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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 04 Jun 2017 14:17

X Posted on the Analyzing CPEC & STFUP Threads

Sri Lanka for sale?

On May 29, the BBC asked, “Is Sri Lanka up for sale?” According to the BBC, “Sri Lanka is allowing Chinese firms to take over key assets, as it struggles to repay loans it was given by China”. In 2007, the EXIM Bank of China began funding Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. The port was completed at a cost of $1.3 billion. The Chinese financed and built the 900MW Norochcholai Power Plant at a cost of $1.35 billion. In 2010, Beijing lent Sri Lanka $200 million to build an airport. In 2012, China lent an additional $810 million.

In 2011, the Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium was built at a cost of Rs700 million. In 2013, the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (near Hambantota) was built at a cost of Rs26 billion. The Southern Expressway was built at a cost of Rs776 billion. The Hambantota Sports Zone was built at a cost of Rs15 billion. In 2013, China lent to Sri Lanka and built $272-million railway.

Between 2008 and 2015, China lent $6 billion in aid and loans. Fast forward to 2017. The port of Hambantota now lies, more or less, abandoned. The Rajapaksa National Tele Cinema now lies, more or less, abandoned. The Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium now lies, more or less, abandoned. The Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport now lies, more or less, abandoned.

Lo and behold, Sri Lanka is having trouble repaying the debt incurred to build the port of Hambantota. As a consequence, Beijing has now taken over four of the seven container berths on a 35-year lease. Beijing is also acquiring 15,000 acres around Hambantota.

Lo and behold, Sri Lanka is having trouble repaying the debt incurred to build the coal-fired Norochcholai Power Plant. On April 17, 2017, the power plant broke down. On March 13, 2016, the power plant had ceased operations. In 2012, there was a leak in one of the boilers. Sri Lanka wants China to take over the power plant.

Lo and behold, Sri Lanka is having trouble repaying the debt incurred to build the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport. Sri Lanka offered China control over some of the largest projects – including the Mattala International Airport and the Port of Hambantota – in return for debt relief.

According to Forbes, “Sri Lanka has a debt problem. After more than a decade of taking out huge loans to build large-scale infrastructure – most of which hasn’t yet produced adequate returns – the country is now struggling to make payments, and is looking for another way out”. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is prepared to give control of large projects to Chinese companies. But according to Forbes, China’s Ambassador Yi Xianliang has clearly told PM Ranil Wickremesinghe that: “We are not interested. We want our money, not your empty airport”.

Sri Lanka is having trouble repaying its debt. Sri Lanka now owes $58.3 billion to foreign lenders and 95.4 percent of Sri Lankan government’s revenue is now going into debt-servicing.

According to the BBC, “We don’t like our land being given away to China,” says fisherman Aruna Roshantha, adding that “Not just China, if any country comes and takes land from Sri Lanka, we don’t like it. The government should protect our land, not sell it”.
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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby manjgu » 04 Jun 2017 20:30

just wondering what kind of feasbility study was done by the SriLankan govt to approve loans for these projects. Surely Rajapaksa was bribed. SL citizens should get his neck !!!

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 05 Jun 2017 07:41

manjgu wrote:just wondering what kind of feasbility study was done by the SriLankan govt to approve loans for these projects.

Chinese do not want the partner country to produce any feasibility report or do any environmental impact analysis. The financial management of the projects are also totally crude. The decision-making process is opaque. They choose vulnerable countries too.

In the case of SL, it was the Chinese military help to Rajapakse in the final phase of the fight against the LTTE that made him overcome that evil group. This was exploited soon thereafter by the Chinese and the rest is history.

We know that in the case of Pakistan, it is China's transfer of nukes, missiles and diplomatic support that makes Pak indebted to China (apart from the Paki obsession against India and their whoring mentality). Even here, the Chinese use the more reliable Army rather than the political leaders/parties to get its things done.

In Myanmar, it was the corrupt and powerful military junta.

After the c.2014 coup, the military-ruled Thailand has distinctly shifted its foreign policy closer to China. There is a very increased cooperation between China & Thailnad today with much expanded military exercises, purchase of submarines & tanks from China, building a naval base etc.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby vijayk » 06 Jun 2017 23:20

http://www.firstpost.com/world/chinas-s ... 24395.html
A Joint Logistics Support Force has been established. This force will provide logistic support to all the services. A reduction of 3,00,000 personnel from the PLA was announced by Xi in September 2015. From these large-scale changes, it can be clearly seen that the entire armed forces of China are getting transformed.

The recession of 2008 hit the Chinese economy hard. Till then, China’s economic growth was based on the export model. Foreign investors started pulling their money out of China. The crisis that gripped the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2015 resulted in the flight of foreign currency.

From a forex reserve of $3.9 trillion dollars, it is now hovering around US$ three trillion, a flight of approximately a trillion dollars from China’s economy. The recession created another problem for China, of excess capacity.


One of the reasons for the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative of China is the excess capacity that China had for cement, steel, glass etc.

Today, all the economic activity and infrastructure projects in China are oriented towards this initiative. There are problems coming up in the execution of the project. India was conspicuous by its absence in the summit. The seven Arab countries cutting ties with Qatar on 4 June, 2017, is likely to affect China’s plans for the OBOR project in the region.

The China-European Union (EU) summit, which was held on 2 June, 2017, revealed the apprehensions of the EU. Catherine Wong, in her article inSouth China Morning Post, mentioned a European diplomat saying that "the initiative is about promoting globalisation which is positive. But it comes with Chinese characteristics. So, it is not really a market-oriented, liberal, rules-based globalisation that we would like to see. It seems to be more about hierarchy."

It is worth noting that representatives of many European countries did not sign the trade declaration at the OBOR summit in Beijing in May this year. Only time will tell whether China’s move to put all her eggs in the OBOR basket is a prudent one.

Thus, China as a country is in a state of flux. The jury is still out on why Xi chose to place China in such a predicament and how China will come out of it.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby chetak » 10 Jun 2017 16:45

India's plan to develop Iran's Chabahar port faces US headwinds



India's plan to develop Iran's Chabahar port faces US headwinds

10th June 2017

A security personnel looks on at oil docks at the port of Kalantari in the city of Chabahar. (Photo
NEW DELHI: Western manufacturers are shying away from supplying equipment for an Iranian port that India is developing for fear the United States may reimpose sanctions on Tehran, Indian officials say, dealing a blow to New Delhi's strategic ambitions in the region.

Lying on the Gulf of Oman along the approaches to the Straits of Hormuz, the port of Chabahar is central to India's hopes to crack open a transport corridor to Central Asia and Afghanistan that bypasses arch-rival Pakistan.

India committed $500 million to speed development of the port after sanctions on Iran were lifted following a deal struck between major powers and Tehran to curb its nuclear programme in 2015.

But the state-owned Indian firm that is developing Chabahar is yet to award a single tender for supplying equipment such as cranes and forklifts, according to two government sources tracking India's biggest overseas infrastructure push.

U.S. President Donald Trump denounced the nuclear agreement on the campaign trail, and since taking office in January has accused Iran of being a threat to countries across the Middle East.

Swiss engineering group Liebherr and Finland's Konecranes and Cargotec have told India Ports Global Pvt Ltd, which is developing the deep water port, they were unable to take part in the bids as their banks were not ready to facilitate transactions involving Iran due to the uncertainty over U.S. policy, the two officials said in separate conversations with Reuters.

These firms dominate the market for customised equipment to develop jetties and container terminals. One official said the first tender was floated in September, but attracted few bidders because of the fear of renewed sanctions. That fear has intensified since January.

"Now the situation is that we are running after suppliers," one official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of matter.

A Konecranes spokeswoman declined to comment beyond confirming the company was not involved in the project.

