Karthik S » 09 Oct 2017 10:40

anupmisra wrote:
Karthik S wrote:May be GoI not being aggressive about CPEC passing through PoK because they feel the CPEC will help China colonize pakis. For us to see how long the pious people of pak mingle with cheen whose govt is banning and subjugating islam.


I wonder which is a better end result? Chinis colonizing bakistan (Bājīsītǎn) for low cost labor or the pakjabis colonizing rest of pakhanistan?


We know the resentment of Sindhis, Balochis and KPK over punjabis. I'd assume the chinese colonization will further drive the wedge.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Karthik S » 09 Oct 2017 10:42

Deans wrote:
pankajs wrote:Exactly. There is no *economic* rational for a China and/or Bangladesh transit trade to bakistan through India. Sea route is cheaper by an order of magnitude.

As far as CPEC is concerned, Sea route is cheaper not just for oil but also for goods from eastern seaboard of China. It makes sense only as an outlet for Xinjiang's trade but how much trade and how much toll will it generate for bakistan?


As I posted earlier, the only commodity which can viably be transported through CPEC, is cotton from Xinjiang. Over half of Pakistan's export is
cotton textiles. Chinese cotton can be transported at a lower cost, to Chinese owned processing units operating in the Gwadar export zone, tax
free (Concessions china will extract after Pak fails to repay Chinese loans) and then exported. This will destroy Pakistan's exports. Pakistan pays to screw itself.


I think the people who are making such decisions are HNI individuals who can apply for "Investor visa" in any G-7 countries if things go horribly downwards.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby pankajs » 09 Oct 2017 10:53

Most already have dual nationality or have investments/residences abroad that allows them residency or have children who are settled abroad where they can move at a moments notice.

These folks already have everything setup abroad.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby yensoy » 09 Oct 2017 11:01

^^^^ And they are legally allowed to do so - through the judicious use of dual-citizenship. It is extremely important that Indian administration (IAS etc) and constitutional & elected positions are allowed to be held by persons holding Indian and only Indian passports. Regardless of the "patriotism" of dual-citizens, the very fact that they have a parachute option prevents them from thinking and acting in the best interests of the country.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Karthik S » 09 Oct 2017 11:06

I don't think we have dual citizenship in India.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby yensoy » 09 Oct 2017 11:56

Karthik S wrote:I don't think we have dual citizenship in India.


True, and it should stay that way. Rather even if there is dual citizenship introduced at some point, government officials should be prevented from holding a foreign citizenship.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Mukesh.Kumar » 11 Oct 2017 13:56

X-Post from PRC Economy - New Reflections : April 20 2015

Mukesh.Kumar wrote:Growth of Chinese Foreign Aid.

We have been discussing, CPEC, OBOR and general growing Chinese financial prowess in using Foreign Aid for influencing countries in S. Asia and Africa. The BBC today carries a good and detailed article, on a report from AidData a public policy think-tank based at William & Mary Univ, US, summarizing how Chinese

Short read: BBC: Following the Money: Uncovering a Chinese state secret

Not very long ago, China was a foreign aid recipient. Now, it rivals the United States as one of the world's largest donors, through traditional development aid or through financial loans.
For the first time, a large group of researchers outside China have compiled a major database detailing virtually all of China's financial money flow to recipient countries. Citing more than 5,000 projects found across 140 countries, it reveals that China and the US rival each other in terms of how much they offer to other countries.
However, "they spend those budgets in radically different ways. And the different compositions of those portfolios have far-reaching consequences", explains Brad Parks, the project's chief researcher


Image

The vast majority (93%) of US financial aid fits under the traditional definition of aid that's agreed upon by all Western industrialised countries. That aid is given with the main goal of developing the economic development and welfare of recipient countries. At least a quarter of that money represents a direct grant, not a loan that needs to be repaid.

In contrast, only a small portion (21%) of the money that China gives to other countries can be considered as traditional aid. And the rest of that money? The "lion's share" of that money is given in commercial loans that have to be repaid to Beijing with interest.
"China wants to get attractive economic returns on its capital


University of British Columbia studied how Chinese aid has changed countries in Africa, arguing that democratic reforms have slowed as the developing countries concluded they could bypass the political demands of Western donors by turning to Chinese aid.
"Traditional donors have criticised China's approach to aid," she says, but "many African countries embrace the assistance from Beijing, or at least are glad to have more options".


For those interested in further details, recommend downloading and going through the original report below
Downloadable PDF report from AID Data

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 24 Oct 2017 14:57

X Posted on the Analyzing CPEC Thread

India lines up projects to strengthen links with South, Southeast Asia

NEW DELHI: India is considering a series of projects aimed at strengthening links with South Asia and between the region and Southeast Asia. This comes at a time when the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is losing steam amid Pakistan's intransigence over connectivity pacts and China is seeking to increase its influence in the region.

The proposals under consideration include mega cross-border air and land connectivity projects, along with power and energy initiatives.

Some of these projects were part of the agenda when external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj met her Bangladeshi counterpart Mahmud Ali in Dhaka on Sunday, officials told ET.

These included proposals for Dhaka-Chennai-Colombo air connectivity, Chittagong-Kolkata-Colombo shipping connectivity, Bangladesh-North Bengal rail link, Bangladesh-Bhutan internet cables through India, trade route connecting Nakugaon Land Port in Bangladesh to Gayleyphung in Bhutan via India.

Image

Besides, efforts are on implement the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) motor vehicles agreement (MVA) soon, while keeping a provision for Bhutan to join later. Bhutan had requested to join the initiative later since its upper house of parliament failed to ratify the pact.

Regional connectivity heads the agenda for the Narendra Modi government because China is expanding its footprint in South Asia and Southeast Asia through its One Belt One Road initiative.

The BBIN MVA will complement the proposed BIMSTEC MVA, which is expected to be the key outcome of the seven-nation summit to be held in Nepal early next year to celebrate 20 years of creation of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. The BIMSTEC MVA will have all multi-modal features connecting Sri Lanka, which has so far been connected to the six members of the grouping only through air or sea. The two agreements are a critical part of India's Act East policy, which is aimed at enabling strengthening of ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN in the periphery of China.

BIMSTEC is also mulling connectivity through cruise liners to promote tourism and coastal shipping between the member states. This will facilitate India's Bay of Bengal outreach, complementing its Indian Ocean Region strategy. Japan is India's key partner in this process.

