Understanding New China After the 19th and 20th Congresses

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Anoop
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Anoop »

https://youtu.be/SlJIGEiev98

Discusses the food hoarding seen in China as a result of the Ministry of Commerce directive to citizens. As is usual with all things Chinese, possible explanations range from a possible invasion of Taiwan to worsening Covid cases and related lockdowns, to kickstarting domestic demand!

There are interesting revelations of the extent of city wide lockdowns for even very modest Covid case numbers and the contact tracing done by tracking proximity of cell phone numbers. I am wondering at the level of domestic surveillance that allows for such contact tracing methods.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Please read the Bloomberg article.

https://twitter.com/PeterMartin_PCM/sta ... 39136?s=20
And post it if you like.
Suraj
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Suraj »

The Chinese are usually seen as exemplars of inter-ministerial coordination towards major goals, e.g. the speed of their high speed rail construction with finance, power, rail and industrial ministries coordinating.

Now you have this situation with Covid where case studies in many places, including the excellent one by Surjit Bhalla and co in India, asserted that lockdowns are a very costly response to Covid, and that the right policy is a measured exercise in living with Covid along with a widely implemented vaccination program.

But no, the Chinese are handling this with a cartoonishly large sledgehammer instead of a scalpel. If they indeed do only have small clusters, their response is laughably off base with best practices derived in the past year.

So one reality perhaps is that the situation is quite a bit more grim on the Covid transmission front in China, despite 2 billion plus vaccinations. This is a possibility and given the rising number of stories of Chinese vaccines no longer being used (Thailand stopped using after last batch, Malaysia cancelled orders...)

The other possibility is simply that they're demonstrating a pronounced change in behavior, from hard pragmatism to ideological blindness - sticking to the Covid zero tolerance policy simply because 'living with Covid' is a loss of face. Not entirely surprising or impossible - historically China's greatest crises have all been instances of ways they creatively shot themselves in the foot.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by DavidD »

Suraj wrote:The Chinese are usually seen as exemplars of inter-ministerial coordination towards major goals, e.g. the speed of their high speed rail construction with finance, power, rail and industrial ministries coordinating.

Now you have this situation with Covid where case studies in many places, including the excellent one by Surjit Bhalla and co in India, asserted that lockdowns are a very costly response to Covid, and that the right policy is a measured exercise in living with Covid along with a widely implemented vaccination program.

But no, the Chinese are handling this with a cartoonishly large sledgehammer instead of a scalpel. If they indeed do only have small clusters, their response is laughably off base with best practices derived in the past year.

So one reality perhaps is that the situation is quite a bit more grim on the Covid transmission front in China, despite 2 billion plus vaccinations. This is a possibility and given the rising number of stories of Chinese vaccines no longer being used (Thailand stopped using after last batch, Malaysia cancelled orders...)

The other possibility is simply that they're demonstrating a pronounced change in behavior, from hard pragmatism to ideological blindness - sticking to the Covid zero tolerance policy simply because 'living with Covid' is a loss of face. Not entirely surprising or impossible - historically China's greatest crises have all been instances of ways they creatively shot themselves in the foot.
For one, you need different tools for different problems. For example, if an infection is localized to a finger, an amputation may be a good choice, but if it's spread everywhere, then systemic antibiotics would be a better choice. If harsh localized lockdowns can help avoid paralysis of the entire country either by overwhelming cases or prolonged nation-wide lockdowns, then perhaps the benefits are worth it.

Secondly, not all lockdowns are equal. Just because penicillin doesn't work for an infection doesn't mean vancomycin won't either. How many countries can lock down based on intrusive monitoring and AI algorithms? How many can actually enforce it to the degree China does?

In the end, studies like what Mr. Bhalla did, while excellent given what he has to work with, are inherently limited due to the necessarily retrospective, non-randomized, and non-blinded nature of them. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and China has managed to grow economically at a similar if not better rate relative to the rest of the world while simultaneously keeping case and death counts low throughout the pandemic. In other words, it's working. It might not work for others, but it's working for them. Whether their strategy is sustainable is another matter, but so far it's done well for China and the Chinese people agree.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Cyrano »

The Chinese know better than anyone else the true nature of this virus and the capabilities they have bestowed upon it by "gain of function" iterations before it was let loose (accidentally I believe, perhaps a step or two before WIV could stabilise it for future weaponisation). I believe this intimate knowledge of the virus' mutation possibilities is the prime reason behind drastic lockdowns being the systematic response to every outbreak. Its more a sign of dread and panic than ideology or dysfunction.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by chetak »

x posted from the chinese threat thread

This will directly affect India in terms of trade, the balance of payments and increased threat postures on the Ladakh, arunachal, and other fronts

we need to hard block the hans and limit the spread of their latest contagion into our markets and economy


Finally, the bubble has burst in China

Ch!na's Evergrande has officially defaulted

The domino effect will kill Ch!na ambitions especially BRI and CPEC

The house of cards is collapsing..........

DMSA is preparing bankruptcy proceedings against Evergrande Group.

Along with this many small nations which received billions of dollar$ in loans from Ch!na defaulting.




Evergrande officially defaulted - DMSA is preparing bankruptcy proceedings against Evergrande Group

Evergrande officially defaulted - DMSA is preparing bankruptcy proceedings against Evergrande Group

November 10, 2021

BERLIN, Nov. 10, 2021 /PRNewswire/ -- China Evergrande Group today again defaulted on interest payments to international investors. DMSA itself is invested in these bonds and has not received any interest payments until today’s end of the grace period. Now DMSA is preparing bankruptcy proceedings against Evergrande and calls on all bond investors to join it.

China Evergrande Group, the second largest real estate developer in China, defaulted on interest payments on two bonds back in September, with the 30-day grace period still ending in October. However, shortly before the end of the grace period, the public was misled by rumors about alleged interest payments. The international media also took the rumors for granted. Only the DMSA - Deutsche Marktscreening Agentur (German Market Screening Agency) already recognized the default at that time and proved in a study that the bankruptcy of Evergrande, the world’s most indebted corporation, could ultimately lead to a “Great Reset”, i.e. the final meltdown of the global financial system.

(Note to journalists: See DMSA press releases dated Oct. 25 and Oct. 29, 2021, and the DMSA study “The Great Reset - Evergrande and the Final Meltdown of the Global Financial System”; all available via the DMSA homepage http://www.dmsa-agentur.de.)

“But while the international financial market has so far met the financial turmoil surrounding the teetering giant Evergrande with a remarkable basic confidence - one can also say: with remarkable naivety - the U.S. central bank Fed confirmed our view yesterday,” says DMSA senior analyst Dr. Marco Metzler. “In its latest stability report, it explicitly pointed out the dangers that a collapse of Evergrande could have for the global financial system.”

In order to be able to file for bankruptcy against the company as a creditor, DMSA itself invested in Evergrande bonds, whose grace period expired today (Nov. 10, 2021). In total, Evergrande would have had to pay $148.13 million in interest on three bonds no later than today. “But so far we have not received any interest on our bonds,” explains Metzler. He adds, “With banks in Hong Kong closing today, it’s certain that these bonds have defaulted.”

(Note to editors: Exact details of the bonds that have defaulted so far can be found in the appendix to this press release.)

Particularly problematic for Evergrande: all 23 outstanding bonds have a cross-default clause. “This means that if a single one of these bonds defaults, all 23 outstanding bonds automatically have ‘default’ status” DMSA senior analyst Metzler knows. However, this does not automatically result in a bankruptcy for Evergrande Group. To determine bankruptcy, a insolvency petition must be filed with the court. This can be done either by the company itself or by one or more of the company’s creditors. And this is precisely what is now planned. Metzler: “DMSA is preparing bankruptcy proceedings against Evergrande. We are already holding talks with other investors in this regard. We would be pleased if other investors were to join our action group.”