Cargotec and Liebherr did not respond to requests for comment.

Some tenders have been floated three times since September because they failed to attract bidders. A Chinese firm, ZPMC, has since come forward to supply some equipment, the same Indian official said.

THREAT OF SANCTIONS

Trump has called the agreement between Iran and six major world powers restricting Tehran's nuclear programme in exchange for lifting of sanctions "the worst deal ever negotiated".

Last month his administration extended relief on Washington's broadest and most punitive sanctions, while carrying out a wider policy review on how to deal with the Islamic Republic.

Uncertainty over U.S. policy is already causing long delays in contracts that Iran has sought with international firms to develop its oil fields and buy planes for its ageing airlines.

The lifting of United Nations and European Union sanctions in 2016 partly reconnected Iran with the international financial system crucial to trade.

But large international bankers with exposure to the United States remain unwilling to facilitate Iranian deals for fear of running afoul of narrower, unilateral U.S. sanctions that remain outside the nuclear deal and uncertainty over whether wider sanctions relief will continue.

India's ambassador to Iran said the process of procuring equipment for the Chabahar port was under way and that some of the customised cranes needed take up to 20 months to build. The banking situation was slowing improving, he added.

"Tenders are re-floated for a variety of reasons including technical specifications not being met, etc. Banking channels, in recent months, have in fact somewhat eased," Saurabh Kumar said in an emailed response to Reuters from Tehran. "If some companies do not participate, it really is their business."

India has been pushing for the development of Chabahar port for more than a decade as a hub for its trade links to the resource-rich countries of central Asia and Afghanistan. Access to those countries is currently complicated by India's fraught relationship with Pakistan.

Bureaucratic delays, difficult negotiations with Iran and the risk of incurring Washington's displeasure during the financial embargo in Tehran had meant there was little progress on the port until now.

But, prodded in part by China's development of Gwadar port, which lies barely 100 km (60 miles) from Chabahar on the Pakistani coast, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has unveiled massive investment plans centred around the Iranian port, offering to help build railways, roads and fertiliser plants that could eventually amount to $15 billion.

So far, even an initial credit line of $150 million that India wants to extend to Iran for development of Chabahar has remained a non-starter as Tehran has not been able to do its part of work.

"They have not sought the loan from us because they haven't awarded the tenders, either because of lack of participation or banking problems," said the second government official.

Ambassador Kumar said the Iran had indicated it would be sending proposals shortly to tap the credit line.

Meena Singh Roy, who heads the West Asia centre at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, a New Delhi think-tank, said increasing tension between Washington and Tehran would have an impact on the port project.

"The Chabahar Project has strategic significance for India," she said. "However ... nothing much seems to be moving due to new uncertainties in the region."

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby A_Gupta » 10 Jun 2017 18:13

http://www.eurasiareview.com/10062017-c ... -analysis/
A direct economic corridor between China and India would demand delineation of the border at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries in some sectors. For this, it will be necessary to set up custom offices and develop certain infrastructure to facilitate trade through the border. But China is least enthusiastic on such an arrangement. It does not want to enter the Indian market directly through their common border, but only through the third country like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) and the proposed China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor (CNIEC). China intends to make entry into the Indian market without resolving border issues with India at the LAC

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 10 Jun 2017 19:33

chetak wrote:India's plan to develop Iran's Chabahar port faces US headwinds

India's plan to develop Iran's Chabahar port faces US headwinds

India has consistently deferred to every wish of the USA on the Iran issue. Ms. Clinton promised us the transit route through Pakistan for Afghanistan and beyond. All she could do was to get one-way trade from Afghanistan; Pakistan would not budge. India must stand firm on the Chahbahar issue because that is an important route for us and we can't afford to end up without access to Afghanistan or CAR and optionless against the Chinese outmaneuvers.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby A_Gupta » 10 Jun 2017 22:25

IMO, it is a little more than just fear of US sanctions.
e.g., https://news.vice.com/article/this-is-w ... ill-people
Not long ago, we received a press release that caught our eye — this is not a common occurrence — and was distributed by an NGO called United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). Based in New York and headed by former US Ambassador to the United Nations Mark D. Wallace, UANI had photos of alleged criminals being hanged in front of spectators in the Iranian cities of Qaem Shahr and Babol. However, the condemned weren't hanging from traditional gallows. They were hanging from construction cranes that had one word painted on them: Atlas.
..
..
Being hanged from a crane is a particularly gruesome way to die. When the gallows we're all used to seeing in moves are used, the condemned’s neck often breaks as he falls, which typically causes near-instant death. When someone is hanged from a crane, however, he is slowly lifted from the ground by his neck and left to dangle in the noose. It can take more than 20 minutes to die.
..
..
According to UANI, its campaign has persuaded five large crane manufacturers to pull out of the Iranian market: Konecranes of Finland, UNIC and Tadano of Japan, Germany’s Liebherr, and most notably Connecticut’s Terex. Notable because the company's presidents have included both Filipov and his son Steve, and because the company claimed in 2011 that UANI didn't persuade them to stop doing business in Iran because they'd already stopped doing business in Iran.


But read the whole thing.

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 12 Jun 2017 04:40

X Posted on the Analyzing CEPC & STFUP Threads

After OBOR gets ready, Pakistan will become China’s colony: S Akbar Zaidi

NEW DELHI: Pakistan will become a colony of China once the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) -- flagship project under the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is operationalised, contended top Pak political economist S Akbar Zaidi on the very day the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit praised Beijing’s mega connectivity plan.

In a lecture titled “Has China taken over Pakistan” organised in Kolkata by think tank ‘Calcutta Research Group’ on Friday night Zaidi noted that the CPEC initiative is the most discussed but the least transparent among all the foreign initiatives in Pakistan.

“It is indeed a game changer, but not in the way our ruling classes have projected it to be. It will enslave Pakistan and undermine its sovereignty,” alleged Zaidi author of pioneering books --‘Military Civil Society and democratisation in Pakistan’ and ‘Issues in Pakistan’s Economy’.

“CPEC is a part of China’s OBOR initiative to expand its influence in the world and Pakistan is just the geographical space used by Beijing to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. But in the process, Beijing blueprint will ensure complete control over Pakistan,” Zaidi further alleged.

Incidentally Zaidi’s comments came on the very day when SCO praised China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India, which went to the Summit as an observer and became a member, however, was not party to the final Summit document on this occasion. CPEC is the very project that has irked India as it passes through PoK besides the fact that OBOR or BRI initiative lacks transparency and is being implemented in a unilateral fashion.

Speaking at SCO Summit PM Narendra Modi took a dig at connectivity projects that infringes on sovereignty. Zaidi quoted Pak Senator Tahir Mashhadi, chairman of the standing committee on planning and development, who had described the CPEC corridor as the advent of “another East India Company is in the offing.” China has announced to invest whopping $ 62 bn in CPEC.

The most dangerous implication of the CPEC would be that Pakistan’s foreign relations, especially those with India, will be determined by the Chinese, the Pak scholar warned. “Pakistan’s obsession with China and CPEC will prevent any rapprochement between India and Pakistan unless the Chinese themselves initiate such a process and that they would do only if that fits into their grand design in the region. With China taking over Pakistan, providing it with undisclosed amount of investments, any any argument of increasing trade and economic cooperation between India and Pakistan lose out completely.” Zaidi blamed the Pakistani ruling elite for leading the country down the path of enslavement.

“Our ruling classes, especially the military, have first lived with the influence of US imperialism, then allowed unusual degree of Saudi intrusion in domestic, cultural and social affairs. Now they have prostrated themselves before Chinese imperial designs.”

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 13 Jun 2017 13:44

Mods - Unable find a "Myanmar Thread". Please post this on a suitable thread.