Connectivity through trans-border rivers among BIMSTEC member states is also on the cards, officials indicated. A significant development has been the beginning of the direct sea movement of containerised cargo between India and Bangladesh, which has reduced shipping time from 30-40 days to not more than 10 days. The two states are linked by cross-border bus and train, besides movement of cargo through rivers. Additionally, old rail links are being revived and new routes added between India and Bangladesh.

The BBIN MVA seeks to allow movement of a pre-determined number of passenger vehicles (personal, regular and non-regular) and cargo vehicles along pre-identified routes running across the territories of the four countries. The trial run of a truck carrying cargo on the Dhaka-Kolkata-Delhi route under the BBIN MVA was carried out successfully in September last year.

A memorandum of understanding for trilateral hydropower cooperation among Bangladesh, India and Bhutan is expected to be signed soon. India had earlier agreed to facilitate import of electricity to Bangladesh from hydro projects in Nepal.

The MoU for Indo-Bhutan-Bangladesh energy partnership is proposed to be signed in presence of the prime ministers of the three countries, according to people aware of the matter. The MoU between NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Limited and Bangladesh Power Development Board for the supply of 500 mw hydropower from the 900 mw Upper Karnali Hydropower plant in Nepal was signed during the visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India in April 2017. At present there are two interconnections through which 660 mw of power is transferred from India to Bangladesh. The state-run Indian firm plans to set up a 1,320 mw coal-fired thermal power plant at Rampal in Bangladesh and several private players are also setting up power stations in the neighbouring country.

India will construct a 135-km-long pipeline from Assam to supply oil to Bangladesh ollowing an agreement signed on Sunday after the Swaraj-Ali joint consultative committee meeting. ONGC Videsh Ltd has acquired two shallow water blocks in Bangladesh, SS-04 and SS-09, in a 50:50 consortium with Oil India Limited, and is carrying out exploration activities in these blocks.

Meanwhile, eyeing better integration among the seven member states, BIMSTEC is considering other regional efforts as well, including the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt, a joint effort of Japan and Bangladesh. Maritime connectivity is crucial for the BIMSTEC region owing to its geography as well as geo-strategic requirements.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 27 Oct 2017 05:31

India should shed its reservations over Belt and Road Initiative and join it: China - PTI
China on Thursday said India should shed its reservations+ over President Xi Jinping's ambitious 'Belt and Road Initiative' and join the project as it will not change Beijing's stand on the Kashmir issue.

The BRI, which includes China-Pakistan Economic Corridor+ (CPEC), has been included in the Constitution of the ruling Communist Party of China in the just concluded once-in-a- five-year Congress.

"We welcome other countries including India to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the basis of voluntarism," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told media briefing here today.

The BRI's goal is to promote connectivity between regional countries and common prosperity of all countries, the spokesman said.

"The initiative will not affect China's position on relevant issues and our position on relevant initiatives will not be changed," he said.


China has been reiterating that the USD 50 billion CPEC which traverses though the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is a connectivity project and will not affect its stand that the Kashmir issue should be resolved between India and Pakistan through talks.

India has objected to the CPEC as it is being laid through the disputed territory and boycotted a high-profile Belt and Road Forum organised by China in May.

The BRI will bring tangible benefits to those who are participating in the project at an early date, Geng said.

BRI has been included in the CPC Constitution as part of President Xi's ideological thought putting more pressure on Chinese officials to work for early harvest from the massive amount of investment being poured by China in Pakistan and other countries.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby tandav » 27 Oct 2017 08:10

SSridhar wrote:India should shed its reservations over Belt and Road Initiative and join it: China - PTI
China on Thursday said India should shed its reservations+ over President Xi Jinping's ambitious 'Belt and Road Initiative' and join the project as it will not change Beijing's stand on the Kashmir issue.

The BRI, which includes China-Pakistan Economic Corridor+ (CPEC), has been included in the Constitution of the ruling Communist Party of China in the just concluded once-in-a- five-year Congress.

"We welcome other countries including India to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the basis of voluntarism," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told media briefing here today.

The BRI's goal is to promote connectivity between regional countries and common prosperity of all countries, the spokesman said.

"The initiative will not affect China's position on relevant issues and our position on relevant initiatives will not be changed," he said.


China has been reiterating that the USD 50 billion CPEC which traverses though the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is a connectivity project and will not affect its stand that the Kashmir issue should be resolved between India and Pakistan through talks.

India has objected to the CPEC as it is being laid through the disputed territory and boycotted a high-profile Belt and Road Forum organised by China in May.

The BRI will bring tangible benefits to those who are participating in the project at an early date, Geng said.

BRI has been included in the CPC Constitution as part of President Xi's ideological thought putting more pressure on Chinese officials to work for early harvest from the massive amount of investment being poured by China in Pakistan and other countries.


The better option is that China should change its stance on PoK and work to restore it to India, China e should convince Pakistan to end their illegal occupation of PoK and hand over the area to India, which will then negotiate with CHina on CPEC. Its the only way Chinese investment in CPEC can be protected. If China invests in PoK then all their investments will be taken over by India without any return to China. Heck when Pakistan is not able to pay back China in CPEC, they themselves would downhill ski from the area and nullify the treaty by ceding territory back to India.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ArjunPandit » 27 Oct 2017 08:17

perhaps you can convince them to give us CoK and free tibet too and of course give up all the islands they claim. China and charity dont go together

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 27 Oct 2017 14:55

ArjunPandit wrote:perhaps you can convince them to give us CoK and free tibet too and of course give up all the islands they claim. China and charity dont go together
ArjunPandit Ji : I hope you can find a "Different Nomenclature - Letters" for that Part of Kashmir which the Terroristanis Gifted to China!

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ArjunPandit » 27 Oct 2017 15:33

Why separate Saar why

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Rudradev » 28 Oct 2017 00:38

Just read the quoted sentence in Peregrine ji's post out loud (phonetically) and you will see why :mrgreen:

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Prem » 28 Oct 2017 03:16

Peregrine wrote:
ArjunPandit wrote:perhaps you can convince them to give us CoK and free tibet too and of course give up all the islands they claim. China and charity dont go together
ArjunPandit Ji : I hope you can find a "Different Nomenclature - Letters" for that Part of Kashmir which the Terroristanis Gifted to China!

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We just have to slice The COK off with sharp Jhatka .

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 28 Oct 2017 03:31

Forum Gurus :

1. Why are the Chinkies so insistent /anxious for India to join OBOR-CPEC?

2. One can only think they want to use a "Land Route" to Terroristan via India - Bangladesh - Myanmar - South China using Chinese as well as Terroristani Trucks.