For the DMSA expert, it is clear: “As soon as a court opens insolvency proceedings, Evergrande will also be officially bankrupt - and that is only a matter of days.”

Bond Name

Regular coupon
payment date

End of the
goodwill period
("grace period")

Total interest
payment

(in US$ million)

EVERRE 8.25% due 2022

2021.09.21

22.10.2021

83.53

EVERRE 9.5% due 2024

2021.09.29

28.10.2021

45.17

Total not paid
in October 2021



128.70

EVERRE 9.5% due 2022

2021.10.11

2021.11.10

68.88

EVERRE 10% due 2023

2021.10.11

2021.11.10

42.50

EVERRE 10.5% due 2024

2021.10.11

2021.11.10

32.75

Total not paid

in November 2021



148.13

Source: DMSA, own research

About DMSA Deutsche Markt Screening Agentur GmbH:

DMSA Deutsche Markt Screening Agentur GmbH, is an independent data service that collects and evaluates market-relevant information on companies, products and services. DMSA sees itself as an advocate for consumers, private customers and intelligent investors. The claim: to always look at companies and providers, products and services through the eyes of the customers. The customers are the focus of DMSA’s work. For them, important and decision-relevant information is bundled and presented as market screenings. The aim is to create more transparency for consumers when selecting products, investments and services.

Press release:
http://www.dmsa-agentur.de/download/202 ... _PM_en.pdf
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Sky is falling has been popular refrain.
Evergrande and others are controlled demolition.
Suraj
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Suraj »

DavidD wrote:For one, you need different tools for different problems. For example, if an infection is localized to a finger, an amputation may be a good choice, but if it's spread everywhere, then systemic antibiotics would be a better choice. If harsh localized lockdowns can help avoid paralysis of the entire country either by overwhelming cases or prolonged nation-wide lockdowns, then perhaps the benefits are worth it.

Secondly, not all lockdowns are equal. Just because penicillin doesn't work for an infection doesn't mean vancomycin won't either. How many countries can lock down based on intrusive monitoring and AI algorithms? How many can actually enforce it to the degree China does?
Sectoral ring tier lockdown are commonplace in India, from house level up to ward level. While it's impressive that you conflate some medical examples here, they're not relevant. Maybe not with AI whizzbang, but "AI" is a grossly overused term, and I work in the field.
DavidD wrote:In the end, studies like what Mr. Bhalla did, while excellent given what he has to work with, are inherently limited due to the necessarily retrospective, non-randomized, and non-blinded nature of them. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and China has managed to grow economically at a similar if not better rate relative to the rest of the world while simultaneously keeping case and death counts low throughout the pandemic. In other words, it's working. It might not work for others, but it's working for them. Whether their strategy is sustainable is another matter, but so far it's done well for China and the Chinese people agree.
You're speaking for a lot of things here aren't you ? On one hand assert an Indian economic study doesn't have the standard of a medical study as you bizarrely conflate it to be, and then proceed to speak for Chinese economic data and popular views quite authoritatively, presumably because there are clear randomized, and double blinded studies with an unknown placebo confirming all of this correct ?

While inspiring, they're not worth any serious consideration because it's really just an exercise in competitive devaluation, with even less rigor on your part. But it gives a good mindset into your thought process and tactics for rhetorical defense, which is why your presence here is useful :)
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by chetak »

ramana wrote:Sky is falling has been popular refrain.
Evergrande and others are controlled demolition.
waiting for the other shoe to drop

the collateral damage and the reaction of some of the invested markets
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by DavidD »

Suraj wrote: Sectoral ring tier lockdown are commonplace in India, from house level up to ward level. While it's impressive that you conflate some medical examples here, they're not relevant. Maybe not with AI whizzbang, but "AI" is a grossly overused term, and I work in the field.
I appreciate that you're impressed by my use of a medical example, but clearly it wasn't impressive enough for you to understand either of my points. Allow me to emphasize, an amputation (e.g. sectorial ring tier lockdown) may not be useful when the infection is systemic (widespread across the country). A lockdown in India, or anywhere else, also may not be executed with the same degree of efficacy as a lockdown in China, or anywhere else.
DavidD wrote: You're speaking for a lot of things here aren't you? On one hand assert an Indian economic study doesn't have the standard of a medical study as you bizarrely conflate it to be, and then proceed to speak for Chinese economic data and popular views quite authoritatively, presumably because there are clear randomized, and double blinded studies with an unknown placebo confirming all of this correct ?

While inspiring, they're not worth any serious consideration because it's really just an exercise in competitive devaluation, with even less rigor on your part. But it gives a good mindset into your thought process and tactics for rhetorical defense, which is why your presence here is useful :)
Fair enough, nothing is knowable with 100% certainty. I suppose if that's your argument then we don't need to discuss this further. If you're willing to believe that there exists a spectrum between 0% certainty and 100% certainty, then we can discuss further.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by SSridhar »

Chinese President Xi’s supremacy cemented after CPC adopts landmark resolution - Straits Times
President Xi Jinping made history on Thursday (Nov 11) after the top leadership of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a historical resolution bolstering his mandate and continued grip on power.

About 350 members of the party’s top decision-making body, the Central Committee, met for what is known as the sixth plenum of its current five-year term.

In a lengthy communique released by state news agency Xinhua at the end of the four-day conclave, Mr Xi’s name was mentioned at least 14 times compared to Chairman Mao Zedong’s seven mentions; former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s five; and former presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s once each.

The statement said the Communist Party should have the “correct view” of its history, adding that it should understand why it was able to succeed in the past and how it can continue to thrive in the future.

In a clear signal of President Xi’s continued leadership and key role in China’s future, the communique was full of praise for him, saying that he had “put forward a series of original new ideas and strategies on governance” and reiterating that his political ideology, Xi Jinping Thought, was “21st century Marxism”.

It mentioned all four of Mr Xi’s predecessors and outlined their contributions to the party and nation-building. But under Mr Xi, the Communist Party has strengthened its political and ideological leadership, public appeal, and boosted China's economy and military and technological advancements, said the communique.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

SS Thanks for the Straits Times article.

It's significant that such a resolution was adopted only thrice and the earlier two were historic pivots.
XJP's Sinic Marxism is very intriguing for it builds on the three pillars of Confucius, Taoism, and Han Fe's Legalism. Over this is an overlay of Buddhism. The capstone is Sinic Marxism.
Important to note that Leninism has no place after Mao.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Need to study this Han Emperor period.


https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_He_of_Han

Sima Guang, the early historian lists these items as the faults of Emperor He that led to the decline of Han dynasty
1. excessive power in the hands of imperial in-laws
2. indulgence of imperial favorites
3. a lack of standards in reward and punishment
4. open bribery
5. confusion in judging the worthy and the inept
6. a confounding of right and wrong
All of these broke the Confucius compact between the Emperor and the people. It's not that he personally was corrupt but he tolerated corruption and is the symptom of wider decay in the ruling echelons of the Han dynasty.
Even though Sima Guang focuses on Emperor He, its a critique of several Emperors in the following decades.
The point is Emperor He eroded the goodwill of the earlier three Emperors.
And led to the eventual loss of MoH.

Now in the modern PRC these six faults we can see re-emerging.

Mapping the Han dynasty which is the iconic Chinese dynasty to the current Communist dynasty we see that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping are like the early Han emperors.
Then came the two mid-dynasty leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Jiang Zemin is like Emperor He.
XJP is trying to restore and recover from the faults of Neo Emperor He of the CPC dynasty.
Now try to understand his purges of corruption, deflating the traders, and bringing down the overblown RE markets.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Magnificent 7 of modern.China

https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-7-m ... run-china/

Sorry, this is the 2017 picture and composition.