Eye on China, India speeds up infra projects in Myanmar

NEW DELHI: Having missed several deadlines, and with China taking big strides, India is trying hard to speed up its infrastructure commitments in Myanmar. India's tardiness in project implementation has marred its reputation, even though India has extended over $1.75 billion in grants and credit to Myanmar.

Indian envoy to Myanmar Vikram Misri said India had completed building the Sittwe power and the inland water terminal in Paletwa. Speaking to a local publication, Global Light of Myanmar this week he said, "We have just awarded the contract for the final stage which is the road to be built from Paletwa to a point called Zorinpui which is on the border with Mizoram. I think the creation of this transport corridor, once it is fully functioning, has the potential to transform the economic landscape in the states through which it goes, Rakhine and Chin." Construction is expected to start in October, with a Rs 1,600-crore contract awarded for building 109-km road connecting Paletwa river terminal to Zorinpui in Mizoram.

India is also building the trilateral highway, or India-Myanmar-Thailand highway, which was originally targeted for 2014, but will now only be complete by 2020. Misri said projects there are underway. "We are repairing 69 bridges on the Tamu-Kalay road and also constructing the Kalaywa-Yagyi section of the highway. In Chin State which borders Mizoram in India, we are constructing a road that will connect Rhi on the border to the town of Tiddim."

India-Myanmar relations saw some official attention recently, when foreign secretary S Jaishankar went to Naypyidaw for foreign office consultations on May 27, but by and large this eastern neighbour has not seen the kind of high-voltage attention lavished on Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Yet Myanmar is crucial to India's Act East policy, particularly as India tries to balance out China's massive presence in the country.

Ironically, India is helped by Myanmar's own growing discomfort with China. China's Belt & Road (OBOR) project has seen an almost $10 billion investment in a port Kyaukphyu and a special economic zone, which, China has promised, will generate thousands of jobs.

Aung San Suu Kyi, state counselor and effectively the head of the civilian government, allowed the Chinese investment as Beijing-Yangon relations have improved under her watch, perhaps more than India. But there remains a popular distrust of China, which is largely absent vis-a-vis India.

Part of the problem is also security-related issues. India still worries about some of the insurgent groups that take sanctuary across the Myanmar border, though in recent years, the two security systems have worked quietly to combat them.

India has also raised alarm over the fact that a number of Rohingyas have found their way to Jammu & Kashmir, although that is more a failure on India's part. However, India reckons the road projects, including a couple of new ones in Kachin and Rakhine states would help the people of these largely poor areas, find some extra means of economic activity.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby arun » 14 Jun 2017 12:28

X Posted from the Analyzing CPEC thread.

ramana wrote:China loan interest rates will drive Pak, BD and Nepal to bankruptcy

https://twitter.com/kamnaAKrish/status/ ... 2909054976



Peoples Republic of China trying to con Bangladesh by jacking up interest rate on financing of tied aid projects.

China has asked Bangladesh to convert part of the credit it promised during its president’s Dhaka visit to commercial loans.

Converting soft loans into commercial credit means Bangladesh will have to pay higher interest for the fund.

Bangladesh signed $25 billion deals with China for nearly two and a half dozen projects during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Dhaka in October last year.

Li Guangjun, economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in Dhaka, made the proposal during a recent meeting of the Joint Economic Council, according to a senior official at the Economic Relations Division or ERD.

However, the ERD official said in the face of resistance against such proposal, China showed the sign of softening its stance. ………………………


From Bangladesh News:

China seeks to convert part of soft loans into commercial credit for Bangladesh

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby anupmisra » 14 Jun 2017 16:48

In Pakistan, China presses built-in advantage for 'Silk Road' contracts

Last year, Pakistan held informal talks with General Electric, Siemens and Switzerland's ABB to build the country's first high-voltage transmission line. Chinese power giant State Grid committed to building the $1.7 billion project in half the time of its European counterparts – and clinched the deal.
As China makes its "Belt and Road" initiative...Chinese companies are taking the lion's share of infrastructure projects across the region.
In Pakistan, whose geographical position makes it central to Beijing's "Silk Road" plans, contracts have been awarded for projects worth more than $28 billion – all by Chinese companies working together with local firms.
China Inc's main advantage, officials in both countries said, is the ability of Chinese banks – with the blessing of the government - to fast-track loans for projects related to the Silk Road.
"(Chinese companies have) that advantage because of the support of the Chinese government"
Dagha, who spoke to Reuters shortly before being transferred to the Commerce Ministry, said Beijing was fast-tracking loan approvals and pushing its banks and insurance firms to speed up due diligence work.


So, the greatest con game the world has ever witnessed has begun. Chinese money for chinese companies to buy chinese products and hire chinese labor to feed chinese people which will prevent another chinese revolt. CPEC, OBOR, Silk Trade...these are all old world land grab schemes.

"To get rich (with other people's resources and insecurities) is glorious"- Deng Xiaoping

https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/21056 ... -contracts

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby durairaaj » 17 Jun 2017 06:34

Japan will cooperate with China’s One Belt One Road if various conditions are met

We have to give it to Chinese for when they say they will build an infrastructure they build it. Unlike GOI which is always in near comatose whether building infrastucture inside India or abroad.

Reading news from different outlets and learning from visitors experience about the development across China, it feels more certain that China is in a more steady path of technological and economic advance than India. When they have a mandate to gain technology they make it happen.

Only way this path can be derailed is, if a lunatic like Hitler takes over the top post of the CPC and CMC and derail the nation's path of growth from trade and technology advancement to nationalism and racial domination. A rot has to start at the top. I thought south china sea issue will be a harbinger of that. But nothing much seems to be happening there. Instead they are more focused on developing institutions just as the americans did after the World War II.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Shankas » 17 Jun 2017 07:56


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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Singha » 17 Jun 2017 09:04

as per ET

it seems china has told BD not all of the $25b OBOR project it has signed up will be on soft loan terms.

BD is lungi shivering at the % that will now be available on commercial loan basis.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 19 Jun 2017 19:25

India wants China’s Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS on separate tracks - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
India and China are working together to find common ground ahead of the summit in September of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping, despite their differences over docking the Beijing-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the alliance in the future.

At a conference of political parties, think tanks and civil society groups of BRICS held in Fuzhou, The Hindu has learnt, the Indian and Chinese delegations failed to arrive at a consensus that the five emerging economies should formally support the BRI.{China is trying to isolate India}

The Fuzhou meet, organised by the Communist Party of China (CPC), is widely seen as an important component in framing the outcome of the BRICS summit that will be held in the Chinese coastal city of Xiamen in September.

The differences between the two delegations became evident when the text of the Fuzhou Initiative—an open document released at the end of the conference - was changed, on the insistence of the Indian delegation. Paragraph 14 of the first version of the Fuzhou Initiative had commended “the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China”, for its “great significance for achieving development in developing countries…” However, since a consensus could not be achieved, the entire paragraph was dropped in the final version of the document, which was finally adopted at the conference.

A source privy to closed door deliberations, which resulted in recommendations for the BRICS summit as a separate “outcome” document, said that the Indian side, nevertheless, expressed its willingness to support individual connectivity projects, provided they were not tied up with the BRI.

India had boycotted last month’s Belt and Road Forum, hosted by China for promoting the BRI. But in an interview with The Hindu, BJP general secretary Ram Madhav said India’s decision was driven by “certain sovereignty related questions”, and should be treated as an “exception”, within the overall growth of India-China ties in the last three years.

The two delegations at Fuzhou also differed on establishing a permanent “Friends of BRICS” forum, which would include other countries outside the five emerging economies. {This is an attempt by China to include Pakistan to balance India off}

The source said, “All member-countries have an outreach programme. For instance, India at the last summit invited countries belonging to BIMSTEC. Under the outreach programme, we can give loans to everyone. The Chinese side during the Fuzhou conference has invited Laos, Philippines and Cambodia. That is fine. But embedding countries into the BRICS arrangement on a permanent basis, which might include Pakistan, through the Friends of BRICS club was not found acceptable.”