Support connectivity but it has to be open, equitable: India on OBOR

NEW DELHI: India on Friday hoped that the direction and the policy set by the Communist Party Congress in China will further promote Sino-India relations and contribute to peace and stability in the region.

The remarks by external affairs ministry spokesperson Raveesh Kumar came in response to a query on Chinese President Xi Jinping starting his second five-year term and ordering the country's Army to intensify its combat readiness by focusing on how to win wars during the Congress of the Communist party.

"Our Prime Minister had sent his best wishes to President Xi for the success of the Congress before it met and subsequently congratulated him on his re-election as the General Secretary of the Communist Party," he said.

"We hope that the direction and the policy set by the Congress will further promote our bilateral relations and contribute to peace and stability in the region," Kumar said.

On China's offer for India to join its 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) initiative, which includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Kumar said India's position on the issue is well-known.

Though India supports connectivity, it has to be open and equitable, he added.

India has objected to the CPEC as it is being laid through disputed territory. New Delhi had boycotted a high-profile Belt and Road Forum organised by China in May.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang on Thursday in Beijing told reporters that, "We welcome other countries including India to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the basis of voluntarism."

Replying to a separate question, Kumar said India is in touch with Pakistani authorities regarding Hamid Nihal Ansari, who is in a jail in Pakistan.

Ansari had crossed over to Pakistan from Afghanistan in 2012 and then went missing. He was later arrested and tried by a Pakistani military court, which pronounced him guilty of espionage.

The ministry is in touch with Pakistani authorities through its high commission there, the external affairs ministry spokesperson said.

On a meeting between Pakistan high commissioner and external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj, the spokesperson said it was a "courtesy" call and in such interactions nothing substantial is discussed.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby pankajs » 28 Oct 2017 15:17

From any major Chinese industrial hub to bakistan it is going to be cheaper to transport goods via sea/ship than land/trucks. Distance is not the key but the cost to the destination is the key. Per one baki commentator the cost of transporting Crude Oil from Gwadar to the eastern Chinese seaboard is 10x more than the cost via sea route even when the land route is shorter. This is a specific example for a specific goods/route/terrain but the general principle holds true in all land vs sea transport over long distances.

The reason for their anxiousness to get India into the OBOR scheme are two fold.
1. Indian opposition means that the CPEC part at least always remains at risk of direct action [different from covert action] by India anytime in the future.
2. India, given the trajectory of its economy and its central location on the oceanic route, remains one of the major pivot around which an opposing transportation/connectivity architecture can be built. This is already being talked about between India, Japan and US with the talk of Asia-Africa corridor. An US-Asia-Africa corridor covering the whole Indo-pacific anchored by India in the middle is quite feasible.

By co-opting India into the OBOR fold China is trying to preempt those two possibilities that pose the maximum risk to OBOR/CPEC.
Last edited by pankajs on 28 Oct 2017 15:31, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby chola » 28 Oct 2017 15:29

Is Cheen so delusional that it expects India to join even as they run roughshod over POK?

Or are they saying this while fully expecting a rejection so they can tell other parties in the affair (Unkil, Japan, Korea, Oz, EU) that “Look, we asked them but they said no” and so can continue with the charade that OBOR is global?

If they are delusional then we have nothing to worry about. They are just yellow pakis and irrational and this OBOR will be a trillion dollar sinkhole without India.

But if they are not and they have planned this without India (but with everyone else) then we better have a strategy other than just hoping this thing fails on its own.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby pankajs » 28 Oct 2017 15:38

Chinese have been able to bribe its way across Africa and now even Europe and they were expecting the same with India. However they failed with the current GOI so they are trying their luck via media.

In the runup to the OBOR/BRI meet there was quite a bit of writing in Indian media about the GOI making a mistake with not joining BRI. Infact they even co-opted West Bengal admin to some extent promising massive investment. I remember someone in Harvard from Bengal who wrote in [wire??] that how GOI was depriving WB of its rightful path to development by shunning BRI/OBOR!

They are trying out all kinds of tools/methods that they are accustomed to deploying and from their perspective there is no harm in trying even while they try building public opinion within India with the help of #paidmedia. Part of the game.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Philip » 28 Oct 2017 16:58

So what wi happen if we don't sign up? Will they "belt" us along the "road?

But seriously they're clearly making a huge attempt in Pak.$500B to be spent on infra,industry,etc. The JF-17 JV a success story,Pak will become China's cheap labour centre/de facto province for mil.eqpt.Helos next with subs to come.Sino-Pak mil exports of affordable mil eqpt. to developing countries across the globe.

Managing Pak is already taking place with Chinese cos. increasingly entering Pak ,collecting Karachi's garbage,etc. India cannot stop a further "take-away" of Pak by China.We have to make contingency plans.Baluchi independence movements will now face thousands of Chinese forces who will be even less bothered about human rights than the Pakis.With XI Gins now elevated to the status of Mao and Deng, he has nothing to stop him from accelerating his megalomaniacal ambitions.

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 29 Oct 2017 22:11

X Posted on the Terroristan & Analyzing CPEC Thread

India sends 1st wheat shipment to Afghanistan via Chabahar port

Badhaiyan Ji Badhaiyan, Cheen ko Badhaiyan, Terroristan Ko Badhaiyan, Gamechanger CPEC Ko Badhaiyan, OBOR Ko Badhaiyan aur antim mein Gwadar Ko Badhaiyan! :rotfl:

NEW DELHI: India on Sunday sent its first consignment of wheat to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port in Iran, seen as a "landmark" move to operationalise the new strategic transit route, bypassing Pakistan.

The shipment was flagged off from the Kandla port in Gujarat with External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Afghan counterpart Salahuddin Rabbani joining the ceremony through video conferencing.

"The shipment of wheat is a landmark moment as it will pave the way for operationalisation of the Chabahar port as an alternate, reliable and robust connectivity for Afghanistan," the ministry of external affairs (MEA) said in a statement.

In June, India and Afghanistan had launched an air freight corridor between the two countries to boost trade as Pakistan has been refusing land transit access through its territory.

"I am extremely delighted that today we have joined on a momentous occasion for the people of our three countries and the region," Swaraj said, terming the move as an important step in realising the shared aspiration to carve out "new routes" of peace and prosperity.

The consignment will be transported to Afghanistan from Chabahar through land route.