We don't have the 2021 pictures and composition.

Again apologies.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Cyrano »

All well choreographed by Xitler! Hard to say if a challenger-less Xi will relax or let loose on the world.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

If all you have is a rant dont bother posting.
Compare these 7 figures to those in 19th Congress and note any changes and who stayed.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

2017 Leadership Profile of PRC:
Image
DavidD
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by DavidD »

ramana wrote:Need to study this Han Emperor period.


https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_He_of_Han

Sima Guang, the early historian lists these items as the faults of Emperor He that led to the decline of Han dynasty
1. excessive power in the hands of imperial in-laws
2. indulgence of imperial favorites
3. a lack of standards in reward and punishment
4. open bribery
5. confusion in judging the worthy and the inept
6. a confounding of right and wrong
All these broke the Confucius compact between the Emperor and the people. It's not that he personally was corrupt but he tolerated corruption and is the symptom of wider decay in the ruling echelons of the Han dynasty.
Even though Sima Guang focuses on Emperor He, its a critique of several Emperors in the following decades.
The point is Emperor He eroded the goodwill of the earlier three Emperors.
And led to the eventual loss of MoH.
Now in modern PRC these six faults we can see re-emerging.
Mapping the Hand dynasty which is the iconic Chinese dynasty to the current Communist dynasty we see that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping are like the early Han emperors.
Then came the two mid dynasty leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Jiang Zemin is like Emperor He.
XJP is trying to restore.
Now try to understand his purges of corruption, deflating the traders, bringing down the overblown RE markets.
On another thread someone asked what Xi's accomplishment is, I think his greatest accomplishment is his clampdown on corruption. With that said, I don't think you can always count on having a leader who's determined and capable of keeping corruption down. The fundamental issue IMO is a mismatch between politicians' power and their pay. Besides the throne no longer being hereditary, I don't see how the current Chinese government is that different from the imperial system.

Without some sort of innovative new system, I see China growing for a few more decades before stagnating under the pressure of corruption and then decline and descend into chaos until a new regime arises. Basically following the same script as dynasties of the past.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Thanks.
In my view, the fundamental problem of China since ancient days is the lack of internal consumption that requires these foreign trade proponents or modern-day globalists.
Last twenty years China was trying to increase the pattern of consumption to address this issue.
However, they approached using Keynesian economics of building projects.
The workers are well off as long as projects are going on.
Sadly can't afford to buy and move up the chain.
XJP Common Prosperity is to make the middle class more wealthy to bring change.
Lets see.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Need to see the outcome of Xi and Biden talks on Monday.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Suraj »

That's a pretty funny Chinese view of the matter. 'Anti-corruption' is a bog standard way to eliminate political opposition anywhere. Even a cursory view of the record here makes the argument look very shallow. For example, one can go into the details of whether Bo Xilai was or wasn't corrupt, but it would be besides the point - the very debate underscores the reality that there's nothing clear or unambiguous about this, beyond a despot ensuring his long term survival. About the only point I agree with is the concept of political power vs pay. LKY was very smart about that in Singapore from quite early on.

The real question here is how much does Xi blocking the upward move of the party cadre impact functioning ? Stalin's longevity is intrinsically tied to his purges - by flushing out the middle repeatedly, he made space for continued career growth within the structure. From Brezhnev on, that stopped even as he stayed in power almost 20 years, and CPSU stagnated there. Xi's 'anticorruption drives' in reality are just the same as Stalin's flushing out the CPC interior a bit, but he can't do so on the same scale today. This means the structure is ossifying and will keep doing so the way the USSR state apparatus did.

Probably the easiest way to hasten things is to encourage Eleven to stay at the top, but thwart his attempts at 'anti-corruption drives' . Then it takes just one Gorbachev right after for the state apparatus to come apart.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by DavidD »

I can't speak about Bo Xilai, but I do have a relative who's a low level CCP official. He's the vice-secretary of the CCP of a district in a Tier-1 city. Based on what he tells me, the anti-corruption drive is for real. All his colleagues are on their tippy-toes as punishments are quite severe. One of his colleagues was jailed for 6 months for a DUI, for example.

Maybe at the higher level it's all power play, I think it's almost certain there are some elements of it, e.g. with Bo. Using anti-corruption for power play does not preclude real anti-corruption efforts, however. With that said, I have no insights on that, and despite the certainty with which you speak, I suspect you don't either. At least at the lower levels though, a level that's more visible to commoners, it's been a sea change. If you know other Chinese folks you can ask them if they feel a change. The low level corruption is something that commoners had to deal with on a daily basis so it's something very easy for folks to judge.

Suraj, I know you don't believe anything that comes out of China. That's fine, I take everything the CCP says with a grain of salt too. With that said, if you just invent your own reality instead of trying to look for coroborating evidence then you won't be any closer to the truth than had you taken the CCP's words at their face value.

For example, this is an article that indirectly touches on Xi's anti-corruption drive. Perhaps it's just psy-ops by the CIA to convince the CCP that their counterintelligence efforts are working, but IMO if there are enough corroborating evidence from different sources, I tend to believe it.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/ch ... -networks/
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Suraj »

DavidD wrote:Suraj, I know you don't believe anything that comes out of China. That's fine, I take everything the CCP says with a grain of salt too. With that said, if you just invent your own reality instead of trying to look for coroborating evidence then you won't be any closer to the truth than had you taken the CCP's words at their face value.
Essentially nothing coming out of China can be independently verified the same way one can in India. Essentially every Chinese diaspora view of home is a fisheye perspective based on the extent of their local connections, which today are quite small because the last 1.5 generations of Chinese have no siblings. Therefore, any appeal to 'consider the evidence' is really just an appeal to believe your point of view, by and large. That's not obligatory on either of our parts.

Anti-corruption drives are boring stuff. China's had them since Mao's era. Generally, 'anti-corruption drives' are not measured by lack of personal graft, but rather by a significant change in how the system works. For example, India has in fact made enormous strides in rooting out petty corruption by simply taking away the middleman out of a lot. You might have seen posts about UPI in the economy thread. Subsidies and benefits are largely transferred electronically now. There's no person to deal with. The improvement is objective.

See, the whole concept of 'anti-corruption drive' is antiquated. I don't think India was better off in systemic personal graft, but the approach wasn't to target the people, but to simply change the economic transactional structure to make it go away. If you talk about changing the manner in which such transactions are done, yes that's an objectively real anti-corruption effort.

When you're just talking about people, it's merely a question of whether you choose to believe it's about corruption or a factional war. You're fundamentally trying to argue on this basis with me. It may even be an important barometer to you, but your view is subjective as long as it's about actions against people.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by DavidD »

Suraj wrote:
DavidD wrote:Suraj, I know you don't believe anything that comes out of China. That's fine, I take everything the CCP says with a grain of salt too. With that said, if you just invent your own reality instead of trying to look for coroborating evidence then you won't be any closer to the truth than had you taken the CCP's words at their face value.
Essentially nothing coming out of China can be independently verified the same way one can in India. Essentially every Chinese diaspora view of home is a fisheye perspective based on the extent of their local connections, which today are quite small because the last 1.5 generations of Chinese have no siblings. Therefore, any appeal to 'consider the evidence' is really just an appeal to believe your point of view, by and large. That's not obligatory on either of our parts.