At a press conference in March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed establishing a BRICS-plus arrangement, involving other countries with the grouping.

However, there was greater convergence among the delegates on other issues, including establishment of a BRICS financial institute, back up the existing contingency reserve arrangement of the New Development Bank of the emerging economies. “There is a suggestion to set up an institution on the lines of the IMF. It is not a bad idea but the location of the headquarters of such an institution is yet to be decided,” the source said.

India is keen on establishing a BRICS credit rating agency, while, so far, the Chinese have been focusing more on improving the methodology of the existing credit rating agencies. “But this might change after Moody’s downgraded China’s credit rating,” the source observed.

In his his opening remarks at the conference, Samir Saran, vice president of the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and leader of the visiting Indian delegation, proposed that the forthcoming Chinese Presidency of the BRICS must pursue the institution-building project, proposed by India in 2016, which included setting up research institutions, rating agencies and other bodies that promoted intra-BRICS cooperation.

Cyber security is likely to emerge as another important topic in the Xiamen summit. India, on its part, is keen on promoting digital economy, and is likely to back the existing working group on Information and Communication Technology (ICT), to comprehensively examine all aspects of cyber security.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ramana » 19 Jun 2017 21:43

I see NaMo strategy now. He wants China to takeover Pak via OBOR/CPEC.

The more he appears reluctant the more China presses on with CPEC.

What this does is add burden of Pak to China which so far was a freebie.

Pak has survived so far on Western and KSA money and did China's bidding.

Now China has to fund Pak to exist.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ramana » 20 Jun 2017 00:19

Paul posted this in 2008!!!!

viewtopic.php?p=555039#p555039

Paul wrote:The old great game culminated in an understanding between the Tsarist Russia and Great Britain wherein the following agreement was reached (there were other parts of this agreement but focus is on the relevance for the subcontinent) :

1. The borders of Russian influence stops at the Amu Darya.
2. Afghanistan is a buffer state but within the British sphere of influence.

When the British left India they did not want the Subcontinent to fall under Soviet hegemony, hence Pakistan came into the picture. However the northern regions of India which came into the closest proximity with Pakistan was a cause of concern. To address this : a buffer region between USSR and Pakistan called Wakhan corridor was created and given to Afghanistan (not sure about the date).

However the British being the cynical SOBs that they are, wanted to wear suspender and a belt at the same time. Hence they engineered the invasion of J&K state and gerrymandered the creation of POK and ensured it stayed in the hands of their proxies: Pakistan.

The utility of this arrangement is now under question due to Pakistan’s failing health. Also the new great game player: PRC wants risk free access to the oil rich regions of the Middle East. As a rising great power it inherits the interests of the west in ensuring India stays cut off from Central Asia.


Hence as I see it, there are two major questions facing the old great game players(West and Russia):

1. Should PRC gain access to middle east through the land route? If yes, then POK will go to PRC.
2. USSR’s borders have receded to the regions hundreds if not thousands of miles west of Amu Darya. They are nowhere close to the POK region and the threat of communism subverting the subcontinent has receded. So should India be given land access to the Central Asian regions as well. If yes then POK should go to India.

If the answer is NO to both (1) and (2), then a new arrangement has to be worked out. This means new proxies have to be found to manage this geographically strategic region.

The answer to this to give a new lease of life to the time trusted Sunni alliance. The Taliban are the obvious choice. They will be a headache for all the major players – India and China. Not to mention Russia and Iran as well.

The other option – not necessarily exclusive to the option mentioned above is to break J&K as a separate state from India. POK can be part of this independent state and through these two proxies the offshore balancing strategy put in place by the west post WWII will be executed.



Last is ruled out with NAmO in Delhi.

Hence the Sunni NATO was created.
At same time Russia brought in India as part of SCO.

Also explains the recent J&K Hurrirats/HuM over drive for violence.


Its all related.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ramana » 20 Jun 2017 00:20

And old article in Foreign Affairs:

svinayak wrote:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001f ... rgain.html
From Great Game to Grand Bargain
Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008
Summary: The crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan is beyond the point where more troops will help. U.S. strategy must be to seek compromise with insurgents while addressing regional rivalries and insecurities

BARNETT R. RUBIN is Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Blood on the Doorstep. AHMED RASHID is a Pakistani journalist and writer, a Fellow at the Paci?c Council on International Policy, and the author of Jihad, Taliban, and, most recently, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.


The Great Game is no fun anymore. The term "Great Game" was used by nineteenth-century British imperialists to describe the British-Russian struggle for position on the chessboard of Afghanistan and Central Asia -- a contest with a few players, mostly limited to intelligence forays and short wars fought on horseback with rifles, and with those living on the chessboard largely bystanders or victims. More than a century later, the game continues. But now, the number of players has exploded, those living on the chessboard have become involved, and the intensity of the violence and the threats it produces affect the entire globe. The Great Game can no longer be treated as a sporting event for distant spectators. It is time to agree on some new rules.

Seven years after the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghan commanders it supported pushed the leaderships of the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, an insurgency that includes these and other groups is gaining ground on both the Afghan and the Pakistani sides of the border. Four years after Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election, the increasingly besieged government of Hamid Karzai is losing credibility at home and abroad. Al Qaeda has established a new safe haven in the tribal agencies of Pakistan, where it is defended by a new organization, the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, beset by one political crisis after another and split between a traditionally autonomous military and assertive but fractious elected leaders, has been unable to retain control of its own territory and population. Its intelligence agency stands accused of supporting terrorism in Afghanistan, which in many ways has replaced Kashmir as the main arena of the still-unresolved struggle between Pakistan and India.

For years, critics of U.S. and NATO strategies have been warning that the region was headed in this direction. Many of the policies such critics have long proposed are now being widely embraced. The Bush administration and both presidential campaigns are proposing to send more troops to Afghanistan and to undertake other policies to sustain the military gains made there. These include accelerating training of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police; disbursing more money, more effectively for reconstruction and development and to support better governance; increasing pressure on and cooperation with Pakistan, and launching cross-border attacks without Pakistani agreement to eliminate cross-border safe havens for insurgents and to uproot al Qaeda; supporting democracy in Pakistan and bringing its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under civilian political control; and implementing more effective policies to curb Afghanistan's drug industry, which produces opiates equal in export value to half of the rest of the Afghan economy.

Cross-border attacks into Pakistan may produce an "October surprise" or provide material for apologists hoping to salvage George W. Bush's legacy, but they will not provide security. Advancing reconstruction, development, good governance, and counternarcotics efforts and building effective police and justice systems in Afghanistan will require many years of relative peace and security. Neither neglecting these tasks, as the Bush administration did initially, nor rushing them on a timetable determined by political objectives, can succeed. Afghanistan requires far larger and more effective security forces, international or national, but support for U.S. and NATO deployments is plummeting in troop-contributing countries, in the wider region, and in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan, the poorest country in the world but for a handful in Africa and with the weakest government in the world (except Somalia, which has no government), will never be able to sustain national security forces sufficient to confront current -- let alone escalating -- threats, yet permanent foreign subsidies for Afghanistan's security forces cannot be guaranteed and will have destabilizing consequences. Moreover, measures aimed at Afghanistan will not address the deteriorating situation in Pakistan or the escalation of international conflicts connected to the Afghan-Pakistani war. More aid to Pakistan -- military or civilian -- will not diminish the perception among Pakistan's national security elite that the country is surrounded by enemies determined to dismember it, especially as cross-border raids into areas long claimed by Afghanistan intensify that perception. Until that sense of siege is gone, it will be difficult to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan.