Swaraj also reiterated India's continued commitment to support reconstruction, capacity building and socio-economic development of Afghanistan, including under the framework of the New Development Partnership announced last month.

"The wheat that is leaving the Indian shores today, is a gift from the people of India to our Afghan brethren. It is testament to the continued commitment of the government and the people of India to support our Afghan brethren in building a normal, peaceful, prosperous, secure and bright future for themselves," Swaraj said.

The external affairs minister also renewed commitment to work closely with regional and international partners to bring peace, security, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.

The Chabahar port is expected to open up new opportunities for trade and transit from and to Afghanistan and enhance trade and commerce between the three countries and the wider region.

"The people of India, Afghanistan and Iran have been connected through centuries; shared commonalities of art and culture, ideas and knowledge; language and traditions. Today, we are rejuvenating these connects and commonalities. I believe that this is the starting point of our journey to realise the full spectrum of connectivity," Swaraj said.

Swaraj and Rabbani welcomed the fact that this is the first shipment that would be going to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port after trilateral agreement on Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridor was signed during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Iran in May 2016, the MEA said.

It said six more wheat shipments will be sent to Afghanistan over the next few months.

India and Iran have already expressed commitment for early completion of the work on the Chabahar port project.

The Chabahar port, located in the Sistan-Balochistan province on the energy-rich Persian Gulf nations southern coast, lies outside the Persian Gulf and can be easily accessed from India's western coast, bypassing Pakistan.

The port is likely to ramp up trade between India, Afghanistan and Iran in the wake of Pakistan denying transit access to New Delhi for trade with the two countries.

India has been closely working with Afghanistan to create alternate and reliable access routes, bypassing Pakistan.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Bart S » 30 Oct 2017 01:50

pankajs wrote:From any major Chinese industrial hub to bakistan it is going to be cheaper to transport goods via sea/ship than land/trucks. Distance is not the key but the cost to the destination is the key. Per one baki commentator the cost of transporting Crude Oil from Gwadar to the eastern Chinese seaboard is 10x more than the cost via sea route even when the land route is shorter. This is a specific example for a specific goods/route/terrain but the general principle holds true in all land vs sea transport over long distances.

The reason for their anxiousness to get India into the OBOR scheme are two fold.
1. Indian opposition means that the CPEC part at least always remains at risk of direct action [different from covert action] by India anytime in the future.
2. India, given the trajectory of its economy and its central location on the oceanic route, remains one of the major pivot around which an opposing transportation/connectivity architecture can be built. This is already being talked about between India, Japan and US with the talk of Asia-Africa corridor. An US-Asia-Africa corridor covering the whole Indo-pacific anchored by India in the middle is quite feasible.

By co-opting India into the OBOR fold China is trying to preempt those two possibilities that pose the maximum risk to OBOR/CPEC.



IMHO, another important reason is that all the infrastructure in CPEC and the planned industrial zones will either be a non-starter or an expensive white elephant, if they cannot export to India from Pakistan. The Pakistanis are in no position to demand that and probably cannot either given that their stance has been 'no trade till Kashmir has been resolved' so the Chinis are trying to make the demand. Also, if and when CPEC is constructed and there is enough electricity for industry in Pakistan, one should fully expect Pakistanis to demand trade access to the Indian market or try to sweet talk their way into it with all the usual supects like Manmohan and Chiddu batting for it. India should not give them this release valve at any cost.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 08 Nov 2017 14:32

X-posted from the "China 19th Congress" thread . . .

What the Inclusion of BRI in the Chinese Constitution Implies - Jagannath P Panda, IDSA
The recently concluded 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) amended the Party’s Constitution to include the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as one of the major future objectives. This has been seen as an “unexpected” development in Beijing’s political practice in some quarters.1 The amended constitution emphasises that China would work closely with the international community for “shared interest” and “shared growth” through the pursuit of the BRI.2 The use of phrases such as “shared growth” and “shared interest” is nothing new in Chinese official parlance and may look superfluous. But the BRI’s inclusion in the CPC’s amended Constitution is a significant development since the international community mostly views the initiative as an economic strategy that is linked to China’s external engagement policy, and less of a “political” proposition. {If international community had taken such a view, it was immensely foolish because nothing that China does is divorced from its political goals. I think we have understood that clearly here in BRf} No matter how minor this amendment might appear to be, it signifies a ‘Chinese state strategy’ in the making, both in the domestic and international contexts.

Past National Congresses have also witnessed amendments to the Party’s Constitution. From the first amendment in 1982, the CPC Constitution has been amended six times before this, each of which brought about changes to the party’s governing principles and functioning style, and adding new leadership thoughts in the process. A similar pattern can be seen in the 2017 amendments as well. By acknowledging Xi Jinping’s strong leadership, the amended Constitution emphasises the importance of Communism in China and how the Communists have progressed smoothly since the 18th National Congress under the guidance of Comrade Xi Jinping as “chief representative”.

Xi’s flagship thought of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” has also been entered into the Constitution, essentially implying that China would denounce the Western model of democracy and would like to persist with a system that draws its inspiration from Marxism-Leninism along with Mao Zedong’s thought and Deng Xiaoping’s theory and other established principles. The naming of Xi Jinping along with his thought was one of the highpoints of the 19th National Congress, for it elevated Xi’s position as a strong leader equivalent to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao failed to secure the distinction of having their name mentioned alongside their thoughts in the CPC constitution, even though their principal thoughts do figure in constitution. In fact, in the Communist system, naming a particular leader’s thoughts is a symbolic gesture and signifies his or her leadership persona.

Likewise, the reference to the BRI in the Constitution was another big recognition for Xi Jinping himself since it was primarily known as his project. Further, the inclusion of BRI in the constitution signifies that it is a long-term national project that will continue to be pursued even if Xi were to step down from the presidency in 2022. (But there is speculation that Xi might continue to hold power as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and perhaps as the general secretary of the Party beyond 2022, the two most important positions that really influence the Party’s supervisory process in China’s political structure.) Moreover, since its formal announcement in 2013, BRI has primarily been seen as Xi’s “leadership” project. By naming the BRI in the CPC Charter, China has placed more policy weight on the initiative and offered it a legal sanctity. Further, its inclusion in the Charter reiterates the fact that the BRI is not merely an economic policy but rather a ‘political project’ that Beijing would like to pursue as part of its national developmental programme.