Anti-corruption drives are boring stuff. China's had them since Mao's era. Generally, 'anti-corruption drives' are not measured by lack of personal graft, but rather by a significant change in how the system works. For example, India has in fact made enormous strides in rooting out petty corruption by simply taking away the middleman out of a lot. You might have seen posts about UPI in the economy thread. Subsidies and benefits are largely transferred electronically now. There's no person to deal with. The improvement is objective.

See, the whole concept of 'anti-corruption drive' is antiquated. I don't think India was better off in systemic personal graft, but the approach wasn't to target the people, but to simply change the economic transactional structure to make it go away. If you talk about changing the manner in which such transactions are done, yes that's an objectively real anti-corruption effort.

When you're just talking about people, it's merely a question of whether you choose to believe it's about corruption or a factional war. You're fundamentally trying to argue on this basis with me. It may even be an important barometer to you, but your view is subjective as long as it's about actions against people.
OK, I do agree with you on most of that. Targeting people is ineffective, I completely agree. But what about the massive shift to almost 100% digital transactions with Alipay, etc., and the ongoing effort to make it more official and easier to monitor with the digital CNY? It used to be that to open a bank account you could use any name, a bank note is all you need to prove that the money is yours. A few years ago the rules changed so that you need a valid ID to open an account. Wouldn't these be the sort of systemic changes you're referring to?

With that said, I don't believe these efforts are enough. I think the current method still relies too much on targeting people. The mismatch in power and pay I mentioned above still exist, so there'll always be people who can manage to skirt the rules. There is progress though, and some of those moves cannot be done without first targeting the corrupt people nor without consolidating enough power.

As for your second point, again you're just inventing a reality on the basis that nothing about China is truly knowable. There's no point in discussing China if that's your stance.
Cyrano
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Cyrano »

An authoritarian system that derives its authority from the simple fact of its being in power, and whose decision making cannot be challenged by common people in anyway, whose direction is set by the vision/whim/ambition of a supreme leader or a small group of individuals, will breed corruption of a very different nature compared to a democracy. We might be talking of very different things using the same word.

Democracies are imperfect systems and acknowledge this fact and therefore checks & balances and transparency are built into them via elected bodies, the legislative, the executive, the judiciary which operate independently of each other and the military belongs to the state, not a party. The whole endeavour is to make the elected leaders, systems & bureaucracy accountable and the people reserve the right to boot out leaders they're not happy with during elections.

It interesting that the example quoted of the corrupt being punished in China is a case of a minor official's DUI ! In a democracy that would be seen as individual misdemeanour, not some systematic problem to be corrected.

I would postulate that China's "corruption with Chinese characteristics" stems from the very nature of its communist authoritarian system. As you go down the authority chain, everyone is answerable only to his superiors and not to the people, not the constitution, not to an independent justice system and not to public opinion (which requires freedom of expression and a free press).

Example: Lets say the top leadership commands "we must be world No 1 in high speed railways " , the next level sets targets like "build 10000 kms each year for the next 5 years", the next level sets metrics "build 10 new lines this year from X to Y, A to B...." and so on, and non achievement of such targets will lead to severe consequences. So arbitrariness inevitably sets in and things like need, economic viability, environment, durability etc are all compromised to different extents and such warped decision making continues as technologies are chosen, contract awarded, works undertaken, lines are built and inaugurated with great fanfare and credit is claimed. But reality doesn't bend to anyone's will, not even Xi's. Money spent in showpiece or grandiose projects fails to deliver expected economic and other benefits. When such failures are impossible to ignore, the lowest levels of authority are made scape goats first and the punishments spread upwards until they reach a level which can absolve itself for the failure.


Authority without any real accountability to people is the fundamental flaw of communism no matter how much lipstick you put on the pig and call it Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics or Xi Jinping Thought or whatever.

Communist regimes are inherently person/clique dependent, they rule by force to remain unchallenged, therefore lack/remove corrective mechanisms and this will breed systemic inefficiency and corruption. Their corruption is not just limited to abuse of a position of authority by demanding bribes etc. but also manifests as moral, ethical and professional corruption where monetary gains may not even exist.

Building huge tofu dreg projects, high speed railways to nowhere that have no passengers, pompous olympic stadia, highways, ports, hospitals, universities, how many engineers or doctors or produced, how a pandemic is controlled, or how to attack a neighbour on inhospitable borders etc etc. are all manifestations of this "corruption".

Top leaders like Xi can never acknowledge the real problem is the communist system itself so they launch periodic purges to eliminate "corruption", and the size and scale of the purge depends on the size and scale of the failures that are trying to deflect. Of course anti corruption purges help to cement the ruling elite from any possible challenges to authority as well !
Leonard
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Leonard »

This below is a Load of Tosh

>>
On another thread someone asked what Xi's accomplishment is,
I think his greatest accomplishment is his clampdown on corruption.
<<

Evidence

Xi Mingze -- Average Cost of Tuition at Harvard per year to study Pschology & pEnglish

>>
According to Harvard’s website, tuition costs for the 2019-2020 school year total $47,730, fees are $4,195, and room and board costs $17,682 for a subtotal of billed costs of $69,607.

After estimating personal expenses like text books ($4,193) and travel costs ($0-$4,400), Harvard estimates total billed and unbilled costs of about $73,800-$78,200 per year to attend the presti
gious school — up from $71,650-$76,650 the previous year.

Now TACK on 3-4 Flights HOME per year -- Assuming Xi Mingze did NOT fly Cattle Car class -- and
Flew on a Chartered Jet or First Class ~ $10K per Flight
...
<<

The NPC -- Chinese Communist CULT has

>>
Released this week, research from Hurun Report, found China minted 206 billionaires in the last year, taking the country's total to 819 billionaires 40% more billionaires than in the US.

But its the number of billionaires within senior arms of the Communist Party, according to more data from Hurun Report, that's drawing attention.

The National People's Congress (NPC), which serves as the country's legislature and will be responsible for voting on scrapping presidential term limits in about two weeks, contains 45 billionaires.

And there are a whopping 59 billionaires in the party's top advisory body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The CPPCC includes entrepreneurs, academics,
and even celebrities, who advise the government and legislative arms.

<<

https://www.businessinsider.com/billion ... ity-2018-3

Reminder -- What is the Communist Manifesto ?

>>
The main argument in the Communist Manifesto is that creating one class of people would end the problem of continuous class struggles and cycles of revolution between the bourgeois and proletariat classes
<<

So is Xi Jinping -- Bourgeois or NOT ?

By the Way Xi Mingze is BACK for Graduate Studies at Harvard ..
DavidD
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by DavidD »

Cyrano wrote:An authoritarian system that derives its authority from the simple fact of its being in power, and whose decision making cannot be challenged by common people in anyway, whose direction is set by the vision/whim/ambition of a supreme leader or a small group of individuals, will breed corruption of a very different nature compared to a democracy. We might be talking of very different things using the same word.

Democracies are imperfect systems and acknowledge this fact and therefore checks & balances and transparency are built into them via elected bodies, the legislative, the executive, the judiciary which operate independently of each other and the military belongs to the state, not a party. The whole endeavour is to make the elected leaders, systems & bureaucracy accountable and the people reserve the right to boot out leaders they're not happy with during elections.

It interesting that the example quoted of the corrupt being punished in China is a case of a minor official's DUI ! In a democracy that would be seen as individual misdemeanour, not some systematic problem to be corrected.

I would postulate that China's "corruption with Chinese characteristics" stems from the very nature of its communist authoritarian system. As you go down the authority chain, everyone is answerable only to his superiors and not to the people, not the constitution, not to an independent justice system and not to public opinion (which requires freedom of expression and a free press).