U.S. diplomacy has been paralyzed by the rhetoric of "the war on terror" -- a struggle against "evil," in which other actors are "with us or with the terrorists." Such rhetoric thwarts sound strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous "terrorist" enemy. Only a political and diplomatic initiative that distinguishes political opponents of the United States -- including violent ones -- from global terrorists such as al Qaeda can reduce the threat faced by the Afghan and Pakistani states and secure the rest of the international community from the international terrorist groups based there. Such an initiative would have two elements. It would seek a political solution with as much of the Afghan and Pakistani insurgencies as possible, offering political inclusion, the integration of Pakistan's indirectly ruled Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the mainstream political and administrative institutions of Pakistan, and an end to hostile action by international troops in return for cooperation against al Qaeda. And it would include a major diplomatic and development initiative addressing the vast array of regional and global issues that have become intertwined with the crisis -- and that serve to stimulate, intensify, and prolong conflict in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan has been at war for three decades -- a period longer than the one that started with World War I and ended with the Normandy landings on D-day in World War II -- and now that war is spreading to Pakistan and beyond. This war and the attendant terrorism could well continue and spread, even to other continents -- as on 9/11 -- or lead to the collapse of a nuclear-armed state. The regional crisis is of that magnitude, and yet so far there is no international framework to address it other than the underresourced and poorly coordinated operations in Afghanistan and some attacks in the FATA. The next U.S. administration should launch an effort, initially based on a contact group authorized by the UN Security Council, to put an end to the increasingly destructive dynamics of the Great Game in the region. The game has become too deadly and has attracted too many players; it now resembles less a chess match than the Afghan game of buzkashi, with Afghanistan playing the role of the goat carcass fought over by innumerable teams. Washington must seize the opportunity now to replace this Great Game with a new grand bargain for the region.

THE SECURITY GAP

The Afghan and Pakistani security forces lack the numbers, skills, equipment, and motivation to confront the growing insurgencies in the two countries or to uproot al Qaeda from its new base in the FATA, along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Proposals for improving the security situation focus on sending additional international forces, building larger national security forces in Afghanistan, and training and equipping Pakistan's security forces, which are organized for conflict with India, for domestic counterinsurgency. But none of these proposals is sufficient to meet the current, let alone future, threats.

The Pakistani military does not control the insurgency, but it can affect its intensity. Putting pressure on Pakistan to curb the militants will likely remain ineffective, however, without a strategic realignment by the United States. The region is rife with conspiracy theories trying to find a rational explanation for the United States' apparently irrational strategic posture of supporting a "major non-NATO ally" that is doing more to undermine the U.S. position in Afghanistan than any other state. Many Afghans believe that Washington secretly supports the Taliban as a way to keep a war going to justify a troop presence that is actually aimed at securing the energy resources of Central Asia and countering China. Many in Pakistan believe that the United States has deceived Pakistan into conniving with Washington to bring about its own destruction: India and U.S.-supported Afghanistan will form a pincer around Pakistan to dismember the world's only Muslim nuclear power. And some Iranians speculate that in preparation for the coming of the Mahdi, God has blinded the Great Satan to its own interests so that it would eliminate both of Iran's Sunni-ruled regional rivals, Afghanistan and Iraq, thus unwittingly paving the way for the long-awaited Shiite restoration.

On September 19, 2001, when then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced to the nation his decision to support the U.S.-led intervention against the Taliban in Afghanistan, he stated that the overriding reason was to save Pakistan by preventing the United States from allying with India.
In return, he wanted concessions to Pakistan on its security interests.

Subsequent events, however, have only exacerbated Pakistan's sense of insecurity. Musharraf asked for time to form a "moderate Taliban" government in Afghanistan but failed to produce one. When that failed, he asked that the United States prevent the Northern Alliance (part of the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan), which had been supported by India, Iran, and Russia, from occupying Kabul; that appeal failed. Now, Pakistan claims that the Northern Alliance is working with India from inside Afghanistan's security services. Meanwhile, India has reestablished its consulates in Afghan cities, including some near the Pakistani border. India has genuine consular interests there (Hindu and Sikh populations, commercial travel, aid programs), but it may also in fact be using the consulates against Pakistan, as Islamabad claims. India has also, in cooperation with Iran, completed a highway linking Afghanistan's ring road (which connects its major cities) to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, potentially eliminating Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for access to the sea and marginalizing Pakistan's new Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, which was built with hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese aid. And the new U.S.-Indian nuclear deal effectively recognizes New Delhi's legitimacy as a nuclear power while continuing to treat Islamabad, with its record of proliferation, as a pariah. In this context, pressuring or giving aid to Pakistan, without any effort to address the sources of its insecurity, cannot yield a sustainable positive outcome.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 20 Jun 2017 06:24

India wants to be a trade, transit hub; inks UN pact in bid to counter China’s OBOR - Indrani Bagchi, ToI
India became the 71st country on Monday to join the United Nations TIR Convention, the international customs transit system, to position itself as a regional trading and transit hub.

The TIR system is the international customs transit system with the widest geographical coverage.

As other customs transit procedures, the TIR procedure enables goods to move under customs control across international borders without the payment of the duties and taxes.

TIR Convention is more than a transport agreement and has a strong foreign policy element.

In a world where China's 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) is the dominating project straddling economics and geopolitics, India has no option but to play a better game if it wants to be counted as a serious rising power.

Welcoming India into the global transport arrangement, Umberto de Pretto, the secretary general of IRU which manages the TIR Convention, told TOI from Geneva that India's accession would have a big impact on regional connectivity. "TIR can help implement the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement by addressing policy incompatibility among the BBIN group. For example, Bangladesh does not recognise insurance policies made in India, Nepal or Bhutan. With TIR, there would be no need for bilateral arrangements as guarantors are covered by the global guarantee chain."

One of the persistent problems for India's connectivity projects has been the disconnect between transport and customs systems with different countries.

Once the systems are integrated with global norms, India reckons it will become easier to service African and Asian markets when the DMIC (Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor) comes online.

It will breathe life into the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Chabahar project that India has been working on for some time.

China joined the TIR in 2016 when its giant inter-regional connectivity projects began to take off. As India ramps up its connectivity ambitions this is a necessary step.
For instance, the BBIN motor vehicles agreement needs this convention to make it operational.

"BBIN MVA lacks any guaranteeing mechanism to protect customs revenue in the event of goods getting diverted to the national territory of the state through which it is passing. Without such mechanism, the MVA could not be operational," he said.

Joining the convention "would be a major economic boost to South Asia, eventually connecting the region to the rest of the world. It could become a key link between South and South-East Asia, particularly as China is already a TIR member, and connects transit routes east to Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and beyond".

He added it can link India to maritime transport routes across the entire Asia-Pacific region.

A statement from IRU (International Roads Union) said this was "part of India's multi-modal transport strategy that aims to integrate the economy with global and regional production networks".

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Singha » 20 Jun 2017 10:47

Last edited by SSridhar on 20 Jun 2017 12:31, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Added a title

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Paul » 21 Jun 2017 12:47

Thanks Ramana....

Option 3:If Sunni NATO stabilizes then it's charter can be expanded to take on other fronts in addition to Iran. Hence Sunni NATO could have been the third option for controlling POK but PRC has become too big and powerful and wants Pakistan all to itself.

Question is: How long before US steps in to protect it's interests in Pakistan. We will have to see what Trump Sain's tweets say in the coming months. So far he has not said much about Pakistan. But the troop surge in Afghanistan is a heartening step indicating increased US presence in Af-Pak.