At the same time, the constitutional amendment links BRI with China’s aspiration to ‘build a community of shared interest’ and to achieve “shared growth” through “discussion and collaboration”. {So far, BRI has proceeded without much 'discussion and collaboration'. The countries have been chosen carefully so that China could thrust its plans upon them. But, China seems to recognize the widespread criticism and has for namesake, included "discussion and collaboration”.} This implies the leadership’s ambition to shape the world order through the progress and success of BRI. On the practical side, this implies China’s determination to further promote BRI internationally. China, under Xi’s leadership, has spent enormous resources and energy to promote this flagship initiative since 2013 when Xi formally introduced the initiative to the outside world.

If Xi’s first tenure were to be seen as the ‘promotional’ phase of BRI, the induction of BRI into the Chinese constitution coinciding with the start of his second term as President would imply the beginning of its second ‘execution’ phase. In fact, to launch the execution plan, Beijing convened a forum in May 2017 which witnessed the attendance of 70 heads of international organisations, representatives from 130 countries and 29 national leaders. Releasing a “List of Deliverables” document during the forum, China emphasised the priority areas – policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and people-to-people connectivity – of the BRI.3

The execution of BRI concerning these priority areas is, however, an uphill task. Domestically, the initial promotion and execution of BRI was carried out quite non-systematically. A number of provinces were initially offered a free hand to promote BRI and to sign deals abroad. By inducting BRI into the constitution, China has made it a procedural feature, offering more power to the central government. Earlier, provincial governments aimed to implement BRI as part of their five-year plans. For instance, Xinjiang and Guangxi from Western China were looking to promote infrastructure and trade connecting routes as priorities with the neighbouring Central Asian region. And the targets of Fujian, Guangdong and Shanghai from China’s eastern coastal regions prioritised foreign trade, shipping and logistics and e-commerce while promoting further “opening up”. Moreover, the induction of BRI into the constitution exerts the central leadership’s political control over the provinces since power struggles between different provinces and between the centre and the provinces area known issues in China. It may be recalled that due to his strict anti-corruption drive, Xi Jinping faced political opposition from various quarters and their business communities in various provinces, mainly in Hunan, Gansu, Guangxi, Chongqing and Beijing. 4

The amendment clubbing BRI with “shared interests” and “shared growth” through “discussion and collaboration” elucidates the foreign policy intent that Beijing attaches to its external engagement policy. That means, Beijing may like to employ a more serious approach for convincing the international community to formally join the BRI, and sign agreements that would be beneficial to China and the outside world. This would further imply that China would pursue a more ‘purposeful’ external engagement policy where the top-down directives of the CPC would exert more pressure on Chinese banks, state-owned companies, private companies and business operators to promote investment decisions abroad that will reflect Beijing’s strategic objectives. The performance of the state-owned companies and private companies in promoting the BRI abroad has been under review for some time now. Beijing is slowly implementing a strict capital control mechanism to finance projects abroad under the BRI through different categories.5

In terms of foreign policy, China would like to employ a more consultative process to execute BRI deals, through “discussion and collaboration”. Beijing would be pursuing this consultative process from a position of strength as the world’s second-largest economy. Foreign exchange reserves of US$ 3.1 trillion are likely to enable China offer deals which many smaller economies will find hard to resist or ignore. In addition, the constitutional amendment implies that China is still counting on a set of countries that are yet to offer open or full support to the BRI or have expressed reservations about participating in the initiative.

Both the United States and Japan sent representatives to attend the BRI summit in May 2017, but neither is yet to offer full support for the initiative. Also, Beijing has not completely given up hope of gaining India’s support for the BRI.
The recent Doklam border standoff and rising competition on various issues between the two countries may not really encourage China to vest too much hope on India. But the idea of promoting a “forward looking constructive” relationship between China and India, as discussed between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi during the Xiamen BRICS summit in 2017,6 is not entirely a proposition outside the purview of the BRI.

To sum up, the inclusion of BRI in the CPC constitution was a deliberate political move. The BRI, with a proposed US$900 billion investment,7 is undoubtedly an initiative with global scope that is moreover closely linked to China’s future. Xi, in his speech to the National Congress, acknowledged the importance of BRI for the future of the Chinese economy. Stressing BRI as a “priority”, he emphasised on opening China further to the outside world and encouraged an equal emphasis on “bringing in” and “going global” in order to promote stable engagement with the international community. This implies that China’s external engagement policy will be more BRI-centric in the years to come. Nationally, the inclusion of BRI in the CPC charter was a historic moment for Xi Jinping personally. If Mao Zedong is remembered as the founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Deng Xiaoping for his “Reform and Opening-up” policy which transformed China into what it is today, Xi Jinping will certainly be remembered for his Belt and Road policy in the years to come.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 12 Nov 2017 20:00

China's attempts to revive Xi's dream project are hitting roadblocks all around - AFP
SINGAPORE: From a stalled Indonesian rail project to an insurgency-threatened economic corridor in Pakistan, China's push to revive Silk Road trade routes is running into problems that risk tarnishing the economic crown jewel of Xi Jinping's presidency.

The "One Belt, One Road" initiative, unveiled by Xi in 2013, envisages linking China with Africa, Asia and Europe through a network of ports, railways, roads and industrial parks.

Xi, the most powerful Chinese leader in decades, has pushed the infrastructure drive which is central to his goal of extending Beijing's economic and geopolitical clout.

The initiative was enshrined in the Communist Party's constitution at a key congress last month, and some estimates say more than $1 trillion has been pledged to it, with projects proposed in some 65 countries.

But on the ground it has run into problems. Projects traverse insurgency-hit areas, dictatorships and chaotic democracies, and face resistance from both corrupt politicians and local villagers.

"Building infrastructure across countries like this is very complicated," said Murray Hiebert, from Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who has studied some of the projects in Southeast Asia.

"You've got land issues, you have to hammer out funding agreements, you have to hammer out technological issues."

Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying however insisted the initiative was "moving forward smoothly".

Beijing won the contract to build Indonesia's first high-speed railway in September 2015, but more than two years later work has barely started on the route from Jakarta to the city of Bandung.

A recent visit to Walini, where President Joko Widodo broke ground on the train line in January last year, found excavators flattening land but no track laid for the train, which is meant to start operating in 2019.

"The first year after the ground-breaking ceremony, I did not see any progress at all," Neng Sri, a 37-year-old food stall owner from nearby Mandala Mukti village, told AFP.

The central problem has been persuading villagers to leave their land on the proposed route, which is often an issue in the chaotic, freewheeling democracy.