Example: Lets say the top leadership commands "we must be world No 1 in high speed railways " , the next level sets targets like "build 10000 kms each year for the next 5 years", the next level sets metrics "build 10 new lines this year from X to Y, A to B...." and so on, and non achievement of such targets will lead to severe consequences. So arbitrariness inevitably sets in and things like need, economic viability, environment, durability etc are all compromised to different extents and such warped decision making continues as technologies are chosen, contract awarded, works undertaken, lines are built and inaugurated with great fanfare and credit is claimed. But reality doesn't bend to anyone's will, not even Xi's. Money spent in showpiece or grandiose projects fails to deliver expected economic and other benefits. When such failures are impossible to ignore, the lowest levels of authority are made scape goats first and the punishments spread upwards until they reach a level which can absolve itself for the failure.


Authority without any real accountability to people is the fundamental flaw of communism no matter how much lipstick you put on the pig and call it Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics or Xi Jinping Thought or whatever.

Communist regimes are inherently person/clique dependent, they rule by force to remain unchallenged, therefore lack/remove corrective mechanisms and this will breed systemic inefficiency and corruption. Their corruption is not just limited to abuse of a position of authority by demanding bribes etc. but also manifests as moral, ethical and professional corruption where monetary gains may not even exist.

Building huge tofu dreg projects, high speed railways to nowhere that have no passengers, pompous olympic stadia, highways, ports, hospitals, universities, how many engineers or doctors or produced, how a pandemic is controlled, or how to attack a neighbour on inhospitable borders etc etc. are all manifestations of this "corruption".

Top leaders like Xi can never acknowledge the real problem is the communist system itself so they launch periodic purges to eliminate "corruption", and the size and scale of the purge depends on the size and scale of the failures that are trying to deflect. Of course anti corruption purges help to cement the ruling elite from any possible challenges to authority as well !
While I do agree with you that corruption can be a symptom of authoritarianism, I think most of what you describe is an issue with command economy. These two things do not go hand-in-hand, as one is a political system and the other an economic system. Historically there have been many monarchies with extremely lassaire-faire economic systems, while you saw in pre-90s India that a democracy can have many elements of a command economy as well.

In addition, if you think China still operates on a pure command economy, I think your view of China is quite outdated.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by nandakumar »

DavidD
You cannot have a command economy without centralising political authority in the hands of one party which invariably leads to one individual. The 10 year rules by Ziang Zemin and Hun Jintao were an aberration rather than a norm. India in the first 30 years operated a 'mixed economy' which for all all practical purposes a 'command economy '. It is significant that the first Prime Minister and later his daughter later on pretty much ruled India as the central authority. So the bottom line is the distinction that you are trying to make between the two is illusory.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Suraj »

DavidD wrote:OK, I do agree with you on most of that. Targeting people is ineffective, I completely agree. But what about the massive shift to almost 100% digital transactions with Alipay, etc., and the ongoing effort to make it more official and easier to monitor with the digital CNY? It used to be that to open a bank account you could use any name, a bank note is all you need to prove that the money is yours. A few years ago the rules changed so that you need a valid ID to open an account. Wouldn't these be the sort of systemic changes you're referring to?
They're what are the actual meat of any anti-corruption effort. India has all that too, and on a scale much bigger than China in volume.

In fact, China is doing relatively poorly compared to India here - India started from much lower volume in the mid 2010s and now does more than 2x China volume of RT payments. Given the Chinese system, your relative wealth and larger middle class, you're way behind.

India does ~5billion transactions a month, >$100B value/month and the trailing 12 month figure is now almost 35 billion transactions for close to $900B value. China has a middle class multiples larger and multiples wealthier, but half the transaction value.
DavidD wrote:With that said, I don't believe these efforts are enough. I think the current method still relies too much on targeting people. The mismatch in power and pay I mentioned above still exist, so there'll always be people who can manage to skirt the rules. There is progress though, and some of those moves cannot be done without first targeting the corrupt people nor without consolidating enough power.
Targeting people as an 'anti-corruption' drive is simply eyewash. Name a Chinese despot who did NOT have an anticorruption drive ? This is literally SOP for any incoming leader. He's got to make sure to push out the opposing factions off the feeding trough and get his own people in.

If China was actually doing 'anti-corruption' it would have a transparent RT payment infrastructure processing multiple of what India is doing today, instead of talking about targeting people. That is so Great Leap Forward poster like.
DavidD wrote:As for your second point, again you're just inventing a reality on the basis that nothing about China is truly knowable. There's no point in discussing China if that's your stance.
You are concerned about the reality of life for an average Chinese person, but it's important to note that here, that's not relevant to us at all. It may be entirely true that your friend/cousin has seen improvement in their day to day life, but that's simply a small fisheye perspective of one person.

Here's the larger view - Xi has been around since 2012. It's 2021. The 'anti-corruption drive' is still on. That means the problem is far from 'solved'. Pretty interesting for a man who can command many other things to be done in far less time. Yay for the Average Zhou whose lives have improved, but it's not relevant here.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ldev »

X-posted from the China-Pakistan border thread in the Military Forum:

Xi's schedule if anything is accelerating. China does not want their society to follow "degenerate" America and implode as Wang Huning characterizes the US and hence the crackdown on social and cultural icons and non Chinese norms which have crept into Chinese society. Capitalism with Chinese characteristics allowed the creation of unparalleled asset values which in turn furthered the global aims of the CCP. But having reached a benchmark of having more credit in the system than even the US supported by hard assets such as real estate there was a need to reign in the new barons of Chinese business specially when one of them was so bold as to criticize the Chinese establishment for having "a pawn shop mentality" in public i.e. Jack Ma. And hence the crackdown on Chinese business. At the end of the day Xi wants Chinese national power i.e. both economic and military focused on achieving the CCP objective of attaining parity with the US. The party has supposedly set 2049 as the date for achieving that objective i.e. the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic. But internal Chinese gossip suggests that the goal is earlier, by 2035. That makes sense because Xi would like that Chinese goal to be achieved while he is still around in some form. He is 68 now and by 2035 will be 82 and as such not inconceivable that he will still be in power and lucid. 2049 on the other hand is a bridge too for him considering his age.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

WH is incorrect about democracies.
They have a safety valve to let off anger and to do course correction.
That is something authoritarian states don't have.
Having said that China's problem was and is lack of purchasing power in their own masses.
When you have unrestrained capitalism you create wealth and concentrate with the few and mighty.
When you have socialism you destroy wealth and reduce everyone to poverty but still concentrate the power which is wealth with the few and mighty.
Pareto's Law says that 20% will control 80% of wealth in a normal society.
If you apply this twice more you find
1% control 51% of the wealth.

So all the social engineering in West or East is to break Paretos' Law.
The dilemma is how to do it equitably?

The reason is you need the 99% to own the 49% wealth or else it collapses.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by m_saini »

Hopefully this is the right thread for this.
Naomi Osaka and Novak Djokovic shocked at Peng Shuai disappearance after sexual allegations
Shuai, 35, accused 75-year-old Zhang Gaoli, a former senior Chinese official, of alleged sexual coercion in a post uploaded to Chinese microblogging website Weibo earlier this month.

The post was soon deleted along with all of the player's content on the website.

There have been concerns from the global tennis community for Shuai as she has not been seen since the post.
Zhang Gaoli (born November 1, 1946) is a retired Chinese politician. He served as the senior Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China between 2013 and 2018 and as a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee, China's highest ruling council, between 2012 and 2017.
Anoop
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Anoop »

https://youtu.be/qZO_rY89z0Y

Interesting take on the flop of the Nov 11 shopping festival in China this year. This festival is an e-commerce extravaganza targeting single people and has shown growth rates of over 25% year on year over the past few years. This year, it grew only 8%, despite having a low base last year due to Covid. The report attributes it to stricter regulatory crackdown on promotional activities, less disposable income as well as a "lie flat" philosophy that is getting popular- one that buys into more austerity, remaining single, less workplace ambition etc.