OT: I am one of the few on this forum who think India could get away with a few scratches on it's face dealing with Trump. One indicator in this direction is so far he does not appear to have moved in on the H1B issue which is close to India's heart....NM's visit in the coming days will reveal more on this.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ramana » 21 Jun 2017 21:59

Paul wrote:Thanks Ramana....

Option 3:If Sunni NATO stabilizes then it's charter can be expanded to take on other fronts in addition to Iran. Hence Sunni NATO could have been the third option for controlling POK but PRC has become too big and powerful and wants Pakistan all to itself.

Question is: How long before US steps in to protect it's interests in Pakistan. We will have to see what Trump Sain's tweets say in the coming months. So far he has not said much about Pakistan. But the troop surge in Afghanistan is a heartening step indicating increased US presence in Af-Pak.

OT: I am one of the few on this forum who think India could get away with a few scratches on it's face dealing with Trump. One indicator in this direction is so far he does not appear to have moved in on the H1B issue which is close to India's heart....NM's visit in the coming days will reveal more on this.



KSA has removed its previous crown prince and put Salaman as the new Crown Prince. This shows they want to consolidate behind the new Sunni NATO, intervention in Yemen, and the standoff with Qatar as policy. It shows they are clearing their backyard and dissension in ranks.

I agree CPEC means China has decide Pakistan is not viable and hence has taken over. The CPEC chief is de-facto Chinese Viceroy of Pakistan.
If China has taken over TSP, I see no US role there.
The extra troops in Af-Pak are to ensure India doesn't move in during the interregnum. Its to support the CPEC only.

Afghanistan has to retaliate against the Taliban and its backers in Pak. if it wants to survive.

Then there is the Iran card.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby yensoy » 22 Jun 2017 10:01

I was and still am hoping for this thread to die an unmourned death, just like its eponymous project, OBOR.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby pankajs » 25 Jun 2017 21:34

pankajs wrote:
Amoghvarsha wrote:
Can you expand on this?

As of 2015, Indian merchandise export is 1.62% of global trade and import is 2.34% of global trade i.e is our share of global trade is about 3.96%.

So Bakistan hopes to generate traffic, to and from China, equivalent to total Indian import/export with this one port and one 6 lane road by 2020. Now that is building hawai mahal. This is a common sense compare/contrast kind of evaluation.

Ok, lets look at some numbers from the wiki entry on Gwadar
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwadar_Port

Phase I: 2002-2006
Phase II: 2007–present

No. of berths
Phase I: 4
Phase II: 9
Total: 13

Longer term plans
* Dredging of approach channel to depth of 20 meters
* 150 berths to be built by 2045
* Capacity to handle 400 million tons of cargo per year

If the 2045 plans fructify, they hope to handle cargo equivalent to the current Indian import/exports i.e. about 4% of the current global world trade. Assuming proportional traffic distribution, based on the current build i.e 13 berths, they should be able to handle about 40 million tons of cargo at peak output i.e 0.4 % of global trade by their own calculation. If 4% traffic would fetch them $6-8 billion, then 0.4% traffic should fetch them not more than $600-800 million by 2020.

Plus there is the question of the road network backing the traffic over karakoram mountains. If a 6 lane highway can at max support 40 million tons of cargo then they will need to build 60 lane highway to carry 400 million tons of cargo.

Note: This is based on the rather simplistic linear scaling of data from Wiki and may not be accurate but does provide ballpark estimates.

Bakis are well known for building hawai mahal and this analysis too is high of rhetoric and has its faults but
http://nation.com.pk/blogs/24-Jun-2017/ ... ythologies
Probing into CPEC mythologies
The brokerage house anticipated exports to surge by 4.5% a year till fiscal year 2025, which is higher than the previous decade’s average of 3%. This is because of expectation of CPEC-led higher GDP growth in the coming years and positive impact on local industry. Imports are expected to grow by 4% in line with last decade’s average. Further, remittances are expected to grow within 4-4.5%. Services to China for transporting its trade cargo via Pakistan would generate $500-700 million per year for Islamabad. This amount may be exploited to pay back China’s debt for CPEC projects.

My estimate was based on linear scaling wrt Gwadar's current and planned capacity. Now that was under the assumption that the roads will be available 24x7 unhindered and it has sufficient traffic. We know that the 1st assumption is not true based on Shiv saar's research and the 2nd assumption too is optimistic.

Accounting for the assumptions, my best guess as of today for 2020 @ 25% capacity utilization, is $100-150 million dollar per year annual toll. With $11 billion in investment and $150 million revenue works out to be ~1.3% return of investment not sufficient to pay for itself far from generating *handsome rent* as flaunted by the bakis and parroted by some on this forum. Heck, it may not be sufficient to fund the annual maintenance charges. Now there are ancillary benefits like boost for local connectivity and savings on fuel on better roads, etc.

There are other hawai baten and some interesting facts but I will leave it for others to explore.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby panduranghari » 26 Jun 2017 17:58

ramana wrote:I agree CPEC means China has decide Pakistan is not viable and hence has taken over. The CPEC chief is de-facto Chinese Viceroy of Pakistan.
If China has taken over TSP, I see no US role there.
The extra troops in Af-Pak are to ensure India doesn't move in during the interregnum. Its to support the CPEC only.
.


But CPEC will take at least 10 years to be complete. Can US stay that long in Af-Pak?

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ArjunPandit » 26 Jun 2017 19:39

In pakistan this morning, i had an idea, after china takes over pakistan post CPEC ( a big if), can India use the quintessential pakistaniyat (terror+sooside+islam) to light the backyards of china.
Afterall,
1. china is not giving the paki locals work, or any benefit now.
2. In future, the debt servicing will make pakis more austere (no lavish lifestyles for army and chaudhris)
3. The chinese infestation will lead to cultural issues (read clashes between religion of peace and followers of buddhist ahinsa..ok ..ok atheism)
Net net, they will see EIC redux.

Can't RAA at that time help our biraadars at that time (who knows CIA might join them too, US had vietnam, Soviets had afghanistan and chinese would have pakistan).
The problems with that will be
1. Active Terror house lit with civil war right besides us (a bigger syria perhaps)
2. huge refugee problem: how many can be shot down at border and that too unarmed civilians if they decide to break fence with their hands
3. China will certainly activate our eastern border in such cases or may be fuel insurgencies

Just asking the forum members if i should have flushed this idea in pakistan this morning itself?

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby deejay » 26 Jun 2017 19:43

As China takes over more and more pf Pakistan. We need to make sure our Western border is completely fenced. The Pakis by large won't fight but come running to the original daddy.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby pankajs » 26 Jun 2017 19:48

There are 3 models of occupation takeover that I can think of. The American model cannot be termed as a occupation in the strict sense of the word.

1. The Chinese model: Use Han migration to change demography and takeover all of state functions including security/policing. Implemented in Tibet and Xinxiang.
2. The British model: Takeover all state functions including security/policing. The decision makers are all imports with another layer of local elites to interface with the mangos. The policing/security function is handled by locals overseen by imports.
3. The American model: No imposition of imports. The state functions including security/policing stays with the locals. The local elites are co-opted by using saam, daam, danda and bheda. The local elites have total flexibility in decision making except where it concerns the overlords.

Is the classic Chinese model even possible to implement in Bakistan given its population(size, role of religion and fanaticism)?

The British model can be tweaked to suit the current environment. The Bakis can keep the top positions as puppets while the Chinese populate the next rung where the actual decisions are made while the lower rungs are populated by locals.

The American model is a very weak form of control and the Bakis have used the TINA card effectively to protect it *core* interests and extract jaziya. They know how to play that game.

The current situation resembles the American model where the Chinese, sitting in China, are trying to get their agenda implemented by the locals. E.g. The security of the CPEC corridor is still BakMil area of responsibility or at least that is the news with the creation of a 15,000 strong force.