The Indonesian transport ministry declined to give an update on the project and the consortium of Chinese and Indonesian companies building the line did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

On another planned high-speed line from southern China to Singapore, the Thai stretch of the railway was delayed by tussles over financing and protective labour regulations, and it was only in July that the military government finally approved $5.2 billion to start construction.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Philip » 16 Nov 2017 13:25

What gives? Pak has rejected Chin aid for its future dam project.Why? I imagine that the Paki generals can skim off the project far more than what the Chins have offered them as kickbacks.In addition,it would employ more Pakis as Chin projects usually have 90% Chin forced labour imported from China to do the biz,with the whiplash at their back!

Now Nepal has also rejected a dam offer from China,this may have to do more with politics Nepalese,as it was a prev. govt. that awarded the work to China.The SL deb trap has also probably warned the Nepalese of losing control of their country by getting "Shanghaied" by the Chins!


http://www.defencenews.in/article/In-a- ... Aid-444542
In a jolt to OBOR, Pakistan rejects China Dam Aid
Thursday, November 16, 2017
By: TNN
Highlights
Pakistan has turned down China’s offer of assistance for the $14-billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam
Islamabad is learnt to have asked China to take the project out of the CPEC
The project is located in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), which is claimed by India
Pakistan has turned down China's offer of assistance for the $14-billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam+ , according to a leading Pakistan daily.

Moreover, Islamabad is learnt to have asked China to take the project out of the $60 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and allow it to build the dam on its own. The project is located in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), which is claimed by India.

The Asian Development Bank had earlier refused to finance the project because it was to come up in a disputed territory. Express Tribune cited a top official saying Pakistan would prefer to self-finance the project instead of accepting extremely tough conditions set by Chinese companies.

Sources in Pakistan said international lenders were linking serious conditions with the provision of funding, and the project cost had reached $14 billion against the original estimates of $5 billion.

Express Tribune quoted chairman of Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda) Muzammil Hussain as saying, "Chinese conditions for financing the Diamer-Bhasha Dam were not doable and against our interests."

Hussain said this while briefing the public accounts committee (PAC) of parliament, and added that Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi has approved a plan to finance the dam from the country's own resources.

The report caused huge surprise to knowledgeable sources in Beijing, some of whom were in denial and said Pakistan was unlikely to spring a nasty surprise without first consulting Chinese authorities.

A Beijing-based Chinese expert said Pakistan would not risk turning down Beijing's offer because it would impact the CPEC as a whole.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the expert told TOI, "I think Chinese diplomats in Islamabad would have known if Pakistan was unhappy with the financing and would have alerted Beijing. But this is not the case because Pakistan's planning minister asked for Chinese funds for several dam projects including this one only a few days back."

In his presentation to the parliamentary committee, Hussain said China wanted Pakistan to pledge an existing dam project to obtain funds for the new one, besides pay interests and other charges.

Chinese conditions were about taking ownership of the project, operation, and maintenance costs, and security of the Diamer-Bhasha project by pledging another operational dam, the paper quoted Hussain as saying.

Taking a different view, former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar said, "I don't get the sense of a discord here. China has left it to Pakistan to decide whether it wants to go ahead with the Diamer-Bhasha dam as a OBOR initiative, where Beijing is, conceptually speaking, increasingly conforming to international practices and injecting financial viability, efficiency and transparency in the execution of such infrastructural projects."

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 16 Nov 2017 15:53

Is Pakistan up to its usual tricks, trying to milk the Chinese bull (which of course cannot be milked), the way it did the Americans?

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Bart S » 16 Nov 2017 17:29

In a jolt to OBOR, Pakistan rejects China Dam Aid


In his presentation to the parliamentary committee, Hussain said China wanted Pakistan to pledge an existing dam project to obtain funds for the new one, besides pay interests and other charges.

Chinese conditions were about taking ownership of the project, operation, and maintenance costs, and security of the Diamer-Bhasha project by pledging another operational dam, the paper quoted Hussain as saying.

Taking a different view, former Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar said, "I don't get the sense of a discord here. China has left it to Pakistan to decide whether it wants to go ahead with the Diamer-Bhasha dam as a OBOR initiative, where Beijing is, conceptually speaking, increasingly conforming to international practices and injecting financial viability, efficiency and transparency in the execution of such infrastructural projects."


This guy is more Chinese than Mao himself :lol:

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby arun » 20 Nov 2017 08:46

South China Morning Post Op-Ed by Peter Guy on how the Peoples Republic of China’s avaricious price gouging got rumbled by the potential victims of the con and cost PRC the Budhigandaki Dam Project in Nepal and the Diamer Bhasha Dam project in the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan despite the Islamic Republic and the PRC being “Taller than Himalaya’s”, “Deeper than Indian Ocean”, “Sweeter than Honey”, “As Close as Lips to Teeth”, “Iron Brothers”.

Nepal and Pakistan pulling the plug on Belt and Road plans, casts spotlight on public tender issues

Full transparency – through competing public tenders – of the adequacy, suitability and quality of the Chinese equipment being used could soon become a serious problem

PUBLISHED : Monday, 20 November, 2017, 6:45am

When lofty aspirations meet the real world of competing sovereign interests the reality is that being a global superpower requires a delicate weaving of soft versus hard power with influence and dominance at multiple levels comprising military, political, economic and technological.

And a few recent cracks in the plans for hegemony highlight the complicated road to infrastructure based influence faced by China.

Last week, according to an SCMP report, the government of Nepal appears to have decided to abandon the US$2.5 billion deal to build the Budhigandaki Hydroelectric project dam with the Chinese state company China Gezhouba Group. The deal was scrapped by a new, incoming administration which criticised that the deal was signed without an open tender process, which was required by law.

Ironically, the agreement was originally signed a few weeks after Nepal joined China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. Then, last week, Pakistan also decided to pull out of the US$14 billion Diamer-Bhasha dam with China because it refused accept the strict deal conditions.

The project will go on ahead, however, as Pakistan has decided to finance the project – which will generate 4,500 megawatts (MW) of hydropower – itself.

Exploring why they might have collapsed so close together will explain why Belt and Road projects will face severe financing hurdles.

The Belt and Road seems to be faltering in its conceptual financial stage.

Two major related projects have been cancelled within a week, in both cases because the terms were not considered by the recipient country to be fair and equitable. And this inevitably also raises issues about the commercial viability and financial credibility of some other projects.

As a former World Bank Group officer who has advised on the financing of infrastructure, I can highlight the underlying issues of these cancellations. They illustrate the problems that countries will encounter when dealing with the Chinese concept of infrastructure investment.