The last half of the video talks about the declining marriage rates, especially among youth born in the 1990s, talks of the gender gap and the average increase by around 4 years in the age of women getting married. It's interesting to see the parallels with Japan and whether excessive focus on work and social mobility will lead to a stasis.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Anoop »

https://youtu.be/WgOVsGPFrms

Worth watching in full. Covers the economic headwinds in China. Some startling statistics like 70% of workforce laid off at ByteDance etc., stories of civil servants having to deliver food to make ends meet etc.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

https://thecritic.co.uk/is-china-headin ... -collapse/
Is China heading for global empire or Soviet collapse?
Dan Blumenthal’s new book wants us to be pessimistic, realistic, and proactive

BOOKS
By

Bruce Newsome
13 February, 2021
Academics, journalists, and policy wonks tend to be optimistic about China. For instance, back in 2016, Anja Manuel expected China to end up as large, long-lasting, and benign as the British Empire. Dan Blumenthal offers a useful corrective, rich in historical and geopolitical anchors, yet accessible. From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China is restoring its ancient state, but Blumenthal considers both the precedent and the tribute act as illegitimate. China is an “empire pretending to be a nation-state.”

The pretence involves the suppression of Tibet, Xinjiang (the Uighur province), and Hong Kong. It involves religious persecution, and the censoring of Western content.

This too is historically anchored – and misrepresented. The empire was broken by a serious of rebellions from 1850 to 1873, coincident with Western and Japanese incursions. “Germane to China today is the fear that Western forces will work with internal Chinese rebels to bring down the CCP.” No surprise then that this is the storyline of “Wolf Warrior” (a Chinese movie released in 2015).

China’s leaders are historically conditioned to think that internal stability comes from unipolarity

China’s leaders are historically conditioned to think that internal stability comes from unipolarity. Confucian familial hierarchy is applied to international relations, with China as the patriarch. China “wants to carve out an authoritarian sphere of influence that it can control, making Asia repressive and closed.” And communism, let us not forget, aims to export revolution. Mao sponsored insurgencies in Thailand, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Mao’s China fought with the Soviet Union, India, Vietnam, South Korea, and (in Korea) most of the Western states.

In 1979, China loosened its economy and seemed pro-Western. However, after Western criticism of its repression in Tiananmen Square (1989), and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the US was left as China’s nemesis.



The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State by Dan Blumenthal (American Enterprise Institute, November 2020) £14.95

Blumenthal admits that George H.W. Bush could have done more to push democratization. In most subsequent years, transnational progressives dominated Western governments, complacent that democratization would follow naturally from economic development. While they were distracted by Afghanistan, Iraq, and financial crisis, China expanded, particularly in the South China Sea, where the US has no bases. When Barack Obama visited in 2009, he was lectured and ignored.

China’s leader from 2002 to 2012 (Hu Jintao) had publicized an agenda towards “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” but “hid his aggrandizing aims” behind an “unassuming persona”. China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, is blatant. At the time of his inauguration in November 2012, Xi promised “the great renewal of the Chinese nation”. The CCP, he said, could succeed where previous restorers had failed.

In 2013, he announced the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, which aimed for road and railway links from China to Europe, and soon added a global network of communications. In 2014, he told an audience in the Shanghai Expo Centre: “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” Blumenthal notes that this sounds like Imperial Japan’s “new order” and “co-prosperity” schemes of the 1930s. Another eerily familiar Chinese euphemism for imperialism is “community of common destiny”.


Blumenthal thinks China has peaked

In the mid-2010s, China expanded its territories in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It persuaded almost every government, including the US, not to recognize Taiwan’s independence. It encroached on its border with India. It established economic and military privileges in Southeast Asia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, East Africa, Latin America, and even European countries. It partnered with Russia to source energy and open an Arctic trade route to Europe. Its supplicants dominate the World Health Organization. The United Nations adjusts its language according to directives from Beijing.

In October 2017, Xi spoke to the Party Congress for 3.5 hours about China’s increased power. He broke with precedent by openly seeking to change the global system, not just the near-abroad. China offers “a new option for other countries,” he said, “and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” In June 2018, he told an internal conference on foreign affairs that China would “take an active part in leading the reform of the global governance system… [until it would be] favourable [towards] a great modern socialist country in all aspects”. For Blumental, the latter clause is a euphemism for “a dictatorship sitting atop a state-dominated economy that also allows for limited free markets”.

While this sounds inexorable, Blumenthal thinks China has peaked. The “rot” started in the 2000s, when Hu “moved from a growth-and-development-obsessed autocracy to an oppressive national security state focused heavily on maintaining stability.” China protected key industries, restricted foreign investment, increased its debt, consolidated public ownership, and stifled innovation (although it continued to steal technologies).

China has no real property rights, which, combined with severe environmental degradation, means that land is badly misused and does not generate significant economic growth. Moreover, because of the one-child policy, China will soon face a labour shortage that will worsen over time. The CCP also confronts enormous social costs related to its ageing population and the need to provide a social safety net. Inefficient state-owned enterprise and politically motivated state banks dominate the economy. Thus, unsurprisingly, capital is badly misallocated.

Xi centralized power to his own person, in contrast to the deliberative-consensus model established in the 1980s. He used his anti-corruption campaign to purge rivals. He cracked down on the media, schools, religious minorities, human rights groups, and non-profits.

Blumenthal’s titular ‘nightmare’ is that China’s internal reactionism will destabilize the world

In 2016, Anja Manuel had admitted China’s structural problems, such as public-ownership and retarded private consumption (in order to pay for care of the elderly), but expected reform of healthcare, pensions, and corporate debt to unstick everything. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies subsequently forecast rising financial risk, and recommended some decoupling, but expects no crisis for years. It expects the Biden administration to improve the situation in the short term, and expects China to muddle through in the long term. Other commentators foresee Biden’s foreign policy as more continuity than change.

Blumenthal is more pessimistic. He blames China’s ideational and structural flaws, which are hardly subject to Western leverage:

The theme of this book is that, while China is acting to further ever-grander ambitions, it is also facing profound internal problems and increasing rot in the party. This makes China even more dangerous than many assume… For a great authoritarian nation like China, frustration leads to lashing out. China is powerful enough to pose security threats yet weak, paranoid, and incompetent enough to turn a local epidemic into a plague on the world.

This paranoia and incompetence are crucial differentiation in Blumenthal’s theory. The Chinese government itself, and most Western academic specialists, argue that China will feel benignly secure once it has settled its ancient borders. Since Chinese leaders are historically anchored, this suggests stability. Why push beyond the limits of an empire than endured for nearly 5,000 years?

Blumenthal agrees that the current communist empire approaches the extent of Qing Empire, but notes that it falls short of Taiwan, Outer Mongolia, and parts of Russia and Kazakhstan. It already has land borders with 14 states.

According to Blumenthal, China doesn’t want war, but could over-reach, nonetheless. “Wolf warrior diplomacy” is termed after a movie in which the threats are inside China, but the diplomacy is directed outside. Blumenthal’s titular “nightmare” is that China’s internal reactionism will destabilize the world.

When might this risk peak? Blumenthal admits that prediction is difficult because of divergent outcomes from unpredictable events. For instance, Xi has appointed no successor, so his incapacitation would destabilize the CCP. But if he keeps going, so does his strategy. Like the Soviets, Chinese communists will follow the rules longer than they believe in the ideology.