The next step could be takeover of Balochistan and GB citing security concerns and under some kind of a *joint* force which will effectively pass control on to the Chinese. Beyond that, will the bakis allow overt Chinese presence in pakjab or sindh?

It will be difficult to go further and induct the Chinese into pakjab or sindh. The pakjabis have a record of turning on their benefactor. Even when the baki elites have all their wealth and progeny in the west they where unwilling to be pushed beyond a point. They have used the religious parties and the mullas to effectively push back against the American demand. While the Chinese have extended their veto umbrella to the Baki's the bakis are the only country with the willingness and heft to challenge India and tie it down in the region. Who knows but imagine the bakis using the India card with the Chinese! TINA factor on both sides.

I don't think the Chinese will even attempt the full British model for the fear of getting bogged down in the cesspool of fanaticism. If they do, it should provide us with an opportunity to use "Islam khetra me hai" against them. I believe India has the necessary *tools* to fan that flame better than any other country, excluding the bakis themselves, given our *shared* history and culture.

One has to wait to see how far the Chinese are willing to push and how far the pakjabi will get pushed. Interesting times ahead.

PS: Multiple edits for clarity.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ramana » 27 Jun 2017 01:11

Are you factoring the presence of Chinese on Pak mard-e-momin while Chinese servicing is in play?
Goats will be in short supply.

This will have its impact in a generation or two when we will see Pakistan becoming East Turkistanfied.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby chetak » 27 Jun 2017 11:25

ramana wrote:Are you factoring the presence of Chinese on Pak mard-e-momin while Chinese servicing is in play?
Goats will be in short supply.

This will have its impact in a generation or two when we will see Pakistan becoming East Turkistanfied.


the pakis have already "tightened" visa controls for the hans following the killing of two hans by pakis, ostensibly for "preaching/proselytising".

I think that the realisation that they are being scammed by the hans under the guise of CPEC is slowly gaining credibility and the local mango pakis have started to react.

there may be some sort of underground that will increasingly oppose the silent han occupation.

$60 billions odd may be a small price to pay for the kind of real estate assets and privileges/built in security/right of way etc that the hans will get in return.

the increasingly shrill noise from the controlled han and also paki media demanding/cajoling Indian participation in the CPEC is also an indication that the hans have majorly miscalculated the viability and risk factors of the project.

These han/paki reactions have only increased in magnitude after the BRI conference, indicating possibly that expected milestones in terms of global support as well as buy in for the han initiative may not have met set gate exit and entry criteria.

Aggression on the border breaking conditions of engagement that have held fast for 40 odd years is either a naked warning of things to come or signs of increased frustration for the hans at what they consider as Indian intransigence in "accommodating their reasonable views".

Increased paki hostility in cashmere is also han inspired and funded. Chinese weapons are increasingly being captured from paki terrorists. This cannot be a mere coincidence.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 27 Jun 2017 12:20

pankajs wrote:There are 3 models of occupation takeover . . . . .
3. The American model: No imposition of imports. The state functions including security/policing stays with the locals. The local elites are co-opted by using saam, daam, danda and bheda. The local elites have total flexibility in decision making except where it concerns the overlords.[/b]


The classic Chinese model that you refer to as Option 1 can happen only within the far-flung regions of its own borders or what it claims as its borders like in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria etc. We must realize that the geographical boundary of China was fixed only in the 20th century. The country did not even have a name historically!

However, the Chinese Emperor ruled from his position midway between Heaven & Earth as the Son of Heaven. All he did was to demand and get tributes from other smaller kingdoms in return for allowing them to learn Confucian knowledge, custom and also get protection. That is exactly what the CPC, which is behaving like a traditional Chinese Emperor, is demanding from its tributes. The Confucian knowledge and custom are being spread through Pakistan by establishing 'Confucius Institutes' and other efforts at teaching Chinese language and associated culture. The vision document on CPEC prepared by China and revealed by DAWN a few weeks back, openly admitted to these efforts. Mao banished Confucianism through his Cultural Revolution, but it has since been restored especially by Xi.

As for 'protection' we know that Pakistan looks up to the Chinese these days for that. The continuous Chinese support for Pakistani position since the 1963 border agreement between these two nations is being formalized in the form of a 'Protectorate', if not a Province.

All that the Chinese Emperors cared about far-away lands was their regular tributes at the Emperor's court or whenever he sent his emissaries to their courts. Some of modern-day tributes for CPC from Pakistan are 18%-plus RoI on investments, Gwadar port et al. They don't need to physically occupy lands.

What the CPC has to guard against is the mistake the Americans made after defeating the Spanish in the Philippines. They thought that the Philippinos would welcome the Americans with open arms and warmth which didn't happen. However, the advantage to the CPC is that the Pakistani armed forces, politicians and Generals are in complete awe and support of the Chinese for various reasons.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby pankajs » 27 Jun 2017 12:57

The Protectorate strategy is American+ and that is also what I feel will happen. As I have stated in my earlier post even a full fledged British model is unlikely to be implemented in the whole of Bakistan. But stranger things have happened and it will be interesting to watch.

However, I do see a partial British strategy being implemented in GB and Balochistan, far away from the pakjabi homeland, perhaps in the form of special advisers to the local government or *joint* committee on security or some such arrangement. That *might* work without inviting robust response of the pakjabi jihadis.

The key question however is what happens in case of a Indo-Bak war? Will China intervene on behalf of its protectorate *militarily*? The bakis think that CPEC will create a redline for India and prevent a *forceful* response from India. The bakis are using CPEC to enmesh China in the defense of Bakiland OR rather they want the Indians to believe that. The bakis are banking on the Chinese to save their skin. It is strategic in that sense too.

Chinese will be happy to extract whatever they can from Bakistan and they certainly desire to get back their investment with high ROI. However lets say India hits a powerplant, one that is *billed* as a Chinese investment, will China intervene *militarily*? I don't think so. They will raise a stink but stop short of intervening on bakis behalf.

In short, CPEC will drain bakis economically while not deterring India from going to war. Neither of the twin objective that the bakis have for CPEC will be met.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby TKiran » 27 Jun 2017 13:39

Pakis and the Chinese make their strategies based on the assumption that Indians are sissies. They forget that even bhagavan Sri Krishna was pleading with Duryodhana to avoid war.

Avoiding war at any cost is imbibed into Indian psyche.

Problem is war. When it is war, it will be decisive. So, short of war they can do whatever they want. Indians would never get into war unless the war is thrust upon them.

Even pandavas were in 12 years vanavaasa and 1year agnathavaasa. Indians typically wait till the fruit is ripe.

Let's see when the pakis or Chinese thrust the war upon us.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby yensoy » 27 Jun 2017 13:51

Chinese are even more into war avoidance than us. They seem to love confrontation as long as they have the upper hand and the escalation ladder is in their control.

If India goes to war, its people will unite. There will be severe pain all around but the country will be intact. If China goes to war, its government and party system will probably fail, and that's not a risk they will be willing to take.

Sub-conventional warfare is a different story altogether and that is where we should focus on.

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OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby Peregrine » 27 Jun 2017 14:38

X Posted on the Analyzing CPEC Thread

India's opposition can affect CPEC in short run: Chinese media

BEIJING: The construction of the $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has been affected in the short run due to India's objections, a report in the state-run Chinese media said.

It added that if Beijing and Islamabad are firm in their cooperation, they can dispel New Delhi's doubts.

India is protesting against the CPEC as it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)
"Some people believe obstruction by India may become a stumbling block to the development of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)," an article in the official daily Global Times said.

In fact, India's "rejection" is mainly because the corridor passes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The corridor's construction may be affected in the short term, but from a long-term perspective, China and Pakistan can dispel India's doubt to the maximum degree if they are firm about their cooperation and actively interact with neighbouring countries, it said.
The article written by a researcher who worked in Pakistan said Chinese investments there could make profits.