First of all, they cannot be analysed as investments in the conventional financial sense. They are not even donations or credit by the post second world war Marshall Plan or loans, grants made by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development to war torn European countries, one of the World Bank institutions.

For massive power projects, the deals represent a sale of generation equipment as well as infrastructure construction. Developmental bankers say that while many recipient countries will do these deals without a sovereign guarantee, China, as a sovereign has realised that they cannot.

And international best practices dictate that these power plants need to be put out to public tender.

Full transparency – through competing public tenders – of the adequacy, suitability and quality of the Chinese equipment being used could soon become a serious problem.

Then, the importation of tens of thousands of Chinese workers to install Chinese equipment displaces the employment for locals, which leads to significant political fall out.

China probably insisted on a sovereign guarantee to support the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). And Nepal probably refused given the onerous requirements and size. Unless China rethinks its developmental financing strategy, the need for a sovereign guarantee will persist as the Belt and Road expands. Demanding sovereign guarantees in a non-transparent bidding process only arouses suspicions of corruption.

Unless China decides to give away multibillion-dollar power generation systems it will begin acting like a rational financier and demand sovereign guarantees or guarantees on power off take agreements to support the loans.

Check book diplomacy and soft power lending generate their own hazards.

The Belt and Road Initiative looks good, until each country closely examines what their financial commitment to receive infrastructure.


From here:

Nepal and Pakistan pulling the plug on Belt and Road plans, casts spotlight on public tender issues

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 20 Nov 2017 12:12

To counter OBOR, India pushes its own idea of connectivity to the world - Indrani Bagchi, ToI
When India stood up against China's OBOR+ in May this year, it inserted a new thinking to the whole idea of connectivity as an instrument of foreign policy. Until then, connectivity was how China would build its way through Asia and Africa using highways and rail networks — its excess capacity and capital creating fabulous infrastructure and debt underbellies.

India, too, used connectivity to further its own foreign policy, but not to the same effect. But as China continues to grow, connectivity as a foreign policy is being perceived as a certain threat by countries like India and Japan.

Therefore, since this summer, India has pushed its own connectivity mantra with most of its international partners, but with very different rules from China.

A cursory glance at joint statements between India and its international partners shows how New Delhi is trying to change the language of development aid and connectivity initiatives as well as getting its friends to agree.

In its most recent statement with Italy, the two countries "acknowledged the importance of connectivity in today's globalised world. They underlined that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality and must follow principles of financial responsibility, accountable debt financing practices, balanced ecological and environmental protection, preservation standards and social sustainability."

These are the contours of the Indian version of connectivity as compared to China's OBOR.


The India-EU summit early September noted the same thing: "India and the EU acknowledged the importance of connectivity in today's globalised world. They underlined that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness ..."

Again in September, PM Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe pledged to work for a more connected world.

Their joint statement said, "strong commitment to work together to enhance connectivity in India and with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region including Africa ... ensuring the development and use of connectivity infrastructure in an open, transparent and non-exclusive manner based on international standards and responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment." They further reaffirmed the importance of "quality infrastructure" which, among others, ensures alignment with local economic and development strategies, safety, resilience, social and environmental impacts, and job creation as well as capacity building for the local communities.

At the India-Afghanistan strategic partnership council meeting, the two sides "stressed the need to make the regional Transit and Trade Agreement more inclusive and comprehensive ..."

The clearest iteration, of course, lay in the joint statement with Donald Trump in June, where both the countries said that they "support bolstering regional economic connectivity through the transparent development of infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment."

Equally importantly, India and Russia, which is now much closer to China, plumped for this new definition of connectivity — "It should be based on dialogue and consent of all parties concerned with due respect to sovereignty. The Russian and Indian Sides being guided by the principles of transparency, sustainability and responsibility, reiterate their commitment to build effective infrastructure ... "

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby manjgu » 20 Nov 2017 16:14

a) If the real purpose of Chinese is strategic/military in nature then why is is bothered about building CPEC. If it wants to use Gwadar as a base whats the rationale of investing 50B USD in roads etc?? I am sure Pakistan will be only too happy to give it to the chinese? or is this a roundabout chinese way to push Pakis into debt and then ask for Gwadar?

b) the economic rationale also does not look very convincing as shown by the calculations in previous posts?

c) is it about building Chinese owned industry in Pakistan and exporting?? and also developing China's western regions as manufacturing hub?

d) is it about creating an insurance / backup in case Malacca straits are choked? + a+b+c

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby sum » 20 Nov 2017 16:31


a) If the real purpose of Chinese is strategic/military in nature then why is is bothered about building CPEC. If it wants to use Gwadar as a base whats the rationale of investing 50B USD in roads etc?? I am sure Pakistan will be only too happy to give it to the chinese?

Have been having the same Question

There is nothing needed for a roundabout when the Pakis are more than ready to hand over the base and are just waiting for the Chinese to just ask. So there seems to be something else with this CPEC tamasha

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Aditya_V » 20 Nov 2017 16:48

Or it could be dismantling and selling old Chinese power plants as new to Pakis, Building roads with full CHinese imports by Chinese workers and comapnies, so even if there are say 60% bad debts, CHina makes a profit with Pakistani public paying for it.

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 20 Nov 2017 16:52

a) If the real purpose of Chinese is strategic/military in nature then why is is bothered about building CPEC. If it wants to use Gwadar as a base whats the rationale of investing 50B USD in roads etc?? I am sure Pakistan will be only too happy to give it to the chinese?
sum wrote:Have been having the same Question

There is nothing needed for a roundabout when the Pakis are more than ready to hand over the base and are just waiting for the Chinese to just ask. So there seems to be something else with this CPEC tamasha
sum Ji :

The Terroristanis started to "beg" the Chinese to build a Naval Base in Gwadar since 2011. Here is the Article :

Pakistan turns to China for naval base

Pakistan has asked China to build a naval base at its south-western port of Gwadar and expects the Chinese navy to maintain a regular presence there, a plan likely to alarm both India and the US.

“We have asked our Chinese brothers to please build a naval base at Gwadar,” Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, Pakistan’s defence minister, told the Financial Times, confirming that the request was conveyed to China during a visit last week by Yusuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan’s prime minister.

Hitherto, China has shied away from moves that might alienate the US and Beijing’s neighbours, such as India, Malaysia and Indonesia. “China’s rise is a beneficial force for peace and we have no hegemonic ambitions,” said a Chinese official familiar with Beijing’s security policy.