The next CCP Congress isn’t due until 2022. At the 2017 Congress, Xi spoke about developing China’s economy and technology up to 2035, then developing China as a military great power by 2050. One Belt, One Road is due to complete in 2049.

Yet Xi seems to throw China’s weight around like it’s 2050 already: border incursions, espionage, disinformation, price dumping, intimidation of the Chinese diaspora abroad, leveraging Confucius Centres to influence academic comment, trade deals in return for foreign policy concessions.

The US needs to exploit China’s vulnerabilities politically

Xi pulled some states further into orbit, but repelled others. The year 2020 was pivotal. China’s dishonesty about Covid-19, its manipulation of the WHO, its demand for more favourable comment before exporting medical equipment, its spin of exports as aid – all these actions pushed a critical mass of Western politicians off the fence. For instance, Britain belatedly reversed Huawei’s dominance of national 5G infrastructure. Australia agitated for an international inquiry into China’s culpability in Covid. China retaliated with a trade war. Already China is short of coal (a major Australian export). But China is also planning to build a megacity on an island at the border between Australia and Papua New Guinea.

What should be done? Manuel’s recommendations had reduced to “engagement.” But as Blumenthal points out, engagement can’t reconcile incompatible interests. The doves think US withdrawal would lower tensions. Blumenthal admits the security dilemma but points out that US withdrawal would leave Asia insecure and damage US interests.

Still, Blumenthal faces the realist’s dilemma. As China becomes more powerful, other states have more justification to balance against it, but fewer options for doing so. The US is already forward deployed to keep the seas open and its allies free. South Korea and Japan permit major US Navy bases within striking range of China’s Eastern seaboard. Korea, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand are entreatied allies of the US. Singapore and Vietnam are naval partners. Nobody doubts whose side Taiwan is on. China genuinely feels threatened.

From 2014 to 2020, China launched more warships than Britain, Spain, Germany, India, and Taiwan combined. China’s maritime policing fleet, outside of the navy, will have 400 ships within a few years. Chinese warships routinely visit partner countries around the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.

China can’t defeat the US Navy on the high seas, but it can hack its networks, pay agitators in the countries that host US ships, and launch anti-ship missiles from wheeled platforms and from copies of US F22 and F35 aircraft. The US Marine Corps is deleting its tanks in order to restructure to counter such missiles.

Blumenthal urges the US to be “confrontational”. The US needs to adapt militarily. More importantly it should exploit China’s vulnerabilities politically: unfriendly neighbours, unsettled borders, stagnating economy, divided elite, and popular dissatisfaction with repression. “While the US may have little ability to influence the outcomes of Chinese politics, Washington can force the CCP to spend more to defend its record on corruption, injustice, and gross abuses of human rights.”

This might be unwelcome advice to Joe Biden, who has said he will be tougher on China, but has yet to explain why his son Hunter was riding on Air Force 2, when Joe was Vice-President, to do business in China.
The last para tells why his advice won't be taken!
First of all the US is being led by a group in both parties who are basically mercantile. National security takes a back seat since the end of ColdWar.
Next XJP knows where he is going and except for some missteps wrt India he has been on a steady roll.
The missteps are bordeer confrontations with India when he has everything going for China: huge trade surplus (cumulative $550B since 2008 to 2020), most media in India eating out of China's hands, the biggest Opposition party in bed with Beijing, Indian military oriented towards a declining Pakistan, etc., etc.
All these are changing.
Good that we started looking at XJP and New China in 2017 which is what most people are now doing.
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Re: Blumenthal's Book

Post by SSridhar »

ramana wrote:
Is China heading for global empire or Soviet collapse?
Dan Blumenthal’s new book wants us to be pessimistic, realistic, and proactive
ramana, thanks for posting this interesting article. One should almost entirely agree with Blumenthal, and the Realism theory of IR. The Americans have been myopic (and therefore optimistic either by design or by default), unrealistic and reactive as far as China is concerned since 1969 when they made their first contacts with it post WW-II.
. . . China is an “empire pretending to be a nation-state.”
This is an absolutely correct statement which most of us miss. IMO, China doesn't fit the criterion either to be a nation or to be a state. A Nation is linked by its common history, culture, and race. On the other hand, a State is defined by its geographical borders and its sovereignty. A Nation-State is a convergence of these two ideas.

Until recently, the state did not have a name for itself. In the Chinese language, zhongguo denoted the ‘Middle Kingdom’ {zhong=middle, guo=~state/city/space} and it connoted the state. There is another term that is also used to denote the nation, huaxia, which means ‘a civilized society’. The closest approximation to a nation-state is the combination of these two terms that China uses to denote itself, zhonghua. Therefore, the Republic of China refers to itself in Chinese language as zhonghua minguo. But since a vast swathe of territories has only been dubiously integrated with China, one cannot consider China as a State. It either refuses to define the boundaries or stakes claims over lands belonging to other States, thus leading to ill-defined borders.

Is China a nation, zhonghua minzu {min = people & zu = group}? The last Qing Emperor who abdicated in favour of the emerging Republicanism referred to China as the “lands of the five races—Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan—which shall combine to form the great Republic of China’. Since these races have not been assimilated in a Han China, the nation’s contours are incomplete. Until now, China has five Autonomous Regions. Though China has much diversity in terms of races such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Manchurians, Hui Muslims, and Dai people, it has thrust its Chinese language, Han culture, and history on these peoples and has been trying now for decades to make it appear as one nation. China officially recognizes 55 ethnic minorities apart from the Han majority. Mao Zedong’s Long March to save the Communist rebels from the Guomindang Army passed essentially through the minorities regions of Hui, Tibetans, and Mongols, which were only loosely coupled with China, until it reached Yan’an in the north. During the Long March, Mao Zedong promised to safeguard the rights of these minorities when the CCP came to power. But it was observed only in the breach, not in practice. So, one cannot consider this as a nation too.

It is very much like Pakistan in this regard which is also not a nation-state by any stretch of imagination.
. . . Confucian familial hierarchy is applied to international relations, with China as the patriarch.
The crucial point here is that there is no change in the Chinese thinking that the Middle Kingdom has been created by the Heaven to Sinicize barbarians living outside it. Even Confucius has reportedly lived in the midst of the 'barbarians' for sometime to understand them and make them accept the superior Han culture. He wondered why such a benign, pure and well-intentioned approach was being opposed vehemently by them! Very evangelical, indeed.

China's domestic and international approaches are always seamlessly interwoven. They are not separate. For example, the BRI was conceived not only to export surplus domestic production but also to export Chinese hegemonic influence everywhere. For another, the China Dream that Xi sells to his people is another where it is tied with the same Sinicization/vassalage fervor. The 'Community of Common Destiny' is another where the community (the barbarians) would help the Middle Kingdom achieve its destiny and that 'destiny' would be thrust upon the barbarians as their destiny too. What a noble idea !
. . .And communism, let us not forget, aims to export revolution. Mao sponsored insurgencies in Thailand, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Mao-sponsored them in India too, apart, of course, from aggression. That kind of violence was one kind of making other nations as tributes. Deng changed that approach. But, neither he nor Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao forsook the ultimate goal of achieving the true status of being the 'Middle Kingdom'. Deng made it very explicit, 'Bide for the right time and keep quiet and build your strength until then'. A very sane advice, a la Hudaibiya.
. . . Another eerily familiar Chinese euphemism for imperialism is “community of common destiny”.