"The return rate of the CPEC for China is generally higher than that in other countries. Pakistan is required to pay 17 per cent of the investment deposit for each project," it said, providing rare details about the conditions laid down for Chinese investments in Pakistan.

"At present, China has invested in 51 projects in the CPEC, with 19 already complete. Pakistan has announced that the total investment has reached $50 billion. That number is based on projects that are currently running, and the final number will exceed it," the article said.

In addition to the CPEC, China has invested in more than 200 projects in Pakistan. Its investment in the Hualong One Nuclear Power project near Karachi amounted to $6.5 billion, it said.

The investments mainly focus on energy and infrastructure, which are urgently needed for Pakistan's economic development.

It also sought to dispel fear about Chinese workers' safety in Pakistan after two Chinese were killed in Balochistan allegedly by the Islamic State terrorists.

"Many Chinese have serious concerns about the security environment and prospects of the CPEC after the recent kidnapping and alleged murder of their compatriots there," the article said.

"But I found the misgivings were not necessary after carrying out on-the-spot research at Chinese and local enterprises in Pakistan, and visiting scholars and research fellows at various universities and think tanks," it said.

Cheers Image

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2017 21:00

Obor affordable, India participation vital: Brookings fellow - Asia Times
The costs of China’s One Belt, One Road (Obor) project are sustainable and won’t reach into the trillions of dollars, says David Dollar, a former World Bank official and US Treasury emissary to Beijing.

The senior fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based Brookings Institution estimates that Obor shouldn’t cost more than US$100 billion annually, an investment that can be handled if China’s current account stays within its present range.

But Dollar warns that India, which has so far been reluctant to join Obor, must participate if China’s plan is to succeed. He also downplays the possibility of Chinese participation in President Donald Trump’s plan to rebuild US infrastructure.

Dollar spoke with Asia Times recently on Obor’s chances for success.

Q:Would the US help fund what some say are Obor’s US$1 trillion to US$2 trillion in estimated costs in return for Chinese help in rebuilding and financing US infrastructure?

A:The basic answer to that question is “no.” First of all, I don’t think there’s going to be trillions of dollars invested in Obor. The numbers, so far, are much, much smaller than that.

The leading financial agency for the project is the China Development Bank and it has so far reported US$160 billion dollars that it’s lent over a number of years. It’s a modest amount. It’s hard to believe that this would accelerate into the trillions unless you’re talking about 20-plus years.

Q:Would the US help in such financing?

A:The US, unfortunately, is not a major funder of infrastructure. The only way the US could contribute is through the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). But the US has been reluctant to allow the two institutions to increase their role through capital increases. So it’s hard to see that the US would play much of a role in funding Obor.

Q:Would the US be averse to Chinese help in funding and participating in Trump’s infrastructure rebuilding plan?

A:There’s been a little talk of that. But I’m kind of skeptical that Chinese companies have any real comparative advantage here.

Some commentators have pointed out that capital is very inexpensive right now. The US can borrow at practically zero. So there’s not a financing problem — in the US it’s actually quite complicated from a regulatory point of view to build new infrastructure.

I think a big issue is that Americans are reluctant to pay a reasonable price to use infrastructure. If you accept you need to pay tolls to use roads, then it would be easy to finance roads in the US. But we seem reluctant to want to pay for this. So I don’t see how China can solve that problem.

Q:The Trump administration has hinted that the US will be more cooperative on Sino-US economic issues if China makes a major commitment to build US factories that employ American workers. Do you think such a tradeoff is possible?

A:We certainly see a lot of Chinese investment in the US. It’s mostly taken the form of mergers and acquisitions — so that’s not creating new jobs. That’s not the kind of greenfield investment like Toyota and others did in the past.

We may start to see some Chinese greenfield investment. But there are things that work against it. A lot of China’s manufacturing prowess [is based on its connection] to global value chains that are managed by western companies, or by Japanese and Korean companies. That, I think, limits the potential for Chinese greenfield investment.

But we’ll certainly see some and that will create new interest groups that see it benefiting US-China economic integration.

Q:China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Japan, US-led ADB are competing against each other in Asia. Could the two cooperate in funding Asian infrastructure projects and do you see any signs of this?

A:I think there’s actually quite good cooperation between the AIIB and the ADB. They are co-funding projects. That’s a rational way of spreading the risks and there are a lot of needs, looking at different funding sources. So I think AIIB is off to a good start and it’s going to give a little healthy competition to the ADB. But we also see them collaborating quite a bit and that’s positive for Asia.

Q: Is China’s current economic performance sufficient to sustain a project of Obor’s size?

A: As I said, some of the numbers being discussed for Obor are unrealistic. The actual level of activity is certainly no more than US$100 billion a year. China can sustain that.

The sustainable funding source for this is China’s current account surplus — and that’s in the range of US$200 to US$300 billion a year. That funds other things as well — including Chinese investment coming to the US and Europe. So I think the current level of outward investment from China is sustainable so long as they have this current account surplus — which seems to be the most likely scenario.

Q:What signals has India sent about participating in Obor and how important is New Delhi’s cooperation in China’s plan?

A:India’s been quite negative. They’re very aware that the core door that goes from China through Pakistan includes some territory that’s in dispute — in Kashmir, I believe. And so India is quite unhappy about that particular aspect in the larger Chinese project.

Q:How do you bridge such differences?

A:For Obor to really be a kind of Asia-wide project, you’d have to get a rapprochement between India and China. Probably China would have to recognize some of those Indian sensitivities. So as long as that’s not happening, that also limits the scale of Belt and Road.

Q:Why do you say that?

A:There are all these estimates of what kind of infrastructure needs there are in Asia. Well, a huge part of that is India. So if India is not buying into this, then frankly, a lot of those numbers people are talking about are not relevant.

Q:The Obama administration tried to ignore Obor. Is this changing under Trump and what might happen?

A:It’s definitely changing. In that first early harvest (trade agreement between the US and China) announced a few weeks ago, it was put into the agreement that the US recognizes Obor. The US also agreed to send a relatively high-level delegation to the Belt and Road Forum in May.

It was headed by Matt Pottinger, who is the Asia Director on the National Security Council. This is the first time that the US is kind of recognizing Belt and Road, which in some ways is just recognizing reality. Doing this seems like a smart policy.

But I worry at the same time that the Trump administration has pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). I saw the TPP as complementary to Obor.

Q:How was TPP complementary to Obor?

A:Belt and Road is financing a lot of physical infrastructure. But real integration of economies also requires harmonization of regulations and customs administrations. In the modern world, we’re also trying to break down barriers for services, trade and investment.

TPP had a lot of the “software” that’s needed for integration. There are also countries like Vietnam and Malaysia who are looking to China to finance infrastructure. But they were also looking to the US to set the rules of global trade and investment and now the US is pulling out of that. I find that worrisome.


Doug Tsuruoka is Asia Times’ Editor-at-Large

ramana
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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ramana » 28 Jun 2017 21:19

Chetak, You didn't get the drift of my question! :)
Read again and think about it.

The Brookings fellow can stuff his opinion where it belongs.

Who is he to warn India? On whose behalf?
Should use words more judiciously.

BTW, Democrats are in total disarray and wont come back in 2020.



My insight after listening to a Democrat Congressman.

So Brookings will become China think tank.

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby ArjunPandit » 28 Jun 2017 21:22

One way we can counter the chinese narrative of being sissy (if needed) is that we offer alternative routes, say through Arunachal pradesh to show that we are in control and their intentions that CPEC is not at all about business but their expansionist agenda

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Re: OBOR, Chinese Strategy and Implications

Postby V J » 28 Jun 2017 23:41



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