But Christopher Yung, senior research fellow at National Defense University in Washington, said in a recent paper “the nature and degree of China’s access to out-of-area bases will be the ultimate indication and warning” of its eventual intention to become a global military power. A Pentagon official said: “We have questions and concerns about this development and [China’s] intentions. But that is why we believe it is important to have a healthy, stable and continuous military-to-military relationship.”

A senior Pakistani official familiar with Sino-Pakistani discussions on naval co-operation said: “The naval base is something we hope will allow Chinese vessels to regularly visit in [the] future and also use the place for repair and maintenance of their fleet in the [Indian Ocean region].”

Such a foothold would be the first overseas location offering support to the People’s Liberation Army navy for future out-of-area missions and so would be likely to reinforce international concerns over Beijing’s longer-term military ambitions.

“This will definitely be a ‘game changer’ in China’s defence and security relationships,” said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a south Asia security expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The construction of a naval base in Gwadar would provide its own ships and possibly submarines with ‘permanent’ basing rights, along with the possibility of regular patrols and exercises in the Arabian Sea to protect the growing number of Chinese-flagged oil tankers traversing the region to meet its increasing energy demands from the Gulf region.”

As anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have made the PLA Navy aware that it lacks port access for restocking with food and water, swapping staff and maintenance, the force is lobbying for the construction of foreign bases.

The proposed port could meet some of the PLA navy’s needs but is less aggressive than a Chinese-owned base on foreign soil. The existing commercial port at Gwadar was built by China but is run by the Singapore Port Authority. But it could antagonise India as it comes amid a strengthening of China’s military ties with Pakistan.

During Mr Gilani’s visit last week, Beijing agreed to accelerate delivery of 50 fighter jets to Pakistan

Pakistan’s defence officials are keen for the PLA Navy to build up its presence in the Indian Ocean and the northern Arabia sea, mainly to counterbalance India’s naval forces.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 20 Nov 2017 17:21

manjgu wrote:a) If the real purpose of Chinese is strategic/military in nature then why is is bothered about building CPEC. If it wants to use Gwadar as a base whats the rationale of investing 50B USD in roads etc?? I am sure Pakistan will be only too happy to give it to the chinese? or is this a roundabout chinese way to push Pakis into debt and then ask for Gwadar?

b) the economic rationale also does not look very convincing as shown by the calculations in previous posts?

c) is it about building Chinese owned industry in Pakistan and exporting?? and also developing China's western regions as manufacturing hub?

d) is it about creating an insurance / backup in case Malacca straits are choked? + a+b+c

sum wrote:Have been having the same Question

There is nothing needed for a roundabout when the Pakis are more than ready to hand over the base and are just waiting for the Chinese to just ask. So there seems to be something else with this CPEC tamasha

The CPEC is not merely for accessing waters and getting a naval port closer to the choke points of Strait of Hormuz & Bab-al-Mandeb, but also for four other reasons. It has a strategy for each of the choke points. Of course, China is doing everything it can to overcome the Malacca & Singapore Straits Dilemma. The Sunda Strait has navigational & depth issues while Lombok further down is unsuitable for submarines. It is therefore building a port in Malaysia at Melaka itself.

One of the other four reasons is, of course, to string India especially with naval power in which China reposes great faith; the second is to find an outlet for excess capacity (which indeed is one of the reasons for Silk Road in the first place) and the third is to make a success of this flagship project that can inspire confidence in other nations where OBOR is planned. That third reason is very important for Xi personally. It chose a very pliant Pakistan therefore for the pilot project. The fourth reason is the constant undercurrent in the Chinese Empire, namely that all peripheral states must be Sinicized. The Long Term Plan (LTP) that DAWN leaked a couple of months back is a clear proof of this last aspect.

China always has multiple aims.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby TKiran » 20 Nov 2017 17:41

^^^china is megalomaniac, they conceive some grand project and work for it's completion single mindedly. (Any number of examples exist, Tibetan railway, subjugating Pakistan, absolutely unaffected by Terrorism, supplying iPhones to defence equipment, taking over American corporations are all no mean achievements)

CPEC/OBOR/BRI, diversion of Tibet waters, SCS ownership etc do not make sense for a lay man, they sound stupid, unviable uneconomical and impossible.

But it will happen, unless India puts a spanner in wheels and makes China understand it's limitations, and in the process gets gravely injured by losing Tibet, Xinjiang and gets cut to size.

This is how megalomaniacs behave.(A megalomaniac is a pathological egotist, that is, someone with a psychological disorder with symptoms like delusions of grandeur and an obsession with power. We also use the word megalomaniac more informally for people who behave as if they're convinced of their absolute power and greatness. )

Coming to the question, why India should stop China, the answer is India will lose if it doesn't stop China.

The next question is, why only India? The answer to that question is that, no other country is interested to contain China (despite pretentions to the contrary), no other country is capable, no other country has wherewithal or strength to match up to China.

"Why now?" is a good question, the answer to the question is, after 2008, China realized that it's the undisputed leader of the world, as it's technological advances have reached the potential to be the supplier of the world needs multiple times. That assessment was not wrong. They can supply everything world wants.

China is like pre WWII Germany. It's going to end up like post WWII Germany.
Last edited by TKiran on 20 Nov 2017 18:57, edited 2 times in total.

Philip
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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Philip » 20 Nov 2017 18:11

India needs to be pro-active and look to its own future needs and establishing an "India-centric" security apparatus for the IOR instead of jumping onto Uncle Sam's bandwagon. If we want a UNSC seat,we must deserve it and only our independent performance will ensure the same. Like they did during the heyday of NAM,nations across Asia and Africa should look to India for democratic,economic and military leadership ,as we have no evil,predatory intent unlike China. The West and their Anglo-Saxon agenda are welcome to join an India led front!

panduranghari
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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby panduranghari » 22 Nov 2017 21:16

India wont be drawn into the Thucydidides trap as proven by Doklam. We have to assume China has risen when I am making this claim. So what will China do next? It wants to get one upmanship in someway, anyway. China cannot afford status quo with India especially in relation to OBOR BRI. Longer there is uncertainty in Indian position the higher the risk of derailment of planned work in multiple regimes under aegis of OBOR.

Singha
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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Singha » 24 Nov 2017 07:12

https://mobile.almasdarnews.com/article ... nitiative/

Tsp and nepal seeing the true shape of the beast now


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