The Chinese are good at hiding their intentions well. In Imperial times, art forms were used to convey hidden messages and this has been developed into a fine art. Panchsheel, BRI, Community of Common Destiny et al mean the same thing.
. . . It partnered with Russia to source energy and open an Arctic trade route to Europe.
Now, the Arctic is the next big thing that China wants to conquer. This is the last and mostly enexplored area on Earth which has huge wealth. By 2040, the Arctic would become much easier for transportation. The Northern Sea Routes, NSR, would largely reduce the Malacca Dilemma. It would cut costs & time of transportation to Western Europe. Today Russia rules the roost as the ships have to go through Russian Territorial waters and they keep the waterway navigable. After c. 2040, Russia wouldn't be playing such a determining role, perhaps, in the Arctic.
. . . Hu “moved from a growth-and-development-obsessed autocracy to an oppressive national security state focused heavily on maintaining stability.”
Again, it is my surmise that this was the result of the same hegemonic narrative which entwines domestic and international approach.
. . .The theme of this book is that, while China is acting to further ever-grander ambitions, it is also facing profound internal problems and increasing rot in the party.
As Chinese history shows, the grander the Emperors went, then most certainly harder they fell and zhongguo floundered. AFAIK, no Chinese Emperor seemed to have learned from their own history, which they meticulously kept otherwise. I see no exception for Xi who is the closest of the all-time CPC leaders to being a 'Chinese Emperor'.
. . .Why push beyond the limits of an empire than endured for nearly 5,000 years?
Chinese Emperors (as did any Emperor) pushed constantly to expand their borders. An Empire therefore never has a fixed boundary. It is always fraught. The Chinese Empire was also acquired incrementally. Xi cannot stop that urge.
. . . Still, Blumenthal faces the realist’s dilemma.
There is no dilemma. Realism says that China must be fragmented, at least China must be divested of Greater China. Greater China includes non-Han population centers like the South West (Dai & Hui), Tibet, East Turkestan, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria
Malayappan
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by Malayappan »

Xi Jinping’s mission to dominate the Chinese Communist Party
Couple of excerpts -
At the 20th Party Congress, Wang Xiaohong and Chen Yixin are tipped to be promoted as heads of the Ministry of Public Security and the CPLAC respectively. As both these men belong to the Xi Jinping faction, their promotion indicates that Xi’s control over the Zhengfa system is now complete and absolute. It is exactly for this reason that the likes of Fu Zhenghua who perhaps were all too aware of the murky secrets of this long battle need to be eliminated. The next target in this line appears to be Huang Ming, who was removed from the Ministry of Public Security along with Fu in 2018. This puts the fate of Wang Qishan, China’s Vice President and the man who by all means knows the most about Xi Jinping once again open to speculation.
Any attack on Wang would be regarded as yet another on the powerful faction within China’s elite politics and might generate a great deal of disconcertion among them. The road to the 20th Party Congress is a saga of fallen power-centres, factional betrayals, and overturned loyalties — all dedicated to a man’s relentless pursuit of his “China Dream”.
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

SS, Thanks for the scholarly essay on why China is not a nation-state.

You should write an article.
We need the Indian position articulated.
Blumenthal etc is bokwas trying to put a cookie-cutter approach on China.

China since the Qin Huang Di was really the state (Emperor) around the nation (Han Chinese).
Hegel tried to say this as China is a state with a nation.
In Western Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia (TOW), the idea of nations having states got prominence.
ramana
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Re: Understanding New China after 19th Congress

Post by ramana »

Malayappan wrote:Xi Jinping’s mission to dominate the Chinese Communist Party


My comments in italics:
Xi Jinping continues to remain the most addictive enigma in international political discourse. He has delivered on his next act with the downfall of China’s former Justice Minster, Fu Zhenghua due to corruption charges. Since Fu played a pivotal role in bringing down Xi’s first “tiger”, Zhou Yongkang, his fall signals the beginning of Xi’s plans to cover up his tracks ahead of the 20th Party Congress. Therefore, this event heralds the second phase in Xi’s mission to dominate the political-security (zhengfa) apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

{Xi Jinping is no enigma. He is on the traditional Emperor's course of removing thorns. Stop looking through Western lens}

The first part of this meticulously crafted orchestra began with the fall of China’s former security tsar, Zhou Yongkang, and served as a prelude to Xi’s long-drawn venture to cut off his umbilical cord with his political cradle, the Shanghai clique. Xi’s choice of the anti-corruption campaign as his primary weapon is itself laden with significant strategic nuances. As the CCP had for long recognised corruption as an existential threat, adopting an unbridled anti-corruption programme at the core of his governance model allowed Xi to garner support from the party elders for his initial actions. In fact, by 2013 Xi wasn’t yet powerful enough to have taken on Zhou without the blessings of the party elders.

{Anti corruption campaign is to keep the "traders" in Confucius terms under control. Historically courtiers (CPC members now) indulged in self-aggrandizement and brought down the Emperor by losing the mandate of heaven.}


Similarly, the political-legal apparatus has been singled out as the most prominent and sustained battlefield as this arm of the party has direct bearing on the “political security” of the CCP regime. Moreover, the Zhengfa system is the one where the influence of Zhou Yongkang was the most pronounced.


From 2007-2012, Zhou represented the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) — the apex body of the Zhengfa system on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Before that, he was a politburo member between 2002-2007 and simultaneously served as the Minister of Public Security. As such, Zhou sat at the triumvirate of three powerful positions within the party, the party’s security apparatus, and the state security machinery. In fact, barring Hua Guofeng and Wang Fang, no other Minister of Public Security had by far held concurrent positions within the Party’s organisational set-up. This allowed Zhou to entrench his proteges within the Zhengfa system. Since the beginning of the anti-corruption campaign, at least three of his proteges serving as the vice ministers of public security have come under the corruption net. These include Sun Lijun, Meng Hongwei, and Li Dongsheng.

Zhou’s penetration within China’s political-legal apparatus could well have been one of the primary reasons behind Jiang Zemin’s approval of Xi Jinping’s actions against Zhou. As an astute politician, Jiang well understood the importance of retaining control over the Zhengfa system in a country undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. He even exercised this control in the Hu Jintao administration by first getting Luo Gan, the then Secretary of the CPLAC, elevated to the PBSC. This was achieved by expanding the PBSC membership from seven to nine members. Zhou represented a continuum in this Jiang Zemin scheme of things.

In order to exert supreme authority over the Zhengfa system and prevent any machinations designed for outside interference, Xi Jinping once again reduced the strength of the PBSC to seven members and demoted the CPLAC head to the politburo. Both of Zhou’s successors in CPLAC, Meng Jiangzhu and Guo Shengkun have been members of the politburo, and not the standing committee.

{I submit XJP demoting Zhou Yongkang is reducing Jiang Zemin.}

At the 20th Party Congress, Wang Xiaohong and Chen Yixin are tipped to be promoted as heads of the Ministry of Public Security and the CPLAC respectively. As both these men belong to the Xi Jinping faction, their promotion indicates that Xi’s control over the Zhengfa system is now complete and absolute. It is exactly for this reason that the likes of Fu Zhenghua who perhaps were all too aware of the murky secrets of this long battle need to be eliminated. The next target in this line appears to be Huang Ming, who was removed from the Ministry of Public Security along with Fu in 2018. This puts the fate of Wang Qishan, China’s Vice President and the man who by all means knows the most about Xi Jinping once again open to speculation.

Any attack on Wang would be regarded as yet another on the powerful faction within China’s elite politics and might generate a great deal of disconcertion among them. The road to the 20th Party Congress is a saga of fallen power-centres, factional betrayals, and overturned loyalties — all dedicated to a man’s relentless pursuit of his “China Dream”.

{Wang Qishan is safe. He will continue.}

This column first appeared in the print edition on December 27, 2021 under the title ‘Saga of fallen power centres’. The writer, a Senior Fellow at India Foundation, is currently in Taipei on the Taiwan Fellowship awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan
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